slr_con com notes

8/22/2019 SLR_Con Com Notes

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Record of the Constitutional Commission

Volume 2

07-28-1986 RCC no. 41

MR. NATIVIDAD: That is clear, Mr. Presiding Officer. If that is encompassed withinthe meaning of that power, maybe I should withdraw the amendment.

MR. MONSOD: Yes. maybe the proper thing to do is to withdraw it in view ofthat manifestation.

MR. NATIVIDAD: Yes, anyway it is in the record already.

Thank you.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): For the .record, the proposed amendment ofCommissioner Natividad has been withdrawn.

MR. RAMA: Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): The Floor Leader is recognized.

MR. RAMA: Mr. Presiding Officer, I ask that Commissioner Aquino be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Aquino is recognized.

MS. AQUINO:My questions would pertain to Section 3 on impeachment procedures.

I have a lot of doubts about the effectivity and validity of the impeachment

procedure as it is now provided for in the Constitution when it adopted verbatim theprocedures in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

Impeachment originated in England but it had been in disuse for one century and ahalf ago. In fact, the last time it was used was sometime in the first years of the19th century. It had been partly discredited and proven to be practically obsoletewhen the English countries adopted the principle of ministerial responsibility, suchthat in the trend of legal history, there was a growing tendency to vest the powersof impeachment, not in the legislature but in the judiciary. This procedure of vestingimpeachment powers in the legislature found its way in the constitutions of theAmerican colonies and eventually in the Constitution of the United States.

But let me call the Gentleman's attention to the Philippine experience. In thePhilippines, all of the efforts to impeach the President have been effectivelyfrustrated by the simple reason of partisanship and political loyalties. In fact, whenthere was a serious attempt to impeach President Quirino on the grounds of willfulbreach and deliberate violations of the Constitution, it was overwhelmingly voteddown by the House of Representatives for the simple reason that the political party


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in control of the House of Representatives was the same political party as that ofPresident Quirino.

That experience was very instructive; in fact, it led us to the same conclusion thatimpeachment proceedings vested in a legislature are practically futile and inutile.

cdasiaThe same experience was borne out in the attempt of the Batasan, the defunctBatasan, to impeach President Marcos. All of these would be instructive andindicative, and leading to a conclusion that the very brief experiment of thePhilippines with impeachment proceedings shows ample proof that decisions onimpeachment proceedings are rendered on purely partisan and political reasons,totally disregarding the merits of the allegations or the accusations against thePresident. This is a defect that is inherent in impeachment powers vested in thelegislature. Experience shows that impeachment power, which is essentially a

judicial function, once vested in the legislature, is almost always unsatisfactory in

realizing its vested objective which is protecting the State. Therefore the process asit goes is impracticable. It is also cumbersome and complicated and, to say theleast, grossly inadequate in terms of exacting responsibility from the public officersto the Constitution and to the State.

I might be trailblazing here, but I am seriously considering the idea of transferringthe powers of impeachment trial. after it has been initiated by the joint action of thelegislative chamber to the judicial courts, the way it is being adopted now in thecountries of the United States and in Europe.

Is the Committee's benediction on this matter forthcoming, or am I a lonely voice on

this matter?

MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer, when we were reviewing the provisions onimpeachment, those same questions were asked in our discussions. The Committeedecided that the presence of the impeachment provision by itself, even if it has notbeen successful, would act even as a deterrent if liberalized. We accepted the factthat the impeachment proceeding is primarily a political act, and we are not surethat it did not serve its purpose, for example, the last time it was used, even if itappeared that it failed. The events and the sequence of decisions after that seem toindicate that the President at the time really exerted all his efforts to defeat theimpeachment proceeding. This, by itself, showed that it had impact. Second. this

subsequent calling of snap elections may have been influenced to some extent bythe fact that there was an attempt at impeachment.

So, in terms of achieving its purpose, it being a political act, and calling theattention of the people to certain actions that would make the incumbent seek afresh mandate from the people, keeping it in the Constitution would still serve apurpose.


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As far as judicial action is concerned, the resort to judicial action for certain crimes,as the provision itself says, is still there. It does not preclude the judicial process.

MS. AQUINO:Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Aquino is recognized.

MS. AQUINO:I appreciate the explanation of the Committee Chairman. But forpurposes of conceptual clarity, we might as well underscore the fact thatimpeachment. although it is an exercise of a political act. is essentially a judicialfunction. The political component here would be necessary in recognizing that animpeachment procedure, which is a judicial function, covers not only politicalmatters but even legal matters.

MR. MONSOD: We realize that there is a judicial function involved in theimpeachment process. But I think the questions we want to address ourselves are:Is the provision on impeachment still necessary? Does it serve a useful purpose as

far as the political processes are concerned?

MS. AQUINO:I may be launching a lonely crusade here. Even as I would concedethat the powers of impeachment might have to be vested in the legislature, I wouldconduct a massive overhaul of the procedures to make impeachment procedure aviable option.

MR. MONSOD: We would be very happy to take a look at any suggestion thatwould improve our Constitution.

MS. AQUINO:Do I take it to mean that I am effectively foreclosed in terms of a

conceptual redefinition of impeachment procedures when I would attempt to vest itin the judicial courts insofar as the presidency is concerned?

MR. MONSOD: Yes. Mr. Presiding Officer, I believe the Committee at this pointbelieves that an overhaul in that direction might not be appropriate. But we wouldbe amenable to other suggestions in order to make it a more effective deterrent.

MS. AQUINO:My only concern is that experience has shown that impeachmentprocedures as they are now stated in the draft would be nothing more pardon theFreudian slip but there is no better term for this than a glorified act of politicalmasturbation. There should be a conscious and deliberate attempt to make this a

feasible and viable option in the exercise of a concern to protect the State againsterring officers for malfeasance or misfeasance.

MR. MONSOD: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. We understand the Commissioner'sappreciation of the problem. What we are saying is that perhaps our perception ofits deterrent effect even in cases where it seems to have failed may be different.

MR. NOLLEDO: May I propound an inquiry to Commissioner Aquino?


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MS. AQUINO:Yes, gladly.

MR. NOLLEDO: The Commissioner need not overhaul the procedure. But itseems to me that she is suggesting some sort of judicial review; am I right?

MS. AQUINO:No, what I am suggesting is to transfer the impeachment power after

the impeachment articles have been initiated and formulated by the joint action ofthe legislative chambers to the judicial courts.

MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you.

MR. OPLE: Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Ople is recognized.

MR. OPLE: Will Commissioner Aquino yield to a question, too?

MS. AQUINO:Gladly.

MR. OPLE: Commissioner Aquino must be aware that the main provision onimpeachment in the draft article under discussion was lifted virtually from the twoprevious Constitutions, actually almost a verbatim copy of Article VII of the UnitedStates Constitution that was framed and ratified in 1787. May I briefly read ArticleVII:

Judgment in case of impeachment shall not extend further than the removal fromoffice and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit underthe United States, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subjectto indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law.

It is almost unchanged since the American constitutional framers established thisimpeachment rule in the Constitution of 1787.

But the reason I brought this up was to induce Commissioner Aquino to recall amore recent event related to impeachment in the United States Congress of anAmerican President, Richard Nixon, who was facing impeachment. As a matter offact, the charges had already been formulated in a committee of the House ofRepresentatives and he was to be tried by the Senate in the full glare of worldtelevision. Instead of submitting to impeachment proceedings, he resigned, andlater on was granted amnesty by President Ford. The point is that impeachment is a

sword in the scabbard. It is as good as a sword drawn; it certainly caused theresignation of an American President because, in the words of President Ford beforehe gave the amnesty to President Nixon, the presidency of the United Statesprobably could not withstand the rigor and injury arising from a public trial in theSenate by impeachment of the President of the United States.

Since this section is indubitably of American origin, I think we are justified inrecalling some American-examples in the contemporary period. I do not want to


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share Commissioner Aquino's despair that this impeachment or trial by the Senate,through the origination of charges in the House of Representatives is equivalent toa constitutional decoration or tinsel. It is actually a powerful check on thepresidency. It may be a sword in the scabbard but there are circumstances when asword in the scabbard is as good as a sword drawn.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MS. AQUINO:Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): What is the pleasure of CommissionerAquino?

MS. AQUINO:I appreciate Commissioner Ople's setting the stimulus of the discussionon this line. But there may be a variance of conceptual appreciation here.

Impeachment is not intended to punish the offender. Impeachment is a method of

national inquest to protect the State. It does not intend to prosecute; it is notintended for its retributory or restitutory effects. Rather, it is in the nature of anexemplary act by which the State infuses the highest sense of responsibility topublic service.

In other words, when the Constitution provides that the intent of an impeachmentproceeding is not only to remove from office, it follows as a necessary concurrenteffect the disqualification of that erring public officer from positions of trust orresponsibility. It may be true that it is a sword in the scabbard but the sword in thescabbard can rust unless it is drawn.

MR. GUINGONA: Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): The Chair would like to understand thepresent parliamentary situation. Is Commissioner Aquino proposing a specificamendment? cda

MS. AQUINO:Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): On what section and what is the nature ofthe amendment?

MS. AQUINO:It will overhaul massively Section 3 in the sense that I am

contemplating the possibility of amending Section 3 to vest in the judicial courts thepower of impeachment trials after the impeachment articles have been formulatedand initiated by the joint action of the legislative chambers. But the Committee hasexpressed reluctance to this position.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Precisely, the Chair would like to know thereaction of the Committee on the proposed amendment.


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MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer, the Committee explained its position thatwe believe the present provision serves a very useful purpose, and we want to seeit retained. Furthermore, if I get the drift of the arguments of Commissioner Aquino,the overhaul would involve the introduction of the judicial branch of the governmentinto the process in the case of the President.

Our position is that the President has been directly elected by the people. Since thisis a political act, the more appropriate judge of the President in this matter shouldprobably be the direct representatives of the people as well, which are the Senateand the House.

MS. AQUINO:Mr. Presiding Officer, I am presently inclined to respect the position ofthe Committee. However, without foreclosing the possibility of introducing pertinentamendments on the basis of their position, may I make two inquiries?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): The Commissioner may proceed.

MS. AQUINO:Am I in agreement with the Committee that impeachment proceedingsare essentially judicial in nature?

MR. ROMULO: No, we believe that they are political. Judicial aspects may comein the procedures such as the forming of the articles, the actual trial being presidedover by the Chief Justice, and so on. But we still believe that they are essentially apolitical act rather than a judicial act.

MS. AQUINO:Precisely, I was very careful on my formulation of terms when I saidimpeachment proceedings, not impeachment power. So, we are agreed on thepremise that impeachment proceedings are essentially judicial in nature. Does it

follow, therefore, that when the legislative chamber sits to undertake impeachmentproceedings, it sits not as a legislative body but as a judicial body; rather, it sits as acourt of justice?

MR. ROMULO: In a way, they probably sit more like jurists, as finders of factand the law, I suppose. They combine those functions. We could say that there is anexercise of judicial power involved.

MS. AQUINO:On the basis of these shared premises, would the legislature then,sitting to undertake impeachment proceedings, still be bound by the rules oflegislative sessions? Specifically, if the legislature adjourns, are the Members duty-

bound to terminate or preterminate as the case may be the impeachmentproceedings if the supervening circumstance of adjournment of the sessions comein?

MR. ROMULO: I think that would depend on the rules they would adopt.Certainly, the Constitution does not settle that.


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MS. AQUINO:Because I would proceed from settled jurisprudence that impeachmentproceedings are essentially judicial in nature, such that it follows that when thelegislative chamber undertakes these proceedings it sits as a court of justice and,therefore. it is not bound by the rules of legislative sessions. It cannot adjourn.Assuming that the session is adjourned, impeachment proceedings should not, in

any way, be affected by the adjournment of the session.

MR. ROMULO: That is not precluded from our proposal. If the Commissionerwants to make it explicit and to suggest amendments to that effect, I suppose wewould not object. Our thinking is that if the Commissioner's premise is that it is likea court of justice. maybe an adjournment of the hearing will certainly not preclude itfrom continuing the proceedings on some other day. In other words, it could notlose jurisdiction just because of adjournment.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): The Chair, therefore, understands fromCommissioner Aquino that her proposed massive amendment is considered

withdrawn.

MS. AQUINO:Not yet, Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): The Commissioner may proceed.

MS. AQUINO:On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed againstthe President, for example, and the President resigns before judgment of convictionhas been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect theimpeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?

MR. ROMULO: If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from

office, then his resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, asthe provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinarycourts.

MS. AQUINO:I am not so much concerned about the civil and criminal aspects as Iam concerned with the necessary effect of a judgment of conviction in animpeachment proceeding. A judgment of conviction also means disqualificationfrom office; it does not only mean removal from office.

MR. ROMULO: Yes, I see that point. It is my personal opinion that if he resigns,that in itself would end the impeachment proceeding.

MR. RAMA: Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): The Chair recognizes the Floor Leader.

MR. RAMA: There are several other Commissioners who would like to amend theArticle. May I ask that Commissioner Regalado be recognized?


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THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Just a minute. May we considerCommissioner Aquino's proposed amendment withdrawn?

MS. AQUINO:No, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have to consult Commissioner Guingonaabout it.

MR. GUINGONA: Precisely, Mr. Presiding Officer, I was going to ask CommissionerAquino a couple of questions, if I may, in connection with her proposal.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA: Is the Commissioner's perception of an impeachmentproceeding an exclusively political device or proceeding or an essentially politicalproceeding? If it is an essentially political proceeding, then there would be noobjection to exceptions where courts may be allowed to be given the power toadjudicate on this particular proceeding. On the other hand, if it is exclusivebecause the President is elected by the people. the judgment about the President's

tenure or term of office should be judged by the representatives of the people, if thecourts are not empowered to decide cases or questions relating to elections, andterms and qualifications of the President.

MS. AQUINO:Mr. Presiding Officer. may I briefly reply? It is my humble submissionthat an impeachment proceeding and an impeachment power are essentiallypolitical acts. But because of the nature of the judgment of conviction in animpeachment proceeding, it requires the process of adjudication. If we divorceourselves from the conceptual definition of impeachment and focus on thepracticality of impeachment proceedings, then it becomes necessary for us toreassess the procedure. I am not so much concerned in the conceptual purity ofimpeachment as I am concerned in it being a feasible and viable alternative in theexercise of protection of the State.

MR. GUINGONA.: Last question. Mr. Presiding Officer.

Mention was made here about the impeachment proceeding we are adopting asbeing copied from the United States. Is the honorable Commissioner aware that inother countries the legislature is given the power to initiate and the courts arevested with the power to adjudicate an impeachment proceeding? I would like tocite, among others, the following countries: United Arab Republic, Zambia, theRepublic of France, Burundi, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Cyprus,Gabon, Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, and others.

MS. AQUINO:I am not aware of that, Mr. Presiding Officer. But I am thankful for thatcitation because it reinforces my position.

MR. RAMA.: Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): The Floor Leader is recognized.


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MR. RAMA: May I ask that Commissioner. Regalado be recognized?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Still on the same proposed amendment?

MR. RAMA: On impeachment.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): We have to dispose of the proposedamendment of Commissioner Aquino which was not accepted by the Committee.

Does Commissioner Aquino insist on a vote if she will not withdraw it?

MR. RAMA: There was no amendment, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MS. AQUINO:There are no specific amendments yet and on the prompting of thekibitzers around me I have been pressured not to withdraw it. A possibility is thatwe can intermarry this proposal with the procedural amendments of CommissionerDavide and Commissioner Maambong.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): The Chair recognizes the Floor Leader.

MR. RAMA.: I ask that Commissioner Regalado be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Regalado is recognized.

MR. REGALADO: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

Before we leave that matter of Section 3 on impeachment. I suppose CommissionerAquino could submit her proposed amendment which, together with my amendmentand that of Commissioners Maambong and Davide, had been deferred for

consideration.My proposed amendments would, therefore, leave only Sections 2, 9 and 12.Without prejudice to my talking, let us go to the consideration of the amendment onSection 3.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Regalado is given fiveminutes.

MR. REGALADO: I propose to add in Section 2 as a last sentence thereof asalready amended the following: ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES MAYBE REMOVED FROM OFFICE AS PROVIDED BY LAW BUT NOT BY IMPEACHMENT. The

reason for the amendment is this: While Section 2 enumerates the impeachableofficers, there is nothing that will prevent the legislature as it stands now fromproviding also that other officers not enumerated therein shall also be removableonly by impeachment, and that has already happened. Cdpr

Under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606. the Sandiganbayan Decree, justices of theSandiganbayan may be removed only by impeachment. unlike their counterparts inthe then Court of Appeals. They are, therefore, a privileged class on the level of the


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Supreme Court. In the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies,there are many commissions which are sought to be constitutionalized if I mayuse the phrase and the end result would be that if they are constitutionalcommissions, the commissioners there could also be removed only byimpeachment. What is there to prevent the Congress later because of the lack of

this sentence that I am seeking to add from providing that officials of certainoffices, although nonconstitutional, cannot also be removed except byimpeachment?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas) : What does the Committee say on theproposed amendment of Commissioner Regalado?

MR. MONSOD: May we ask Commissioner Regalado a few questions?

Does this mean that with this provision, the other officers in the case of theSandiganbayan would not be removable by impeachment?

MR. REGALADO: For the present and during the interim and until the newCongress amends P.D. No. 1606, that provision still stands. But the proposedamendment will not prevent the legislature from subsequently repealing oramending that portion of the law. Also, it will prevent the legislature from providingfor favored public officials as not removable except by impeachment.

That is the purpose of this proposal.

MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer, the Committee is willing to accept theamendment of Commissioner Regalado.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas). The proposed amendment of CommissionerRegalado has been accepted by the Committee.

MR. REGALADO: After the last sentence in Section 2, the amendment will read:ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES MAY BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE ASPROVIDED BY LAW BUT NOT BY IMPEACHMENT.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas) : Precisely, that has been accepted by theCommittee.

MR. REGALADO: They wanted me to read before we vote.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas) : All right.

Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved.

MR. REGALADO: On Section 9, Mr. Presiding Officer, regarding the Ombudsmanand his deputies serving for a term of seven years without reappointment. I proposeto add a sentence to read as follows: THEY SHALL NOT BE QUALIFIED TO RUN FOR


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ANY OFFICE IN THE ELECTION IMMEDIATELY SUCCEEDING THE END OF THEIR TERMOR RESIGNATION FROM OFFICE.

May I explain the reason, Mr. Presiding Officer?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): The Gentleman may proceed.

MR. REGALADO: The reason is that the Ombudsman as now visualized by us willbe a person who will have some powers, although as they say he is "toothless."Nevertheless, he is publicly visible and highly capable of projecting himself into thepublic limelight; whether he likes it or not, he will have to do so. We would like toavoid the possibility that an Ombudsman may use his position as a springboard forthe coming elections. Or if he is caught in midstream in his term and the electionsare coming up, he may resign and having already the aura of public acceptance, hemay immediately go into politics. In other words, he should not use his position as aspringboard for political purposes but we are not going to deprive the electorate

completely of such a man if he is really capable and competent. All I am trying tointroduce here is that there be an interval before he can run in the next election.

MR. DAVIDE: Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE:Will the proponent accept some amendments?

MR. REGALADO: May I hear the proposed amendment?

MR. DAVIDE:The amendment would be on the election immediately following their

cessation from office. It may be by removal; it may be by a declaration ofincapacity; it may be by resignation. So, the amendment reads THEIR CESSATIONFROM OFFICE.

MR . REGALADO: Under that concept, the proposed amendment to myamendment is willingly accepted.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): For clarification, will Commissioner Regaladoread his proposed amendment taking into account the amendment suggested byCommissioner Davide?

MR. REGALADO: The amendment, as amended, will now read: "THEY SHALL NOT

BE QUALIFIED TO RUN FOR ANY OFFICE IN THE ELECTION IMMEDIATELYSUCCEEDING THEIR CESSATION FROM OFFICE." In other words, the amendmentmakes the provision all-embracing.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): What does the Committee say?

MR. MONSOD: Just one clarificatory question. Does the Gentleman realize thatif that is three years, that was the consensus of this Assembly, of this Commission?


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MR. REGALADO: Three years.

MR. MONSOD: With that clarification, the Committee is willing to accept theproposed amendment.

MR. REGALADO: As amended further by Commissioner Davide.

MR. FOZ: Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Foz is recognized.

MR. FOZ: May I amend the amendment? Will the proponent accept anamendment to his amendment?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): What does Commissioner Regalado say?

MR. REGALADO: The Committee has already accepted the amendment. Is theCommittee willing to defer acceptance in the meantime to give Commissioner Foz

an opportunity to introduce a proposed amendment to the amendment, asamended?

MR. MONSOD: May we hear the proposed amendment to the amendment?

MR. FOZ: The amendment is to the effect that instead of disqualifying them injust the immediately succeeding election, I would amend it to provide IN THE NEXTTWO SUCCEEDING ELECTIONS AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF HIS TERM. May I explainmy amendment, if the Chair will permit me?


MR. FOZ: The office of the Ombudsman is a very visual office. Precisely, thefunctions, powers and duties of the Ombudsman make it a natural subject of a lot ofpublicity. As a matter of fact, one of its functions is to publicize, whencircumstances so warrant, matters covered by its investigation. We expect,therefore, a very active Ombudsman who will most probably be in the glare ofpublicity almost everyday. If he does his job well, he will be popular. In other words,he may use his office as a launching pad for his political ambitions.

In order to preclude a politicking Ombudsman, we should so provide that aside fromprohibiting him from resigning his office and then running for public office within the

term for which he was appointed and for the succeeding election, we shouldlengthen the period during which he should be prohibited from running for publicoffice precisely to dissuade him from harboring political ambitions during the timehe will be discharging the functions of his office.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): What does the Committee say?


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MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer, we regret we cannot accept theamendment. The reasons given by Commissioner Foz were the same reasons givenby Commissioner Regalado.

If we extend it to two elections. the prohibition could reach nine years. We feel that

probably that is not really the intention of the original proponent. We just want todeter politicking; on the other hand, nine years may be a little too long for a reallygood man who might be able to serve the people.

MR. FOZ: May we respond to the statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Foz has two minutes.

MR. FOZ: Under the provisions we have approved regarding the term of office ofMembers of the Congress, we have provided for a term of office of only three yearsfor Members of the Lower House. So, we have provided that every three years thereshall be an election. Therefore, after six years, it is possible for a former

Ombudsman to run for public office. It is not really nine years straight.

MR. MONSOD: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, if the Ombudsman ceases from officeshortly after one election, then he has to wait almost nine years before he can run.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Will Commissioner Foz insist on a vote?

MR. REGALADO: My position, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that providing for the nextsucceeding election is a happy compromise because the country may also need theservices of such an Ombudsman who has proved true to his worth. If we provide fortwo successive elections in the case of animals, they hibernate; in the case of

fish, they estivate the Ombudsman might politically vegetate. That is why if theprohibition is only for the immediately succeeding election, this offers a happycompromise.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): The matter has been sufficiently discussed.

Will Commissioner Foz insist on a vote?

MR. FOZ: I withdraw my amendment.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): The proposed amendment of CommissionerFoz has been withdrawn.

MR. REGALADO: Having been accepted by the Committee, was the amendmentsubmitted to a vote or was there an objection?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas) : Will Commissioner Regalado restate hisproposed amendment?


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MR. REGALADO: The additional sentence on Section 9 will be: THEY SHALL NOTBE QUALIFIED TO RUN FOR ANY OFFICE IN THE ELECTION IMMEDIATELYSUCCEEDING THEIR CESSATION FROM OFFICE.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair

hears none; the amendment is approved. cdphilMR. REGALADO: One more proposed amendment, Mr. Presiding Officer.

Section 12 (1) on page 5, lines 1 to 3, reads: "any act or duty required of him bylaw, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance ofduties." I propose to add a comma (,) and the phrase ESPECIALLY ANY VIOLATIONOF CIVIL, POLITICAL, NATURAL OR HUMAN RIGHTS. May I explain, Mr. PresidingOfficer?


MR. REGALADO: In the subcommittee on additional Constitutional Commissionsand Agencies, there is a pending resolution to create a Constitutional Commissionon Human Rights. We do not know what will be the fate of that resolution but weare nevertheless concerned about human rights. Therefore, this addition I amproposing would be a sort of a backup measure in the event that that proposedConstitutional Commission on Human Rights is not approved. At least there is anexpression of concern for the protection of civil, political, natural or human rightsthis time through the graces of the Ombudsman. That is the only purpose for theamendment.

MR. SARMIENTO: Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Sarmiento is recognized.

MR. SARMIENTO: May I interpose my objection to the proposed amendment? If weexpand the powers of the Ombudsman, then we will be giving the body too muchpowers. We will be expanding it and making it a superbody. I think the Commissionon Human Rights should be the appropriate body to conduct investigations onhuman rights violations. These are serious matters, matters like salvaging, tortures,hamletting. This cannot be the duty of the Ombudsman considering its multifariousduties. I think we should limit the Ombudsman to investigation of cases involvinggraft and corruption, how to make the government efficient, to avoid waste, graft

and corruption, and mismanagement.

MR. FOZ: Mr. Presiding Officer, just a point of information on the matter.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Is the Gentleman's question addressed toCommissioner Regalado?

MR. FOZ: Yes, and to the body.


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THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Will Commissioner Regalado answer thepoint of clarification?

MR. REGALADO: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.


MR. FOZ: Actually, we would like to inform the body that in the Committee onConstitutional Commissions and Agencies, there is a consensus on theestablishment of a Commission on Human Rights which would have jurisdiction overthe matters which are now being proposed by the proponent of the amendmentregarding the function of the Ombudsman. So, I think we should not include such afunction under the office of the Ombudsman because that is precisely the mainfunction of the proposed Commission on Human Rights, which the Committee onConstitutional Commissions and Agencies is about to take up in a meeting.

MR. REGALADO: Mr. Presiding Officer, may I respond to that?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): The Gentleman is given two minutes.

MR. REGALADO: I specifically prefaced my statement by saying that thisproposed additional phrase is only a backup measure in the event that the proposedConstitutional Commission on Human Rights is not approved. Commissioner Fozsays there is a consensus. I am not aware how many voted for or against the same.Secondly, I said that I do not know what would be the fate of that proposedConstitutional Commission on Human Rights. I think there are only a few membersin the Committee that we cannot even reach a unanimous decision. If CommissionerFoz can assure me with certainty that that proposed Constitutional Commission on

Human Rights will be approved by the entire membership of the plenum, I willwithdraw my amendment. Can he assure me now that that is assured of approval?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Will Commissioner Foz respond?

MR. FOZ: First of all, I would like to report that 7 out of 13 members have votedto establish such a commission, of course, with a lot of reservations as to functionsand powers. With that as basis, I think we can more or less be assured of thepossibility of having the same body be reported out in a committee report, unlessthe members change their minds, particularly those who voted for itsestablishment.

If we can be assured that the approval of such an amendment now being proposedby Commissioner Regalado will not be a stumbling block to the Committee actingand reporting out in a committee report a proposal to establish a Commission onHuman Rights, then we will have no objection to such a proposal.


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THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): The Chair believes the matter has beensufficiently discussed. What is the reaction of the Committee to the proposedamendment?

MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer, we believe that the intent of the proponent

in making the amendment is very clear. He would like to insert this phrase so thatif, for any reason, a Commission on Human Rights is not approved, then there is acorresponding phrase here that the Ombudsman can act on. However, if theproponent is willing, we are prepared to accept the proposed amendment with theunderstanding that should the Commission on Human Rights be established underthis Constitution, the phrase that would be redundant be removed.

MR. REGALADO: That is wholeheartedly agreed upon, not by reason of literalredundancy but substantially because it would be academic.

MR. DAVIDE: Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE: I would like to propose some amendments.

Instead of "ESPECIALLY," we use only the word INCLUDING and we should delete theword "NATURAL."

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): What does Commissioner Regalado say?

MR. REGALADO: I have no objection to the use of the word "INCLUDING" but thejus naturale has not always been translated into statutory rights or political rights or

civil rights. That is also a catch-all phrase for the natural rights of a person.

PROPOSED PROVISION ON IMPEACHMENT

ARTICLE___

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

xxx xxx xxx

Section 3. (1) Impeachment may be initiated only by a resolution filed by at least

one-fifth (1/5) of all the Members of the House of Representatives indorsing averified complaint for impeachment of a Member thereof or any citizen allegingultimate facts constituting ground or grounds for impeachment.

No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more thanonce within a period of one year.


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(Note: The 1/5 requirement or even a lesser number is necessary to protect theimpeachable officers from BASELESS and embarrassing complaints FROM JUSTANYBODY. The President and Vice-President are politicians and they may havepolitical enemies; the other impeachable officers, by the very nature of their work,could step on the toes of a lot of people in the performance of their duties and they

deserve protection from harassment. It will also be A WASTE OF TIME for the propercommittee to take cognizance of a complaint without even a minimal support fromthe Members of the House because in all probability, it will be dismissed.

The requirement of a RESOLUTION is standard procedure even in the United States.It gives the complaint the formality it deserves considering that the respondents arenot ordinary government employees.)

(2) IF THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FINDS THAT THERESOLUTION IS SIGNED BY AT LEAST ONE-FIFTH (1/5) OF ALL THE MEMBERS

THEREOF AND THE SUPPORTING COMPLAINT IS PROPERLY VERIFIED AND

SUFFICIENT IN FORM, THE RESOLUTION SHALL WITHIN THREE SESSION DAYS FROMRECEIPT BE INCLUDED IN THE ORDER OF BUSINESS FOR REFERRAL TO THE PROPERCOMMITTEE FOR THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE. cdrep

(3) UPON DUE REFERRAL AND AFTER DUE NOTICE AND HEARING WHEREIN THEPARTIES ARE ACCORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE THEIR RESPECTIVEEVIDENCE, THE COMMITTEE SHALL DECIDE BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITSMEMBERS WHETHER OR NOT A SUFFICIENT GROUND OR GROUNDS FORIMPEACHMENT EXIST. IF THE COMMITTEE FINDS THAT PROBABLE CAUSE HAS BEENESTABLISHED, IT SHALL SUBMIT WITH ITS REPORT A RESOLUTION SETTING FORTH

THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED

BEFORE THE COMMITTEE; OTHERWISE, THE COMPLAINT SHALL BE DISMISSED. THEREPORT OF THE COMMITTEE SETTING FORTH ITS FINDINGS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE WITHIN THIRTY (30)SESSION DAYS FROM SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR RESOLUTION. IT SHALL BESCHEDULED FOR IMMEDIATE CALENDAR IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES.

(4) A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE IS NECESSARY FOR THEAPPROVAL OF THE RESOLUTION SETTING FORTH THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT.IF THE RESOLUTION IS APPROVED, IT SHALL THEN BE REFERRED TO THE SENATEFOR TRIAL, TOGETHER WITH THE COMMITTEE REPORT CONTAINING ITS FINDINGSAND RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDING ALL THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BEFORE THECOMMITTEE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE RESOLUTION IS DISAPPROVED, THECOMPLAINT FOR IMPEACHMENT IS DEEMED DISMISSED.

WHEN THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE DISMISSES THE COMPLAINT, THE REPORTSHALL BE NOTED BY THE HOUSE AND SENT TO THE ARCHIVES, UNLESS A MAJORITYVOTE OF ALL ITS MEMBERS DECIDE TO RECOMMIT THE MATTER TO THE COMMITTEEOF ORIGIN FOR FURTHER DELIBERATIONS, OR, THEY OVERRULE THE COMMITTEE


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AND PRESENT BEFORE THE HOUSE A RESOLUTION SETTING FORTH THE ARTICLESOF IMPEACHMENT, SIGNED BY SUCH MAJORITY OF THE HOUSE. SUCH RESOLUTIONSHALL THEN BE REFERRED TO THE SENATE FOR ITS ACTION, TOGETHER WITH THEORIGINAL COMMITTEE REPORT CONTAINING ITS FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONSDISMISSING THE COMPLAINT INCLUDING ALL THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE.

THE VOTING ON THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE SHALLBE BY ROLL CALL, AND THE VOTE OF EACH MEMBER SHALL BE RECORDED.

(5) THE SENATE SHALL HAVE THE SOLE POWER TO TRY ALL CASES OFIMPEACHMENT. WHEN SITTING FOR THAT PURPOSE, THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATESHALL BE ON OATH OR AFFIRMATION. WHEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ISON TRIAL, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT SHALL PRESIDE BUTWITHOUT THE RIGHT TO VOTE. NO PERSON SHALL BE CONVICTED WITHOUT THECONCURRENCE OF TWO-THIRDS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE.

(6) JUDGMENT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT SHALL NOT EXTEND FURTHER THAN THEREMOVAL FROM OFFICE AND DISQUALIFICATION TO HOLD ANY OFFICE UNDER THEREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, BUT THE PARTY CONVICTED SHALL NEVERTHELESSBE LIABLE AND SUBJECT TO PROSECUTION, TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT INACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

(7) THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL PROMULGATE ITS OWN RULES OFPROCEDURE TO GOVERN THE INITIATION, COMMITTEE DELIBERATIONS, AND ACTIONOF THE HOUSE IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS. LIKEWISE, THE SENATE SHALLPROMULGATE ITS OWN RULES TO GOVERN THE TRIAL AND JUDGMENT IN

IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS. ALL SUCH RULES MUST PROVIDE DUE PROCESS ANDMUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS SET FORTH HEREIN.

(Sgd.) Regalado E. Maambong

Member, Constitutional Commission

Footnotes:

1. A verified complaint and a resolution initiates the impeachment in the House;on the other hand, the Senate only acquires jurisdiction upon receipt of the Articlesof Impeachment from the House. The Articles is the equivalent of the "indictment"

in the United States and the "information" in the Philippines. Usually, a Committeeor some members of the House are assigned to present the Articles to the Senate ina bipartisan manner. Once the Articles are received, they can only be modified oramended by a resolution of the House filed before the Senate.

2. In impeachment, we come into contact with three resolutions: Resolutioninitiating (or indorsing) a verified complaint for impeachment; Resolution of the


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proper Committee setting forth the Articles of Impeachment; and a resolution of theHouse referring the Articles of Impeachment (among other papers) for trial.

Record of the Constitutional Commission

Volume 2

07-28-1986 RCC no. 40

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER MONSOD

MR. MONSOD: Madam President, the Committee on Accountability of PublicOfficers is respectfully submitting its proposed Article in the Constitution, and wewould just want to make a few remarks on the articles and sections that we have

included.

"SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust." We have amended the 1973 provisionin order to incorporate the resolution of Commissioner Tadeo to invest public officewith more than just the normal requirements of fidelity, integrity and efficiency, butalso as an example of modest lives or simplified lifestyle.

With respect to the section on impeachment, we would like the honorableCommissioners to note the inclusion of the Ombudsman among the offices that aresubject to impeachment, and the addition of betrayal of public trust as a ground forimpeachment. This is derived from a resolution of Commissioner de los Reyes. In

the section on the procedure for impeachment, we were benefitted by thesuggestions and advice of the honorable President of the Commission. The principalauthor of this section is Commissioner Romulo. What we seek to institute here is amore liberal interpretation of the impeachment procedures in order to avoid, forexample, the deadlock which happened in the last Batasan. While incorporating theprocedures arising from the bicameral nature of the future legislation, the body willnote that we provided here that a majority of the Members of the House can initiateimpeachment upon vote. But what is important is that any Member of the House orany citizen can file a verified complaint. We used the majority rule of the House,although in 1973 the provision was for 20 percent of the Members of the National

Assembly. In that case since it was unicameral, the trying body was also theNational Assembly.

In the 1935 Constitution, the rule was two-thirds of the House may initiateimpeachment proceedings and three-fourths of the Senate shall convict. However,in our proposal, majority of the Members of the House may initiate and two-thirds ofthe Senate shall convict. This is one section on which we would like to consult withthe Members of this body. This is a very important provision, and we would be


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advised by the consultations and wisdom of this body with respect to this provision,particularly on the numbers and vote necessary to initiate, to try or to convict.

With respect to the Sandiganbayan and the Tanod-bayan, the Committee decided tomake a distinction between the purely prosecutory function of the Tanod-bayan and

the function of a pure Ombudsman who will use the prestige and persuasive powersof his office. To call the attention of government officials to any impropriety,misconduct or injustice, we conceive, the Ombudsman as a champion of thecitizens. As part of the sponsorship presentation, we would like to ask Vice-Chairman Colayco of the Committee, who is the main author of this section, to giveus a few words on the ideas of the Committee in this regard, as well asCommissioner Nolledo who also has contributed his ideas in the framing of thissection. The concept of the Ombudsman here is admittedly a little bit different fromthe 1973 concept. But I will leave that to Commissioner Colayco to explain later.With respect to the section on the right of the State to recover properties unlawfullyacquired Section 13, page 5 this is based mainly on the resolution of

Commissioner Nolledo, with the assistance of Commissioner Azcuna in itsformulation. The idea here is to address ourselves to the problem that those whohave unlawfully benefitted from the acquisition of public property over the years,through technicalities or practice, have gained immunity and that, therefore, theright of the people to recover should be respected. With that, I would now like tocall on Commissioner Colayco to give us his remarks regarding our concept of theOmbudsman.

THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Colayco is recognized.

INTERPELLATION OF MR. DAVIDE

In reply to the initial query of Mr. Davide, Mr. Nolledo agreed that culpable violationof the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes and graft and corruption areincluded in the phrase "betrayal of public trust". However, on the suggestion thatthe ground for impeachment be limited to betrayal of public trust for the reasonthat it includes the other grounds enumerated, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that theviolation, although not culpable, may be serious enough to justify the impeachmentproceedings like when one violates his oath of office. He explained that the phrase"betrayal of trust" was placed precisely to plug the loophole in the use of the word

"culpable". However, Mr. Nolledo stated that the Committee would consideramendments at the proper time. cdphil

On the rationale for increasing the vote requirement from one-fifth to a majorityvote of all Members of the House for purposes of initiating impeachment, if thethrust of the provision is to relax the impeachment process, Mr. Monsod stated thatthis is a matter on which the Committee would like to be advised considering the


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need to balance the right to demand accountability and the right of the governmentto a certain amount of stability and freedom from harassment.

On the observation that the proposal requiring a referral of the complaint to aCommittee would make the process more rigorous because the Committee could

kill the proposal, Mr. Romulo expressed willingness to further discuss the matter.On the contention that Section 3(4) would in effect prevent one-fifth of the Membersof the House of the Representatives from reviving an impeachment move by anordinary Member or by a citizen, Mr. Romulo explained that the Committee waslooking forward to a very liberal impeachment proceedings; and that it wasstruggling with the problem of a verified complaint rather than the signatures ofone-fifth of the Members of the House. Mr. Romulo stated that whether to provide aperiod within which the Committee should report or whether the Committee shouldbe allowed to overrule a verified complaint are only some of the questions whichthe Committee would like to have a thorough discussion on the floor.

Responding thereto, Mr. Davide opined that the Constitution could probablyoverrule a rejection by the Committee by providing that it could be over- turned byone-half or one-fifth of the House of Representatives, provided that suchoverturning would not amount to a refiling which is prohibited under Section 3(4).

On whether the Committee, in the course of the investigation of a charge forimpeachment, may add other grounds for impeachment, Mr. Romulo stated that theCommittee would be willing to consider amendments at the proper time.

On the disposition of the Committee Report, Mr. Romulo stated that in the event it isrejected by the House of Representatives, said Report has to be sent to theArchives.

On the nature of the evidence which the Committee would require, Mr. Romulostated that it is an aspect of criminal proceedings but the Committee did not go intoit because the Committee felt that impeachment is a political act more thananything else.

On the suggestion that guidelines be provided to prevent the Committee from justkilling any proposal, Mr. Romulo stated that the suggestion could either be in theform of a provision or an interpretation placed in the Record or the Journal for theguidance of the House when it establishes its rules.

On whether the impeachment charge should always be in the nature of a verifiedcomplaint or a resolution, Mr. Romulo stressed that the recommendation of theCommittee should be signed under oath by all the members pursuant to Section3(3).

Mr. Davide recalled that under the impeachment rules of the interim BatasangPambansa, an impeachment charge may be filed either by a Member of the Batasan


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through a verified complaint or an ordinary resolution which must forthwith becalendared within three session days from its filing without necessarily requiring acertification by the Speaker as to its correctness in form. With respect to acomplaint filed by an ordinary citizen, Mr. Davide inquired whether it would also beimmediately calendared or whether it should pass the Speaker who would

determine the correctness in form of the complaint.

In reply, Mr. Romulo stated that the procedures should be left to the Rules of theHouse.

Mr. Romulo stressed that impeachment, not being a criminal proceeding, would notrequire proof beyond reasonable doubt for a finding of conviction. He pointed outthat conviction would not bar a succeeding criminal prosecution in court for thesame offense pursuant to Section 6. Moreover, he opined that the decision of theHouse could be admissible subject to the quantum of evidence which the courtnormally requires under the Rules of Evidence.

With respect to the Ombudsman, Mr. Romulo stated that he has the right to conductinvestigations. Additionally, Mr. Nolledo stressed that he could conduct investigationbut he could not prosecute before a court of justice.

Mr. Colayco explained that when a complaint is filed, the Ombudsman could alreadyact because it is just a question of finding out from the respondent whether thecomplaint is valid or not.

On Section 12(2) which empowers the Ombudsman to direct the officer concernedto take appropriate action against the erring official or employee, Mr. Colaycostated that a recommendation for removal would not deprive the official oremployee of due process.

Should a person to whom the directive recommending the removal is addressedwould not comply, Mr. Colayco stated that there are always administrative remedieswhich could be resorted to like the Civil Service rules and regulations relevant to thematter.

Mr. Colayco concurred with Mr. Davide's observation that it is the intention, more orless, to make the Ombudsman more powerful than any other administrative body.

Mr. Monsod, however, stated that it would not necessarily be a superbody

considering that it is not given prosecutory functions.

Mr. Colayco allayed the fear expressed by Mr. Davide that the Ombudsman mightbecome a superbody by affirming that the Fiscal's Office cannot just file the casebased on the recommendation of the Ombudsman because it would have toconduct a preliminary investigation and decide for itself whether there is areasonable ground to believe that a case, may be filed. He, however, disagreed with


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Mr. Davide's statement that the Fiscal's Office would be at the mercy of theOmbudsman because only the latter could order the investigation.

On the danger of duplication of functions considering that there would be twobodies doing an investigation of the same matter, Mr. Nolledo stated that it would

only lessen the burden of the fiscal. He pointed out that under the 1985 Law onCriminal Procedure, mere affidavits on the part of the complainant and counter-affidavits on the part of the respondent would suffice for the fiscal to determinewhether there is a prima facie case. He stated that it is only when the fiscal needsclarification that he may propound questions to the parties. He maintained that ifthe Ombudsman would do his duty, it would lessen considerably the burden of thefiscal and expedite appropriate action.

Mr. Romulo disagreed that there would be a duplication of functions because a fiscalis not allowed to investigate motu proprio while the Ombudsman, on his own, couldinitiate investigation. He stated that on the contrary, there would be a division of

functions. cdasia

INTERPELLATION OF MR. VILLACORTA

On Section 3 which prohibits the initiation of impeachment proceedings against thesame official more than once within a period of one year, Mr. Villacorta inquiredwhether it contemplates a situation where evidence is discovered to supportanother ground for impeachment. He stated that if the intention is to protect thepublic official from undue harassment, it may, on the other hand, give an unduelimitation on the accountability of public officers.

In reply, Mr. Romulo stated that the intention is really to limit the initiation ofimpeachment charges in order to allow the Legislature to concentrate more on itsprimary function of lawmaking. He opined that the Legislature might be toopreoccupied with too many impeachment proceedings if multiple impeachmentcharges are allowed.

On Section 5, Mr. Romulo affirmed that it is just a point of reference to a particularprovision in the 1973 Constitution without necessarily repeating said provision sinceit is a shorter way of identifying the Tanodbayan.

On the observation that this would only create confusion, Mr. Monsod stated thatthe Committee would be open to any suggestion.

On the rationale for making reference to PD No. 1630 as the basis of the powers ofthe Tanodbayan, and on whether it would not be hazardous to make reference todecrees issued by the past regime which may one day be repealed, Mr. Colaycostated that the Committee was just making a statement that the intention is toretain the agency as it was functioning before the new Constitution. He opined that


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some of the decrees issued by Mr. Marcos were alright. He stressed that thereference made would prevent complications.

On the suggestion to reword the provision without making reference to thesedecrees, Mr. Monsod stated that these are some realities- that the Body could not

wish out of existence. He stressed the fact that the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayanwere created pursuant to a constitutional mandate and the enabling acts weredecrees. He stated that the reference made would prevent confusion, ambiguity orvacuum considering that these bodies are already in place.

On the suggestion to do away with the use of the term "betrayal of public trust" toavoid confusion and instead stick to the original wording of the 1973 Constitution,Mr. Nolledo affirmed that during the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there wereresolutions proposing to make betrayal of public trust one of the grounds forimpeachment but which resolutions were turned down because of Mr. Marcos' fearof the term. He stated, however, that the Committee would be amenable to possible

amendments at the proper time.

INTERPELLATION OF MR. CONCEPCION

Mr. Concepcion stated that he could not perceive the distinction between theTanodbayan and the Ombudsman as far as their respective roles are concerned. Hepointed out that in Sweden, the Ombudsman is an overseer, not in the sense ofexercising supervisory authority but in the sense that it has the duty to assurehimself that the offices under his jurisdiction function as efficiently as possible. Inthe exercise of that function, he has the power and duty to find out what is going onin all these offices and to recommend some modifications in their operations.

Mr. Concepcion opined that a study of the Ombudsman in Sweden would help theBody envisage the roles of these two bodies. He urged the Committee to come upwith an explanation as to the main difference between one and the other.

Mr. Colayco acknowledged the observations made by Mr. Concepcion andmanifested that the Committee would welcome constructive suggestions whichwould make the proposal adaptable and practicable in the Philippines.

Mr. Monsod stressed that the effectiveness of the Ombudsman would depend on theperformance of those who would be appointed to that office and how the citizenswould respond to it. He stated that what the Committee wanted to avoid was whathappened in 1973 when the Tanodbayan was relegated to the status of a specialprosecutor.

Mr. Nolledo stressed that the Tanodbayan has the power to prosecute anti-graftcases, while the Ombudsman does not have such power.


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THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE:Thank you, Madam President.

Will the Committee yield to some clarificatory questions?

MR. NOLLEDO: Gladly.

MR. DAVIDE:On impeachment, the Committee has now added as another groundthe betrayal of public trust. Would not the Committee consider culpable violation ofthe Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, graft and corruption asincluded in the phrase "betrayal of public trust"?

MR. NOLLEDO: I think they are, if we will stretch the meaning of "betrayal ofpublic trust."

MR. DAVIDE:Yes. If all these culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,bribery, other high crimes, graft and corruption are already included in thephrase "betrayal of public trust," can we not just, therefore, limit the ground forimpeachment to betrayal of public trust?

MR. NOLLEDO: As I said, the violation of an oath of office does not necessarilyconstitute any of the foregoing instances.

MR. DAVIDE:Yes, precisely. A violation of an oath of office is itself a violation of theConstitution because a public official's oath is in the Constitution.

MR. NOLLEDO: The provision says that the violation must be culpable. Supposeit is not culpable, it will not be categorized as such, but it is serious enough to justifythe impeachment proceedings?

MR. DAVIDE: In any case, even the violation of the Constitution is betrayal of trust.

MR. NOLLEDO: That is the reason we put betrayal of trust in order to remedythe loophole that will be created in view of the use of the word "culpable."

MR. DAVIDE:The idea then of the proposal is really to relax impeachment as aground for the removal of the President.

MR. NOLLEDO: I think the Commissioner is right, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE: If that is so, since even culpable violation of the Constitution is alreadyincluded in the betrayal of public trust, why can we not just limit the ground to merebetrayal of public trust?

MR DAVIDE: So the thrust of the report is really to relax impeachment as a process.I notice, however, that the proposal now requires a majority vote of all the members


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of the House to initiate impeachment, while the present constitutional provisionrequires only a vote of one-fifth of the Members. The provision of the 1935Constitution is also one-fifth vote of the Members. Why did we increase it to amajority vote of all the Members, if the idea is to relax impeachment? Does not theCommittee realize that we will now have a House of Representatives with a

membership of 250? A majority of the membership will be 126, yet one-fifth wouldonly be 50. So if we are going to relax impeachment, we should retain the one-fifthrequirement to initiate impeachment and, perhaps, even reduce the requirement forconviction.

MR MONSOD: If we will recall, during the sponsorship, we precisely said thatthis is a matter that we would like very much to be discussed on the floor, becausethere is a very delicate balancing here of the right to demand accountability withthe right of the government to a certain amount of stability and freedom fromharassment.

MR. NOLLEDO: That is correct.

MR MONSOD: And we would like very much to be advised by the body on this.We were looking at the past where, in the 1973 Constitution, a vote of 20 percent ofthe membership of the House and, in the 1935 Constitution, a vote of two-thirds ofthe membership of the House were required to initiate impeachment proceedings.

MR DAVIDE: That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachmentproceedings still requires a vote of one-fifth of the membership of the House underthe 1935 Constitution.

MR. MONSOD: A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required toinitiate proceedings.

MR. DAVIDE:No, for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only one-fifth vote ofthe membership of the House is required; for conviction, a two-thirds vote of themembership is required.

MR. MONSOD: For conviction, it is a three-fourths vote of the Senate, MadamPresident.

MR. DAVIDE: I see.

MR. ROMULO: No, it is two-thirds vote.

MR DAVIDE: Here we now recognize the right of every citizen and a Member of theLower House to file a complaint. However, the proposal would require a referral ofthe complaint to a committee. Would it not make the process rigorous because thecommittee can kill the proposal? Suppose the committee now votes against theimpeachment complaint, may one-fifth or a majority of the Members of the NationalAssembly overturn that rejection by the committee.


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MR. ROMULO: Yes, Madam President. These are the points that we would liketo be discussed.

MR. DAVIDE:However, if we will allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislatureto overturn a report of the committee, we have here Section 3 (4) which reads:

No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more thanonce within a period of one year.

So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow one-fifthof the Members of the National Assembly to revive an impeachment move by anindividual or an ordinary Member. cda

MR. ROMULO: Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards thepossibility of a very liberal impeachment proceeding. Second, we were ourselvesstruggling with that problem where we are faced with just a verified complaintrather than the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is we decide, of the Members

of the House. So whether to put a period for the Committee to report, whether weshould not allow the Committee to overrule a mere verified complaint, are some ofthe questions we would like to be discussed.

MR. DAVIDE:We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providingthat it can be over-turned by, say, one-half or a majority, or one-fifth of themembers of the legislature, and that such over-turning will not amount to a refilingwhich is prohibited under Section 3 (4).

Another point, Madam President. May the Committee, taking into account evidenceobtained in the course of the investigation of a charge for impeachment, add other

grounds for impeachment?

MR. ROMULO: That is not prohibited per se in our proposal, and again we arewilling to consider that.

MR. DAVIDE:Another question. Suppose the committee's report is a rejection, underthe proposal it is not very clear whether the overturning of that report can be doneby the legislature. Does it mean that such a report shall have to be archived if it is arejection?

MR. ROMULO: Yes.

MR. DAVIDE: In other words, no Member of the Lower House can even comment onthe report?

MR. ROMULO: That is not contemplated here.

MR. DAVIDE:What could be the nature of the evidence which the Committee wouldrequire? Would it be mere preponderance of evidence, just like in the fiscal's office?


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Thus, if it believes that there is reasonable ground to believe that a probable causeexists, the committee must have to make a report for the articles of impeachment?

MR. ROMULO: We did not go into that precisely because it would then partaketoo much of a criminal proceeding. As I said, we believe this is a political act more

than anything else.MR. DAVIDE:While it may not necessarily be a criminal proceeding, does not theCommittee believe that we have to give some guidelines to the committee becauseit can just kill any proposal for that matter?

MR. ROMULO: Yes. There are two ways of handling that, either we put itspecifically in this provision or we put it in the Journal for the guidance of the Housewhen it establishes its rules.

MR. DAVIDE:When an impeachment charge is, as recommended by the Committee,signed by a majority of all the members of the House, should it always be in the

nature of a complaint which must be verified, or is it enough that it is in the natureof a resolution?

MR. ROMULO: No, in our thinking it should be under oath.

MR. DAVIDE:Must all of the signatories swear to the oath, or would only one of thembe enough?

MR. ROMULO: No, in Section 3 (3) that would be all of them, as distinguishedfrom Section 2 (2) where only one Member can sign.

MR. DAVIDE:All of them must have to swear to the oath.Under the impeachment rules of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, an impeachmentcharge may be filed by a Member of the Batasan either by a verified complaint oran ordinary resolution, and must forthwith be calendared within three session daysfrom its filing. It would not even require a certification by the Speaker as to itscorrectness in form. But in the matter now of a complaint filed by an ordinarycitizen, would it be immediately calendared also, or shall it pass the Speaker for himto determine the correctness in form of the complaint?

MR. ROMULO: We leave that to the procedures of the House.

MR. DAVIDE:And, finally, for convicting a person for impeachment, would proofbeyond reasonable doubt be required?

MR. ROMULO: Again, since this is not a criminal proceeding, I would not thinkso.

MR. DAVIDE: If a President or anybody else who is impeachable is prosecuted in animpeachment proceeding for graft and corrupt practices and is convicted, would


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such a conviction not bar a succeeding criminal prosecution in court for graft andcorruption or for the same offense?

MR. ROMULO: Absolutely it would not bar a succeeding criminal prosecution incourt for the same offense because the provision of Section 6 is very clear.

MR. DAVIDE:So it would not bar a succeeding prosecution in court.

But would that decision of the Senate convicting him for graft and corruption be anadmissible evidence to prove the crime in court for the same offense, or should it beconsidered as not admissible because otherwise it might unduly influence the

judge?

MR. ROMULO: I should think it would be admissible but subject to the quantumof evidence that the particular charge in court would normally require under ourrules on evidence.

MR. ROMULO: No. That would not be permitted in a regular court of justice.

MR. DAVIDE: I notice in the report and from the answers during the period ofinterpellations that the Ombudsman would have no right to conduct investigations.

MR. NOLLEDO: No, that is not true.

MR. ROMULO: The Ombudsman has the right to conduct investigations.

MR. DAVIDE:So, it can conduct investigations.

MR. NOLLEDO: It can conduct investigations but it cannot prosecute before a

court of justice.

MR. COLAYCO: At the inception, no. I mean when a complaint is filed, from theinception of the complaint he can already act because it is a question of finding outfrom the person being complained about whether or not the complaint is valid. It isa very simple procedure.

MR. DAVIDE: In other words, to determine whether the complaint is valid or not,necessarily he has to conduct an investigation.

MR. COLAYCO: Afterwards, yes.

MR. DAVIDE:Under Section 12 (2), we empower the Ombudsman to direct theofficer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee atfault, and to recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure orprosecution, and to see to the compliance of the directive. My first question is withregard to the recommendation for removal. Does it mean that the offending publicofficial or employee may be deprived of due process because there is already arecommendation for removal?


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MR. COLAYCO: Of course not.

MR. DAVIDE:And since he is to see the compliance of the directive, which is torecommend his removal, etc., what if the person to whom the directive is addressedwill not comply with it?

MR. COLAYCO: There are always administrative remedies against that.

MR. DAVIDE:Could the offending party be prosecuted then for disobedience?

MR COLAYCO: Yes, as the case may be and as the regulations of the civilservice so require.

MR. DAVIDE:So, in effect, we will have a superbody in this case which can be evenmore powerful than any other administrative body.

MR. COLAYCO: More or less that is the intention.

MR. MONSOD: Except that we do not precisely give him the prosecutoryfunctions in order to have some balance here, and we do not precisely want him tobe a supergovernment overseer.

MR. DAVIDE:That is exactly the reason I am afraid it might be a superbody becauseit does not have by itself the prosecutory power, so it will necessarily recommend tothe fiscal's office the prosecution of an individual. But we know for a fact that thefiscal's office cannot just immediately file the case. It will have to conduct thepreliminary investigation and decide for itself whether there is a reasonable groundto believe that a case may be filed.

MR. COLAYCO: The Commissioner is correct.

MR DAVIDE: So if the fiscal's office believes that there is really no basis to therecommendation, yet it will be at the mercy of the Ombudsman because theOmbudsman will now prosecute him for disobeying the recommendation of thedirective. cdphil

MR. COLAYCO: No; the Commissioner is wrong there. The Ombudsman can onlyorder the investigation, that is all.

MR. DAVIDE: I see.

MR. COLAYCO: He cannot overrule.

MR. NOLLEDO: Yes.

MR. DAVIDE:There is the danger of duplication of functions because theOmbudsman will investigate and the result may be forwarded to the fiscal's office.

The fiscal's office will then review it before filing the case. So two bodies will have toinvestigate before the same matter reaches the court.


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MR. NOLLEDO: Why not? It will lessen the burden of the fiscal. We will noticethat under the law on criminal investigation, as now embodied in the 1985 Law onCriminal Procedure, mere affidavits on the part of the respondents would suffice forthe fiscal to determine whether or not there is a prima facie case. And it is onlywhen the fiscal needs clarification that he may propound questions to the parties

before the case. If the Ombudsman had done his duty, we cannot deny that this willlessen to a considerable degree the burden of the fiscal and, thus, expedite theappropriate action.

MR. DAVIDE: It will multiply the burden of the fiscal because two agencies will haveto conduct the investigation. In other words, it will result in duplication of functions.

MR. NOLLEDO: I do not think so.

MR. DAVIDE:That is all, Madam President.

Thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.

MR. SARMIENTO: Madam President, may I ask that Commissioner Villacorta berecognized.

MR. MONSOD: Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the pleasure of Commissioner Monsod?

MR. MONSOD: Madam President, we have one additional explanation. May wejust ask Commissioner Romulo address himself to a point raised by Commissioner

Davide?

MR. SARMIENTO: May I ask, Madam President, that Commissioner Romulo berecognized.

THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Romulo is recognized.

MR. ROMULO: We would just like to observe that actually there will not be atotal duplication of functions because the fiscal is not allowed to investigate motuproprio, that is, by himself; whereas the Ombudsman, precisely, as I said, is abusybody, so he can initiate investigations on his own. So, from that point of view,

there is a division of functions.

THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Villacorta is recognized.

MR. VILLACORTA: Madam President, I would just like to ask the Committee threequestions.

On Section 3, page 2, lines 12 to 14, the last paragraph reads as follows: "Noimpeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than


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once within a period of one year." Does this mean that even if an evidence isdiscovered to support another charge or ground for impeachment, a second orsubsequent proceeding cannot be initiated against the same official within a periodof one year? In other words, one year has to elapse before a second or subsequentcharge or proceeding can be initiated. The intention may be to protect the public

official from undue harassment. On the other hand, is this not undue limitation onthe accountability of public officers? Anyway, when a person accepts a public trust,does he not consider taking the risk of accounting for his acts or misfeasance inoffice?

MR. ROMULO: Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only toprotect public officials who, in this case, are of the highest category fromharassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its work which is lawmaking.Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow multiple impeachmentcharges on the same individual to take place, the legislature will do nothing else butthat.

MR. VILLACORTA: Thank you, Madam President. I have another question. I wouldlike to know why of all the provisions we have discussed, Section 5, lines 7 to 12,has to refer to a particular provision in the 1973 Constitution. May I repeat that?Section 5, page 3, lines 7 to 12.

MR. ROMULO: Yes.

MR. VILLACORTA: I would like to know why this section has to refer to a particularprovision in the 1973 Constitution, instead of just repeating the desired 1973provisions as was done in other articles that we have approved.

MR. ROMULO: Yes, it is a shorthand way of identifying exactly who thisTanodbayan is. It is a point of reference, more than anything else.

MR. VILLACORTA: Yes, because, as I have observed in the other articles that wehave approved and are still considering whenever we would like to use provisions inthe previous Constitutions, we would simply repeat the wording rather than refer tothese provisions. Referring to these provisions would confuse the user of theConstitution.

MR. MONSOD: Madam President, that is an alternative that we can consider.But if we mention only the phrase to repeat the words in the 1973 Constitution, werealize that we would have to have a separate provision in the Transitory Provisionsand we were trying to consolidate it here. But we would be open to amendments orsuggestions in that regard.

MR. VILLACORTA: Thank you very much.

I am also wondering why P.D. No. 1630 was referred to, if I am not mistaken, byHonorable Colayco and Nolledo as a basis of the powers of the Tanodbayan as


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provided by law. Would it not be hazardous to anchor the constitutional powers ofthe Tanodbayan from a decree of a discredited regime considering that the decreesof Mr. Marcos may all be repealed one day?

MR. COLAYCO: We were referring to an established agency of the government

already. And the intent of the Committee is merely to make a plain statement that itis its intention to retain the agency as it was functioning before the newConstitution is written.

MR. VILLACORTA: I find it hazardous because we seem to be enshrining thedecrees of Mr. Marcos, and even the immunities contained in those decrees.

MR. COLAYCO: Some of those decrees are all right, I think.

MR. VILLACORTA: Yes, but should this Constitution be confined to certain decrees?We are not referring only to the decrees of Mr. Marcos. But should we be bound bythe executive orders of certain previous presidents?

MR. COLAYCO: With reference to Sections 4 and 5, as I said, the intention of theCommittee is to make a statement retaining the Sandiganbayan and the

Tanodbayan. Since these two agencies are functioning under the laws mandated bythe original Constitution, short of requiring another piece of legislation to allowthem to continue as before and to avoid complications, we thought it is amisinformation to simply refer to them as functioning and exercising their

jurisdiction as provided under the law which established them.

MR. VILLACORTA: If that is so, may I submit my humble suggestion to theCommittee that we just state this in the manner that we desire, without reference to

these decrees because of the dangers inherent in doing so. But I understand fromthe discussions that that is the intent of the Committee, that the records of ourdeliberations be consulted in the future.

MR. MONSOD: Madam President, there are some realities that we cannot wishout of existence. The fact is that the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan have beencreated pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution and the enabling acts weredecrees. We have mentioned here in this Constitution that the reference is only tothe particular section of the Constitution, and there are laws or decrees that enablethis particular provision to be implemented. We were concerned about creatingconfusion, ambiguity or a vacuum because these institutions are in place. We evenmentioned them here; and, in any case, they have to be mentioned in the

Transitory Provisions.

MR. VILLACORTA: Thank you. I do not want to belabor that point. cdll

One last matter with respect to the use of the words "betrayal of trust" asembodying a ground for impeachment that has been raised by the HonorableRegalado. I am not a lawyer so I can anticipate the difficulties that a layman may


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encounter in understanding this provision and also the possible abuses that thelegislature can commit in interpreting this phrase. It is to be noted that this groundwas also suggested in the 1971 Constitutional Convention. A review of the Journalsof that Convention will show that it was not included; it was construed asencompassing acts which are just short of being criminal but which constitute gross

faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusablenegligence of duty, favoritism and gross abuse of discretionary powers. Iunderstand from the earlier discussions that these constitute violations of the oathof office, and I also heard the Honorable Davide say that even the criminal acts thatwere enumerated in the earlier 1973 provision on this matter constitute betrayal ofpublic trust as well. In order to avoid confusion, would it not be clearer to stick tothe wording of Section 2 which reads: "may be removed from office onimpeachment for and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,bribery, and other high crimes, graft and corruption or VIOLATION OF HIS OATH OFOFFICE," because if betrayal of public trust encompasses the earlier acts that wereenumerated, then it would behoove us to be equally clear about this last provisionor phrase.

MR. NOLLEDO: I agree with the Commissioner that there were a lot ofresolutions in the 1971 Constitutional Convention making betrayal of public trust asone of the grounds for impeachment, and the Commissioner knows already whathappened in the Convention. Marcos was very afraid of the term "betrayal of publictrust" because at that time, he was already guilty of violating that expression. Andso, the Marcos boys did not like that to be placed in the 1971 ConstitutionalConvention. I think we will miss a golden opportunity if we fail to adopt the words"betrayal of public trust" in the 1986 Constitution. But I would like him to know that

we are amenable to any possible amendment. Besides, I think plain error ofjudgment, where circumstances may indicate that there is good faith, to my mind,will not constitute betrayal of public trust if that statement will allay the fears ofdifficulty in interpreting the term.

MR. VILLACORTA: Thank you very much, Madam President.

MR. SUAREZ: I thank Commissioner Villacorta.

Madam President, may I ask that Commissioner Roberto Concepcion be recognized.

THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.

MR. CONCEPCION: Thank you, Madam President.

I am not so sure if I am clear about the distinction between the Tanodbayan and theOmbudsman. The 1973 Constitution mentioned Tanodbayan. It seems the plan nowis to create two separate offices, and I am trying to project in my mind the role ofone as distinguished from the other.


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I had the perception that the Ombudsman, as the office is known in Sweden,performs what Commissioner Romulo mentioned in a very flattering language as a"busybody." My impression is that an Ombudsman is some sort of an overseer, notin a sense that it exercises supervisory authority, but that it has the power and dutyto take measures to assure himself that the offices of the government assigned to

him function as efficiently as possible. Of course, there is an Ombudsman for theexecutive department; there is one for the legislative department; I think there is anOmbudsman for something like human rights and for military affairs. In the exerciseof that function, it has the power and the duty to find out what is going on in allthese offices and, of course, to recommend some modifications in the practices inthese offices, particularly those which do not entail graft and corruption but maylead later on to greater problems. So, at least, the report of the Ombudsman fromSweden indicates that some employees are dismissed; some are merely warned;the attention of the head of the office is sometimes called to some practices ordeficiencies or irregularities in the operation of the office. Perhaps, it would help theCommission to envisage the role, because I notice that is the question whetherthe function is purely recommendatory or they have the power to prosecute. I thinkthat in Sweden, generally, ordinary crimes are referred to the ordinary prosecutorybranches. Sometimes, only administrative action is needed while a recommendationis made to that effect.

I am not aware whether or not any of these officials to whom the Ombudsman hasreferred a number of cases have overruled the Ombudsman in the sense that thepronouncements of the Ombudsman carry great weight. The institution has existedin Sweden for over one-and- a-half centuries, I think, since 1815. It is an institutionoriginally established to play the role of the king in a way; that is, to assure the king

that the offices of the government are properly run, to make suggestions or pointout or call attention to certain practices that are irregular or improper and theimprovements that can be introduced in the operation of the offices and whatadministrative action should be taken against some officials, including theirdismissal.

And so, I hope the Committee will give us, at least, an explanation as to the maindifference between the one and the other. At least, under the proposed draft of theCommittee, there will be two separate offices. It would seem that the Tanodbayan ishigher than the Ombudsman, yet there is no constitutional guarantee. I think theright of impeachment exists as to the Ombudsman, not against the Tanodbayan.

And so, in a way, that might be a misconception among the Members of theCommission.

Thank you, Madam President.

MR. SARMIENTO: Madam President.

MR. COLAYCO: Madam President.


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THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Colayco is recognized.

MR. COLAYCO: We would like to thank Commissioner Concepcion for his verypertinent remarks. However, I would like to add that there are really significantvariations even among the Scandinavian countries which follow the system. As the

Commissioner pointed out, Sweden has no fewer than three of the so-calledguardians of the law. And in the three Scandinavian countries, except Finland, theyhave no power to overturn administrative or judicial decisions. But in Finland, theyhave. So, while the system that we are proposing is definitely not perfect and forthis reason we are welcoming constructive suggestio

slr_con com notes

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