SidDrell:BeyondtheBlackboard

PhysicsofNuclearWeapons

RaymondJeanlozUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley

AdvisortoPresidents

…andmore

Thegovernmentneedsindependentexperts,andwearefortunatethatSidisboth…

Panofsky(1998)

Physics-BasedPolicyforNuclearWeapons

1)Stockpilestewardshipandnuclear-explosionban

2)Worldwithoutnuclearweapons“jointenterprise”

3)Nuclear-weaponssafety&security

JASON

•  Foundingmember–Townescall1960Ipersonallythinkthebiggestimpacthasbeencreatingagenerationofscientists…whohavehadanimpactthroughtheirdirectinvolvement,eitherbecauseofthestudiestheydidwhichthencauseddefensescientistsorpartsoftheDefenseDepartmenttoseethingsbetter,orbecausewe'veenteredthepublicdebate…

Drell(1986)

“Stewardship”ofUSnuclearweaponsObjective:ProvidetechnicalbasisforUSadoptingComprehensiveNuclearTestBanTreaty(CTBT)

CTBT:ArticleI1.  EachStatePartyundertakesnottocarryoutany

nuclearweapontestexplosionoranyothernuclearexplosion,andtoprohibitandpreventanysuchnuclearexplosionatanyplaceunderitsjurisdictionorcontrol.

2.EachStatePartyundertakes,furthermore,torefrainfromcausing,encouraging,orinanywayparticipatinginthecarryingoutofanynuclearweapontestexplosionoranyothernuclearexplosion.

StatusofStockpileStewardship

SuccessfulannualassessmentsofstockpileSuccessfullife-extensionprogramsRe-establishmentofpitproductiontechnologyRetentionofcorecapabilities– Advancesinunderstandingweaponperformance– Advancesinunderstandingmaterials– Developmentsatexperimentalfacilities

Studystarts2000Publication:2002

Studystarts2009Publication:2012

AvailableatNationalAcademiesPressnap.edu

SummaryofNationalAcademyofSciencesStudies

Objectives1)  AssessmaintainingUSnuclearweaponscapabilities2)  Assessnuclear-explosionmonitoring3)  Assessconstraintsonnuclearproliferation

Conclusionsofstudies2000:Adequateplan2009:Provencapabilitiesbetterthanplanned

TreatyMonitoring

Kvaerna&Ringdal(2013)40ton

90%probabilityrecordedat3/41IMSstations

100ton

InternationalMonitoringSystem(IMS)

50primarystations120auxiliarystations

10/09/2006 ∼ 0.5kt05/25/2009 ∼ 202/12/2013 ∼ 1001/06/2016 ∼ 509/09/2016 ∼ 1209/03/2017 ∼ 250

NorthKorea

DigitalGlobe –CommercialSatelliteImagery

Test

Earthquake

Dreger(2016) Ford&Walter(2015)

05/2010event<0.0005kt

10/09/2006 ∼ 0.5kt05/25/2009 ∼ 202/12/2013 ∼ 1001/06/2016 ∼ 509/09/2016 ∼ 1209/03/2017 ∼ 250

~1000stationsChinaEarthquakeAdministration

Richards,2017

2)Worldwithoutnuclearweapons“jointenterprise”

“GangofFour”

“GangofFour”

“JointEnterprise”

•  Reassertionofthevisionofaworldfreeofnuclearweaponsandpracticalmeasurestowardachievingthatgoal… aboldinitiativeconsistentwithAmerica'smoralheritage.

•  Withouttheboldvision,theactionswillnotbeperceivedasfairorurgent.Withouttheactions,thevisionwillnotbeperceivedasrealisticorpossible.

•  Weendorsesettingthegoalofaworldfreeofnuclearweaponsandworkingenergeticallyontheactionsrequiredtoachievethatgoal,beginningwiththemeasuresoutlinedabove.

Shultz,Perry,Kissinger&Nunn(2007)

Stepswouldinclude…•  ChangingtheColdWarpostureofdeployednuclearweaponstoincreasewarningtimeand

therebyreducethedangerofanaccidentalorunauthorizeduseofanuclearweapon.•  Continuingtoreducesubstantiallythesizeofnuclearforcesinallstatesthatpossessthem.•  Eliminatingshort-rangenuclearweaponsdesignedtobeforward-deployed.•  InitiatingabipartisanprocesswiththeSenate,includingunderstandingstoincrease

confidenceandprovideforperiodicreview,toachieveratificationoftheComprehensiveTestBanTreaty,takingadvantageofrecenttechnicaladvances,andworkingtosecureratificationbyotherkeystates.

•  Providingthehighestpossiblestandardsofsecurityforallstocksofweapons,weapons-usableplutonium,andhighlyenricheduraniumeverywhereintheworld.

•  Gettingcontroloftheuraniumenrichmentprocess,combinedwiththeguaranteethaturaniumfornuclearpowerreactorscouldbeobtainedatareasonableprice,firstfromtheNuclearSuppliersGroupandthenfromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)orothercontrolledinternationalreserves.Itwillalsobenecessarytodealwithproliferationissuespresentedbyspentfuelfromreactorsproducingelectricity.

•  Haltingtheproductionoffissilematerialforweaponsglobally;phasingouttheuseofhighlyenricheduraniumincivilcommerceandremovingweapons-usableuraniumfromresearchfacilitiesaroundtheworldandrenderingthematerialssafe.

•  Redoublingoureffortstoresolveregionalconfrontationsandconflictsthatgiverisetonewnuclearpowers.

Shultz,Perry,Kissinger&Nunn(2007)

Bundy,Crowe&Drell(1993)

Drell&Goodby(2007)

Drell&Goodby(2003)

Drell&Peurifoy(1994) Wikipedia

NuclearArsenals

SEPTEMBER20,2017DozensofstatessignnuclearweaponsbantreatyatUnitedNationsReuters

3)Nuclear-weaponssafety&security

Safetyrelatedtechnologiesneedtoberobust–Goldsboro,NCAccident

Jan.23,1961

Everysafetymechanismhadfailed,exceptone:theready/safeswitchinthecockpit.TheswitchwasintheSAFEpositionwhenthebombdropped.HadtheswitchbeensettoGROUNDorAIR,theX-unitwould’vecharged,thedetonatorswould’vetriggered,andathermonuclearweaponwouldhaveexplodedinafieldnearFaro,NorthCarolina.WhenAirForcepersonnelfoundtheMark39laterthatmorning,thebombwasharmlesslystuckintheground,nosefirst,itsparachutedrapedinthebranchesofatree.“Itwouldhavebeenbadnews—inspades,”ParkerF.Jones,asafetyengineeratSandia,wroteinamemoabouttheaccident.“Onesimple,dynamo-technology,low-voltageswitchstoodbetweentheUnitedStatesandamajorcatastrophe!”EricSchlosser,CommandandControl(2013)

Drell,2012

19

121

Eventsper

decade

1990Drell,Foster,TownesSafetyPanelfindingsreinforcedpreviousstudiesofsafetyneeds

ConcernsaboutthesafetyofseveralofthenuclearweaponssystemsintheU.S.arsenalhaveledthegovernmenttotakeimmediatestepstoreducetheriskofunintended,accidentaldetonationsthatcouldresultindispersingplutoniumintotheenvironmentinpotentiallydangerousamountsorevengenerateanuclearyield.Thesestepsincludetemporarilyremovingtheshort-rangeair-togroundattackmissiles,SRAM-A,fromthealertbombersoftheStrategicAirCommandandmodifyingsomeoftheartillery-firedatomicprojectiles(AFAPs)deployedwithU.S.Forces.Modernizationandimprovementprogramsgaveprioritytomilitaryrequirements...Safetyingeneralwasnotviewedwiththesameurgency.Specifically,safety,securityandusecontrolshouldbetreatedtogetherbecauseoftheircriticalimportanceandtheirinterdependence.Amajorconsequenceoftheseresultsisarealizationthatunintendednucleardetonationspresentagreaterriskthanpreviouslyestimated(andbelieved)forsomeofthewarheadsinthestockpile.

Surety:Safety&Security

NuclearWeaponDesignSafetyThefollowingaresafetycriteriadesignrequirementsforallU.S.nuclearweapons:

•  Normalenvironment—Priortoreceiptoftheenablinginputsignalsandthearmingsignal,theprobabilityofaprematurenucleardetonationmustnotexceedoneinabillionpernuclearweaponlifetime. 1:109

•  Abnormalenvironment—Priortoreceiptoftheenablinginputsignals,theprobabilityofaprematurenucleardetonationmustnotexceedoneinamillionpercrediblenuclearweaponaccidentorexposuretoabnormalenvironments. 1:106

•  One-pointsafety—TheprobabilityofachievinganuclearyieldgreaterthanfourpoundsofTNTequivalent,intheeventofaone-pointinitiationoftheweapon’shighexplosive,mustnotexceedoneinamillion. 1:106

DoDNuclearMattersHandbook2016

Publicdisclosureshelpedtofocusgovernmentattentiononaddressingconcerns

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb498/Always/Never (5hourhistory)

https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB/chapters/chapter_7.htm

UQS=uniquesignal

stronglink weaklink

enhancednucleardetonationsafetyENDS

NuclearWeaponsSurety(Safety&Security)

1)Pathtoacatastrophicevent

2)Potentialfornuclearcrisis

3)Difficulttodiscuss