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SITUATIONSANDRESPONSIVENESSTOREASONS*

CarolinaSartorio

UniversityofArizona

Someclassicalstudiesinsocialpsychologysuggestthatwearemoresensitivetosituationalfactors,andlessresponsivetoreasons,thanwenormallyrecognizeweare.Inrecentyears,moralresponsibilitytheoristshaveexaminedthequestionwhetherthosestudiesrepresentaseriousthreattoourmoralresponsibility.Acommonresponsetothe“situationistthreat”hasbeentodefendthereasons-responsivenessofordinaryhumanagentsbyappealtoatheoryofreasons-responsivenessthatappealstopatternsofcounterfactualscenariosorpossibleworlds.InthispaperIidentifyaproblemwiththatresponseandIofferabettersolution.

1.ACase

InafamousexperimentinsocialpsychologybyDarleyandBatson(1973),the“Good

Samaritan”experiment,seminarystudentswereaskedtogiveatalkacrosscampus.

Onthewaythere,theyranintoamanwhoappearedtobe(butwasn’treally)in

needofurgentmedicalcare.Thestudyfoundthatwhetherthestudentswerelikely

tohelpheavilydependedonhowmuchinahurrytheywere:iftheyhadbeentold

thattheyhadverylittletimetogettotheirlecture(the“rush”condition),theywere

muchlesslikelytohelpthaniftheyhadbeentoldthattheyhadmoretime(the“no-

rush”condition).Inrecentyears,moralresponsibilitytheoristshavefocusedon

studiesofthiskindtoseewhatimplicationstheymayhaveabouttheresponsibility

ofhumanagents.Inparticular,theyhaveexaminedwhetherthebehaviorofagents

instudiesofthiskindsuggeststhatwearelessresponsivetoreasons,andthus

arguablylessmorallyresponsible,thanwenormallytakeourselvestobe(see,e.g.,

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Nelkin2005,Nahmias2007,Brink2013,Vargas2013,Stammers2016,McKenna

andWarmkeForthcoming,andHerdovaandKearnsForthcoming).

Conditionssuchastherushandno-rushconditionsintheGoodSamaritan

experimentareknownassituationalfeatures.Situationalfeaturesareexternal

factorsoftheenvironmentthatdon’tmakeadifferencetowhatweshoulddointhe

circumstances,butthatstilltendtohaveaneffectonwhatweactuallydo.Ifyourun

intoamanwhodesperatelyneedsyourhelp,youshouldassisthim,evenifthat

meansthatyou’llbelateforalecture.(Althoughbeinginarushcouldprovidesome

reasonnottohelp,itisnotasufficientreasonnottohelp,inthecircumstances,and

itdoesn’tmakeadifferencetowhatyoushoulddointhatcase.)Insomecases,the

studiesalsoseemtoshowthatsituationalfactorscanaffectthebehaviorofhuman

agentswithoutourevenrealizingthatthisisthecase;infact,bycontradictingthe

principlesofactionthatweconsciouslystandby(suchastheprinciplethatwe

shouldassistsomeoneinneedevenifthismeansthatwe’llbelateforalecture).

Thusthethreattoourresponsibilityposedbystudiesofthiskindisthattheyseem

toshowthatwearemoresensitivetosituationalfactors,andlessresponsiveto

reasons,thanwenormallyrecognizeweare.I’llrefertothischallengeasthe

situationistthreat.

Severalreasons-responsivenesstheoristshavepushedbackagainstthis

threat.TheyhavepointedoutthatstudiesliketheGoodSamaritanexperimentfail

toshowthatagentsarepreytosituationalfactors,atleastinanyradicalkindofway.

For,theyhaveargued,eveninthosecasesagentstendtoretainasufficientextentof

responsivenesstoreasons(seeBrink2013,Vargas2013,McKennaandWarmke

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Forthcoming,andHerdovaandKearnsForthcoming).Ingeneralterms,thestrategy

hasbeenthefollowing.Accordingtotraditionaltheoriesofreasons-responsiveness,

whetheragentsretainasufficientextentofresponsivenesstoreasonsisamatterof

whethertheyhadontherelevantoccasionthecapacitytorespondtotherelevant

reasons,regardlessofwhethertheyactuallyexercisedsuchacapacity.And,even

thoughsomeagentswhoaresubjecttosituationalinfluencesdon’trespondtothe

actualreasonsduetothepresenceofthosefactors,theyretaintherelevantcapacity

torespondtothosereasons.

Whatdetermineswhetherthoseagentshaveorlacktherelevantcapacity?

Ontheseviews,theanswerisgivenbytheexistenceornonexistenceofcertain

counterfactualscenarios,orofapatternofcounterfactualscenarios,wherethe

agentsrespondtotherelevantreasonsandthusactotherwise.Ifthereareenough

possibleworlds,orpatternsofpossibleworlds,wheretheagentsrespondtothe

relevantreasons,thisissufficientforthoseagentstohavethecapacityinquestion,

andthustoberesponsible.Howmanyofthosecounterfactualscenariosare

“enough”is,ofcourse,notsomethingthatcanbegivenaprecisecharacterization,

anditmaydependonthenatureofeachspecificcase.Butthethoughtisthatfor

eachsetofcircumstanceswe’llbeabletoidentifysomerelevantsetof

counterfactualscenariosandsomevaguelyspecifiedthresholdbeyondwhichwe

wouldjudgethattheagenthadthecapacityinquestion.

So,toreturntotheGoodSamaritancase,thequestionwouldbewhetherthe

agentswhofailedtohelpthevictimintherushconditionstillretainedthecapacity

tohelphimandthuscanbemorallyresponsiblefornothelpinghim.Andthiswould

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beamatterofwhetherthereareenoughcounterfactualscenarios,orpatternsof

counterfactualscenarios,wherethoseagentsrespondtotherelevantreasonsand

actotherwise.

Whatcouldbesuchcounterfactualscenarios?Well,foronething,noticethat

theexperimentalresultsthemselvessuggestthatmanyofthesubjectswhofailto

assistthemanintherushconditionwouldhaveinfactassistedhimiftheyhadbeen

placedintheno-rushconditioninstead.Afterall,whatthestudyisinterpretedto

suggestispreciselythatwhetherornotyou’reinahurryislikelytomakea

differencetowhatyoudointhosecircumstances.Sothismeansthatthereareat

leastsomecounterfactualscenarios,scenarioswheretheagentsarenotinahurry,

wheretheagentsinquestiontendtorespondtotherelevantreasons(Herdovaand

KearnsForthcoming).1Also,theexperimentalresultsarecompatiblewiththe

existenceofseveralotherscenariosinwhichtheagentisequallyinarushbutstops

tohelpthevictim.Forexample,thesecouldbescenariosinwhichthevictimwas

muchmorevisiblyhurt,suchassomeonewhohadanaxesunkintheirskull

(McKennaandWarmkeForthcoming).Itisreasonabletoexpectthatmanyofthe

originalsubjectsintheexperimentwouldhavehelpedthevictimiftheyhadbeen

placedinsuchan“axe-in-skull”condition,eveniftheywereinahurry.Andthesame

canbesaidaboutseveralothernon-actualconditions.(Ofcourse,wecouldonly

knowforsurebyrunningmorestudies!Butnotethat,inordertotestforthis,we

wouldhavetorunlotsofstudiesinwhichwe’dvarydifferentaspectsofthe

circumstancesthatwethinkarelikelytohaveaninfluenceontheagents’behavior.)

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So,ifthereissuchavarietyofcounterfactualscenariosorpatternofpossible

worldswherethesubjectsinstudiesliketheGoodSamaritancaserespondtothe

relevantreasonsandassistthevictim,itfollowsfromtraditionaltheoriesof

reasons-responsivenessthatthoseagentsaresufficientlyresponsivetoreasonsand

thusmorallyresponsibleforactuallyfailingtoassisthim.Ofcourse,theycouldstill

besomewhatlessresponsivetoreasonsthanothersubjectswhowereneverplaced

inthoseconditions.And,asaresult,assumingthatmoralresponsibilitycomesin

degreesandthatittracksdegreesofreasons-responsiveness,theycouldalsobe

somewhatlessresponsiblethanthoseothersubjects.Butthemainpointisthatthey

wouldstillbemorallyresponsiblefortheirbehavior.Thesituationistthreathas

beendefused,forthemostpart,orsoitseems.

2.AProblem

Butthereisabasicworrywiththisstrategy.Theworrycanbemotivatedinthe

followingway.Thesituationistthreatarisesfromthefactthatwecanapparentlybe

“gripped”bysomeaspectsoftheactualcircumstances(inmanycases,withoutour

evenrealizingthis)inwaysthatcanundermineourcontrolandresponsibility.Thus,

inordertodeterminewhetherthisistrueinacertaincase,theobjectiongoes,we

cannotsupposeawaythoseveryaspectsofthecircumstancesandtrytofigureout

howtheagentwouldhavebehavedinscenarioswherethecircumstanceswere

different.For,ifwe’retryingtodeterminewhetherthecircumstances—theactual

circumstances—aregrippingus,it’sofnousetolookatwhatwewouldhavedoneif

thosecircumstanceshadbeendifferent.

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Compare:thereareotherthingsthatcan(muchlesscontroversially)gripus

inawaythattheycanrobusofcontrolandresponsibility.Acompulsivedesire,for

example,canhavesuchaneffectonus.Imagineanextremeaddictwhoisirresistibly

compelledtotakeadrugonacertainoccasion.Anaccountofresponsibilityinterms

ofreasons-responsivenesswouldsaythattheaddictisnotresponsivetoreasons

whenheactsonhisdesiretotakethedrugonthatoccasion.Now,imaginearguing

thatthisisnotactuallytruebecausetheaddictretainsthecapacitytofailtotakethe

drugwhenhedoesn’tdesiretotakeit—say,incircumstanceswherehetookthedrug

veryrecently.Ofcourse,inmostofthosecircumstanceswherehedoesn’tdesireto

takethedrug,hedoesn’ttakeit.Doesthismeanthatouraddictretainssome

measureofreasons-responsiveness?

Ofcoursenot!Circumstanceswherehedoesn’tdesiretotakethedrugjust

aren’trelevanttohowreasons-responsiveheiswhenhetakesthedrugdrivenby

hisdesiretotakeit—inotherwords,whenhisaddictionkicksin.Ifwearetryingto

figureoutwhetherabehaviorbyanagentisacompulsivebehavior,whatweare

tryingtodetermineiswhetherhisactualdesiregripshiminawaythatrobshimof

controlandresponsibility.Inordertoanswerthisquestion,wecannotlookatcases

wherethedesireisn’tpresent,butmustfocusonlyonwhathappenstotheagent

whenthedesireispresent.Afterall,thecompulsionisn’talwaysatplay,butis

triggeredbythedesire(orbythecircumstancesgivingrisetothedesire),andwhat

weareinterestedinfindingoutiswhethertheagentactsfreelyinthosespecific

circumstances,whereheisdrivenbythedesire.2

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Thesituationistthreatmustbeinterpretedalongsimilarlines,Iclaim,lest

weunderappreciateitsforce.Thecontentionisthatexternalcircumstancescangrip

ustoo,inasimilarway,andcanalsorobusofcontrolandresponsibility.Butthenit

seemsthatwecannotassumethattheagent’sreasons-responsivenessis

determinedbywhatshedoesinconditionswherethoseverysamecircumstances

areabsent.Inparticular,blamingtheagentsintherushconditionfornothelpingthe

victimonthebasisofwhattheywouldhavedoneiftheyhadbeenplacedintheno-

rushconditionseemswrong,justaswrongasblamingtheaddictforsuccumbingto

hisdesiretotakethedrugonthebasisofthefactthathecaneasilyrefrainfrom

takingthedrugwheneverhedoesn’tdesiretotakeit.Afterall,whatwearetryingto

figureoutiswhetherthoseagentsintherushconditionweresufficientlygrippedby

thespecificcircumstancesthataretheactualcircumstances,inparticular,bytheir

beinginahurry.Whattheydoinscenarioswherethecircumstancesaredifferent—

circumstanceswheretheyarenotinahurry—isarguablyirrelevanttothis

question.

Inresponse,itcouldbearguedthatreasons-responsivenessisamatterof

degree,andthat,eveninthecaseoftheaddict,heisslightlymoresensitiveto

reasonsgivenwhathedoesinpossibleworldswherehedoesn’tdesiretotakethe

drug.Sothoseworldsdocounttowardshisreasons-responsiveness,althoughthey

areprobablynotenoughtomakehimresponsible.Onthisview,allworlds(or,

perhaps,allnearbyworlds)whereagentshavesufficientreasonstorefrainfrom

actingandwheretheyactonthosereasonscounttowardtheirreasons-

responsiveness.

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Butthisistomissthepointoftheobjection.Theobjectionisthat,inthecase

oftheaddict,possibleworldswherehedoesn’tdesiretotakethedrugarejustplain

irrelevanttohisreasons-responsivenessonthatoccasion(similarly,intheGood

Samaritancase,possibleworldswheretheagentsaren’tinahurry,arejustplain

irrelevanttotheirreasons-responsivenessonthatoccasion).Theyareirrelevant

becausetheydon’tspeaktohowresponsivetoreasonshewaswhenhetookthe

drugwhilebeingunderthegripofthedesire,whichiswhatwewanttoknowinthat

case.Sothosepossibleworldsshouldn’tevenbeamongtherelevantpossible

worlds,whenweareassessingthereasons-responsivenessoftheagentinthose

cases.Takingreasons-responsivenesstobeamatterofdegreeisconsistentwith

thinkingthattherearepossibleworldswheretheagenthassufficientreasonsto

refrainfromactinginthewayhedoesintheactualworld,butthataresimply

irrelevanttohisreasons-responsivenessonthatparticularoccasion.

Imagine,then,thatwearemovedbytheforceofthisargumentandthuswe

concedethatpossibleworldswheretheagentsarenotinahurryarejustirrelevant

totheirreasons-responsivenessintherushcondition.Howaboutotherpossible

worlds,suchas(tousethesameexamplebyMcKennaandWarmkefrombefore)

worldswherethevictimliesonthegroundwithanaxesunkintheirskull?Couldn’t

thosecounterfactualscenariosberelevant?

Yes,inprinciple,theycould.Butreasons-responsivenessviewsfacea

demarcationproblematthispoint.Forweneedsomeprincipledreasontosingleout

theaspectsoftheactualcircumstancesthatwecanvaryfromtheaspectsofthe

circumstancesthatwemustheldfixedinordertoassessanagent’sreasons-

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responsivenessonacertainoccasion.Onceweacknowledgethatnotallpossible

worldswheretheagentshavesufficientreasonstorefrainfromactingarerelevant

totheirreasons-responsivenessintheactualscenario,weneedtosaymoreabout

whichonesarerelevantandwhichonesaren’t.IntheGoodSamaritancase,for

example,whatdetermineswhethertheagentsintherushconditionweremorally

responsibleforfailingtoassistthevictim?Isittheirreasons-responsivenessjust

holdingfixedthattheywereinahurry?Orisittheirreasons-responsivenessalso

holdingfixed,forinstance,thattherewasnoextremelyvividemergencysuchasthe

presenceofavictimwithanaxesunkinherskull?

Thesearehardquestions.Butunlesswecanfigureouthowtoanswerthem

wewon’tbeabletosettletheissueofwhethertheagentsweresufficiently

responsivetoreasonsonthatoccasion.Fortheextentoftheirresponsivenessto

reasonswillvarysignificantly,dependingonwhichaspectsofthecircumstanceswe

holdfixedandwhichoneswevary.Sothereisaninterestingpuzzlethatarisesfor

reasons-responsivenessviews,onethatthesituationistthreathelpsbringoutina

particularlyvividway.Abitmoreprecisely,thepuzzleisthis.Exampleswhere

situationalfeatureshaveaninfluenceonthebehaviorofagentscanbeusedto

illustratethefactthat,inassessinganagent’sresponsivenesstoreasonsin

counterfactualterms(intermsoftheirbehaviorincounterfactualscenarios),at

leastsomeaspectsoftheactualcircumstancesmustbeheldfixed.For,ifwedon’t

holdanyaspectsofthecircumstancesfixed,wefacetheirrelevanceworry:the

worrythatthecounterfactualscenarioswearefocusingonarejustirrelevanttothe

agent’sresponsivenesstoreasonsintheactualcircumstances.Now,ofcoursewe

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can’tholdalltheaspectsofthecircumstancesfixed,onpainoftrivializingreasons-

responsivenessviews.Soweneedsomeprincipledcriteriontosetapart,ineach

case,theaspectsofthecircumstancesthatweshouldholdfixedfromthosethatwe

canlegitimatelyvary.Unlesswecanoffersuchacriterion,reasons-responsiveness

viewsrestonshakyfoundations.

Thisisanimportantproblemfortraditionaltheoriesofreasons-

responsiveness,onethatdeservesimmediateattention.Surprisingly,verylittlehas

beensaidintheliteratureaboutit;atleast,verylittlehasbeensaidthatspeaks

directlytothisissue.3

Iwillargueforaradicalsolutiontotheproblem,onethatissoradicalthatit

managestoavoiditaltogether.Iwillsuggestthatwecanavoidthedemarcation

problembyswitchingtoanactualistconceptionofreasons-responsiveness.Itisan

“actualist”conceptioninthatitunderstandsresponsivenesstoreasons,notinterms

ofpatternsofcounterfactualscenarios,butjustintermsoftheactualscenarioand

theactualcircumstancesinwhichtheagentacts.Ofcourse,ifwejustfocusonthe

actualscenario,insteadofondeparturesfromtheactualcircumstancesorinmerely

possibleworlds,theproblemofdemarcationsimplydisappears.Forthenwedon’t

havetoworryaboutwhichvariationsareallowedandwhicharen’t,orwhich

possibleworldsarerelevantandwhicharen’t.

3.ASolution

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Buthow,youmayask,couldresponsivenesstoreasonsjustbeamatterofwhat

happensintheactualscenario?Atfirstthismaysoundcompletelyconfused,almost

likeacontradictioninterms.

Butit’snot.Thebasicideaisthis.4Incaseswhereagentsareresponsiveto

reasons,therearemanyaspectsoftheactualcircumstancesthatareexplanatorily

relevanttotheagents’behaviorbutthattendtoremainunnoticed.IntheGood

Samaritancase,oneofthemhastodowiththeaxe-in-skullconditiondiscussed

above.Imaginethat,asitisreasonabletoexpect,mostsubjectsintherushcondition

are“ordinary”humanbeingsinthattheyaresensitivetoextremelyvivid

emergenciessuchasanaxe’sstickingoutfromthevictim’sskull.Calloneofthose

agents“Sensitive.”Nowimaginethatthereisalsoan(out-of-the-ordinary)agentin

thegroup,callhim“Insensitive,”whoissogrippedbytherushconditionthathe

becomesinsensitivetoanysuchemergencieswheneverheisinahurry.Insensitive

is,inanimportantsense,likeourearlierexampleoftheaddict,whoisgrippedby

hiscompulsivedesiretotakethedrugandisinsensitivetoprettymuchanything

elsethatmightbegoingonaroundhimwheneverheisundertheinfluenceofthe

desire:hestandstothecircumstanceofbeinginahurryinthesamewaytheaddict

standstohisdesiretotakethedrug.

Again,imaginethatbothofouragents,SensitiveandInsensitive,failtoassist

thevictimwhentheyareplacedintherushcondition.Still,surely,thereisan

importantdifferencebetweenthem.ThedifferenceIhaveinminddoesn’tjust

concernhowtheybehaveinotherpossibleworlds,butitconcerns,more

fundamentally,theactualexplanationoftheirbehavior.Plainlyput,thedifferenceis

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that,inchoosingnottoassistthevictimintheactualcircumstances,Sensitivewas

respondingtotheabsenceofvividemergenciesandInsensitivewasnot.

Comparethisothercase.ImaginethatyouandIliketosingatthetopofour

lungswhileshowering,butyouaremuchmoreconsideratethanme:yourefrain

fromdoingsowheneverthereissomebodyinthehousewhodoesn’tappreciate

yourmusicalperformance,butIdon’tcareatallaboutthatanddosoregardless,

withoutexception.Imaginethatonacertainoccasionwherenobodyisaround,we

bothsing“BohemianRhapsody”atthetopofourlungs.Surely,eveninthatcase,

thereisadifferenceintheactualexplanationofourbehavior:youdoit,among

otherthings,becausenobodyisaround,butIdon’t.I’mjustinsensitivetothat

aspectoftheactualcircumstances.Sothefactthatnobodyisaroundisnotpartof

theexplanationofmysinging;however,itisinyourcase,asinthecaseofanyother

equallyconsiderateperson.

Thisdifferencebetweentheconsiderateandtheinconsideratesingerisareal

andsignificantone.Butitmaybeeasytooverlookit,atfirstglance,inscenariosof

thiskind,wheretheactualbehaviorisexactlythesame,andwherethereisamore

obviousorsalientcausethatpartiallyexplainsthebehaviorinbothcases(our

desiretosingwhileshowering).Inparticular,notethatthedifferenceconcernsthe

roleofanabsence(theabsenceofanannoyedaudience)intheexplanationofour

behavior.Soitmightbeeasytooverlookthisdifference,inthesecases,becauseit

hastodowiththeroleplayedbyanabsenceinsteadofapositiveevent.Absences

tendtoremainunnoticed,andforgoodreason:it’shardtokeeptrackofallthe

absencesintheworld!Still,wewouldbemissingsomethingimportantaboutthose

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agentsandtheirbehaviorifweweretosaythattheydowhattheydoforexactlythe

samereasons.Theydon’tdowhattheydoforexactlythesamereasons,sincethey

arenotbeingsensitivetoallthesameaspectsofthecircumstances.

Youmightbewonderinghowthisdifferencebetweentheexplanationofthe

consideratesinger’sbehaviorandtheexplanationoftheinconsideratesinger’s

behaviorshouldbecashedoutinmetaphysicalterms.Thisisadifficultissue,one

thatconcernshowweshouldmakesenseoftalkaboutabsencecausationorabout

theexplanatorypowerofabsences,andthisisnottheplacetodiscussit.Still,

regardlessofhowexactlythedifferenceshouldbecashedout,itseemsclearthatit

isarealandimportantdifference,astheexamplesoftheconsiderateand

inconsideratesingerhelpillustrate.5

IsubmitthatweshouldanalyzethebehaviorofouragentsintheGood

Samaritanscenario,SensitiveandInsensitive,inasimilarway.Theactual

explanationofSensitive’sbehaviorincludestheno-axe-in-skullaspectofthe

circumstances,ortheabsenceofanaxeinthevictim’sskull,whereasthisisn’ttrue

ofInsensitive’sbehavior,giventhatheisinsensitivetothosethings(whenheisina

hurry).Althoughthetwoagentsinfactbehaveinthesameway,andalthoughsome

ofthecausesofwhattheydoarethesame(theybothfailtoassistthevictim

becausetheyareinahurry),theydon’tdowhattheydoforexactlythesame

reasons,orforallthesamereasons.Again,wewouldbemissingsomething

importantabouttheirbehaviorifweweretosaythattheybehaveinthewaythey

doforexactlythesamereasons,orforallthesamereasons.

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Thisgeneralizestootheraspectsofthecircumstancesthatcouldplausiblybe

playingaroleintheagents’behavior.Wheneverthereisadifferenceintheagents’

sensitivitytocertainaspectsofthesituation,thatdifferencewillbereflectedinthe

actualexplanationoftheirbehavior.Thismeansthatwedon’tneedtolookat

merelypossibleworldsorcounterfactualscenariostolocateadifferenceinthe

reasons-responsivenessoftheseagents:theactualworldandtheactual

circumstancesaresufficient,oncewelookcloseenough.

Whatweneedtodo,then,isbuildatheoryofreasons-responsivenessthat

appealstosuchfeaturesoftheactualexplanationofbehavior.Thisisanactualist

theoryofreasons-responsiveness.Roughly,itisatheoryaccordingtowhich,

whenevertheactualexplanationoftheagent’sbehaviorexhibitssensitivityto

enoughoftherelevantaspectsofthecircumstances,theagentisreasons-

responsive;otherwiseheisnot.Forexample,theviewwouldsaythatSensitiveis

sufficientlyresponsivetoreasonsandInsensitiveisnotbecausetheactual

explanationofSensitive’sbehaviorrevealsthatheisresponsivetocertainrelevant

aspectsofthecircumstances(theno-axe-in-skullcondition,amongmanyothers),

whiletheactualexplanationofInsensitive’sbehaviordoesnot.6

Thisviewcompletelyavoidstheproblemofdemarcationthatarisesfor

traditional(i.e.counterfactualist)reasons-responsivenessviews.Again,sinceit

doesn’tappealtopossibleworldsorhypotheticalchangesintheactualconditions,

thereisnoneedtodistinguishthosepossibleworldsthatarerelevanttotheagent’s

reasons-responsivenessfromthosethatarenot,orthoseaspectsofthe

circumstancesthatwehavetoholdfixedinassessingtheagent’sreasons-

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responsivenessfromthosethatwecanlegitimatelyvary.Allweshouldlookat,

accordingtotheactualistview,istheactualexplanationoftheagent’sbehavior.In

somecases,certainaspectsoftheactualcircumstanceswillbeexplanatorily

relevanttotheagent’sbehavior,andinothercasestheywon’tbe.That’sallthereis

toit.

ThewayIhavemotivatedtheactualistviewcanalsobeusedtoshedlighton

someremarksImadeearlier,whenIintroducedtheproblemofdemarcationby

appealtotheGoodSamaritancase.Inoticedthenthatthereseemstobesomething

inappropriateaboutappealingtowhattheagentswoulddointheno-rushcondition

toassesstheirreasons-responsivenessintheactual,rushcondition.Nowwecansee

why.IntheGoodSamaritanscenariotheno-rushconditionisn’tactual.Asaresult,

ontheactualistview,itjustisn’trelevanttotheagent’sreasons-responsivenessin

theactual,rushconditions.Again,thisstrikesmeasexactlywhatwewanttosayin

thiscase.Justliketheaddict’sreasons-responsivenesswhenhetakesthedrug

drivenbythedesiretotakeitcannotbedeterminedbywhathedoesinscenarios

wherehedoesn’thavethedesire,thereasons-responsivenessofanagentinthe

rushconditioncannotbedeterminedbywhattheagentdoesintheno-rush

condition.

Incontrast,noticethattheno-axe-in-skullcondition(thatistosay,the

absenceofanaxeinthevictim’sskull)isactual:asamatteroffact,therehappensto

benoaxesunkinthevictim’sskull,inthecircumstanceswheretheagentsact.Not

onlyisitactual,but,aswehaveseen,itcanplayanexplanatoryroleintheagents’

behavior(asitdoesinthecaseofSensitive:theabsenceofanaxeinthevictim’s

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skullispartoftheexplanationofwhySensitivefailstoassistthevictim).Asaresult,

itcanberelevant,andarguablyitisrelevant,totheagents’responsivenessto

reasonsintheactualcircumstances.Again,thisstrikesmeastherightresult.As

illustratedbythecontrastbetweenSensitiveandInsensitive,whetheranagentwas

beingsensitivetoconditionsofthatkindseemstomattertowhetherwewould

judgethatshewasresponsivetoreasonswhensheacted.WhenSensitiveacted,she

seemedtoberesponsivetoreasonsinawaythatInsensitivewasnot,giventhatshe

wasrespondingtocertainrelevantaspectsofthecircumstancesthatInsensitive

wasn’trespondingto.

So,onthisview,manydifferentaspectsofthecircumstancescanberelevant

totheagent’sreasons-responsiveness—basically,allofthoseaspectsofthe

circumstancesthatwewouldidentifyasreasons,orabsencesofreasons,that

rationalizetheagent’sbehavior.Buttheyareallaspectsoftheactualcircumstances.

Althoughtheappearanceofanemergencyisactual,theagentsintheGood

Samaritancasearen’trespondingtoit,sothisdoesn’tcountinfavoroftheir

reasons-responsiveness.However,therearemanyotheraspectsoftheactual

circumstancesthatareintuitivelyalsorelevanttotheirreasons-responsivenesson

thatoccasion,andthatitisplausibletothinktheyarerespondingto.Itiseasyto

missthem,becausetheytaketheformofabsences:theabsenceofanaxesunkinthe

victim’sskull,theabsenceofyellingonthevictim’spart,etc.But,onreflection,they

seemtobejustasrelevanttotheagent’sreasons-responsivenessasthepositive

ones.So,onthisview,totheextentthatagentsaresensitivetotheseothersaspects

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ofthecircumstanceswhentheyact,theycanstillbesufficientlyresponsiveto

reasons.

Atthispoint,traditionalreasons-responsivenesstheoristscouldthinkof

appropriatingtheseresultsandusingthemtoanswerthedemarcationproblemthat

arisesfortheirviews.Theycouldclaim,inparticular,thatpossibleworldswherethe

agentsarenotinahurryarenotrelevanttotheirreasons-responsiveness,but

possibleworldswherethevictimhasanaxesunkinhisskull(orwherethevictimis

screamingloudly,etc.)are.

Butnoticewhathashappenedhere.Thissolutionwouldsimplypiggybackon

themotivationfortheactualistview.And,oncewehaveavailabletheactualist

accountofthesecases,thereisnofurtherworktobedonebythepossibleworlds.

Oncewerealizethatthereisanactualdifferencebetweenouragents,Sensitiveand

Insensitive,adifferencethatconcernsjusttheactualexplanationoftheirbehavior,

wenolongerneedtoappealtopossibleworldstoaccountforthedifferencein

reasons-responsiveness.

Thisisapointworthemphasizing.WhenIclaimedthatwewouldbemissing

somethingimportantabouttheagents’behaviorifweweretosaythatSensitiveand

Insensitivedidwhattheydidforexactlythesamereasons,Imeantthateverybody

shouldacceptthatthereisadifferenceintheactualexplanationoftheirbehavior.In

particular,traditionalreasons-responsivenesstheoristsshouldacceptthistoo.

Moreover,everybodyshouldacceptthatsuchadifferenceintheactualexplanation

oftheirbehaviorisintuitivelyrelevanttotheirreasons-responsiveness.Butthenit

seemsthattheappealtocounterfactualscenariosisnolongermotivated,orneeded.

18

Toclarifythispointfurther:thisisnottosaythatcounterfactualscenariosor

possibleworldsneedn’tplayaroleontheactualistview.Theycouldstillplayarole,

evenontheactualistview,bygroundingtheclaimsabouttheactualexplanationsof

behavior.Forexample,onecouldhavetheviewthatthefactthatSensitiveis

responsivetotheabsenceofanaxeinthevictim’sskullisgroundedinthefactthat

herespondstothepresenceofanaxeinsomepossibleworldswherethevictimhas

anaxesunkinhisskull.Whetherweshouldsaythatpossibleworldsplaythiskind

ofrolewoulddependonwhatwethinkabouthowclaimsaboutactualcausesor

actualexplanationsaregrounded(ifwethinkthattheyaregroundedinanythingat

all).Ifwebelievethattheyaregroundedincounterfactualfacts,thenthe

counterfactualfactsbecomerelevantbyvirtueofprovidingthegroundsforthe

relevantfactsaboutactualcausesoractualexplanations.7

Idon’twanttotakeastandonthisissuehere,andIdon’tneedto.Fornote

that,evenifsomepossibleworldsweretoplaythatkindofrole,theywouldonlydo

soinsofarastheyhelpgroundtherelevantfactsaboutactualcausesoractual

explanations.Thecounterfactualfactswouldonlyberelevantbecauseoftheir

connectionwiththeactuallyexplanatoryfacts.So,onthisview,possibleworlds

wouldn’tplayanyroleindependentlyofthissubsidiaryrole,andresponsivenessto

reasonswouldstilljustbeamatteroffactsabouttheactualsourcesofbehavior(the

factsaboutactualexplanations,andwhicheverfactsgroundthosefacts).

4.Conclusion

19

Thesituationistthreatisathreattoourreasons-responsivenessposedbyexternal

circumstancesthataresaidtobesostrongthattheycandepriveusofourreasons-

responsivenessoncertainoccasions.Whenwearesubjecttosuchforces,theclaim

is,thesituationalfactors“grip”usandrenderusblindorirresponsivetoour

reasons.InthispaperIhaveoutlinedwhatItaketobetherightanswertothe

situationistthreat.

Ihaveargued,first,thatthethreatcannotbeansweredsimplybydrawingon

counterfactualscenariosthatdifferfromtheactualworldwithrespecttothevery

aspectsofthecircumstancesthataresaidtogriptheagent.Instead,Ihaveargued

thatweshouldanswerthethreatinaradicallydifferentway.Basically,thestrategy

consistsindrawingonother,usuallylessimmediatelyobvious,aspectsoftheactual

circumstances,aspectsthat(itisreasonabletoassume)theagentsinquestionare

respondingtowhentheyactintheactualscenario.Ihavesuggestedthatthiscanbe

donebyappealtoaplausibleandindependentlymotivatedactualisttheoryof

reasons-responsiveness.

TheactualistviewthatIhavesketchedherehassomeimportantfeatures

thatareworthmentioning.First,andmostobviously,itcomesapartfrom

traditional(counterfactualist)viewsofreasons-responsivenessinthatitdisposesof

theconceptofresponsivenesstoreasonsasacapacitythatispossiblyunexercised,

andreplacesitwithaconceptthatispurelybasedontheactualsourcesofbehavior.

AsIhaveexplained,thishastheadvantagethatithelpsusavoidaseriousproblem

fortraditionalviewsofreasons-responsiveness,whichIhavereferredtoas“the

20

problemofdemarcation.”Onceweembracetheactualistframework,theproblem

simplyvanishes.

Asanaddedbonus,theactualistviewsitswellwithanincreasinglypopular

andelegantconceptionofmoralresponsibility,theonespearheadedbyHarry

Frankfurtinhisclassicalpaperonresponsibilityandalternativepossibilities

(Frankfurt1969).Accordingtothisconceptionofresponsibility,thetypeofcontrol

requiredtobemorallyresponsibleforourbehaviorisjustamatteroftheactual

sourcesofourbehavior,orofwhyweactuallydowhatwedo;nothingelsematters.

Theactualistframeworkofreasons-responsivenessthatIhavesketchedhereisa

goodmatchforthisconceptionofresponsibility.8

Toconclude,then:whathavewelearnedaboutthesubjectsintheGood

Samaritanstudy,andaboutthereasons-responsivenessofhumanagentsmore

generally?Arewereallysensitivetothevariousaspectsoftheactualcircumstances

thatweneedtobesensitivetoinordertobesufficientlyresponsivetoreasons?At

theendoftheday,thisisanempiricalquestion,sothemostIcanofferhereisan

educatedguess.Butatleastwecandrawthefollowingconclusion.Unlessitcanbe

shownthatmostofusarelikeourhypotheticalcharacterInsensitive,inthatweare

generallyinsensitivetothevariousaspectsoftheactualcircumstancesthatare

relevanttoourreasons-responsiveness,weshouldn’tconcludethatstudieslikethe

GoodSamaritanexperimentprovethatwearenotresponsivetoreasons.Thus,

unlessanduntilthatcanbeshown,weshouldn’tregardthesituationistthreatasa

seriouschallengetoourresponsibility.

21

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*Forhelpfulcomments,thankstoJuanComesaña,MichaelMcKenna,andanaudienceatUniversidadAutónomadeMadrid.1HerdovaandKearnsuseFischerandRavizza’saccountofreasons-responsiveness(FischerandRavizza1998)astheirmainexampleofareasons-responsivenessview.TheyapplyFischerandRavizza’sviewtoscenariosliketheGoodSamaritanandargue,onthatbasis,thatagentsremainsufficientlyreasons-responsiveinthosecases.Buttheyalsopointoutthatotheraccountsofreasons-responsiveness,suchasVargas’2013account,whichrelativizereasons-responsivenesstotheagents’circumstances,wouldhavedifferentresultsinthosecases.WhatI’llsuggestinthenextsectionis,ineffect,thatsomerelativizationtocircumstancesisalwayswarranted,givenanyplausibleaccountofreasons-responsiveness.2Inthisvein,Haji(1998)defendsatheoryofreasons-responsivenessaccordingtowhichinordertodeterminehowresponsivetoreasonsagentsareweneedtoholdfixedtheagents’motivationalstate.Suchanaccountwouldentailthattheaddict’scompulsivedesirehastobeheldfixedinordertoassesshisreasons-responsiveness.3McKenna2005isanexception.McKennaarguesforaviewaccordingtowhichthebestwaytounderstandreasons-responsiveness(atleastinthecaseofblameworthiness)isintermsofthecapacitytorespondtotheactualmoralreasons.

23

Inordertodothis,heargues,wemustholdfixedthosereasonswhilevaryingotheraspectsofthecircumstances(allofthisiswithinthecontextofFischerandRavizza’s1998reasons-responsivenessaccount).It’saninterestingquestionwhetherthissuggestionbyMcKennacanbemodifiedandsuitablyextendedtotheGoodSamaritancase—where,aswehaveseen,oneshouldarguablyalsoholdfixedsomesalientfeaturesofthecircumstances,suchasthefactthattheagentwasinarush.Insteadoftryingtosettlethisissuehere,mystrategywillbetoargueforadifferentconceptionofreasons-responsiveness,oneforwhichtheproblemdoesn’tevenarise.4IdevelopthisinmorelengthinSartorio2016,chapter4.HereI’mmostlyinterestedinhowtheviewhelpsavoidtheproblemofdemarcationthatarisesforreasons-responsivenessaccounts.SeealsoSartorio2015,whereIhintatarelatedissue(seeespeciallysection5.5).5IdiscussthisissueanddifferentpossibleapproachestoitinSartorio2016,chapter2.Themainpossibilitiesinclude:understandingthedifferenceintermsofcausation,causalexplanation,orotherrelationslikequasi-causation(Dowe2001).6Formoreonthis,seeSartorio2016,chapter4.Again,hereIamnotinterestedingivingthedetailsofsuchatheory,butsimplyonitsbasicclaimsandmotivations,andinhowithelpswiththedemarcationproblemfacedbyreasons-responsivenessviews.Therelevantaspectsofthecircumstancesarereasonsforactionandabsencesofreasonsforaction.Notethat,onthisview,reasons-responsivenessstilldependsonavaguelyspecifiedthreshold:beingresponsivetoreasonsisamatterofactuallyrespondingtoenoughoftherelevantaspectsofthecircumstances.7HereIhaveinmindcounterfactualaccountsofcausationorexplanation(see,e.g.,Lewis1986).8IargueforthisindepthinSartorio2016.Ofcourse,theactualistviewcouldstillworkasanadequatetheoryofreasons-responsivenesseveniftheconceptionofresponsibilitymotivatedbyFrankfurtfailed.Inotherwords,althoughtheactualistviewisagoodmatchforsuchaconceptionofresponsibility,itdoesn’tdependonthetruthofsuchaconceptionofresponsibility.