sirseloudi teras index

TERAS-INDEX Terrorism and Radicalisation –

Indicators for External Impact Factors

Dr. des. Matenia Sirseloudi

Potsdamer Konferenz für Gesellschaft und Sicherheit, Universität Potsdam, 26. April 2012

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Outline Main goals of TERAS-INDEX

Conceptual background of TERAS-INDEX

Indicators for radicalisation potential

Why external factors?

Assumptions / Hypotheses

Methodical approach in generating indicators

page 2Terrorism and Radicalisation – Indicators for External Impact Factors Dr. des. Matenia Sirseloudi

Terrorism and Radicalisation – Indicators for External Impact Factors Dr. des. Matenia Sirseloudi Seite 3

Main goals of TERAS-INDEX Elaboration of indicators on the impact of foreign and security policy on Islamist

radicalisation processes in Europe – these indicators shall enable us to anticipateIslamist radicalisation processes at an early stage

Elaboration of instruments to capture the feedback effects of German foreign andsecurity policy on Islamist radicalisation processes

Description of influencable variables on of German foreign and security policy on Islamist radicalisation processes towards jihadist terrorism

Empirical research on the impact of external conflicts on three different levels ofradicalisation as represented in three milieus (vulnerable youth, Islamists, Jihadists) andon the radical Islamist discourse

Detection of potential intervening variables, such as migration policy (internal structural factor) Mobilisation efforts of international terrorist groups independent of German foreign

and security policy

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Ex-ternal Con-flicts

Do-mestic and inter-na-tional

Identity construction in the diaspora

Terrorists / jihad discourse

Islamists/ islamist discourse

Vulnerable Youth

Support/Transfer of militant Know-how

Jihad as Ressource for mobilisation

German Foreign and Security Policy

TERAS-INDEX-Indicators


Indicators for radicalisation potential

… empirically founded set of indicators (e.g. type and depth of engagement, polical communication, legitimation, timing), that will contribute to a better assessment of the impact of of German foreign and security policy on Germany‘s internal security (civil security/ homeland security)

… generating indicators will only at a limited extend consider developments in real-time.Ex post analysis is most relevant for the construction of indicators („retrospective earlydetection“ <=> scenarios)

… clusters of factors (not only numerical assertions) and their emergence will indicatethe existence of radicalisation potentials and therefore ecpected radicalisation processes

…. By analysing and consolidating of the empirical data (interviews, content analysis ofthe radical discourse in texts and videos, biographical data on terrorists) we willformulate conditional assertions that help to identify radicalisation potentials which candevelop into manifest radicalisation processes

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Indicators as starting point of an early warning systemPotential future expansions of TERAS-INDEX:

Direct or indirect (via proxy variables) systematic monitoring and regular evaluation ofthe validity of the indicators.

Indicators as instrument and starting point for a more holistic early warning system onIslamist/Jihadist radicalisation.

TERAS-INDEX is focussed on the impact of external factors (research gap) and onlyincludes internal factors as exemplary control variable at the macro-level (migrationpolicy) – in order to systematically anticipate radicalisation processes also internalfactors and dynamics at the social and socio-psychological level (micro and meso) haveto be considered.

For a holistic early warning system we will have to look at the co-dynamics of internaland external determining factors for radicalisation as well as at their operationalisationand monitoring.

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Why external factors?

„Every war sets loose social and political forces that have a greater impact on the ultimate outcome of the war than the actual result of combat itself. For example, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 led to the emergence of Hisbollah, which played a central role in Israel’s eventual withdrawal from the country two decades later. The U. S. war to liberate Kuwait in 1991 produced a dramatic military victory, but it was followed by sanctions fatigue, the rise of Osama bin Laden’s movement, and U. S.-Saudi tensions. Many of the coalition’s current actions will undoubtedly lead to political and social outcomes that, while only dimly perceptible at the moment, may have a dramatic long-term impact on Iraq and, quite probably, the region as a whole.” (Eisenstadt, White et al. 2003)

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Restoring Peace or Provoking Terrorism? Exploring the Links Between Multilateral Military Interventions and International Terrorism

Starting Point (Kjøk, Å., T. Hegghammer, et al., 2003)

„Terrorism spill-over“

Five case studies of multilateral intervention: International intervention in Kuwait (Desert Shield and Desert Storm) during Gulf crisis 1990-1991 Multinational Forces in Lebanon (Multinational Forces MNF I und II) 1982 to 1984 International Interventionen in Kosovo 1998 to mid 2000 Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan since October 2001 Operation Iraqi Freedom since March 2003

Assumtion: Three factors of international interventions in local conflicts contribute to the level of„terrorism spill over“ in the homeland of the intervening countries: Type and intensity of the intervention Determinants and characteristics of the conflict Existence of potential terrorists

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Restoring Peace or Provoking Terrorism? Exploring the Links Between Multilateral Military Interventions and International Terrorism

„There is thus little doubt that participation in military interventionsentails risks of international terrorism.“

Findings:

Type and intensity of the interventionThere is no relation between legitimation referring to international law of the intervention and terrorism spill over.Neither are we able to establish a relationship with political legitimacy, although there are hints that the relevantrelation might be perceived legitimacy and terrorist reaction. (not perceived legitimacy in the broader population butwithin the group with terrorist capabilities)

Determinants and characteristics of the conflictThe type of conflict seems to play no determining role. While the civil war scenario in Kosovo seems to havetriggered only a small amount of attacks, civil war in Lebanon was the starting point for a middle range spill over.The two inter-state conflicts with Iraq triggered the highest amounts of terrorist attacks – it seems as if inter-stateconflicts have a higher potential for terrorism spill over. Geographical proximity is a more contributing variable thanparticipation in the intervention.

Existence of potential terroristsAlthough the biggest threat usually is expected to come from actors directly involved in the conflict, most of the attacks

in the case studies were perpetrated by groups with „pan-ideologies“, with no stakes in the concrete conflict setting. Social-revolutionary and increasingly groups motivated by Jihadist narratives were the most active ones. Still, even for radicalisation beyond the violence threshold a radical infrastructure is necessary.

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Restoring Peace or Provoking Terrorism? –Conclusions for TERAS-INDEX

Indirectly involved groups/ individuals are more radicalisaed towards terrorism than directly involved actors – global and manichaeic ideologies (such as Takfir and Jihad narratives) are prone to this kind of imperialist argument.

The intensity of the reaction (reactive radicalisation) depends on the perceived political legitimacy (among the radical group, not the broader population) and the level of applied violence in the intervention

Actors inclined to use violence take the conflicts developing from international interventions as a starting point for the legitimation of their own campaign – without taking the risk of being involved into the same conflict. Jihadists seem to take over the role social-revolutionary groups were playing during the 70ies and 80ies

Legitimacy of the intervention, level of applied violence and aversion of military losses of the allied forces were the main indicators for upcoming terrorist attacks. Moreover, one of the best predictors was the mere existence of a terrorist infrastructure related to the conflict or following a manichaeic pan-ideology

A special risk is to be considered: a military intervention can lead to changes in the radical narrative/ideology, driving it towards a global outlook and strategy (such as happened with Osama bin Laden / Salaffiya Jihadiya after the Gulf War /Kuwait and e.g. German radical networks in Bosnia)

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Not only forecasting but also explaining

Sirseloudi, M. (2006) Assessment of the link between external conflicts and violent radicalisation processes.

How and through which channels do external conflicts/military interventions contribute to Islamist radicalisation processes towards Jihadist terrorism?

Training camps – Waging of real militant Jihad Veteranen-Networks Ideology/Narrative Propaganda Identity

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Ex-ternal Con-flicts

Do-mestic and inter-na-tional

Identity construction in the diaspora

Terrorists / jihad discourse

Islamists/ islamist discourse

Vulnerable Youth

Support/Transfer of militant Know-how

Jihad as Ressource for mobilisation

German Foreign and Security Policy

TERAS-INDEX-Indicators


What do we mean with indicators? With „indicator“ we mean an empirically observable social issue, which enables

us to measure a not measurable (latent) construct or a certain dimension ofsuch a construct. What is being measured by the indicator is the indicated(Indikatum).

In TERAS-INDEX: Indikatum: The dimension of the radicalisation potential that is

influenced by external factors Indicators: Factor clusters giving hints on coming and existing

radicalisation potential (of idnividuals, groups and broader parts ofpopulation)

We eventually will elaborate future-oriented indicators (as we cope with„potential“), but first we will develop ex post indicators, based on empiricalresearch, indicating already existing radicalisation. In a second step we willextrapolate the relation of determining factor clusters into future – to beanticipated - developments.

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Indicators – scales / measuring levels

Quantitative and qualitative indicators do measure social phenomena at different levelsand use different scales. While qualitative indicators classify social objects exclusively bycriteria of identity/difference into classes, quantitative indicators do also explain rangeand distance between categories

Three types of scales:

Nominal scale (qualitative)

Ordinal scale (qualitativ)

Metric scale (quantitative)

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Indicators – scales / measuring levels

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Indicators – quality criteriaQualitative Indicators: Indicators have to fulfill certain criteria in order to be accepted as „good“

indicators. Following the UN, a good indicator is „SMART“ (S=Specific,M=Measurable, A=Attainable, R=Relevant, T=Trackable). I.e. the indicatorrepresents the theoretical issue, is measurable, adaptable to the needed fieldcontext, relevant for the solution of coming problems and understandable for allstake holders involved. (UNDP 2002):12

A „good“ indicator has to fulfill not only theoretical (1), methodical (2) andpractical (3), but also political (4) quality expectations. (Meyer 2004):24

Helen Fein (1994) calls it the „good enough“-approach, i.e. regular updates possible, understandable and politically communicatable with practical relevance as main quality criteria (therefore in TERAS-INDEX quantification as far as possible – politicians need absolute and relative numbers – focus on process velocity and intensity)

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Thank you very much for your attention!

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sirseloudi teras index

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