short v unemployment insurance board

8/9/2019 Short v Unemployment Insurance Board

1/4

SUPER IOR COURTOF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

R ICHARD S . GEBELEINJUDGE

Submitted:Decided: June 24, 1985July 26, 1985

COURT HOUSEWILMINGTON, DE . l a ao l .:a3153,

John C. Landis, E sq uir eDelaware Volunteer LegalS erv ice s, In c.200 West Ninth St ree tSui te 200Wilmington, DE 19801Mr. Gerald Q. MillerVice-Pres ident - Adminis t ra t ionPhoenix Stee l Corporat ion4001 Phi ladelphia PikeClaymont, DE 19703

Re: William A. Shor t , J r . v. UnemploymentInsurance Appeal Boa rd and Phoenix Stee lCorporat ionC.A. No. 84A-JL-13Gentlemen:

This i s an appea l by William A. Shor t (claimant) from adecis ion of th e Unemployment Insu rance Appeal Board ' s dec i s i 4nt ha t cla imant was i ne l i g ib l e to rece ive benef i t s because he v o l u ~ -t a r i l y l e f t h is employment without good cause .On February 19 , 1983 , c la imant te rm in ate d h is employment with Phoenix Stee l Corporat ion. At the t ime cla imant t e rmi -na ted h is emplo ymen t, h e had been l a id o ff fo r approximately opeyear . During t h i s period of l ayof f , the Department t h a t cla imaAtworked in was s h u t down, t hus e l imina t i ng any hope of be ingreca l led in h is former capac i ty . The shu t down d id not aff;'l;l'cth is r i gh t to bid on openings in o ther departments I however, t p e ~ ewas little chance of him re turn ing to work because of th e way th eb id system opera t ed . By t e rmina t i ng h is employment , c la iman treceived over $1,900 in severance pay, bu t l o s t h is r i gh t to ~ i on j obs . I f th e c la im an t d id no t t e rm ina t e h is employment,.


2/4

c

.John C. Landi s, Esqui reMr. Gerald Q. MillerJuly 26, 1985Page 2" When the claimant f i led for the new benefits year, approximatelyten months l a ter , the employer was contacted who disclosed t ha t. the claimant had voluntarily terminated his employment. Based on. ' this. new information, a claims adjus ter made a redeterminationfinding claimant was ine l ig ib le for benefits as of February 19,1983. Claimant was notif ied of the disqualif icat ion on Apri l 13,.1984.

Claimant f i r s t argues that the Board re l ied on an inade-.quate record in denying his benefits. In test ing the holdings ofthe Board, " I t is the duty of the Superior Court merely toascertain whether subs tan t i a l evidence ex is t s on the record tosupport such f indings ." Anchor Motor Fr. , Inc. v. UnemplOymentIns. Ap. Bd., Del. Super. , 325 A.2d 374 (1974). The Board basedi t s decis ion on t es timony hea rd before . them and also the referee.The records of these two proceedings disclose th e fo llow ing: (1)the cla imant terminated his employment ; (2) the claimant did notdisclose this to the claims deputy; (3) the claims deputy did notmake any fur ther inquiry; (4) when claimant f i led for benefitsfor the new year, new information came to the at tent ion of thec la ims d eputy ; and (5) based on this new information, the claimsdeputy made a redetermination of c la imant ' s e l ig ib i l i t y . This, . evidence alone provides subs tan t ia l evidence to support theBoard's decision.

Claimant then argues tha t the redetermination was madewithout good cause as required by 19 Del. C. S33l8 which reads,in par t , as follows:

The deputy may for good cause reconsiderhis decision and sha l l promptly notify thecla imant of the denial of such applica-tion or h is amended decis ion and the rea -sons therefor, as the case may be.When the cla imant f i led for a new benef i t year a newdetermination of h is e l i g ib i l i t y was made. As a r e s u l t , newinformation. supplied by the employer, came to the attention ofthe claims deputy. This information, t ha t claimant volunta r i ly

terminated h is employment, gave the claims deputy good cause tomake a redetermination.Claimant also argues that t h Board's decision to char-acter ize cla imant ' s te rminat ion as a disqua l i fy ing "voluntaryquit" without good cause was in error because he was constructive-ly discharged I i . e . his quit t ing under the circumstances was notVoluntary. Voluntary has been d e ~ i n e d as "proceeding from one'sown choice or fu l l consent ." Anchor Motor Fr" Inc . , supra a t


3/4

, .

John C. Landis , Esqui reMr. Gerald Q. MillerJuly 26, 1985Page 3

Good cause i s not found where the employee feels i t , t sf inancial ly advantageous to terminate his employment. The t ~ ~ ~ ,"good cause a t t r ibu tab le to such work" contemplates such thingsas a subs tan t ia l reduct ion in wages or hours or a substantia ' ldeviat ion in the working condi t ions from the original a g r e e m e n ~of hire. "!'

: . : ~ ' .

An ind iv idua l s h a l l be disqual i f ied fo rbenefi ts :(1) For the period of unemployment nextensuing af te r he has l e f t his work voluntari ly without good cause at tr ibutable to suchwork.19 Del. C. 53315.

Claimant 's f ina l argument i s tha t to find in f a v o r ; : ~ fthe employer vio la tes the in ten t of the leg is la ture and p u b ~ l cpol icy of th e S tate . Although the Supreme Court has d i r e c t e d ~ ~Courts not to slavishly adhere to t echnica l and a r t i f i c i a l c 9 ~ -s t ruct ion of the law 's p ro vis io ns , Johnston v. Chrysler C o r P . ~Del. Supr. , 178 A.2d 459 (1962); and fu r ther , the law i s t O ~ ~ $l ibe ra l ly construed, Harper v. Unemployment In . App. Bd., ~ 1 Super., 293 A.2d 813 (1972), in favor of the employees to be b e ~ e -f i t t ed , Biqger v. Unemployment Compo Com'n., Del. Supr., 53 A ~ t d61 (1947), the fact remains tha t this claimant voluntar i ly t e r m ~ ~nated h is employment without good cause at tr ibutable to suchwQ*,kin order to obta in volunta ry severance pay. A constructio'n\.i ,n

Although c la imant ' s terminat ion of his employment ' W ~ svoluntary, i t must be without good cause to make him i n e l i g i b ~ eto receive benef i t s . Good cause' for qui t t ing a job was held):',obe "such as would jus t i fy a person in voluntar i ly l e a v i n g ~ ~ eranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed."O'Neal ' s Bus S ervice, In c. v. Employment Secur . Com'n. , DEl,!,Super . ; 296 A.d 247, 249 (1970). Also it "must be for r e a s ~ n .connected with the employment and not upon personal grounds }"Brainard v. Unemployment Compensation Com' n . , Del. Super . , ,:'16A.2d 126, 127 (1950). The applicable sta tute provides:

376. In Anchor, the Court further discussed the concept of c o ~ -structive discharge and s ta ted t ha t the claimant was induced ,t.ores ign under pressure . To induce i s defined as "to e f fec t ,,cause , [or} to in fluence A resignation induced under pressu:J:'ei s tantamount to a discharge." Id. a t 376. In the present case,the claimant was given a choice, which he made on h is own, witb-out any inducement by the employer other than monetary. Clearly,this i s not the type of pressure contemplated by Anchor MotorFr. , Inc supra. ':,.;' ~ : ; : -


4/4

oc: ProthonotaryRSQ/pd,w

S. Gebelein.v..

,John C. Landis, EsquireMr. Gerald Q. Miller. July 26, '1985'; Page 4\ favor of th e c laim ant would twist the pla in meaning of the s t a t -' u t e . This is not what is meant by l ibe ra l construct ion.

. The decis ion of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Boardis affi rme4.

IT IS SO ORDERED.::.

o '

short v unemployment insurance board

Documents