rUADTED _ TTW^n***^ ■ Lb l^m JLJL

SINO-INDIAN WAR-1962:

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

One of the most unwarranted happenings in the international history of

India was India-China war. China and India the two Asian giants, went to war in

the fag end days of October 1962. The main cause of the war was the

competing interests of India and China which took the form of sharp differences

over the border. These were most acute in the western and eastern extremities

of the Himalayas separated by over thousand miles. As the border dispute was

the immediate cause of the war, it is essential to understand how it arose.

At the very first instance, it is important to examine the view that

both countries have enjoyed friendly relations for over two thousand years and

the problems between them have arisen only during the last five decades since

India became independent and the People’s Republic of China had emerged out

of Chairman Mao’s Revolution.

To a great extent, this euphoric view had been sanctified by the

writings and speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru even before he assumed the mantle

as India’s first Prime Minister. Nehru had a grand vision of India and China

working together and contributing to the cause of peace and development in Asia

and the world.1

Speaking in a Radio Broadcast on September 7, 1946 Jawaharial

Nehru, Vice-President of the Interim National Government of India stated “China

that mighty country with a mighty past, our neighbour, has been our friend

through the ages and that friendship will endure and given.2 However, this vision

was obviously not shared by the Chinese leadership, which considered India as

being still under the influence of Great Britain and the west generally. That view

had been reinforced when India close to remain with the Commonwealth.3

K.M.Panikker quotes “Mao opened the conversation by saying that

in China there was an old belief that if a man lived a good life he would be reborn

in India”.4 This relations between China and India during the first ten years of the

existence of the People’s Republic of China which came into existence on 1

October 1949 were amicable. This friendship between the two countries became

a matter of envy for the imperialists. The reasons were obvious. India, after a

long struggle and enormous sacrifices, was able to throw off the yoke of

imperialism. The anti-imperialist struggle of the Indian people and their final

victory paved the way for the liberation of many countries in Asia. Two years

after the independence of India, the people of China succeeded in their

revolution which had its genesis in the anti-imperialist movement. The two

countries, therefore, had a common basis for their friendship.

The populations of both countries constitute about one-third of the

world population. Both the countries suffered under those rulers who exploited

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the vast resources of these countries for their vested interests and made the

people economically backward. Both needed development to reconstruct their

economy and usher a new era of peace and prosperity for their people.

India signed the Panchsheela agreement with China on 29th April

1954, with the hope that the friendship between these two countries based on the

‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’ would herald a new era of friendship

and cooperation in Asia in spite of their different social systems and forms of

government.5

In the communique, reaffirming their faith in Panchsheela, both

Chou En-lai and Jawaharlal Nehru declared that ‘this friendship would help the

cause of world peace and peaceful development of the two countries as well as

other countries in Asia. Chou En-lai, during his visit to India, in a broadcast at

Delhi, said that “countless centuries of cultural and economic interchange

between China and India has never been marred by conflict or animosity”. It was

true that both the countries never had any confrontation with each other. There

were no disputes or differences between the two countries on any matter

including the boundary question.

When Jawaharlal Nehru visited Peking in October 1954, where he

was astonished to see an official Chinese map showing 50,000 sq. miles of

Indian territory as forming part of China. It was shocking to learn that a country

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which had signed the Panchsheela agreement could be so naive to commit

cartographic aggression on a friendly country like India. The territorial claims

were certainly unfounded and when this was brought to the notice of the Chinese

leaders, they explained that ‘they were old maps and need not be taken

seriously'.

Then came the Bandung conference, co-sponsored by India. The

idea was that the resurgent nations of Asia and Africa must build up unity of mind

and purpose and uphold the spirit of peaceful co-existence which was vital for the

development of the newly independent countries as also for peace and progress

of this region which had suffered for long under colonial domination. India

pleaded with other sponsoring countries to bring China to Bandung. China by

then had not been recognized by most of the western countries and also not

admitted to the United Nations and other international forums. India thought that

China being the largest Asian country, without her the conference could not be

fully represented.

Chou En-lai attended the Bandung conference and enthusiastically

subscribed to the principles enunciated in the conference. Chou En-lai was

aware to the border incidents on the Sino-lndian border and the intrusion of the

Chinese army into Indian territory at Barahoti. But he sought to allay the fear of

the neighbouring countries with a promise of “non-interference in the internal

affairs of others and peaceful settlement of disputes without any use of force”.

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Chou En-lai declared at the Bandung conference that “China would not

transgress the territorial integrity of any country, not even by one inch”. He was

so categorical in his expression that he went further and said that “if by mistake,

the Chinese people crossed the frontier of neighbours, the government of China

will bring them back”.

The neighbouring countries including India had, therefore, reasons

to believe that China had no wayward intentions or territorial claims against her

neighbours. Twenty-nine countries which took part in the Bandung conference

pledged themselves to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one

another as good neighbours. China was one of them.

But soon it became clear that the Panchshila and the Bandung

declaration which became articles of faith for India in international affairs, were

mere slogans for China to cover its real intentions and so China repeatedly

declared its adherence to these principles while at the same time preparing

herself for further intrusions into Indian territory.

Before the ink of the ‘Bandung’ declaration could dry, China under

Mao Tse-tung re-discovered the Great Han foreign policy of expansionism. So

when Chou En-lai was speaking about ‘no disputes between China and India’, he

was only referring to the past. He knew that what he was talking about was a

mere exercise of diplomatic rhetoric by China to begin an era of tension and

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conflicts between the two ancient countries. So, the professed adherence to the

principles of Panchshila and Bandung was deceptive and a time-gaining device

to prepare for a major conflict with India under the garb of a ‘border dispute’.6

Difference in approach

The Indian approach to life is different from that of China in many

ways. The two have opted for different forms of government. In the legislative

field, the National People’s Congress in China is the supreme legislative body but

it seldom decides. The decisions are taken by a coterie which controls the

National People’s Congress. India is a democratic country where the Parliament

is supreme and decides on all issues of national and international importance

after fair and free discussion.

In its judiciary, China has established people’s courts which are

directly responsible to the National People’s Congress. There are no courts of

appeal except for a very limited specified cases. The Indian judiciary is

independent and the law provides checks and balances against misuse of

authority by the government.

The social life of the Chinese people is regulated by the rules laid

down by the party posses. There is no respect for man’s privacy and the party

workers can enter any home to search, to browbeat and seize anything without

slightest pretence of legality. China is the only country where religion has been

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suppressed. India, on the other hand, is a secular state which means that there

is no state's patronage to any particular religion but the people have the right to

profess their own faith.

The Chinese Constitution which has undergone many changes in

the past to suit the whims of the ruling group, believes in friendship between the

Chinese and the “people’s democracies” in their struggle against imperialism.

India is opposed to imperialism in all its manifestation. India has been

consistently supporting national liberation movements against colonialism, neo­

colonialism and imperialism. India opposes racism and racial discrimination and

had no diplomatic relations with the apartheid regime of the Union of South

Africa 7

When the government of China was told about the rough sketch

map showing the development of railways and trunk roads in China during the

First Five Year Plan period published in China Pictorial in its July issue of 1954,

the Chinese government explained its position as under:

“In the maps currently published in China, the boundary line between China and its neighbouring countries, including India, is drawn on the basis of maps published in China before liberation. This was made clear to His Excellency Prime Minister Nehru by Prime Minister Chou En-lai when the former visited China in October 1954. Premier Chou En-lai explained then to Prime Minsiter Nehru that the reason why the boundary in Chinese maps is drawn according to old maps is that the Chinese government has not yet undertaken a survey of China’s boundary, nor consulted with the countries concerned, and that it will not make any changes in the boundary of its own. The Chinese government believes

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that with the elapse of time, and after consultations with the various neighbouring countries and a survey of the border regions, a new way of drawing the boundary of China will be decided in accordance with the results of the consultations and the survey.’8

When Chou En-lai paid his first visit to India in June 1954, he said:

“The Chinese people feel very happy that such a neighbour as India is devoted to the cause of peace. India has made valuable contributions to the efforts of bringing about an armistice in Korea. India has constantly been interested in striving for the termination of Indo-China war, and has untiringly supported efforts made at the Geneva conference to restore peace in Indo-China. It is very obvious that this position of India is of great significance for safeguarding peace in Asia.9

From Bandung to Bomdi

The story of friendship between India and China from Bandung to

Bomdi, ranging over a period of 15 years, is a story of faith demolished as a

result of the hegemonistic designs of the Peking leadership. India tried to build

up faith in her bona-fides as a member of the Afro-Asian community. India was

the first to plead for the inclusion of the People’s Republic of China into the

United Nations. India took up the cause of China’s inclusion in the UN because it

believed that without China the world body could not function realistically. But

China betrayed this confidence. On 15 September 1955, a detachment from

Hoti plain in India, approaching Damzan which is 10 miles south of Niti Pass and

lies in the Indian territory, was stopped by a group of Chinese soldiers who had

trespassed into the Indian territory. The Chinese soldiers told the Indian

detachment not to go via Damzan without getting the permission from the

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Chinese authorities at Gartok. The Government of India, in its note given to the

Chinese Counsellor in New Delhi on 5 November 1955, said:10

“We must point out that Damzan is clearly within Indian territory. It is situated at longitude 79.61°, latitude 30.49° and is 10 miles south of the Niti Pass which has been recognised by the Sino-lndian agreement of 29 April 1954 as the border pass between the two countries of this region. The unauthorised presence of the Chinese soldiers at Damzan in Indian territory, therefore, amounts to trespass."

On 1 September 1956, a party of 10 Chinese army personnel

entered and took up positions about two furlongs from Hupsong Khad on the

Indian side of Shipki La Pass. A note handed by the Ministry of External Affairs

of the Government of India to the Chinese Counsellor in India on 2 July 1958,

said:

“We have received information that the Chinese troops crossed into Indian territory and visited the Khurnak Fort which lies within the Indian frontiers of the Ladakh region of Kashmir and occupied it.”

The Chinese built a motor-road across the eastern part of Ladakh

which formed a part of the Chinese road known as Ychcheng-Gartok Road or

Sinkiang-Tibet highway, the completion of which was announced in September

1957. The road entered Indian territory just east of Sarigh Jilgnang, running

north-west in Amtogar through Yangpa, Khitai Dawan and Haji Langar which are

all indisputably in Indian territory. Near the Amtogar lake, several branch tracks

were also made motorable. The territory through which the road traversed has

been part of the Ladakh region of India and the old established frontiers had

been accepted by the Chinese in a Treaty of 1842 as the international boundary.

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In an official communication, a Chinese member of the Boundary Commission of

1847-49 accepted the boundary as “sufficiently and distinctly fixed so that it will

be best to adhere to this ancient arrangement and it will prove far more

convenient to abstain from any additional measures for fixing them”. The

travellers to this area have referred to it as part of Ladakh and atlases like the

Johnston’s Atlas of India (edition: 1894), and maps published by the Survey of

India, unmistakably as part of Ladakh.

The border provacations by China were totally uncalled for.

Wherever the Chinese incursions took place, the Peking rulers tried to blame the

Indian side by making false accusations. Replying to such an allegation, the

Government of India, in its note on 26 June 1979, wrote to the Chinese

Government.11

“The Government of India has scrupulously observed the traditional border between India and the Tibet region of China along the entire India-China frontier. This traditional international frontier coincides with the so-called MacMahon Line. The Government of India regrets that the Government of the People’s Republic of China should have believed the allegations that their forces could in any way be in collusion with Tibetan rebels. The Government of India have no information about any rebel activities in this area, and if there are any, they are in no way responsible for them.”

Border Maps

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in his letter dated 14th December

1958 to the Chinese Premier pointed out that during his visit to China in October

1954, he had briefly mentioned some maps recently published in China which

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depicted wrong by the border-line between the two countries, Chou En-lai had

assured him that so far as India was concerned, they were not much worried

about the matter because their boundaries were quite clear and not a matter of

agreement and, further, that those maps were really reproductions of old pre­

liberation maps and that China had no time to revise them. During Chou En-lai’s

visit to India towards the end of 1956, the Chinese Premier had referred to the

Sino-Burmese border and his desire to settle the problem with the Burmese

government. It was in this connection that Chou En-lai had mentioned to the

Prime Minister of India the Sino-lndian border and more especially about the so-

called MacMahon Line because the MacMahon Line covered a part of Sino-

Burmese border and a large part of the Chinese border with India. Chou En-lai

had said that he did not approve of this border being called the MacMahon Line

and Jawaharlal Nehru had replied that he too did not like that name either but for

facility of reference they referred to it as such.

Jawaharlal Nehru in his letter of 14th December 1958 wrote to the

Chinese Premier Chou En-lai :12

’’You told me then that you had accepted this MacMahon Line border with Burma and, whatever might have happened long ago, in view of the friendly relations which existed between China and India, you proposed to recognise this border with India also. You added that you would like to consult the authorities of the Tibet region of China and you proposed to do_ _ HSO.

“I remember discussing this matter with you at some considerable length. The Chinese government came to Delhi and discussed one of these petty issues for some time. Unfortunately, no settlement about this matter was

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arrived at then and it was decided to continue the talks later. I was sorry that these talks had not resulted in satisfactory agreement so far."

“A few months ago our attention was drawn to a map of China published in the magazine “China Pictorial” which indicated the border with India. This map was also not very clearly defined. But even the rough border lines appeared to us to be wrongly placed. A large part of our North-East Frontier Agency as well as some other parts of India had been administered by India in the same way as other parts of our country, were shown to be part of Chinese territory.”

Regarding this cartographic aggression on the territory of India, the

Indian side repeatedly told the Chinese government that these distortions would

affect the relationship between the two countries. Jawaharial Nehru, continuing

his letter, further wrote:

“The magazine containing this map was widely distributed and questions were asked in our Parliament about this. I gave answers to the effect that these maps were merely reproductions of old ones and did not represent the actual facts of the situation. “We drew your government’s attention to this map some time ago this year. “I was puzzled by this reply because there was no major boundary dispute between China and India. There never has been such a dispute so far as we are concerned. But you will appreciate that nine years after the Chinese People’s Republic came into power, the continued issue of these incorrect maps is embarrassing to us as to others. There can be no question of large parts of India being anything but India and there is no dispute about them. I do not know what kind of surveys can effect these well-known and fixed boundaries.”

Sino-lndian boundary

Premier Chou En-lai replied on 23rd January 1959 explaining the

stand of the Chinese government on the crucial question of Sino-lndian

boundary. It showed a marked deviation from the position explained by the

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Chinese leader earlier during the exchange of notes between the two sides. In

his letter, Chou En-lai wrote:13

“I wish to point out that the Sino-lndian boundary has never been formally delimited. Historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-lndian boundary has been concluded between the Chinese central government and the Indian government. So far as the actual situation is concerned, there are certain differences between the two sides over the border question. In the past few years, question as to which side certain areas on the Sino-lndian border belong were on more than one occasion taken up between the Chinese and the Indian sides through diplomatic channels. Recently the Indian government claimed that southern part of China’s Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region was Indian territory. All this shows that border disputes do exist between China and India."

“An important question concerning the Sino-lndian boundary is the question of the so-called MacMahon Line. I discussed this with Your Excellency as well as with Prime Minister U Nu. I would now like to explain again the Chinese government’s attitude. As you are aware, the MacMahon line was a product on the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China and aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. And I have also told you formally about their dissatisfaction. In view of the various complex factors mentioned above, the Chinese government, on the one hand finds it necessary to make a more or less realistic attitude towards the MacMahon Line and, on the other hand, cannot, but act with prudence and needs time to deal with this matter. As a matter of fact, our people have expressed surprise at the way the Sino- lndian boundary, particularly its western section, is drawn on maps published in India. They have asked our government to take up the matter with the Indian government.

On receipt of the letter of Chou En-lai, the Indian Prime Minister,

Jawaharlal Nehru replied on 22 March 1959, mentioning therein:14

“It is true that the frontier has not been demarcated on the ground in all the sectors but I am somewhat surprised to know that this frontier was not accepted at any time by the Government of China. The traditional frontier, as you may be aware, follows the geographical principle of watershed on the crest of the High Himalayan Range, but apart from this the then

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Government of India and the Central Government of China. It mayperhaps be useful if I draw your attention to some of these agreements:”

(i) Sikkim: The boundary of Sikkim, a protectorate of India, with the

Tibet region of China was defined in the Anglo-Chinese Convention

1890 and jointly demanded on the ground in 1895.

(ii) The Ladakh Region of the State of Jammu & Kashmir: A treaty of

1842 between Kashmir on one hand and the Emperor of China and

the Lama Guru of Lhasa on the other, mentions the India-China

boundary in the Ladakh region. In 1847, the Chinese government

admitted that this boundary was sufficiently and distinctly fixed.

The area now claimed by China has always been depicted as part

of India official maps, has been surveyed by Indian officials and

even a Chinese map of 1893 shows it as Indian territory.

(iii) The MacMahon Line: As you are aware, the so-called MacMahon

Line runs East Wards from the eastern borders of Bhutan and

defines the boundary of China on one hand and India and Burma

on the other. The line was drawn after full discussion and was

confirmed subsequently by a formal exchange of letters; and there

is nothing to indicate that the Tibetan authorities were in any way

dissatisfied with the agreed boundary. Moreover, although the

Chinese Plenipotentiary at the Conference objected to the

boundaries between Inner and Outer Tibet and China, there is no

7l

mention of any Chinese reservation in respect to the India-Tibet

frontier either during the discussions or at the time of their initiating

the Convention. I hope that we shall reach an understanding on

this issue.

Treaties bypassed

From these letters exchanged between India and China, it is clear

that the Chinese government adopted a bellicose attitude to brush aside the

treaties and conventions to lay illegal claim on Indian territory. It was surprising

that an authoritarian government of China acted in an illogical manner and further

aggravated the problem by its repeated incursions into the Indian territory by

violating Indian air space. During October and November 1958, a Chinese

aircraft unauthorisedly flew over the Spiti valley in Himachal Pradesh. It flew in

from western Tibet and returned towards Gartok. Chinese aircraft repeatedly

violated air space over Chini in Himachal Pradesh, entering from the north and

north-east.

Chinese soldiers started camping and erecting permanent

structures in Hoti during winter. As regards Barahoti, Indian Prime Minister

Nehru, during his talks with Premier Chou En-lai had made it clear that the Indian

government had extensive proof that this area had been under Indian jurisdiction

and lies well within the frontier of India. An on-the-spot investigation was

suggested by China, though the stand taken by India was that investigation could

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hardly throw any light until proofs to the contrary could be adduced.

Nevertheless, India expressed its willingness to the suggestion that both sides

should not send their civil and military officials to that area but the Chinese

delegation did not agree to this suggestion. In the meantime, China tried to

manufacture false evidence in support of its contention, and thus stated making a

material change in the situation by despatching civil and military detachments,

equipped with arms, to camp in that area, after the Indian civil party had

withdrawn at the beginning of winter in 1958.

The Government of China took an obstinate attitude to precipitate a

crisis and started nibbling at Indian territory in assertion of its claim to the

disputed area. When the Government of India protested against the flight of

Chinese aircraft into Indian air space, the Chinese government made counter­

allegations, knowing it to be fabricated, that during October and November 1958,

the Peking government had received reports to the effect that foreign aircraft

intruding into Chinese air space were observed at Gargunsa, Gartok, Gyantima

and other places in the western part of Tibet region of China. Some of these

aircrafts, it was alleged, flew from the direction of India which others flew towards.

India. However, the Chinese government admitted that the Chinese border

troops were not able to identify the nationality of these planes. It added that

considering the direction of their flights and the fact that the places where thy

appeared were close to India, the Chinese government, in a spirit of friendship

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and cooperation, would like to draw the attention of the Indian government in the

above mentioned circumstances. If these were Indian planes, the note of the

Chinese government dated 12 January 1959 said, the Indian government should

take necessary measures to prevent recurrence of such incidents.15

Beginning of Aggression

In 1959, Chinese soldiers made incursions into Indian territory in

Ladakh and killed Indian policemen inside Indian territory. Police official Karam

Singh became the first victim of Chinese aggression. He became a martyr in the

cause of defending the territorial integrity of India. It was not a mere border

incident which could go unnoticed. It was the beginning of aggression which had

its roots in the expansionist policy of the Chinese leaders towards a neighbouring

country. Had India wanted to precipitate a crisis, it would have retaliated by

ambushing the Chinese intruders. India only reconciled itself to this incident by

lodging a protest with the Chinese government through diplomatic channels to

persuade China to abandon its policy of confrontation with India.

Jawaharlal Nehru wrote:17

“I had never known that there was such a thing as Sino-lndian border. I refuse to

consider that large areas in question (shown in the Chinese maps and atlases)

could belong to any country but India."

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The Chinese Government disregarding all the facts and

circumstances, embarked upon a highly provocative action which naturally

caused deep concern for peoples all over the world. Future historians may differ

as to the course adopted by India in not taking a tough line against China on the

border problem, but they will be unanimous to assert that India chose to be

peaceful because of its adherence to the Five Principles of Peace and Peaceful

coexistence. India wanted settlement of all disputes by mutual negotiations and

not by use of force.

During 1960-62, Chinese soldiers made repeated incursions into

Indian territory and clashed with Indian border guards. China used its infantry,

artillery and tank units on the Indian border in preparation for a large-scale

aggression on India in the year 1962. The Chinese leadership was only trying to

gain time to prepare itself and, therefore, Chinese leadership used all methods to

make false accusations against India so as to find a pretext to justify its later

actions.

If the world had joined in unequivocally condemning Chinese

invasion of Tibet and stopped the hands of the aggressor, the course of history

would have been different. Unfortunately there was no united concerted move to

contain China from committing aggression. India accepted China’s suzerainty

over Tibet and recognised Tibet as a Chinese region. This was an unfortunate

stand taken by India which affected the future course of events in the world.

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China adopted an aggressive posture and continued to pursue a highly

provocative and dangerous policy.

The year 1962 will go down in the history of India-China relations

as a period of great betrayal by China. The Chinese committed large scale

aggression on Indian territory. In a broadcast to the Indian people on 22nd

October 1962, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said:18

“A grave situation has arisen on our frontiers because of continuing and unabashed aggression by the Chinese forces. A .situation has arisen which calls upon all of us to meet it effectively. We are men and women of peace in this country conditioned to the ways of peace. We are unused to the necessities of war. Because of this, we endeavoured to follow a policy of peace even when aggression took place on our territory in Ladakh five years ago. We explored avenues for an honourable settlement by peaceful methods. That was our policy all over the world, and we tried to apply it even in our own country. We know the horrors of war in this age today, and we have done our utmost to prevent war from engulfing the world.”

“But all our efforts have been in vain in so far as our own frontier is concerned where a powerful and unscrupulous opponent, not caring for peace of peaceful methods, has continuously threatened us and even carried these threats into action.”

“There have been five years of continuous aggression on the Ladakh frontier. Our other frontier at NEFA remained largely free from this aggression. Just when we were discussing ways and means of reducing tension, and there was even some chance of representatives of the two countries meeting to consider this matter, a new and fresh aggression took place on the NEFA border. This began on the 8th September last. This was a curious way of lessening tension. It is typical of the way of Chinese government has treated us.”

“Our border with China in the NEFA region is well known and well established from ages past. It is sometimes called the MacMahon Line. But this line which separates India from Tibet was the high ridges which divides the water sheds. This has been acknowledged as the border by

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history, tradition and treaties long before it was called the MacMahon Line. The Chinese have in many ways acknoweldged it as the border, even though they have called the MacMahon Line illegal. The Chinese laid claims in their maps, to a large part of the NEFA which has been under our administration for a long time. The present Chinese regime was established about 12 years ago. Before that the Tibetans did not challenge it. Even the maps that the Chinese produced wereacknowledged by them repeatedly to be old and out of date maps which had little relevance today.”

India in her fight against the Chinese aggression received

sympathy and support from most of the countries of the world. Till July 11, 1963

the countries which had conveyed their support and sympathy to the government

of India included Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia,

Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Columbia, Congo (Leopoldville), Costa

Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia,

France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Gautemala, Haiti, Iceland, Iran, Italy,

Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea (South), Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg,

Malagasy, Malaya, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,

Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,

Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic,

United Kingdom, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Vietnam (South), Yemen and

Yugoslavia. Among those countries who sent their message of concern and who

made suggestions for a peaceful solution of the border conflict included Algeria,

Bulgaria, Cambodia, Guinea, Hungary, Indonesia, Mali, Mongolia, Nepal, Poland,

Rumania, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika and the USSR. Messages

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of sympathy and concern were also received from Burma, Israel, Laos, Libya and

Vatican.

Unilateral Ceasefire

On November 20, 1962, China unilaterally declared a three-point

ceasefire proposal. An acceptance of these proposals would have meant:19

1. India should not dispute Chinese occupation of 14,000 square

miles of Indian territory in the Ladakh area.

2. Chinese claims should be fully satisfied as far as physical

occupation is concerned in the middle sector.

3. In the eastern sector, the accepted boundary, the highest

Himalayan ridge, should be given up in favour of whatever

interpretation the government of China decided to put on the

MacMahon Line and the Chinese should be left in possession of

the vital mountain passes which hold the key to India.

The Government of India obviously could not submit to this demand

of surrender.

A three-day conference of six non-aligned nations, namely Ceylon,

UAE, Ghana, Indonesia, Burma and Cambodia discussed in Colombo in

December 1962, the situation arising out of the Sino-lndian conflict, the

proposals emanating from this conference were taken by the Chairman of the

conference, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaaranaike, to China. She was joined in her

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discussions with the Chinese government by Dr. Subanrio, Indonesian foreign

minister. Thereafter, Mrs. Bandaranaike brought these proposals to India where

she was joined during the discussions by the delegation from UAK and Ghana.

Dr. Subandrio and Prince Nordom Sihanouk came to India and had discussions

with the Indian Prime Minister.20

Analysing the proposals along with their clarifications, the broad

deal that emerged were the following:

Western Sector: The Colombo conference appealed to the Chinese government

to carry out the 20-kilometre withdrawal of their military posts. This is from the

line of ‘actual control’ between the two sides as of ‘November 7, 1959, as defined

in maps III and V circulated by the government of China’. The existing military

posts which the forces of the government of India would keep should be on and

up to the above line of actual control.

Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the areas vacated by

the Chinese military withdrawals would be demilitarised zone to be administered

by civilian posts of both sides.

Eastern Sector: The conference considered that the line of actual control in the

areas recognised by both the governments could serve as a ceasefire line to

their respective positions. The clarification said that Indian forces can move right

up to south of the line of actual control, i.e,, the MacMahon Line, except for the

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two areas on which there is difference of opinion between the governments of

China and India. The Chinese forces could similarly move right up to the north of

the MacMahon Line except for these two areas. The two areas mentioned were

Chedong or Thagia Ridge area and the Longju area.

Middle Sector: The conference suggested that the dispute should be solved by

peaceful means without resorting to force. The status quo in this sector should

be maintained and neither side should do anything to disturb the status quo.

While the Government of India accepted these proposals in the

light of the clarifications given to them, the Chinese government did not accept

the proposals. Their so-called acceptance ‘in principle’ contained reservations,

for example:

1. The Chinese government wanted that the demilitarised zone resulting

from Chinese withdrawal by 20 kilometers should be administered

only by Chinese civil posts. This was contrary to the proposal of the

Colombo conference which said that the demilitarised zone should be

administered by civilian posts of both sides i.e., India and China.

2. In the eastern sector, the Chinese government said that the Indian

military force should not enter the areas evacuated by the Chinese

withdrawing forces in NEFA. The Colombo conference proposal was

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that the Indian armed forces could go right up to the MacMahon Line

except in the two areas of Thagla Ridge and Longju.

Even after the much publicised unilateral ceasefire and Chinese

pronouncement of accepting the Colombo proposals “in principle” the Chinese

government continued its army build-up on a massive scale on the northern

border of India. Peking also deployed, after the ceasefire, sixteen Divisions in

Tibet, thirteen of them being deployed along the border. In addition these troops

were backed by a labour force of considerable number. They also started large-

scale building of roads leading right up to the Indian border.

In March 1963, Peking sought to cover up its build-up in the

Chumbey valley by an expression of mock indignation over alleged violation of

Tibetan territory.

On 27 April, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in a broadcast to the nation,

warned the Indian people:

“Let our enthusiasm not be unreliable and transient as a monsoon stream, flooding over briefly and then drying up, but like the deep and constant Ganga whose flow has sustained and inspired our peoples through the ages. The spark of patriotic nationalism, which burst into flame at the news of the Chinese invasion captured for a movement, the true face of India; the pettiness and weakness of some, the greatness and strength of others. Against the darkness of disaster, it outlined and highlighted the unity and quality of the Indian people. The Chinese invasion was not merely for the purpose of territorial gains, but reflects a basic conflict of ideology. In the eyes of the world, India stands for certain values and ideals. India and China have opted opposite paths to solve their problems. India has chosen the way of persuasion, cooperation and the active participation of her people. By contrast, China’s path is one of

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compulsion and coercion where all activities, even in the literary and artistic fields, is directed and controlled by the State.”

Sino-Pak Agreement

Chinese leadership knew that the western part of Pak-held Kashmir

provided an outlet to the border with the Chinese province of Sinkiang along a

strip, about 500 km. long. Pakistan had no common border with China till it

forcibly occupied the western part of Kashmir. The Peking leadership entered

into a vicious understanding with the leadership of Pakistan. In January 1961,

the foreign minister of Pakistan announced that his country had proposed to

China to draw a line of demarcation between the two countries because the

Chinese maps had shown 4,000 to 6,000 sq. miles of territory in Kashmir within

the bounds of China. In May 1962, China and Pakistan simultaneously

announced the forthcoming talks between the two countries on the question of

the demarcation of boundary through Pak-held Kashmir.

The Government of India lodged its protest on 10th May 1962 and

said that these bilateral talks were ill-motivated because there was no existing

common frontier between the two. What was being negotiated by Pakistan was

Indian territory in Kashmir which was under illegal occupation of Pakistan. India

also objected to the interference by China into the sovereignty of India.21

On 3rd May 1962, the Governments of Pakistan and China issued a

joint communique to carry on mutual negotiations. Negotiations for what? Not to

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settle any territorial dispute as there was none but to change the status of

Jammu & Kashmir with a view to submit certain parts of Pak-held Kashmir to

China. The two aggressors - China and Pakistan - had agreed to enter into

bilateral talks over a territory over which none of them had any right to negotiate.

Neither China nor Pakistan had any right to negotiate Indian

territory in Kashmir as none of them had any locus standi in the matter. Both

were aliens to this territory. It is a fact that Pakistan is an aggressor in the

Kashmir territory held by it by force since 1947. This position is too well-known

to be elaborated but what surprised everybody was the attitude of China to

extend its support to Pakistan on the question of Kashmir knowing it fully well

that its stand on Kashmir had no judicial basis nor it could be supported by facts

but since China itself is an aggressor on the Indian territory, its support to

another aggressor meets the common intentions of both of them.

India’s representative in the Security Council, V.K.Krishna Menon,

told the Security Council on 3 May 1962:

“Pakistan has nevertheless sought to negotiate Kashmir’s border with Siakiang with the Government of China. We say categorically that Pakistan has no authority to barter away or negotiate any part of Indian territory and any agreement Pakistan may reach with anybody else would have no value in our eyes”.

On 2nd March 1963, a Sino-Pak agreement was concluded and

Pakistan handed over to China 2,100 sq. miles of Indian territory in Pak held

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Kashmir. This was not only a highly provocative action but also a hostile act

which was blatantly aggressive and condemnable.

In this way, China illegally occupied 14,100 sq. miles of Indian

territory both by means of aggression in 1962 and as a result of the Sino-Pak

agreement of 1963.

In all the joint communiques issued by China and Pakistan at the

conclusion of their ‘friendly visits' to either country, there has been a pointed

reference always to the question of Kashmir, with China’s support of Pakistan’s

claim over Kashmir. China also did not recognise Sikkim as a part of India and in

the earlier maps published by China, Sikkim was shown to be an area outside

the territorial jurisdiction of India while Jammu & Kashmir was shown as ‘disputed

area’. The Chinese maps also showed many parts of India forming part of the

Chinese territory.

The 2,100 sq. miles territory in Pak held Kashmir which was ceded

by Pakistan to China in 1963 lies in the strategic area near USSR, Afghanistan

and China. The Chinese have built a network of strategic roads in this area

linking China directly with Pakistan. Pakistan has ceded this territory to China as

a result of a tacit understanding between the two that China will support

Pakistan’s claim over Kashmir in lieu of China’s ‘occupations’ over the ceded

territory.

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China supports Pakistan’s claim over Kashmir for another reason.

Kashmir lies close to the international boundary of China, USSR, Afghanistan

and Pakistan. In 1959, the Chinese ambassador in New Delhi told the foreign

secretary of India: “India could not afford to have two fronts against China.”

Obviously, the Chinese ambassador was hinting at the collusion between China

and Pakistan against India.

In a note on 31st May 1962, Peking went to the extent of telling a

blatant lie that China had never recognised Indian sovereignty over Kashmir.

The note also said that the preliminary agreement with Pakistan in no way

affected the question as to whom Kashmir belonged to.

The Sino-Pak talks began on 12th October 1962. At the beginning

of the talks, the territory claimed by the two sides was 3,400 sq. miles which, at

the time of concluding the talks, was reduced to 2,100 sq. miles, including the

Shakegan Muztag valley area.

On 22nd February 1963, the Joint Boundary Commission reported

complete agreement between China and Pakistan on the location and course of

the frontier between the two countries. On 2nd March 1963, the Sino-Pak frontier

agreement was signed.22

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Strategic Roads

Having entered into a frontier agreement with Pakistan, the Peking

government started building strategic roads in the high mountainous regions

such as the Karakoram Road linking Siakiang with Pak-held Kashmir.

In 1968, China built a link road through Gilgit and Hunza connecting

Kashgar in China with Muzaffarabad in Pakistan. The Chinese have built

another link road through the Khunjerab pass in the Himalayan ranges which

passes along Qila Nabi and joins at Morkhun and then goes along Hunza and

Gilgit down to Muzaffarabad in Pakistan.

Another link-road measuring 800 km. was built by China in 1978,

linking western Tibet with Islamabad in Pakistan through the Karakoram pass.

This road also extends upto Kashgar through the Havelian rail road which

reaches 60 km. north of Islamabad.

The Chinese had concentrated their military activities in the territory

which they have illegally occupied after the Sino-Pak agreement on the ceded

territory in Pak-held Kashmir. The Aksai-chin area over which Chinese

aggression is still continuing since 1962, has been linked up with the ceded

territory through the Karakoram pass.

The building of these strategic roads was not meant to improve

civilian transport system and land communication between them because the

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population of this area is very sparse and requires practically very little

movement. These areas have no industrial complex nor any trading activity is

possible which may require an extensive transport system. In spite of this, China

has spent hundred of crores of dollars on the construction of these roads at the

expense of the already poor economic conditions of its own people. Why had

China chosen to be so liberal to the Himalayan ranges by making them

accessible by road links everywhere? It is clear that the Chinese have

developed an important military base at Kashgar which was the feeding centre

for Chinese military manoeuvers against neighbouring countries like India,

Afghanistan and the erstwhile USSR. China also wants to perpetuate its

aggression on Indian territory through a network of roads which are a vital part of

the logistical support system of arms and transportation. In addition, the Chinese

were maintaining regular army units all along these strategic roads under the

garb of ‘road maintenance workers’, who, in fact, are enlisted in the regular

Chinese army. China also made it possible for itself to have an access to the

Indian ocean ports. US warships are already prowling in the Indian Ocean and

one cannot rule out the possibility of Chinese military assistance to American

moves in case of any flare-up involving the littoral states around the Indian

Ocean who have refused to line up with the Sino-US policy in Asia.

There is not a single incident which can prove that the policy of the

Peking leadership has not been based on sheer opportunism and opportunistic

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alliances. The Government of India made its stand clear in Parliament on 22nd

June 1969:

“The entire alignment of the road runs in the Indian territory which is presently under the illegal and forcible occupation of Pakistan. We have lodged emphatic protests with Pakistan and China over the building of this military road in Indian territory and pointed out that it is a threat to peace and tranquility of the region.

Throughout the last two decades, Peking’s attitude had been to

incite Pakistan to wage a war against India. That Peking's non-recognition of

Sikkim as a part of India was evident from Chinese maps showing Sikkim as

Chinese territory.

The Peking leadership was talking about a package deal to settle

the ‘border-dispute’ with India. Although no official Chinese version was

available on this point, the package deal came to light when Subramaniam

Swamy, an emissary of the Janata Party, visited China during the Janata regime.

His visit was followed by an official mission to China by the then Foreign Minister,

Atal Behari Vajpayee. Subramaniam Swamy said that China was prepared for a

negotiated settlement with India in which China would agree to ‘hand over

Chumbey valley to India in lieu of the Aksai-chin area which China was

occupying since 1962’. This ‘package deal’ was an absurd idea which did not

have the support of the Indian people. The people asserted that the sovereignty

of India was not negotiable and that no government had the right to cede any

territory of the Indian Union. There is no doubt that the Chumbey valley has

88

great strategic importance for the defence of India as it lies between Sikkim and

Bhutan but the question of bartering away Indian territory would be treacherous

in as much as the territory being negotiated also forms part of India and has been

illegally and forcibly occupied by China.

Subramaniam Swamy went on a ‘holy mission’ to Kailash and

Manasasarovar, the ancient places of pilgrimage for the Hindus. The mere fact

that the Chinese government has agreed to allow Indian pilgrims to visit these

places does not mean that China has vacated aggression from Indian soil. A few

visits of pilgrims does not indicate any marked change in China’s foreign policy

towards India. Although Kailash and Mansarovar are holy places for the Hindus,

India has not made any territorial claims on these areas.

Overview

The foreign policy of China is to be seen in the context of its

permanent attitude towards its neighbours. What China claims to be its policy of

‘liberalization’ is in fact nothing more than rope-dancing. The Indian attitude

towards China is very clear. India has no territorial claims against it. It has

neither interfered nor has any intention to interfere in the internal affairs of China.

India is not opposed to the normalization of relations between the two countries

but China must respect India’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty. It is

the Peking leadership that has to assure good conduct and, as a first step, to

unconditionally vacate its aggression from Indian territory. It has also to reverse

89

its hostile policy against India and to accept the reality that Kashmir and Sikkim

are integral parts of India.

After paying glowing tributes to the role of India for peace, the

Chinese leadership did a quick political somersault and became hostile to India.

The Chinese attack on India did not come all of a sudden. Behind it, there was

thirteen years of aggressive activity of China in which the Chinese government

was fully involved. It began with the publication of wrong maps in which China

laid territorial claims against India.

On 24th August 1960, China accused India of using Sikkimese

territory for alleged violation of Chinese territory. On 16 January 1961, China

alleged encroachment into Chinese territory by Indian troops near Nathu La. It

was an imaginary charge and a pretext to justify the deployment of large

segments of the Chinese army all along the Sikkim border.

It was the Chinese leadership that caused this breach. The Indian

leadership throughout remained sincere in its efforts to have peace with China.

The people of India were hopeful that better sense would prevail upon the

Chinese leadership to change its attitude of hostility and belligerence towards

India.

The Chinese attitude towards its neighbour caused great

disillusionment. The Peking leadership maintained its aggressive posture on one

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side and, on the other, continued to cover their designs under the cloak of

diplomacy and deception. The new leadership of China, instead of devoting itself

to the urgent task of solving the economic problems of its people, diverted a

major part of its national resources to militarise the country.

Thus, it was the story of the great betrayal by China in shattering

the hopes of millions of people who had hoped that after the emergence of the

People’s Republic of China, its leaders - who claimed to be the revolutionary -

would choose a path that would be a departure from theGreat Han chauvinistic

and obscurantist attitude. But this hope was belied. The consequence of the

Sino-lndian war of 1962 and the stalemate in Sino-lndian dialogue is discussed

in the next chapter.

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References:

1) Jain R.K.(ed.) China- South Asian Relations 1947-1980, Vol.l, New Delhi: Radiant, 1981, P.3.

2) Ibid.

3) Ibid.

4) John Lail, Aksai Chin and Sino-lndian Conflict. New Delhi: Allied, 1988, P.232.

5) Jain R.K., Op.cit., P.61, Ratified by both the Governments on June 3, 1954.

6) Chakravorthy P.C., India-China Relations, Calcutta: 1961, P.56.

7) Daljit Sen Adel; ‘China and Her Neighbours’, New Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1984, PP.22-23.

8) Bajpai V.S., ‘India and its Neighbourhood’ New Delhi: Lancer, 1986, P.113.

9) Extracts of Chou En-lai’s Statement at a Press Conference in New Delhi on June 27, 1954, Jain R.K., Op.cit., P.72.

10) Daljit Sen Adel., Op.cit., P.26.

11) Dalvi, J.P., Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to Sino-lndian War of 1962. New Delhi: Thacker, 1969, P.115.

12) India, Ministry of External Affairs, Notes, Memorandum and Letters Exchanged between Government of India and China, White paper - I, P.51.

13) Ibid., PP.52-4.

14) Ibid., PP.55-7.

15) John W. Garner, Protracted contest: Sino-lndian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, P.42.

16) Daljit Sen, Op.cit., p.261.

17) Ibid., p.261.

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18) Hoffman Steven, India and the China crisis, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, p.14.

19) Ibid., p.28.

20) Daljit Sen., Op.cit., P.39.

21) Ibid., p.42.

22) Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, China and India - Cooperation or conflict. New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003, PP. 19-20.

23) Daljit Sen, Op.cit., p.47.

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