ZEFShaping environmental policies for

sustainable tropical forest bioeconomies

Policy choice and incentive-based forest conservation in the Amazon: evidence

from Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru

Hugo Rosa da ConceiçãoJan Börner

ZEF-Uni-Bonn

Washington, October 28th 2014

ZEFShaping environmental policies for sustainable

tropical forest bioeconomies

Outline

- Background and research questions

- Multiple streams framework

- Process tracing

- Cases: Programa Bosques (Peru), Sociobosque (Ecuador), SISA (Acre-Brazil)

- Conclusions

Shaping environmental policies for sustainable tropical forest

bioeconomies

ZEFLiterature Background

- Literature on incentive-based policies focuses on additionality, opportunity costs, spatial targeting, conditionalities, participation and poverty. Recommendations for efficiency.

- Many programs are not efficient based on those criteria, especially government-led programs. (Wunder, 2007; Ferraro and Simpson, 2002; Börner and Wunder, 2008; Pagiola, 2008; Wunder et al., 2008; Wünscher et

al., 2008…)

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- Fewer works on how programs are chosen and designed (historical, political and social factors). (Andriamahefazafy et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2011; Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; de Koning et al., 2011; Hajek et al., 2011; Kosoy et al., 2008; Le Coq et al., 2013…)

- Fewer analyses take into consideration the debate in the field of public policy theory. (Corbera et al., 2009; Le Coq et al., 2012 and 2013; Yashiro et al., 2013; Ananda,2013)

- Many large scale schemes are government policies, therefore the importance of understanding them within the public policy debate.

Literature Background

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- What aspects of the public opinion, characteristics of political organizations inside and outside the government, and of government leaderships led to the adoption of incentive-based conservation policies?

- How did existing policies influence the programs' introduction in the governments' agendas?

- Why are design recommendations / good practices highlighted in the literature on incentive-based policies so rarely considered in government-led incentive-based conservation schemes?

Research Questions

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Policy Entrepreneu

r - Access - Resources - Strategies

Theoretical framework

Problem stream- Indicators- Focusing events- Feedback

Policy Instrument

Policy Window

- Routine- Spillover - Discretionary - Random

Politics stream- National mood- Organized political forces - Political and administrative structure and changes

Multiple Streams Framework

Kingdon (1984), Howlett (1998), Zahariadis (2007)

Policy stream- Perceived technical feasibility - Perceived value acceptability

ZEFMethodology

- Detailed, semi-structured interviews (~45) with current and past government officials, NGO representatives, and other actors directly and indirectly with program design.

- Analysis of available government documents.

ZEFCase Studies3 case studies of large-scale, government-led incentive-based policies

- Undifferentiated 10 S./ha/yr- 48 Native Communities- Low pressure, high poverty areas- Conservation Agreements- Investment Plans- Low additionality potential- Low participation in design - Implemented by MINAM- Mostly government financing

- Size, ecosystem, tenure payment differentiation- 0.50 to 60 US$/ha/yr- 147 communities and 2054 individual owners- Low pressure, high poverty areas- Conservation Agreements- Investment Plans- Low additionality potential- Low participation in design - Implemented by MAE- Mostly government financing

- State Law- Jurisdiction based system- Support to existing policies from the government and regulation of new private activities - Carbon as a starter, other services in the future- Aims to issue certified emission reductions, to attract external funding (currently from KfW)- Specifics defined at project level

ZEFWhy these 3 cases?

Amazon region: relevance for biodiversity, carbon storage and regional climate regulation, increased relevance of incentive-based policies for the region’s governments.

Cases- Consolidated organizational structure - Large geographic and demographic scale- Centrality of government involvement - High profile within scholars and policy makers

- Three cases: examination of diverse contexts, a denser understanding of different decision making processes, while still manageable for detailed examination.

Case Studies

ZEFPrograma Bosques - Peru

Problem stream

Indicators• High deforestation rates, largest

percentage of GHG emissions from LULUCF, high poverty rates in forest areas.

Focusing events: • FTA with the USA and forest annex (2007). Creation of MINAM

(2008): Strengthen conservation. COP 14 (2008): Commitment to conserve 54 Mha of forests. Baguazo (2009): strained the relations of the government with indigenous peoples and motivated appeasing actions.

Feedback from previous policies: • Command and control policies were perceived as ineffective. • Juntos CCT program was considered a success in poverty reduction

in the Andes region, ‘inspired’ the idea of conditional transfers (Conservando Juntos).

ZEFPrograma Bosques PeruPolitics stream

- National Mood (Public opinion)• Virtually no pressure from the general electorate to create a

conservation program.• Only a diffuse interest in social welfare programs in the forest

areas.

- Organized political forces• No legislative (party politics) process, all decisions made within the

executive.• Foresaw relations with local governments, but no involvement at

first. • No direct pressure for program creation from NGOs, but high

involvement in the Baguazo and follow up, very critical of the non-participatory character of program design.

- Political and administrative structure and changes • Influence of MEF to add poverty reduction to the design (otherwise,

no approval)• Conflicts with MINAG, who still had most of the mandate on forests

and a production-oriented view. • Pressure for quick design and results due to MINAG’s opposition

and skepticism from MEF (ultimately responsible for budget decisions). No participation.

ZEFPrograma Bosques - PeruPolicy stream

- Perceived technical feasibility • Existing experience in other countries (CR, MX EC) showed that

incentive-based programs worked in countries relatively similar to Peru.

- Perceived value acceptability• A ‘conservation only’ program would not be accepted by the MEF

(little concern for environmental issues) and by the other ministries involved in the Amazon (would miss the opportunity for appeasing native communities).

Policy Entrepreneur

- Access, resources and strategies • Antonio Brack: famous environmentalist and respected scholar.

First environment minister. No previous relations with the president, but perceived as being supported by him. Conservation agenda and stronger international presence.

Policy Window

• Can be understood as part of a forest sector reform process, which was boosted by the forests annex in the Free-Trade Agreement with the USA

ZEFSome conclusions

• Perceived political feasibility is a very strong determinant of program design. It is considered better to have an incomplete design (that can be improved) than no project at all, or a project that attracts no interest in enrollment.

• Organized domestic interest groups outside of the government tend to be too politically weak to influence environmental policy choice, unless there are government-led institutional spaces, such as in Acre.

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• The previous success of CCT programs has helped raising the profile of policy instruments with a direct cash transfer component, but did not influence directly the conservation programs’ design.

• Participation makes policy processes more complex and time consuming, thus less well established governing or administrative groups shy away from it, needing to guarantee action within shorter policy windows.

Some conclusions

ZEFShaping environmental policies for sustainable tropical forest

bioeconomies

Thank you!Obrigado!

hugo.rosa@gmail.coms5hurosa@uni-bonn.de