sextus, descartes, hume, and peirce: on securing settled doxastic states

Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce: On Securing Settled Doxastic StatesAuthor(s): Louis E. LoebSource: Noûs, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 205-230Published by: WileyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2671965 .

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NOUS 32:2 (1998) 205-230

Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce: On Securing Settled Doxastic States

Louis E. LOEB

The University of Michigan

1. Introduction.

Sextus Empiricus and Peirce are famously philosophers for whom the objective of inquiry or investigation is characterized in psychological terms-for Sextus, as quietude or tranquility, and for Peirce, as the settlement or fixation of belief. I maintain that Descartes and Hume also characterize the goal of inquiry psychologically, in terms of such notions as unshakability and equilibrium in belief, and that their approaches to assessing belief-forming methods with reference to psychological notions have affinities with those in Sextus and Peirce. Methods of forming doxastic states are assessed by each of the four figures with reference to effectiveness in achieving a settled condition in those states.

My argument depends on identifying important lines of thought in Descartes and Hume, tendencies in their thinking that are present and not dismissed, that place a premium on settled doxastic states. In this paper, I seek to bring to light these lines of thought. In the interest of presenting an overview of Descartes and Hume, against the backdrop of Sextus and Peirce, I provide a partial defense of admittedly contentious interpretive claims, ones I attempt to defend more fully elsewhere.

I locate in Hume the claim that one ought to seek doxastic states that are settled. I locate in Descartes the claim that one ought to seek beliefs that are not only settled, but also incapable of being shaken or unsettled. Achieving a settled condition is necessary, but not sufficient, for achieving a settled condition that cannot be unsettled. The Cartesian objective is more ambitious, and the Humean more modest. I maintain that the value placed on settled doxastic states has a naturalistic foundation in three of the figures; we find in Peirce, Hume, and Sex- tus, though not in Descartes, the claim that unsettled states are unpleasant, and hence to be avoided. It is Hume, however, who is odd man out in a different

? 1998 Blackwell Publishers Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK.

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respect; unlike the other figures, he claims to be pessimistic that the objective of inquiry he identifies can be achieved.

To make interpretive headway, we need to consider the notion that the objective of inquiry might be characterized in psychological terms. Belief exhibits two kinds of characteristics.' In the first place, belief is typically associated with a first-order disposition, or set of dispositions, to behave in particular ways in particular conditions. This first characteristic focuses on the effects or outputs of belief. These include other internal states, as well as external behavior. In the second place, belief is typically associated with a second-order disposition to regulate one's belief that a proposition is true, and hence the first-order dispositions associated with belief, by (what one takes to be) evidence or indicators of truth.2 This second characteristic focuses on the causes or inputs of belief. There is room for controversy about the relationship between these characteristics. At one extreme, it might be held that possession of the first-order disposition is sufficient for belief, so that one could believe a proposition even in the absence of the second-order disposition to regulate one's first-order dispositions by evidence of the truth. I call this the output model of belief. At an opposing extreme, it might be held that the second-order disposition is constitutive of belief, so that the presence of the first-order disposition is not sufficient for belief, unless the second-order disposition is also present.3 I call this the input model of belief.

An example might help to make vivid the differences between these models. Suppose someone possesses the first-order dispositions associated with the belief thatp. We present strong evidence that the belief has been acquired and sustained by a highly unreliable method. Though the person appreciates this evidence, he is not moved or bothered by it, and indeed continues to possess the first-order dispositions. From the perspective of the output model, the person, in possessing the first-order dispositions, maintains the belief that p. From the perspective of the input model, the person's attitude toward p is not belief, but rather something else. Let us call it blind faith that p; the person regards p as true, without possessing the second-order disposition to regulate his first-order dispositions by evidence of their truth. I do not intend to adjudicate the issues raised by the competing extremes. I simply take it that any account of the matter will both grant that belief is typically associated with appropriate effects and causes, and also seek to explain the interrelations among these characteristics of belief.

Let us return to the second-order disposition to regulate one's belief that a proposition is true by evidence of its truth. The characterization of this disposition provides a sense in which belief "aims" at the truth; when we believe a proposition, we accept it as true with the aim that whether or not we believe it should be responsive to its truth, with the aim that belief should be sensitive to what is really true.4 And if belief aims at the truth, this might seem not to leave room for the objective of inquiry to be something else, something other than truth, such as tranquility, settlement, equilibrium, or unshakability.

Short of compelling evidence, we ought not suppose that an historical figure would deny that, in having belief, we seek to regulate what we regard as true by



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evidence of truth. Even if such an aim is not constitutive of belief, it seems closely associated with it. Consider the example of the person who has blind faith that p. At the least, we are inclined to look for some special psychological explanation of his indifferent response to evidence. Perhaps, for example, the person is so in- vested in regarding p as true as to fall into self-deception about the evidential state of affairs.5 So it remains to understand how the objective of inquiry can be something other than truth.

A possible answer is that truth and a favored objective characterized in psychological terms-let's choose "stability"-are coordinate aims that trade-off against each other. They might be related as objectives in something like the way that such features as simplicity, fruitfulness, and scope are sometimes thought to trade-off as criteria of theory-acceptance. It is not clear, however, that we can reasonably regard "belief aims at the truth" and "belief aims at stability" as coordinate claims. Even if aiming at the truth is not constitutive of belief, aiming at the truth seems to be much more tightly related to our concept of belief than is aiming at stability.

A better answer is that we can possess yet higher-order dispositions than aiming at the truth. An analogy to other activities might be helpful.6 Playing a game, such as chess, is typically associated with a set of first-order dispositions, to move pieces in accordance with the rules, and also a second-order disposition, to move pieces in accordance with the rules with the aim of winning the game. One's engagement in the activity of chess, however, might itself be directed by a higher- order desire, for example, to have fun, or to develop skill, or to show off-by playing chess. For the sake of achieving these other aims, one is aiming to win. So we can think of activities-such as moving chess pieces, or regulating belief-as being directed by a hierarchy of dispositions. Of course, in playing chess and in regulating belief, there need not be a higher-order objective than winning and aiming at the truth, respectively, but there might be.

We might, for example, possess a third-order desire to possess the first- and second-order dispositions characteristic of belieffor the sake of achieving stability in doxastic states (or, at least, we might possess a third-order desire to achieve stability in doxastic states in the course of aiming at the truth). Sextus represents the skeptic's initial position in precisely this way: "the Skeptic... set out to phi- losophize with the object of passing judgement on the sense-impressions and as- certaining which of them are true and which false, so as to attain quietude thereby" (PH I, 26).7 Sextus portrays the skeptic as setting out to achieve true belief for the sake of, or as a means to, the higher-order objective of quietude. The possibility of higher-order desires explains how inquiry might have two distinct objectives.

Viewing "aiming at truth" and "aiming at stability" as dispositions of different orders is also illuminating in application to Peirce. How could Peirce hold that the objective of inquiry is something other than truth? The answer is that Peirce takes the desire for settled belief as a higher-order disposition which directs the lower- order disposition to regulate one' s belief that a proposition is true by evidence of its truth. In Peirce's view, reflection on the consideration that it is accidental that



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the employment of the method of authority and the a priori method have led us to form particular beliefs, and not others, will unsettle those very beliefs (cf. CP 5.381-83). It will unsettle those beliefs precisely because such reflection finds that they have been "determined by [a] circumstance extraneous to the facts" (CP 5.383). This argument presupposes that belief characteristically aims at the truth. Were this not the case, the line of reflection Peirce describes would not be unsettling. Peirce endorses the presupposition: "A man... wishes his opinions to coincide with the fact, and... there is no reason why the results of those three first methods should do so" (CP 5.387). Here, Peirce begins with a formulation of the idea that belief aims at the truth, and then assesses the methods of tenacity and authority, and the a priori method, with reference to it. In Peirce's machinery, the aims of truth and of settled belief are wheels that engage one another; reflection on the methods under consideration unsettles beliefs that result from them because the methods are unlikely to lead to beliefs that agree with the facts.

This interpretation disarms an objection to Peirce due to Harry Frankfurt. Frankfurt is prepared to suppose, for the sake of the objection in question, that Peirce has established that the goal of inquiry is fixed belief. Frankfurt writes: "But to propose this is to deprive inquiry of its cognitive significance, for it is to run afoul of the distinction between capricious and serious belief which has al- ready been discussed." The reference is to Frankfurt's discussion of a "man who has written down on separate slips of paper all the possible answers to a question and decided to believe the answer on the slip that he picks while blindfolded." Frankfurt observes that the man "surely was not engaged in inquiry." The issue is not whether Peirce wants to locate a sense in which belief might be capricious. Peirce is explicit that beliefs based on authority are determined by "caprice" (CP 5.3 82), and that beliefs based on tenacity, authority, and the a priori method have an "accidental and capricious element" (CP 5.383). The issue is whether Frank- furt is right to suggest that "it was necessary for [Peirce] to introduce into his discussion considerations unwarranted by his original account of inquiry. " 8

Frankfurt views 5.383 as constituting a "revision" in Peirce's conception of inquiry: "Here Peirce suggests that behind inquiry lies a desire not merely for fixed beliefs, but for beliefs that are fixed in accordance with the facts." 9 Peirce, however, is not guilty of illicitly importing truth into his account of the aim of inquiry. Peirce's position simply incorporates into his account of the aim of inquiry, settled belief, the aim of belief itself, agreement with the facts. If Peirce took the aim of inquiry to be the settlement or fixation of blind faith-as characterized earlier in this section, where blind faith is not associated with a disposition to regulate one's first-order dispositions by evidence of their truth-, the considerations about "the facts," about the truth of one's convictions, would be out of place. For Peirce, it is the irritation specifically of doubt that motivates inquiry; doubt is the opposite of belief (CP 5.372), and belief is a way of regarding propositions as true that aims to coincide with the facts.

Frankfurt writes that for Peirce "The sole relevant criterion in the evaluation of any method, as such, is whether or not it is effective in securing the result for




which it is designed" (emphasis added).10 This overlooks the relevance of a distinction between lower- and higher-order aims. It might be helpful to recall that Peirce introduces 'inquiry' as a term of art, hastening to allow that his terminology is potentially misleading: "The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle Inquiry, though it must be admitted that this is sometimes not a very apt designation" (CP 5.374). Peirce uses the term 'inquiry' in the sense of the process motivated by the desire for belief. The term is, I suspect, more commonly associated with the lower-order desire to regulate one's belief that a proposition is true by evidence of its truth.

Throughout this paper, when I write, without special explanation, of the objective of inquiry, I have in mind a higher-order objective than aiming at truth. This helps to clarify my initial statements of my position-that for Descartes and Hume, as well as Sextus and Peirce, the objective of inquiry is characterized in psychological terms. My thesis is that the four figures share the view that the desire to aim at truth that is characteristic of belief is itself subject to a higher- order desire, the desire to secure doxastic states that satisfy conditions characterized in psychological terms, without reference to truth.

2. Descartes on Doubt and Unshakability.

I begin with a development of Descartes' account of the objective of inquiry. The first step is to identify an important strand in Descartes' conception of doubt. In paragraph fourteen of Meditation V, Descartes considers circumstances in which he remembers having clearly and distinctly proved a geometrical theorem, but without attending to the proof at the time of the recollection:

[O]ther arguments can now occur to me which might easily undermine my opinion, if I did not possess knowledge of God; and I should thus never have true and certain knowledge about anything, but only shifting and changeable opinions... [I]n spite of still remembering that I perceived [the proof of the theorem] very clearly, I can easily fall into doubt about its truth, if I am without knowledge of God. For I can convince myself that I have a natural disposition to go wrong from time to time in matters which I think I perceive as evidently as can be. (CSM II, 48; AT VI, 69-70)

In context, easily having one' s opinion undermined, and easily falling into doubt, are alternative descriptions of what might happen to a person who lacks knowledge of the existence of a non-deceiving God. Falling into doubt is sufficient for having one's opinion undermined. Descartes tells us that when his opinion is undermined, he is left with "shifting" or inconstant (vagas) and "changeable" (mutabiles) opinions." l Falling into doubt, therefore, is sufficient for opinion that is shifting and changeable.'2 Doubt is sufficient, we might say, for unsettled belief.

A 1640 letter to Regius confirms a connection between doubt and unsettled belief. Descartes is again discussing circumstances where we recollect a conclusion that we previously clearly and distinctly perceived, but without attending to the demonstration:



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I say that on such occasions, if we lack knowledge of God, we can imagine that the conclusions are uncertain even though we remember that they were deduced from clear principles: because perhaps our nature is such that we go wrong even in the most evident matters. Consequently, even at the moment when we deduced them from those principles, we did not have knowledge (scientia) of them, but only a conviction (persuasio) of them. I distinguish the two as follows: there is conviction when there remains some reason which might lead us to doubt, but knowledge is conviction based on a reason so strong that it can never be shaken by any stronger reason. No- body can have the latter unless he also has knowledge of God. (CSMK 147; AT III, 64-65)

Descartes characterizes mere conviction as susceptibility to doubt. He characterizes conviction that constitutes scientific knowledge as conviction that cannot be shaken. Mere conviction and scientific knowledge would not be mutually exclu- sive if a conviction could be susceptible to doubt and yet unshakable. The passage presupposes that susceptibility to doubt is sufficient for shakability.'3 Doubt leaves our previous beliefs shaken. 'Shaken', in Kenny's translation of the letter to Regius, renders 'concuti', from 'concutere', to shake or agitate. This is another way of saying the belief is unsettled by doubt. It is worth noting that twice in the Med- itations, Descartes writes of seeking something that is "inconcussum," unshakeable (CSM II, 16, 17; AT VII, 24, 25).'4

The letter to Regius and paragraph fourteen of Meditation V offer accounts of the requirements for scientific knowledge (scientia) and for "true and certain knowledge," respectively. I take these pieces of terminology to belong to a cluster of interchangeable technical terms. In both the letter to Regius and Meditation V, scientific knowledge is belief that is incapable of being unsettled or shaken.15

And in both passages, doubt shakes or unsettles belief. These passages enable us to give substance to the truism that Descartes seeks belief that is certain or indubitable, as well as to give sense to his persistent metaphors of firm and solid belief (CSM I, 115, 126, II, 12, 103, 104; AT VI, 9, 31, VII, 17, 145, 146): Descartes seeks beliefs that are incapable of being shaken.'6

Descartes' objective of belief that is incapable of being unsettled is similar to Peirce's objective of the "settlement" of opinion, or "fixation" of belief, as Peirce's understanding of the objective is standardly interpreted. (Indeed, Peirce uses "shake," "shaken," and "unshakable" in related contexts-see CP 5.378, 2.29, and 5.516). On this interpretation, the fixation of belief requires belief that is settled permanently or in the long run.'7 This looks roughly equivalent to the Cartesian objective of unshakability. It would seem that permanence in belief (at least, permanence that does not arise by accident) would require unshakability, and that belief that is incapable of being unsettled would be permanent.18

We have seen that Descartes holds that doubt is sufficient for unsettled belief. My formulation has been intentionally ambiguous. It could mean that doubt is causally sufficient to unsettle belief; or it could mean that Descartes identifies doubt with an unsettled state (and belief with a settled state). We have just this identification in Peirce. For Peirce, doubt is a hesitating, wavering, unsettled




state; belief is opposed to doubt, so that belief is a state that is firm or settled (CP 5.372, 394, 417). The reading of Descartes which identifies doubt with an unsettled state is the most economical, and captures the direction or tendency of his thought in passages we have considered. (The economical reading, however, is perhaps somewhat anachronistic. In the official ontology, doubt is a conscious experience, a mode of thought.) Whether or not he identifies doubt with an unsettled state, it remains the case that for Descartes doubt is unsettling, and that the objective of inquiry is a settled state that is incapable of being unsettled.

Peirce is notoriously critical of Descartes, and this might seem at odds with my interpretation of Descartes' account of doubt. According to Peirce, doubt must be "real"-rather than "paper" or "verbal" (CP 5.376, 416, 445, 451)-in that it must actually unsettle belief, and Cartesian doubt fails this test. Real doubt requires a "positive reason" (cf. CP 5.265); it must be "real and living" (cf. CP 2.192, 5.376, 6.498); it must be particular rather than universal (cf. CP 5.265, 318, 376,416); it must have an "external origin" (CP 5.443); and it must have the capacity to change belief (cf. CP 5.265). Peirce's conception of doubt is a complex topic. The gist of my position is this. Peirce's chief quarrel is with Descartes' view of the kinds of hypotheses that are capable of generating doubt. At the same time, Peirce's conception of the nature of doubt was much closer to that of Des- cartes than Peirce thought.19

Peirce was more than capable of overlooking detail and nuance in Descartes' philosophy. For example, as Frankfurt has shown, Peirce is mistaken in his claim that "The distinction between an idea seeming clear and really being so, never occurred to [Descartes]" (cf. CP 5.39 1).20 In the present context, Peirce suggests that "no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up" (CP 5.265). This is not an accurate account of Descartes' conception of the outcome of the method of doubt. A number of beliefs about the material world with which the doubter might begin-that there is a void, and that bodies possess qualities exactly similar to sensory experiences of secondary qualities-do not survive the doubt.21

A more fundamental point is that Peirce is blind to the strand in Descartes' conception of doubt, on which doubt is sufficient for unsettled belief, that I have identified. There is much evidence Peirce overlooks, beyond the crucial passages from Meditation V, the letter to Regius, and elsewhere. It is the clear intent of the final two paragraphs of Meditation I that its skeptical hypotheses eventually undermine opinion; noticing that his "habitual opinions keep coming back," Des- cartes proposes a technique for overcoming "the distorting influence of habit" (CSM II, 15; AT VII, 22). By the first paragraph of Meditation II, the doubt Descartes has introduced is unsettling the meditator: "So serious are the doubts into which I have been thrown as a result of yesterday's meditation that I can neither put them out of my mind nor see any way of resolving them. It feels as if I have fallen unexpectedly into a deep whirlpool which tumbles me around" (CSM II, 16; AT VII, 23-24). It is at the close of this paragraph that Descartes



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notes that "Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire earth," and expresses his interest in managing "to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakeable" (CSM II, 16; AT VII, 24).

In addition, Descartes holds that a proposition cannot be doubted at any time it is clearly and distinctly perceived (CSM 11 104, 309, 321; AT VII, 146, 460, 477). Indeed, Descartes maintains that a proposition is not "in any way" (nullo modo ) open to doubt (AT VII, 38, VIII-1, 21; CSM II, 27; cf. CSM I, 207) when it is clearly and distinctly perceived.22 It is difficult to see how Descartes could claim this if doubt, on his conception of it, need not be psychologically living or real. Granted, Descartes also holds that belief in a proposition is psychologically irresistible at any time it is clearly and distinctly perceived. This doctrine appears in the letter to Regius-"our mind is of such a nature that it cannot help assenting to what it clearly understands" (CSMK 147; AT III, 64)-, in paragraph fourteen of Meditation V (CSM II, 48; AT VII, 69), and elsewhere (cf. CSM I, 197, 207, 11, 103, 104, C 6; VIII-1, 9, 21, VII, 145, 146, V, 148).23 But if Peirce is correct that Cartesian doubt can be merely paper or verbal, on what grounds could Descartes claim that it is not possible, while irresistibly believing that p, to doubt whether p is true?24 The explanation cannot be that belief and doubt are incompatible or opposite states. Perhaps they are, but if so belief would preclude doubt whether the belief is irresistible or not.

If doubt is a state that unsettles belief, Descartes seems entitled to the claim that irresistible belief is not "in any way" open to doubt. We need only suppose that, in Descartes' view, irresistible belief cannot be unsettled. Obviously, the clear and distinct perception of a proposition can be disrupted. Descartes is thus careful to claim that a belief is irresistible and not subject to doubt "so long as," or "as long as," it is clearly and distinctly perceived (CSM I, 197, 11 48, 309, C 6; AT VIII-1, 9, VII, 69-70, 460, V, 149). Given that belief cannot be unsettled so long as it is irresistible, it is because doubt is a state that unsettles belief that it follows that irresistible belief precludes doubt.

3. The Role of Unshakability in Descartes' Epistemology.

What is the function, in Descartes' epistemology, of the strand in his thinking that identifies unshakability as the objective of inquiry? The answer is that the conceptions of doubt and unshakability discussed in the preceding section are essen- tial elements in Descartes' solution to the problem of the Cartesian circle. In a nutshell, the problem of the circle arises as follows. In the final four paragraphs of Meditation I, Descartes invokes the hypothesis of a powerful deceiver, raising doubt about the truth of, at least, beliefs based upon sense-perception.25 In paragraph four of Meditation III, Descartes also invokes an hypothesis of a powerful deceiver, in this instance raising doubt specifically about the truth of beliefs based upon clear and distinct perception. In response to these skeptical hypotheses, Descartes offers proofs of the existence of an all-perfect being, God. Since an




all-perfect being is omnipotent and a non-deceiver, God would not give us cognitive faculties-such as the faculties of sense-perception and clear and distinct perception-which lead to false belief if used correctly. The proofs of the existence of God, however, rely on clear and distinct perception, so that Descartes' response to the deceiver hypothesis appears question-begging.

Descartes took the problem of the circle seriously, and provided an answer. His approach might be called a "psychological" response to the problem of the circle, a line of response that has now received considerable attention in the literature.26 The response relies upon Descartes' claim that doubt unsettles belief, so that the skeptical hypotheses unsettle the beliefs whose truth they call into question. Drawing on the framework introduced in ?1, we can state the solution as follows. While belief aims at truth, belief is directed by a higher-order objective, unshakability. Descartes thinks that unshakability can be achieved, in light of two theses identified in ?2: that belief cannot be shaken so long as it is psychologically irresistible; and that belief is psychologically irresistible so long as one attends to a clear and distinct demonstration of the proposition believed. The objective of unshakability can then be achieved by someone who possesses a clear and distinct demonstration of the existence of a non-deceiving God and its epistemological implications. This demonstration does beg the question with respect to the truth of the skeptical hypothesis of Meditation III. At the same time, when a person attends to the relevant demonstration, he irresistibly believes that there is a non-deceiving God, that his cognitive faculties would not lead to false belief if used correctly, that whatever he clearly and distinctly perceives is true, and so forth. Such beliefs are unshakable; the skeptical hypothesis cannot unsettle them, so long as they are clearly and distinctly perceived.

What has happened here to aiming for truth? Descartes does not claim that he cannot achieve truth. The deceiver hypothesis has no tendency to show that our cognitive faculties are unreliable, in the sense of leading to false beliefs more often than not; the hypothesis at most shows that our cognitive faculties might be unreliable. True belief remains an objective. Short of begging the question, however, Descartes fails to locate a way of establishing that clear and distinct perception and other cognitive faculties lead to truth. Truth is an objective that gives out, in the sense that Descartes is unable to exploit considerations related to truth to ground a particular method for forming beliefs-such as reliance on clear and distinct perception-, without begging the question. More generally, an aim "gives out" if it underdetermines the choice among means, in light of the information available, thereby allowing a higher-order aim to determine the choice. Suppose I undertake to play a grand master. Were I to win, it would be a matter of sheer luck; no strategy is better suited to my winning than any other, so that the aim of winning gives out. If I am playing with the higher-order objective of having fun, I might as well regulate my style of play accordingly, among the various ways I might try to win. Similarly, Descartes does think he is able to exploit the higher- order objective of unshakability, coupled with some psychological theses, to ground a method for forming belief. The higher-order objective of unshakability



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takes over where the lower-order objective gives out.27 For Descartes, the aim of truth remains in place, though it is idle in his response to the problem of the circle.28

Here we have a difference between Descartes and Peirce. As we have seen in ?1, in Peirce's assessments of methods of forming beliefs, the aims of truth and unshakability engage each other. Reflection on tenacity, authority, and the a priori method is unsettling because there is no reason why beliefs based on these methods should coincide with the facts; by contrast, "to coincide with the fact... is the prerogative of the method of science" (CP. 5.387). Peirce's assessments of belief-forming methods rely on considerations about the likely reliability of a method in forming true beliefs. At the stage of the Meditations where Descartes must respond to the hypothesis of a deceiver, such considerations are out of bounds, in that they would beg the question with respect to the truth of the skeptical hypotheses.

It is the Pyrrhonian, not Descartes, who gives up the aim of truth. Lower- and higher-order aims can conflict. The conception of a hierarchy of desires carries no implications about the relative strengths of the higher- and lower-order desires. The higher-order desire, however, might be the stronger, so that in cases of conflict the higher-order aim would take precedence. For example, one might be so inept at playing chess that one simply cannot have fun playing. If having fun takes precedence, one would give up playing chess in favor of some other way of having fun; the higher-order aim of having fun would supplant the lower-order aim of winning at chess. Pyrrhonian skepticism is an example of a position on which a higher-order desire for a psychological objective supplants the lower- order desire for truth. Though the skeptic sets out to achieve true belief as a means to quietude (see ?1), he "found himself involved in contradictions of equal weight, and being unable to decide between them suspended judgment" (PH I, 26). The skeptic gives up achieving quietude by aiming for true belief. Sextus continues:

[T]he Skeptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect this they suspended judgment; and they found that quietude, as if by chance, followed upon their suspense... (PH I, 28-29)

For the Pyrrhonian, the lower-order aim of truth is renounced as one that cannot be achieved, and the higher-order objective of quietude is achieved in another way, by suspending belief. Descartes, however, does not claim that there is an incompatibility either between aiming at truth and aiming at unshakability, or between achieving truth and achieving unshakability; for Descartes, the higher- order goal of unshakability does not supplant the lower-order goal of truth.

I do not claim that Descartes' solution to the problem of the circle is a satis- fying one.29 Where the aim of truth gives out, the aim of unshakability takes over, faute de mieux. Descartes' position amounts to his settling for showing how to achieve unshakability, absent a showing (without begging the question) that un-




shakable beliefs are likely to be true.30 This raises the possibility of a develop- mental interpretation of Descartes, according to which he adopted the higher- order aim of unshakability under pressure from the problem of the Cartesian circle. Descartes' emphasis on the unsettling character of doubt and on unshakability as an objective are prominent in texts where Descartes is discussing the problem of the circle-Meditation V, the Replies to Objections, and the letter to Regius. On the other hand, some of the evidence presented in ?2 for Descartes' conception of doubt derives from Meditations I and II. My own speculation is that Descartes started out with a conception of an objective of "firm" belief, thinking of such belief as psychologically unshakable because based on the best possible evidence of truth. If so, the aim of unshakability is in place from the beginning, with Descartes expecting unshakability to be a byproduct of evidence of truth. Unable to identify such beliefs without begging the question against the deceiver hypothesis, he becomes prepared to rely on unshakability on its own.31

What mattes more for my purposes is that Descartes offers little independent argument for adopting unshakability (that is, mere psychological unshakability) as a higher-order objective. Perhaps he comes closest to doing so in the Second Replies, where Descartes supplies a forceful statement of unshakability as an objective of inquiry. The statement leads to an account of "perfect certainty," which I take to belong to the cluster of terms interchangeable with 'scientific knowledge' (?2). In the sentence following the quotation I am about to give, Descartes identifies perfect certainty with "firm and immutable conviction" (CSM II, 103; AT VII, 145). Descartes writes:

First of all, as soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are spon- taneously convinced that it is true. Now if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever to have any reason [causa] for doubting what we are convinced of, then there are no further questions for us to ask: we have everything that we could reasonably want. What is it to us that someone may make out that the perception whose truth we are so firmly convinced of may appear false to God or an angel, so that it is, absolutely speaking, false? Why should this alleged 'absolute falsity' bother us, since we neither believe in it nor have even the smallest suspicion of it? For the supposition which we are making here is of a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty. (CSM II, 103; AT VII, 144-145)

This is reminiscent of Peirce, in "The Fixation of Belief":

[T]he sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. (CP 5.375; cf. 376, 563, 6.485)

Similarly, Peirce wrote three decades later: "If you absolutely cannot doubt a proposition-cannot bring yourself, upon deliberation, to entertain the least sus-



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picion of the truth of it, it is plain there is no room to desire anything more" (CP 6.498). For Peirce, when we reach firm belief, "we are entirely satisfied," and have everything we could "desire," whether the belief be true or false. For Des- cartes, if we achieve conviction so firm that it cannot be destroyed, "we have everything that we could reasonably want," even if the belief is alleged absolutely false.32

But why do we want unshakable conviction at all? Descartes does not say. As I have suggested, this objective comes to the forefront under pressure of the problem of the circle; Descartes does not provide an explicit independent rationale for it. Peirce, by contrast, provides a rationale: doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state, and the irritation of doubt provides the only immediate motive for inquiry, the struggle to attain belief. In providing resources for an account of the selection of the objective of inquiry, Peirce supplies a layer of theory that is virtually absent in Descartes.

4. Peirce and Hume on Doubt.

In the claim that doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state, Hume, unlike Des- cartes, is aligned with Peirce. In the final paragraph of Treatise II.iii.10, "Of curiosity, or the love of truth," Hume makes a number of important claims about uncertainty or doubt, and certainty or belief (T 453). In the first place, there are claims about the "nature" of doubt and belief. Hume writes: "'tis the nature of doubt to cause a variation in the thought," so that doubt involves "instability and inconstancy" (T 453). By contrast, belief or certainty involves "fixing one particular idea in the mind, and keeping it from wavering in the choice of its objects" (T 453). In this passage, Hume treats belief and certainty as the opposites of doubt and uncertainty. If it is of the nature of doubt to cause "variation," "instability," and "inconstancy" in thought, then the property of "fixing one particular idea in the mind, and keeping it from wavering," must be of the nature of belief.33 It is in the nature of belief, unlike doubt, to be settled.34

In the second place, there are claims about contingent psychological effects of doubt and belief, as distinct from claims about their nature. Hume writes in the preceding section of the Treatise that "uncertainty...is uneasy" (T 447).35 Hume tells us at page 453: "'Tis a quality of human nature, which is conspicuous on many occasions, and is common both to the mind and body, that too sudden and violent a change is unpleasant to us, and that however any objects may in themselves be indifferent, yet their alteration gives uneasiness." Since " 'tis the nature of doubt to cause a variation in the thought, and transport us suddenly from one idea to another, it must of consequence be the occasion of pain" (T 453).36 Doubt is uneasy because it is unsettled. By contrast, belief or certainty "prevents uneasiness" (T 453). Hume holds independently that there is a general desire for plea- sure, and aversion to pain (cf. T 118-19, 414, 438-39, 574-75). The uneasiness in doubt, therefore, provides a motive for its own removal. There is a natural motive to replace doubt in favor of belief.




The central claim at Treatise 453 recurs in the "Appendix." In belief, unlike doubt, the mind "fixes and reposes itself in one settled conclusion" (T 625); whereas doubt is associated with "agitation," and hence uneasiness, belief is pleas- ant, involving "tranquility and repose" (T 626). Hume's position in the passages at pages 453 and 625-26 bears a striking similarity to that of Peirce in "The Fixation of Belief": "Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief; while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid" (CP 5.372). For Peirce, doubt is a state of uneasiness or dissatisfaction that provides an immediate motive to seek relief in favor of the tranquil or calm state where thought is settled, or does not fluctuate (cf. CP 2.210, 5.384, 394, 397, 510, 605). Hume adopts a similar position in Book II and the "Appendix."37 Furthermore, it is explicit in Hume, and implicit in Peirce, that doubt is unpleasant because it is unsettled.

We should expect Hume' s epistemological position to emerge in Book I of the Treatise, so that the evidence from Book II and the "Appendix" cannot on its own sustain an interpretation of his epistemology.38 The Peircian idea that we struggle to remove the uneasiness in uncertainty or doubt is prominent, however, in I.iv.2, "Of skepticism with regard to the senses." According to Hume, there is a propensity to ascribe identity to a succession of perceptions such as the perceptions of a mountain, or of furniture in the chamber, before and after we shut our eyes or turn our head (T 194-95) that are perfectly resembling or invariable, though interrupted (T 204). At the same time, the interruption in the perceptions makes us consider them distinct objects (T 205). We are involved in a "contradiction" (T 199, 205, 208), and hence "perplexity" (T 205), that is, uncertainty or doubt. In these circumstances, there is an "opposition" (T 206), a "combat of internal principles" (T 205). The metaphors point to a psychological war, a highly unsettled condition. This is a source of uneasiness. Hume writes:

[A]ny contradiction either to the sentiments or passions gives a sensible uneasiness, ... Now there being here an opposition betwixt the notion of the identity of resembling perceptions, and the interruption of their appearance, the mind must be uneasy in that situation, and will naturally seek relief from the uneasiness. Since the uneasiness arises from the opposition of two contrary principles, it must look for relief by sacrificing the one to the other. (T 205-206, emphases added)

In this we are frustrated, since the opposing beliefs prove equally strong (cf. T 206).

In the end, we relieve our uneasiness by supposing that perfectly resembling perceptions have a continued existence at times when they are not perceived, and hence an unchanging and uninterrupted existence (cf. T 199, 205-210). This supposition leads to a second contradiction. Hume thinks that reflection on the phe- nomena of double vision and perceptual relativity convince us that perceptions do not have an existence independent of the mind, and hence do not have a continued existence when not perceived (cf. T 210, 214, 215). This conflicts with the supposition at hand. In connection with this "contradiction" (T 215), Hume iden-



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tifies the same elements of doubt, struggle, and uneasiness encountered in the previous example. We are not "fully convinc'd" (T 215, twice) of either side of the contradiction, so that our mind is in an "intermediate situation" (T 216), that is, doubt or uncertainty. There is "opposition" between "two enemies" that "struggle" to "destroy" one another (T 215). Hume writes: "In order to set ourselves at ease in this particular, we contrive a new hypothesis" (T 215, emphasis added); "Not being able to reconcile these two enemies, we endeavour to set ourselves at ease as much as possible, by successively granting to each whatever it demands" (T 215, emphases added). We are led, that is, to the hypothesis of the double existence of perceptions and objects, to indirect or representative realism.

Treatise I.iv.2 provides extensive confirmation of the Peircian themes of page 453 and the "Appendix": doubt is an unsettled and hence uneasy state, which we desire to relieve.39 Here we have a higher-order desire than aiming at truth the desire to attain belief for the sake of relieving uneasiness and achieving tranquility , so that the objective of inquiry is settled belief.40 On Hume' s view, one ought to seek doxastic states that are settled, or in equilibrium.41 One ought to do so in order to relieve the uneasiness in an unsettled state; uneasiness provides a natural motive to relieve doubt in favor of belief. For Hume, epistemic obligation is naturalized, as deriving from the motivational force of the felt uneasiness to which an unsettled doxastic condition gives rise.42

Though my interpretation of Hume's epistemology is "naturalistic," it is im- portantly different from that due to Norman Kemp Smith. Kemp Smith maintains that Hume has a response to skepticism in his doctrine of "natural beliefs" that are "inevitable" or "irresistible."43 This leads Kemp Smith to formulate a sense in which, for Hume, natural beliefs ought to be accepted: "The beliefs which ought to be accepted are, [Hume] teaches, beliefs that Nature itself marks out for us. In their fundamental forms, as 'natural' beliefs, we have no choice but to accept them; they impose themselves upon the mind." 44 On the Kemp Smith interpretation, Hume's epistemology is entirely negative: since the natural beliefs are irresistible, to say that we ought not hold them is pointless, or even false (if ought implies can).45 On my interpretation, Hume not only delimits the class of beliefs we ought to accept in naturalistic terms, but also provides a positive account of our obligation to accept them with reference to the desire to relieve the uneasiness in unsettled states. What is more, as I interpret Hume, irresistibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for justification: beliefs could be settled without being irresistible; and conflicting beliefs could be irresistible without being settled.

5. Hume and Sextus.

Hume is interested in equilibrium or a settled condition in belief because he was working within a philosophical tradition that emphasizes the desirability of ataraxia, a state of quietude, in which one is tranquil, or not disturbed.46 A hallmark of Pyrrhonian skepticism is the claim that the suspension of belief is the only route to tranquility. Isostheneia, an equipollence of opposing arguments, leads to




epoche', suspense of judgment (PH I, 8), which in turn leads to ataraxia (PH I, 26, 29, 31). Hume is concerned with tranquility in his theory of belief (T 119, 626), as well as in his theory of the passions (T 417, 423, 437, 442). Hume shares a Pyrrhonian conception of tranquility as the objective of inquiry. At the same time, Hume has two criticisms of Pyrrhonian skepticism. One criticism is well-known: there are beliefs the belief in body, for example that cannot be suspended, so that the Pyrrhonian prescription is to no avail in the effort to achieve tranquility.47 This is a criticism of the Pyrrhonian technique for achieving tranquility, not a criticism of the Pyrrhonian conception of the objective itself.

Formulating the second of the two criticisms requires additional background. Such notions as "ataraxia," "quietude," or "tranquility" admit of more than one meaning. On the one hand, they can refer to a feeling, an occurrent state either a calm feeling, or the absence of any felt disturbance or irritation. For Sextus, ataraxia had this meaning at least, for he took the fact that disturbances such as cold or thirst are unavoidable to imply that ataraxia cannot be fully achieved. For this reason, the objective of skepticism is ataraxia in matters of opinion, and moderation of those disturbances that are unavoidable (PH I, 25). Such moderation can be achieved, if we eliminate the opinion that the disturbances are good or bad (cf. PH I, 29-30, and M XI, 147_50).48

In addition to referring to a calm feeling, such notions as "tranquility" can refer to the settled character of the mental disposition that a calm feeling manifests. This is also an element in the Pyrrhonian notion: " 'Suspense' is a state of mental rest owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything" (PH I, 10); "the term 'suspension' is derived from the fact of the mind being held up or 'suspended' so that it neither affirms nor denies anything owing to the equipollence of the matters in question" (PH I, 196). The underlying idea is that equipollence of opposing arguments constitutes an equilibrium, and hence a settled condition, so that, other things being equal, sustained suspension of judgment, and the felt tranquility that derives from it, are possible.49 It is because it constitutes an equilibrium that isostheneia can lead to epoche', and in turn to ataraxia. These latter states suspense of judgment and tranquility require equilibrium, a settled condition that, for Sextus, is ultimately the contribution of the equipollence of opposing arguments.

Hume takes a keen interest in the idea that equipollence gives rise to a feeling of tranquility, and thinks that the Pyrrhonian has something right, and something wrong. Hume in effect isolates two elements in the idea. One element is that a settled condition gives rise to a calm or tranquil feeling (and that an unsettled condition gives rise to uneasiness). Hume thinks this is correct. Settled conditions in our doxastic lives, much as settled conditions in our emotional lives, feel calm. The calm feeling (or the absence of felt disturbance) just is an occurrent mani- festation of the settled doxastic condition, or our conscious awareness of that state.

The second element in the Pyrrhonian position is that equipollence of opposing arguments constitutes a settled condition. It is here, according to Hume, that



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the Pyrrhonian goes wrong. Hume's account of why this is so constitutes the second of his two criticisms of the Pyrrhonian. We might imagine that opposing arguments somehow cancel each other out, or that they are locked in an ongoing stand-off for influence on belief or assent. Hume maintains, to the contrary, that opposing arguments more typically struggle with each other in a psychological war. As we have seen in ?4, the metaphors of combat are Hume's. In I.iv.2, we have "combat," "opposition," and "struggle" between "enemies" that seek to "destroy" each other. Though we "look for relief by sacrificing the one to the other," the opposing beliefs can prove equally strong (cf. T 206), so that neither "will...quit the field" (T 215).

It is helpful to think in terms of Hume's own analogy to physical combat. Equally matched combatants are not typically locked in a literal steady-state. There is an ebb and flow where one combatant, then the other, temporarily gains the upper-hand. Owing to the fundamental equality of the opponents, there is indeed a kind of tie or deadlock, in that neither party can prevail for long; this deadlock, however, manifests itself in an alternating cycle. Applying this model to opposing beliefs, as Hume does, we do not have a picture of an equilibrium, or settled condition, in doxastic states. We have a picture of one of the opposing beliefs ascending, and then the other.50 Thus, Hume writes in conjunction with one of the oppositions in I.iv.2 of our "successively granting to each [enemy] whatever it demands." Similarly, in I.iv.7, in response to an opposition between two "directly contrary" operations of the mind we "successively assent to both" (T 266). Hume is explicit that in a number of instances opposing beliefs have oscillation in belief, alternating cycles of assent, as a (provisional or permanent) result.51

In Hume' s view, the second element of the Pyrrhonian position, the idea that we can achieve equilibrium in the presence of opposing arguments of equal strength, is mistaken. The presence of such arguments leads to combat, struggle, and cycles of alternating belief a dramatically unsettled doxastic condition. Cou- pled with the claim that an unsettled condition gives rise to uneasiness, equipollence would be an unpleasant and disturbing state.52 Though correct that genuine mental equilibrium gives rise to felt tranquility, the Pyrrhonian has a hopeless account of how doxastic equilibrium can be achieved. This is a deeper objection to the Pyrrhonian than Hume's first criticism, the familiar Humean point that there are beliefs that cannot be suspended. Even if belief could be suspended, tranquility could not be achieved through equipollence. As Hume sees it, the Pyrrhonian leaves us with the problem of explaining how mental equilibrium might be achieved. As we have seen (?3), the skeptic, finding contradictions of equal weight, gave up aiming for truth, and suspended belief. In Hume's view, this gains nothing for the skeptic, in respect to tranquility. As with Hume's first criticism, there is no challenge to tranquility as the objective of inquiry.

Hume's conclusion is that if tranquility is to be achieved, it will have to be within a system of beliefs. Since belief aims at truth, Hume thus reinstates the lower-order objective of aiming at truth, an objective relinquished by the Pyrrho-




nian. One project in Book I of the Treatise is to determine whether a settled condition can be achieved within a system of beliefs, given that it cannot be achieved through an equipollence of opposing arguments where belief is suspended. Hume takes this to be a pressing issue, for he thinks that disequilibrium is a pervasive feature of our mental life. On the face of it, many stretches of the Treatise pages 186-87, 198-210, 210-216, 219-224, 253-55, 439-48 are given over to descriptions of disequilibria in our doxastic or emotional lives. Since an unsettled condition causes uneasiness, a kind of disturbance, mental disequilibrium is itself a serious threat to the achievement of ataraxia. It is these Pyrrhonian themes and concerns, and Hume's reaction to them, that stand in the background of Hume's Peircian starting points.

6. Hume's Pessimism.

Sextus, Descartes, and Peirce are sanguine that a settled condition can be achieved. Sextus identifies a battery of ways or modes for achieving equipollence (cf. PH I, 31-186), and hence suspension of judgment and tranquility. For Descartes, unshakable belief can be achieved by attending to a clear and distinct demonstration of the existence of a non-deceiving God. For Peirce, settled belief can be achieved by employing the method of science. Hume, in the end, brings himself to a pessimistic conclusion about the possibility of achieving settled belief.

Hume's pessimism is in full view in I.iv.7, "The conclusion of this book." This complex section has recently received a good deal of attention. I confine myself to some brief comments, from the perspective of my overall interpretation of Hume. Hume writes: "I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another" (T 268-69). Hume cannot mean that he is ready to suspend all belief; some beliefs are irresistible (T 31, 225; cf. 128). He means that he is ready to reject all belief as unreasonable. At pages 265-68, Hume draws on a number of considerations in route to this result.

Hume develops the most important of these considerations at pages 267-68.53 His discussion draws on conclusions at Liv. 1, "Of skepticism with regard to reason," where Hume argues that "all knowledge," even demonstrative knowledge, "degenerates into probability" (T 180). Hume proceeds to argue that judgments of probability are subject to correction in light of the fallibility of judgment; that this correction takes the form of a reduction in the estimate of probability; and that the new judgment of probability is itself subject to correction and reduction, ad infinitum. The result of such a series of reductions would be "a total extinction of belief and evidence" (T 183); it would "at last reduce [the original evidence] to nothing" (T 184). In I.iv.7, Hume reiterates that "the understanding, when it acts alone ... entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition" (T 267-68).

In Liv. 1, the argument for the claim that the understanding subverts itself depends upon the assumption that the principles by which we correct probability judgments are "apply'd to every new reflex judgment" (T 186). As Hume puts it



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in I.iv.7, it is only when adherence to the understanding is "steadily executed" (T 267) that belief is extinguished. The extinction of belief depends on the repeated execution of corrections to probability judgments. At I.iv. 1, however, Hume claims that repeated correction of probability judgments "becomes forc'd and unnatural"; "The attention is on the stretch: The posture of the mind is uneasy" (T 185). As Hume writes in L.iv.7, "we enter with difficulty into remote views of things" (T 268). The extinction of belief, then, depends on a series of corrections and reductions that does not take place. If Hume has not shown that the understanding does subvert itself, why should he be prepared to reject all belief as unreasonable?

Hume's point, I suggest, is that reflection on the result of repeated corrections to probability judgments, were we to undertake them, unsettles our current probability judgments. We assign a non-zero probability to a great many propositions. Reflection shows that repeated corrections reduce to nothing the probability that any belief is true. Since belief aims at the truth, this consideration unsettles (albeit without entirely extinguishing) our current beliefs. When one considers that a series of corrections would reduce the probability to nothing, one is less inclined to maintain one's current probability judgments.54

This is not, however, the end of Hume's story. At pages 267-68, intense and sophisticated reflection (about possible corrections to probability judgments) unsettles belief. This reflection, according to Hume, gives way:

Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours amusement, I wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther. (T 269)

Has settled belief now been achieved, in the absence of intense reflection? Un- fortunately, the relatively unreflective posture when we are involved in mundane pursuits is itself unstable:

At the time, therefore, that I am tir'd with amusement and company..., I feel my mind all collected with itself, and am naturally inclin'd to carry my view into all those subjects, about which I have met with so many disputes ... I cannot forbear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of moral good and evil, the nature and foundation of government, and the cause of those several passions and inclinations, which actuate and govern me. I am uneasy to think I approve of one object and disapprove of another; call one thing beautiful, and another deform'd; decide concerning truth and falshood, reason and folly, without knowing upon what principles I proceed. (T 270-71)

The uneasiness in this mood should lead to increased reflection, about morality, beauty, and even the principles by which we "decide concerning truth and false-




hood" (the very topic that has occupied Hume in Book I of the Treatise), returning him to investigation of the understanding. It is difficult to see why he should not cycle back to the intense reflection of Treatise 268-69, and hence oscillate between the different levels. There is no level of reflection that can be sustained, and hence no steady or settled belief.55

More precisely, settled belief cannot be achieved by someone who has gotten so far as the intense reflection of pages 265-68. Such a person will lapse into a more unreflective posture, and in turn undertake inquiries that lead back to unsettling intense reflection. Though Hume describes the oscillations in the first- person, he does not think of them as idiosyncratic. To the contrary, he wants to draw general conclusions about the role of philosophy, for himself and others (cf. T 27 1-74).

At the same time, many are exempt from the oscillations he describes:

I am sensible, ... that there are in England, in particular, many honest gentlemen, who being always employ'd in their domestic affairs, or amusing themselves in common recreations, have carried their thoughts very little beyond those objects, which are every day expos'd to their senses. And indeed, of such as these I pretend not to make philosophers, nor do I expect them either to be associates in these researches or auditors of these discoveries. (T 272)

Hume has provided no reason to think that such unreflective persons cannot achieve belief that is by and large settled. They will not have had their beliefs systematically unsettled by the considerations in I.iv.7, and will not be prone to the oscillations Hume describes as infecting those who are more philosophical. It is those who have engaged in intense reflection who are subject to the oscillations Hume describes.

In this regard, Hume stands in marked contrast to Peirce. Peirce is in agreement with Hume that an unreflective person can achieve settled belief. A certain degree of reflection is required to unsettle belief-forming methods other than the method of science. As Peirce writes, in discussing the method of tenacity, the needed reflection is likely to occur "in some saner moment" (CP 5.378); and in discussing the method of authority, that "some individuals will be found who are raised above" the condition of not being able to "put two and two together" (CP 5.381). Not everyone achieves the level of reflection necessary to unsettle beliefs based on tenacity, or authority. Do the higher levels of reflection have some pride of place in the evaluation of belief-forming methods? Peirce seems to allow that he has no answer:

A man may go through life, systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change in his opinions, and if he only succeeds ... I do not see what can be said against his doing so. It would be an egotistical impertinence to object that his procedure is irrational, for that only amounts to saying that his method of settling belief is not ours. (CP 5.377)



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In this passage, Peirce is not prepared to claim that the person who clings tena- ciously to belief ought to be more reflective, or that he ought to adopt a different method.

Peirce's reserve here finds itself in the company of another line of thought. Peirce maintains that there is a tendency for one method to give way to another, in a sequence moving from tenacity, to authority, to the a priori method, and to the method of science. In other words, there is a tendency to greater degrees of reflection, culminating in the method of science. This is true both at the level of the individual, and at the level of entire societies.56 Thus, a portion of Peirce's analysis of belief-forming methods is given over to the method of authority's sway, and eventual collapse, in earlier cultures and civilizations (cf. CP 5.380- 82). Peirce writes in this vein: "But most of all I admire the method of tenacity for its strength, simplicity, and directness... It is impossible not to envy the man who can dismiss reason, although we know how it must turn out at last" (CP 5.386). I take the final clause to be an allusion to the ascendency of the method of science, in the fullness of time. Though we perhaps cannot say that persons at earlier stages in the sequence ought to be more reflective, we can take note of the tendency for one method progressively to give way to another. Here we have the marked contrast with Hume. For both Peirce and Hume, an unreflective person can achieve settled belief, albeit belief that would be unsettled by greater reflection. For Peirce, however, heightened reflection leads to another method of settling belief; for Hume, it leads to oscillation.

Though Hume has a constructive orientation in epistemology, he is happy to let it lead to a pessimistic conclusion. Indeed, he seems to rush into it. The foundation in I.iv.i for the main argument leading to the pessimism in I.iv.7 seems utterly mistaken. In order to conclude that the series of corrections would reduce probability to nothing, Hume multiplies probabilities of different orders, taking the probability that a first-order probability estimate is mistaken to reduce the original estimate.57 I think that the outcome of a close examination of the considerations at I.iv.7 would be that Hume has not provided any sound reason for thinking his naturalistic project leads to pessimism.

The epistemological position I attribute to Hume on which settled belief is the objective of inquiry is recessive in the Treatise. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, with his own pessimism in view, Hume does not bother to elaborate the details of his favored epistemological theory. In addition, Hume's normative epistemological project is secondary to the project of psychological explanation and the science of human nature.58 Similarly, in the case of Des- cartes, I identify what is but an important strand in his thinking. We have seen in ?3 that to some extent Descartes backs into unshakability as the objective of inquiry, under pressure of the problem of the Cartesian circle. Thus, my claim is that the kind of position on the regulation of doxastic states that is to be found on the surface of Sextus and Peirce has a role to play, albeit a less obvious role, in Descartes and Hume.59




Notes

'For a similar formulation, see Leon, 1992, esp. pp. 299-302. 2This formulation is adapted from Velleman, 1992, p. 14, including note 24. Also cf. Leon, 1992,

p. 300. I owe the distinction that follows to Velleman, in conversation. 3This position is found in Velleman, 1992, pp. 10-15, and 1996, pp. 707-11. Also cf. Humber-

stone, 1992, pp. 73-75; and Kobes, 1992. Though Leon, 1992, begins by taking the two features as "central and connected characteristics" of belief (p. 299), his position at p. 304 seems to approach that of Velleman.

4This formulation is based on Velleman, 1992, pp. 13-15 and 1996, p. 709. Also see Leon, 1992, pp. 299 and 300.

5I owe this point to David Velleman. 6Analogies to chess are used by Velleman, 1996, pp. 713-14. 7The system of references to Descartes, Hobbes, Hume, Peirce, and Sextus Empiricus is ex-

plained under "References" at the end of the paper. 8The quotations of Frankfurt in this paragraph are from 1958, pp. 590, 588, 590, and 591,

respectively. 9Frankfurt, 1958, p. 592. ?0Frankfurt, 1958, p. 590. 1'The translation of 'vagas' as 'vague' at HR I, 184 seems unsupportable; vagueness in nowhere

at issue. This translation also appears in Cr, 44 and Hef, 179. For experientia vaga as a technical term in Spinoza, see Curley, 1985, p. 636.

12Hobbes identifies doubt with a "whole chain of opinions [that] alternate in the question of true and false" (L I, vii).

13Perhaps more strictly, the upshot of the letter is that doubt is at least able to shake or unsettle belief; this falls short of the result of the Meditation V passage, that doubt is sufficient for unsettled opinion. It is unclear, however, what beyond doubt would be required to unsettle opinion. I see no reason to think that in the letter to Regius Descartes seeks to weaken his position in Meditation V.

14The CSM translation as 'unshakeable' is strictly speaking a stretch from the more literal 'un- shaken', though perhaps supported by the use of "indubitable" (AT IX-1, 19, 20) in the authorized French translation. I am grateful to David Velleman for calling my attention to the issue about translation, and to Edwin Curley for help in addressing it. What matters most for my purposes is Descartes' use of a cognate of 'concutere' in the Meditations.

'5For additional discussion, and for the place in the literature of my interpretation of Descartes' conception of unshakability, see Loeb, 1992, esp. pp. 200-203.

16In the first sentence of Meditation I, where Descartes writes of establishing something firm in the sciences, the verb is 'stabilio', to establish or to make stable. (The verb, however, is 'Ytablir' in the French-AT IX-1, 13).

17Goudge, 1950, p. 18; Murphey, 1961/1993, p. 163; and Misak, 1991, pp. 46-47 and 80-81. l8Details of Descartes' notion of unshakability require qualification of the latter claim. See Loeb,

1992, esp. pp.210-22. In Loeb, 1990, esp. pp. 15-16, 1 mistakenly took permanence in belief to be the central notion in Descartes' conception of the objective of inquiry.

191 do not seek to minimize the differences between the conceptions of doubt in Peirce and Des- cartes. Peirce holds that belief is inherently connected to action (cf. CP 5.371, 5.373, 5.397-98). Belief is settled because it is habitual, and a habit leads a person to act in particular ways in particular sorts of circumstances. Descartes, however, divorces action from belief (CSM II, 15, CSMK 229; AT VII, 22, IV, 63). We can speculate that this misleads Peirce into thinking that for Descartes doubt need not be psychologically real. I introduce another difference at the close of ?3.

20See Frankfurt, 1970, ch. 13. 211 develop this point in Loeb, 1990, ?11, esp. pp. 8-11. For misgivings in regard to Peirce's

understanding of Descartes on doubt, see Haack, 1982, pp. 162-67, and Hookway, 1990b, p. 398.



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22CSM does not capture the identity in the Latin expressions. They have "cannot in any way be open to doubt" for the first of the two passages, and "quite unable to doubt" for the second. The more literal Miller and Miller translation of the passage from the Principles seems superior (MM, 20).

23At paragraph fourteen of Meditation V, Descartes extends this doctrine to demonstrations or proofs, connected sequences of clear and distinct perceptions, as well as to individual clear and distinct perceptions (cf. CSM I, 197, C 6; AT VIII-1, 9, V, 148).

24The room for this question can be obscured by running together the claims that clear and distinct perception is indubitable and that it is irresistible, as in Frankfurt: "But [Descartes] also holds that he cannot doubt the truth of what he perceives while he is perceiving it clearly and distinctly. 'Our mind is of such a nature', he says, 'that it cannot refuse to assent to what it apprehends clearly'. Descartes enunciates this doctrine on a number of occasions, but never explains his grounds for it" (1970, p. 163). Here Frankfurt treats irresistibility as equivalent to indubitability.

25Whether the deceiver hypothesis in Meditation I calls into question beliefs based on clear and distinct perception, as well as beliefs based on sense-perception, has been a matter of controversy. For the central discussion of the matter, see Frankfurt, 1970, Part One, pp. 3-87.

26See Rubin, 1977; Larmore, 1984; and Bennett, 1990. What follows is a sketch of the psychological response. For required refinements, see Loeb, 1990, ?VI, pp. 31-36, and 1992, esp. pp. 210- 22.

27These observations constitute my response to Miller's claim that there is a "crucial mistake" (1994, p. 118) in the argument for the infallibility of reason that I attribute to Descartes in Loeb, 1990. Miller's objection rests on the thought that the "objectives of truth and permanence stand side by side" (p. 119). ("Permanence" is the ancestor of "unshakability" in my interpretation here.) Truth and unshakability cannot, for Descartes, stand "side by side"; the skeptical hypotheses preclude Des- cartes, during the relevant stages of his argument, from appealing to considerations of truth. This response was implicit in Loeb, 1990, ?VI.

28Bennett comes very near to my position: "Descartes has some concern with stability considered as standing on it [sic] own feet and not as an upshot of truth" (1990, p. 76), so that there is a strand in Descartes where stability is "considered as a goal to be reached directly rather than through truth" (1990, p. 80). Bennett goes too far, however, in writing that "To the extent that his goal is just stability, Descartes can tell a coherent story about what his belief in God's veracity does for him" (p. 102). Descartes' goals are truth and stability, not "just stability," but the goal of truth does no work in Descartes' solution to the problem of the circle. Similarly, we should not construe Descartes as "setting the pursuit of truth aside" (p. 105), except in the sense that the pursuit of truth does not ground the adoption of a particular method.

291 have suggested elsewhere that Descartes can do somewhat better putting considerations of truth in play than in the position described here. See Loeb, 1992, pp. 222-23.

30As Bennett writes, Descartes "is capable, at least sometimes, of... settling for something sub- jective, psychological, causal-something like stability" (1990, p. 105).

3'This view is similar to that of Bennett, 1990, esp. pp. 75-76, 102-105, and 107-108, though Bennett's position incorporates hypotheses about aspects of Descartes' thinking that were subliminal (cf. p. 107). Adjudicating the questions of the development of Descartes' view would require a de- tailed inspection of the texts, and hypotheses about the composition of the Meditations, that go well beyond the purposes of this paper.

32Frankfurt brought the Second Replies passage into prominence with the suggestion that it com- mits Descartes to a coherence theory of truth (1970, p. 179; cf. 25-26, 170). Frankfurt would have done better to jettison this aspect of his interpretation, falling back on his emphasis on Descartes' interest in belief that is solid, permanent, and unshakable (179-80; cf. 24, 44, 45, 124).

33Hume writes at I.iii.7, "Of the nature of the idea or belief," that "'till there appears some principle, which fixes one of these different situations, we have in reality no opinion" (T 96).

34These claims might seem at odds with Hume's characterizations of belief with reference to vivacity, liveliness, or intensity. To remove the apparent conflict, it is necessary to exploit Hume's




tendency to treat belief as a disposition, as well as an occurrent state. I take up these matters in Loeb, 1995a, ?4, and 1995b, ?2.

35Hume says: "uncertainty alone is uneasy." In context, "alone" means on its own, not only. 36MacNabb is the only commentator I know to take note of the fact that Hume takes instability to

be unpleasant, something we dislike (1951/1966, pp. 99, 192). Curiously, he does not bother to cite any textual evidence for this.

37At T 453, Hume is explaining the source of "curiosity." He provides a distinct, and more ex- tended discussion, of the "love of truth" at T 448-52, a discussion that arguably seeks to explain the love of inquiry. I take this point. Peirce, however, is providing an account of the immediate motive for inquiry, or the struggle to attain belief. Hume can be a Peircean in this regard without supposing that the relief of the uneasiness in doubt is the only motive to inquiry.

38Though they do put forward the claim that doubt is uneasy as a general doctrine, the discussions at II.iii.10 and the "Appendix" emerge for rather specialized purposes. In the "Appendix," Hume is defending the claim that belief is a modification of an idea, not an impression distinct from an idea.

39I have more to say about connections between Hume and Peirce in Loeb, 1995b. 40In Loeb, 1990, ?VII, I mistakenly took permanence in belief, rather than settled belief, to be the

central notion in Hume's conception of the objective of inquiry. 41A number of commentators have called attention to the importance of a notion of stability in

Hume's theory of belief and epistemology-most notably MacNabb, 1951/1966, pp. 72-79 and 96- 100 (cf. 166-67 and 191-93), and, more recently, Fogelin, 1985, pp. 60-62, 75, 83, 92 and Baier, 1991, pp. 5-6, 16, 24, 58, 72-74. For the most part, these commentators offer remarks about stability somewhat in passing, or within the confines of particular epistemological discussions. They do not advance a systematic stability-based interpretation of Hume's theory of justification. (Baier's comments at pp. 26-27 undercut her recognition of the importance of stability for Hume: a Humean "reformed philosopher makes no bogey out of contradiction"; "There will, in the nature of the enter- prise, be contradictions between various parts of the Treatise," giving rise to "delicate dialectical satisfactions." Here it looks as if contradiction and instability are to be prized.)

421 elaborate the interpretation in Loeb, 1991, 1995a, and 1995b. 43Kemp Smith, 1941/1966, pp. 87, 455, 486, and 1905, esp. pp. 152, 161, 162. 44Kemp Smith, 1941/1966, p. 388 (cf. pp. 46, 68), and Kemp Smith, 1905, p. 152. 45For statements of the Kemp Smith interpretation, as characterized here, see: Lenz, 1958, pp. 170

and 184 (cf. 182-85); Strawson, 1958, pp. 20-21, and 1985, pp. 10, 11; and Stroud, 1977, pp. 76 and 247 (cf. p. 248).

46Immerwahr, 1992, has discussed the importance of a notion of tranquility outside Hume's epistemology.

47Cf Popkin, 1951, pp. 54, 93-96; Norton, 1982, pp. 264-69; Burnyeat, 1983a, pp. 118-19; Penelhum, 1983a, p. 298, and 1983b, pp. 35, 120-31; Burnyeat, 1984, p. 249; Fogelin, 1985, p. 92; and Hookway, 1990a, pp. 3-4.

481 owe the reference in the text to M to Stough, 1969, p. 14. 49Burnyeat writes: "if tranquillity is to be achieved, at some stage the skeptic's questing thoughts

must come to a state of rest or equilibrium" (1983a, p. 139; and see p. 148, n. 54). Barnes translates 'epoche'' as 'standstill', and writes that epoche' "supervenes" where "two sets of arguments exactly balance one another" (1982, p. 1). Patrick, 1899, p. 27 and Naess, 1968, p. 5, take note that stability or equilibrium is involved in epoche' and ataraxia, respectively.

50Baier has nicely called attention to Hume's conception of opposition in belief as dynamic, manifested in alternation over time (1982, pp. 644-47, and 1991, pp. 15-17).

51The picture that emerges is that of a set of doxastic states that are in a state of dynamic equilibrium, but not in static equilibrium. The state is "dynamic," owing to the presence of cycles of change; it is in "equilibrium," in the sense that the cycles recur. (Suppose physical laws and initial conditions such that the universe alternately expands and contracts; such a universe, though far from static, would nevertheless be in dynamic equilibrium.) Hume's insight is that there are systems of belief in



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"equilibrium," dynamic equilibrium, that are not static. Hereinafter, I use 'equilibrium' as a shorthand for 'static equilibrium'.

52Hume anticipates recent objections to Pyrrhonian skepticism: cf. Burnyeat, 1983a, pp. 138-39; and Annas and Barnes, 1985, pp. 170-71. Hume, however, has a more elaborate account than the contemporary criticisms of why equipollence is unpleasant. Penelhum, 1983b, attributes to Hume the point that suspense of judgement or doubt leads to anxiety, but Penelhum does not see that equipollence leads to disturbance because it is unsettled.

53I discuss another of his considerations in Loeb, 1991, ?6, 1995a, ?2, and 1995b, ?5. 54I provide a somewhat different treatment of this material in Loeb, 1991, ?6, 1995a, ?2, and

1995b, ?5. 55Cf. Laird, 1932, p. 179; Hookway, 1990a, p. 103; and M. Williams, 1991, pp. 8-9. For a different

reading, see Baier, 1991, esp. p. 22. 561 owe my awareness of this Hegelian strand in Peirce to Jeffrey Kasser. 57SeeMacNabb, 1951/1966,pp. 100-102;Hacking, 1978, ?9,p.30;andFogelin, 1985,pp. 16-19. 58I discuss the recessive character of Hume's position somewhat more thoroughly in 1995a, ? ?2-4,

passim, and 1995b, ??1 and 5. 59 am grateful to Jeffrey Kasser for helpful discussion and encouragement, and to Daniel Garber

for his careful response to a version of this paper read at the Central Division Meetings, American Philosophical Association, April, 1995. I have benefitted greatly from the comments of faculty colleagues-Mark Crimmins, Edwin Curley, Sally Haslanger, David Hills, James Joyce, and Eric Lormand among them-in conjunction with a presentation of a version of this paper for a colloquium at Michigan. I also thank Geoffrey Sayre-McCord and referees for Nous for their most helpful comments and suggestions. I am especially grateful to David Velleman, who-as in other instances-has provided indispensable help in bringing this project to fruition.

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sextus, descartes, hume, and peirce: on securing settled doxastic states

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