Oleg KozlovskyInstitute for European, Russian and Eurasian

StudiesGeorge Washington University

Moderates Radicals

Negotiated, limited reform, influencing the authorities

Gradual change Talks and seeking

compromise

Regime change and complete recreation of the state

Revolutionary change Open conflict, public

protests, maximizing pressure

Both negotiations and open conflict require a strong movement

Neither strategy can be effective in the short run

Window of opportunity for negotiations closed by March 2012

Split in the ruling elites, most importantly the police force and the army, is a necessary precondition for a peaceful political change

Confrontation is not only emotional, but also rational

Serbian and Ukrainian experience: “victims of the regime”

No coherent approach to regime defectors Defectors should be judged on a case-by-case

basis

Russian protest movement is remarkably non-violent

Internal crisis activates violent elements of the movement

Public opinion is ambivalent about political violence (see Primorye Guerillas)

May 6: succumbing to a provocation harmed the movement, opened way to government crackdown

Movement was chaotic and spontaneous from the beginning

Void was filled by self-appointed Organizing Committee and other similar structures

Lack of legitimate leadership undermined attempts of negotiations and impeded coordination

Election of Coordinating Council in October 2012 opened new page

CC still has a long way to go to prove its effectiveness

Concise message vs. broad public appeal Bringing in economic and social welfare

issues may be risky Scope of demands: from bicycle lanes to

“Russia without Putin” Too humble demands may be as damaging

as too radical It may be easier to radicalize masses than

to de-marginalize a radical movement

Apathy and pessimism are major obstacles to public participation

Identifying, publicizing, and celebrating even small achievements can raise morale and people’s interest in activism

Preventing ungrounded euphoria and elevated expectations just as important as fighting pessimism

Moscow has been the ground zero of protests 78% of CC members are from Moscow Moscow has 12% of voters, 22% of GDP,

most federal institutions If Russia voted like Moscow in 2012, there

would be 2nd round “Sorties” to Astrakhan, Gagarin, etc. had

mixed results Long-term capacity building and support is

required for sustainable development of civil society in “the regions”

oleg@kozlovsky.rufacebook.com/kozlovskytwitter.com/kozlovsky_en