sense-experience and the argument for recollection in plato's phaedo - j. t. bedu-addo

8/12/2019 Sense-Experience and the Argument for Recollection in Plato's Phaedo - J. T. Bedu-Addo

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Sense-Experience and the Argument for Recollection in Plato's "Phaedo"Author(s): J. T. Bedu-AddoSource: Phronesis, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1991), pp. 27-60Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182375.

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Sense-experience nd theArgument orRecollection n Plato'sPhaedo

J.T. BEDU-ADDO

IntroductionAt Phaedo 65a9ff., in the course of his descriptionof the philosopher's'practice f death',Socratesmaintains hatthe sensesare a hindrance o thephilosopher n his pursuitof truth and wisdom(qpQovoGL),and that it isonly by meansof pure reason,or reasoningwithout he aid of the senses(atUTjjxctO' czrv ELXQLVEI In bLavoiv XW,UVO (66al-2), that thephilosopher, n his present life, can attainknowledgeof Forms.We areexplicitlytold that these Forms- the Just, the Beautiful,the Good, andeven Tallness, Health, Strengthandall the rest- cannotbe seen withtheeyes, nor can they be apprehended y anyother orm of bodilyperception(65a4-e5). Accordingly, he truephilosopherwill 'asfar as possible' (xaO'OCov &vvaTaI,4e5;oTL taiktaXa, 5c7, 66a4)leave the body behind,ridhimselfof eyes andears,and seek truthwith reasonalone, knowing hat hesenses,oneandall, aredeceptive 65b1-7)andthatone canneverapprehendrealityandattain truthand wisdomwith the eye (65a9-66alO).A fewpages ater, however, n theargumentor recollection 72e3-77a5)which orms he secondhalfof the firstproofof the immortality f the soul,Socrates claims, apparently n flat contradictiono what he has just saidaboutthe worthlessnessof the sensesto the philosopher n his pursuitofknowledge, that, in fact, it is only through ense-experience,whichwe alldo have rightfrom the very momentof birth,that we recollectthe Forms,knowledge of which we acquired n a previous discarnateexistence andforgot at the momentof birth.Takingour knowledgeof Equality as an example,Socratesmaintainsthat we know it, and that we deriveour conceptionof it from no othersource- indeed, to do so is impossible than fromsightor touch, or fromsome other one of the senses (74a9-75a7). nsucha case, Socratesargues,we recognize the sensible equals, e.g. equal sticks, equalstones, etc., asstriving to be like Equality, but succeeding only imperfectly, and it isPhronesis 1991. Vol. XXXVIIJ (Accepted January 1991) 27

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impossible or us to do so unlesswe hadpreviousknowledgeof the FormEquality.Thus, sincewe begin o see, hearandenjoythe useof all the othersensesas soon as we are born,our knowledgeof Equalitymusthave beenacquiredbefore then, and lost at birth.However,later on (i5crEQOV),yusing our senses (Tats aiaLoJeoEl X(COEvoL),we recover the knowl-edge whichwe previouslypossessed- a processof learningrightlycalledrecollection 75a11-76e8).These two passagesdeserve carefulstudy, for they are obviouslyofcrucialimportance or any assessmentof the roles of reasonand sense-experiencen Plato'sepistemologyandmethodology n the Phaedo.Bothpassagesare concernedwiththeprocessof attainingknowledgeof Forms.On the face of it, the argument or recollectionwhich maintains hatit isonly throughsense-experience hat we recollect he Formsseems flatlytocontradicthe viewclearlyexpressed nthe description f thephilosopher's'practice f death',namely hatthesenses, beingdeceptive,areahindranceto the philosopher n his pursuitof knowledgeof the Forms,andthat thephilosophercan only attain this knowledge by the sole use of reasonunaided by the senses. Thus it is not uncommonlysupposedthat thephilosopher's'practiceof death' has nothingwhatever to do with theargument or recollection n the dialogue,and that unlike the processoflearningnvolved nthe acquisition f knowledgen theMeno,theRepublicandtheSymposium,n thePhaedoPlato sexplicitly aying hatallperceiv-ers, includingnewborn nfants,do attainknowledgeof theForms nvolvedin their perceptions.As MichaelMorgan'observes:

In the Phaedothe terrain s different.Hereany perceivercanhave, as a resultof hisperception,some knowledgeof the Forms nvolved in thatperception.No lengthy,elaboratetechnicaleducationis requiredto bringthe soul to an awarenessof theForms. Simple sense-experiencewill do. And it mustdo, in order for Socratestoarguethat the soul mustexist prenatallyknowingthe Forms,in such a way thatat' Michael Morgan, Sense-Perceptionand Recollection in the Phaedo , PhronesisXXIX, No. 3 (1984) 238. Myemphasis.Cf. also F. M. Cornford,PrincipiumSapientiae(Cambridge, 1952) 51-2, where he identifies the argument'sweak point as Plato'simplausibleascriptionof highly reflective judgements to infants. Accordingto N.Gulley [ Plato'sTheoryof Recollection , CQ n.s. (1954) 197-8],what is envisagedhereis an immediate transitionfrom the sensible to the intelligibleworld . As he sayselsewhere[Plato'sTheoryof Knowledge London, 1962)27], Plato interprets oncept-ual apprehensionas being remindedof an archetypalFormby any one of its sensiblecopies. Perceptionof a single instanceis assumedto be sufficientas a reminder,andthequestionof reflectivecomparisonand progressiveclarificationdoes not enterthe argu-ment . Against such views on recollection in the Phaedo, see esp. H. D. Rankin,Immediate Cognition of Forms in the Phaedo? , Dialectica (1958) 81-6; W.K.C.Guthrie, Historyof GreekPhilosophy, Vol. IV (Cambridge,1975)345-6.28



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the use of the senses, that our minds can form true opinions, and sub-sequentlyconvertthem intoknowledge n the courseof the 'upward ath',by completelyrecollectingthe Forms involved in a particulardialecticalenquiry.That is to say, thephilosopher's practice f death'too involvesrecollection f Forms.In this paper, I try to show (1) that the major presupposition f thisarguments a theory of the gradualdevelopmentof the humanmindrightfrom infancy, at which stage reason is completelyput out of action bysensations(ackrOTioLg),o the stage of the true philosopher, at whichalone the mindcan dissociatereason rom he senses asfaras possible',andattaincompleterecollection f the Forms,and (2) thatPlato'smainconcernin this argument is to vindicate the thesis of the Meno argumentforrecollection,namely, that all learnings recollection. shall argue(1) thatPlato's conspicuoususe of the abilityto recognizesimilarity To 6 OLOV),identity Tai'T6v)and difference TO ?TEQOV)hroughout his argument s aclear ndication hathe has allalongat thebackofhismind histheoryof thedevelopmentof the mindright rombirthwhichheputsforward xplicitlynthe Timaeus(43aff.) and metaphoricallyn RepublicV-VII in terms ofdreamingand being awake n relation o imagesand theiroriginals, irst nthe realmof the facultyofopinion,andsecond,intherealmof thefacultyofknowledge, and (2) that in this argumentPlato has in mind two quitedifferent ypesof recollection,namely(i) recollectionas a gradualprocessof learning i.e. the typeof recollectiondemonstratedntheMeno,and(ii)the immediaterecollectionof Forms by true philosophers,who, havingalreadyachievedcompleterecollectionof Formsbymeansof the firsttypeof recollection,can,on perceiving sensible mageof a Form, mmediatelyrecall he relevantForm thetypeof recollectionweshouldexpect hetruephilosopherntheRepublic o becapableof achievingwhenhereturnsntothe cave. In the following discussion,I shall refer to the first type ofrecollectionas RI,and the secondasR2,andI shallshowthat Plato'smainpurpose n discussingR2 s to supplyhimselfwitha premiss romwhichhecan arguea thesis aboutR1.

1. Phaedo 72e2-74a8Plato introduces he argument or recollectionby makingCebes remindSocratesof his favouriteargument TOV koyov . .. .v 0U ELwOcagaLaX?yELV(72c4-5), namely, that all learning s recollection,andso we musthave acquiredknowledgeata previous ime,butthatthis wouldbe impos-sible unlessour souls existed before takingon the humanform. For the30



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benefit of Simmiaswho sayshe does not remember he argument,Cebessummarizest thus:Whenpeoplearequestioned, f the questionsarewellframed,they themselvesexplaineverything,andyet if they did not haveknowledgeandcorrectexplanationof the matterwithinthemselves,theycould hardlydo that. Next, if you take them to geometricaldiagramsorsomethingelse of that sort, it becomes perfectlyclear that this is so(72e3-73b2).Thispassage s a clearstatementof R,; and,as it is generallyadmitted, tis a faithfulsummary f the Menoargumentorrecollection,whichmakesno mentionof Forms.'Sincethe Phaedoargument,quite apartfromthefact that it mentions the Formsfor the first time in Plato'swritings,isadmittedlydifferent romthe Menoargument,t seemsquitereasonable osupposethat if Platohimselfthoughtthat the two argumentswere in anywayincompatible,hewouldhardlyntroduce he newargumenthe isabouttoset forthwithasummary f theMenoargument,describingtasSocrates'favouriteargument.Thus,just as in the case of any interpretation f thePhaedoargument or recollectionwhichis incompatiblewith Plato'sde-scriptionof thephilosopher'spractice f death',weshouldbesuspiciousofthe correctnessof anyinterpretationwhichrenders he two argumentsorrecollection ncompatible.Socratesbeginstheargumentbyexplaininghat f one remembersome-thing, one musthave known(Enrrioac0aL)t at some previoustime. Forinstance, f a personsees or hearsorotherwiseperceivessomething hatisdifferentEiTrQOV),andnot only recognizes yv4) thatthing,but thinksof(?vvoicq) somethingdifferent hat snottheobjectof thesame i a' Ti)butdifferentknowledge ?roij'), we shouldsay, quiterightly,thathe hasrecollectedthe thingof whichhe has thought(ouiTi'v evvoLav EXacev).Our knowledge of a man (?Mtot17JtRia&V0QO;rnou),or instance, is differentfrom our knowledgeof a lyre, yet when loverssee a lyre or a cloak orsomethingelse thattheir ovedones areaccustomed o use, theyrecognize(Eyvwaav) he lyre, and in theirthought, hey graspthe form (Ev 'i bLa-voL XEa4ov 6oEtbo) of the boy who owns it. In muchthe same way,whenpeoplesee Simmias, heyareoftenremindedof Cebes;andtherearecountless examplesof this sort. We may call this a sort of recollectionS See my Sense-Experienceand Recollection in Plato'sMeno , AJP 104 (1983) 228-248, where I arguethat his suggestionthat though one cannotknow whata thing is like(.noEv TL) who does not know whatit is (( tOTL),he actual process of recollectingwhata thing s, beginswith the stirringup of innatetrueopinionsabout what t is like,indicatesthat at the time of writingthe Meno, Plato had alreadyformulatedhis meta-physicaltheory of Forms.

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(vdjav'q(g IL;); and it happensespeciallywith things one has forgottenthrough apse of time andthroughnot havingseen them(73cl-e3).Again, it is possible o see apictureof a horseor of a lyreandbe remindedof a man, or see the pictureof Simmiasand be remindedof Cebes; andseeing a pictureof Simmias an remindone of Simmiashimself.In all thesecases recollection s broughtabout either by things that are similar(&p'6Rohov)or things that are dissimilar(&nd&vojio'wv).In the case ofrecollection broughtaboutby something hat is similar, one is bound toconsider (lwvvoE^v)hether t falls short or not in respectof its similarityto the thing of which one is reminded 73e5-74a8).

Plato thus begins the argument by stating what he takes to be thenecessaryand sufficientconditionsfor recollection n everyday ife. Hisconspicuoususe of the mind'sability to recognize imilarity, dentityanddifferencen stating heseconditions s a very mportant lue to the meaningof theentire argument. t is almostcertainlyntended o remind eadersofthe use to whichhe puts the mind'sabilityor the lack of it, to recognizesimilarity, dentityanddifference,especially n respectof imagesand theiroriginals. n the Republicandthe Timaeus,Platoemploys hisability o putforwarda theoryof thedevelopmentof themindrightfrom nfancy.IntheRepublic his progressof the mind s describedntermsof themetaphor fdreamingand being awake n relation o imagesandtheiroriginals. n viewof itscrucialmportancen thisargument, shallproceed o describebrieflyhow Plato states this theory n the Republic.6

From Eikasia o NoesisThe clueto the meaningsof thefourstatesof mindor levelsof thought stobe found at Republic476aff.,wherePlatodistinguishes etweenthe levelsof thoughtof the true philosopherand the loversof sights, sounds,etc.(qPLXOOEaOVEg, qpXf8xoot xrk).7 He describes the latter as dreamingaboutthe Forms because, in theirthinking, hey arequiteunableto distinguishbetweenFormsand the sensibleparticularswhichare saidto participatenForms, e.g. between Beauty itself and particularbeautifulthings. He6 I discuss this theory in some detail in my A Theoryof MentalDevelopment:Plato'sRepublicV-VII , Pts. 1 and 2, Platon28 (1976) 288-300,and 29 (1977) 212-24.' Since Platodoes not mentionthis distinctionuntil longafter the Cave passage,whenat533b-cand 534c-d he describesthe practitionersof the method of dianoiaas dreamingabout the Forms,it is not uncommonly upposedthathe mentionsthefour states of mindat the end of the Line asanafterthought.Cf. RichardRobinson,Plato'sEarlierDialectic,Oxford (1953) 195. But see note 3.32



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describes hetruephilosopherwho alone is able to distinguish learly nhisthinkingbetweenFormsandparticulars sbeingwide awake FaukanazQ(476d).Plato makesSocratesexplainpreciselywhathe meansbydreamingthus:dreaming,whetherone is asleeporawake, s to think hat what s likesomething s not like it, butis thething tself- T6o LoL6OvV x1'6[oLov &XX'acuT6 yrjtaLElvaL EOLXEV476c). That is to say, the lovers of sights etc.are quite unable in their thinkingto recognizesimilarity,identity anddifference n respectof Formsandparticulars.Platoremindshis readersof thisdistinctionbetweenthelevels of thoughtof the true philosopherand the lovers of sightsetc. by makingSocratesexplicitlydescribe the mindin dianoiatwiceas dreamingabout the Forms(533b-c,534c-d),bywhichwe are meantto understand,not that in dianoiathe mind apprehendsa gradeof objectsontologicallydifferentfrom, orintermediatebetween,Formsand sensibleparticulars, utsimply hat, likethe lovers of sightsetc., the dianoieticmathematicians quiteincapableofdistinguishingn hisreasoningbetweenFormsandthe sensible particularshe actually employs as imagesof Forms(510b-511a).That is to say, indianoia the mindis quite incapableof recognising imilarity, dentity anddifference n respect of the Square tself, the Diagonalitself etc. and thesensible squaresand diagonalsetc. it employs.8Thus, since the relationbetweendianoiaand noesisin the realmof thefacultyof knowledge s said to be analogous o the relationbetweeneikasiaandpistis in the realm of the facultyof opinion (Rep. 533e-534a),we aremeant to understand hat as the mind in dianoiadreamsaboutthe Formswhicharetheoriginalsnthe realmof thefacultyof knowledge, o ineikasiathe mind dreams about the physicalobjects- i.e. 'the trees and animalsaroundus' etc. (Rep.510a5-6),whicharethe originals n the realmof thefacultyof opinion, in the sense that in its thinking t is quite incapableofdistinguishing etweenthese physicalobjectsandtheirshadowsandreflec-tions in water.That is to say, as the mind ndianoia s unableto recognizesimilarity, dentity anddifference n respectof Formsandsensiblepartic-ulars,so in eikasiathe mind is unableto recognizesimilarity,dentityand8 As Plato says of the dianoietic mathematician, . .6v. tLrTo0oU [~v nEr T6 6V,'naQ bU d6biuvaTov aOrtfaicz tv (533b) . . . &XX'et an- dib XOU TLVO (wnTE-TaL66tn ootxbLot'tfl- tp6ntmo0aL (534c). This should mean that it is only when themind is able to go beyond the hypotheses of dianoietic mathematics hat it can knowtheMathematical Forms. That is to say, only the philosophicdialecticiancan know theMathematical Forms. See note 30 below. On the methods and objects of dianoia andnoesis, see my Mathematics, Dialectic and the Good in Republic VI-VII , Platon 30(1978) 112ff., and ALdvoLa nd the Images of Forms in Plato's Republic VI-VII ,Platon 31 (1979) 89ff.

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difference in respectof the physicalobjects and their manifold mages.Similarly,as the mind in noesis is wide awakein respect of Formsandsensibleparticulars, o in pistis the mindis wide awake in respectof thephysicalobjectsandtheirshadowsandreflections n water.Thuswe canreadilyappreciate hatwhatPlatohas inmind s thatin therealmof the facultyof opinionthere aretwo levels of thoughtor states ofmind- eikasiaandpistis, and that whereas n the formerthe mindis notconsciouslyawareof anydifference nrealitybetweenphysicalobjectsandtheir mages, inthe latterthe mind s awareof thefactthatphysicalobjectsare 'morereal'9 han theirshadowsand reflections.Similarly,n the realmof the facultyof knowledgethere are two states of mind- dianoia andnoesis; in the former, though the mind reasonsabout Forms,it is quiteunawareof the fact that they are entities far 'more real' than sensibleparticularswhich are theirimages,whereas n the latterthe mind is wellawareof this.Once the metaphorof dreamingand beingawakeis interpreted n thelight of the mind'sability o recognize imilarity,dentityand difference nrespectof images and their originals,first in the realm of the facultyofopinion,and second in the realm of the facultyof knowledge, t emergesthatPlato, in the LineandCave, is putting orwarda theoryof the devel-opment of the mindright rominfancy,and thatbyeikasiahe hasin mindspecificallythe mental conditionthat characterizes ll infancyand earlychildhood the stage at which the mind is unableto makeanydistinctionbetweenrealityandunreality, act and fictionetc., whilstbypistishe hasinmindthe mentalcondition of the normalgrown-upwho can make thesedistinctionsn respectof the objectsof thefacultyof opinion.Thisstateofmindis, in effect, the mental conditionpeculiar o man;no otheranimalattainspistis.09 Cf. Republic 515d, where the released prisoner s said to have turned towardsmorereal things - nQ6SIa'Uov 6vta.10 The meaning of the two lower states of mind- eikasia and pistis - are crucial for theinterpretationof the Sun, Line and Cave. However, whereas the meaning of eikasia isdisputed,it is generallyagreed thatpistis,whichmeans 'conviction'or 'assurance', s themental condition of the ordinaryman. Aristotleseems to be usingpistis n this verysensewhen he observes that no beast attainspistis, but that many of them have phantasia: dv[&J] Qi v o0Oevi 1v6XeL nItLoTtgpavtaoa bU no7roXX De Anima, III, iii(428a20). Thus, if our interpretation of eikasia is correct, then, since the distinctionbetween dianoia and noesis is said to be analogous to that between eikasia and pistis,Plato is saying, in effect, that in the realmof knowledge he dianoieticmathematicianandall other qnkoftAzovegare childrenas comparedwith the 'true philosopher'.And thisisprecisely what he makes Socrates hint at, when he humourously omparesthe practitio-34



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Of the four statesof mind,these two, whicharereallythe onlystatesofmindor levelsof thoughtclearlyrecognizableneveryday ife, areexplicitlydescribed n Timaeus 3aff. ntermsof themythicalmachinery f the circlesof the mind. Weare toldthatwhen thegods placethemind(which, ike theuniversalmind, consistsof intertwined irclesof theSameand the Other)into a mortalbody, reason s at first(i.e. in infancy)completelyputout ofaction by sensations,so that the mind, beingnow thoughtless dvovs), isunable to announce he classof the Sameand thatof Othercorrectly Tim.44a-b).Thesecondstage,i.e. the mentalconditionof the normalgrown-up,is the stage at which the mind becomes intelligent (EtQwv), thus enablingits possessor to announce the class of the Same and that of the Othercorrectly(44b). The attainmentof this state of mindis not saidto be theresult of any special typeof education.'The manner n whichPlatoemploysthisabilityto recognizesimilarity,identity and difference in relation to images and their originals in thisargument or recollectionwouldseemto indicate hat at the timeof writingthe Phaedo, he had alreadyworkedout this theory of the developmentofthe mind right rom birth, when t is imprisonedn thehumanbody.2 Thus,since all the instancesof recollectioncited in this section of the argumentare drawn rom everyday ife, Plato almost certainlyhas in mind here thementalconditionsof eikasiaandpistis nthe realmof the facultyof opinion.Thissuggests hat the ability o recognize imilarity, dentityand differencein respectof the objectsof sense is an essentialprerequisite or the instancesners of the method of dianoia, who are unable to give logos of the Forms, with thechildrenof Glaucon who, being as XkoyoLs the lines so called, should not be allowedto hold political power in the state until they become accomplisheddialecticians(Rep.534d). See my 'A Theory of MentalDevelopment:Plato'sRepublicV-VII, Pt. 1 (n.6)292ff., where I explain that we are meant to understand that the child's mind likens(ENdtEL) images to their originals - it supposes T6 6OAol6v npd1t 6,koLov &X'aift1dvaL 4J OLXEV476c). Indeed, Plato may be trying to remindus of this descriptionofthe dream state when he refers to the lowest subsection as T6 6>toLWOEvand to thesubsection immediately above this as IO .bdbRoLWOi510a). Cf. also 511a, where theobjects in the second subsection are said to be bno6Gwx&Xw&JtxaOOEZOLv.Similarly, in the Republic, we are told that the release of the prisonersfrom theiroriginalconditionoccurs in the courseof nature- (PVOEL515c).12 For the view that the imageryof the Cave derives from the 'secret doctrine'of thePhaedo, and that the progressof the prisonerswho are said to have been in chainsfromchildhood bx naLbwv 514a) depicts the progress of the mindimprisoned n the humanbody at birth, and also that when Socrates says that the prisoners in their originalunreleased condition are like us - 6Ro(olug iRiv (515a), we are meant to understandthat their conditiondepicts the mentalconditionof all infancyand earlychildhood, SeeBedu-Addo (n.6, Pt. ii) 212ff.

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of recollection cited here. For instance, as Socratesexplains, for one torememberA, on seeing B, one must (i) have knownA at some previoustime, and (ii) not only recognize B, but also think of A as somethingdifferent romB (73c6-8).This s clearlya featwhichno infantcan perform,especiallywhen, as in the case of the last example(73e5-74al), the recog-nition of identityand differencehas to do withimagesand their originals.Significantly, he next step in the argumentwhich s concernedwith therecollectionof our prenatalknowledgeof Forms,is modelled on the lastexampleof recollectionof ordinaryknowledge ited here, namely, he caseof recollection where, on seeing a pictureof Simmias, one remembersSimmias himself. In a case like this, Socrates explains, one is bound toconsider(?voeELv4a6) whetherthe picture allsshortor not in respectofits similarity o Simmiashimself. This example,which nvolvesthe recog-nition of identity and difference n respectof an image and its original, sclearlywhatPlatoconsiders elevant orthe next step in his argumentwhichis concernedwith the similarity ensibleequalsbearto the FormEquality.Thus,itseems clearthat, asintheRepublic, hesimilarityPlatohas n mindhere is primarily he similarityan image (E'xWv) bears to its original.Besides, an image may be appropriately escribedas beinginferior o, or'less real' than its original.It is important o recognize hat in thissectionof the argument,Platoiscitingexamplesof recollection n everyday ifeto illustrate hepointshe isabout to make in the next stepinhisargumentwhich s concernedwith therecollectionof Forms,and thatwe arenot meant o takethe termsdenotingknowledge here (e.g. bIcTaoa, yv4, eoTltiL . . . 73c2-8) at theirface value.Nevertheless, t ispossible ora reader o bemisled ntothinkingthat Plato here considers hese instancesasconstitutingknowledgeproper-ly so called.Thus, Morganobserves:

... in the Phaedo Plato . . . does not distinguish he knowledgethat resultsfromordinaryrecollectionfromknowledgeof the Forms whichis the resultof a specialkind of recall, and does not make muchof the role of a logos in knowledgeof theForms, althoughhe does mention thatgenuineknowledgeof Forms does requirethe abilityto providesuchlogoi (76b5-6).3As we shallsee, Socrates'mentionof the ability o give logosof what oneknows is crucial n thisargument; or it renderscompletelyuntenable heview that in the PhaedoPlatois sayingthatall perceivers, ncludingnew-13 Michael Morgan(n. 1) 238, n.3. Cf. also D. Scott, PlatonicAnamnesisRevisited ,CQ 37 ii (1987) 355, where he says Plato makes no attempt at all to differentiatebetween ordinaryrecollectionand the philosophicalvariety...36



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born infants,attainknowledgeof the Forms nvolved n theirperceptions.Again, it is important o recognize hat the examplesof recollectioncitedhere are not illustrativeof the gradualprocessof learningcalled recol-lection (R1); they are rather llustrativeof the immediaterecollectionofForms (R2) which is the basis of the argumentfor recollectionin thePhaedo. It is presumably o distinguish his type of recollection rom thelearningprocessthat Plato describes his as a sortof recollection v vq-oL; TLg 73e1).'4Finally,Plato'slanguage n this sectionrevealsthat he thinks of recol-lection, even of ordinaryknowledge,as being, not indeed the result ofsimple sense-experience,but ratherof what followsthe sense-experience,namely, thoughtor reason.Thus, one sees something,recognizes t, andthinksof (WvvOIOT3c7-8)somethingelse;sucha personis rightlysaid tohave recollectedthe thingof whichhe has thought ov'TI8V Evvotav 'Ear3v73c9-74dl). The expression?V TInbLavo@ 'Eapiov To 1o0g oT5 itaLbogat 73d7-8 is particularly noteworthy. R. S. Bluck'5 translates: . . . (they)forma mental mageof theboy . However, tseemsclearthat to Plato,theformationof this 'mental image' is not at all the work of simple sense-experience; or, he says, they grasp he form(orthe image)of the boy intheir thought - ?V Tm 5Lavoq. Again, we are told that in the case ofrecollectionbroughtaboutby something hat is similar o the thing recol-lected, one is bound to consider (ivvoE?Lv)whether it falls short or not inrespectof its similarity o the thingof whichone is reminded 74a5-7).This'reflective judgement' or 'reflective comparison' s quite obviously thework, not of simple sense-experience,but ratherof reason.Indeed, this repeateduse of the verb 'to think'(Cvvoo6v)ere, as wellas in the subsequentargumentor the recollectionof prenatalknowledgeofForms,can hardlybe unintentional n Plato'spart. He seemsto be deliber-ately harpingon reason to remindhis readersof the important ole he hasalreadyassigned o the useof reason n the processof acquiringknowledgeof Formsin his descriptionof the philosopher's practiceof death'. Hemeansthatsense-experience an promptreasoning,and thatthe processof14 See note 3 above. One of the methodsbywhichPlato triesto concealhismeaning s themannerin which he employs termsin different senses. In thispassage, his descriptionofthe immediaterecollection of objects as a sort of recollection &v vllo(; xti (73el) isalmost certainly a hint that he has two quite differenttypesof recollection in mind. Cf.Meno 86e ff. where Plato describes the geometer as havinga sortof hypothesis WaIEQtwa &bn6OeGLvto indicatethat he has in mindtwo quite differenttypes of hypothesis.See my Recollection and the Argument 'From a Hypothesis'in Plato's Meno , JHSCIV (1984) 6ff.Is R. S. Bluck, Plato's Phaedo, (London, 1955)66. See also note 25 below.

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recollection tselfis identicalwith thereasoning hat is promptedby sense-experience. This means that there is no recollectionwheresense-experi-ence is not followed by reasoning.2. Phaedo74a9-75a2

Turningnow to recollectionof Forms,SocratesasksSimmiaswhetherweare right nthinking hat thereis such a thingasEquality not theequalityof one stickto another,or of one stone to anotheroranythingof that sort,butsomethingdifferent romthese- i.e. Equalitytself, andwhetherwe doknowwhat it is. Simmiasenthusiasticallyepliesthatthere is sucha thingand that we know its nature(brLoT6[LeOai,t6 6 EgotV 74b2). Socratesthenproceedsto explainthatwe obtained hisknowledge romthese verysticksand stones: having seen them, we conceived(tvEvofGoa>Lv, 4b6)the notion of Equalityfrom them, thoughit is somethingdifferent romthose things. The reason why it is different s thatwhereasthe sticks andstones etc., while remaining the same (Ta1T'a 6vta 74b8), sometimesappearequal to one man and unequalto another,Equalityitself neverappearsunequal to anyone (74a9-c6). Nevertheless from these equalthings,differenthough hey arefromEquality,youconceived nd obtainedyour knowledgeof it ( iv bItocn>8i-v ivcv6pxad; TE xat EiAqlag 74c8-9)eitherbecause tissimilarordissimilaro them .For t makesnodifferenceso long as from seeing one thing you thinkof (CVoiiCqrg)anotherthingwhethersimilaror dissimilar the processmust be recollection 74c7-d2).Socrates henmakesSimmiasagree (i) thatsensibleequalsdonotappeartousto beequal nthe samewayasEquality tself,butthattheyfall shortbyfar in respectof theirsimilarity o the Form; (ii) that this beingthe case,whenevera mansees somethingand thinks wvvojno) hat what amnowseeing wants to be like some otherthingthat exists(kXo TLT'WvvOrwv74d1O),butthat it falls shortandcannot be equalin the samewayas thatone, since it is inferior - the man who has this thought (t6v toUfcoFwooiuvTa4e2) must havepreviousknowledgeof thatthingto which hesayswhat he sees is similar, hough t is inferior;and(iii) thatsince we dohave this sort of experiencewith respect to sensibleequalsand Equalityitself, we musthave hadknowledgeof Equalitybefore the timewhenwefirst saw the sensible equals and thought (*vevoioaaev) that all thesethings are strivingto be like Equality, but that they fall short of it(74d4-75a2).Now, the manner n whichSimmiasunhesitatingly ndenthusiasticallyagreeswithSocrates hatthereexistssuchathingasEquality tself,different

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from sensible equals, is particularly triking. It would seem to indicateclearly right at the beginningof thissectionof the argument hat Awe nthis argumentcannot alwaysrefer to people in general; n some placesitrefers only to 'truephilosophers'.16Plato, in the Republic,makesit clearthat even the loversof the sightsetc. (IAXo0a, ov?gxTX.)and dianoieticmathematicianswho dreamabout Formsarenot consciouslyawareof theexistenceof Formsas differententitiesfromsensibleparticulars.7 Here, inthe Phaedo, Plato expects his readersto recognizethat only the 'truephilosopher'who, by his assiduous practiceof death'- i.e. philosophicaldialectic,hasalreadyattainedknowledgeof Forms ncludingEquality,can,on seeing equal sticks, equal stones etc., think of (CvvojoatL) - i.e. recallthe FormEqualityand consider how far the sensibleequalsfall short ofEquality in respect of their similarity o it. Thus, in this section of theargument,what Platohas in mindis R2- the sort of recollection he truephilosopher n the Republic s said to be capableof performingwhen hereturnsntothe cave and 'getsaccustomed o the observation f the obscurethings there' (Rep. 520c1-6).As we shallsee, inthisargument, houghPlato s awareof thefactthatweobtain all our conceptionsof the Forms by makinguse of our senses, hedoes not considerthathaving the relevantconcept of a Form is the samethingasknowing he Form.The earliest tages n the learningprocesscalled16 Cf. J. L. Ackrill, Anamnesis in the Phaedo: Remarks on 73c-75c , Exegesis andArgument, Phronesis, suppl., Vol. 1 (1973) 191ff. As he points out: It is importanttoknowwhether 'we' and 'you'refer to people ingeneralor to believers in Forms .Cf. alsoD. Scott (n. 13)356ff. where he also limits the reference of we to the philosophicallyearnest . Really, at64cl, Socratesexplicitlysaysthatwe shouldignoreother people andconverse among ourselves - Et7L(ORLVy6d, ?qM, EQ6g iR&g ai-toVS, XalQELV cin6v-TEr fXXe(VOLg. Thus we are meant to understand that the entire discussion in thePhaedo is for the benefit of true philosophers. It is not to be supposed, however, thatthroughout this argument we refersto truephilosophers.Platoexpects his readers todetectwhere it canonly referto truephilosophers,andwhere it refersto humanbeings ingeneral.17 At Republic474c, Socrates explainsthat even if someonetries to guide a pLXoOc6tLWvto the knowledge of Beauty, he will not be able to follow: aiJTO&x?Xuog dtFevollitv

LYTITEv T15 Ayfjtat bi xihv yv&otv aftoO buvd[evog 7EwOaL. In much the sameway, if a true philosopher,well versed in Mathematics, riesto explainto the dianoiecticmathematician hatthe figures he drawsare only imagesof some supremelyrealentitiescalled Forms, he will thinkthat the 'truephilosopher' s not reallymentiscompos. As J.Gosling [ RepublicBook V: T'anoUXaXaXd XT. , PhronesisV (1960), 120-211 ightlypoints out, the people whom Plato describes as WLXo6E6VovEgtc., are not reallyordinarypeople, but rather people generally regarded as being knowledgeable, butwhomPlato regardedas notreallyhavingknowledge,properly ocalled,andwhoforthisreason should not be entrusted with political power.39



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recollection RI)areconcernedwith the formationof concepts,beginningright rom nfancy;andtheForms hemselvesarerecollectedmuch ateronin lifeby meansof philosophical ialectic,which sthe finalstageof R1.It isonlyafterthis stage thatone is inaposition operformR2.All the instancesof recollectionof ordinaryknowledge n the firstsection of the argumentwhich,as I have argued,canbe performedonly bynormalgrown-ups,areillustrative f R2which, nturn,can be performed nly by truephilsophers.The easiest wayto be misled ntoobtaining he impression hat this typeof recollection R2)can be achievedby all andsundry s to suppose hat theequalityPlato has in mind here is the concept of equalityrather han theFormEquality.This,however, s amisunderstanding,f only because, f wetake equality here as the concept, 8 lato's talk about the inferiorityofsensibleequalsin respect of their similarity o equality (i.e. the concept)becomes quite inappropriate.Thisbringsus again o thequestionof whatsort of similarityPlatohasinmindhere.As in thecaseof thesimilarity etweenSimmias ndapictureofhim, if, as I have argued,Plato hasinmind nthisargument he distinctionbetweeneikasiaandpistison the one hand,andbetweendianoiaandnoesison theother,thenthesimilarity etweenEqualitytself andsensibleequalshas to be thatexistingbetweenan originalandits images(Edx6vEg);or, inthe Linewe are meantto understand hat the sensibleparticulars fpistis,whichare the originalsntherealmof thefacultyof opinion,are the imagesof Formsemployedin dianoia.These objectsof pistisare 'less real'thanForms, sincethey dependon Forms or theirexistence. In muchthe sameway, the shadowsandreflectionsof eikasiaare 'less real'thanthe physicalobjectsof pistis, sincetheyowe their existenceto the physicalobjects. In18 That Plato distinguishes learly betweenconcepts and Forms s clearfrom the fact thatwhen at Parmenides132b Socrates suggeststhat the Form may be a thoughtor concept-vofija, Parmenidesrejects the suggestion on the ground that a thought must be ofsomething, and thatthing is the Form asoriginallypostulated. Cf. also Phaedrus249bif.,where Plato explains that concepts are not Forms, but that they are only named afterForms. The philosopher makes use of concepts as tokens or means of remembrance(bnolLvAttacw)o recollectthe Forms. Since these concepts are of Forms,it is reasonableto suppose that Plato thinks of concept formation as being part of the process ofrecollection. But see D. Scott (n. 13) esp. 348ff., where he arguesthatrecollection s notoperative during the process of concept formation. Assimilationof concept and Formclearlyderives from the presupposition almost certainlymistaken- that to have theconcept of equality, for instance, is to know (i.e. to have completely recollected) theForm Equality. As the Phaedruspassage suggests,all humanbeingsformconceptsof theForms, but only 'true philosophers' make use of them to complete the process ofrecotlection.See note 35 below.40



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effect, theyarethe imagesof the imagesof Forms;and thustheyowe theirexistence ultimately o the existenceof Forms.Interpreted n this light, Plato's talk about the inferiorityof sensibleequals o theFormEqualitynrespectof theirsimilarityo the Form squiteappropriate; or theycan be moreorlesssimilar o the Form,buttheycannever attain he samedegreeof realityas the Form.In this sensetheyareatonce similar to, and different rom the Form, and never thesame as theForm. Besides, it isonlyin thelightof thegrading f objects nthe Line andCavethat Plato'stalk here aboutconsideringhowfar sensible objects fallshort in respectof theirsimilarityo the Formsmakessense;for a sensibleobject maybe an imageofa Formor animageof animageof aForm.That sto say, it may be either two or three removes n degreeof realityfrom itsForm. As we are meant to understand,whenthe true philosopherreturnsinto the cave, he is able to determinewhetheran actionsupposed o be justisreallyan imageof Justiceor an imageof animageof Justice Rep. 517d). 9Again, in this section we are told that when one is remindedof the FormEqualityby equal sticks, equal stones, etc., one alsonotices that they wantto be like (74d9-10)orstriveto be like Equality,but thatthey fall shortof it(75bl-2). These phrases, ike the metaphors f participation nd imitationin theRepublic,expressa metaphysical elationbetweenFormsand partic-ularswhichonly we , i.e. 'truephilosophers', ndnotanychanceperceiv-er, do notice.2019 Note that at 517d, Socrates says that the philosopher,when he returns nto the cave,having seen the real objects in the outer world, is compelled &ywv(te,rOaLe(i T6vtoO bLxaLou OXtWv &yaX4dnTV bv d axLac, thus making it quite clear that he isreferring o the twogradesof images nside the cave, namely, imagesof physicalobjects(i.e. puppetsandstatuettesandimagesof the imagesof physicalobjects(i.e. the shadowsof the puppets and statuettes)). See my ALtvoLaand the Images of Forms in Plato'sRepublicVI-VII , (n.8) 90ff. formyview thattheequalityof the two middlesubsectionsof the line is not somethingunintendedbyPlato andthattheyrepresentontologicallythesame objects, namely, images of Forms, and that the gradingand arrangementof thesymbols in the Cavecorrespondexactlywiththe gradingandarrangementof the objectsin the Line. Thus in the Line, we have(1) Forms,(2) imagesof Forms(in the two middlesubsections) and (3) images of the images of Forms, while in the Cave, we have (1)physicalobjects, (2) imagesof physicalobjects (in the two middlesubsections)and (3)imagesof the images of physicalobjects.? J. Gosling [ Similarity n Phaedo 73b seq. , Phronesis 10 (1965) 157ff.] rightlysaysthat the similarityPlato has in mind in this argument s that of an image (dix6v) to itsoriginal, and that he means that no image can be a perfect likeness of its original.However, he rejectsthe view thatPlato means that sensibles are all imperfectcopies ofForms.Perhaps, whatPlato has inmind inusingthe metaphorof striving s thatsensiblesare always in a processof becoming, but neverreallyare in relationto the Forms.Thuswhat Plato is saying at 74b6-c6is not that in the ordinarysense sensible equals may not

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How closelythePhaedo srelated o RepublicV-VII s again ndicatedbySocrates'argumenthere forthe differencebetween he FormEqualityandsensibleequals:sensibleequals,whileremaing hesame, sometimesappear(qpa(vExaL)qual to one manand unequalto another,whereasthe FormEqualityneverappearsunequal o anyone(74bc6). This, in effect, is thesame type of argumentPlato offers at Republic(478e7-479d9) or thedifferencebetween Forms(the objectsof the facultyof knowledge)andparticularsthe objectsof the facultyof opinion)whichare saidto rollabout between being ('u66v) and non-being (t6 Rh6v) .As I have argued,since only 'truephilosophers'possessthe ability torecognizesimilarity, dentityanddifference n respectof Formsand theirsensible mages,we are meantto understandhatthey arethe onlypeoplecapableof recallingheFormsonseeingtheirsensible mages.This s why tis a misunderstandingo suppose that what Plato explicitlysays in thePhaedo s thatall perceivers, ncludingnewborn nfants,attainknowledgeof the Forms nvolved n theirperceptions.Any readerwho is unawareofthe fact thatPlato employsthis ability o recognizesimilarity,dentityanddifference n respectof imagesand their originals o distinguishbetweendifferent levels of thought or states of mind, is bound to find Plato'sargument or recollection n the Phaedoextremelybaffling.However,weare meant to see at least that no ordinary,non-philosophicalndividualdoes, on seeingequalsticks,sayto himself,or reasonthat the sticksI amnowseeingare striving o be likesomeotherthingthatexists,but theyfallshort of it in respect of their similarity . . . . The immediate transition herefromthe sensibleto the intelligibleworldcanonlybe accomplished yonewho has alreadyattainedknowledgeof the FormEqualityby R1.Finally,we aretold thatsincewe areable to compare he sensibleequalswith Equality,we musthave had knowledgeof Equalitybeforethe timewhen we first saw the equal thingsand thoughtthatall these thingsarestriving o be like Equality,buttheyfall shortof it:'Avayxaiov &Qa hit'&; JtQoEL69VaL T6 LOOV nQp6 Ntevou TOi X&6vov

6X? T6 nQ3TOV W6VT'c5Ta toa tvevoijoalcev bTL 6LQAyETaltiV n6vTaxaOxa Eivat otov r6 laov 9XEL bi V6ECffQQ; (74e9-75a3).This passage, like the previousone, is of crucialimportance or theinterpretation f the rest of the argument.If, however,by the time onecomesto it, one is still underthe impression hatthe recollection husfardiscussed s possiblefor allandsundry,one isvery ikelyto think hatwhatbe, or ratherappear, perfectlyequal, but ratherthat they are quite a differenttype ofthingsfromthe Formwhichnever appearsdifferentfromwhat it is.42



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Socrates sexplicitly ayinghere is thatthe irsttimeanyone eesequalsticksetc., he beginsto make reflectivecomparisons n respectof the sensibleequals and the Form Equality.2 This, however, is almost certainlyamisunderstanding.Up to thispoint,Socrates ssaying hatwhenever we ,i.e. truephiloso-phers,see sensibleequals, we makethis reflectivecompanson n respectof the sensibleequalsandthe FormEquality.Naturally,however,beforewe attainedthe abilityto do so, there was a long periodduringwhichwe , like everyone else, were seeing equal sticks, equal stones etc.,withouthaving heslightest nkling hattheywere ndeedstrivinghard obelike somethingelse that exists, for we were not yet true philosophers.Socrates, n this passage, s nowadvertingo thetimewhen we firstmadethis reflectivecomparisonon seeingequalsticksetc. Now, these are twoquitedifferent tatements.' In theformercase, evennewbornnfants, incetheyenjoy the use of theirsenses,can makethisreflectivecompanrsonhefirsttimethey see equal sticksetc.; in the latter, t is onlyafterseeing equalsticksetc. over a longperiod duringwhichperiod we wereundergoingthe requisitetrainingrightfromchildhood o becometrue philosophersthat one day, on seeingequalsticks, we madethis reflectivecomparisonfor thefirst time. That is to say, by the time we made this reflectivecomparison or the firsttime, we hadalreadyattainedknowledgeof theFormEquality,andour reflectivecomparisonwas thereforeaninstanceofR2. Before then we were graduallyundergoingR, which, to judge bywhat Plato says about it in the Republic,is an exceptionally ong andlaboriousprocess.?3We canthussee thatwhile theformer tatementmakes

21 See Michael Morgan (n. 1) 238-42 and 249-50.' The Greek (quoted above) is admittedlyambiguousand, I think, deliberatelyso. Seenote 3 above. It can be translatedeither way. However, anyone who recognizes whatPlato is doing with the abilityto detect similarity, dentityanddifference n this argumentis not likely to suppose that what he is saying here is that even a newborn infant is quitecapable of thinking hat sensibleequals strive to be like the FormEquality, but that theyfall short of it. Plato is aware of the fact that at this stage the mind has not yet formed theconcept of equality to enable it recognize sticks as being equalor unequal, or indeed, asbeing different from anythingelse.3 On Plato's educational programme or the guardians,see Republic523a-540a. Notethat at the end of the discussion,Socratessays, significantly, hatwhentrue philosophersobtain political power in a state, their first act of refonn should be to take over all thechildrenbelow the age of ten, havingsent away all other citizensinto the fields, andbringthe children up in their own mannersand laws. This should mean (1) that the truephilosopherswill guide the children hrough he stagesoutlined in the Line and allegori-cally described n the Cave, and (2) that byeikasiaPlato almostcertainlyhasin mindthemental condition that characterizesall infancy and early childhood. See Bedu-Addo43



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prettyobviouslyapplies o allhumanbeings we all do enjoy the useof alloursenses as soon as we areborn.Now, it is not uncommonly upposedthatwhen Socrates aysherethatwe deriveourconceptionof the FormEquality romno othersourcethanfrom sense-experience,he is, ineffect, enunciating omethingquitediffer-ent fromanything o be foundin the Meno, theRepublicand theSymposi-um.In the firstplace,it is importanto recognize hatSocrates s not reallysayinghere thatsimplesense-experiences quitesufficient o makeusknowtheFormEquality.As we haveseen, he can onlybe talkinghereabouthowwe allderiveour conceptionof it, i.e. how we come to formourconceptofEquality;andthis is the work, not of simplesense-experience,butof thethought r reasonpromptedby sense-experience. econdly, hereasonwhyit is impossible orusto formourconceptof theFormEqualitywithout heuse of our senses is surely to be sought in Plato's view of the presentconditionof the humansoul. At 62b, we are explicitly oldthatwe humanbeingsare in a sortof prison fV TLVLwQOVQt[ LoEV toavOQonoL. In itspreviousdiscarnateexistence the soul was directlyacquaintedwith theForms.Now, however, imprisonedas it is in the humanbody, it is onlythroughsense-experience hatit cangradually ecollectthe Forms.26As Ihavearguedelsewhere,Plato'sconspicuoususeof sensiblediagramsntheMenoargument or recollection ndicates hat he was awareof the impor-tanceof sense-experiencen the processof recovering urprenatalknow-ledge even at that time, thoughhe makesno mentionof Formsin thatdialogue.27However,the greatestobstacleto seeingthatin the Republic oo Platorecognizes heindispensabilityf sense-experiencen theprocessofacquir-ingknowledgeof Forms s thatit is notgenerally ecognized hatthe actualprocessof acquiring nowledgeof Formsbeginsonlyafter hemind s widehere is that whereaswe (i.e. all humanbeings) can form the thought (or conceive thenotion) of Equality to varyingdegreesof clarity,only we (i.e. truephilosophers)whoknow the FormEqualitycan thinkthatsensibleequals striveto be like Equality.I thinkthat in the TheaetetusPlato is usingb&avoeLUOQL n the same way at 185aff. There toohe has in mind the view thatwhilewe canall'thinkof, 'conceivethenotionof the xotvd,only the truephilosophercan engage in the independentactivityof the mind, by whichalone the xoLv6 can be apprehended. See my Plato on the Object of Knowledge:Theaetetus185c ff. (n.24) 302ff.1 This view of the present incarnatecondition of the human mind is very stronglyreaffirmedat 82d-83a, where Socrates explains that the minds of lovers of learning(qiXoauf8t4) arecompelledto surveyreality hrough hebodyas througha prison wall,insteadof viewing realitydirectlyby themselves.27 See note 5 above.46



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awake and can competently detect similarity, identity and difference in therealm of the faculty of opinion, i.e. after the attainment of pistis,28 with theuse of hypotheses derivedromsense-experience. hus Gulley maintains:

... Althoughthe languageof 'images'of Forms is prominent n the dialogue, andalthougha theoryof recollectionis implicit n it, the doctrineof the Republicaboutthe contribution of sense-perceptionto knowledge appears in many importantrespectsto be opposed to whatis impliedin the Phaedotheoryof recollection ..To appreciatewhatPlato is doingin the Line, it is absolutelynecessary oreadthe entirepassage n the lightof the metaphorof dreamingandbeingawakein relationto imagesand theiroriginals.Thus,when Platosaysthatin dianoia, the mind, usingas images the objects whichwere previouslyimitated, is compelled(&vayxdtEtaM)o proceedfrom hypothesisdown-wards to a conclusion, whereas in noesis it proceeds from hypothesisupwards o a beginning 510b-511a),we are meantto understand 1) thattheprocessof acquiringknowledgeof Formsbeginswith theuse of sensibleparticularsn dianoiaasimagesof Forms,butthatatthatstage,dreaming sit does aboutthe Forms,the mind is not consciouslyawareof the factthatsensibleparticulars re really magesof Forms,northat the premisesof itsdemonstrationsareonly hypothesesand not reallypieces of knowledge;'(2) that the mind is compelled to make use of sense-experience n theprocess,preciselybecause in itspresentcondition t cannotapprehend heFormsdirectly;313) that all the hypothesesemployed in the realmof the' As Plato saysat Timaeus44c, if, after the attainmentof the secondcondition of mind,one receives the righteducationaltraining,one becomes whollysound, havingescapedthe worst of maladies (i.e. ignorance) . . .9 N. Gulley, Plato's Theoryof Knowledge(n.i) 53.3 See note 8 above. Presumably, t is forthisreasonthat Platodescribes the 'knowledge'attainablein dianoia as66ua. Thus, there are, in effect, three levels or gradesof b66a inthe Republic: (i) the b6eaL of the child in eikasia who, being unable to distinguishbetween realityand unreality,fact and fiction etc., is inclinedto believe every detail inAlice in Wonderland; ii) the 66gaLof the normal grown-upin pistis, which are con-cerned with facts of everyday life, or contingenttruths;and (iii) the b6ctt of dianoiawhich are concerned with necessary or a priori truths.Cf. the b6ta of the slave-boy atMeno 85c.31 The statement that the mind in dianoia is compelled(&vayxa4ETaL) to make use ofthe objects of pistis as imagesand proceed fromhypothesis,has puzzledcommentatorsprecisely because of the mistaken presupposition that the upper section of the linerepresents,quite literally, the intelligibleworld of the Sun passage(whichis, of course,accessible only to discarnatemindswhich directly apprehend the Forms) rather thansimply'the realm of the faculty of knowledge'where the mind, whilestill sojourninginthis worldof sense, can, by making use of the objects of sense and hypotheses derivedtherefrom, graduallyrecollect the Forms with which it was acquainted in its previous

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facultyof knowledgeare, likethehypothesesof the truephilosopher nthePhaedo,opinions expressible n X6yoLnvolvingnotions or conceptionsofForms nitiallyderived romsense-experience;32nd(4) thatthe processcanonly be completedat the stage of noesiswhen the mind s wide awakeandcan go beyondthese samehypothesesof dianoiato attaincompleterecol-lectionof Forms.33 hus, in describing he method of dianoia the way hedoes, Plato is not really blamingdianoieticmathematiciansand otherpractitioners f that method or doingthewrong hing;he is, in effect, onlyspeaking romthe point of view of the philosophicdialecticianwho aloneknowswhat the mind is trying o do at thisstage.

Wecanthussee that when Platosaysin thisargumenthatwederiveourconception of the FormEqualityfrom no other sourcethan from sense-experience, he is not reallyenunciating omething hatis at variancewithwhat he saysin otherdialogues. He is expressinga viewthat derives romhisconceptionof the natureandthepresentconditionof thehumanmind.34As we have seen, throughout his argument,Plato makesit clear that hethinksof recollectionas being denticalwiththethought rreasoninghat spromptedby sense-experience.With this in mind,let us now proceedtoexamine the present argumenttending to prove that we acquiredourknowledgeof the FormEqualitybeforewe wereborn.Plato'sargumentmay be outlinedas follows:(1) It is fromthe sensesandonlythe senses thatwe deriveourconcep-tion (or form the thought)of the FormEquality 75a5-10).(2) It is alsothrough he useof our sensesthatwe cometo think hatallsensibleequalsstriveto be like theFormEquality,but thattheyfallshort of it (75a9-b2).(3) Thus,we must haveacquiredourknowledgeof the FormEqualitybeforewe ever beganto use our senses(75b3-6).

discarnateexistence. Cf. the eulogy of sight at Timaeus47ff. and the processof attainingknowledgeof Beautyat Symposium210a-212a.There, it is particularlynoteworthy hatthe process s said to begin n childhoodwith the experienceof particularbeautiful hings;and knowledge of Beauty itself comes much lateron in life as the result of a processofgeneralization repeated at progressivelymore abstract levels, while sense-experiencegraduallyceases to play a part in it. See also notes 19and 26 above.I For the view that hypothesesboth in the Phaedoand the Republicare not things,butrather opinions expressible in statements or propositions, see my 'The Role of theHypothetical Method in the Phaedo (n.2) 112ff.and Mathematics,Dialectic andtheGood in RepublicVI-VII (n.8) 114ff.3 See note 8 above.3' See notes 26 and 31 above.48



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(4) But we beganto enjoythe use of all our senses as soon as we wereborn(75blO-12).(5) Thus,we acquiredourknowledgeof the FormEqualitybeforewewereborn (75c1-3).Now, as I haveargued,Plato s hereusingthe verb 'to think'(EvvofOiuL)ntwoslightlydifferent,but closelyrelatedsenses:(i) to formthe thoughtorconceptof something,and(ii) to think orhavethethought) hat omethingis the case. Thus, since all humanbeings form concepts of the Forms,whatever their levelsof thoughtmay be, whereasonly true philosopherscan, in theirthinking,referthe deliverancesof their sensesconsciously o

the Forms,thepointof stating 1)mustbe thatPlatomeans ocontrastwhatwe (all humanbeings) do, namely,conceivethenotionof the FormEqual-ity by makinguseof oursenses,with(2), i.e what we (truephilosophers)alone are capableof doing,namely,achievingR2onseeingequalsticksetc.In this way, Platoremindshisreaders hathaving he conceptof the FormEquality,whichenables all of us to recognizeequal sticks etc. when wecome acrossthem, is something quite differentfromknowingthe FormEquality,whichenables us to achieveR2 n respectof equalsticksetc.andthe FormEquality.Beforestating 1), SocratesmakesSimmiasagreethatthe factthat weareable to achieve R2on seeingequalsticksetc. indicates hat we musthavehadknowledgeof the FormEqualitybefore hetimewhen we madeourfirst reflective omparison n respectof the FormEqualityand equalsticks etc. (74e6-75a4).Thus, sincePlatointendsto argue thatour know-ledgeof the FormEqualitymusthave been acquiredprior o ouruse of oursenses,it wouldseem thatthisstatement s intended oremindSimmiasandus that t istheconcept,andnotknowledgeof Equality, hatwederive romno othersourcethanfromsense-experience.35Knowledgeof Equality,as we learnfromhisdescriptionof the philoso-pher's practiceof death',canonlybe attainedby reasoningwithout he aidof thesenses, andnot by anyformof bodilyperception.36 hismeans that3 These two statements would seem to indicate that Plato thought of R, as involvingconcept formation. Since the concepts are of Forms, our innate knowledge of Formsmust be operative subconsciously in forming these concepts with the aid of sense-experience. Thus Plato would reject any purelyempiricistaccountof the formationofconcepts. He wouldratheraccept a Kantianaccountof R,. But see D. Scott (n.13, 350),where he maintains hat in Plato'sview recollection s not operativeduringthe processof conceptformation,and inhumancognitivedevelopmentingeneral andthat he restscontent with an empiricisttheory to account for our formationof opinions . See alsonote 18above.3 Thiswould seem to indicatethatwithoutrelatingthe argument orrecollection in this

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conditionof the normalgrown-up i.e. pistis), that one can embarkon theeducationthat leads to the full recollectlonof Forms. Indeed, when atRepublic510b-51a, Platosaysthatin dianoia, themind, usingas imagesthe things that were previously imitated - ToLgTOTERI11qOFEotVEaXOtI XQW[EV? - iS compelledto proceedfromhypothesis ... he is, ineffect, sayingpreciselywhat he saysherein the Phaedo, namelywe recol-lect the Forms ater on in life by makinguse of our senses tats aLOiO0j-OEOLXQW4LEVOL75e3). It is significant hat thisphraseoccursonly here inthe argument. Elsewhere, Plato makes Socratestalk merely about ourseeing, hearing and having sensations (cf. aiaoOoctE EixoLEv,75bll).For, indeed, usingour senses for the purposeof acquiringknowledgeissomething quite different frommerely having sense-experience.That iswhy the majorityof humanbeingsdo notgo beyondthestageofpistis- thementalconditionof the ordinaryman.As we have seen, Plato considers hat situatedas we are, sense-experi-ence isanindispensable id n the processofacquiring nowledgeof Forms.However, he considersthat at a certainstage in its reasoningthe mindshould be able to dissociatereason 'as far as possible'fromthe senses toapprehendForms.Hismentionof the dialecticalprocessofquestioning ndansweringhere is almostcertainlya hint intendedto remindus that thelearningprocess he is describingas recollection 75e3-7), i.e. R,, involvesfar more than the use of the senses.In the previoussection (75a6-c6)Plato has been preoccupiedwithR2i.e. thepossibility njoyed by truephilosophers f having ense-experienceprompt mmediate ecollection f theirknowledgeof Forms.In this section,Platobeginsto proveRIon the basisof the admittedpossibilityof R2.Thusin hissummary f the precedingargument 76al-7), he is saying, n effect,that since we do achieve R2 on seeing sensible images of Forms wehave attainedknowledgeof these Forms. Thus either all human beings(7u6v-g) are bornknowing heseForms, and know them throughout ife,orthose whomwedescribe s learning implyrecollect hem lateron in life,and learning will be recollection xail Ti [iatOTo;L 'vadvolT av EaT(76a4-7).Now, it has been strenuously rgued hatthe learningprocessreferred ohereisrecollection nsense R2,andhence thatsince only true philosophersare capableof achievingR2, 'those whom we describe as learning',oi5gwaRev u1avO&vELv76a6), can only referto true philosophers.That is tosay, unlike recollection in the Meno, recollection in the Phaedo is theexclusiveprerogative f truephilosophers.' This view is almostcertainlyamisunderstandingorthe followingreasons: 1) Since R2requires he prior

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abilityto recognizesimilarity, dentityand difference n respectof imagesand their originals,it alreadypresupposes he completionof a learningprocess.Hence, it is immediate,and not a processof learningat all. (2)Throughouthis developmentof the argument nvolvingR2 (74a-75c) t isnoticeable hatPlato himselfneverdescribes t as a learningprocessat all,although t satisfiessome of the criteriaPlatoassociateswith recollection.On the contrary,he insiststhat we must have attainedknowledgeofEqualitybefore hetimewhen, on seeingequalsticksetc. we achievedR2for the irsttime. (3) Platoonly turnsexplicitly o the questionof whetherwhatwe do with regard o knowledgeof the Forms, afterforgetting t atbirth, is recollectit 'by makinguse of our senses'- a9oOqoEoL QWIiEVOL(75d7-e8)whenthe argumentnvolvingR2 s overat 75d6.(4) Since,havingintroduced he Phaedo argumentwitha summary f the Meno argument,Platomakes Socratessay explicitly hat if Simmiasdoes not believe that'what is called learning' i xako1UEvyEVnaiOriot; is recollectionwhendemonstratedn this way(tacctp),he is goingto demonstratet inanotherway- TVe ,rn (73b3), we are meantto see thatthe followingargumentsintended to demonstratethe same thesis, namely, that 'what is calledlearningis recollection',and hence that by the repeatedreferencestolearningas recollection 6 xaXoi'tEv tIavO6vELv75e5),ov' wpayv icvOa-VEIv (76a6) and iq RaL6OTp3L;Vaciv1oL; av Er1 (76a7), Plato is nowmeaning o refer o the ordinaryime-consuming rocesswe areallfamiliarwith, includingphilosophical ialectic,aswell asto alludeoncemoreto thethesisof the Menoargument or recollection.Thus, havingargued that since we do achieveR2on seeingsensibleimagesof Forms, we haveattainedknowledgeof thoseForms,andthateither all humanbeings (narvTE;)re bornwithknowledgeof the Forms,and know them throughout ife, or 'thosewhomwe describeas learningsimplyrecollectthem lateron in life', Socratesasks Simmiasonce againwhetherhe thinks hat we are bornalreadyknowing he Forms,or thatwelater on recollectwhatwe knewbefore(76a9-b2).As Simmiass unable odecide whetherwe are bornalreadyknowing heForms,or, having orgot-ten them atbirth,we lateron recollect hem,4'Socrateshelpshimout of his4 D. Scott (n.13) esp. 356-358. Cf. p. 358, note 29, where he suggests that onlyknowledge is recollected: If Socrates and Simmiasare now concludingthat all menrecollect,theyarecontradictingwhat heyhave ustdecided,viz. thatnot allmen knowtheForns . . . Myemphasis.That is to say, the attainmentof true opinionis not the resultof recollectionat all. As he says at p. 350, He (Plato) rests contentwith an empiricisttheoryto accountfor ourformationof opinions,butis not concernedwith theexplicationof such a theory. But see note 35 above.54



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predicament y askinghimwhetheror notone whohasknowledgewillbeableto giveanaccount bo'vac k6yov76b6)of the thingshe knows.WhenSimmiasrepliesthatit is verynecessary or sucha personto be able to giveaccount of what he knows, Socratesagain asks him whetherhe thinkseveryonecangiveaccountof thethingswe were alkingabout ustnow, i.e.the Forms:H xaiL OXOVOL01 7aVTST EXFLVtbova kOyOV EQLTOiVTWVv VUV6iX yo,.Ev (76b8-9).To thisSimmias eplies: Iwishtheycould,butI amafraid omorrowbythistime, therewillbe no one anylongercapableof doingso adequately(76blO-12).Here again, Platorevealshis awarenessof the fact that he is not at allbeingasexplicitassomereadersmaythink,and thatwhathe hassaidthusfar about the importanceof sense-experiencen the processof acquiringknowledgeof Forms svery ikelyto givetheimpressionhathe isascribingknowledgeof the Formsto all perceivers, ncludingnewborn nfants.Bypointing out here that the ability to give accountof whatone knowsis anecessaryconditionof knowledge,Plato obviouslyhopes to dispel anylingeringmpressionwe maystillhavethathe is infactascribingknowledgeof the Forms to all and sundry.Here, surely,Plato expects his readers,whetherthey are 'truephilosophers' r not, to recognize hathe is indeeddistinguishing etweenknowledgeandopinionasclearlyas he does in theMenoandtheRepublic,andthathe meansus to understandhatsinceonly'truephilosophers' angive logos of the Forms,onlytheyhaveknowledgeof theForms,whereas withtheexceptionof infantswhocannotyetreason- allotherperceiversonlyhaveopinionswhich nvolvetheirconceptionsofForms.42

4' This indicatesthatit is not futile for Platoto address this argumentprimarily o 'truephilosophers',since Simmiasapparentlydoes not knowthe epistemological mplicationof hisown acceptanceof the theory of Forms.See alsomy TheRole of the HypotheticalMethod in the Phaedo , (n.2) esp. 126-7.Cf. also D. Scott(n.13, 359), where he rightlypoints out that itgivesthemanexplanationas to whythese Formsare not accessible tothe senses, why, that is, we could never have derived our knowledge of the FormEqualitypurelyfromseeing equal sticksand stones .42 Since Plato does not discussthe distinctionbetween knowledgeand opinion in thisdialogue, it is sometimessupposedthatthe distinction s irrelevant oranunderstandingof the Phaedo argumentfor recollection.Thus Morgan(n.1, 249) says: In the Menorecollectionseems to leadfirstto beliefandonly afterelaboratelabor to knowledge. Butthere s no mentionof belief in the Phaedoand no support or employingthedistinctionbetweenbeliefand knowledgehere . My emphasis.See note 3 above.

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Havingdrawn his distinctionbetweenknowledgeandopinionor belief,SocratesnowmakesSimmiasadmit i) thatnoteveryone asknowledge, ii)that people recollectwhat they knew before, and (iii) thatour souls ac-quiredthis knowledgeduringthe time when we were not humanbeings(76c1-10).Socrates hen concludes hatour soulsexistedearlieron beforetakingon thehuman orm,andthattheyexistedapart rombodies,andhadintelligence.Simmias,however,does notseem convinced.He suggests hatperhapswe acquirethis knowledgeat the sametime as we are born,andthat this time still remainsas a possibility(76c14-15).43However,whenSocratesaskshim whenwe losethis knowledge sincethey havejustagreedthatwe arenot bornwith it) andwhetherwe lose it atthe same timeasweacquire t, Simmiasadmits he absurdity f his suggestion FXaOovcan-'u6v oi'b'v 3t'nwv (76d5-6).Inconclusion,Socrates ays,significantly,hat t is withtheseForms hatour belief in the immortality f the soulmuststandorfall: If theFormsdoexist, and we refer all the deliverancesof our senses to this reality,discovering hat it existedpreviouslyand that it is our own, and wecomparethese thingswith thatreality,45hen our soulsmust exist no lessthanthese thingsbeforewe wereborn. If, on the otherhand,thesethingsdo notexist, thenourdiscussionwouldhavebeen to no purpose.Andit isequallynecessary hatthese thingsand oursoulsmusthave existedbeforewe were born - if the formerdid not exist, then neitherdid the latter(76d7-e7). Indeed, Simmiasdoes not seem to have any doubtswhateverthat Forrms o exist; and accordinglyhe acceptsSocrates'proof of theimmortality f the soul:

Nothingis so clearto me as this, thatall these things- the Beautiful,the Good, andall the other things you mentioned just now, do have a most complete existence.And I think the proof is sufficient(77a2-5).See note 41 above.This seems to indicatequite clearlythat Simmias inallyagreeswith Socratesthatit is

later on in life that we recollect the Forms. According to Morgan (n. 1, 249), however,Socrateshere seems to agree that there is a sense in whicha newborncan be said toknow, since his rejoinder is not that newborns cannot provide logoi, but ratherthatcomingto know and forgettingcannot occursimultaneously .s 76e1-2, from'discovering'o 'withthatreality' vriQXovoav. . . oIUwg) ssometimessaid to be an interpolation(so Jackson,Wilamowitzand Archer-Hind).However, thephrasemakes very good sense on our interpretation;orsurely,those who do referthedeliverancesof theirsensesconsciouslyto the Formscan onlybe the 'truephilosophers'

who 'discover' them, i.e. get to know them, and recognize that they were indeedacquaintedwith themin theirpreviousdiscarnateife, and that particularsn thisworldofsense are only imagesof Forms.56



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ConclusionAt the beginningof thispaper,I suggested hat sincePlato introduces hePhaedoargumentwitha summary f the Menoargument or recollection,describingt as Socrates' avouriteargument,we shouldbesuspiciousof thecorrectnessof any interpretationof the Phaedo argumentwhich is in-compatiblewith theMenoargument. have triedto showthatPlato'smainconcern in the Phaedo argument s to vindicate the thesis of the Menoargumentorrecollection,namely, hatwhatwecalllearningsnothingbutrecollection R1). For, who-eas in the Meno, Platopresentsa directargu-mentforthe thesis, inthe Phaedohe addsan indirectargumentorit- viz.thatthepossibility njoyedby truephilosophers f having ense-experienceprompt mmediate ecollectionof theirknowledgeof Forms(R2) s explic-ableonlyifRIis true (giventhatnobody sbornwithaccess o knowledgeofForms).Thus, if the Phaedoarguments not incompatiblewith the thesisthatall learnings recollection,t is notincompatiblewith thephilosopher's'practiceof death' either; for, as I have argued elsewhere,4 by a'riT'aXoytaRo'gMeno 98a) Platohas in mind the ability ogiveaccount boi3vaLkoyov)possessed onlyby the philosophicdialectician.I havealso triedto showthatthisargumentpresupposes hetheoryof thegradualdevelopmentof the mindright rom birthasputforward xplicitlyinthe Timaeus, ndmetaphorically,n termsofdreaming ndbeingwakeinrelation o imagesandtheiroriginals, n theRepublic. ndeed,we shouldbesurprisedf, as themiddle-period ialoguesclearly ndicate,Plato believedin (i) thetheoryof Forms,(ii) theimmortality ndprenatal xistenceof themind or soul, and (iii) the theory of learning as recollection, withoutrealizingthat his psychology is incompletewithout a theory of humancognitivedevelopmentright frombirth. That this argumentpresupposessucha theory s indicatedby Plato'sconspicuoususe of themind'sability orecognizesimilarity,dentityanddifference n respectof imagesandtheiroriginals,as I havetried to show.In the Phaedo, as in the Republicand the Timaeus,Plato thinksof thesenses (atoi0o0;Lg) nd reason (pQo6vqoLg)s being closely bound to-gether throughout life in the world of sense. Since at birth, reason is said tobe completely put out of action by the senses,47 whereas at the stage of thetruephilosopher, he mind candissociatereasonfrom the senses 'as faraspossible',48we shouldexpectthateach of thefour evels of thoughtorstates4 See my Sense-ExperienceandRecollectionin Plato'sMeno (n.5) esp. 244-248;andRecollectionand the Argument Froma Hypothesis' n Plato'sMeno (n.14) esp. 9-10.'4 See Timaeus43a1-44b2.

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of mind eikasia,pistis,dianoiaandnoesis,marks he extentto whichthemiind anor cannotdissociatereasonfromthe senses.Thusthe ability(orthe lack of it) to recognizesimilarity, dentity and difference,first, inrespect of physicalobjects and their images in the realm of sense, andsecond, in respect of Formsand their sensible images in the realmofknowledge,is a functionof the extent to whichthe mindcan or cannotdissociatereasonfromthe senses.We maythusdescribe he progressof the mind rombirth o thelevelofthouglht f the truephilosophern termsof the metaphorof dreaming ndbeingawakeas follows:At birth,the mindcompletely orgets ts prenatalknowledgeof the Forms,since reasonis completelyput out of actionbysensations.At this stageit is fast asleep,anddoesnot even dreamabout heobjects ntheworldof sense. Gradually,however, hemindbegins o formconcepts of these forgotten Forms throughsense-experience,and as itbeginsto recognizeobjects, it beginsto dreamaboutthe objectsof theworldof sense, beingquiteunawareof thefact thatsomeobjectsaremorerealthanothers.Thisis the lowestlevelof thought, .e. eikasia.Themind,however,graduallywakesupfrom his nitialdream-like ondition,untilbythe timeit attainspistis,the mentalconditionof the normalgrown-up,t iswideawakein the realmof sense;at thisstagereasonhasbegunto assertitself, andthe mindis nowconsciouslyawareof the fact thatsomeobjectsaremorereal hanothers.It hasthusattained heability o detectsimilarity,identityanddifference nrespectof imagesandtheiroriginalsn the realmof sense. However,it takesphysicalobjectsfor grantedasbeingfullyreal.Hence it does not even dreamaboutthe Forms.It is onlyafterthe attain-ment of this stage thatthe mindcan embarkon the processof acquiringknowledge,whichbeginswiththeuseof the senses.Whenthe mindbeginsmakinguseof thesenses nthisway,thus reating ensibleparticularsstheimagesof Formstheyreallyare, reasonbeginsto assert tself stillfurther,and it beginsto dreamaboutthe Forms.Thisis the stageof dianoia.Themindat this stagecannotapprehend he Forms,sinceit cannotdissociatereasonfromthe sensesfarenough.However, t is nowwell furnishedwithconcepts of Forms. If it starts reasoningabout these conceptswithoutreference o particulars,t begins o wakeup gradually,untilat thestageofnoesis it is wide awakein the realmof knowledge.It can now dissociatereason'asfaras possible'fromthe sensesandapprehendhe Forms,thusattaining knowledge properly so called - TMLOT 1, and with it the abilityto48 T 6kLoTaPhd. 045); xaO'6oov bOvaTaL (65c7 and 66a4). Cf. also 6oov >^

Vd6yXi aclIToLSXQTOaL (83a6-7).

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recognizesimilarity, dentityand difference n respectof Forms andsen-sibleparticulars.This metaphorof dreamingandbeingawake in relationto imagesandtheir originalsclearlypresupposes he theoryof recollection.Thus we aremeantto understandhatrecollection RI)is a life-longprocess,beginningright rom nfancy,butthattheprocessofrecollectingheFormsbymakinguse of our senses - TaLg acLoOoEoL QW[LEVOt begins only after themind swide awake,andcanrecognize imilarity, dentityanddifference nthe worldof sense, i.e. after heattainment f thementalconditionofpistis,the mentalconditionpeculiar o man.Thisis the process llustrated n theslave-boyexperimentntheMeno.49However, t ismuch ateroninlifethatthe Forms are apprehendedby those who, by the assiduouspracticeofphilosophicaldialectic- the philosopher's practiceof death', attain theabilityto reason withconceptsalone, makingno use of the senses.I conclude, then (i) that thisarguments primarily ddressed o peoplewhohavealreadyaccepted hetheoryof Forms; ii) that sincePlatoarguesfrom the possibilityof R2to the possibilityof R1,it is plain thathis mainconcern s to vindicate he Menoargument or the view thatall learning srecollection the argument with which he significantly ntroduces thePhaedoargument thus revealingthat his theory of recollection s con-cerned, not indeedwith R2 which,beingthe end productof the learningprocess,enables truephilosophers'o appreciatehemetaphysicalelationbetweenthe world of sense andthe world of Forms, but ratherwith R1 so(iii) thatthe argumentpresupposesnot onlythe philosopher'spracticeofdeath'which s identicalwith the hypotheticalmethod as described n theMeno, the Phaedoand the Republic,5'but also the progressof the mind4 It is significant hatbeforeproceedingwith the experiment,Socratesmakes surethatthe slave-boy canspeak Greek(Meno82b);for bythe time one attainspistis,one mustbeable to speak competently the languageof the community n which one happens to live.Socrates s thusassured hatthe boy hasthe necessaryconceptsto enable himunderstandthe termshe is about to employin the experiment.It is also significant hatat the end ofthe experiment,Socrates saysthat the boy'strueopinion, namelythat the squareof thediagonal is twice the size of the given square, has been stirredup in himlike a dream-Wa.ntrQvaQ(85c), thusindicating hat this trueopinion is not the type characteristicofpistis, but rather the type attainable in dianoia. See note 30 above.5 See notes 35 and 40.5' See my'Recollection andthe Argument Froma Hypothesis' nPlato'sMeno , (n.14)esp. 9-10. Since in the Phaedo, Socratesdeduces consequences from his initial hypo-thesis, it seems reasonableto supposethatin the Republic oo we arenot really meant tounderstand that it is only in dianoia that the mind deduces consequences from itshypotheses, andthatthisprocedure, aswell as the use of sensibleparticularsas images ofForms, is beneaththe dignityof the 'truephilosopher'.Indeed, we shouldratherexpect

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from eikasia o noesis as outlined n the Line and allegorically escribed nthe Cave; (iv) that we are meant to understand hat owing to the presentincarnate onditionof our minds, sense-experience,whichwe all do haverightfromthe momentof birth,is a necessarycondition or recollection,but that it is not also sufficient or that purpose; 2nd finally, (v) thatit isindeeddifficult o imagineamore appropriatetatementof themoralof theargument or recollection n the Phaedo,as well as of the Sun, Line andCave in the Republic, hanthe followingstatement n the Theaetetus:... all impressions naxlftLaxa)which reach the mindthrough he body arethingsthat humanbeings and animals alike are by nature (qr6oEL) able to perceiverightfromthe moment of birth whereasreasoningand reflectionabout thesewithrefer-ence to their real nature and worth(n(?6g tE oivotav xai WbcXEtav) are acquiredby those who do acquirethem withdifficultyand througha long and troublesomeprocess of education (1 86b1 1 cS).,

ObafemiA wolowo Universitylle - Ife, Nigeria

the truephilosopherto be capableof perceiving heconsequencesof the hypotheses,anduse sensible particularsas imagesof Forms, even more competentlythanthe practitio-nersof the method of dianoia;for the two methodsmust be complementaryat the stageof noesis. See note 8 above, and my Mathematics,Dialectic and the Good in theRepublicVI-VII (n.8) 120ff.S2 Thus, Platonicrecollection(R1)has a definite Kantianflavour. See note 35 above.S See my Platoon the Objectof Knowledge:Theaetetus 85cff. (n.24) esp. 306-7.Cf.also W.K.C. Guthrie (n.1, 345-6), where, havingrejectedCornford'sview that Platoascribes highly reflective judgements to infants in the Phaedo, he cites Theaetetus186b-c, and Timaeus43c. ff. (on the conditionof the humanmind atbirth)in supportofhis view that Plato consistentlyheld that recollectionis a process- whichmeans that ittakes time, and that manymen never complete it .I would like to thank the Editor, Dr MalcolmSchofield,for his very helpfulcommentson earlierversionsof this paper.60

sense-experience and the argument for recollection in plato's phaedo - j. t. bedu-addo

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