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SENIOR

Manual of ReadingsFall 2017

Contents

1 Ludwig Feuerbach 3Essence of Christianity (Selections) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2 Frederick Engels 81Anti-Duhring (Selections) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

3 T.S. Eliot 107Journey of the Magi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

4 Lyric Poetry 111John Keats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111Gerard Manley Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113Wallace Stevens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

5 Outlines of Aristotle’s Physics 119General Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119Book IV, Chapters 1–5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120Detail of Previous Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123Book VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126Book VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127Book VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

6 St. Thomas Aquinas 129The Division and Methods of the Sciences (Latin) . . . . . . . . . 129

7 St. Thomas Aquinas 175De Ente et Essentia / On Being and Essence . . . . . . . . . . . 175

1 Ludwig Feuerbach

ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY

Preface to the Second Edition1

The clamour excited by the present work has not surprised me, and henceit has not in the least moved me from my position. On the contrary, I haveonce more, in all calmness, subjected my work to the severest scrutiny,both historical and philosophical; I have, as far as possible, freed it fromits defects of form, and enriched it with new developments, illustrations,and historical testimonies,—testimonies in the highest degree striking andirrefragable. Now that I have thus verified my analysis by historical proofs,it is to be hoped that readers whose eyes are not sealed will be convincedand will admit, even though reluctantly, that my work contains a faithful,correct translation of the Christian religion out of the Oriental language ofimagery into plain speech. And it has no pretension to be anything morethan a close translation, or, to speak literally, an empirical or historico-philosophical analysis, a solution of the enigma of the Christian religion.The general propositions which I premise in the Introduction are no a priori,excogitated propositions, no products of speculation; they have arisen outof the analysis of religion; they are only, as indeed are all the fundamentalideas of the work, generalisations from the known manifestations of humannature, and in particular of the religious consciousness,—facts convertedinto thoughts, i.e., expressed in general terms, and thus made the propertyof the understanding. The ideas of my work are only conclusions, conse-quences, drawn from premises which are not themselves mere ideas, butobjective facts either actual or historical—facts which had not their placein my head simply in virtue of their ponderous existence in folio. I uncon-ditionally repudiate absolute, immaterial, self-sufficing, speculation,—thatspeculation which draws its material from within. I differ toto coelo fromthose philosophers who pluck out their eyes that they may see better; for mythought I require the senses, especially sight; I found my ideas on materialswhich can be appropriated only through the activity of the senses. I do notgenerate the object from the thought, but the thought from the object; and

1The opening paragraphs of this Preface are omitted, as having too specific a refer-ence to transient German polemics to interest the English reader.

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I hold that alone to be an object which has an existence beyond one’s ownbrain. I am an idealist only in the region of practical philosophy, that is,I do not regard the limits of the past and present as the limits of human-ity, of the future; on the contrary, I firmly believe that many things—yes,many things—which with the short-sighted, pusillanimous practical menof today, pass for flights of imagination, for ideas never to be realised, formere chimeras, will tomorrow, i.e., in the next century,—centuries in indi-vidual life are days in the life of humanity,—exist in full reality. Briefly,the “Idea” is to me only faith in the historical future, in the triumph oftruth and virtue; it has for me only a political and moral significance; for inthe sphere of strictly theoretical philosophy, I attach myself, in direct op-position to the Hegelian philosophy, only to realism, to materialism in thesense above indicated. The maxim hitherto adopted by speculative philos-ophy: All that is mine I carry with me, the old omnia mea mecum porto,I cannot, alas! appropriate. I have many things outside myself, which Icannot convey either in my pocket or my head, but which nevertheless Ilook upon as belonging to me, not indeed as a mere man – a view not nowin question—but as a philosopher. I am nothing but a natural philosopherin the domain of mind ; and the natural philosopher can do nothing withoutinstruments, without material means. In this character I have written thepresent work, which consequently contains nothing else than the principleof a new philosophy verified practically, i.e., in concreto, in application toa special object, but an object which has a universal significance: namely,to religion, in which this principle is exhibited, developed, and thoroughlycarried out. This philosophy is essentially distinguished from the systemshitherto prevalent, in that it corresponds to the real, complete nature ofman; but for that very reason it is antagonistic to minds perverted andcrippled by a superhuman, i.e., anti-human, anti-natural religion and spec-ulation. It does not, as I have already said elsewhere, regard the pen asthe only fit organ for the revelation of truth, but the eye and ear, the handand foot; it does not identify the idea of the fact with the fact itself, soas to reduce real existence to an existence on paper, but it separates thetwo, and precisely by this separation attains to the fact itself; it recognisesas the true thing, not the thing as it is an object of the abstract reason,but as it is an object of the real, complete man, and hence as it is itself areal, complete thing. This philosophy does not rest on an Understandingper se, on an absolute, nameless understanding, belonging one knows not towhom, but on the understanding of man;—though not, I grant, on that of

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Essence of Christianity (Selections)

man enervated by speculation and dogma;—and it speaks the language ofmen, not an empty, unknown tongue. Yes, both in substance and in speech,it places philosophy in the negation of philosophy, i.e., it declares that aloneto be the true philosophy which is converted in succum et sanguinem, whichis incarnate in Man; and hence it finds its highest triumph in the fact thatto all dull and pedantic minds, which place the essence of philosophy in theshow of philosophy, it appears to be no philosophy at all.

This philosophy has for its principle, not the Substance of Spinoza, notthe ego of Kant and Fichte, not the Absolute Identity of Schelling, not theAbsolute Mind of Hegel, in short, no abstract, merely conceptional being,but a real being, the true Ens realissimum—man; its principle, therefore,is in the highest degree positive and real. It generates thought from theopposite of thought, from Matter, from existence, from the senses; it hasrelation to its object first through the senses, i.e., passively, before definingit in thought. Hence my work, as a specimen of this philosophy, so farfrom being, a production to be placed in the category of Speculation,—although in another point of view it is the true, the incarnate result ofprior philosophical systems, is the direct opposite of speculation, nay, putsan end to it by explaining it. Speculation makes religion say only whatit has itself thought, and expressed far better than religion; it assigns ameaning to religion without any reference to the actual meaning of religion;it does not look beyond itself. I, on the contrary, let religion itself speak; Iconstitute myself only its listener and interpreter, not its prompter. Not toinvent, but to discover, “to unveil existence,” has been my sole object; tosee correctly, my sole endeavour. It is not I, but religion that worships man,although religion, or rather theology, denies this; it is not I, an insignificantindividual, but religion itself that says: God is man, man is God; it is not I,but religion that denies the God who is not man, but only an ens rationis,– since it makes God become man, and then constitutes this God, notdistinguished from man, having a human form, human feelings, and humanthoughts, the object of its worship and veneration. I have only found thekey to the cipher of the Christian religion, only extricated its true meaningfrom the web of contradictions and delusions called theology;—but in doingso I have certainly committed a sacrilege. If therefore my work is negative,irreligious, atheistic, let it be remembered that atheism—at least in thesense of this work—is the secret of religion itself; that religion itself, notindeed on the surface, but fundamentally, not in intention or according toits own supposition, but in its heart, in its essence, believes in nothing else

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than the truth and divinity of human nature. Or let it be proved that thehistorical as well as the rational arguments of my work are false; let them berefuted—not, however, I entreat, by judicial denunciations, or theologicaljeremiads, by the trite phrases of speculation, or other pitiful expedientsfor which I have no name, but by reasons, and such reasons as I have notalready thoroughly answered.

Certainly, my work is negative, destructive; but, be it observed, onlyin relation to the unhuman, not to the human elements of religion. It istherefore divided into two parts, of which the first is, as to its main idea,positive, the second, including the Appendix, not wholly, but in the main,negative; in both, however, the same positions are proved, only in a differ-ent or rather opposite manner. The first exhibits religion in its essence, itstruth, the second exhibits it in its contradictions; the first is development,the second polemic; thus the one is, according to the nature of the case,calmer, the other more vehement. Development advances gently contestimpetuously, for development is self-contented at every stage, contest onlyat the last blow. Development is deliberate, but contest resolute. Develop-ment is light, contest fire. Hence results a difference between the two partseven as to their form. Thus in the first part I show that the true sense ofTheology is Anthropology, that there is no distinction between the pred-icates of the divine and human nature, and, consequently, no distinctionbetween the divine and human subject: I say consequently, for wherever,as is especially the case in theology, the predicates are not accidents, butexpress the essence of the subject, there is no distinction between subjectand predicate, the one can be put in the place of the other; on which pointI refer the reader to the Analytics of Aristotle, or even merely to the Intro-duction of Porphyry. In the second part, on the other hand, I show thatthe distinction which is made, or rather supposed to be made, between thetheological and anthropological predicates resolves itself into an absurdity.Here is a striking example. In the first part I prove that the Son of Godis in religion a real son, the son of God in the same sense in which man isthe son of man, and I find therein the truth, the essence of religion, thatit conceives and affirms a profoundly human relation as a divine relation;on the other hand, in the second part I show that the Son of God—notindeed in religion, but in theology, which is the reflection of religion uponitself,—is not a son in the natural, human sense, but in an entirely differ-ent manner, contradictory to Nature and reason, and therefore absurd, andI find in this negation of human sense and the human understanding the

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negation of religion. Accordingly the first part is the direct, the second theindirect proof, that theology is anthropology: hence the second part neces-sarily has reference to the first; it has no independent significance; its onlyaim is to show that the sense in which religion is interpreted in the previouspart of the work must be the true one, because the contrary is absurd. Inbrief, in the first part I am chiefly concerned with religion, in the secondwith theology: I say chiefly, for it was impossible to exclude theology fromthe first part, or religion from the second. A mere glance will show thatmy investigation includes speculative theology or philosophy, and not, ashas been here and there erroneously supposed, common theology only, akind of trash from which I rather keep as clear as possible, (though, for therest, I am sufficiently well acquainted with it), confining myself always tothe most essential, strict and necessary definition of the object,2 and henceto that definition which gives to an object the most general interest, andraises it above the sphere of theology. But it is with theology that I haveto do, not with theologians; for I can only undertake to characterise whatis primary,—the original, not the copy, principles, not persons, species, notindividuals, objects of history, not objects of the chronique scandaleuse.

If my work contained only the second part, it would be perfectly justto accuse it of a negative tendency, to represent the proposition: Religionis nothing is an absurdity, as its essential purport. But I by no means say(that were an easy task!): God is nothing, the Trinity is nothing, the Wordof God is nothing, &. I only show that they are not that which the illusionsof theology make them,—not foreign, but native mysteries, the mysteriesof human nature; I show that religion takes the apparent, the superficialin Nature and humanity for the essential, and hence conceives their trueessence as a separate, special existence: that consequently, religion, in thedefinitions which it gives of God, e.g., of the Word of God,—at least inthose definitions which are not negative in the sense above alluded to,—only defines or makes objective the true nature of the human word. Thereproach that according to my book religion is an absurdity, a nullity, apure illusion, would be well founded only if, according to it, that into whichI resolve religion, which I prove to be its true object and substance, namely,man, – anthropology, were an absurdity, a nullity, a pure illusion. But sofar from giving a trivial or even a subordinate significance to anthropology

2For example, in considering the sacraments, I limit myself to two; for, in the strictestsense (see Luther, T. xvii. p. 558), there are no more.

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– a significance which is assigned to it only just so long as a theologystands above it and in opposition to it,—I, on the contrary, while reducingtheology to anthropology, exalt anthropology into theology, very much asChristianity, while lowering God into man, made man into God; though, itis true, this human God was by a further process made a transcendental,imaginary God, remote from man. Hence it is obvious that I do not take theword anthropology in the sense of the Hegelian or of any other philosophy,but in an infinitely higher and more general sense.

Religion is the dream of the human mind. But even in dreams we donot find ourselves in emptiness or in heaven, but on earth, in the realm ofreality; we only see real things in the entrancing splendour of imaginationand caprice, instead of in the simple daylight of reality and necessity. HenceI do nothing more to religion—and to speculative philosophy and theologyalso—than to open its eyes, or rather to turn its gaze from the internaltowards the external, i.e., I change the object as it is in the imaginationinto the object as it is in reality.

But certainly for the present age, which prefers the sign to the thingsignified, the copy to the original, fancy to reality, the appearance to theessence, this change, inasmuch as it does away with illusion, is an absoluteannihilation, or at least a reckless profanation; for in these days illusiononly is sacred, truth profane. Nay, sacredness is held to be enhanced inproportion as truth decreases and illusion increases, so that the highestdegree of illusion comes to be the highest degree of sacredness. Religionhas disappeared, and for it has been substituted, even among Protestants,the appearance of religion—the Church—in order at least that “the faith”may be imparted to the ignorant and indiscriminating multitude; that faithbeing still the Christian, because the Christian churches stand now as theydid a thousand years ago, and now, as formerly, the external signs of thefaith are in vogue. That which has no longer any existence in faith (thefaith of the modern world is only an ostensible faith, a faith which does notbelieve what it fancies that it believes, and is only an undecided, pusillan-imous unbelief) is still to pass current as opinion: that which is no longersacred in itself and in truth is still at least to seem sacred. Hence the simu-lated religious indignation of the present age, the age of shows and illusion,concerning my analysis, especially of the Sacraments. But let it not bedemanded of an author who proposes to himself as his goal not the favourof his contemporaries, but only the truth, the unveiled, naked truth, thathe should have or feign respect towards an empty appearance, especially as

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the object which underlies this appearance is in itself the culminating pointof religion, i.e., the point at which the religious slides into the irreligious.Thus much in justification, not in excuse, of my analysis of the Sacraments.

With regard to the true bearing of my analysis of the Sacraments, espe-cially as presented in the concluding chapter, I only remark, that I thereinillustrate by a palpable and visible example the essential purport, the pe-culiar theme of my work; that I therein call upon the senses themselvesto witness to the truth of my analysis and my ideas, and demonstrate adoculos, ad tactum, ad gustum, what I have taught ad captum throughoutthe previous pages. As, namely, the water of Baptism, the wine and breadof the Lord’s Supper, taken in their natural power and significance, areand effect infinitely more than in a supernaturalistic, illusory significance;so the object of religion in general, conceived in the sense of this work,i.e., the anthropological sense, is infinitely more productive and real, bothin theory and practice, than when accepted in the sense of theology. Foras that which is or is supposed to be imparted in the water, bread, andwine, over and above these natural substances themselves, is something inthe imagination only, but in truth, in reality, nothing; so also the objectof religion in general, the Divine essence, in distinction from the essenceof Nature and Humanity,—that is to say, if its attributes, as understand-ing, love, &., are and signify something else than these attributes as theybelong to man and Nature,—is only something in the imagination, but intruth and reality nothing. Therefore—this is the moral of the fable—weshould not, as is the case in theology and speculative philosophy, make realbeings and things into arbitrary signs, vehicles, symbols, or predicates of adistinct, transcendent, absolute, i.e., abstract being; but we should acceptand understand them in the significance which they have in themselves,which is identical with their qualities, with those conditions which makethem what they are:- thus only do we obtain the key to a real theory andpractice. I, in fact, put in the place of the barren baptismal water, thebeneficent effect of real water. How “watery,” how trivial! Yes, indeed,very trivial. But so Marriage, in its time, was a very trivial truth, whichLuther, on the ground of his natural good sense, maintained in oppositionto the seemingly holy illusion of celibacy. But while I thus view water as areal thing, I at the same time intend it as a vehicle, an image, an example,a symbol, of the “unholy spirit of my work, just as the water of Baptism– the object of my analysis—is at once literal and symbolical water. It isthe same with bread and wine. Malignity has hence drawn the conclusion

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that bathing, eating, and drinking are the summa summarum, the positiveresult of my work. I make no other reply than this: If the whole of reli-gion is contained in the Sacraments, and there are consequently no otherreligious acts than those which are performed in Baptism and the Lord’sSupper; then I grant that the entire purport and positive result of my work,are bathing, eating and drinking, since this work is nothing but a faithful,rigid, historico-philosophical analysis of religion—the revelation of religionto itself, the awakening of religion to self-consciousness.

I say an historico-philosophical analysis, in distinction from a merelyhistorical analysis of Christianity. The historical critic—such a one, forexample, as Daumer or Ghillany—shows that the Lord’s Supper is a ritelineally descended from the ancient cultus of human sacrifice ; that once, in-stead of bread and wine, real human flesh and blood were partaken. I, on thecontrary, take as the object of my analysis and reduction only the Christiansignificance of the rite, that view of it which is sanctioned in Christianity,and I proceed on the supposition that only that significance which a dogmaor institution has in Christianity (of course in ancient Christianity, not inmodern), whether it may present itself in other religions or not, is also thetrue origin of that dogma or institution in so far as it is Christian. Again,the historical critic, as, for example, Lutzelberger, shows that the narra-tives of the miracles of Christ resolve themselves into contradictions andabsurdities, that they are later fabrications, and that consequently Christwas no miracle-worker, nor, in general, that which he is represented to bein the Bible. I, on the other hand, do not inquire what the real, naturalChrist was or may have been in distinction from what he has been madeor has become in Supernaturalism; on the contrary, I accept the Christof religion, but I show that this superhuman being is nothing else than aproduct and reflex of the supernatural human mind. I do not ask whetherthis or that, or any miracle can happen or not; I only show what miracleis, and I show it not a priori, but by examples of miracles narrated in theBible as real events; in doing so, however, I answer or rather preclude thequestion as to the possibility or reality or necessity of miracle. Thus muchconcerning the distinction between me and the historical critics who haveattacked Christianity. As regards my relation to Strauss and Bruno Bauer,in company with whom I am constantly named, I merely point out here thatthe distinction between our works is sufficiently indicated by the distinctionbetween their objects, which is implied even in the title-page. Bauer takesfor the object of his criticism the evangelical history, i.e., biblical Christian-

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ity, or rather biblical theology; Strauss, the System of Christian Doctrineand the Life of Jesus (which may also be included under the title of Chris-tian Doctrine), i.e., dogmatic Christianity, or rather dogmatic theology; I,Christianity in general, i.e., the Christian religion, and consequently onlyChristian philosophy or theology. Hence I take my citations chiefly frommen in whom Christianity was not merely a theory or a dogma, not merelytheology, but religion. My principal theme is Christianity, is Religion, asit is the immediate object, the immediate nature, of man. Erudition andphilosophy are to me only the means by which I bring to light the treasurehid in man.

I must further mention that the circulation which my work has hadamongst the public at large was neither desired nor expected by me. It istrue that I have always taken as the standard of the mode of teaching andwriting, not the abstract, particular, professional philosopher, but universalman, that I have regarded man as the criterion of truth, and not this orthat founder of a system, and have from the first placed the highest ex-cellence of the philosopher in this, that he abstains, both as a man and asan author, from the ostentation of philosophy, i.e., that he is a philosopheronly in reality, not formally, that he is a quiet philosopher, not a loud andstill less a brawling one. Hence, in all my works, as well as in the presentone, I have made the utmost clearness, simplicity, and definiteness a lawto myself, so that they may be understood, at least in the main, by everycultivated and thinking man. But notwithstanding this, my work can beappreciated and fully understood only by the scholar, that is to say, bythe scholar who loves truth, who is capable of forming a judgment, whois above the notions and prejudices of the learned and unlearned vulgar;for although a thoroughly independent production, it has yet its necessarylogical basis in history. I very frequently refer to this or that Historical phe-nomenon without expressly designating it, thinking this superfluous; andsuch references can be understood by the scholar alone. Thus, for example,in the very first chapter, where I develop the necessary consequences of thestandpoint of Feeling, I allude to Jacobi and Schleiermacher; in the secondchapter I allude chiefly to Kantism, Scepticism, Theism, Materialism andPantheism; in the chapter on the “Standpoint of Religion,” where I discussthe contradictions between the religious or theological and the physical ornatural-philosophical view of Nature, I refer to philosophy in the age oforthodoxy, and especially to the philosophy of Descartes and Leibnitz, inwhich this contradiction presents itself in a peculiarly characteristic man-

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ner. The reader, therefore, who is unacquainted with the historical factsand ideas presupposed in my work, will fail to perceive on what my ar-guments and ideas hinge; no wonder if my positions often appear to himbaseless, however firm the footing on which they stand. It is true that thesubject of my work is of universal human interest; moreover, its fundamen-tal ideas, though not in the form in which they are here expressed, or inwhich they could be expressed under existing circumstances, will one daybecome the common property of mankind: for nothing is opposed to themin the present day but empty, powerless illusions and prejudices in contra-diction with the true nature of man. But in considering this subject in thefirst instance, I was under the necessity of treating it as a matter of science,of philosophy; and in rectifying the aberrations of Religion, Theology, andSpeculation, I was naturally obliged to use their expressions, and even toappear to speculate, or—which is the same thing—to turn theologian my-self, while I nevertheless only analyse speculation, i.e., reduce theology toanthropology . My work, as I said before, contains, and applies in the con-crete, the principle of a new philosophy suited – not to the schools, but—toman. Yes, it contains that principle, but only by evolving it out of thevery core of religion; hence, be it said in passing the new philosophy canno longer, like the old Catholic and modern Protestant scholasticism, fallinto the temptation to prove its agreement with religion by its agreementwith Christian dogmas; on the contrary, being evolved from the nature ofreligion, it has in itself the true essence of religion,—is, in its very qualityas a philosophy, a religion also. But a work which considers ideas in theirgenesis and explains and demonstrates them in strict sequence, is, by thevery form which this purpose imposes upon it, unsuited to popular reading.

Lastly, as a supplement to this work with regard to many apparentlyunvindicated positions, I refer to my articles in the Deutsches Jahrbuch,January and February 1842, to my critiques and Charakteristiken des mod-ernen Afterchristenmus, in previous numbers of the same periodical, andto my earlier works, especially the following:—P. Bayle. Ein Beitrag zurGeschichte der Philosophie und Menschkeit, Ausbach, 1838, and Philoso-phie und Christenthum, Mannheim, 1839. In these works I have sketched,with a few sharp touches, the historical solution of Christianity, and haveshown that Christianity has in fact long vanished, not only from the reasonbut from the life of mankind, that it is nothing more than a fixed idea, inflagrant contradiction with our fire and life assurance companies, our rail-roads and steam-carriages, our picture and sculpture galleries, our military

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and industrial schools, our theatres and scientific museums.

LUDWIG FEUERBACHBruckberg, Feb. 14, 1843.

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Chapter I: Introduction

§1 the essential nature of man

Religion has its basis in the essential difference between man and thebrute—the brutes have no religion. It is true that the old uncritical writerson natural history attributed to the elephant, among other laudable qual-ities, the virtue of religiousness; but the religion of elephants belongs tothe realm of fable. Cuvier, one of the greatest authorities on the animalkingdom, assigns, on the strength of his personal observations, no highergrade of intelligence to the elephant than to the dog.

But what is this essential difference between man and the brute? Themost simple, general, and also the most popular answer to this question is—consciousness:—but consciousness in the strict sense; for the consciousnessimplied in the feeling of self as an individual, in discrimination by the senses,in the perception and even judgment of outward things according to definitesensible signs, cannot be denied to the brutes. Consciousness in the strictestsense is present only in a being to whom his species, his essential nature,is an object of thought. The brute is indeed conscious of himself as anindividual—and he has accordingly the feeling of self as the common centreof successive sensations—but not as a species: hence, he is without thatconsciousness which in its nature, as in its name, is akin to science. Wherethere is this higher consciousness there is a capability of science. Science isthe cognizance of species. In practical life we have to do with individuals;in science, with species. But only a being to whom his own species, hisown nature, is an object of thought, can make the essential nature of otherthings or beings an object of thought.

Hence the brute has only a simple, man a twofold life: in the brute, theinner life is one with the outer; man has both an inner and an outer life.The inner life of man is the life which has relation to his species, to hisgeneral, as distinguished from his individual, nature. Man thinks—that is,he converses with himself. The brute can exercise no function which hasrelation to its species without another individual external to itself; but mancan perform the functions of thought and speech, which strictly imply sucha relation, apart from another individual. Man is himself at once I andthou; he can put himself in the place of another, for this reason, that tohim his species, his essential nature, and not merely his individuality, is anobject of thought.

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Religion being identical with the distinctive characteristic of man, isthen identical with self-consciousness—with the consciousness which manhas of his nature. But religion, expressed generally, is consciousness of theinfinite; thus it is and can be nothing else than the consciousness whichman has of his own—not finite and limited, but infinite nature. A reallyfinite being has not even the faintest adumbration, still less consciousness,of an infinite being, for the limit of the nature is also the limit of theconsciousness. The consciousness of the caterpillar, whose life is confinedto a particular species of plant, does not extend itself beyond this narrowdomain. It does, indeed, discriminate between this plant and other plants,but more it knows not. A consciousness so limited, but on account ofthat very limitation so infallible, we do not call consciousness, but instinct.Consciousness, in the strict or proper sense, is identical with consciousnessof the infinite; a limited consciousness is no consciousness; consciousnessis essentially infinite in its nature.3 The consciousness of the infinite isnothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of the consciousness; or,in the consciousness of the infinite, the conscious subject has for his objectthe infinity of his own nature.

What, then, is the nature of man, of which he is conscious, or whatconstitutes the specific distinction, the proper humanity of man?4 Reason,Will, Affection. To a complete man belong the power of thought, the powerof will, the power of affection. The power of thought is the light of theintellect, the power of will is energy of character, the power of affectionis love. Reason, love, force of will, are perfections—the perfections of thehuman being—nay, more, they are absolute perfections of being. To will,to love, to think, are the highest powers, are the absolute nature of manas man, and the basis of his existence. Man exists to think, to love, towill. Now that which is the end, the ultimate aim, is also the true basisand principle of a being. But what is the end of reason? Reason. Of love?

3Objectum intellectus esse illimitatum sive omne venim ac, ut loquuntur, omne ensut ens, ex eo constat, quod ad nullum non genus rerum extenditur, nullumque est, cujuscognoscendi capax non sit, licet ob varia obstacula multa sint, quae re ipsa, non norit.—Gassendi (Op[era] Omn[ia] Phys[ica]).

4The obtuse materialist says: “Man is distinguished from the brute only byconsciousness—he is an animal with consciousness superadded;” not reflecting, that ina being which awakes to consciousness, there takes place a qualitative change, a dif-ferentiation of the entire nature. For the rest, our words are by no means intended todepreciate the nature of the lower animals. This is not the place to enter further intothat question.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Gassendi

1. Ludwig Feuerbach

Love. Of will? Freedom of the will. We think for the sake of thinking;love for the sake of loving; will for the sake of willing—i.e., that we maybe free. True existence is thinking, loving, willing existence. That alone istrue, perfect, divine, which exists for its own sake. But such is love, such isreason, such is will. The divine trinity in man, above the individual man,is the unity of reason, love, will. Reason, Will, Love, are not powers whichman possesses, for he is nothing without them, he is what he is only bythem; they are the constituent elements of his nature, which he neither hasnor makes, the animating, determining, governing powers—divine, absolutepowers—to which he can oppose no resistance.5

How can the feeling man resist feeling, the loving one love, the rationalone reason? Who has not experienced the overwhelming power of melody?And what else is the power of melody but the power of feeling? Music is thelanguage of feeling; melody is audible feeling—feeling communicating itself.Who has not experienced the power of love, or at least heard of it? Whichis the stronger—love or the individual man? Is it man that possesses love,or is it not much rather love that possesses man? When love impels a manto suffer death even joyfully for the beloved one, is this death-conqueringpower his own individual power, or is it not rather the power of love? Andwho that ever truly thought has not experienced that quiet, subtle power—the power of thought? When thou sinkest into deep reflection, forgettingthyself and what is around thee, dost thou govern reason, or is it not reasonwhich governs and absorbs thee? Scientific enthusiasm—is it not the mostglorious triumph of intellect over thee? The desire of knowledge—is it not asimply irresistible, and all-conquering power? And when thou suppressesta passion, renouncest a habit, in short, achievest a victory over thyself, isthis victorious power thy own personal power, or is it not rather the energyof will, the force of morality, which seizes the mastery of thee, and fills theewith indignation against thyself and thy individual weaknesses?

Man is nothing without an object. The great models of humanity, suchmen as reveal to us what man is capable of, have attested the truth ofthis proposition by their lives. They had only one dominant passion—therealization of the aim which was the essential object of their activity. Butthe object to which a subject essentially, necessarily relates, is nothing elsethan this subject’s own, but objective, nature. If it be an object commonto several individuals of the same species, but under various conditions,

5“Toute opinion est assez forte pour se faire exposer au prix de la vie.”—Montaigne.

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it is still, at least as to the form under which it presents itself to each ofthem according to their respective modifications, their own, but objective,nature.

Thus the Sun is the common object of the planets, but it is an objectto Mercury, to Venus, to Saturn, to Uranus, under other conditions than tothe Earth. Each planet has its own sun. The Sun which lights and warmsUranus has no physical (only an astronomical, scientific) existence for theearth; and not only does the Sun appear different, but it really is anothersun on Uranus than on the Earth. The relation of the Sun to the Earth istherefore at the same time a relation of the Earth to itself, or to its ownnature, for the measure of the size and of the intensity of light which theSun possesses as the object of the Earth, is the measure of the distance,which determines the peculiar nature of the Earth. Hence each planet hasin its sun the mirror of its own nature.

In the object which he contemplates, therefore, man becomes acquaintedwith himself; consciousness of the objective is the self-consciousness of man.We know the man by the object, by his conception of what is externalto himself; in it his nature becomes evident; this object is his manifestednature, his true objective ego. And this is true not merely of spiritual, butalso of sensuous objects. Even the objects which are the most remote fromman, because they are objects to him, and to the extent to which they are so,are revelations of human nature. Even the moon, the sun, the stars, call toman Γνῶθι σεαυτόν. That he sees them, and so sees them, is an evidence ofhis own nature. The animal is sensible only of the beam which immediatelyaffects life; while man perceives the ray, to him physically indifferent, ofthe remotest star. Man alone has purely intellectual, disinterested joys andpassions; the eye of man alone keeps theoretic festivals. The eye whichlooks into the starry heavens, which gazes at that light, alike useless andharmless, having nothing in common with the earth and its necessities—this eye sees in that light its own nature, its own origin. The eye is heavenlyin its nature. Hence man elevates himself above the earth only with theeye; hence theory begins with the contemplation of the heavens. The firstphilosophers were astronomers. It is the heavens that admonish man of hisdestination, and remind him that he is destined not merely to action, butalso to contemplation.

The absolute to man is his own nature. The power of the object overhim is therefore the power of his own nature. Thus the power of the objectof feeling is the power of feeling itself; the power of the object of the intel-

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lect is the power of the intellect itself; the power of the object of the willis the power of the will itself. The man who is affected by musical sounds,is governed by feeling; by the feeling, that is, which finds its correspondingelement in musical sounds. But it is not melody as such, it is only melodypregnant with meaning and emotion, which has power over feeling. Feelingis only acted on by that which conveys feeling, i.e., by itself, its own nature.Thus also the will; thus, and infinitely more, the intellect. Whatever kind ofobject, therefore, we are at any time conscious of, we are always at the sametime conscious of our own nature; we can affirm nothing without affirmingourselves. And since to will, to feel, to think, are perfections, essences,realities, it is impossible that intellect, feeling, and will should feel or per-ceive themselves as limited, finite powers, i.e., as worthless, as nothing. Forfiniteness and nothingness are identical; finiteness is only a euphemism fornothingness. Finiteness is the metaphysical, the theoretical—nothingnessthe pathological, practical expression. What is finite to the understandingis nothing to the heart. But it is impossible that we should be conscious ofwill, feeling, and intellect, as finite powers, because every perfect existence,every original power and essence, is the immediate verification and affirma-tion of itself. It is impossible to love, will, or think, without perceiving theseactivities to be perfections—impossible to feel that one is a loving, willing,thinking being, without experiencing an infinite joy therein. Consciousnessconsists in a being becoming objective to itself; hence it is nothing apart,nothing distinct from the being which is conscious of itself. How could itotherwise become conscious of itself? It is therefore impossible to be con-scious of a perfection as an imperfection, impossible to feel feeling limited,to think thought limited.

Consciousness is self-verification, self-affirmation, self-love, joy in one’sown perfection. Consciousness is the characteristic mark of a perfect na-ture; it exists only in a self-sufficing, complete being. Even human vanityattests this truth. A man looks in the glass; he has complacency in hisappearance. This complacency is a necessary, involuntary consequence ofthe completeness, the beauty of his form. A beautiful form is satisfied initself; it has necessarily joy in itself—in self-contemplation. This compla-cency becomes vanity only when a man piques himself on his form as beinghis individual form, not when he admires it as a specimen of human beautyin general. It is fitting that he should admire it thus; he can conceive no

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form more beautiful, more sublime than the human.6 Assuredly every be-ing loves itself, its existence—and fitly so. To exist is a good. Quidquidessentia dignum est, scientia dignum est. Everything that exists has value,is a being of distinction—at least this is true of the species: hence it asserts,maintains itself. But the highest form of self-assertion, the form which isitself a superiority, a perfection, a bliss, a good, is consciousness.

Every limitation of the reason, or in general of the nature of man, restson a delusion, an error. It is true that the human being, as an individ-ual, can and must—herein consists his distinction from the brute—feel andrecognise himself to be limited; but he can become conscious of his limits,his finiteness, only because the perfection, the infinitude of his species isperceived by him, whether as an object of feeling, of conscience, or of thethinking consciousness. If he makes his own limitations the limitations ofthe species, this arises from the mistake that he identifies himself immedi-ately with the species—a mistake which is intimately connected with theindividual’s love of ease, sloth, vanity, and egoism. For a limitation whichI know to be merely mine humiliates, shames, and perturbs me. Hence tofree myself from this feeling of shame, from this state of dissatisfaction, Iconvert the limits of my individuality into the limits of human nature ingeneral. What is incomprehensible to me is incomprehensible to others;why should I trouble myself further? it is no fault of mine; my understand-ing is not to blame, but the understanding of the race. But it is a ludicrousand even culpable error to define as finite and limited what constitutes theessence of man, the nature of the species, which is the absolute nature of theindividual. Every being is sufficient to itself. No being can deny itself, i.e.,its own nature; no being is a limited one to itself. Rather, every being is inand by itself infinite—has its God, its highest conceivable being, in itself.Every limit of a being is cognisable only by another being out of and abovehim. The life of the ephemera is extraordinarily short in comparison withthat of longer lived creatures; but nevertheless, for the ephemera this shortlife is as long as a life of years to others. The leaf on which the caterpillarlives is for it a world, an infinite space.

That which makes a being what it is—is its talent, its power, its wealth,

6Homini homine nihil pulchrius. (Cicero, De natura deorum. 1. i.) And this is nosign of limitation, for he regards other beings as beautiful besides himself; he delights inthe beautiful forms of animals, in the beautiful forms of plants, in the beauty of naturein general. But only the absolute, the perfect form, can delight without envy in theforms of other beings.

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its adornment. How can it possibly hold its existence non-existence, itswealth poverty, its talent incapacity? If the plants had eyes, taste andjudgment, each plant would declare its own flower the most beautiful; forits comprehension, its taste, would reach no farther than its natural powerof production. What the productive power of its nature has brought forthas the highest, that must also its taste, its judgment, recognise and affirmas the highest. What the nature affirms, the understanding, the taste,the judgment, cannot deny; otherwise the understanding, the judgment,would no longer be the understanding and judgment of this particular being,but of some other. The measure of the nature is also the measure of theunderstanding. If the nature is limited, so also is the feeling, so also is theunderstanding. But to a limited being its limited understanding is not feltto be a limitation; on the contrary, it is perfectly happy and contented withthis understanding; it regards it, praises and values it, as a glorious, divinepower; and the limited understanding, on its part, values the limited naturewhose understanding it is. Each is exactly adapted to the other; how shouldthey be at issue with each other? A being’s understanding is its sphere ofvision. As far as thou seest, so far extends thy nature; and conversely.The eye of the brute reaches no farther than its needs, and its nature nofarther than its needs. And so far as thy nature reaches, so far reaches thyunlimited self-consciousness, so far art thou God. The discrepancy betweenthe understanding and the nature, between the power of conception andthe power of production in the human consciousness, on the one hand ismerely of individual significance and has not a universal application; and,on the other hand, it is only apparent. He who having written a bad poemknows it to be bad, is in his intelligence, and therefore in his nature, notso limited as he who, having written a bad poem, admires it and thinks itgood.

It follows, that if thou thinkest the infinite, thou perceivest and affirmestthe infinitude of the power of thought; if thou feelest the infinite, thoufeelest and affirmest the infinitude of the power of feeling. The object ofthe intellect is intellect objective to itself; the object of feeling is feelingobjective to itself. If thou hast no sensibility, no feeling for music, thouperceivest in the finest music nothing more than in the wind that whistlesby thy ear, or than in the brook which rushes past thy feet. What thenis it which acts on thee when thou art affected by melody? What dostthou perceive in it? What else than the voice of thy own heart? Feelingspeaks only to feeling; feeling is comprehensible only by feeling, that is, by

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itself—for this reason, that the object of feeling is nothing else than feeling.Music is a monologue of emotion. But the dialogue of philosophy also isin truth only a monologue of the intellect; thought speaks only to thought.The splendours of the crystal charm the sense; but the intellect is interestedonly in the laws of crystallization. The intellectual only is the object of theintellect.7

All therefore which, in the point of view of metaphysical, transcendentalspeculation and religion, has the significance only of the secondary, thesubjective, the medium, the organ,—has in truth the significance of theprimary, of the essence, of the object itself. If, for example, feeling isthe essential organ of religion, the nature of God is nothing else than anexpression of the nature of feeling. The true but latent sense of the phrase,“Feeling is the organ of the divine,” is, feeling is the noblest, the mostexcellent, i.e., the divine, in man. How couldst thou perceive the divine byfeeling, if feeling were not itself divine in its nature? The divine assuredlyis known only by means of the divine—God is known only by himself.The divine nature which is discerned by feeling, is in truth nothing elsethan feeling enraptured, in ecstasy with itself—feeling intoxicated with joy,blissful in its own plenitude.

It is already clear from this that where feeling is held to be the organ ofthe infinite, the subjective essence of religion,—the external data of religionlose their objective value. And thus, since feeling has been held the cardinalprinciple in religion, the doctrines of Christianity, formerly so sacred, havelost their importance. If from this point of view some value is still concededto Christian ideas, it is a value springing entirely from the relation theybear to feeling; if another object would excite the same emotions, it wouldbe just as welcome. But the object of religious feeling is become a matterof indifference, only because when once feeling has been pronounced to bethe subjective essence of religion, it in fact is also the objective essence ofreligion, though it may not be declared, at least directly, to be such. I saydirectly; for indirectly this is certainly admitted, when it is declared thatfeeling, as such, is religious, and thus the distinction between specificallyreligious and irreligious, or at least non-religious, feelings, is abolished,—anecessary consequence of the point of view in which feeling only is regardedas the organ of the divine. For on what other ground than that of its essence,

7“The understanding is percipient only of understanding, and what proceedsthence.”—Reimarus (Wahrh. der Naturl. Religion, iv. Abth, § 8.)

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its nature, dost thou hold feeling to be the organ of the infinite, the divinebeing? And is not the nature of feeling in general, also the nature of everyspecial feeling, be its object what it may? What, then, makes this feelingreligious? A given object? Not at all; for this object is itself a religious oneonly when it is not an object of the cold understanding or memory, but offeeling. What then? The nature of feeling—a nature of which every specialfeeling, without distinction of objects, partakes. Thus, feeling is pronouncedto be religious, simply because it is feeling; the ground of its religiousnessis its own nature—lies in itself. But is not feeling thereby declared to beitself the absolute, the divine? If feeling in itself is good, religious, i.e., holy,divine, has not feeling its God in itself?

But if, notwithstanding, thou wilt posit an object of feeling, but at thesame time seekest to express thy feeling truly, without introducing by thyreflection any foreign element, what remains to thee but to distinguish be-tween thy individual feeling and the general nature of feeling;—to separatethe universal in feeling from the disturbing, adulterating influences withwhich feeling is bound up in thee, under thy individual conditions? Hencewhat thou canst alone contemplate, declare to be the infinite, and defineas its essence, is merely the nature of feeling. Thou hast thus no other def-inition of God than this; God is pure, unlimited, free Feeling. Every otherGod, whom thou supposest, is a God thrust upon thy feeling from with-out. Feeling is atheistic in the sense of the orthodox belief, which attachesreligion to an external object; it denies an objective God—it is itself God.In this point of view, only the negation of feeling is the negation of God.Thou art simply too cowardly or too narrow to confess in words what thyfeeling tacitly affirms. Fettered by outward considerations, still in bondageto vulgar empiricism, incapable of comprehending the spiritual grandeurof feeling, thou art terrified before the religious atheism of thy heart. Bythis fear thou destroyest the unity of thy feeling with itself, in imaginingto thyself an objective being distinct from thy feeling, and thus necessarilysinking back into the old questions and doubts—is there a God or not?—questions and doubts which vanish, nay, are impossible, where feeling isdefined as the essence of religion. Feeling is thy own inward power, butat the same time a power distinct from thee, and independent of thee; itis in thee, above thee: it is itself that which constitutes the objective inthee—thy own being which impresses thee as another being; in short, thyGod. How wilt thou then distinguish from this objective being within theeanother objective being? how wilt thou get beyond thy feeling?

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But feeling has here been adduced only as an example. It is the samewith every other power, faculty, potentiality, reality, activity—the name isindifferent—which is defined as the essential organ of any object. Whateveris a subjective expression of a nature is simultaneously also its objective ex-pression. Man cannot get beyond his true nature. He may indeed by meansof the imagination conceive individuals of another so-called higher kind, buthe can never get loose from his species, his nature; the conditions of being,the positive final predicates which he gives to these other individuals, arealways determinations or qualities drawn from his own nature—qualities inwhich he in truth only images and projects himself. There may certainly bethinking beings besides men on the other planets of our solar system. Butby the supposition of such beings we do not change our standing point—weextend our conceptions quantitatively, not qualitatively. For as surely as onthe other planets there are the same laws of motion, so surely are there thesame laws of perception and thought as here. In fact, we people the otherplanets, not that we may place there different beings from ourselves, butmore beings of our own or of a similar nature.8

§2 the essence of religion considered generally

What we have hitherto been maintaining generally, even with regard tosensational impressions, of the relation between subject and object, appliesespecially to the relation between the subject and the religious object.

In the perceptions of the senses consciousness of the object is distinguish-able from consciousness of self; but in religion, consciousness of the objectand self-consciousness coincide. The object of the senses is out of man, thereligious object is within him, and therefore as little forsakes him as hisself-consciousness or his conscience; it is the intimate, the closest object.“God,” says Augustine, for example, “is nearer, more related to us, andtherefore more easily known by us, than sensible, corporeal things.”9 Theobject of the senses is in itself indifferent—independent of the dispositionor of the judgment; but the object of religion is a selected object; the most

8Verisimile est, non minus quam geometriae, etiam musicae oblectationem ad pluresquam ad nos pertinere. Positis enim aliis terris atque animalibus ratione et auditupollentibus, cur tantum his nostris contigisset ea voluptas, quae sola ex sono percipipotest?—Christ. Hugenius. (Cosmotheoros, 1. i.)

9Unusquisque vestrum non cogitat, prius se debere Deum nosse, quam colere.—M.Minucii Felicis Octavianus, c. 24.

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excellent, the first, the supreme being; it essentially pre-supposes a criticaljudgment, a discrimination between the divine and the non-divine, betweenthat which is worthy of adoration and that which is not worthy.10 Andhere may be applied, without any limitation, the proposition: the object ofany subject is nothing else than the subject’s own nature taken objectively.Such as are a man’s thoughts and dispositions, such is his God; so muchworth as a man has, so much and no more has his God. Consciousnessof God is self-consciousness, knowledge of God is self-knowledge. By hisGod thou knowest the man, and by the man his God; the two are identical.Whatever is God to a man, that is his heart and soul; and conversely, Godis the manifested inward nature, the expressed self of a man,—religion thesolemn unveiling of a man’s hidden treasures, the revelation of his intimatethoughts, the open confession of his love-secrets.

But when religion—consciousness of God—is designated as the self-consciousness of man, this is not to be understood as affirming that thereligious man is directly aware of this identity; for, on the contrary, igno-rance of it is fundamental to the peculiar nature of religion. To preclude thismisconception, it is better to say, religion is man’s earliest and also indirectform of self-knowledge. Hence, religion everywhere precedes philosophy, asin the history of the race, so also in that of the individual. Man first ofall sees his nature as if out of himself, before he finds it in himself. Hisown nature is in the first instance contemplated by him as that of anotherbeing. Religion is the childlike condition of humanity; but the child sees hisnature—man—out of himself; in childhood a man is an object to himself,under the form of another man. Hence the historical progress of religionconsists in this: that what by an earlier religion was regarded as objective, isnow recognised as subjective; that is, what was formerly contemplated andworshipped as God is now perceived to be something human. What was atfirst religion becomes at a later period idolatry; man is seen to have adoredhis own nature. Man has given objectivity to himself, but has not recog-nised the object as his own nature: a later religion takes this forward step;every advance in religion is therefore a deeper self-knowledge. But everyparticular religion, while it pronounces its predecessors idolatrous, exceptsitself—and necessarily so, otherwise it would no longer be religion—fromthe fate, the common nature of all religions: it imputes only to other re-

10Unusquisque vestrum non cogitat, prius se debere Deum nosse, quam colere.—M.Minucii Felicis Octavianus, c. 24.

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ligions what is the fault, if fault it be, of religion in general. Because ithas a different object, a different tenour, because it has transcended theideas of preceding religions, it erroneously supposes itself exalted above thenecessary eternal laws which constitute the essence of religion—it fanciesits object, its ideas, to be superhuman. But the essence of religion, thushidden from the religious, is evident to the thinker, by whom religion isviewed objectively, which it cannot be by its votaries. And it is our taskto show that the antithesis of divine and human is altogether illusory, thatit is nothing else than the antithesis between the human nature in general,and the human individual: that, consequently, the object and contents ofthe Christian religion are altogether human.

Religion, at least the Christian, is the relation of man to himself, or morecorrectly to his own nature (i.e., his subjective nature);11 but a relation toit, viewed as a nature apart from his own. The divine being is nothing elsethan the human being, or, rather the human nature purified, freed fromthe limits of the individual man, made objective—i.e., contemplated andrevered as another, a distinct being. All the attributes of the divine natureare, therefore, attributes of the human nature.12

In relation to the attributes, the predicates, of the Divine Being, this isadmitted without hesitation, but by no means in relation to the subject ofthese predicates. The negation of the subject is held to be irreligion, nay,atheism; though not so the negation of the predicates. But that which hasno predicates or qualities, has no effect upon me; that which has no effectupon me, has no existence for me. To deny all the qualities of a being isequivalent to denying the being himself. A being without qualities is onewhich cannot become an object to the mind; and such a being is virtuallynon-existent. Where man deprives God of all qualities, God is no longeranything more to him than a negative being. To the truly religious man,God is not a being without qualities, because to him he is a positive, realbeing. The theory that God cannot be defined, and consequently cannot

11The meaning of this parenthetic limitation will be clear in the sequel.12Les perfections de Dieu sont celles de nos ames, mais il les possede sans bornes—

il y a en nous quelque puissance, quelque connaissance, quelque bonte, mais elles sonttoutes entieres en Dieu.—Leibnitz, (Theod. Preface.) Nihil in anima esse putemuseximium, quod non etiam divinae naturae proprium sit—Quidquid a Deo alienum extradefinitionem animae.—S. Gregorius Nyss. Est ergo, ut videtur, disciplinarum omniumpulcherrima et maxima se ipsum nosse; si quis enim se ipsum norit, Deum cognoscet.—Clemens Alex. (Paed. 1, iii. c. 1.)

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be known by man, is therefore the offspring of recent times, a product ofmodern unbelief.

As reason is and can be pronounced finite only where man regards sen-sual enjoyment, or religious emotion, or aesthetic contemplation, or moralsentiment, as the absolute, the true; so the proposition that God is unknow-able or undefinable can only be enunciated and become fixed as a dogma,where this object has no longer any interest for the intellect; where the real,the positive, alone has any hold on man, where the real alone has for himthe significance of the essential, of the absolute, divine object, but whereat the same time, in contradiction with this purely worldly tendency, thereyet exist some old remains of religiousness. On the ground that God isunknowable, man excuses himself to what is yet remaining of his religiousconscience for his forgetfulness of God, his absorption in the world: hedenies God practically by his conduct,—the world has possession of all histhoughts and inclinations,—but he does not deny him theoretically, he doesnot attack his existence; he lets that rest. But this existence does not affector incommode him; it is a merely negative existence, an existence withoutexistence, a self-contradictory existence,—a state of being, which, as to itseffects, is not distinguishable from non-being. The denial of determinate,positive predicates concerning the divine nature, is nothing else than a de-nial of religion, with, however, an appearance of religion in its favour, sothat it is not recognised as a denial; it is simply a subtle, disguised atheism.The alleged religious horror of limiting God by positive predicates, is onlythe irreligious wish to know nothing more of God, to banish God from themind. Dread of limitation is dread of existence. All real existence, i.e., allexistence which is truly such, is qualitative, determinate existence. He whoearnestly believes in the Divine existence, is not shocked at the attributingeven of gross sensuous qualities to God. He who dreads an existence thatmay give offence, who shrinks from the grossness of a positive predicate,may as well renounce existence altogether. A God who is injured by deter-minate qualities has not the courage and the strength to exist. Qualities arethe fire, the vital breath, the oxygen, the salt of existence. An existence ingeneral, an existence without qualities, is an insipidity, an absurdity. Butthere can be no more in God, than is supplied by religion. Only where manloses his taste for religion, and thus religion itself becomes insipid, doesthe existence of God become an insipid existence—an existence withoutqualities.

There is, however, a still milder way of denying the Divine predicates

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than the direct one just described. It is admitted that the predicates of thedivine nature are finite, and, more particularly, human qualities, but theirrejection is rejected; they are even taken under protection, because it isnecessary to man to have a definite conception of God, and since he is man,he can form no other than a human conception of him. In relation to God,it is said, these predicates are certainly without any objective validity; butto me, if he is to exist for me, he cannot appear otherwise than as he doesappear to me, namely, as a being with attributes analogous to the human.But this distinction between what God is in himself, and what he is forme, destroys the peace of religion, and is besides in itself an unfoundedand untenable distinction. I cannot know whether God is something elsein himself or for himself, than he is for me; what he is to me, is to meall that he is. For me, there lies in these predicates under which he existsfor me, what he is in himself, his very nature; he is for me what he canalone ever be for me. The religious man finds perfect satisfaction in thatwhich God is in relation to himself; of any other relation he knows nothing,for God is to him what he can alone be to man. In the distinction abovestated, man takes a point of view above himself, i.e. above his nature, theabsolute measure of his being; but this transcendentalism is only an illusion;for I can make the distinction between the object as it is in itself, and theobject as it is for me, only where an object can really appear otherwiseto me, not where it appears to me such as the absolute measure of mynature determines it to appear—such as it must appear to me. It is truethat I may have a merely subjective conception, i.e. one which does notarise out of the general constitution of my species; but if my conception isdetermined by the constitution of my species, the distinction between whatan object is in itself, and what it is for me ceases; for this conception isitself an absolute one. The measure of the species is the absolute measure,law, and criterion of man. And, indeed, religion has the conviction that itsconceptions, its predicates of God, are such as every man ought to have, andmust have, if he would have the true ones—that they are the conceptionsnecessary to human nature; nay, further, that they are objectively true,representing God as he is. To every religion the gods of other religions areonly notions concerning God, but its own conception of God is to it Godhimself, the true God—God such as he is in himself. Religion is satisfiedonly with a complete Deity, a God without reservation; it will not have amere phantasm of God; it demands God himself. Religion gives up its ownexistence when it gives up the nature of God; it is no longer a truth, when it

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renounces the possession of the true God. Scepticism is the arch-enemy ofreligion; but the distinction between object and conception—between Godas he is in himself, and God as he is for me, is a sceptical distinction, andtherefore an irreligious one.

That which is to man the self-existent, the highest being, to which hecan conceive nothing higher—that is to him the Divine being. How thenshould he inquire concerning this being, what He is in himself? If God werean object to the bird, he would be a winged being: the bird knows nothinghigher, nothing more blissful, than the winged condition. How ludicrouswould it be if this bird pronounced: to me God appears as a bird, butwhat he is in himself I know not. To the bird the highest nature is thebird-nature; take from him the conception of this, and you take from himthe conception of the highest being. How, then, could he ask whether Godin himself were winged? To ask whether God is in himself what he is forme, is to ask whether God is God, is to lift oneself above one’s God, to riseup against him.

Wherever, therefore, this idea, that the religious predicates are onlyanthropomorphisms, has taken possession of a man, there has doubt, hasunbelief obtained the mastery of faith. And it is only the inconsequence offaint-heartedness and intellectual imbecility which does not proceed fromthis idea to the formal negation of the predicates, and from thence to thenegation of the subject to which they relate. If thou doubtest the objec-tive truth of the predicates, thou must also doubt the objective truth ofthe subject whose predicates they are. If thy predicates are anthropomor-phisms, the subject of them is an anthropomorphism too. If love, good-ness, personality, &c., are human attributes, so also is the subject whichthou pre-supposest, the existence of God, the belief that there is a God,an anthropomorphism—a pre-supposition purely human. Whence knowestthou that the belief in a God at all is not a limitation of man’s mode of con-ception? Higher beings—and thou supposest such—are perhaps so blest inthemselves, so at unity with themselves, that they are not hung in suspensebetween themselves and a yet higher being. To know God and not oneselfto be God, to know blessedness, and not oneself to enjoy it, is a state ofdisunity, of unhappiness. Higher beings know nothing of this unhappiness;they have no conception of that which they are not.

Thou believest in love as a divine attribute because thou thyself lovest;thou believest that God is a wise, benevolent being, because thou knowestnothing better in thyself than benevolence and wisdom; and thou believest

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that God exists, that therefore he is a subject—whatever exists is a subject,whether it be defined as substance, person, essence, or otherwise—becausethou thyself existest, art thyself a subject. Thou knowest no higher humangood, than to love, than to be good and wise; and even so thou knowestno higher happiness than to exist, to be a subject; for the consciousness ofall reality, of all bliss, is for thee bound up in the consciousness of being asubject, of existing. God is an existence, a subject to thee, for the samereason that he is to thee a wise, a blessed, a personal being. The distinctionbetween the divine predicates and the divine subject is only this, that tothee the subject, the existence, does not appear an anthropomorphism,because the conception of it is necessarily involved in thy own existence asa subject, whereas the predicates do appear anthropomorphisms, becausetheir necessity—the necessity that God should be conscious, wise, good,&c.—is not an immediate necessity, identical with the being of man, butis evolved by his self-consciousness, by the activity of his thought. I am asubject, I exist, whether I be wise or unwise, good or bad. To exist is to manthe first datum; it constitutes the very idea of the subject; it is presupposedby the predicates. Hence, man relinquishes the predicates, but the existenceof God is to him a settled, irrefragable, absolutely certain, objective truth.But, nevertheless, this distinction is merely an apparent one. The necessityof the subject lies only in the necessity of the predicate. Thou art a subjectonly in so far as thou art a human subject; the certainty and reality ofthy existence lie only in the certainty and reality of thy human attributes.What the subject is, lies only in the predicate; the predicate is the truthof the subject—the subject only the personified, existing predicate, thepredicate conceived as existing. Subject and predicate are distinguishedonly as existence and essence. The negation of the predicates is thereforethe negation of the subject. What remains of the human subject whenabstracted from the human attributes? Even in the language of commonlife the divine predicates—Providence, Omniscience, Omnipotence—are putfor the divine subject.

The certainty of the existence of God, of which it has been said that it isas certain, nay, more certain to man than his own existence, depends only onthe certainty of the qualities of God—it is in itself no immediate certainty.To the Christian the existence of the Christian God only is a certainty; tothe heathen that of the heathen God only. The heathen did not doubt theexistence of Jupiter, because he took no offence at the nature of Jupiter,because he could conceive of God under no other qualities, because to him

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these qualities were a certainty, a divine reality. The reality of the predicateis the sole guarantee of existence.

Whatever man conceives to be true, he immediately conceives to be real(that is, to have an objective existence), because, originally, only the realis true to him—true in opposition to what is merely conceived, dreamed,imagined. The idea of being, of existence, is the original idea of truth;or, originally, man makes truth dependent on existence, subsequently, ex-istence dependent on truth. Now God is the nature of man regarded asabsolute truth,—the truth of man; but God, or, what is the same thing,religion, is as various as are the conditions under which man conceives thishis nature, regards it as the highest being. These conditions, then, underwhich man conceives God, are to him the truth, and for that reason theyare also the highest existence, or rather they are existence itself; for onlythe emphatic, the highest existence, is existence, and deserves this name.Therefore, God is an existent, real being, on the very same ground thathe is a particular, definite being; for the qualities of God are nothing elsethan the essential qualities of man himself, and a particular man is whathe is, has his existence, his reality, only in his particular conditions. Takeaway from the Greek the quality of being Greek, and you take away hisexistence. On this ground, it is true that for a definite positive religion—that is, relatively—the certainty of the existence of God is immediate; forjust as involuntarily, as necessarily, as the Greek was a Greek, so neces-sarily were his gods Greek beings, so necessarily were they real, existentbeings. Religion is that conception of the nature of the world and of manwhich is essential to, i.e., identical with, a man’s nature. But man does notstand above this his necessary conception; on the contrary, it stands abovehim; it animates, determines, governs him. The necessity of a proof, of amiddle term to unite qualities with existence, the possibility of a doubt,is abolished. Only that which is apart from my own being is capable ofbeing doubted by me. How then can I doubt of God, who is my being?To doubt of God is to doubt of myself. Only when God is thought of ab-stractly, when his predicates are the result of philosophic abstraction, arisesthe distinction or separation between subject and predicate, existence andnature—arises the fiction that the existence or the subject is something elsethan the predicate, something immediate, indubitable, in distinction fromthe predicate, which is held to be doubtful. But this is only a fiction. AGod who has abstract predicates has also an abstract existence. Existence,being, varies with varying qualities.

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The identity of the subject and predicate is clearly evidenced by theprogressive development of religion, which is identical with the progressivedevelopment of human culture. So long as man is in a mere state of nature,so long is his god a mere nature-god—a personification of some naturalforce. Where man inhabits houses, he also encloses his gods in temples.The temple is only a manifestation of the value which man attaches tobeautiful buildings. Temples in honour of religion are in truth temples inhonour of architecture. With the emerging of man from a state of savageryand wildness to one of culture, with the distinction between what is fittingfor man and what is not fitting, arises simultaneously the distinction be-tween that which is fitting and that which is not fitting for God. God isthe idea of majesty, of the highest dignity: the religious sentiment is thesentiment of supreme fitness. The later more cultured artists of Greecewere the first to embody in the statues of the gods the ideas of dignity,of spiritual grandeur, of imperturbable repose and serenity. But why werethese qualities in their view attributes, predicates of God? Because theywere in themselves regarded by the Greeks as divinities. Why did thoseartists exclude all disgusting and low passions? Because they perceivedthem to be unbecoming, unworthy, unhuman, and consequently ungodlike.The Homeric gods eat and drink;—that implies: eating and drinking is adivine pleasure. Physical strength is an attribute of the Homeric gods: Zeusis the strongest of the gods. Why? Because physical strength, in and byitself, was regarded as something glorious, divine. To the ancient Germansthe highest virtues were those of the warrior; therefore, their supreme godwas the god of war, Odin,—war, “the original or oldest law.” Not the at-tribute of the divinity, but the divineness or deity of the attribute, is thefirst true Divine Being. Thus what theology and philosophy have held tobe God, the Absolute, the Infinite, is not God; but that which they haveheld not to be God, is God: namely, the attribute, the quality, whateverhas reality. Hence, he alone is the true atheist to whom the predicates ofthe Divine Being,—for example, love, wisdom, justice, are nothing; not heto whom merely the subject of these predicates is nothing. And in no wiseis the negation of the subject necessarily also a negation of the predicatesconsidered in themselves. These have an intrinsic, independent reality; theyforce their recognition upon man by their very nature; they are self-evidenttruths to him; they prove, they attest themselves. It does not follow thatgoodness, justice, wisdom, are chimaeras, because the existence of God is achimaera, nor truths because this is a truth. The idea of God is dependent

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on the idea of justice, of benevolence; a God who is not benevolent, notjust, not wise, is no God; but the converse does not hold. The fact is notthat a quality is divine because God has it, but that God has it becauseit is in itself divine: because without it God would be a defective being.Justice, wisdom, in general every quality which constitutes the divinity ofGod, is determined and known by itself, independently, but the idea of Godis determined by the qualities which have thus been previously judged tobe worthy of the divine nature; only in the case in which I identify Godand justice, in which I think of God immediately as the reality of the ideaof justice, is the idea of God self-determined. But if God as a subject isthe determined, while the quality, the predicate is the determining, then intruth the rank of the godhead is due not to the subject, but to the predicate.

Not until several, and those contradictory, attributes are united in onebeing, and this being is conceived as personal—the personality being thusbrought into especial prominence—not until then is the origin of religionlost sight of, is it forgotten that what the activity of the reflective power hasconverted into a predicate distinguishable or separable from the subject, wasoriginally the true subject. Thus the Greeks and Romans deified accidentsas substances: virtues, states of mind, passions, as independent beings.Man, especially the religious man, is to himself the measure of all things,of all reality. Whatever strongly impresses a man, whatever produces anunusual effect on his mind, if it be only a peculiar, inexplicable sound ornote, he personifies as a divine being. Religion embraces all the objectsof the world; everything existing has been an object of religious reverence;in the nature and consciousness of religion there is nothing else than whatlies in the nature of man and in his consciousness of himself and of theworld. Religion has no material exclusively its own. In Rome even thepassions of fear and terror had their temples. The Christians also mademental phenomena into independent beings, their own feelings into qualitiesof things, the passions which governed them into powers which governedthe world, in short, predicates of their own nature, whether recognizedas such or not, into independent subjective existences. Devils, cobolds,witches, ghosts, angels, were sacred truths as long as the religious spiritheld undivided sway over mankind.

In order to banish from the mind the identity of the divine and humanpredicates, and the consequent identity of the divine and human nature,recourse is had to the idea that God, as the absolute, real Being, has aninfinite fulness of various predicates, of which we here know only a part,

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and those such as are analogous to our own; while the rest, by virtue ofwhich God must thus have quite a different nature from the human or thatwhich is analogous to the human, we shall only know in the future—thatis, after death. But an infinite plenitude or multitude of predicates whichare really different, so different that the one does not immediately involvethe other, is realized only in an infinite plenitude or multitude of differentbeings or individuals. Thus the human nature presents an infinite abun-dance of different predicates, and for that very reason it presents an infiniteabundance of different individuals. Each new man is a new predicate, anew phasis of humanity. As many as are the men, so many are the powers,the properties of humanity. It is true that there are the same elements inevery individual, but under such various conditions and modifications thatthey appear new and peculiar. The mystery of the inexhaustible fulness ofthe divine predicates is therefore nothing else than the mystery of humannature considered as an infinitely varied, infinitely modifiable, but, conse-quently, phenomenal being. Only in the realm of the senses, only in spaceand time, does there exist a being of really infinite qualities or predicates.Where there are really different predicates, there are different times. Oneman is a distinguished musician, a distinguished author, a distinguishedphysician; but he cannot compose music, write books, and perform curesin the same moment of time. Time, and not the Hegelian dialectic, is themedium of uniting opposites, contradictories, in one and the same subject.But distinguished and detached from the nature of man, and combined withthe idea of God, the infinite fulness of various predicates is a conceptionwithout reality, a mere phantasy, a conception derived from the sensibleworld, but without the essential conditions, without the truth of sensibleexistence, a conception which stands in direct contradiction with the DivineBeing considered as a spiritual, i.e., an abstract, simple, single being; forthe predicates of God are precisely of this character, that one involves allthe others, because there is no real difference between them. If, therefore,in the present predicates I have not the future, in the present God not thefuture God, then the future God is not the present, but they are two dis-tinct beings.13 But this distinction is in contradiction with the unity and

13For religious faith there is no other distinction between the present and future Godthan that the former is an object of faith, of conception, of imagination, while the latteris to be an object of immediate, that is, personal, sensible perception. In this life, andin the next, he is the same God; but in the one lie is incomprehensible, in the other,comprehensible.

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simplicity of the theological God. Why is a given predicate a predicateof God? Because it is divine in its nature; i.e., because it expresses nolimitation, no defect. Why are other predicates applied to Him? Because,however various in themselves, they agree in this, that they all alike expressperfection, unlimitedness. Hence I can conceive innumerable predicates ofGod, because they must all agree with the abstract idea of the Godhead,and must have in common that which constitutes every single predicatea divine attribute. Thus it is in the system of Spinoza. He speaks of aninfinite number of attributes of the divine substance, but he specifies noneexcept Thought and Extension. Why? because it is a matter of indifferenceto know them; nay, because they are in themselves indifferent, superfluous:for with all these innumerable predicates, I yet always mean to say thesame thing as when I speak of thought and extension. Why is Thought anattribute of substance? Because, according to Spinoza, it is capable of be-ing conceived by itself, because it expresses something indivisible, perfect,infinite. Why Extension or Matter? For the same reason. Thus, substancecan have an indefinite number of predicates, because it is not their spe-cific definition, their difference, but their identity, their equivalence, whichmakes them attributes of substance. Or rather, substance has innumerablepredicates only because (how strange!) it has properly no predicate; thatis, no definite, real predicate. The indefinite unity which is the product ofthought, completes itself by the indefinite multiplicity which is the productof the imagination. Because the predicate is not multum, it is multa. Intruth, the positive predicates are Thought and Extension. In these two, in-finitely more is said than in the nameless innumerable predicates; for theyexpress something definite, in them I have something. But substance is tooindifferent, too apathetic, to be something ; that is, to have qualities andpassions; that it may not be something, it is rather nothing.

Now, when it is shown that what the subject is, lies entirely in theattributes of the subject; that is, that the predicate is the true subject;it is also proved that if the divine predicates are attributes of the humannature, the subject of those predicates is also of the human nature. But thedivine predicates are partly general, partly personal. The general predicatesare the metaphysical, but these serve only as external points of support toreligion; they are not the characteristic definitions of religion. It is thepersonal predicates alone which constitute the essence of religion—in whichthe Divine Being is the object of religion. Such are, for example, that Godis a Person, that he is the moral Law-giver, the Father of mankind, the

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Holy One, the Just, the Good, the Merciful. It is however at once clear,or it will at least be clear in the sequel, with regard to these and otherdefinitions, that, especially as applied to a personality, they are purelyhuman definitions, and that consequently man in religion—in his relationto God—is in relation to his own nature; for to the religious sentimentthese predicates are not mere conceptions, mere images, which man formsof God, to be distinguished from that which God is in himself, but truths,facts, realities. Religion knows nothing of anthropomorphisms; to it theyare not anthropomorphisms. It is the very essence of religion, that to itthese definitions express the nature of God. They are pronounced to beimages only by the understanding, which reflects on religion, and whichwhile defending them yet before its own tribunal denies them. But to thereligious sentiment God is a real Father, real Love and Mercy; for to ithe is a real, living, personal being, and therefore his attributes are alsoliving and personal. Nay, the definitions which are the most sufficing tothe religious sentiment, are precisely those which give the most offence tothe understanding, and which in the process of reflection on religion itdenies. Religion is essentially emotion; hence, objectively also, emotion isto it necessarily of a divine nature. Even anger appears to it an emotionnot unworthy of God, provided only there be a religious motive at thefoundation of this anger.

But here it is also essential to observe, and this phenomenon is an ex-tremely remarkable one, characterising the very core of religion, that inproportion as the divine subject is in reality human, the greater is the ap-parent difference between God and man; that is, the more, by reflectionon religion, by theology, is the identity of the divine and human denied,and the human, considered as such, is depreciated.14 The reason of this is,that as what is positive in the conception of the divine being can only behuman, the conception of man, as an object of consciousness can only benegative. To enrich God, man must become poor; that God may be all,man must be nothing. But he desires to be nothing in himself, becausewhat he takes from himself is not lost to him, since it is preserved in God.

14Inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitude notari, quin inter eosmajor sit dissimilitude notanda.—Later. Conc. can. 2. (Summa Omn. Conc. Carranza.Antw. 1559. p. 326.) The last distinction between man and God, between the finite andinfinite nature, to which the religious speculative imagination soars, is the distinctionbetween Something and Nothing, Ens and Non-Ens; for only in Nothing is all communitywith other beings abolished.

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Man has his being in God; why then should he have it in himself? Whereis the necessity of positing the same thing twice, of having it twice? Whatman withdraws from himself, what he renounces in himself, he only enjoysin an incomparably higher and fuller measure in God.

The monks made a vow of chastity to God; they mortified the sexualpassion in themselves, but therefore they had in Heaven, in the VirginMary, the image of woman—an image of love. They could the more easilydispense with real woman, in proportion as an ideal woman was an objectof love to them. The greater the importance they attached to the denialof sensuality, the greater the importance of the Heavenly Virgin for them:she was to them in the place of Christ, in the stead of God. The morethe sensual tendencies are renounced, the more sensual is the God to whomthey are sacrificed. For whatever is made an offering to God has an especialvalue attached to it; in it God is supposed to have especial pleasure. Thatwhich is the highest in the estimation of man, is naturally the highest in theestimation of his God—what pleases man, pleases God also. The Hebrewsdid not offer to Jehovah unclean, ill-conditioned animals; on the contrary,those which they most highly prized, which they themselves ate, were alsothe food of God (cibus Dei, Levit. iii. 2.) Wherever, therefore, the denialof the sensual delights is made a special offering, a sacrifice well-pleasing toGod, there the highest value is attached to the senses, and the sensualitywhich has been renounced is unconsciously restored, in the fact that Godtakes the place of the material delights which have been renounced. The nunweds herself to God; she has a heavenly bridegroom, the monk a heavenlybride. But the heavenly virgin is only a sensible presentation of a generaltruth, having relation to the essence of religion. Man denies as to himselfonly what he attributes to God. Religion abstracts from man, from theworld; but it can only abstract from the limitations, from the phenomena,in short, from the negative, not from the essence, the positive, of the worldand humanity: hence, in the very abstraction and negation it must recoverthat from which it abstracts, or believes itself to abstract. And thus, inreality, whatever religion consciously denies—always supposing that whatis denied by it is something essential, true, and consequently incapable ofbeing ultimately denied—it unconsciously restores in God. Thus, in religionman denies his reason; of himself he knows nothing of God, his thoughts areonly worldly, earthly; he can only believe what God reveals to him. But onthis account the thoughts of God are human, earthly thoughts: like man,He has plans in His mind, he accommodates himself to circumstances and

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grades of intelligence, like a tutor with his pupils; he calculates closely theeffect of his gifts and revelations; he observes man in all his doings; he knowsall things, even the most earthly, the commonest, the most trivial. In brief,man in relation to God denies his own knowledge, his own thoughts, thathe may place them in God. Man gives up his personality; but in return,God, the Almighty, infinite, unlimited being, is a person; he denies humandignity, the human ego; but in return God is to him a selfish, egoisticalbeing, who in all things seeks only Himself, his own honour, his own ends;he represents God as simply seeking the satisfaction of his own selfishness,while yet He frowns on that of every other being; his God is the very luxuryof egoism.15 Religion further denies goodness as a quality of human nature;man is wicked, corrupt, incapable of good; but on the other hand, God isonly good—the Good Being. Man’s nature demands as an object goodness,personified as God; but is it not hereby declared that goodness is an essentialtendency of man? If my heart is wicked, my understanding perverted, howcan I perceive and feel the holy to be holy, the good to be good? CouldI perceive the beauty of a fine picture, if my mind were aesthetically anabsolute piece of perversion? Though I may not be a painter, though Imay not have the power of producing what is beautiful myself, I mustyet have aesthetic feeling, aesthetic comprehension, since I perceive thebeauty that is presented to me externally. Either goodness does not existat all for man, or, if it does exist, therein is revealed to the individualman the holiness and goodness of human nature. That which is absolutelyopposed to my nature, to which I am united by no bond of sympathy, isnot even conceivable or perceptible by me. The Holy is in opposition tome only as regards the modifications of my personality, but as regards myfundamental nature it is in unity with me. The Holy is a reproach to mysinfulness; in it I recognise myself as a sinner; but in so doing, while Iblame myself, I acknowledge what I am not, but ought to be, and what,for that very reason, I, according to my destination, can be; for an “ought”which has no corresponding capability, does not affect me, is a ludicrouschimaera without any true relation to my mental constitution. But whenI acknowledge goodness as my destination, as my law, I acknowledge it,whether consciously or unconsciously, as my own nature. Another nature

15Gloriam suam plus amat Deus quam omnes creaturas. “God can only love himself,can only think of himself, can only work for himself. In creating man, God seeks hisown ends, his own glory,” &c.—Vid. P. Bayle. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philos.u. Menschh. p. 104-107.

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than my own, one different in quality, cannot touch me. I can perceive sin assin, only when I perceive it to be a contradiction of myself with myself—thatis, of my personality with my fundamental nature. As a contradiction ofthe absolute, considered as another being, the feeling of sin is inexplicable,unmeaning.

The distinction between Augustinianism and Pelagianism consists onlyin this, that the former expresses after the manner of religion what thelatter expresses after the manner of rationalism. Both say the same thing,both vindicate the goodness of man; but Pelagianism does it directly, in arationalistic and moral form, Augustinianism indirectly, in a mystical, thatis, a religious form.16 For that which is given to man’s God, is in truthgiven to man himself; what a man declares concerning God, he in truthdeclares concerning himself. Augustinianism would be a truth, and a truthopposed to Pelagianism, only if man had the devil for his God, and with theconsciousness that he was the devil, honoured, reverenced, and worshippedhim as the highest being. But so long as man adores a good being as hisGod, so long does he contemplate in God the goodness of his own nature.

As with the doctrine of the radical corruption of human nature, so is itwith the identical doctrine, that man can do nothing good, i.e., in truth,nothing of himself—by his own strength. For the denial of human strengthand spontaneous moral activity to be true, the moral activity of God mustalso be denied; and we must say, with the oriental nihilist or pantheist:the Divine being is absolutely without will or action, indifferent, knowingnothing of the discrimination between evil and good. But he who definesGod as an active being, and not only so, but as morally active and morallycritical,—as a being who loves, works, and rewards good, punishes, rejects,and condemns evil,—he who thus defines God, only in appearance denieshuman activity, in fact making it the highest, the most real activity. He

16Pelagianism denies God, religion—isti tantam tribuunt potestatem voluntati, utpietati auferant orationem. (Augustin de Nat. et Grat. cont. Pelagium, c, 58.) It hasonly the Creator, i.e., Nature, as a basis, not the Saviour, the true God of the religioussentiment—in a word, it denies God; but, as a consequence of this, it elevates man intoa God, since it makes him a being not needing God, self-sufficing, independent. (Seeon this subject Luther against Erasmus and Augustine, 1. c. c. 33.) Augustinianismdenies man; but, as a consequence of this, it reduces God to the level of man, even to theignominy of the cross, for the sake of man. The former puts man in the place of God,the latter puts God in the place of man; both lead to the same result—the distinctionis only apparent, a pious illusion. Augustinianism is only an inverted Pelagianism; whatto the latter is a subject, is to the former an object.

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who makes God act humanly, declares human activity to be divine; he says:a god who is not active, and not morally or humanly active, is no god; andthus he makes the idea of the Godhead dependent on the idea of activity,that is, of human activity, for a higher he knows not.

Man—this is the mystery of religion—projects his being into objectiv-ity,17 and then again makes himself an object to this projected image ofhimself thus converted into a subject; he thinks of himself, is an object tohimself, but as the object of an object, of another being than himself. Thushere. Man is an object to God. That man is good or evil is not indifferentto God; no! He has a lively, profound interest in man’s being good; he willsthat man should be good, happy—for without goodness there is no happi-ness. Thus the religious man virtually retracts the nothingness of humanactivity, by making his dispositions and actions an object to God, by mak-ing man the end of God—for that which is an object to the mind is an endin action; by making the divine activity a means of human salvation. Godacts, that man may be good and happy. Thus man, while he is apparentlyhumiliated to the lowest degree, is in truth exalted to the highest. Thus,in and through God, man has in view himself alone. It is true that manplaces the aim of his action in God, but God has no other aim of actionthan the moral and eternal salvation of man: thus man has in fact no otheraim than himself. The divine activity is not distinct from the human.

How could the divine activity work on me as its object, nay, work inme, if it were essentially different from me; how could it have a humanaim, the aim of ameliorating and blessing man, if it were not itself human?Does not the purpose determine the nature of the act? When man makeshis moral improvement an aim to himself, he has divine resolutions, divineprojects; but also, when God seeks the salvation of man, He has humanends and a human mode of activity, corresponding to these ends. Thus inGod man has only his own activity as an object. But, for the very reasonthat he regards his own activity as objective, goodness only as an object,he necessarily receives the impulse, the motive, not from himself, but fromthis object. He contemplates his nature as external to himself, and thisnature as goodness; thus it is self-evident, it is mere tautology to say, that

17The religious, the original mode in which man becomes objective to himself, is (asis clearly enough explained in this work) to be distinguished from the mode in whichthis occurs in reflection and speculation; the latter is voluntary, the former involuntary,necessary—as necessary as art, as speech. With the progress of time, it is true, theologycoincides with religion.

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the impulse to good comes only from thence where he places the good.God is the highest subjectivity of man abstracted from himself; hence

man can do nothing of himself, all goodness comes from God. The moresubjective God is, the more completely does man divest himself of his sub-jectivity, because God is, per se, his relinquished self, the possession ofwhich he however again vindicates to himself. As the action of the arteriesdrives the blood into the extremities, and the action of the veins brings itback again, as life in general consists in a perpetual systole and diastole; sois it in religion. In the religious systole man propels his own nature fromhimself, he throws himself outward; in the religious diastole he receives therejected nature into his heart again. God alone is the being who acts ofhimself,—this is the force of repulsion in religion; God is the being whoacts in me, with me, through me, upon me, for me, is the principle of mysalvation, of my good dispositions and actions, consequently my own goodprinciple and nature,—this is the force of attraction in religion.

The course of religious development which has been generally indicated,consists specifically in this, that man abstracts more and more from God,and attributes more and more to himself. This is especially apparent inthe belief in revelation. That which to a later age or a cultured peopleis given by nature or reason, is to an earlier age, or to a yet unculturedpeople, given by God. Every tendency of man, however natural—even theimpulse to cleanliness, was conceived by the Israelites as a positive divineordinance. From this example we again see that God is lowered, is con-ceived more entirely on the type of ordinary humanity, in proportion asman detracts from himself. How can the self-humiliation of man go fur-ther than when he disclaims the capability of fulfilling spontaneously therequirements of common decency?18 The Christian religion, on the otherhand, distinguished the impulses and passions of man according to theirquality, their character; it represented only good emotions, good disposi-tions, good thoughts, as revelations, operations—that is, as dispositions,feelings, thoughts,—of God; for what God reveals is a quality of God him-self: that of which the heart is full, overflows the lips, as is the effect suchis the cause, as the revelation, such the being who reveals himself. A Godwho reveals himself in good dispositions is a God whose essential attributeis only moral perfection. The Christian religion distinguishes inward moral

18Deut. xxiii. 12, 13.

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purity from external physical purity; the Israelites identified the two.19 Inrelation to the Israelitish religion, the Christian religion is one of criticismand freedom. The Israelite trusted himself to do nothing except what wascommanded by God; he was without will even in external things; the au-thority of religion extended itself even to his food. The Christian religion,on the other hand, in all these external things, made man dependent onhimself, i.e., placed in man what the Israelite placed out of himself, in God.Israel is the most complete presentation of positivism in religion. In rela-tion to the Israelite, the Christian is an esprit fort, a free-thinker. Thus dothings change. What yesterday was still religion, is no longer such to-day;and what to-day is atheism, to-morrow will be religion.

19See, for example, Gen. xxxv. 2; Levit. xi. 44; xx. 26; and the Commentary of LeClerc on these passages.

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Part I: The True or Anthropological Essence of Religion

chapter ii. god as being of understanding

Religion is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before himas the antithesis of himself God is not what man is—man is not what Godis. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect;God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful.God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of allrealities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.

But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it mustbe shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with whichreligion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.

The inherent necessity of this proof is at once apparent from this, – thatif the divine nature, which is the object of religion, were really different fromthe nature of man, a division, a disunion could not take place. If God isreally a different being from myself, why should his perfection trouble me?Disunion exists only between beings who are at variance, but who oughtto be one, who can be one, and who consequently in nature, in truth, areone. On this general ground, then, the nature with which man feels himselfin disunion must be inborn, immanent in himself, but at the same time itmust be of a different character from that nature or power which gives himthe feeling, the consciousness of reconciliation, of union with God, or, whatis the same thing with himself.

This nature is nothing else than the intelligence—the reason or the un-derstanding God as the antithesis of man, as a being not human, i.e., notpersonally human, is the objective nature of the understanding. The pure,perfect divine nature is the self-consciousness of the understanding, theconsciousness which the understanding has of its own perfection. The un-derstanding knows nothing of the sufferings of the heart; it has no desires,no passions, no wants, and, for that reason, no deficiencies and weaknesses,as the heart has. Men in whom the intellect predominates, who, with one-sided but all the more characteristic definiteness, embody and personify forus the nature of the understanding are free from the anguish of the heart,from the passions, the excesses of the man who has strong emotions; theyare not passionately interested in any finite, i.e., particular object; they donot give themselves in pledge; they are free. “To want nothing and by thisfreedom from wants to become like the immortal gods;”—“not to subject

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ourselves to things, but things to us;”—“all is vanity;” – these and similarsayings are the mottoes of the men who are governed by abstract under-standing. The understanding is that part of our nature which is neutral,impassible, not to bribed, not subject to illusions – the pure, passionlesslight of the intelligence. It is the categorical, impartial consciousness ofthe fact as fact, because it is itself of an objective nature. It is the con-sciousness of the uncontradictory, because it is itself the uncontradictoryunity, the source of logical identity. It is the consciousness of law, necessity,rule, measure, because it is itself the activity of law, the necessity of thenature of things under the form of spontaneous activity, the rule of rules,the absolute measure, the measure of measures. Only by the understand-ing can man judge and act in contradiction with his dearest human, thatis, personal feelings, when the God of the understanding,—law, necessity,right,—commands it. The father who, as a judge, condemns his own sonto death because he knows him to be guilty, can do this only as a ratio-nal, not as an emotional being The understanding shows us the faults andweaknesses even of our beloved ones; it shows us even our own. It is forthis reason that it so often throws us into painful collision with ourselves,with our own hearts. We do not like to give reason the upper hand: we aretoo tender to ourselves to carry out the true, but hard, relentless verdictof the understanding. The understanding is the power which has relationto species: the heart represents particular circumstances, individuals,—theunderstanding, general circumstances, universals; it is the superhuman, i.e.,the impersonal power in man. Only by and in the understanding has manthe power of abstraction from himself, from his subjective being,—of exalt-ing himself to general ideas and relations, of distinguishing the object fromthe impressions which it produces on his feelings, of regarding it in andby itself without reference to human personality. Philosophy, mathematics,astronomy, physics, in short, science in general, is the practical proof, be-cause it is the product of this truly infinite and divine activity. Religiousanthropomorphisms, therefore, are in contradiction with the understand-ing; it repudiates their application to God; it denies them. But this God,free from anthropomorphisms, impartial, passionless, is nothing else thanthe nature of the understanding itself regarded as objective.

God as God, that is, as a being not finite, not human, not materi-ally conditioned, not phenomenal, is only an object of thought. He is theincorporeal, formless, incomprehensible—the abstract, negative being: heis known, i.e., becomes an object, only by abstraction and negation (via

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negationis). Why? Because he is nothing but the objective nature of thethinking power, or in general of the power or activity, name it what youwill, whereby man is conscious of reason, of mind, of intelligence. There isno other spirit, that is (for the idea of spirit is simply the idea of thought,of intelligence, of understanding, every other spirit being a spectre of theimagination), no other intelligence which man can believe in or conceivethan that intelligence which enlightens him, which is active in him. Hecan do nothing more than separate the intelligence from the limitations ofhis own individuality. The “infinite spirit,” in distinction from the finite,is therefore nothing else than the intelligence disengaged from the limitsof individuality and corporeality,—for individuality and corporeality areinseparable,—intelligence posited in and by itself. God, said the schoolmen,the Christian fathers, and long before them the heathen philosophers,—Godis immaterial essence, intelligence, spirit, pure understanding. Of God asGod no image can be made; but canst thou frame an image of mind? Hasmind a form? Is not its activity the most inexplicable, the most incapableof representation? God is incomprehensible; but knowest thou the natureof the intelligence? Hast thou searched out the mysterious operation Ofthought, the hidden nature of self-consciousness? Is not self-consciousnessthe enigma of enigmas? Did not the old mystics, schoolmen. and fathers,long ago compare the incomprehensibility of the divine nature with that ofthe human intelligence, and thus, in truth, identify the nature of God withthe nature of man?20 God as God—as a purely thinkable being an object ofthe intellect—is thus nothing else than the reason in its utmost intensifica-tion become objective to itself. It is asked what is the understanding or thereason? The answer is found in the idea of God. Everything must expressitself, reveal itself, make itself objective, affirm itself. God is the reasonexpressing affirming itself as the highest existence. To the imagination, thereason is the revelation of God; but to the reason, God is the revelation ofthe reason; since what reason is, what it can do, is first made objective inGod. God is a need of the intelligence, a necessary thought—the highest

20Augustine, in his work Contra Academicos, which he wrote when he was still insome measure a heathen, says (1. iii. c. 12) that the highest good of man consists in themind, or in the reason. On the other hand, in his Libr. Retractationum, which he wroteas a distinguished Christian and theologian, he revises (1. i. c. 1) this declaration asfollows:—Verius dixissem in Deo. Ipso enim mens fruitur, ut beata sit, tanquam summobono suo. But is there any distinction here? Where my highest good is, is not there mynature also?

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decree of the thinking power. “The reason cannot rest in sensuous things;”it can find contentment only when it penetrates to the highest, first neces-sary being which can be an object to the reason alone. Why? Because withthe conception of this being it first completes itself, because only in the ideaof the highest nature is the highest nature of reason existent, the higheststep of the thinking power attained: and it is a general truth, that we feela blank, a void, a want in ourselves, and are consequently unhappy andunsatisfied, so long as we have not come to the last decree of a power, tothat quo nihil majus cogitari potest,—so long as we cannot bring our inborncapacity for this or that art, this or that science, to the utmost proficiency.For only in the highest proficiency is art truly art; only in its highest degreeis thought truly thought, reason. Only when thy thought is God dost thoutruly think, rigorously speaking; for only God is the realised, consummate,exhausted thinking power. Thus in conceiving God, man first conceivesreason as it truly is, though by means of the imagination he conceives thisdivine nature as distinct from reason, because as a being affected by ex-ternal things he is accustomed always to distinguish the object from theconception of it. And here he applies the same process to the conceptionof the reason, thus for an existence in reason, in thought, substituting anexistence in space and time, from which he had, nevertheless, previouslyabstracted it. God, as a metaphysical being is the intelligence satisfied initself, or rather, conversely, the intelligence, satisfied in itself, thinking itselfas the absolute being is God as a metaphysical being. Hence all metaphys-ical predicates of God are real predicates only when they are recognised isbelonging to thought, to intelligence, to the understanding.

The understanding is that which conditionates and co-ordinates all things,that which places all things in reciprocal dependence and connection, be-cause it is itself immediate and unconditioned; it inquires for the cause ofall things, because it has its own ground and end in itself. Only that whichitself is nothing deduced, nothing derived, can deduce and construct, canregard all besides itself as derived ; just as only that which exists for itsown sake can view and treat other things as means and instruments. Theunderstanding is thus the original, primitive being. The understanding de-rives all things from God as the first cause. it finds the world, without ,inintelligent cause, given over to senseless, aimless chance; that is, it findsonly in itself, in its own nature ’ the efficient and the final cause of theworld—the existence of the world is only then clear and comprehensiblewhen it sees the explanation of that existence in the source of all clear and

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intelligible ideas, i.e., in itself. The being that works with design towardscertain ends, i.e., with understanding, is alone the being that to the under-standing has immediate certitude, self-evidence. Hence that which of itselfhas no designs, no purpose, must have the cause of its existence in the de-sign of another, and that an intelligent being. And thus the understandingposits its own nature as the causal, first, premundane existence—i.e., beingin rank the first but in time the last, it makes itself the first in time also.

The understanding is to itself the criterion of all reality. That whichis opposed to the understanding that which is self-contradictory, is noth-ing; that which contradicts reason contradicts God. For example, it is acontradiction of reason to connect with the idea of the highest reality thelimitations of definite time and place; and hence reason denies these of Godas contradicting his nature. The reason can only believe in a God who isaccordant with its own nature, in a God who is not beneath its own dignity,who, on the contrary, is a realisation of its own nature: i.e., the reason be-lieves only in itself, in the absolute reality of its own nature. The reason isnot dependent on God, but God on the reason. Even in the age of miraclesand faith in authority, the understanding constitutes itself, at least formally,the criterion of divinity. God is all and can do all, it was said, by virtueof his omnipotence; but nevertheless he is nothing and he can do nothingwhich contradicts himself, i.e., reason. Even omnipotence cannot do whatis contrary to reason. Thus above the divine omnipotence stands the higherpower of reason; above the nature of God the nature of the understandingas the criterion of that which is to be affirmed and denied of God, the cri-terion of the positive and negative. Canst thou believe in a God who is anunreasonable and wicked being? No, indeed; but why not? Because it is incontradiction with thy understanding to accept a wicked and unreasonablebeing as divine. What then dost thou affirm, what is an object to thee, inGod? Thy own understanding. God is thy highest idea, the supreme effortof thy understanding thy highest power of thought. God is the sum of allrealities, ie., the sum of all affirmations of the understanding. That which Irecognise in the understanding as essential I place in God as existent: Godis what the understanding thinks as the highest. But in what I perceive tobe essential is revealed the nature of my understanding is shown the powerof my thinking faculty.

Thus the understanding is the ens realissimum, the most real being ofthe old onto-theology. “Fundamentally,” says onto-theology we cannot con-ceive God otherwise than by attributing to him without limit all the real

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qualities which we find in ourselves.”21 Our positive, essential qualities, ourrealities, are therefore the realities of God, but in us they exist with, inGod without, limits. But what then withdraws the limits from the reali-ties, what does away with the limits? The understanding What, accordingto this, is the nature conceived without limits, but the nature of the un-derstanding releasing abstracting itself from all limits? As thou thinkestGod, such is thy thought;—the measure of thy God is the measure of thyunderstanding. If thou conceivest God as limited, thy understanding is lim-ited; if thou conceivest God as unlimited, thy understanding is unlimitedIf, for example, thou conceivest God as a corporeal being, corporeality isthe boundary, the limit of thy understanding; thou canst conceive nothingwithout a body. If, on the contrary, thou deniest corporeality of God, thisis a corroboration and proof of the freedom of thy understanding from thelimitation of corporeality. In the unlimited divine nature thou representestonly thy unlimited understanding. And when thou declarest this unlimitedbeing the ultimate essence, the highest being, thou sayest in reality nothingelse than this: the etre supreme, the highest being is the understanding.

The understanding is further the self-subsistent and independent being.That which has no understanding is not self-subsistent, is dependent. Aman without understanding is a man without will. He who has no under-standing, allows himself to be deceived, imposed upon, used as an instru-ment by others. How shall he whose understanding is the tool of anotherhave an independent will? Only he who thinks is free and independent.It is only by the understanding that man reduces the things around andbeneath him to mere means of his own existence. In general, that only isself-subsistent and independent which is an end to itself, an object to itself.That which is an end and object to itself is for that very reason—in so faras it is an object to itself—no longer a means and object for another being.To be without understanding is, in one word, to exist for another,—to be anobject: to have understanding is to exist for oneself—to be a subject. Butthat which no longer exists for another, but for itself, rejects all dependenceon another being. It is true we, as physical beings, depend on the beingsexternal to us, even as to the modifications of thought; but in so far as wethink, in the activity of the understanding as such, we are dependent on noother being. Activity of thought is spontaneous activity. “When I think, Iam conscious that my ego in me thinks, and not some other thing. I con-

21Kant, Vorlesungen uber die philosophische Religionslehre. Leipzig, 1817, p. 39.

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clude, therefore, that this thinking in me does not inhere in another thingoutside of me, but in myself, consequently that I am a substance, i.e., thatI exist by myself, without being a predicate of another being.”22 Althoughwe always need the air, yet as natural philosophers we convert the air froman object of our physical need into an object of the self-sufficing activity ofthought, i.e., into a mere thing for us. In breathing I am the object of theair, the air the subject; but when I make the air an object of thought, ofinvestigation, when I analyse it, I reverse this relation,—I make myself thesubject, the air an object. But that which is the object of another beingis dependent. Thus the plant is dependent on air and light, that is, it isan object for air, and light, not for itself. It is true that air and light arereciprocally an object for the plant. Physical life in general is nothing elsethan this perpetual interchange of the objective and subjective relation.We consume the air and are consumed by it; we enjoy and are enjoyed.The understanding alone enjoys all things without being itself enjoyed; it isthe self-enjoying, self-sufficing existence—the absolute subject—the subjectwhich cannot be reduced to the object of another being, because it makesall things objects, predicates of itself,—which comprehends all things initself, because it is itself not a thing, because it is free from all things.

That is dependent the possibility of whose existence lies out of itself ;that is independent which has the possibility of its existence in itself. Lifetherefore involves the contradiction of an existence at once dependent andindependent, the contradiction that its possibility lies both in itself and outof itself. The understanding alone is free from this and other contradictionsof life ; it is the essence perfectly self-subsistent, perfectly at one with itself,perfectly self-existent.23 Thinking is existence in self; life, as differencedfrom thought, existence out of self : life is to give from oneself ; thought isto take into oneself. Existence out of self is the world; existence in self isGod. To think is to be God. The act of thought, as such, is the freedom ofthe immortal gods from all external limitations and necessities of life.

The unity of the understanding is the unity of God. To the under-standing the consciousness of its unity and universality is essential ; the

22Kant, loc. cit., p. 80.23To guard against mistake, I observe that I do not apply to the understanding the

expression self-subsistent essence, and other terms of a like character, in my own sense,but that I am here placing myself on the standpoint of onto-theology, of metaphysicaltheology in general, in order to show that metaphysics is resolvable into psychology, thatthe onto-theological predicates are merely predicates of the understanding.

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understanding is itself nothing else than the consciousness of itself as ab-solute identity, i.e., that which is accordant with the understanding is to itan absolute, universally valid, law ; it is impossible to the understandingto think that what is self-contradictory, false, irrational, can anywhere betrue, and, conversely, that what is true, rational, can anywhere be falseand irrational. “There may be intelligent beings who are not like me, andyet I am certain that there are no intelligent beings who know laws andtruths different from those which I recognise; for every mind necessarilysees that two and two make four, and that one must prefer one’s friend toone’s dog”.24 [Malebranche] Of an essentially different understanding fromthat which affirms itself in mall, I have not the remotest conception, thefaintest adumbration. On the contrary, every understanding which I positas different from my own, is only a position of my own understanding, i.e.,an idea of my own, a conception which falls within my power of thought,and thus expresses my understanding. What I think, that I myself do, ofcourse only in purely intellectual matters; what I think of as united, I unite;what I think of as distinct, I distinguish; what I think of as abolished, asnegatived, that I myself abolish and negative. For example, if I conceive anunderstanding in which the intuition or reality of the object is immediatelyunited with the thought of it, I actually unite it; my understanding or myimagination is itself the power of uniting these distinct or opposite ideas.How would it be possible for me to conceive them united—whether thisconception be clear or confused—if I did not unite them in myself? Butwhatever may be the conditions of the understanding which a given humanindividual may suppose as distinguished from his own, this other under-standing is only the understanding which exists in man in general – theunderstanding conceived apart from the limits of this particular individual.Unity is involved in the idea of the understanding. Tile impossibility forthe understanding to think two supreme beings, two infinite substances,two Gods, is the impossibility for the understanding to contradict itself, todeny its own nature, to think of itself as divided.

The understanding is the infinite being. Infinitude is immediately in-

24Malebranche. (See the author’s Geschichte der Philos., I. Bd. p. 322.) “Exstaretnealibi diversa ab hac ratio? censereturque injustum aut scelestum in Jove aut Marte,quod apud nos justum ac praeclarum habetur? Certe nec verisimile nec omnio possi-bile.”—Chr. Hugenii (Cosmotheoros, lib. i.) “And can there be anywhere a Reasoncontrary to this? or can what we call just and generous in Jupiter or Mars be thoughtunjust Villany? This is not at all, I don’t say probable, but possible.”

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volved in unity, and finiteness in plurality. Finiteness—in the metaphysicalsense—rests on the distinction of the existence from the essence, of the in-dividual from the species; infinitude, on the unity of existence and essence.Hence, that is finite which can be compared with other beings of the samespecies; that is infinite which has nothing like itself, which consequentlydoes not stand as an individual under a species, but is species and individ-ual in one, essence and existence in one. But such is the understanding;it has its essence in itself, consequently it has nothing together with orexternal to itself, which can be ranged beside it; it is incapable of beingcompared, because it is itself the source of all combinations and compar-isons; immeasurable, because it is the measure of all measures,—we measureall things by the understanding alone; it can be circumscribed by no highergeneralisation, it can be ranged under no species, because it is itself theprinciple of all generalising, of all classification, because it circumscribesall things and beings. The definitions which the speculative philosophersand theologians give of God, as the being in whom existence and essenceare not separable, who himself is all the attributes which he has, so thatpredicate and subject are with him identical,—all these definitions are thusideas drawn solely from the nature of the understanding.

Lastly, the understanding or the reason is the necessary being. Reasonexists because only the existence of the reason is reason; because, if therewere no reason, no consciousness, all would be nothing; existence wouldbe equivalent to non-existence. Consciousness first founds the distinctionbetween existence and non-existence. In consciousness is first revealed thevalue of existence, the value of nature. Why, in general, does somethingexist? why does the world exist? on the simple ground that if somethingdid not exist, nothing would exist; if reason (lid not exist, there would beonly unreason; thus the world exists

because it is an absurdity that the world should not exist. In the ab-surdity of its non-existence is found the true reason of its existence, in thegroundlessness of the supposition that it were not the reason that it is.Nothing, non-existence, is aimless, nonsensical, irrational. Existence alonehas an aim, a foundation, rationality; existence is, because only existenceis reason and truth; existence is the absolute necessity. What is the causeof conscious existence, of life? The need of life. But to whom is it a need?To that which does not live. It is not a being who saw that made the eye:to one who saw already, to what purpose would be the eye? No! only thebeing who saw not needed the eye. We are all come into the world without

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the operation of knowledge and will; but we are come that knowledge andwill may exist. Whence, then, came the world? Out of necessity; not out ofa necessity which lies in another being distinct from itself—that is a purecontradiction,—but out of its own inherent necessity; out of the necessityof necessity; because without the world there would be no necessity; with-out necessity, no reason, no understanding. The nothing out of which theworld came, is nothing without the world. It is true that thus, negativity,as the speculative philosophers express themselves—nothing is the causeof the world;—but a nothing which abolishes itself, i e., a nothing whichcould not have existed if there had been no world. It is true that the worldsprings out of a want, out of privation, but it is false speculation to makethis privation all ontological being: this want is simply the want which liesin the supposed non-existence of the world. Thus the world is only neces-sary out of itself and through itself. But the necessity of the world is thenecessity of reason. The reason, as the sum of all realities,—for what are allthe glories of the world without light, much more external light without in-ternal light?—the reason is the most indispensable being—the profoundestand most essential necessity. In the reason first lies the self-consciousnessof existence, self-conscious existence ; in the reason is first revealed the end,the meaning of existence. Reason is existence objective to itself as its ownend; the ultimate tendency of things. That which is an object to itself istile highest, the final being; that which has power over itself is almighty.

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chapter iii. god as moral being or law

God as God—the infinite, universal, non-anthropomorphic being of theunderstanding, has no more significance for religion than a fundamentalgeneral principle has for a special science; it is merely the ultimate point ofsupport, as it were, the mathematical point of religion. The consciousnessof human limitation or nothingness which is united with the idea of thisbeing, is by no means a religious consciousness; on the contrary, it charac-terises sceptics, materialists, and pantheists. The belief in God—at leastin the God of religion—is only lost where, as in scepticism, pantheism, andmaterialism, the belief in man is lost, at least in man such as he is presup-posed in religion. As little then as religion has any influential belief in thenothingness of man,25 so little has it any influential belief in that abstractbeing, with which the consciousness of this nothingness is united. The vitalelements of religion are those only which make man an object to man. Todeny man is to deny religion.

It certainly is the interest of religion that its object should be distinctfrom man; but it is also, nay, yet more, its interest that this object shouldhave human attributes. That he should be a distinct being concerns hisexistence only; but that he should be human concerns his essence. If hebe of a different nature, how can his existence or non-existence be of anyimportance to man? How can he take so profound an interest in an existencein which his own nature has no participation?

To give an example. “When I believe that the human nature alone hassuffered for me, Christ is a poor Saviour to me: in that case, he needsa Saviour himself.” And thus, out of the need for salvation is postulatedsomething transcending human nature, a being different from man. Butno sooner is this being postulated than there arises the yearning of manafter himself, after his own nature, and man is immediately re-established.“Here is God, who is not man and never yet became man. But this isnot a God for me. . . . That would be a miserable Christ to me, who . . .should be nothing but a purely separate God and divine person . . . withouthumanity. No, my friend; where thou givest me God, thou must give me

25In religion, the representation or expression of the nothingness of man before Godis the anger of God; for as the love of God is the affirmation, his anger is the negationof man. But even this anger is not taken in earnest. God. . . is not really angry. He isnot thoroughly in earnest even when we think that he is angry, and punishes.”—Luther(Th. viii. p. 208).

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humanity too.”26

In religion man seeks contentment; religion is his highest good. Buthow could he find consolation and peace in God if God were an essentiallydifferent being? How can I share the peace of a being if I am not of thesame nature with him? If his nature is different from mine, his peace isessentially different,—it is no peace for me. How then can I become apartaker of his peace if I am not a partaker of his nature? but how can Ibe a partaker of his nature if I am really of a different nature? Every beingexperiences peace only in its own element, only in the conditions of its ownnature. Thus, if man feels peace in God, he feels it only because in Godhe first attains his true nature, because here, for the first time, he is withhimself, because everything in which he hitherto sought peace, and whichhe hitherto mistook for his nature, was alien to him. Hence, if man is tofind contentment in God, he must find himself in God. “No one will tasteof God but as he wills, namely—in the humanity of Christ; and if thou dostnot find God thus, thou wilt never have rest.”27 “Everything finds rest onthe place in which it was born. The place where I was born is God. God ismy fatherland. Have I a father in God? Yes, I have not only a father, butI have myself in him; before I lived in myself, I lived already in God.”28

A God, therefore, who expresses only the nature of the understandingdoes not satisfy religion, is not the God of religion. The understandingis interested not only in man, but in the things out of man, in universalnature. The intellectual man forgets even himself in the contemplation ofnature. The Christians scorned the pagan philosophers because, insteadof thinking, of themselves, of their own salvation, they had thought onlyof things out of themselves. The Christian thinks only of himself. By theunderstanding an insect is contemplated with as much enthusiasm as theimage of God—man. The understanding is the absolute indifference andidentity of all things and beings. It is not Christianity, not religious enthu-siasm, but the enthusiasm of the understanding that we have to thank forbotany, mineralogy, zoology, physics, and astronomy. The understanding isuniversal, pantheistic, the love of the universe; but the grand characteristicof religion, and of the Christian religion especially, is that it is thoroughlyanthropo-theistic, the exclusive love of man for himself, the exclusive self-

26Luther, Concordienbuch, Art. 8. Erklar.27Luther. (Sammtliche Schriften und Werke. Leipzig, 1729, fol. T. iii. p. 589. It is

according to this edition that references are given throughout the present work.)28Predigten etzlicher Lehrer vor und zu Tauleri Zeiten. Hamburg, 1621, p. 81.

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affirmation of the human nature, that is, of subjective human nature; for itis true that the understanding also affirms the nature of man, but it is hisobjective nature, which has reference to the object for the sake of the ob-ject, and the manifestation of which is science. Hence it must be somethingentirely different from the nature of the understanding which is an objectto man in religion, if he is to find contentment therein, and this somethingwill necessarily be the very kernel of religion.

Of all the attributes which the understanding assigns to God, that whichin religion, and especially in the Christian religion, has the pre-eminence,is moral perfection. But God as a morally perfect being is nothing elsethan the realised idea, the fulfilled law of morality, the moral nature of manposited as the absolute being; man’s own nature, for the moral God requiresman to be as he himself is: Be ye holy for I am holy; man’s own conscience,for how could he otherwise tremble before the Divine Being, accuse himselfbefore him, and make him the judge of his inmost thoughts and feelings?

But the consciousness of the absolutely perfect moral nature, especiallyas an abstract being separate from man, leaves us cold and empty, becausewe feel the distance, the chasm between ourselves and this being ;—it is adispiriting consciousness, for it is the consciousness of our personal noth-ingness, and of the kind which is the most acutely felt – moral nothingness.The consciousness of the divine omnipotence and eternity in opposition tomy limitation in space and time does not afflict me: for omnipotence doesnot command me to be myself omnipotent, eternity, to be myself eternal.But I cannot have the idea of moral perfection without at the same timebeing conscious of it as a law for me. Moral perfection depends, at leastfor the moral consciousness, not on the nature, but on the will—it is a per-fection of will, perfect will. I cannot conceive perfect will, the will which isin unison with law, which is itself law, without at the same time regarding,it is an object of will, i.e., as an obligation for myself. The conception ofthe morally perfect being is no merely theoretical, inert conception, but apractical one, calling me to action, to imitation, throwing me into strife,into disunion with myself; for while it proclaims to me what I ought to be,it also tells me to my face, without any flattery, what I am not.29 And re-ligion renders this disunion all the more painful, all the more terrible, that

29“That which, in our own judgment, derogates from our self-conceit, humiliates us.Thus the moral law inevitably humiliates every man, when he compares with it thesensual tendency of his nature.”—Kant, Kritik der prakt. Vernunft. Fourth edition, p.132.

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it sets man’s own nature before him as a separate nature, and moreover asa personal being who hates and curses sinners, and excludes them from hisgrace, the source of all salvation and happiness.

Now, by what means does man deliver himself from this state of disunionbetween himself and the perfect being, from the painful consciousness of sin,from the distressing sense of his own nothingness? How does he blunt thefatal sting, of sin? Only by this; that he is conscious of love as the highest,the absolute power and truth, that he regards the Divine Being not onlyas a law, as a moral being as a being of the understanding; but also as aloving, tender, even subjective human being (that is, as having sympathywith individual man).

The understanding judges only according to the stringency of law; theheart accommodates itself, is considerate, lenient, relenting kat anthropou.No man is sufficient for the law which moral perfection sets before us; but,for that reason, neither is the law sufficient for man, for the heart. The lawcondemns the heart has compassion even on the sinner. The law affirmsme only as an abstract being,—love, as a real being Love gives me theconsciousness that I am a man; the law only the consciousness that I am asinner, that I am worthless.30 The law holds man in bondage; love makeshim free.

Love is the middle term, the substantial bond, the principle of reconcil-iation between the perfect and the imperfect, the sinless and sinful beingthe universal and the individual, the divine and the human. Love is Godhimself, and apart from it there is no God. Love makes man God and Godman. Love strengthens the weak and weakens the strong, abases the highand raises the lowly, idealises matter and materialises spirit. Love it thetrue unity of God and man, of spirit and nature. In love common natureis spirit, and the pre-eminent spirit is nature. Love is to deny spirit fromthe point of view of spirit, to deny matter from the point of view of matter.Love is materialism; immaterial love is a chimaera. In the longing of love af-ter the distant object, the abstract idealist involuntarily confirms the truthof sensuousness. But love is also the idealism of nature—love is also spirit,esprit. Love alone makes the nightingale a songstress; love alone gives theplant its corolla. And what wonders does not love work in our social life!What faith, creed, opinion separates, love unites. Love even, humorously

30Omnes peccavimus. . . . Parricidae cum lege caeperunt et illis facinus poena mon-stravit.—Seneca. “The law destroys us.”—Luther, (Th. xvi. s. 320).

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enough, identifies the High noblesse with the people. What the old magiessaid of God, that he is the highest and yet the commonest being, applies intruth to love, and that not a visionary, imaginary love – no! a real love, alove which has flesh and blood, which vibrates as an almighty force throughall living.

Yes, it applies only to the love which has flesh and blood, for only thiscan absolve from the sins which flesh and blood commit. A merely moralbeing cannot forgive what is contrary to the law of morality. That whichdenies the law is denied by the law. The moral judge, who does not infusehuman blood into his judgment judges the sinner relentlessly, inexorably.Since, then, God is regarded as a sin-pardoning being, he is posited, notindeed as an unmoral, but as more than a moral being,—in a word, as ahuman being The negation or annulling of sin is the negation of abstractmoral rectitude,—the positing of love, mercy, sensuous life. Not abstractbeings—no! only sensuous, living beings are merciful. Mercy is the justice ofsensuous life.31 Hence God does not forgive the sins of men as the abstractGod of the understanding but as man, as the God made flesh, the visibleGod. God as man sins not, it is true, but he knows, he takes on himself,the sufferings, the wants, the needs of sensuous beings. The blood of Christcleanses us from our sins in the eyes of God; it is only his human bloodthat makes God merciful, allays his anger; that is, our sins are forgiven usbecause we are no abstract beings, but creatures of flesh and blood.32

31“Das Rechtsgefuhl der Sinnlichkeit.”32“This, my God and Lord, has taken upon him my nature, flesh and blood such as

I have, and has been tempted and has suffered in all things like me, but without sin;therefore he can have pity on my weakness.—Hebrews v. Luther (Th. xvi. s. 533). “Thedeeper we can bring Christ into the flesh the better.”—(Ibid. s. 565). “God himself,when he is dealt with out of Christ, is a terrible God, for no consolation is found in him,but pure anger and disfavour.”—(Th. xv. s. 298.)

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chapter iv. god as love

It is the consciousness of love by which man reconciles himself with God,or rather with his own nature as represented in the moral law. The con-sciousness of the divine love, or what is the same thing, the contemplationof God as human, is the mystery of the Incarnation. The Incarnation isnothing else than the practical, material manifestation of the human na-ture of God. God did not become man for his own sake; the need, the wantof man—a want which still exists in the religious sentiment—was the causeof the Incarnation. God became man out of mercy: thus he was in himselfalready a human God before he became an actual man; for human want,human misery, went to his heart. The Incarnation was a tear of the divinecompassion, and hence it was only the visible advent of a Being havinghuman feelings, and therefore essentially human.

If in the Incarnation we stop short at the fact of God becoming man,it certainly appears a surprising inexplicable, marvellous event. But theincarnate God is only the apparent manifestation of deified man; for thedescent of God to man is necessarily preceded by the exaltation of man toGod. Man was already in God, was already God himself, before God becameman, i.e., showed himself as man.33 How otherwise could God have becomeman? The old maxim, ex nihilo nihil fit, is applicable here also. A kingwho has not the welfare of his subjects at heart, who, while seated on histhrone, does not mentally live with them in their dwellings, who, in feeling,is not, as the people say, “a common man,” such a king will not descendbodily from his throne to make his, people happy by his personal presence.Thus, has not the subject risen to be a king before the kina descends tobe a subject? And if the subject feels himself honoured and made happyby the personal presence of his king, does this feeling refer merely to thebodily presence, and not rather to the manifestation of the disposition, ofthe philanthropic nature which is the cause of the appearance? But thatwhich in the truth of religion is the cause, takes in the consciousness ofreligion the form of a consequence; and so here the raising of man to Godis made a consequence of the humiliation or descent of God to man. God,

33“Such descriptions as those in which the Scriptures speak of God as of a man, andascribe to him all that is human, are very sweet and comforting—namely, that he talkswith us as a friend, and of such things as men are wont to talk of with each other; thathe rejoices, sorrows, and suffers, like a man, for the sake of the mystery of the futurehumanity of Christ.”—Luther (Th. ii. P. 334).

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says religion, made himself human that he might make man divine.34

That which is mysterious and incomprehensible, i.e., contradictory, inthe proposition, “God is or becomes a man,” arises only from the minglingor confusion of the idea or definitions of the universal, unlimited, meta-physical being with the idea of the religious God, i.e., the conditions of theunderstanding, with the conditions of the heart, the emotive nature; a con-fusion which is the greatest hindrance to the correct knowledge of religion.But, in fact, the idea of the Incarnation is nothing more than the humanform of a God, who already in his nature, in the profoundest depths of hissoul, is a merciful and therefore a human God.

The form given to this truth in the doctrine of the Church is, that itwas not the first person of the Godhead who was incarnate, but the second,who is the representative of man in and before God; the second personbeing however in reality, as will be shown, the sole, true, first person inreligion. And it is only apart from this distinction of persons that the God—man appears mysterious, incomprehensible, “speculative;” for, consideredin connection with it, the Incarnation is a necessary, nay, a self-evidentconsequence. The allegation, therefore, that the Incarnation is a purelyempirical fact, which could be made known only by means of a revelationin the theological sense, betrays the most crass religious materialism; for theIncarnation is a conclusion which rests on a very comprehensible premise.But it is equally perverse to attempt to deduce the Incarnation from purelyspeculative, i.e., metaphysical, abstract grounds; for metaphysics apply onlyto the first person of the Godhead, who does not become incarnate, who isnot a dramatic person. Such a deduction would at the utmost be justifiableif it were meant consciously to deduce from metaphysics the negation ofmetaphysics.

This example clearly exhibits the distinction between the method ofour philosophy and that of the old speculative philosophy. The formerdoes not philosophise concerning the Incarnation, as a peculiar, stupendousmystery, after the manner of speculation dazzled by mystical splendour; onthe contrary, it destroys the illusive supposition of a peculiar supernatural

34“Deus homo factus est, ut homo Deus fieret.”—Augustinus (Serm. Ad Pop. p 371,C. I). In Luther, however (Th. i. P. 334), there is a passage which indicates the truerelation. When Moses called man “the image of God, the likeness of God,” he meant,says Luther, obscurely to intimate that “God was to become man.” Thus here theincarnation of God is clearly enough represented as a consequence of the deification ofman.

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mystery; it criticises the dogma and reduces it to its natural elements,immanent in man, to its originating principle and central point—love.

The dogma presents to us two things—God and love. God is love: butwhat does that mean? Is God something besides love? a being distinctfrom love? Is it as if I said of an affectionate human being, he is love itself?Certainly; otherwise I must give up the name God, which expresses a specialpersonal being, a subject in distinction from the predicate. Thus love ismade something apart. God out of love sent his only-begotten Son. Herelove recedes and sinks into insignificance in the dark background—God. Itbecomes merely a personal, though an essential, attribute; hence it receivesboth in theory and in feeling, both objectively and subjectively, the ranksimply of a predicate, not that of a subject, of the substance; it shrinks outof observation as a collateral, an accident; at one moment it presents itselfto me as something essential, at another, it vanishes again. God appearsto me in another form besides that of love; in the form of omnipotence, ofa severe power not bound by love; a power in which, though in a smallerdegree, the devils participate.

So long as love is not exalted into a substance, into an essence, so longthere lurks in the background of love a subject who even without love issomething by himself, an unloving monster, a diabolical being, whose per-sonality, separable and actually separated from love, delights in the bloodof heretics and unbelievers,—the phantom of religious fanaticism. Never-theless the essential idea of the Incarnation, though enveloped in the nightof the religious consciousness, is love. Love determined God to the renun-ciation of his divinity.35 Not because of his Godhead as such, accordingto which he is the subject in the proposition, God is love, but because ofhis love, of the predicate, is it that he renounced his Godhead; thus love isa higher power and truth than deity. Love conquers God. It was love towhich God sacrificed his divine majesty. And what sort of love was that?

35It was in this sense that the old uncompromising enthusiastic faith celebrated theIncarnation. “Amor triumphal de Deo,” says St. Bernard. And only in the senseof a real self-renunciation, self-negation of the Godhead, lies the reality, the vis of theIncarnation; although this self-negation is in itself merely a conception of the imagination,for, looked at in broad daylight, God does not negative himself in the Incarnation,but he shows himself as that which he is, as a human being. The fabrications whichmodern rationalistic orthodoxy and pietistic rationalism have advanced concerning theIncarnation, in opposition to the rapturous conceptions and expressions of ancient faith,do not deserve to be mentioned, still less controverted.

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another than ours? than that to which we sacrifice life and fortune? Wasit the love of himself? of himself as God? No! it was love to man. But isnot love to man human love? Can I love man without loving him humanly,without loving him as he himself loves, if he truly loves? Would not lovebe otherwise a devilish love? The devil too loves. man, but not for man’ssake—for his own; thus he loves man out of egotism, to aggrandise himself,to extend his power. But God loves man for man’s sake, i.e., that he maymake him good, happy, blessed. Does he not then love man as the trueman loves his fellow? Has love a plural? Is it not everywhere like itself?What then is the true unfalsified import of the Incarnation but absolute,pure love, without adjunct, without a distinction between divine and humanlove? For though there is also a self-interested love among men, still thetrue human love, which is alone worthy of this name, is that which impelsthe sacrifice of self to another. Who then is our Saviour and Redeemer?God or Love? Love; for God as God has not saved us, but Love, whichtranscends the difference between the divine and human personality. AsGod has renounced himself out of love, so we, out of love, should renounceGod; for if we do not sacrifice God to love, we sacrifice love to God, and, inspite of the predicate of love, we have the God—the evil being—of religiousfanaticism.

While, however, we have laid open this nucleus of truth in the Incar-nation, we have at the same time exhibited the dogma in its falsity; wehave reduced the apparently supernatural and super-rational mystery to asimple truth inherent in human nature:—a truth which does not belong tothe Christian religion alone, but which, implicitly at least, belongs more orless to every religion as such. For every religion which has any claim to thename presupposes that God is not indifferent to the beings who worshiphim, that therefore what is human is not alien to him, that, as an objectof human veneration, he is a human God. Every prayer discloses the secretof the Incarnation, every prayer is in fact an incarnation of God. In prayerI involve God in human distress, I make him a participator in my sorrowsand wants. God is not deaf to my complaints; he has compassion on me;hence he renounces his divine majesty, his exaltation above all that is finiteand human; he becomes a man with man; for if he listens to me, and pitiesme, he is affected by my sufferings. God loves man—i.e., God suffers fromman. Love does not exist without sympathy, sympathy does not exist with-out suffering in common. Have I any sympathy for a being without feeling?No! I feel only for that which has feeling, only for that which partakes of

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my nature, for that in which I feel myself, whose sufferings I myself suffer.Sympathy presupposes a like nature. The Incarnation, Providence, prayer,are the expression of this identity of nature in God and man.36

It is true that theology, which is preoccupied with the metaphysicalattributes of eternity, unconditionedness, unchangeableness, and the likeabstractions, which express the nature of the understanding, – theologydenies the possibility that God should suffer, but in so doing it denies thetruth of religion.37For religion—the religious man in the act of devotionbelieves in a real sympathy of the divine being in his sufferings and wants,believes that the will of God can be determined by the fervour of prayer,i.e., by the force of feeling, believes in a real, present fulfilment of his desire,wrought by prayer. The truly religious man unhesitatingly assigns his ownfeelings to God; God is to him a heart susceptible to all that is human. Theheart can betake itself only to the heart; feeling can appeal only to feeling;it finds consolation in itself, in its own nature alone.

The notion that the fulfilment of prayer has been determined from eter-nity, that it was originally included in the plan of creation, is the empty,absurd fiction of a mechanical mode of thought, which is in absolute con-tradiction with the nature of religion. “We need,” says Lavater some-where, and quite correctly according to the religious sentiment, “an ar-bitrary God.” Besides, even according to this fiction, God is just as much abeing determined by man, as in the real, present fulfilment consequent onthe power of prayer; the only difference is, that the contradiction with theunchangeableness and unconditionedness of God—that which constitutesthe difficulty—is thrown back into the deceptive distance of the past or ofeternity. Whether God decides on the fulfilment of my prayer now, on theimmediate occasion of my offering it, or whether he did decide on it longago, is fundamentally the same thing.

It is the greatest inconsequence to reject the idea of a God who can

36“Nos scimus affici Deum misericordia nostri et non solum respicere lacrymas nostras,sed etiam numerare stillulas, sicut scriptum in Psalmo LVI. Filius Dei vere afficitur sensumiseriarum nostrarum.”—Melancthonis et aliorum (Declam. T. iii. p. 286, p. 450).

37St. Bernard resorts to a charmingly sophistical play of words:—Impassiblis estDeus, sed non incompassibilis, cui proprium est misereri semper et parcere.”—(Sup.Cant. Sermo 26.) As if compassion were not :suffering—the suffering of love, it is true,the suffering of the heart. But what does suffer if not thy sympathising heart? No love,no suffering. The material, the source of suffering, is the universal heart, the commonbond of all beings.

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be determined by prayer, that is, by the force of feeling, as an unworthyanthropomorphic idea. If we once believe in a being who is an object ofveneration, an object of prayer, an object of affection, who is providential,who takes care of man,—in a Providence, which is not conceivable withoutlove,—in a being, therefore, who is loving, whose motive of action is love;we also believe in a being who has, if not an anatomical, yet a psychicalhuman heart. The religious mind, as has been said, places everything inGod, excepting that alone which it despises. The Christians certainly gavetheir God no attributes which contradicted their own moral ideas, but theygave him without hesitation, and of necessity, the emotions of love, of com-passion. And the love which the religious mind places in God is not anillusory, imaginary love, but a real, true love. God is loved and loves again;the divine love is only human love made objective, affirming itself. In Godlove is absorbed in itself as its own ultimate truth.

It may be objected to the import here assigned to the Incarnation, thatthe Christian Incarnation is altogether peculiar, that at least it is different(which is quite true in certain respects, as will hereafter be apparent) fromthe incarnations of the heathen deities, whether Greek or Indian. Theselatter are mere products of men or deified men; but in Christianity is giventhe idea of the true God; here the union of the divine nature with the humanis first significant and “speculative.” Jupiter transforms himself into a bull;the heathen incarnations are mere fancies. In paganism there is no morein the nature of God than in his incarnate manifestation; in Christianity,on the contrary, it is God, a separate, superhuman being, who appearsas man. But this objection is refuted by the remark already made, thateven the premise of the Christian Incarnation contains the human nature.God loves man; moreover God has a Son; God is a father; the relations ofhumanity are not excluded from God; the human is not remote from God,not unknown to him. Thus here also there is nothing more in the natureof God than in the incarnate manifestation of God. In the Incarnationreligion only confesses, what in reflection on itself, as theology, it will notadmit; namely, that God is an altogether human being. The Incarnation,the mystery of the “God-man,” is therefore no mysterious composition ofcontraries, no synthetic fact, as it is regarded by the speculative religiousphilosophy, which has a particular delight in contradiction; it is an analyticfact,—a human word with a human meaning. If there be a contradictionhere, it lies before the incarnation and out of it; in the union of providence,of love, with deity; for if this love is a real love, it is not essentially different

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from our love,—there are only our limitations to be abstracted from it; andthus the Incarnation is only the strongest, deepest, most palpable, open-hearted expression of this providence, this love. Love knows not how tomake its object happier than by rejoicing it with its personal presence, byletting itself be seen. To see the invisible benefactor face to face is the mostardent desire of love. To see is a divine act. Happiness lies in the mere sightof the beloved one. The glance is the certainty of love. And

the Incarnation has no other significance, no other effect, than the in-dubitable certitude of the love of God to man. Love remains, but theIncarnation upon the earth passes away: the appearance was limited bytime and place, accessible to few; but the essence, the nature which wasmanifested, is eternal and universal. We can no longer believe in the mani-festation for its own sake, but only for the sake of the thing manifested; forto us there remains no immediate presence but that of love.

The clearest, most irrefragable proof that man in religion contemplateshimself as the object of the Divine Being, as the end of the divine activ-ity, that thus in religion he has relation only to his own nature, only tohimself,—the clearest, most irrefragable proof of this is the love of God toman, the basis and central point of religion. God, for the sake of man,empties himself of his Godhead, lays aside his Godhead. Herein lies theelevating influence of the Incarnation; the highest, the perfect being humil-iates, lowers himself for the sake of man. Hence in God I learn to estimatemy own nature; I have value in the sight of God; the divine significance ofmy nature is become evident to me. How can the worth of man be morestrongly expressed than when God, for man’s sake, becomes a man, whenman is the end, the object of the divine love? The love of God to man is anessential condition of the Divine Being: God is a God who loves me—wholoves man in general. Here lies the emphasis, the fundamental feeling ofreligion. The love of God makes me loving; the love of God to man is t ’he cause of man’s love to God; the divine love causes, awakens human love.“We love God because he first loved us.” What, then, is it that I love inGod? Love: love to man. But when I love and worship the love with whichGod loves man, do I not love man; is not my love of God, though indirectly,love of man? If God loves man, is not man, then, the very substance ofGod? That which I love, is it not my inmost being? Have I a heart when 1do not love? No 1 love only is the heart of man. But what is love withoutthe thing loved? Thus what I love is my heart, the substance of my beingmy nature. Why does man grieve, why does he lose pleasure in life when

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he has lost the beloved object? Why? because with the beloved object hehas lost his heart, the activity of his affections, the principle of life. Thusif God loves man, man is the heart of God—the welfare of man his deepestanxiety. If man, then, is the object of God, is not man, in God, an objectto himself? is not the content of the divine nature the human nature? IfGod is love, is not the essential content of this love man? Is not the loveof God to man—the basis and central point of religion – the love of manto himself made an object, contemplated as the highest objective truth, asthe highest being to man? Is not then the proposition, “God loves man” anorientalism (religion is essentially oriental), which in plain speech means,the highest is the, love of man?

The truth to which, by means of analysis, we have here reduced themystery of the Incarnation, has also been recognised even in the religiousconsciousness. Thus Luther, for example, says, “He who can truly conceivesuch a thing (namely, the incarnation of God) in his heart, should, for thesake of the flesh and blood which sits at the right hand of God, bear love toall flesh and blood here upon the earth, and never more be able to be angrywith any man. The gentle manhood of Christ our God should at a glance fillall hearts with joy, so that never more could an angry, unfriendly thoughtcome therein—yea, every man ought, out of great joy, to be tender to hisfellow-man for the sake of that our flesh and blood.” This is a fact whichshould move us to great joy and blissful hope that we are thus honouredabove all creatures, even above the angels, so that we can with truth boast,My own flesh and blood sits at the right hand of God and reigns over all.Such honour has no creature, not even an angel. This ought to be a furnacethat should melt us all into one heart, and should create such a fervourin us men that we should heartily love each other.” But that which in thetruth of religion is the essence of the fable, the chief thing, is to the religiousconsciousness only the moral of the fable, a collateral thing.

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Part II: The False or Theological Essence of Religion

chapter xx. contradiction in existence of god

Religion is the relation of man to his own nature,—therein lies its truthand its power of moral amelioration;—but to his nature not recognised ashis own, but regarded as another nature, separate, nay, contra-distinguishedfrom his own: herein lies its untruth, its limitation, its contradiction to rea-son and morality; herein lies the noxious source of religious fanaticism, thechief metaphysical principle of human sacrifices, in a word, the prima ma-teria of all the atrocities, all the horrible scenes, in the tragedy of religioushistory.

The contemplation of the human nature as another, a separately existentnature, is, however, in the original conception of religion an involuntary,childlike, simple act of the mind, that is, one which separates God and manjust as immediately as it again identifies them. But when religion advancesin years, and, with years, in understanding; when, within the bosom ofreligion, reflection on religion is awakened, and the consciousness of theidentity of the divine being with the human begins to dawn,—in a word,when religion becomes theology, the originally involuntary and harmlessseparation of God from man becomes an intentional, excogitated separation,which has no other object than to banish again from the consciousness thisidentity which has already entered there.

Hence the nearer religion stands to its origin, the truer, the more gen-uine it is, the less is its true nature disguised; that is to say, in the originof religion there is no qualitative or essential distinction whatever betweenGod and man. And the religious man is not shocked at this identification;for his understanding, is still in harmony with his religion. Thus in ancientJudaism, Jehovah was a being differing from the human individual in noth-ing but in duration of existence; in his qualities, his inherent nature, he wasentirely similar to man,—had the same passions, the same human, nay, evencorporeal properties. Only in the later Judaism was Jehovah separated inthe strictest manner from man, and recourse was had to allegory in orderto give to the old anthropomorphisms another sense than that which theyoriginally had. So again in Christianity: in its earliest records the divinityof Christ is not so decidedly stamped as it afterwards became. With Paulespecially, Christ is still an undefined being, hovering between heaven andearth, between God and man, or in general, one amongst the existences

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subordinate to the highest,—the first of the angels, the first created, butstill created; begotten indeed for our sake; but then neither are angels andmen created, but begotten, for God is their Father also. The Church firstidentified him with God, made him the exclusive Son of God, defined hisdistinction from men and angels, and thus gave him the monopoly of aneternal, uncreated existence.

In the genesis of ideas, the first mode in which reflection on religion, ortheology, makes the divine being a distinct being and places him outside ofman, is by making the existence of God the object of a formal proof.

The proofs of the existence of God have been pronounced contradictoryto the essential nature of religion. They are so, but only in their formas proofs. Religion immediately represents the inner nature of man as anobjective, external being. And the proof aims at nothing more than toprove that religion is right. The most perfect being is that than whichno higher can be conceived: God is the highest that man conceives or canconceive. This premise of the ontological proof—the most interesting proof,because it proceeds from within—expresses the inmost nature of religion.That which is the highest for man, from which he can make no furtherabstraction, which is the positive limit of his intellect, of his feeling, ofhis sentiment, that is to him God—id quo nihil majus cogitari potest. Butthis highest being would not be the highest if he did not exist; we couldthen conceive a higher being who would be superior to him in the fact ofexistence; the idea of the highest being directly precludes this fiction. Notto exist is a deficiency; to exist is perfection, happiness, bliss. From a beingto whom man gives all, offers up all that is precious to him, he cannotwithhold the bliss of existence. The contradiction to the religious spiritin the proof of the existence of God lies only in this, that the existence isthought of separately, and thence arises the appearance that God is a mereconception, a being existing in idea only,—an appearance, however, whichis immediately dissipated; for the very result of the proof is, that to Godbelongs an existence distinct from an ideal one, an existence apart fromman, apart from thought,—a real self-existence.

The proof therefore is only thus far discordant with the spirit of re-ligion, that it presents as a formal deduction the implicit enthymeme orimmediate conclusion of religion, exhibits in logical relation, and thereforedistinguishes, what religion immediately unites; for to religion God is nota matter of abstract thought,—he is a present truth and reality. But thatevery religion in its idea of God makes a latent, unconscious inference, is

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confessed in its polemic against other religions. “Ye heathens,” says theJew or the Christian, “were able to conceive nothing higher as your deitiesbecause ye were sunk in sinful desires. Your God rests on a conclusion, thepremises of which are your sensual impulses, your passions. You thoughtthus: the most excellent life is to live out one’s impulses without restraint;and because this life was the most excellent, the truest, you made it yourGod. Your God was your carnal nature, your heaven only a free theatre forthe passions which, in society and in the conditions of actual life generally,had to suffer restraint.” But, naturally, in relation to itself no religion isconscious of such an inference, for the highest of which it is capable is itslimit, has the force of necessity, is not a thought, not a conception, butimmediate reality.

The proofs of the existence of God have for their aim to make the internalexternal, to separate it from man.38 His existence being proved, God is nolonger a merely relative, but a noumenal being (Ding an sich): he is notonly a being for us, a being, in our faith our feeling our nature, he is abeing in himself, a being external to us,—in a word, not merely a belief, afeeling, a thought, but also a real existence apart from belief, feeling, andthought. But such an existence is no other than a sensational existence;i.e., an existence conceived according to the forms of our senses.

The idea of sensational existence is indeed already involved in the char-acteristic expression “external to us.” It is true that a sophistical theologyrefuses to interpret the word “external” in its proper, natural sense, andsubstitutes the indefinite expression of independent, separate existence. Butif the externality is only figurative, the existence also is figurative. And yetwe are here only concerned with existence in the proper sense, and exter-nal existence is alone the definite, real, unshrinking expression for separateexistence.

Real, sensational existence is that which is not dependent on my ownmental spontaneity or activity, but by which I am involuntarily affected,which is when I am not, when I do not think of it or feel it. The existenceof God must therefore be in space—in general, a qualitative, sensationalexistence. But God is not seen, not heard, not perceived by the senses.

38At the same time, however, their result is to prove the nature of man. The variousproofs of the existence of God are nothing else than various highly interesting forms inwhich the human nature affirms itself. Thus. for example, the physico-theological proof(or proof from design) is the self-affirmation of the calculated activity of the understand-ing. Every philosophic system is, in this sense, a proof of the existence of God.

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He does not exist for me, if I do not exist for him; if I do not believein a God, there is no God for me. If I am not devoutly disposed, if Ido not raise myself above the life of the senses, he has no place in myconsciousness. Thus he exists only in so far as he is felt, thought, believedin;—the addition “for me” is unnecessary. His existence therefore is a realone, yet at the same time not a real one;—a spiritual existence, says thetheologian. But spiritual existence is only an existence in thought, in feeling,in belief; so that his existence is a medium between sensational existenceand conceptional existence, a medium full of contradiction. Or: he is asensational existence, to which however all the conditions of sensationalexistence are wanting:—consequently an existence at once sensational andnot sensational, an existence which contradicts the idea of the sensational,or only a vague existence in general, which is fundamentally a sensationalone, but which, in order that this may not become evident, is divested ofall the predicates of a real, sensational existence. But such an “existence ingeneral” is self-contradictory. To existence belongs full, definite reality.

A necessary consequence of this contradiction is Atheism. The existenceof God is essentially an empirical existence, without having its distinctivemarks; it is in itself a matter of experience, and yet in reality no object ofexperience. It calls upon man to seek it in Reality: it impregnates his mindwith sensational conceptions and pretensions; hence, when these are notfulfilled—when, on the contrary, he finds experience in contradiction withthese conceptions, he is perfectly justified in denying that existence.

Kant is well known to have maintained, in his critique of the proofs ofthe existence of God, that that existence is not susceptible of proof fromreason. He did not merit, on this account, the blame which was cast on himby Hegel. The idea of the existence of God in those proofs is a thoroughlyempirical one; but I cannot deduce empirical existence from an a prioriidea. The only real ground of blame against Kant is, that in laying downthis position he supposed it to be something remarkable, whereas it is self-evident. Reason cannot constitute itself an object of sense. I cannot, inthinking, at the same time represent what I think as a sensible object,external to me. The proof of the existence of God transcends the limits ofthe reason; true; but in the same sense in which sight, hearing, smellingtranscend the limits of the reason. It is absurd to reproach reason thatit does not satisfy a demand which can only address itself to the senses.Existence, empirical existence, is proved to me by the senses alone; andin the question as to the being of God, the existence implied has not the

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significance of inward reality, of truth, but the significance of a formal,external existence. Hence there is perfect truth in the allegation that thebelief that God is or is not has no consequence with respect to inwardmoral dispositions. It is true that the thought: There is a God, is inspiring;but here the is means inward reality; here the existence is a movementof inspiration, an act of aspiration. Just in proportion as this existencebecomes a prosaic, an empirical truth, the inspiration is extinguished.

Religion, therefore, in so far as it is founded on the existence of Godas an empirical truth, is a matter of indifference to the inward disposition.As, necessarily, in the religious cultus, ceremonies, observances, sacraments,apart from the moral spirit or disposition, become in themselves an impor-tant fact: so also, at last, belief in the existence of God becomes, apart fromthe inherent quality, the spiritual import of the idea of God, a chief point inreligion. If thou only believest in God—believest that God is, thou art al-ready saved. Whether under this God thou conceivest a really divine beingor a monster, a Negro or a Caligula, an image of thy passions, thy revenge,or ambition, it is all one,—the main point is that thou be not an atheist.The history of religion has amply confirmed this consequence which we heredraw from the idea of the divine existence. If the existence of God, taken byitself, had not rooted itself as a religious truth in minds, there would neverhave been those infamous, senseless, horrible idea of God which stigmatisethe history of religion and theology. The existence of God was a common,external, and yet at the same time a holy thing:—what wonder, then, if onthis ground the commonest, rudest, most unholy conceptions and opinionssprang up!

Atheism was supposed, and is even now supposed, to be the negation ofall moral principle, of all moral foundations and bonds: if God is not, alldistinction between good and bad, virtue and vice, is abolished. Thus thedistinction lies only in the existence of God; the reality of virtue lies not initself, but out of it. And assuredly it is not from an attachment to virtue,from a conviction of its intrinsic worth and importance, that the reality ofit is thus bound up with the existence of God. On the contrary, the beliefthat God is the necessary condition of virtue is the belief in the nothingnessof virtue in itself.

It is indeed worthy of remark that the idea of the empirical existenceof God has been perfectly developed in modern times, in which empiricismand materialism in general have arrived at their full blow. It is true thateven in the original, simple religious mind, God is an empirical existence

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to be found in a place, though above the earth. But here this conceptionhas not so naked, so prosaic a significance; the imagination identifies againthe external God with the soul of man. The imagination is, in general,the true place of an existence which is absent, not present to the senses,though nevertheless sensational in its essence.39Only the imagination solvesthe contradiction in an existence which is at once sensational and not sen-sational; only the imagination is the preservative from atheism. In theimagination existence has sensational effects, existence affirms itself as apower; with the essence of sensational existence the imagination associatesalso the phenomena of sensational existence. Where the existence of God isa living truth, an object on which the imagination exercises itself, there alsoappearances of God are believed in.40 Where, on the contrary, the fire ofthe religious imagination is extinct, where the sensational effects or appear-ances necessarily connected with an essentially sensational existence cease,there the existence becomes a dead, self-contradictory existence, which fallsirrecoverably into the negation of atheism.

The belief in the existence of God is the belief in a special existence,separate from the existence of man and Nature. A special existence canonly be proved in a special manner. This faith is therefore only then atrue and living one when special effects, immediate appearances of God,miracles, are believed in. Where, on the other hand, the belief in God isidentified with the belief in the world, where the belief in God is no longera special faith, where the general being, of the world takes possession of thewhole man, there also vanishes the belief in special effects and appearancesof God. Belief in God is wrecked, is stranded on the belief in the world,

39Christ is ascended on high. . . . that is, he not only sits there above, but he is alsohere below. And he is gone thither to the very end that he might be here below, and fillall things, and be in all places, which he could not do while on earth, for here he couldnot be seen by all bodily eyes. Therefore he sits above, where every man can see him,and he has to do with every man.”—Luther (Th. xiii. p. 643). That is to say: Christor God is an object, an existence, of the imagination; in the imagination he is limitedto no place,—he is present and objective to every one. God exists in heaven, but is forthat reason omnipresent; for this heaven is the imagination.

40“Thou hast not to complain that thou art less experienced than was Abraham orIsaac. Thou also hast appearances . . . Thou hast holy baptism, the supper of the Lord,the bread and wine, which are figures and forms, under and in which the present Godspeaks to thee, and acts upon thee, in thy ears, eyes, and heart. . . . He appears to theein baptism, and it is he himself who baptises thee, and speaks to thee. . . . Everything isfull of divine appearances and utterances, if he is on thy side.”—Luther (Th. ii. P. 466.See also on this subject, Th. xix. P. 407).

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in natural effects as the only true ones. As here the belief in miracles isno longer anything more than the belief in historical, past miracles, so theexistence of God is also only an historical, in itself atheistic conception.

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chapter xxvii. concluding application

In the contradiction between Faith and Love which has just been exhib-ited, we see the practical, palpable ground of necessity that we should raiseourselves above Christianity, above the peculiar stand-point of all religion.We have shown that the substance and object of religion is altogether hu-man; we have shown that divine wisdom is human wisdom; that the secretof theology is anthropology; that the absolute mind is the so-called finitesubjective mind. But religion is not conscious that its elements are human;on the contrary, it places itself in opposition to the human, or at least itdoes not admit that its elements are human. The necessary turning-pointof history is therefore the open confession, that the consciousness of God isnothing else than the consciousness of the species; that man can and shouldraise himself only above the limits of his individuality, and not above thelaws, the positive essential conditions of his species; that there is no otheressence which man can think, dream of, imagine, feel, believe in, wish for,love and adore as the absolute, than the essence of human nature itself.41

Our relation to religion is therefore not a merely negative, but a criticalone; we only separate the true from the false;—though we grant that thetruth thus separated from falsehood is a new truth, essentially differentfrom the old. Religion is the first form of self-consciousness. Religions aresacred because they are the traditions of the primitive self-consciousness.But that which in religion holds the first place—namely, God—is, as wehave shown, in itself and according to truth, the second, for it is only thenature of man regarded objectively; and that which to religion is the second– namely, man—must therefore be constituted and declared the first. Loveto man must be no derivative love; it must be original. If human natureis the highest nature to man, then practically also the highest and firstlaw must be the love of man to man. Homo homini Deus est :—this isthe great practical principle:—this is the axis on which revolves the historyof the world. The relations of child and parent, of husband and wife, ofbrother and friend—in general, of man to man—in short, all the moralrelations are per se religious. Life as a whole is, in its essential, substantial

41Including external nature; for as man belongs to the essence of Nature,—in opposi-tion to common materialism; so Nature belongs to the essence of man,—in opposition tosubjective idealism; which is also the secret of our “absolute” philosophy, at least in rela-tion to Nature. Only by uniting man with Nature can we conquer the supra-naturalisticegoism of Christianity.

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relations, throughout of a divine nature. Its religious consecration is notfirst conferred by the blessing of the priest. But the pretension of religionis that it can hallow an object by its essentially external co-operation; itthereby assumes to be itself the only holy power; besides itself it knows onlyearthly, ungodly relations; hence it comes forward in order to consecratethem and make them holy.

But marriage—we mean, of course, marriage as the free bond of love42—is sacred in itself, by the very nature of the union which is therein effected.That alone is a religious marriage, which is a true marriage, which cor-responds to the essence of marriage—of love. And so it is with all moralrelations. Then only are they moral,—then only are they enjoyed in a moralspirit, when they are regarded as sacred in themselves. True friendship ex-ists only when the boundaries of friendship are preserved with religiousconscientiousness, with the same conscientiousness with which the believerwatches over the dignity of his God. Let friendship be sacred to thee, prop-erty sacred, marriage sacred,—sacred the well-being of every man; but letthem be sacred in and by themselves.

In Christianity the moral laws are regarded as the commandments ofGod; morality is even made the criterion of piety; but ethics have neverthe-less a subordinate rank, they have not in themselves a religious significance.This belongs only to faith. Above morality hovers God, as a being distinctfrom man, a being, to whom the best is due, while the remnants only fallto the share of man. All those dispositions which ought to be devoted tolife, to man—all the best powers of humanity, are lavished on the beingwho wants nothing. The real cause is converted into an impersonal means,a merely conceptional, imaginary cause usurps the place of the true one.Man thanks God for those benefits which have been rendered to him evenat the cost of sacrifice by his fellow-man. The Gratitude which he expressesto his benefactor is only ostensible: it is paid, not to him, but to God. Heis thankful, grateful to God, but unthankful to man.43 Thus is the moral

42Yes, only as the free bond of love; for a marriage the bond of which is merelyan external restriction, not the voluntary, contented self-restriction of love, in short, amarriage which is not spontaneously concluded, spontaneously willed, self-sufficing, isnot a true marriage, and therefore not a truly moral marriage.

43“Because God does good through government, great men and creatures in general,people rush into error, lean on creatures and not on the Creator;—they do not look fromthe creature to the Creator. Hence it came that the heathens made gods of kings. Forthey cannot and will not perceive that the work or the benefit comes from God, and not

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sentiment subverted into religion! Thus does man sacrifice man to God!The bloody human sacrifice is in fact only a rude, material expression ofthe inmost secret of religion. Where bloody human sacrifices are offered toGod, such sacrifices are regarded as the highest thing, physical existenceas the chief mood. For this reason life is sacrificed to God, and it is so onextraordinary occasions; the supposition being that this is the way to showhim the greatest honour. If Christianity no longer, at least in our day, of-fers bloody sacrifices to its God, this arises, to say nothing of other reasons,from the fact that physical existence is no longer regarded as the highestgood. Hence the soul, the emotions are now offered to God, because theseare held to be something higher. But the common case is, that in religionman sacrifices some duty towards man—such as that of respecting the lifeof his fellow, of being grateful to him—to a religious obligation, – sacrificeshis relation to man to his relation to God. The Christians, by the idea thatGod is without wants, and that he is only an object of pure adoration, havecertainly done away with many pernicious conceptions. But this freedomfrom wants is only a metaphysical idea, which is by no means part of thepeculiar nature of religion. When the need for worship is supposed to existonly on one side, the subjective side, this has the invariable effect of one-sidedness, and leaves the religious emotions cold; hence, if not in expresswords, yet in fact, there must be attributed to God a condition correspond-ing to the subjective need, the need of the worshipper, in order to establishreciprocity.44 All the positive definitions of religion are based on reciprocity.The religious man thinks of God because God thinks of him; he loves Godbecause God has first loved him. God is jealous of man; religion is jealousof morality;45 it sucks away the best forces of morality; it renders to man

merely from the creature, though the latter is a means, through which God works, helpsus and gives to is.”—Luther (T. iv. p. 237).

44“They who honour me, I will honour, and they who despise me shall be lightlyesteemed.”—i Sam. ii. 30. “Jam so, o bone pater, vermis vilissimus et odio dignis-simus sempiterno, tamen confidit amari, quoniam as sentit amare, imo quia se amaripraesentit, non redamare confunditur. Nemo itaque se amari diffidat, qui jam amat.” –Bernardus ad Thomam (Epist. 107). A very fine and pregnant sentence. If I exist notfor God, God exists not for me; if I do not love, I am not loved. The passive is the activecertain of itself, the object is the subject certain of itself. To love is to be man, to beloved is to be God. I am loved, says God; I love, says man. It is not until later that thisis reversed, that the passive transforms itself into the active, and conversely.

45“The Lord spake to Gideon: The people are too many that are with thee, that Ishould give Midian into their hands; Israel might glorify itself against me and say: My

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only the things that are man’s, but to God the things that are God’s; andto him is rendered true living emotion,—the heart.

When in times in which peculiar sanctity was attached to religion, wefind marriage, property, and civil law respected, this has not its foundationin religion, but in the original, natural sense of morality and right, to whichthe true social relations are sacred as such. He to whom the Right is not holyfor its own sake will never be made to feel it sacred by religion. Propertydid not become sacred because it was regarded as a divine institution, but itwas regarded as a divine institution because it was felt to be in itself sacred.Love is not holy because it is a predicate of God, but it is a predicate ofGod because it is in itself divine. The heathens do not worship the lightor the fountain because it is a gift of God, but because it has of itself abeneficial influence on man, because it refreshes the sufferer; on account ofthis excellent quality they pay it divine honours.

Wherever morality is based on theology, wherever the right is madedependent on divine authority, the most immoral, unjust, infamous thingscan be justified and established. I can found morality on theology only whenI myself have already defined the Divine Being by means of morality. Inthe contrary case, I have no criterion of the moral and immoral, but merelyan unmoral, arbitrary basis, from which I may deduce anything I please.Thus, if I would found morality on God, I must first of all place it in God:for Morality, Right, in short, all substantial relations, have their only basisin themselves, can only have a real foundation—such as truth demands—when they are thus based. To place anything in God, or to derive anythingfrom God, is nothing more than to withdraw it from the test of reason,to institute it as indubitable, unassailable, sacred, without rendering anaccount why. Hence self-delusion, if not wicked, insidious design is at theroot of all efforts to establish morality, right, on theology Where we arein earnest about the right we need no incitement or support from above.We need no Christian rule of political right: we need only one which isrational, just, human. The right, the true, the good, has always its ground

hand has delivered me,”—i.e., Ne Israel sibi tribuat, quae mihi debentur.” Judges vii. 2.“Thus saith the Lord: Cursed is the man that trusteth in man. But blessed is the manthat trusteth in the Lord and whose hope is in the Lord.”—Jer. xvii. 5. “God desiresnot our gold, body and possessions, but has given these to the emperor (that is, to therepresentative of the world, of the state), and to us through the emperor. But the heart,which is the greatest and best in man, he has reserved for himself;—this must be ouroffering to God—that we believe in him.”—Luther (xvi. p. 505).

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of sacredness in itself, in its quality, where man is in earnest about ethics,they have in themselves the validity of a divine power. If morality has nofoundation in itself, there is no inherent necessity for morality; morality isthen surrendered to the groundless arbitrariness of religion.

Thus the work of the self-conscious reason in relation to religion is sim-ply to destroy an illusion:—an illusion, however, which is by no meansindifferent, but which, on the contrary, is profoundly injurious in its effecton mankind; which deprives man as well of the power of real life as of thegenuine sense of truth and virtue: for even love, in itself the deepest, truestemotion, becomes by means of religiousness merely ostensible, illusory, sincereligious love gives itself to man only for God’s sake, so that it is given onlyin appearance to man, but in reality to God.

And we need only, as we have shown, invert the religious relations –regard that as an end which religion supposes to be a means—exalt that intothe primary which in religion is subordinate, the accessory, the condition,—at once we have destroyed the illusion, and the unclouded light of truthstreams in upon us. The sacraments of Baptism and the Lord’s Supper,which are the characteristic symbols of the Christian religion, may serve toconfirm and exhibit this truth.

The Water of Baptism is to religion only the means by which the HolySpirit imparts itself to man. But by this conception it is placed in contra-diction with reason, with the truth of things. On the one hand, there isvirtue in the objective, natural quality of water; on the other, there is none,but it is a merely arbitrary medium of divine grace and omnipotence. Wefree ourselves from these and other irreconcilable contradictions, we give atrue significance to Baptism, only by regarding it as a symbol of the valueof water itself. Baptism should represent to us the wonderful but naturaleffect of water on man. Water has, in fact, not merely physical effects, butalso, and as a result of these, moral and intellectual effects on man. Waternot only cleanses man from bodily impurities, but in water the scales fallfrom his eyes: he sees, he thinks more clearly; he feels himself freer; wa-ter extinguishes the fire of appetite. How many saints have had recourseto the natural qualities of water in order to overcome the assaults of thedevil! What was denied by Grace has been granted by Nature. Water playsa part not only in dietetics, but also in moral and mental discipline. Topurify oneself, to bathe, is the first, though the lowest of virtues.46 In the

46Christian baptism also is obviously only a relic of the ancient Nature-worship, in

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stream of water the fever of selfishness is allayed. Water is the readiestmeans of making friends with Nature. The bath is a sort of chemical pro-cess, in which our individuality is resolved into the objective life of Nature.The man rising from the water is a new, a regenerate man. The doctrinethat morality can do nothing without means of grace has a valid meaningif, in place of imaginary, supernatural means of grace, we substitute naturalmeans. Moral feeling can effect nothing without Nature; it must ally itselfwith the simplest natural means. The profoundest secrets lie in commoneveryday things, such as supra-naturalistic religion and speculation ignore,thus sacrificing real mysteries to imaginary, illusory ones; as here, for ex-ample, the real power of water is sacrificed to an imaginary one. Wateris the simplest means of grace or healing for the maladies of the soul aswell as of the body. But water is effectual only where its use is constantand regular. Baptism, as a single act, is either an altogether useless andunmeaning institution, or, if real effects are attributed to it, a superstitiousone. But it is a rational, a venerable institution, if it is understood to typifyand celebrate the moral and physical curative virtues of water.

But the sacrament of water required a supplement. Water, as a universalelement of life, reminds us of our origin from Nature, an origin which we havein common with plants and animals. In Baptism we bow to the power of apure Nature-force; water is the element of natural equality and freedom, themirror of the golden age. But we men are distinguished from the plants andanimals, which together with the inorganic kingdom we comprehend underthe common name of Nature;—we are distinguished from Nature. Hencewe must celebrate our distinction, our specific difference. The symbols ofthis our difference are bread and wine. Bread and wine are, as to theirmaterials, products of Nature; as to their form, products of man. If inwater we declare: Man can do nothing without Nature; by bread and winewe declare: Nature needs man, as man needs Nature. In water, human

which, as in the Persian, water was a means of religious purification. (S. Rhode: Dieheilige Sage, &., PP. 305, 426.) Here, however, water baptism had a much truer, and con-sequently a deeper meaning, than with the Christians, because it rested on the naturalpower and value of water. But indeed for these simple views of Nature which char-acterised the old religions, our speculative as well as theological supra-naturalism hasneither sense nor understanding. When therefore the Persians, the Hindus, the Egyp-tians, the Hebrews, made physical purity a religious duty, they were herein far wiserthan the Christian saints, who attested the supra-naturalistic principle of their religionby physical impurity. Supra-naturalism in theory becomes anti-naturalism in practice.Supra-naturalism is only a euphemism for anti-naturalism.

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mental activity is nullified; in bread and wine it attains self-satisfaction.Bread and wine are supernatural products,—in the only valid and truesense, the sense which is not in contradiction with reason and Nature. If inwater we adore the pure force of Nature, in bread and wine we adore thesupernatural power of mind, of consciousness, of man. Hence this sacramentis only for man matured into consciousness; while baptism is imparted toinfants. But we at the same time celebrate here the true relation of mindto Nature: Nature gives the material, mind gives the form. The sacramentof Baptism inspires us with thankfulness towards Nature, the sacrament ofbread and wine with thankfulness towards man. Bread and wine typify tous the truth that Man is the true God and Saviour of man.

Eating and drinking is the mystery of the Lord’s Supper;—eating anddrinking is, in fact, in itself a religious act; at least, ought to be so.47 Think,therefore, with every morsel of bread which relieves thee from the pain ofhunger, with every draught of wine which cheers thy heart, of the Godwho confers these beneficent gifts upon thee,—think of man! But in thygratitude towards man forget not Gratitude towards holy Nature! Forgetnot that wine is the blood of plants, and flour the flesh of plants, whichare sacrificed for thy well-being! Forget not that the plant typifies to theethe essence of Nature, which lovingly surrenders itself for thy enjoyment.Therefore forget not the gratitude which thou owest to the natural qualitiesof bread and wine! And if thou art inclined to smile that I call eatingand drinking religious acts, because they are common every-day acts, andare therefore performed by multitudes without thought, without emotion;reflect, that the Lord’s Supper is to multitudes a thoughtless, emotionlessact, because it takes place often; and, for the sake of comprehending thereligious significance of bread and wine, place thyself in a position where thedaily act is unnaturally, violently interrupted. Hunger and thirst destroynot only the physical but also the mental and moral powers of man; theyrob him of his humanity of understanding, of consciousness. Oh! if thoushouldst ever experience such want, how wouldst thou bless and praise the

47“Eating and drinking is the easiest of all work. for men like nothing better: yea,the most joyful work in the whole world is eating and drinking, as it is commonly said:Before eating, no dancing, and, On a full stomach stands a merry head. In short, eatingand drinking is a pleasant necessary work;—that is a doctrine soon learned and madepopular. The same pleasant necessary work takes our blessed Lord Christ and says: “Ihave prepared a joyful, sweat and pleasant meal, I will lay on you no hard heavy work.I institute a supper, &c.”—Luther (xvi. 222).

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natural qualities of bread and wine, which restore to thee thy humanity, thyintellect! It needs only that the ordinary course of things be interrupted inorder to vindicate to common things an uncommon significance, to life, assuch, a religious import. Therefore let bread be sacred for us, let wine besacred, and also let water be sacred! Amen.

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ANTI-DUHRING

XII. Dialectics. Quantity and Quality

“The first and most important principle of the basic logical prop-erties of being refers to the exclusion of contradiction. Contra-diction is a category which can only appertain to a combinationof thoughts, but not to reality. There are no contradictionsin things, or, to put it another way, contradiction accepted asreality is itself the apex of absurdity {D. Ph. 30} . . . The an-tagonism of forces measured against each other and moving inopposite directions is in fact the basic form of all actions m thelife of the world and its creatures. But this opposition of thedirections taken by the forces of elements and individuals doesnot in the slightest degree coincide with the idea of absurd con-tradictions {31} . . . We can be content here with having clearedthe fogs which generally rise from the supposed mysteries of logicby presenting a clear picture of the actual absurdity of contra-dictions in reality and with having shown the uselessness of theincense which has been burnt here and there in honour of thedialectics of contradiction — the very clumsily carved woodendoll which is substituted for the antagonistic world schematism”{32}

This is practically all we are told about dialectics in the Cursus derPhilosophie. In his Kritische Geschichte, on the other hand, the dialecticsof contradiction, and with it particularly Hegel, is treated quite differently.

“Contradiction, according to the Hegelian logic, or rather Lo-gos doctrine, is objectively present not in thought, which byits nature can only be conceived as subjective and conscious,but in things and processes themselves and can be met with inso to speak corporeal form, so that absurdity does not remainan impossible combination of thought but becomes an actualforce. The reality of the absurd is the first article of faith in

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the Hegelian unity of the logical and the illogical. . . . The morecontradictory a thing the truer it is, or in other words, the moreabsurd the more credible it is. This maxim, which is not evennewly invented but is borrowed from the theology of the Revela-tion and from mysticism, is the naked expression of the so-calleddialectical principle” {D. K. G. 479-80}.

The thought-content of the two passages cited can be summed up inthe statement that contradiction=absurdity, and therefore cannot occur inthe real world. People who in other respects show a fair degree of commonsense may regard this statement as having the same self-evident validity asthe statement that a straight line cannot be a curve and a curve cannotbe straight. But, regardless of all protests made by common sense, the dif-ferential calculus under certain circumstances nevertheless equates straightlines and curves, and thus obtains results which common sense, insisting onthe absurdity of straight lines being identical with curves, can never attain.And in view of the important role which the so-called dialectics of contra-diction has played in philosophy from the time of the ancient Greeks up tothe present, even a stronger opponent than Herr Duhring should have feltobliged to attack it with other arguments besides one assertion and a goodmany abusive epithets.

True, so long as we consider things as at rest and lifeless, each one byitself, alongside and after each other, we do not run up against any con-tradictions in them. We find certain qualities which are partly common to,partly different from, and even contradictory to each other, but which in thelast-mentioned case are distributed among different objects and thereforecontain no contradiction within. Inside the limits of this sphere of obser-vation we can get along on the basis of the usual, metaphysical mode ofthought. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider thingsin their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on oneanother. Then we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motionitself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of position can onlycome about through a body being at one and the same moment of time bothin one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and alsonot in it. And the continuous origination and simultaneous solution of thiscontradiction is precisely what motion is.

Here, therefore, we have a contradiction which “is objectively presentin things and processes themselves and can be met with in so to speak

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corporeal form”. And what has Herr Duhring to say about it? He assertsthat up to the present there is “no bridge” whatever “in rational mechanicsfrom the strictly static to the dynamic” {D. Ph. 80}. The reader can now atlast see what is hidden behind this favourite phrase of Herr Duhring’s — it isnothing but this: the mind which thinks metaphysically is absolutely unableto pass from the idea of rest to the idea of motion, because the contradictionpointed out above blocks its path. To it, motion is simply incomprehensiblebecause it is a contradiction. And in asserting the incomprehensibility ofmotion, it admits against its will the existence of this contradiction, andthus admits the objective presence in things and processes themselves of acontradiction which is moreover an actual force.

If simple mechanical change of position contains a contradiction this iseven more true of the higher forms of motion of matter, and especially oforganic life and its development. We saw above that life consists preciselyand primarily in this — that a being is at each moment itself and yet some-thing else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in thingsand processes themselves, and which constantly originates and resolves it-self; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, anddeath steps in. We likewise saw that also in the sphere of thought we couldnot escape contradictions, and that for example the contradiction betweenman’s inherently unlimited capacity for knowledge and its actual presenceonly in men who are externally limited and possess limited cognition findsits solution in what is — at least practically, for us — an endless successionof generations, in infinite progress.

We have already noted that one of the basic principles of higher mathe-matics is the contradiction that in certain circumstances straight lines andcurves may be the same. It also gets up this other contradiction: that lineswhich intersect each other before our eyes nevertheless, only five or six cen-timetres from their point of intersection, can be shown to be parallel, thatis, that they will never meet even if extended to infinity. And yet, workingwith these and with even far greater contradictions, it attains results whichare not only correct but also quite unattainable for lower mathematics.

But even lower mathematics teems with contradictions. It is for examplea contradiction that a root of A should be a power of A, and yet A1/2 =√A. It is a contradiction that a negative quantity should be the square of

anything, for every negative quantity multiplied by itself gives a positivesquare. The square root of minus one is therefore not only a contradiction,but even an absurd contradiction, a real absurdity. And yet

√−1 is in many

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cases a necessary result of correct mathematical operations. Furthermore,where would mathematics — lower or higher — be, if it were prohibitedfrom operation with

√−1?

In its operations with variable quantities mathematics itself enters thefield of dialectics, and it is significant that it was a dialectical philosopher,Descartes, who introduced this advance. The relation between the mathe-matics of variable and the mathematics of constant quantities is in generalthe same as the relation of dialectical to metaphysical thought. But thisdoes not prevent the great mass of mathematicians from recognising di-alectics only in the sphere of mathematics, and a good many of them fromcontinuing to work in the old, limited, metaphysical way with methods thatwere obtained dialectically.

It would be possible to go more closely into Herr Duhring’s antagonismof forces and his antagonistic world schematism only if he had given ussomething more on this theme than the mere phrase. After accomplishingthis feat this antagonism is not even once shown to us at work, either in hisworld schematism or in his natural philosophy — the most convincing ad-mission that Herr Duhring can do absolutely nothing of a positive characterwith his “basic form of all actions in the life of the world and its creatures”.When someone has in fact lowered Hegel’s “Doctrine of Essence” to theplatitude of forces moving in opposite directions but not in contradictions,certainly the best thing he can do is to avoid any application of this com-monplace.

Marx’s Capital furnishes Herr Duhring with another occasion for ventinghis anti-dialectical spleen.

“The absence of natural and intelligible logic which characterisesthese dialectical frills and mazes and conceptual arabesques. . .Even to the part that has already appeared we must apply theprinciple that in a certain respect and also in general” (!), “ac-cording to a well-known philosophical preconception, all is to besought in each and each in all, and that therefore, according tothis mixed and misconceived idea, it all amounts to one and thesame thing in the end” {D. K. G. 496}.

This insight into the well-known philosophical preconception also en-ables Herr Duhring to prophesy with assurance what will be the “end” ofMarx’s economic philosophising, that is, what the following volumes of Cap-

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ital will contain, and this he does exactly seven lines after he has declaredthat “speaking in plain human language it is really impossible to divinewhat is still to come in the two” (final) “volumes” {496}.

This, however, is not the first time that Herr Duhring’s writings arerevealed to us as belonging to the “things” in which “contradiction is objec-tively present and can be met with in so to speak corporeal form” {479-80}.But this does not prevent him from going on victoriously as follows:

“Yet sound logic will in all probability triumph over its cari-cature. . . This presence of superiority and this mysterious di-alectical rubbish will tempt no one who has even a modicumof sound judgment left to have anything to do . . . with thesedeformities of thought and style. With the demise of the lastrelics of the dialectical follies this means of duping . . . will loseits deceptive influence, and no one will any longer believe thathe has to torture himself in order to get behind some profoundpiece of wisdom where the husked kernel of the abstruse thingsreveals at best the features of ordinary theories if not of abso-lute commonplaces. . . It is quite impossible to reproduce the”(Marxian) “maze in accordance with the Logos doctrine with-out prostituting sound logic” {D. K. C. 497}. Marx’s method,according to Herr Duhring, consists in “performing dialecticalmiracles for his faithful followers” {498}, and so on.

We are not in any way concerned here as yet with the correctness orincorrectness of the economic results of Marx’s researches, but only withthe dialectical method used by Marx. But this much is certain: most readersof Capital will have learnt for the first time from Herr Duhring what it isin fact that they have read. And among them will also be Herr Duhringhimself, who in the year 1867 (Erganzungsblatter III, No. 3) was still ableto provide what for a thinker of his calibre was a relatively rational reviewof the book; and he did this without first being obliged as he now declares isindispensable, to translate the Marxian argument into Duhringian language.And though even then he committed the blunder of identifying Marxiandialectics with the Hegelian, he had not quite lost the capacity to distinguishbetween the method and the results obtained by using it, and to understandthat the latter are not refuted in detail by lampooning the former in general.

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At any rate, the most astonishing piece of information given by HerrDuhring is the statement that from the Marxian standpoint “it all amountsto one and the same thing in the end” {496}, that therefore to Marx,for example, capitalists and wage-workers, feudal, capitalist and socialistmodes of production are also “one and the same thing” — no doubt inthe end even Marx and Herr Duhring are “one and the same thing”. Suchutter nonsense can only be explained if we suppose that the mere mentionof the word dialectics throws Herr Duhring into such a state of mentalirresponsibility that, as a result of a certain mixed and misconceived idea,what he says and does is “one and the same thing” in the end.

We have here a sample of what Herr Duhring calls

“my historical depiction in the grand style” {556}, or “the sum-mary treatment which settles with genus and type, and does notcondescend to honour what a Hume called the learned mob withan exposure in micrological detail; this treatment in a higherand nobler style is the only one compatible with the interests ofcomplete truth and with one’s duty to the public which is freefrom the bonds of the guilds” {507}.

Historical depiction in the grand style and the summary settlement withgenus and type is indeed very convenient for Herr Duhring, inasmuch as thismethod enables him to neglect all known facts as micrological and equatethem to zero, so that instead of proving anything he need only use generalphrases, make assertions and thunder his denunciations. The method hasthe further advantage that it offers no real foothold to an opponent, whois consequently left with almost no other possibility of reply than to makesimilar summary assertions in the grand style, to resort to general phrasesand finally thunder back denunciations at Herr Duhring — in a word, asthey say, engage in a clanging match, which is not to everyone“s taste.We must therefore be grateful to Herr Duhring for occasionally, by way ofexception, dropping the higher and nobler style, and giving us at least twoexamples of the unsound Marxian Logos doctrine.

“How comical is the reference to the confused, hazy Hegeliannotion that quantity changes into quality, and that therefore anadvance, when it reaches a certain size, becomes capital by thisquantitative increase alone” {498}.

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In this “expurgated” presentation by Herr Duhring that statement cer-tainly seems curious enough. Let us see how it looks in the original, inMarx. On page 313 (2nd edition of Capital), Marx, on the basis of hisprevious examination of constant and variable capital and surplus-value,draws the conclusion that “not every sum of money, or of value, is at plea-sure transformable into capital. To effect this transformation, in fact, acertain minimum of money or of exchange-value must be presupposed inthe hands of the individual possessor of money or commodities.” He takesas an example the case of a labourer in any branch of industry, who worksdaily eight hours for himself — that is, in producing the value of his wages— and the following four hours for the capitalist, in producing surplus-value, which immediately flows into the pocket of the capitalist. In thiscase, one would have to have at his disposal a sum of values sufficient to en-able one to provide two labourers with raw materials, instruments of labourand wages, in order to pocket enough surplus-value every day to live on aswell as one of his labourers. And as the aim of capitalist production is notmere subsistence but the increase of wealth, our man with his two labourerswould still not be a capitalist. Now in order that he may live twice as wellas an ordinary labourer, and turn half of the surplus-value produced againinto capital, he would have to be able to employ eight labourers, that is, hewould have to possess four times the sum of values assumed above. And itis only after this, and in the course of still further explanations elucidatingand substantiating the fact that not every petty sum of values is enoughto be transformable into capital, but that in this respect each period of de-velopment and each branch of industry has its definite minimum sum, thatMarx observes: “Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness ofthe law discovered by Hegel in his Logic, that merely quantitative changesbeyond a certain point pass into qualitative differences.”

And now let the reader admire the higher and nobler style, by virtueof which Herr Duhring attributes to Marx the opposite of what he reallysaid. Marx says: The fact that a sum of values can be transformed intocapital only when it has reached a certain size, varying according to thecircumstances, but in each case definite minimum size — this fact is aproof of the correctness of the Hegelian law. Herr Duhring makes himsay: Because, according to the Hegelian law, quantity changes into quality,“therefore an advance, when it reaches a certain size, becomes capital” {D.K. G. 498}. That is to say, the very opposite.

In connection with Herr Duhring’s examination of the Darwin case, we

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have already got to know his habit, “in the interests of complete truth” andbecause of his “duty to the public which is free from the bonds of the guilds”{507}, of quoting incorrectly. It becomes more and more evident that thishabit is an inner necessity of the philosophy of reality, and it is certainlya very “summary treatment” {507}. Not to mention the fact that HerrDuhring further makes Marx speak of any kind of “advance” whatsoever,whereas Marx only refers to an advance made in the form of raw materials,instruments of labour, and wages; and that in doing this Herr Duhringsucceeds in making Marx speak pure nonsense. And then he has the cheekto describe as comic the nonsense which he himself has fabricated. Just ashe built up a Darwin of his own fantasy in order to try out his strengthagainst him, so here he builds up a fantastic Marx. “Historical depiction inthe grand style” {556}, indeed!

We have already seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, thatin connection with this Hegelian nodal line of measure relations — in whichquantitative change suddenly passes at certain points into qualitative trans-formation — Herr Duhring had a little accident: in a weak moment hehimself recognised and made use of this line. We gave there one of thebest-known examples — that of the change of the aggregate states of wa-ter, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0◦ C from theliquid into the solid state, and at 100◦C from the liquid into the gaseousstate, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative changeof temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of thewater.

In proof of this law we might have cited hundreds of other similar factsfrom nature as well as from human society. Thus, for example, the whole ofPart IV of Marx’s Capital — production of relative surplus-value — deals,in the field of co-operation, division of labour and manufacture, machineryand modern industry, with innumerable cases in which quantitative changealters the quality, and also qualitative change alters the quantity, of thethings under consideration; in which therefore, to use the expression sohated by Herr Duhring, quantity is transformed into quality and vice versa.As for example the fact that the co-operation of a number of people, thefusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to use Marx’s phrase,a “new power”, which is essentially different from the sum of its separateforces.

Over and above this, in the passage which, in the interests of completetruth, Herr Duhring perverted into its opposite, Marx had added a footnote:

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“The molecular theory of modern chemistry first scientifically worked outby Laurent and Gerhardt rests on no other law.” But what did that matterto Herr Duhring? He knew that:

“the eminently modern educative elements provided by the natural-scientific mode of thought are lacking precisely among thosewho, like Marx and his rival Lassalle, make half-science and alittle philosophistics the meagre equipment with which to vampup their learning” {D. K. G. 504} —

while with Herr Duhring “the main achievements of exact knowledge inmechanics, physics and chemistry” {D. Ph. 517} and so forth serve as thebasis —we have seen how. However, in order to enable third persons, too,to reach a decision in the matter, we shall look a little more closely into theexample cited in Marx’s footnote.

What is referred to here is the homologous series of carbon compounds,of which a great many are already known and each of which has its own al-gebraic formula of composition. If, for example, as is done in chemistry, wedenote an atom of carbon by C, an atom of hydrogen by H, an atom of oxy-gen by O, and the number of atoms of carbon contained in each compoundby n, the molecular formulas for some of these series can be expressed asfollows:

CnH2n+2 – the series of normal paraffinsCnH2n+2O – the series of primary alcoholsCnH2nO2 – the series of the monobasic fatty acids.

Let us take as an example the last of these series, and let us assumesuccessively that n=l, n=2, n=3, etc. We then obtain the following results(omitting the isomers):

CH2O2 – formic acid: boiling point 100◦ melting point 1◦

C2H4O2 – acetic acid: ” 118◦ ” 17◦

C3H6O2 – propionic acid: ” 140◦ ” —C8H8O2 – butyric acid: ” 162◦ ” —C5H10O2 – valerianic acid: ” 175◦ ” —

and so on to C50H60O2, melissic acid, which melts only at 80◦ and hasno boiling point at all, because it cannot evaporate without disintegrating.

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Here therefore we have a whole series of qualitatively different bodies,formed by the simple quantitative addition of elements, and in fact alwaysin the same proportion. This is most clearly evident in cases where thequantity of all the elements of the compound changes in the same propor-tion. Thus, in the normal paraffins CnH2n+2, the lowest is methane, CH4,a gas; the highest known, hexadecane, C16H34, is a solid body formingcolourless crystals which melts at 21◦ and boils only at 278◦. Each newmember of both series comes into existence through the addition of CH2,one atom of carbon and two atoms of hydrogen, to the molecular formulaof the preceding member, and this quantitative change in the molecularformula produces each time a qualitatively different body.

These series, however, are only one particularly obvious example; through-out practically the whole of chemistry, even in the various nitrogen oxidesand oxygen acids of phosphorus or sulphur, one can see how “quantitychanges into quality”, and this allegedly confused, hazy Hegelian notionappears in so to speak corporeal form in things and processes — and noone but Herr Duhring is confused and befogged by it. And if Marx was thefirst to call attention to it, and if Herr Duhring read the reference withouteven understanding it (otherwise he would certainly not have allowed thisunparalleled outrage to pass unchallenged), this is enough — even withoutlooking back at the famous Duhringian philosophy of nature — to makeit clear which of the two, Marx or Herr Duhring, is lacking in “the emi-nently modern educative elements provided by the natural-scientific modeof thought” {D. K. G. 504} and in acquaintance with the “main achieve-ments of . . . chemistry” {D. Ph. 517}.

In conclusion we shall call one more witness for the transformation ofquantity into quality, namely — Napoleon. He describes the combat be-tween the French cavalry, who were bad riders but disciplined, and theMamelukes, who were undoubtedly the best horsemen of their time for sin-gle combat, but lacked discipline, as follows:

“Two Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than a match for three French-men; 100 Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300 Frenchmen couldgenerally beat 300 Mamelukes, and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably defeated1,500 Mamelukes.”

Just as with Marx a definite, though varying, minimum sum of exchange-values was necessary to make possible its transformation into capital, sowith Napoleon a detachment of cavalry had to be of a definite minimumnumber in order to make it possible for the force of discipline, embodied

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in closed order and planned utilisation, to manifest itself and rise superioreven to greater numbers of irregular cavalry, in spite of the latter beingbetter mounted, more dexterous horsemen and fighters, and at least asbrave as the former. But what does this prove as against Herr Duhring?Was not Napoleon miserably vanquished in his conflict with Europe? Didhe not suffer defeat after defeat? And why? Solely in consequence of havingintroduced the confused, hazy Hegelian notion into cavalry tactics!

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XIII. Dialectics. Negation of the Negation

“This historical sketch” (of the genesis of the so-called primitiveaccumulation of capital in England) “is relatively the best partof Marx’s book, and would be even better if it had not reliedon the dialectical crutch to help out its scholarly crutch. TheHegelian negation of the negation, in default of anything betterand clearer, has in fact to serve here as the midwife to deliverthe future from the womb of the past. The abolition of ‘in-dividual property’, which since the sixteenth century has beeneffected in the way indicated above, is the first negation. It willbe followed by a second, which bears the character of a nega-tion of the negation and hence of a restoration of ‘individualproperty’, but in a higher form, based on the common owner-ship of land and of the instruments of labour. Herr Marx callsthis new ‘individual property’ also ‘social property’, and in thisthere appears the Hegelian higher unity, in which the contradic-tion is supposed to be sublated, that is to say, in the Hegelianverbal jugglery, both overcome and preserved. . . According tothis, the expropriation of the expropriators is, as it were, theautomatic result of historical reality in its materially externalrelations. . . It would be difficult to convince a sensible man ofthe necessity of the common ownership of land and capital, onthe basis of credence in Hegelian wordjuggling such as the nega-tion of the negation {D. K. G. 502-03}. . . The nebulous hybridsof Marx’s conceptions will not however appear strange to any-one who realises what nonsense can be concocted with Hegeliandialectics as the scientific basis, or rather what nonsense mustnecessarily spring from it. For the benefit of the reader whois not familiar with these artifices, it must be pointed out ex-pressly that Hegel’s first negation is the catechismal idea of thefall from grace and his second is that of a higher unity leadingto redemption. The logic of facts can hardly be based on thisnonsensical analogy borrowed from the religious sphere {504}. . . Herr Marx remains cheerfully in the nebulous world of hisproperty which is at once both individual and social and leavesit to his adepts to solve for themselves this profound dialecticalenigma” {505}

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Thus far Herr Duhring.So Marx has no other way of proving the necessity of the social revo-

lution, of establishing the common ownership of land and of the means ofproduction produced by labour, except by citing the Hegelian negation ofthe negation; and because he bases his socialist theory on these nonsensicalanalogies borrowed from religion, he arrives at the result that in the societyof the future there will be dominant an ownership at once both individualand social, as Hegelian higher unity of the sublated contradiction.

But let the negation of the negation rest for the moment and let us have alook at the “ownership” which is “at once both individual and social”. HerrDuhring characterises this as a “nebulous world”, and curiously enough he isreally right on this point. Unfortunately, however, it is not Marx but againHerr Duhring himself who is in this nebulous world. Just as his dexterityin handling the Hegelian method of “delirious raving” {D. Ph. 227, 449}enabled him without any difficulty to determine what the still unfinishedvolumes of Capital are sure to contain, so here, too, without any great efforthe can put Marx right a la Hegel, by imputing to him the higher unity ofa property, of which there is not a word in Marx.

Marx says: “It is the negation of negation. This re-establishes individ-ual property, but on the basis of the acquisitions of the capitalist era, i.e.,on co-operation of free workers and their possession in common of the landand of the means of production produced by labour. The transformationof scattered private property, arising from individual labour, into capital-ist private property is, naturally, a process, incomparably more protracted,arduous, and difficult, than the transformation of capitalistic private prop-erty, already practically resting on socialised production, into socialisedproperty.” [K. Marx, Das Kapital, p. 793.] [Capital, volume I, Chapter33, page 384 in the MIA pdf file.] That is all. The state of things broughtabout by the expropriation of the expropriators is therefore characterisedas the re-establishment of individual property, but on the basis of the socialownership of the land and of the means of production produced by labouritself. To anyone who understands plain talk this means that social owner-ship extends to the land and the other means of production, and individualownership to the products, that is, the articles of consumption. And inorder to make the matter comprehensible even to children of six, Marx as-sumes on page 56 [Chapter 1, page 48 in the MIA pdf] “a community offree individuals, carrying on their work with the means of production incommon, in which the labour-power of all the different individuals is con-

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sciously applied as the combined labour-power of the community”, that is, asociety organised on a socialist basis; and he continues: “The total productof our community is a social product. One portion serves as fresh meansof production and remains social. But another portion is consumed by themembers as means of subsistence. A distribution of this portion amongstthem is consequently necessary.” And surely that is clear enough even forHerr Duhring, in spite of his having Hegel on his brain.

The property which is at once both individual and social, this confusinghybrid, this nonsense which necessarily springs from Hegelian dialectics,this nebulous world, this profound dialectical enigma, which Marx leaves hisadepts to solve for themselves — is yet another free creation and imaginationon the part of Herr Duhring. Marx, as an alleged Hegelian, is obliged toproduce a real higher unity, as the outcome of the negation of the negation,and as Marx does not do this to Herr Duhring’s taste, the latter has tofall again into his higher and nobler style, and in the interests of completetruth impute to Marx things which are the products of Herr Duhring’s ownmanufacture. A man who is totally incapable of quoting correctly, evenby way of exception, may well become morally indignant at the “Chineseerudition” {D. K. G. 506} of other people, who always quote correctly,but precisely by doing this “inadequately conceal their lack of insight intothe totality of ideas of the various writers from whom they quote”. HerrDuhring is right. Long live historical depiction in the grand style {556}!

Up to this point we have proceeded from the assumption that HerrDuhring’s persistent habit of misquoting is done at least in good faith, andarises either from his total incapacity to understand things or from a habitof quoting from memory — a habit which seems to be peculiar to historicaldepiction in the grand style, but is usually described as slovenly. But weseem to have reached the point at which, even with Herr Duhring, quantityis transformed into quality. For we must take into consideration in the firstplace that the passage in Marx is in itself perfectly clear and is moreoveramplified in the same book by a further passage which leaves no roomwhatever for misunderstanding; secondly, that Herr Duhring had discoveredthe monstrosity of “property which is at once both individual and social”{505} neither in the critique of Capital, in the Erganzungsblatter which wasreferred to above, nor even in the critique contained in the first edition ofhis Kritische Geschichte, but only in the second edition — that is, on thethird reading of Capital; further, that in this second edition, which wasrewritten in a socialist sense, it was deemed necessary by Herr Duhring to

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make Marx say the utmost possible nonsense about the future organisationof society, in order to enable him, in contrast, to bring forward all the moretriumphantly — as he in fact does — “the economic commune as describedby me in economic and juridical outline in my Cursus” {504} — when wetake all this into consideration, we are almost forced to the conclusion thatHerr Duhring has here deliberately made a “beneficent extension” of Marx’sidea — beneficent for Herr Duhring.

But what role does the negation of the negation play in Marx? On page791 and the following pages he sets out the final conclusions which he drawsfrom the preceding fifty pages of economic and historical investigation intothe so-called primitive accumulation of capital. [62] Before the capitalistera, petty industry existed, at least in England, on the basis of the privateproperty of the labourer in his means of production. The so-called prim-itive accumulation of capital consisted there in the expropriation of theseimmediate producers, that is, in the dissolution of private property basedon the labour of its owner. This became possible because the petty indus-try referred to above is compatible only with narrow and primitive boundsof production and society and at a certain stage brings forth the materialagencies for its own annihilation. This annihilation, the transformation ofthe individual and scattered means of production into socially concentratedones, forms the prehistory of capital. As soon as the labourers are turnedinto proletarians, their conditions of labour into capital, as soon as the capi-talist mode of production stands on its own feet, the further socialisation oflabour and further transformation of the land and other means of produc-tion, and therefore the further expropriation of private proprietors, takes anew form.

“That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourerworking for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labour-ers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of theimmanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the concen-tration of capitals. One capitalist always kills many. Handin hand with this concentration, or this expropriation of manycapitalists by few, develop, on an ever extending scale, the co-operative form of the labour-process, the conscious technicalapplication of science, the methodical collective cultivation ofthe soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into in-struments of labour only usable in common, the economising of

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all means of production by their use as the jointly owned meansof production of combined, socialised labour. Along with theconstantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, whousurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transfor-mation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degrada-tion, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the work-ing class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined,united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capi-talist production itself. Capital becomes a fetter upon the modeof production, which has sprung up and flourished along with,and under it. Concentration of the means of production andsocialisation of labour at last reach a point where they becomeincompatible with their capitalist integument. This integumentis burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds.The expropriators are expropriated.”

And now I ask the reader: where are the dialectical frills and mazes andconceptual arabesques; where the mixed and misconceived ideas accordingto which everything is all one and the same thing in the end; where thedialectical miracles for his faithful followers; where the mysterious dialecti-cal rubbish and the maze in accordance with the Hegelian Logos doctrine,without which Marx, according to Herr Duhring, is unable to put his ex-position into shape? Marx merely shows from history, and here states ina summarised form, that just as formerly petty industry by its very devel-opment necessarily created the conditions of its own annihilation, i.e., ofthe expropriation of the small proprietors, so now the capitalist mode ofproduction has likewise itself created the material conditions from which itmust perish. The process is a historical one, and if it is at the same time adialectical process, this is not Marx’s fault, however annoying it may be toHerr Duhring.

It is only at this point, after Marx has completed his proof on the basisof historical and economic facts, that he proceeds:

“The capitalist mode of production and appropriation, hencethe capitalist private property, is the first negation of individualprivate property founded on the labour of the proprietor. Cap-italist production begets, with the inexorability of a process of

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nature, its own negation. It is the negation of the negation” —and so on (as quoted above).

Thus, by characterising the process as the negation of the negation,Marx does not intend to prove that the process was historically necessary.On the contrary: only after he has proved from history that in fact the pro-cess has partially already occurred, and partially must occur in the future,he in addition characterises it as a process which develops in accordancewith a definite dialectical law. That is all. It is therefore once again a puredistortion of the facts by Herr Duhring when he declares that the negationof the negation has to serve here as the midwife to deliver the future fromthe womb of the past {D. K. G. 502-03}, or that Marx wants anyone tobe convinced of the necessity of the common ownership of land and capital{503} (which is itself a Duhringian contradiction in corporeal form) on thebasis of credence in the negation of the negation {479-80}.

Herr Duhring’s total lack of understanding of the nature of dialecticsis shown by the very fact that he regards it as a mere proof-producing in-strument, as a limited mind might look upon formal logic or elementarymathematics. Even formal logic is primarily a method of arriving at newresults, of advancing from the known to the unknown — and dialectics isthe same, only much more eminently so; moreover, since it forces its waybeyond the narrow horizon of formal logic, it contains the germ of a morecomprehensive view of the world. The same correlation exists in mathe-matics. Elementary mathematics, the mathematics of constant quantities,moves within the confines of formal logic, at any rate on the whole; themathematics of variables, whose most important part is the infinitesimalcalculus, is in essence nothing other than the application of dialectics tomathematical relations. In it, the simple question of proof is definitelypushed into the background, as compared with the manifold application ofthe method to new spheres of research. But almost all the proofs of highermathematics, from the first proofs of the differential calculus on, are fromthe standpoint of elementary mathematics strictly speaking, wrong. Andthis is necessarily so, when, as happens in this case, an attempt is made toprove by formal logic results obtained in the field of dialectics. To attemptto prove anything by means of dialectics alone to a crass metaphysician likeHerr Duhring would be as much a waste of time as was the attempt madeby Leibniz and his pupils to prove the principles of the infinitesimal calculusto the mathematicians of their time. The differential gave them the same

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cramps as Herr Duhring gets from the negation of the negation, in which,moreover, as we shall see, the differential also plays a certain role. Finallythese gentlemen — or those of them who had not died in the interval —grudgingly gave way, not because they were convinced, but because it al-ways came out right. Herr Duhring, as he himself tells us, is only in hisforties, and if he attains old age, as we hope he may, perhaps his experiencewill be the same.

But what then is this fearful negation of the negation, which makeslife so bitter for Herr Duhring and with him plays the same role of theunpardonable crime as the sin against the Holy Ghost does in Christianity?— A very simple process which is taking place everywhere and every day,which any child can understand as soon as it is stripped of the veil of mysteryin which it was enveloped by the old idealist philosophy and in which it is tothe advantage of helpless metaphysicians of Herr Duhring’s calibre to keepit enveloped. Let us take a grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barleyare milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain ofbarley meets with conditions which are normal for it, if it falls on suitablesoil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specificchange, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, andin its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of thegrain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers,is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon asthese have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of thisnegation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley,but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold. Species of grainchange extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost the same as itwas a century ago. But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for examplea dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant which grows fromit according to the gardener’s art, we get as a result of this negation of thenegation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds, whichproduce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, eachfresh negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection. — Withmost insects, this process follows the same lines as in the case of the grainof barley. Butterflies, for example, spring from the egg by a negation of theegg, pass through certain transformations until they reach sexual maturity,pair and are in turn negated, dying as soon as the pairing process has beencompleted and the female has laid its numerous eggs. We are not concernedat the moment with the fact that with other plants and animals the process

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does not take such a simple form, that before they die they produce seeds,eggs or offspring not once but many times; our purpose here is only to showthat the negation of the negation really does take place in both kingdoms ofthe organic world. Furthermore, the whole of geology is a series of negatednegations, a series of successive chatterings of old and deposits of new rockformations. First the original earth crust brought into existence by thecooling of the liquid mass was broken up by oceanic, meteorological andatmospherico-chemical action, and these fragmented masses were stratifiedon the ocean bed. Local upheavals of the ocean bed above the surface ofthe sea subject portions of these first strata once more to the action ofrain, the changing temperature of the seasons and the oxygen and carbonicacid of the atmosphere. These same influences act on the molten massesof rock which issue from the interior of the earth, break through the strataand subsequently cool off. In this way, in the course of millions of centuries,ever new strata are formed and in turn are for the most part destroyed, everanew serving as material for the formation of new strata. But the result ofthis process has been a very positive one: the creation of a soil composedof the most varied chemical elements and mechanically fragmented, whichmakes possible the most abundant and diversified vegetation.

It is the same in mathematics. Let us take any algebraic quantity what-ever: for example, a. If this is negated, we get -a (minus a). If we negatethat negation, by multiplying -a by -a, we get +a2, i.e., the original positivequantity, but at a higher degree, raised to its second power. In this casealso it makes no difference that we can obtain the same a2 by multiplyingthe positive a by itself, thus likewise getting a2. For the negated negationis so securely entrenched in a2 that the latter always has two square roots,namely, a and — a. And the fact that it is impossible to get rid of thenegated negation, the negative root of the square, acquires very obvioussignificance as soon as we come to quadratic equations. — The negationof the negation is even more strikingly obvious in higher analysis, in those“summations of indefinitely small magnitudes” {D. Ph. 418} which HerrDuhring himself declares are the highest operations of mathematics, and inordinary language are known as the differential and integral calculus. Howare these forms of calculus used? In a given problem, for example, I havetwo variables,x and y, neither of which can vary without the other alsovarying in a ratio determined by the facts of the case. I differentiate x andy, i.e., I take x and y as so infinitely small that in comparison with anyreal quantity, however small, they disappear, that nothing is left of x and

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y but their reciprocal relation without any, so to speak, material basis, aquantitative ratio in which there is no quantity. Therefore, dy/dx, the ratiobetween the differentials of x and y, is dx equal to 0/0 but 0/0 taken as theexpression of y/x. I only mention in passing that this ratio between twoquantities which have disappeared, caught at the moment of their disap-pearance, is a contradiction; however, it cannot disturb us any more than ithas disturbed the whole of mathematics for almost two hundred years. Andnow, what have I done but negatex and y, though not in such a way thatI need not bother about them any more, not in the way that metaphysicsnegates, but in the way that corresponds with the facts of the case? Inplace ofx and y, therefore, I have their negation, dx and dy, in the formulasor equations before me. I continue then to operate with these formulas,treating dx and dy as quantities which are real, though subject to certainexceptional laws, and at a certain point I negate the negation, i.e., I inte-grate the differential formula, and in place of dx and dy again get the realquantities x and y, and am then not where I was at the beginning, but byusing this method I have solved the problem on which ordinary geometryand algebra might perhaps have broken their jaws in vain.

It is the same in history, as well. All civilised peoples begin with thecommon ownership of the land. With all peoples who have passed a cer-tain primitive stage, this common ownership becomes in the course of thedevelopment of agriculture a fetter on production. It is abolished, negated,and after a longer or shorter series of intermediate stages is transformedinto private property. But at a higher stage of agricultural development,brought about by private property in land itself, private property converselybecomes a fetter on production, as is the case today both with small andlarge landownership. The demand that it, too, should be negated, that itshould once again be transformed into common property, necessarily arises.But this demand does not mean the restoration of the aboriginal commonownership, but the institution of a far higher and more developed form ofpossession in common which, far from being a hindrance to production,on the contrary for the first time will free production from all fetters andenable it to make full use of modern chemical discoveries and mechanicalinventions.

Or let us take another example: The philosophy of antiquity was primi-tive, spontaneously evolved materialism. As such, it was incapable of clear-ing up the relation between mind and matter. But the need to get clarityon this question led to the doctrine of a soul separable from the body, then

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to the assertion of the immortality of this soul, and finally to monotheism.The old materialism was therefore negated by idealism. But in the course ofthe further development of philosophy, idealism, too, became untenable andwas negated by modern materialism. This modern materialism, the nega-tion of the negation, is not the mere re-establishment of the old, but addsto the permanent foundations of this old materialism the whole thought-content of two thousand years of development of philosophy and naturalscience, as well as of the history of these two thousand years. It is no longera philosophy at all, but simply a world outlook which has to establish itsvalidity and be applied not in a science of sciences standing apart, but inthe real sciences. Philosophy is therefore “sublated” here, that is, “bothovercome and preserved” {D. K. G. 503}; overcome as regards its form,and preserved as regards its real content. Thus, where Herr Duhring seesonly “verbal jugglery”, closer inspection reveals an actual content.

Finally: Even the Rousseau doctrine of equality — of which Duhring’sis only a feeble and distorted echo — could not have seen the light but forthe midwife’s services rendered by the Hegelian negation of the negation{502-03} — though it was nearly twenty years before Hegel was born. [63]

And far from being ashamed of this, the doctrine in its first presentationbears almost ostentatiously the imprint of its dialectical origin. In thestate of nature and savagery men were equal; and as Rousseau regardseven language as a perversion of the state of nature, he is fully justified inextending the equality of animals within the limits of a single species alsoto the animal-men recently classified by Haeckel hypothetically as Alali :speechless. But these equal animal-men had one quality which gave theman advantage over the other animals: perfectibility, the capacity to developfurther; and this became the cause of inequality. So Rousseau regards therise of inequality as progress. But this progress contained an antagonism:it was at the same time retrogression.

“All further progress” (beyond the original state) “meant somany steps seemingly towards the perfection of the individualman, but in reality towards the decay of the race. . . Metallurgyand agriculture were the two arts the discovery of which pro-duced this great revolution” (the transformation of the primevalforest into cultivated land, but along with this the introductionof poverty and slavery through property). “For the poet it is

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gold and silver, but for the philosopher iron and corn, whichhave civilised men and ruined the human race.”

Each new advance of civilisation is at the same time a new advanceof inequality. All institutions set up by the society which has arisen withcivilisation change into the opposite of their original purpose.

“It is an incontestable fact, and the fundamental principle of allpublic law, that the peoples set up their chieftains to safeguardtheir liberty and not to enslave them.”

And nevertheless the chiefs necessarily become the oppressors of thepeoples, and intensify their oppression up to the point at which inequality,carried to the utmost extreme, again changes into its opposite, becomes thecause of equality: before the despot all are equal — equally ciphers.

“Here we have the extreme measure of inequality, the final pointwhich completes the circle and meets the point from which weset out: here all private individuals become equal once more,just because they are ciphers, and the subjects have no otherlaw but their master’s will.” But the despot is only master solong as he is able to use force and therefore “when he is drivenout”, he cannot “complain of the use of force. . . Force alonemaintained him in power, and force alone overthrows him; thuseverything takes its natural course”.

And so inequality once more changes into equality; not, however, intothe former naive equality of speechless primitive men, but into the higherequality of the social contract. The oppressors are oppressed. It is thenegation of the negation.

Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought whichcorresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx’s Capital, but also, indetails, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used:processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction;transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernelof the whole thing, the negation of the negation. And though in 1754Rousseau was not yet able to speak the Hegelian jargon {D. K. G. 491}, hewas certainly, sixteen years before Hegel was born, deeply bitten with theHegelian pestilence, dialectics of contradiction, Logos doctrine, theologies,

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and so forth. And when Herr Duhring, in his shallow version of Rousseau’stheory of equality, begins to operate with his victorious two men, he ishimself already on the inclined plane down which he must slide helplesslyinto the arms of the negation of the negation. The state of things in whichthe equality of the two men flourished, which was also described as anideal one, is characterised on page 271 of his Philosophie as the “primitivestate”. This primitive state, however, according to page 279, was necessarilysublated by the “robber system” — the first negation. But now, thanks tothe philosophy of reality, we have gone so far as to abolish the robbersystem and establish in its stead the economic commune {504} based onequality which has been discovered by Herr Duhring — negation of thenegation, equality on a higher plane. What a delightful spectacle, and howbeneficently it extends our range of vision: Herr Duhring’s eminent selfcommitting the capital crime of the negation of the negation!

And so, what is the negation of the negation? An extremely general— and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important — law of de-velopment of nature, history, and thought; a law which, as we have seen,holds good in the animal and plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics,in history and in philosophy — a law which even Herr Duhring, in spite ofall his stubborn resistance, has unwittingly and in his own way to follow.It is obvious that I do not say anything concerning the particular processof development of, for example, a grain of barley from germination to thedeath of the fruit-bearing plant, if I say it is a negation of the negation.For, as the integral calculus is also a negation of the negation, if I said any-thing of the sort I should only be making the nonsensical statement thatthe life-process of a barley plant was integral calculus or for that matterthat it was socialism. That, however, is precisely what the metaphysiciansare constantly imputing to dialectics. When I say that all these processesare a negation of the negation, I bring them all together under this one lawof motion, and for this very reason I leave out of account the specific pe-culiarities of each individual process. Dialectics, however, is nothing morethan the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature,human society and thought.

But someone may object: the negation that has taken place in this caseis not a real negation: I negate a grain of barley also when I grind it, aninsect when I crush it underfoot, or the positive quantity a when I cancelit, and so on. Or I negate the sentence: the rose is a rose, when I say:the rose is not a rose; and what do I get if I then negate this negation and

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say: but after all the rose is a rose? — These objections are in fact thechief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, andthey are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought.Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring thatsomething does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes. Longago Spinoza said: Omnis determinatio est negatio — every limitation ordetermination is at the same time a negation. [64] And further: the kindof negation is here determined, firstly, by the general and, secondly, bythe particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but alsosublate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first negation that thesecond remains or becomes possible. How? This depends on the particularnature of each individual case. If I grind a grain of barley, or crush aninsect, I have carried out the first part of the action, but have made thesecond part impossible. Every kind of thing therefore has a peculiar wayof being negated in such manner that it gives rise to a development, andit is just the same with every kind of conception or idea. The infinitesimalcalculus involves a form of negation which is different from that used in theformation of positive powers from negative roots. This has to be learnt,like everything else. The bare knowledge that the barley plant and theinfinitesimal calculus are both governed by negation of negation does notenable me either to grow barley successfully or to differentiate and integrate;just as little as the bare knowledge of the laws of the determination of soundby the dimensions of the strings enables me to play the violin. — But itis clear that from a negation of the negation which consists in the childishpastime of alternately writing and cancelling a, or in alternately declaringthat a rose is a rose and that it is not a rose, nothing eventuates but thesilliness of the person who adopts such a tedious procedure. And yet themetaphysicians try to make us believe that this is the right way to carryout a negation of the negation, if we ever should want to do such a thing.

Once again, therefore, it is no one but Herr Duhring who is mystifyingus when he asserts that the negation of the negation is a stupid analogyinvented by Hegel, borrowed from the sphere of religion and based on thestory of the fall of man and his redemption {D. K. G. 504}. Men thoughtdialectically long before they knew what dialectics was, just as they spokeprose long before the term prose existed. [An allusion to Moliere’s comedyLe Bourgeois gentilhomme, Act II, Scene 6 — Ed.] The law of negationof the negation, which is unconsciously operative in nature and historyand, until it has been recognised, also in our heads, was only first clearly

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formulated by Hegel. And if Herr Duhring wants to operate with it himselfon the quiet and it is only that he cannot stand the name, then let him finda better name. But if his aim is to banish the process itself from thought,we must ask him to be so good as first to banish it from nature and historyand to invent a mathematical system in which −a×−a is not +a2 and inwhich differentiation and integration are prohibited under severe penalties.

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3 T.S. Eliot

JOURNEY OF THE MAGI

Acknowledgement: The Complete Poems & Plays by T.S. Eliot

Rights holder: FABER AND FABER LIMITED (CLA).

Reproduced by: Thomas Aquinas College per Copyright Clearance Cen-ter’s Annual Academic License; limited to use by Students and Faculty ofThomas Aquinas College.

All rights reserved. Copyright c© 1969

4 Lyric Poetry

JOHN KEATS

Ode on a Grecian Urn

Thou still unravish’d bride of quietness,Thou foster-child of silence and slow time,

Sylvan historian, who canst thus expressA flowery tale more sweetly than our rhyme:

What leaf-fring’d legend haunts about thy shape 5

Of deities or mortals, or of both,In Tempe or the dales of Arcady?

What men or gods are these? What maidens loth?What mad pursuit? What struggle to escape?

What pipes and timbrels? What wild ecstasy? 10

Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheardAre sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;

Not to the sensual ear, but, more endear’d,Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone:

Fair youth, beneath the trees, thou canst not leave 15

Thy song, nor ever can those trees be bare;Bold Lover, never, never canst thou kiss,

Though winning near the goal yet, do not grieve;She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss,

For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair! 20

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4. Lyric Poetry

Ah, happy, happy boughs! that cannot shedYour leaves, nor ever bid the Spring adieu;

And, happy melodist, unwearied,For ever piping songs for ever new;

More happy love! more happy, happy love! 25

For ever warm and still to be enjoy’d,For ever panting, and for ever young;

All breathing human passion far above,That leaves a heart high-sorrowful and cloy’d,

A burning forehead, and a parching tongue. 30

Who are these coming to the sacrifice?To what green altar, O mysterious priest,

Lead’st thou that heifer lowing at the skies,And all her silken flanks with garlands drest?

What little town by river or sea shore, 35

Or mountain-built with peaceful citadel,Is emptied of this folk, this pious morn?

And, little town, thy streets for evermoreWill silent be; and not a soul to tell

Why thou art desolate, can e’er return. 40

O Attic shape! Fair attitude! with bredeOf marble men and maidens overwrought,

With forest branches and the trodden weed;Thou, silent form, dost tease us out of thought

As doth eternity: Cold Pastoral! 45

When old age shall this generation waste,Thou shalt remain, in midst of other woe

Than ours, a friend to man, to whom thou say’st,“Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all

Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.” 50

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Gerard Manley Hopkins

GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS

As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame

As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame;As tumbled over rim in roundy wellsStones ring; like each tucked string tells, each hung bell’sBow swung finds tongue to fling out broad its name;Each mortal thing does one thing and the same: 5

Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;Selves—goes itself; myself it speaks and spells,Crying What I do is me: for that I came.

I say more: the just man justices;Keeps grace: that keeps all his goings graces; 10

10 Acts in God’s eye what in God’s eye he is—Chrıst—for Christ plays in ten thousand places,Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not hisTo the Father through the features of men’s faces

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4. Lyric Poetry

That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the comfort of theResurrection

Cloud-puffball, torn tufts, tossed pillows | flaunt forth, then chevy on anair-

Built thoroughfare: heaven-roysterers, in gay-gangs | they throng; theyglitter in marches.

Down roughcast, down dazzling whitewash, | wherever an elm arches,Shivelights and shadowtackle ın long | lashes lace, lance, and pair.Delightfully the bright wind boisterous | ropes, wrestles, beats earth bare 5

Of yestertempest’s creases; | in pool and rut peel parchesSquandering ooze to squeezed | dough, crust, dust; stanches, starchesSquadroned masks and manmarks | treadmire toil thereFootfretted in it. Million-fueled, | nature’s bonfire burns on.But quench her bonniest, dearest | to her, her clearest-selved spark 10

Man, how fast his firedint, | his mark on mind, is gone!Both are in an unfathomable, all is in an enormous darkDrowned. O pity and indig | nation! Manshape, that shoneSheer off, disseveral, a star, | death blots black out; nor mark

Is any of him at all so stark 15

But vastness blurs and time | beats level. Enough! the Resurrection,A heart’s-clarion! Away grief’s gasping, | joyless days, dejection.

Across my foundering deck shoneA beacon, an eternal beam. | Flesh fade, and mortal trashFall to the residuary worm; | world’s wildfire, leave but ash: 20

In a flash, at a trumpet crash,I am all at once what Christ is, | since he was what I am, andThis Jack, joke, poor potsherd, | patch, matchwood, immortal diamond,

Is immortal diamond.

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Wallace Stevens

WALLACE STEVENS

Sunday Morning

I Complacencies of the peignoir, and lateCoffee and oranges in a sunny chair,And the green freedom of a cockatooUpon a rug mingle to dissipateThe holy hush of ancient sacrifice. 5

She dreams a little, and she feels the darkEncroachment of that old catastrophe,As a calm darkens among water-lights.The pungent oranges and bright, green wingsSeem things in some procession of the dead, 10

Winding across wide water, without sound.The day is like wide water, without sound,Stilled for the passing of her dreaming feetOver the seas, to silent Palestine,Dominion of the blood and sepulchre. 15

II Why should she give her bounty to the dead?What is divinity if it can comeOnly in silent shadows and in dreams?Shall she not find in comforts of the sun,In pungent fruit and bright, green wings, or else 20

In any balm or beauty of the earth,Things to be cherished like the thought of heaven?Divinity must live within herself:Passions of rain, or moods in falling snow;Grievings in loneliness, or unsubdued 25

Elations when the forest blooms; gustyEmotions on wet roads on autumn nights;All pleasures and all pains, rememberingThe bough of summer and the winter branch.These are the measures destined for her soul. 30

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4. Lyric Poetry

III Jove in the clouds had his inhuman birth.No mother suckled him, no sweet land gaveLarge-mannered motions to his mythy mind.He moved among us, as a muttering king,Magnificent, would move among his hinds, 35

Until our blood, commingling, virginal,With heaven, brought such requital to desireThe very hinds discerned it, in a star.Shall our blood fail? Or shall it come to beThe blood of paradise? And shall the earth 40

Seem all of paradise that we shall know?The sky will be much friendlier then than now,A part of labor and a part of pain,And next in glory to enduring love,Not this dividing and indifferent blue. 45

IV She says, “I am content when wakened birds,Before they fly, test the realityOf misty fields, by their sweet questionings;But when the birds are gone, and their warm fieldsReturn no more, where, then, is paradise?” 50

There is not any haunt of prophecy,Nor any old chimera of the grave,Neither the golden underground, nor isleMelodious, where spirits gat them home,Nor visionary south, nor cloudy palm 55

Remote on heaven’s hill, that has enduredAs April’s green endures; or will endureLike her remembrance of awakened birds,Or her desire for June and evening, tippedBy the consummation of the swallow’s wings. 60

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Wallace Stevens

V She says, “But in contentment I still feelThe need of some imperishable bliss.”Death is the mother of beauty; hence from her,Alone, shall come fulfilment to our dreamsAnd our desires. Although she strews the leaves 65

Of sure obliteration on our paths,The path sick sorrow took, the many pathsWhere triumph rang its brassy phrase, or loveWhispered a little out of tenderness,She makes the willow shiver in the sun 70

For maidens who were wont to sit and gazeUpon the grass, relinquished to their feet.She causes boys to pile new plums and pearsOn disregarded plate. The maidens tasteAnd stray impassioned in the littering leaves. 75

VI Is there no change of death in paradise?Does ripe fruit never fall? Or do the boughsHang always heavy in that perfect sky,Unchanging, yet so like our perishing earth,With rivers like our own that seek for seas 80

They never find, the same receding shoresThat never touch with inarticulate pang?Why set the pear upon those river-banksOr spice the shores with odors of the plum?Alas, that they should wear our colors there, 85

The silken weavings of our afternoons,And pick the strings of our insipid lutes!Death is the mother of beauty, mystical,Within whose burning bosom we deviseOur earthly mothers waiting, sleeplessly. 90

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4. Lyric Poetry

VII Supple and turbulent, a ring of menShall chant in orgy on a summer mornTheir boisterous devotion to the sun,Not as a god, but as a god might be,Naked among them, like a savage source. 95

Their chant shall be a chant of paradise,Out of their blood, returning to the sky;And in their chant shall enter, voice by voice,The windy lake wherein their lord delights,The trees, like serafin, and echoing hills, 100

That choir among themselves long afterward.They shall know well the heavenly fellowshipOf men that perish and of summer morn.And whence they came and whither they shall goThe dew upon their feet shall manifest. 105

VIII She hears, upon that water without sound,A voice that cries, “The tomb in PalestineIs not the porch of spirits lingering.It is the grave of Jesus, where he lay.”We live in an old chaos of the sun, 110

Or old dependency of day and night,Or island solitude, unsponsored, free,Of that wide water, inescapable.Deer walk upon our mountains, and the quailWhistle about us their spontaneous cries; 115

Sweet berries ripen in the wilderness;And, in the isolation of the sky,At evening, casual flocks of pigeons makeAmbiguous undulations as they sink,Downward to darkness, on extended wings 120

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5 Outlines of Aristotle’s Physics,following St. Thomas Aquinas

GENERAL DIVISION OF ARISTOTLE’S PHYSICS

I. On the principles of natural science (Books I–II):

A. The intrinsic principles of the subject:

1. Matter, form and privation (Book I).

B. The principles of the science:

1. Its subject & the four causes (Book II).

II. General treatment of the subject: mobile being (Books III–VIII)

A. Movement by itself

1. The definition of movement (Book III, Ch.1–3).2. What follows or belongs to movement.

a. infinity (Book III, Ch.3–8).b. place (Book IV, Ch.1–9).c. time (Book IV, Ch.10–14).

B. The division of movement (Books V–VI).

1. Into species (Book V).2. Into quantitative parts (Book VI).

C. Movement compared to movers and mobiles (Books VII–VIII).

1. That there is a first movement and a first mover (Book VII).2. The characters of the first mover, movement and mobile

(Book VIII).

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5. Outlines of Aristotle’s Physics

OUTLINE OF ARISTOTLE’S PHYSICS, BOOK IV, CHS. 1–5

Book IV of Aristotle’s Physics treats of place (Ch.1–5), emptiness (Ch.6–9),and time (Ch.10–14), all of which apply to movement from without. Placeand emptiness are sorts of measures of movable things, while time is themeasure of movement itself.

An outline of the treatise on place (Ch.1–5).

After showing that natural science must treat of place (Ch.1, to 208b), Aris-totle considers whether, how and what is place: first inquiring dialectically(Ch.1–2), then determining the truth (Ch.3–5).

I. Dialectical inquiry about place (Ch.1–2).

A. Whether there is place (Ch.1).

1. Reasons to show that place is (208b.1 to 209a.2).

a. Two reasons taken from the matter.

i. From change of place (208b.1–8).ii. From the power of place (208b.8-2-4).

b. Two opinions which bear out the reality of place.

i. The opinion that there is emptiness (208b.24–29).ii. The opinion of Hesiod about the primacy of chaos

(208b.29 to 209a.2).

2. Reasons to show that place is not (209a.2–30).

a. If place has dimensions, as does the thing in place, thentwo bodies will coincide.

b. If a point is no other than the place of a point, then asolid is no other than the place of a solid.

c. Place cannot be an element nor from the elements.d. Place is none of the four causes: matter, form, agent,

end.e. (Zeno) If place is, where is it?f. If place equals the placed, it must grow with it.

B. What is place? (Ch.2)

1. Two possibilities. 1f place be either of them, it will be mostdifficult to understand. (209b.17–21)

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a. A reason to show that place is a form: the primary(proper) place of a thing limits and defines its size andmaterial (209a.31 to 209b.6).

b. Plato’s reason for thinking that place is matter: if a placebe a sort of extension (distance) needing to be specifiedby the limiting surfaces of the container, and defined byit, it seems to be an indefinite material. (209b.6–17).

2. Five reasons to show that place is neither matter nor form(209b.22 to 210a.13)

a. Neither matter or form is separated from the thing, butplace can be separated (b.22–31).

b. Whatever is somewhere is itself something, and otherthan what surrounds it (31–33).

c. Against Plato’s opinion: 1f place and matter are thesame, and the ideas and numbers are partaken by mat-ter, are they not also in place? (209b.33–210a.2).

d. Since matter and form move with the thing they con-stitute, they will thus change place; so, there will be aplace of place (210a.2–8).

e. If place were the matter or form of a thing, they would,in a way, corrupt as the thing corrupts (210a.9–11).

II. Determination of the truth about place (Ch.3–5).

A. Necessary preliminaries (Ch.3).

1. Eight meanings of “one thing in another” (to 210a.24).2. Whether a thing can be in itself(210a.25 to 210b.22).

a. Question (210a.25-26).b. Replies: yes, through another, sc. the parts (210a.27–

32), but not through itself, i.e. primarily (210a.33 to210b.22).

i. explanation (210a.33 to 210b.7).ii. proof: neither per se (210b.8–18), nor incidentally

(b.18–22).

3. Two former doubts are resolved (210b.23–32).

a. The difficulty of Zeno.b. The question whether place be matter or form.

B. Determination of the truth (Ch.4–5).

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1. Five suppositions needed to determine about place (210b.33to 211a.5). (St.Thomas takes the first two together).

2. What sort of definition of place will be satisfactory (211a.6–11).

3. Such a definition is pursued and determined, its consequencesfollowed out (211a.12 to end of Ch.5).1

a. The definition is given (Ch.4) and it is shown how some-thing is present in place (Ch.5, up to 212b.22).

b. The remaining difficulties are resolved (212b.22–29).c. The natural properties of place are explained (212b.29

to end Ch.5).

1This item is given in greater detail in the outline on the following page.

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Detail of Previous Outline

DETAIL OF PREVIOUS OUTLINE

Expansion of ll.B.3 (above) i.e., from 211a12 of Ch. 4 thru Ch. 5

I. The definition of place (211a.12 to 212b.22).

A. The definition itself (211a.12 to end of Ch.4).

1. Four premises necessary for investigating the definition (211a.12to 211b.4). Place would not be thought about, unless therewere change of place; this is twofold: Locomotion and Growthor Decrease (211a.12–17).

a. “To be in movement” has two meanings: either per seor accidentally (sc. insofar as one is in what moves);and the latter is again twofold, according as what movesaccidentally can or cannot also move per se (211a.18–24).

b. That in which one is primarily is the last edge of thecontaining body (211a.18–24).

c. When the surrounding is continuous with the surrounded,the latter is present as part in whole, not as placed inplace; but when distinct yet continuous with it, the sur-rounded is in the boundary of the container primarilyand per se (211a.29 to 211b.4).

2. The definition is determined (211b.4 to end of Ch.4)

a. The genus of place is determined (211b.4–212a.7).

i. a fourfold division: place is either matter or form ora sort of extension or the boundary of the container(211b.4-9).

ii. the first three are excluded (211b.9–212a.2).iii. the fourth is concluded (212a.3–7).

b. The difference of place is determined, sc. place is immo-bile (212a.7–19).

c. The definition is concluded: place is the first motionlessboundary of what contains2 (212a.20).

2terminus continentis immobilis primum: Thus, St.Thomas takes “first” (primum)with “contains” rather than with “boundary” (terminus). He explains “what first con-tains” as distinguishing proper from common place. But in the Greek, ’first’ mightmodify “boundary,” which is also neuter, and the word order suggests that it does (“the

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d. The rightness of the definition is indicated. (212a.21 toend Ch.4).

B. How something is in place (Ch.5, up to 212b.22).

1. Thus (by the definition) something is unqualifiedly in placewhen there is an outside body which contains it (212b.31-32).

2. How something (e.g. the last sphere or ’the heaven’) is inplace only in a certain respect (212a.3 to 212b.22).

a. A whole not contained in another is in place through itsparts only (212a.3–212b.22).

b. How the parts of a continuous whole are in place, sc.potentially (212b.3–6).

c. Thus, the uncontained whole-the last sphere-is in placeaccidentally (’indirectly’), sc. insofar as other (its parts)are in place (212b.7–14).

d. A further conclusion: thus the heaven moves only in acircle and is in nothing else, but rather its inner bound-ary is the place of all else (212b.14–22).

II. The resolution of remaining difficulties (212b.22-29).3

III. An explanation of the natural properties of place (212b.29 to endCh.5).

A. Why things naturally move to their places4 (212b.29–33).

container’s boundary, immobile, first”); thus, the English translator’s “innermost.” Yetperhaps St.Thomas’ reading of primum as adverb makes a better definition and fits with210b.35, where we suppose locum esse primum continens illud cujus locus est. (And theEnglish translation there ignores primum!)

3Of the six difficulties given in chapter one, 209a.2-30, Aristotle here answers thefirst two and the last two. The third and fourth are omitted, say St.Thomas, because“those who hold that there is place, do not hold it as if it were an element or cause ofthings.” The others are answered in this order: the 6th, the 2nd, the 1stand the 5th.The English translation numbers separately, under (3) and (4), what are rather parts ofone answer, sc. the answer to the first objection. Furthermore, what it numbers under(6) and (7) are not further objects, but explanations of natural properties. See below.

4“Thus, therefore, the nearness of nature between the containing body and the con-tained is the cause why a body is naturally moved to its place: because the gradation ofnatural places must answer to the gradation of the natures in place.. . . But this reasoncannot be given if place is held to be space, because in the separated dimensions of spaceno order of nature can be considered.” St.Thomas, lesson viii, n.6.

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Detail of Previous Outline

B. Why things naturally rest in their places5 (212b.33 to end ofCh.5).

5Note: The comparison here of water and air is based on two assumptions: (1) wateris naturally contained by and in immediate contact with air, and (2) air is a more perfectnature which water can become. Thus it would follow that the placed compares to thatin which it is placed as matter to form or (more exactly) as matter having an inferiorform to that perfect whole constituted by a superior form. Perhaps such an analogy isappropriate: air : water :: tree : seed.

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OUTLINE OF ARISTOTLE’S PHYSICS, BOOK VI

On the division of movement into quantitative parts.

I. Movement (as every continuum) is divisible (Ch.1–2).

A. No continuum is composed of indivisibles (Ch.1 and 2, to 233b.15).

1. No magnitude is so composed (Ch.1, to 231b.18).2. The same is true of movement and time (231b.18 to Ch.2,

233b.15).

B. No continuum is indivisible (233b.15 to end of Ch.2).

II. How movement is divided (Ch.2–10).

A. Preliminaries (Ch.3 and 4, to 234b.20).

1. No movement or rest in an instant (Ch.3).2. The mobile is divisible (Ch.4, to 23b.20).

B. The division of movement (Ch.4, 234b.21 to Ch.7).

1. The two ways in which movement is divided (Ch.4, 234b.21to end).

2. The order of parts in movement (Ch.5-6).

a. Whether there’s a first in movement (Ch.5).b. Moving and having moved precede one another in move-

ment. (Ch.6).

3. The finite and infinite in movement (Ch.7).

C. The division of rest (Ch.8).D. Certain errors are excluded (Ch. 9–10).

1. Zeno’s paradoxes resolved (Ch.9).2. Indivisibles cannot move (Ch.10, to 241a.26).3. No change is infinite (241a.27 to end of Ch.10).

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Book VII

OUTLINE OF ARISTOTLE’S PHYSICS, BOOK VII

Arguments to show that there is a first movement and a firstmover.

I. That there is a first movement and a first mover (Ch.1–3).

A. A premise: everything moving is moved by another (Ch.1, to242a.15).

B. The argument there is a first movement and a first mover (242a.16to end Ch.1).

C. An assumption proved: mover and moved are together (Ch.2–3).

1. Mover and moved are together (Ch.2).2. An assumption proved: alteration always involves sensible

qualities (Ch.3).

II. Movements compared to one another (Ch.4–5).

A. Which movements can be compared (Ch.4).

1. Difficulties are proposed (248a.10–15).2. The difficulties are discussed (248a.16 to 248b.7).3. The difficulties are resolved (248b.7 to end of Ch.4).

B. How movements are compared (Ch.5).

1. Comparison of local movements (to 250a.28).2. Comparison of the others (250a.28 to end).

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OUTLINE OF ARISTOTLE’S PHYSICS, BOOK VIII

Concerning the first mover, the first movement, and the firstmobile (10 chapters).

I. Preliminary: whether movement is sempiternal (Ch.1–2).

A. The question is raised (Ch.1, to 251a.7).B. Aristotle’s own view (251a.8 to end of Ch.1).C. Replies to objections (Ch.2).

II. That the first mover is immobile (Ch.3-6).

A. Local movement alone can be primary and continuous (Ch.7).B. No non-circular movement can be continuous and everlasting

(Ch.8 to 246b.8).C. Circular movement can be continuous, everlasting, and primary

(264b.8 to end of Ch.9).

III. The condition of the first mover (Ch.10).

A. Preliminaries.

1. Infinite movement requires an infinite power (to 266a.24).2. No infinite power in a finite body (266a.25 to 266b.26).3. The first mover is one (266b.27 to 267b.18).

B. Conclusion: the first mover has no size, i.e., is incorporeal (267b.18to end of Ch.10).

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6 St. Thomas Aquinas

THE DIVISION AND METHODS OF THE SCIENCES

Boethius, De Trinitate, Chapter II (partial)

Age igitur ingrediamur et unumquodque ut intellegi atque capi potest dispi-ciamus; nam, sicut optime dictum videtur, eruditi est hominis unumquodqueut ipsum est ita de eo fidem capere temptare.

Nam cum tres sint speculativae partes, naturalis, in motu inabstractaanupexairetos (considerat enim corporum formas cum materia, quae a cor-poribus actu separari non possunt, quae corpora in motu sunt ut cum terradeorsum ignis sursum fertur, habetque motum forma materiae coniuncta),mathematica, sine motu inabstracta (haec enim formas corporum specu-latur sine materia ac per hoc sine motu, quae formae cum in materia sint,ab his separari non possunt), theologica, sine motu abstracta atque sepa-rabilis (nam dei substantia et materia et motu caret), in naturalibus igiturrationabiliter, in mathematicis disciplinaliter, in divinis intellectualiter ver-sari oportebit neque diduci ad imaginationes sed potius ipsam inspicereformam quae vere forma neque imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex quaesse est.

St. Thomas’ Expositio of the above

Proposuit superius Boethius sententiam Catholicae fidei de unitate Trini-tatis et rationem sententiae prosecutus est. Nunc intendit procedere adinquisitionem praedictorum. Et quia secundum sententiam philosophi in IImetaphysicae ante scientiam oportet inquirere modum scientiae, ideo parsista dividitur in duas. In prima Boethius ostendit modum proprium huiusinquisitionis, quae est de rebus divinis. In secunda vero parte secundummodum assignatum procedit ad propositum inquirendum, ibi: quae vereforma est et cetera. Prima pars dividitur in duas. In prima ponit ne-cessitatem ostendendi modum inquisitionis. In secunda modum congruuminquisitioni praesenti ostendit, ibi: nam cum tres sint et cetera. Dicit ergo:igitur, ex quo constat hanc esse sententiam Catholicae fidei de unitate Trini-tatis et indifferentiam esse rationem unitatis, age, adverbium exhortandi,ingrediamur, id est interius inquiramus ipsa intima rerum principia consid-

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erantes et veritatem quasi velatam et absconditam perscrutantes, et hocmodo convenienti; unde subdit: et unumquodque dicendorum discutiamus,ut potest intelligi atque capi, id est per modum quo possit intelligi et capi.

Et dicit haec duo, quia modus, quo aliqua discutiuntur, debet congruereet rebus et nobis. Nisi enim rebus congrueret, res intelligi non possent;nisi vero congrueret nobis, nos capere non possemus, utpote res divinae exnatura sua habent quod non cognoscantur nisi intellectu. Unde si aliquisvellet sequi imaginationem in consideratione earum, non posset intelligere,quia ipsae res non sunt sic intelligibiles. Si autem aliquis vellet res divinasper se ipsas videre ea certitudine et comprehendere, sicut comprehenduntursensibilia et demonstrationes mathematicae, non posset hoc modo caperepropter defectum intellectus sui, quantumvis ipsae res sint secundum se hocmodo intelligibiles. Et quod modus congruus sit in inquisitione qualibet ob-servandus, probat inducendo auctoritatem philosophi in principio Ethico-rum, et hoc est quod subiungit: nam sicut optime dictum videtur, scilicetab Aristotele in principio Ethicorum: eruditi hominis est ut unumquodqueipsum est, id est per modum congruum ipsi rei, ita de eo fidem caperetemptare. Non enim de omnibus rebus potest aequalis certitudo et evidentiademonstrationis servari. Et sunt haec verba philosophi in I Ethicorum: dis-ciplinati enim est in tantum certitudinem inquirere secundum unumquodquegenus, in quantum natura rei recipit.

Deinde cum dicit: nam cum tres etc., inquirit modum congruum huicinquisitioni per distinctionem a modis qui observantur in aliis scientiis. Etquia modus debet esse congruus rei de qua est perscrutatio, ideo dividiturhaec pars in duas. In prima enim distinguit scientias secundum res, dequibus determinant. In secunda ostendit modos singulis earum congruos,ibi: in naturalibus igitur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit,de quibus consideret naturalis philosophia. Secundo, de quibus mathemat-ica, ibi: mathematica et cetera. Tertio, de quibus considerat divina scientia,ibi: theologia est sine motu et cetera. Dicit ergo: bene dictum est quod utunumquodque est, ita debet de eo fides capi. Nam cum tres sint partesspeculativae, scilicet philosophiae - hoc dicit ad differentiam Ethicae, quaeest activa sive practica - in omnibus requiritur modus competens materiae.Sunt autem tres partes praedictae: physica sive naturalis, mathematica,divina sive theologia. Cum, inquam, sint tres partes, naturalis, quae estuna earum, est in motu, inabstracta, id est versatur eius consideratio circares mobiles a materia non abstractas, quod probat per exempla, ut patetin littera. Quod autem dicit: habetque motum forma materiae coniuncta,

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The Division and Methods of the Sciences (Latin)

sic intelligendum est: ipsum compositum ex materia et forma, in quantumhuiusmodi, habet motum sibi debitum, vel ipsa forma in materia exsistensest principium motus; et ideo eadem est consideratio de rebus secundumquod sunt materiales et secundum quod sunt mobiles.

Deinde exponit de quibus sit mathematica: mathematica est sine motu,id est sine motus et mobilium consideratione, in quo differt a naturali, in-abstracta, id est considerat formas quae secundum esse suum non sunt amateria abstractae, in quo convenit cum naturali; quod quomodo sit ex-ponit. Haec enim, scilicet mathematica, speculatur formas sine materia acper hoc sine motu, quia ubicumque est motus, est materia, ut probatur in IXmetaphysicae, eo modo quo est ibi motus, et sic ipsa speculatio mathematiciest sine materia et motu. Quae formae, scilicet de quibus mathematicusspeculatur, cum sint in materia, non possunt ab his separari secundum esse,et sic secundum speculationem sunt separabiles, non secundum esse.

Deinde ostendit de quibus sit tertia, scilicet divina: theologia, id est ter-tia pars speculativae, quae dicitur divina vel metaphysica vel philosophiaprima, est sine motu, in quo convenit cum mathematica et differt a natu-rali, abstracta, scilicet a materia, atque inseparabilis, per quae duo differt amathematica. Res enim divinae sunt secundum esse abstractae a materiaet motu, sed mathematicae inabstractae, sunt autem consideratione sepa-rabiles; sed res divinae inseparabiles, quia nihil est separabile nisi quod estconiunctum. Unde res divinae non sunt secundum considerationem sep-arabiles a materia, sed secundum esse abstractae; res vero mathematicaee contrario. Et hoc probat per Dei substantiam, de qua scientia divinaconsiderat principaliter, unde et inde nominatur.

Deinde cum dicit: in naturalibus igitur etc., ostendit, quis sit moduscongruus praedictis partibus. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo concluditmodos congruos singulis partium praedictarum, et huius partis expositiorelinquitur disputationi. Secundo exponit ultimum modum qui est pro-prius praesenti inquisitioni. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo removendo id quodest impeditivum dicens: neque oportet in divinis deduci ad imaginationes,ut scilicet de eis iudicando sequamur imaginationis iudicium. Secundo os-tendendo id quod est proprium, ibi: sed potius ipsam inspicere formamsine motu et materia, cuius condiciones consequenter exponit ingrediens adpropositam inquisitionem.

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St. Thomas’ Disputatio

quaestio 5

Hic est duplex quaestio. Prima de divisione speculativae, quam in litteraponit. Secunda de modis, quos partibus speculativae attribuit. Circa pri-mum quaeruntur quattuor.

Primo. Utrum sit conveniens divisio qua dividitur speculativa in hastres partes: naturalem, mathematicam et divinam.

Secundo. Utrum naturalis philosophia sit de his quae sunt in motu etmateria.

Tertio. Utrum mathematica consideratio sit sine motu et materia de hisquae sunt in materia.

Quarto. Utrum divina scientia sit de his quae sunt sine materia et motu.

Articulus 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod speculativa inconvenienter in haspartes dividatur. Partes enim speculativae sunt illi habitus qui partemcontemplativam animae perficiunt. Sed philosophus in VI Ethicorum ponitquod scientificum animae, quod est pars eius contemplativa, perficitur tribushabitibus, scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellectu. Ergo ista tria sunt partesspeculativae et non illa quae in littera ponuntur.

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in VIII de civitate Dei quod rationalis philo-sophia, quae est logica, sub contemplativa philosophia vel speculativa con-tinetur. Cum ergo de ea mentionem non faciat, videtur quod divisio sitinsufficiens.

Praeterea, communiter dividitur philosophia in septem artes liberales,inter quas neque naturalis neque divina continetur, sed sola rationalis etmathematica. Ergo naturalis et divina non debuerunt poni partes specula-tivae.

Praeterea, scientia medicinae maxime videtur esse operativa, et tamenin ea ponitur una pars speculativa et alia practica. Ergo eadem ratione inomnibus aliis operativis scientiis aliqua pars est speculativa, et ita debuit inhac divisione mentio fieri de Ethica sive morali, quamvis sit activa, propterpartem eius speculativam.

Praeterea, scientia medicinae quaedam pars physicae est, et similiterquaedam aliae artes quae dicuntur mechanicae, ut scientia de agricultura,alchimia et aliae huiusmodi. Cum ergo istae sint operativae, videtur quodnon debuerit naturalis absolute sub speculativa poni.

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Praeterea, totum non debet dividi contra partem. Sed divina scientiaesse videtur ut totum respectu physicae et mathematicae, cum subiectaillarum sint partes subiecti istius. Divinae enim scientiae, quae est primaphilosophia, subiectum est ens, cuius pars est substantia mobilis, quamconsiderat naturalis, et similiter quantitas quam considerat mathematicus,ut patet in III metaphysicae. Ergo scientia divina non debet dividi contranaturalem et mathematicam.

Praeterea, scientiae dividuntur quemadmodum et res, ut dicitur in IIIde anima. Sed philosophia est de ente; est enim cognitio entis, ut dicitDionysius in epistula ad Polycarpum. Cum ergo ens primo dividatur perpotentiam et actum, per unum et multa, per substantiam et accidens, vide-tur quod per huiusmodi deberent partes philosophiae distingui.

Praeterea, multae aliae divisiones sunt entium, de quibus sunt scien-tiae, magis essentiales quam istae quae sunt per mobile et immobile, perabstractum et non abstractum, utpote per corporeum et incorporeum, an-imatum et inanimatum et per alia huiusmodi. Ergo magis deberet divisiopartium philosophiae accipi per huiusmodi differentias quam per illas quaehic tanguntur.

Praeterea, illa scientia, a qua aliae supponunt, debet esse prior eis. Sedomnes aliae scientiae supponunt a scientia divina, quia eius est probareprincipia aliarum scientiarum. Ergo debuit scientiam divinam aliis praeor-dinare.

Praeterea, mathematica prius occurrit addiscenda quam naturalis, eoquod mathematicam facile possunt addiscere pueri, non autem naturalemnisi provecti, ut dicitur in VI Ethicorum. Unde et apud antiquos hic ordoin scientiis addiscendis fuisse dicitur observatus, ut primo logica, deindemathematica, post quam naturalis et post hanc moralis, et tandem div-inae scientiae homines studerent. Ergo mathematicam naturali scientiaepraeordinare debuit. Et sic videtur divisio haec insufficiens.

Sed e contra, quod haec divisio sit conveniens, probatur per philosophumin VI metaphysicae, ubi dicit: quare tres erunt philosophicae et theoricae:mathematica, physica, theologia.

Praeterea, in II physicorum ponuntur tres modi scientiarum, qui ad hasetiam tres pertinere videntur.

Praeterea, Ptolemaeus etiam in principio Almagesti hac divisione utitur.Responsio. Dicendum quod theoricus sive speculativus intellectus in

hoc proprie ab operativo sive practico distinguitur quod speculativus habetpro fine veritatem quam considerat, practicus vero veritatem consideratam

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ordinat in operationem tamquam in finem. Et ideo dicit philosophus in IIIde anima quod differunt ad invicem fine, et in II metaphysicae dicitur quodfinis speculativae est veritas, sed finis operativae scientiae est actio. Cumergo oporteat materiam fini esse proportionatam, oportet practicarum sci-entiarum materiam esse res illas quae a nostro opere fieri possunt, ut sicearum cognitio in operationem quasi in finem ordinari possit. Speculati-varum vero scientiarum materiam oportet esse res quae a nostro opere nonfiunt; unde earum consideratio in operationem ordinari non potest sicut infinem. Et secundum harum rerum distinctionem oportet scientias specula-tivas distingui.

Sciendum tamen quod, quando habitus vel potentiae penes obiecta dis-tinguuntur, non distinguuntur penes quaslibet differentias obiectorum, sedpenes illas quae sunt per se obiectorum in quantum sunt obiecta. Esse enimanimal vel plantam accidit sensibili in quantum est sensibile, et ideo peneshoc non sumitur distinctio sensuum, sed magis penes differentiam coloris etsoni. Et ideo oportet scientias speculativas dividi per differentias specula-bilium, in quantum speculabilia sunt. Speculabili autem, quod est obiectumspeculativae potentiae, aliquid competit ex parte intellectivae potentiae etaliquid ex parte habitus scientiae quo intellectus perficitur. Ex parte siq-uidem intellectus competit ei quod sit immateriale, quia et ipse intellectusimmaterialis est; ex parte vero scientiae competit ei quod sit necessarium,quia scientia de necessariis est, ut probatur in I posteriorum. Omne autemnecessarium, in quantum huiusmodi, est immobile; quia omne quod move-tur, in quantum huiusmodi, est possibile esse et non esse vel simpliciter velsecundum quid, ut dicitur in IX metaphysicae. Sic ergo speculabili, quodest obiectum scientiae speculativae, per se competit separatio a materia etmotu vel applicatio ad ea. Et ideo secundum ordinem remotionis a materiaet motu scientiae speculativae distinguuntur.

Quaedam ergo speculabilium sunt, quae dependent a materia secundumesse, quia non nisi in materia esse possunt. Et haec distinguuntur, quiaquaedam dependent a materia secundum esse et intellectum, sicut illa, inquorum diffinitione ponitur materia sensibilis; unde sine materia sensibiliintelligi non possunt, ut in diffinitione hominis oportet accipere carnem etossa. Et de his est physica sive scientia naturalis. Quaedam vero sunt,quae quamvis dependeant a materia secundum esse, non tamen secundumintellectum, quia in eorum diffinitionibus non ponitur materia sensibilis,sicut linea et numerus. Et de his est mathematica. Quaedam vero specula-bilia sunt, quae non dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine materia

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esse possunt, sive numquam sint in materia, sicut Deus et Angelus, sivein quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut substantia, quali-tas, ens, potentia, actus, unum et multa et huiusmodi. De quibus omnibusest theologia, id est scientia divina, quia praecipuum in ea cognitorum estDeus, quae alio nomine dicitur metaphysica, id est trans physicam, quiapost physicam discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus oportet ininsensibilia devenire. Dicitur etiam philosophia prima, in quantum aliaeomnes scientiae ab ea sua principia accipientes eam consequuntur. Non estautem possibile quod sint aliquae res quae secundum intellectum depen-deant a materia et non secundum esse, quia intellectus, quantum est dese, immaterialis est. Et ideo non est quartum genus philosophiae praeterpraedicta.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus in VI Ethicorum determi-nat de habitibus intellectualibus, in quantum sunt virtutes intellectuales.Dicuntur autem virtutes, in quantum perficiunt in sua operatione. Virtusenim est quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit ; et ideosecundum quod diversimode perficitur per huiusmodi habitus speculativos,diversificat huiusmodi virtutes. Est autem alius modus quo pars animaespeculativa perficitur per intellectum, qui est habitus principiorum, quoaliqua ex se ipsis nota fiunt et quo cognoscuntur conclusiones ex huiusmodiprincipiis demonstratae, sive demonstratio procedat ex causis inferioribus,sicut est in scientia, sive ex causis altissimis, ut in sapientia. Cum autemdistinguuntur scientiae ut sunt habitus quidam, oportet quod penes obiectadistinguantur, id est penes res, de quibus sunt scientiae. Et sic distinguun-tur hic et in VI metaphysicae tres partes philosophiae speculativae.

Ad secundum dicendum quod scientiae speculativae, ut patet in princi-pio metaphysicae, sunt de illis quorum cognitio quaeritur propter se ipsa.Res autem, de quibus est logica, non quaeruntur ad cognoscendum propterse ipsas, sed ut adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias. Et ideo logicanon continetur sub speculativa philosophia quasi principalis pars, sed sicutquiddam reductum ad philosophiam speculativam, prout ministrat specula-tioni sua instrumenta, scilicet syllogismos et diffinitiones et alia huiusmodi,quibus in scientiis speculativis indigemus. Unde secundum Boethium incommento super Porphyrium non tam est scientia quam scientiae instru-mentum.

Ad tertium dicendum quod septem liberales artes non sufficienter di-vidunt philosophiam theoricam, sed ideo, ut dicit Hugo de sancto Victorein III sui didascalicon, praetermissis quibusdam aliis septem connumeran-

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tur, quia his primum erudiebantur, qui philosophiam discere volebant, etideo distinguuntur in trivium et quadrivium, eo quod his quasi quibusdamviis vivax animus ad secreta philosophiae introeat. Et hoc etiam consonatverbis philosophi qui dicit in II metaphysicae quod modus scientiae de-bet quaeri ante scientias; et Commentator ibidem dicit quod logicam, quaedocet modum omnium scientiarum, debet quis addiscere ante omnes aliasscientias, ad quam pertinet trivium. Dicit etiam in VI Ethicorum quodmathematica potest sciri a pueris, non autem physica, quae experimentumrequirit. Et sic datur intelligi quod post logicam consequenter debet math-ematica addisci, ad quam pertinet quadrivium; et ita his quasi quibusdamviis praeparatur animus ad alias philosophicas disciplinas. Vel ideo hae in-ter ceteras scientias artes dicuntur, quia non solum habent cognitionem,sed opus aliquod, quod est immediate ipsius rationis, ut constructionemsyllogismi vel orationem formare, numerare, mensurare, melodias formareet cursus siderum computare. Aliae vero scientiae vel non habent opus,sed cognitionem tantum, sicut scientia divina et naturalis; unde nomenartis habere non possunt, cum ars dicatur ratio factiva, ut dicitur in VImetaphysicae. Vel habent opus corporale, sicut medicina, alchimia et aliaehuiusmodi. Unde non possunt dici artes liberales, quia sunt hominis huius-modi actus ex parte illa, qua non est liber, scilicet ex parte corporis. Scientiavero moralis, quamvis sit propter operationem, tamen illa operatio non estactus scientiae, sed magis virtutis, ut patet in libro Ethicorum. Unde nonpotest dici ars, sed magis in illis operationibus se habet virtus loco artis.Et ideo veteres diffinierunt virtutem esse artem bene recteque vivendi, utAugustinus dicit in IV de civitate Dei.

Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Avicenna in principio suaemedicinae, aliter distinguitur theoricum et practicum, cum philosophia di-viditur in theoricam et practicam, aliter cum artes dividuntur in theoricaset practicas, aliter cum medicina. Cum enim philosophia vel etiam artesper theoricum et practicum distinguuntur, oportet accipere distinctionemeorum ex fine, ut theoricum dicatur illud, quod ordinatur ad solam cog-nitionem veritatis, practicum vero, quod ordinatur ad operationem. Hoctamen interest, cum in hoc dividitur philosophia totalis et artes, quod indivisione philosophiae habetur respectus ad finem beatitudinis, ad quemtota humana vita ordinatur. Ut enim dicit Augustinus XX de civitate Deiex verbis Varronis, nulla est homini alia causa philosophandi nisi ut beatussit. Unde cum duplex felicitas a philosophis ponatur, una contemplativaet alia activa, ut patet in X Ethicorum, secundum hoc etiam duas partes

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philosophiae distinxerunt, moralem dicentes practicam, naturalem et ratio-nalem dicentes theoricam. Cum vero dicuntur artium quaedam esse spec-ulativae, quaedam practicae, habetur respectus ad aliquos speciales finesillarum artium, sicut si dicamus agriculturam esse artem practicam, di-alecticam vero theoricam. Cum autem medicina dividitur in theoricam etpracticam, non attenditur divisio secundum finem. Sic enim tota medic-ina sub practica continetur, utpote ad operationem ordinata. Sed atten-ditur praedicta divisio secundum quod ea, quae in medicina tractantur,sunt propinqua vel remota ab operatione. Illa enim pars medicinae diciturpractica, quae docet modum operandi ad sanationem, sicut quod talibusapostematibus sunt talia remedia adhibenda, theorica vero illa pars, quaedocet principia, ex quibus homo dirigitur in operatione, sed non proxime,sicut quod virtutes sunt tres et quod genera febrium sunt tot. Unde nonoportet, ut si alicuius activae scientiae aliqua pars dicatur theorica, quodpropter hoc illa pars sub philosophia speculativa ponatur.

Ad quintum dicendum quod aliqua scientia continetur sub alia du-pliciter, uno modo ut pars ipsius, quia scilicet subiectum eius est pars ali-qua subiecti illius, sicut planta est quaedam pars corporis naturalis; undeet scientia de plantis continetur sub scientia naturali ut pars. Alio modocontinetur una scientia sub alia ut ei subalternata, quando scilicet in su-periori scientia assignatur propter quid eorum, de quibus scitur in scientiainferiori solum quia, sicut musica ponitur sub arithmetica. Medicina ergonon ponitur sub physica ut pars. Subiectum enim medicinae non est parssubiecti scientiae naturalis secundum illam rationem, qua est subiectummedicinae. Quamvis enim corpus sanabile sit corpus naturale, non tamenest subiectum medicinae, prout est sanabile a natura, sed prout est sanabileab arte. Sed quia in sanatione, quae fit etiam per artem, ars est ministranaturae, quia ex aliqua naturali virtute sanitas perficitur auxilio artis, indeest quod propter quid de operatione artis oportet accipere ex proprietati-bus rerum naturalium. Et propter hoc medicina subalternatur physicae, eteadem ratione alchimia et scientia de agricultura et omnia huiusmodi. Etsic relinquitur quod physica secundum se et secundum omnes partes suasest speculativa, quamvis aliquae scientiae operativae subalternentur ei.

Ad sextum dicendum quod quamvis subiecta aliarum scientiarum sintpartes entis, quod est subiectum metaphysicae, non tamen oportet quodaliae scientiae sint partes ipsius. Accipit enim unaquaeque scientiarumunam partem entis secundum specialem modum considerandi alium a modo,quo consideratur ens in metaphysica. Unde proprie loquendo subiectum il-

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lius non est pars subiecti metaphysicae; non enim est pars entis secundumillam rationem, qua ens est subiectum metaphysicae, sed hac ratione con-siderata ipsa est specialis scientia aliis condivisa. Sic autem posset dici parsipsius scientia, quae est de potentia vel quae est de actu aut de uno vel dealiquo huiusmodi, quia ista habent eundem modum considerandi cum ente,de quo tractatur in metaphysica.

Ad septimum dicendum quod illae partes entis exigunt eundem modumtractandi cum ente communi, quia etiam ipsa non dependent ad materiam,et ideo scientia de ipsis non distinguitur a scientia quae est de ente communi.

Ad octavum dicendum quod aliae diversitates rerum, quas obiectio tan-git, non sunt differentiae per se earum in quantum sunt scibiles; et ideopenes eas scientiae non distinguuntur.

Ad nonum dicendum quod quamvis scientia divina sit prima omniumscientiarum naturaliter, tamen quoad nos aliae scientiae sunt priores. Utenim dicit Avicenna in principio suae metaphysicae, ordo huius scientiae est,ut addiscatur post scientias naturales, in quibus sunt multa determinata,quibus ista scientia utitur, ut generatio, corruptio, motus et alia huius-modi. Similiter etiam post mathematicas. Indiget enim haec scientia adcognitionem substantiarum separatarum cognoscere numerum et ordinemorbium caelestium, quod non est possibile sine astrologia, ad quam totamathematica praeexigitur. Aliae vero scientiae sunt ad bene esse ipsius,ut musica et morales vel aliae huiusmodi. Nec tamen oportet quod sitcirculus, quia ipsa supponit ea, quae in aliis probantur, cum ipsa aliarumprincipia probet, quia principia, quae accipit alia scientia, scilicet naturalis,a prima philosophia, non probant ea quae item philosophus primus accipita naturali, sed probantur per alia principia per se nota; et similiter philoso-phus primus non probat principia, quae tradit naturali, per principia quaeab eo accipit, sed per alia principia per se nota. Et sic non est aliquiscirculus in diffinitione. Praeterea, effectus sensibiles, ex quibus proceduntdemonstrationes naturales, sunt notiores quoad nos in principio, sed cumper eos pervenerimus ad cognitionem causarum primarum, ex eis apparebitnobis propter quid illorum effectuum, ex quibus probabantur demonstra-tione quia. Et sic et scientia naturalis aliquid tradit scientiae divinae, ettamen per eam sua principia notificantur. Et inde est quod Boethius ultimoponit scientiam divinam, quia est ultima quoad nos.

Ad decimum dicendum quod quamvis naturalis post mathematicam ad-discenda occurrat, ex eo quod universalia ipsius documenta indigent experi-mento et tempore, tamen res naturales, cum sint sensibiles, sunt naturaliter

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magis notae quam res mathematicae a sensibili materia abstractae.

Articulus 2

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia naturalis non sit de hisquae sunt in motu et materia. Materia enim est individuationis principium.Sed nulla scientia est de individuis, sed de solis universalibus, secundumsententiam Platonis, quae ponitur in Porphyrio. Ergo scientia naturalisnon est de his quae sunt in materia.

Praeterea, scientia ad intellectum pertinet. Sed intellectus cognoscitabstrahendo a materia et a condicionibus materiae. Ergo de his, quae nonsunt a materia abstracta, nulla scientia esse potest.

Praeterea, in scientia naturali agitur de primo motore, ut patet in VIIIphysicorum. Sed ipse est immunis ab omni materia. Ergo scientia naturalisnon est de his solis quae sunt in materia.

Praeterea, omnis scientia de necessariis est. Sed omne quod movetur, inquantum huiusmodi, est contingens, ut probatur in IX metaphysicae. Ergonulla scientia potest esse de rebus mobilibus, et sic nec scientia naturalis.

Praeterea, nullum universale movetur; homo enim universalis non sanatur,sed hic homo, ut dicitur in principio metaphysicae. Sed omnis scientia deuniversalibus est. Ergo naturalis scientia non est de his quae sunt in motu.

Praeterea, in scientia naturali determinatur de quibusdam quae nonmoventur, sicut est anima, ut probatur in I de anima, et terra, ut probaturin II caeli et mundi; et etiam omnes formae naturales non fiunt nec cor-rumpuntur, et eadem ratione non moventur nisi per accidens, ut probaturin VII metaphysicae. Ergo non omnia, de quibus est physica, sunt in motu.

Praeterea, omnis creatura est mutabilis, cum vera immutabilitas soli Deoconveniat, ut Augustinus dicit. Si ergo ad naturalem pertinet consideratiode his, quae in motu sunt, eius erit considerare de omnibus creaturis, quodapparet expresse esse falsum.

Sed contra, ad scientiam naturalem pertinet de rebus naturalibus deter-minare. Sed res naturales sunt, in quibus est principium motus. Ubicumqueautem est motus, oportet et esse materiam, ut dicitur in IX metaphysicae.Ergo scientia naturalis est de his quae sunt in motu et materia.

Praeterea, de his, quae sunt in materia et motu, oportet esse aliquamscientiam speculativam, alias non esset perfecta traditio philosophiae quaeest cognitio entis. Sed nulla alia speculativa scientia est de his, quia nequemathematica nec metaphysica. Ergo est de his naturalis.

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Praeterea, hoc apparet ex hoc quod dicit philosophus in VI metaphysicaeet in II physicorum.

Responsio. Dicendum quod propter difficultatem huius quaestionis coac-tus est Plato ad ponendum ideas. Cum enim, ut dicit philosophus in Imetaphysicae, crederet omnia sensibilia semper esse in fluxu, secundumopinionem Cratyli et Heracliti, et ita existimaret de eis non posse esse scien-tiam, posuit quasdam substantias a sensibilibus separatas, de quibus essentscientiae et darentur diffinitiones. Sed hic defectus accidit ex eo quod nondistinxit quod est per se ab eo quod est secundum accidens, nam secundumaccidens falluntur plerumque etiam sapientes, ut dicitur in I elenchorum.Ut autem probatur in VII metaphysicae, cum in substantia sensibili inve-niatur et ipsum integrum, id est compositum, et ratio, id est forma eius,per se quidem generatur et corrumpitur compositum, non autem ratio siveforma, sed solum per accidens. Non enim fit domum esse, ut ibidem dicitur,sed hanc domum. Unumquodque autem potest considerari sine omnibus hisquae ei non per se comparantur. Et ideo formae et rationes rerum quamvisin motu exsistentium, prout in se considerantur, absque motu sunt. Et sicde eis sunt scientiae et diffinitiones, ut ibidem philosophus dicit. Non autemscientiae sensibilium substantiarum fundantur super cognitione aliquarumsubstantiarum a sensibilibus separatarum, ut ibidem probatur.

Huiusmodi autem rationes, quas considerant scientiae quae sunt de re-bus, considerantur absque motu. Sic oportet quod considerentur absqueillis, secundum quae competit motus rebus mobilibus. Cum autem omnismotus tempore mensuretur et primus motus sit motus localis, quo remotonullus alius motus inest, oportet quod secundum hoc aliquid sit mobile,quod est hic et nunc. Hoc autem consequitur rem ipsam mobilem, se-cundum quod est individuata per materiam exsistentem sub dimensionibussignatis. Unde oportet quod huiusmodi rationes, secundum quas de rebusmobilibus possunt esse scientiae, considerantur absque materia signata etabsque omnibus his quae consequuntur materiam signatam, non autem ab-sque materia non signata, quia ex eius notione dependet notio formae quaedeterminat sibi materiam. Et ideo ratio hominis, quam significat diffini-tio et secundum quam procedit scientia, consideratur sine his carnibus etsine his ossibus, non autem sine carnibus et ossibus absolute. Et quia singu-laria includunt in sui ratione materiam signatam, universalia vero materiamcommunem, ut dicitur in VII metaphysicae, ideo praedicta abstractio nondicitur formae a materia absolute, sed universalis a particulari.

Possunt ergo huiusmodi rationes sic abstractae considerari dupliciter.

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Uno modo secundum se, et sic considerantur sine motu et materia signata,et hoc non invenitur in eis nisi secundum esse quod habent in intellectu.Alio modo secundum quod comparantur ad res, quarum sunt rationes; quaequidem res sunt in materia et motu. Et sic sunt principia cognoscendi illa,quia omnis res cognoscitur per suam formam. Et ita per huiusmodi rationesimmobiles et sine materia particulari consideratas habetur cognitio in scien-tia naturali de rebus mobilibus et materialibus extra animam exsistentibus.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod materia non est individuationis prin-cipium nisi secundum quod est sub dimensionibus signatis exsistens. Et sicetiam scientia naturalis a materia abstrahit.

Ad secundum dicendum quod forma intelligibilis est quiditas rei. Obiec-tum enim intellectus est quid, ut dicitur in III de anima. Quiditas autemcompositi universalis, ut hominis aut animalis, includit in se materiam uni-versalem, non autem particularem, ut dicitur in VII metaphysicae. Undeintellectus communiter abstrahit a materia signata et condicionibus eius,non autem a materia communi in scientia naturali, quamvis etiam in scien-tia naturali non consideretur materia nisi in ordine ad formam. Unde etiamforma per prius est de consideratione naturalis quam materia.

Ad tertium dicendum quod de primo motore non agitur in scientia nat-urali tamquam de subiecto vel de parte subiecti, sed tamquam de terminoad quem scientia naturalis perducit. Terminus autem non est de naturarei, cuius est terminus, sed habet aliquam habitudinem ad rem illam, sicutterminus lineae non est linea, sed habet ad eam aliquam habitudinem, itaetiam et primus motor est alterius naturae a rebus naturalibus, habet tamenad eas aliquam habitudinem, in quantum influit eis motum, et sic cadit inconsideratione naturalis, scilicet non secundum ipsum, sed in quantum estmotor.

Ad quartum dicendum quod scientia est de aliquo dupliciter. Uno modoprimo et principaliter, et sic scientia est de rationibus universalibus, supraquas fundatur. Alio modo est de aliquibus secundario et quasi per reflex-ionem quandam, et sic de illis rebus, quarum sunt illae rationes, in quantumillas rationes applicat ad res etiam particulares, quarum sunt, adminiculoinferiorum virium. Ratione enim universali utitur sciens et ut re scita et utmedio sciendi. Per universalem enim hominis rationem possum iudicare dehoc vel de illo. Rationes autem universales rerum omnes sunt immobiles, etideo quantum ad hoc omnis scientia de necessariis est. Sed rerum, quarumsunt illae rationes, quaedam sunt necessariae et immobiles, quaedam contin-gentes et mobiles, et quantum ad hoc de rebus contingentibus et mobilibus

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dicuntur esse scientiae.Ad quintum dicendum quod quamvis universale non moveatur, est tamen

ratio rei mobilis.Ad sextum dicendum quod anima et aliae formae naturales, quamvis

non moveantur per se, moventur tamen per accidens, et insuper sunt per-fectiones rerum mobilium, et secundum hoc cadunt in consideratione natu-ralis. Terra vero, quamvis secundum totum non moveatur, quod accidit ei,in quantum est in suo loco naturali, in quo aliquid quiescit per eandem nat-uram, per quam movetur ad locum, tamen partes eius moventur ad locum,cum sunt extra locum proprium. Et sic terra et ratione quietis totius etratione motus partium cadit in considerationem naturalis.

Ad septimum dicendum quod mutabilitas illa, quae competit omni crea-turae, non est secundum aliquem motum naturalem, sed secundum depen-dentiam ad Deum, a quo si sibi deserentur, deficerent ab eo quod sunt.Dependentia autem ista pertinet ad considerationem metaphysici potiusquam naturalis. Creaturae etiam spirituales non sunt mutabiles nisi secun-dum electionem, et talis mutatio non pertinet ad naturalem, sed magis addivinum.

Articulus 3

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod mathematica consideratio non sitsine materia de his quae habent esse in materia. Cum enim veritas consistatin adaequatione rei ad intellectum, oportet esse falsitatem, quandocumqueres consideratur aliter quam sit. Si ergo res, quae sunt in materia, sinemateria considerat mathematica, eius consideratio erit falsa, et sic non eritscientia, cum omnis scientia sit verorum.

Praeterea, secundum philosophum in I posteriorum cuiuslibet scientiaeest considerare subiectum et partes subiecti. Sed omnium materialium se-cundum esse materia pars est. Ergo non potest esse quod aliqua scientiaconsideret de his quae sunt in materia, absque hoc quod materiam consid-eret.

Praeterea, omnes lineae rectae sunt eiusdem speciei. Sed mathematicusconsiderat lineas rectas numerando eas, alias non consideraret triangulumet quadratum. Ergo considerat lineas, secundum quod differunt numero etconveniunt specie. Sed principium differendi his, quae secundum speciemconveniunt, est materia, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo materia consideratura mathematico.

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Praeterea, nulla scientia, quae penitus abstrahit a materia, demonstratper causam materialem. Sed in mathematica fiunt aliquae demonstrationes,quae non possunt reduci nisi ad causam materialem, sicut cum demon-stratur aliquid de toto ex partibus. Partes enim sunt materia totius, utdicitur in II physicorum. Unde et in II posteriorum reducitur ad causammaterialem demonstratio, qua demonstratur quod angulus qui est in semi-circulo est rectus ex hoc quod utraque pars eius est semirectus. Ergo math-ematica non omnino abstrahit a materia.

Praeterea, motus non potest esse sine materia. Sed mathematicus debetconsiderare motum, quia cum motus mensuretur secundum spatium, eius-dem rationis et scientiae videtur esse considerare quantitatem spatii, quodpertinet ad mathematicum, et quantitatem motus. Ergo mathematicus nonomnino dimittit considerationem materiae.

Praeterea, astrologia quaedam pars mathematicae est; et similiter scien-tia de sphaera mota et scientia de ponderibus et musica, in quibus omnibusfit consideratio de motu et rebus mobilibus. Ergo mathematica non ab-strahit totaliter a materia et motu.

Praeterea, naturalis consideratio tota est circa materiam et motum. Sedquaedam conclusiones demonstrantur communiter a mathematico et natu-rali, ut utrum terra sit rotunda, et utrum sit in medio caeli. Ergo non potestesse quod mathematica omnino abstrahat a materia. Si dicatur quod ab-strahit tantum a materia sensibili, contra. Materia sensibilis videtur essemateria particularis, quia sensus particularium est, a qua omnes scientiaeabstrahunt. Ergo mathematica consideratio non debet dici magis abstractaquam aliqua aliarum scientiarum.

Praeterea, philosophus in II physicorum dicit tria esse negotia. Primumest de mobili et corruptibili, secundum de mobili et incorruptibili, tertiumde immobili et incorruptibili. Primum autem est naturale, tertium divinum,secundum mathematicum, ut Ptolemaeus exponit in principio Almagesti.Ergo mathematica est de mobilibus.

Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit in VI metaphysicae.Praeterea, quaedam res sunt, quae quamvis sint in materia, tamen non

recipiunt in sui diffinitione materiam, ut curvum, et in hoc differt a simo.Sed philosophia debet de omnibus entibus considerare. Ergo oportet dehuiusmodi esse aliquam partem philosophiae, et haec est mathematica, cumad nullam aliam pertineat.

Praeterea, ea, quae sunt priora secundum intellectum, possunt sine pos-terioribus considerari. Sed mathematica sunt priora naturalibus, quae sunt

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in materia et motu; habent enim se ex additione ad mathematica, ut dic-itur in III caeli et mundi. Ergo mathematica consideratio potest esse sinemateria et motu.

Responsio. Dicendum quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis oportetvidere, qualiter intellectus secundum suam operationem abstrahere possit.Sciendum est igitur quod secundum philosophum in III de anima duplexest operatio intellectus. Una, quae dicitur intelligentia indivisibilium, quacognoscit de unoquoque, quid est. Alia vero, qua componit et dividit, scil-icet enuntiationem affirmativam vel negativam formando. Et hae quidemduae operationes duobus, quae sunt in rebus, respondent. Prima quidemoperatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, secundum quam res intellecta aliquemgradum in entibus obtinet, sive sit res completa, ut totum aliquod, sive resincompleta, ut pars vel accidens. Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esserei, quod quidem resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositisvel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in substantiis simplicibus.Et quia veritas intellectus est ex hoc quod conformatur rei, patet quod se-cundum hanc secundam operationem intellectus non potest vere abstraherequod secundum rem coniunctum est, quia in abstrahendo significaretur esseseparatio secundum ipsum esse rei, sicut si abstraho hominem ab albedinedicendo: homo non est albus, significo esse separationem in re. Unde si se-cundum rem homo et albedo non sint separata, erit intellectus falsus. Hacergo operatione intellectus vere abstrahere non potest nisi ea quae sunt se-cundum rem separata, ut cum dicitur: homo non est asinus. Sed secundumprimam operationem potest abstrahere ea quae secundum rem separata nonsunt, non tamen omnia, sed aliqua. Cum enim unaquaeque res sit intelli-gibilis, secundum quod est in actu, ut dicitur in IX metaphysicae, oportetquod ipsa natura sive quiditas rei intelligatur: vel secundum quod est actusquidam, sicut accidit de ipsis formis et substantiis simplicibus, vel secun-dum id quod est actus eius, sicut substantiae compositae per suas formas,vel secundum id quod est ei loco actus, sicut materia prima per habitudinemad formam et vacuum per privationem locati. Et hoc est illud, ex quo un-aquaeque natura suam rationem sortitur. Quando ergo secundum hoc, perquod constituitur ratio naturae et per quod ipsa natura intelligitur, naturaipsa habet ordinem et dependentiam ad aliquid aliud, tunc constat quodnatura illa sine illo alio intelligi non potest, sive sint coniuncta coniunctioneilla, qua pars coniungitur toti, sicut pes non potest intelligi sine intellectuanimalis, quia illud, a quo pes habet rationem pedis, dependet ab eo, a quoanimal est animal, sive sint coniuncta per modum quo forma coniungitur

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materiae, vel ut pars comparti vel accidens subiecto, sicut simum non potestintelligi sine naso, sive etiam sint secundum rem separata, sicut pater nonpotest intelligi sine intellectu filii, quamvis istae relationes inveniantur indiversis rebus. Si vero unum ab altero non dependeat secundum id quodconstituit rationem naturae, tunc unum potest ab altero abstrahi per in-tellectum ut sine eo intelligatur, non solum si sint separata secundum rem,sicut homo et lapis, sed etiam si secundum rem coniuncta sint, sive ea co-niunctione, qua pars et totum coniunguntur, sicut littera potest intelligisine syllaba, sed non e converso, et animal sine pede, sed non e converso,sive etiam sint coniuncta per modum quo forma coniungitur materiae etaccidens subiecto, sicut albedo potest intelligi sine homine, et e converso.

Sic ergo intellectus distinguit unum ab altero aliter et aliter secundumdiversas operationes; quia secundum operationem, qua componit et dividit,distinguit unum ab alio per hoc quod intelligit unum alii non inesse. In op-eratione vero qua intelligit, quid est unumquodque, distinguit unum ab alio,dum intelligit, quid est hoc, nihil intelligendo de alio, neque quod sit cumeo, neque quod sit ab eo separatum. Unde ista distinctio non proprie habetnomen separationis, sed prima tantum. Haec autem distinctio recte diciturabstractio, sed tunc tantum quando ea, quorum unum sine altero intelligi-tur, sunt simul secundum rem. Non enim dicitur animal a lapide abstrahi, sianimal absque intellectu lapidis intelligatur. Unde cum abstractio non pos-sit esse, proprie loquendo, nisi coniunctorum in esse, secundum duos modosconiunctionis praedictos, scilicet qua pars et totum uniuntur vel forma etmateria, duplex est abstractio, una, qua forma abstrahitur a materia, alia,qua totum abstrahitur a partibus. Forma autem illa potest a materia aliquaabstrahi, cuius ratio essentiae non dependet a tali materia. Ab illa autemmateria non potest forma abstrahi per intellectum, a qua secundum suaeessentiae rationem dependet. Unde cum omnia accidentia comparentur adsubstantiam subiectam sicut forma ad materiam et cuiuslibet accidentisratio dependeat ad substantiam, impossibile est aliquam talem formam asubstantia separari. Sed accidentia superveniunt substantiae quodam or-dine. Nam primo advenit ei quantitas, deinde qualitas, deinde passioneset motus. Unde quantitas potest intelligi in materia subiecta, antequamintelligantur in ea qualitates sensibiles, a quibus dicitur materia sensibilis.Et sic secundum rationem suae substantiae non dependet quantitas a ma-teria sensibili, sed solum a materia intelligibili. Substantia enim remotisaccidentibus non manet nisi intellectu comprehensibilis, eo quod sensitivaepotentiae non pertingunt usque ad substantiae comprehensionem. Et de

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huiusmodi abstractis est mathematica, quae considerat quantitates et eaquae quantitates consequuntur, ut figuras et huiusmodi.

Totum etiam non a quibuslibet partibus abstrahi potest. Sunt enimquaedam partes, ex quibus ratio totius dependet, quando scilicet hoc estesse tali toti quod ex talibus partibus componi, sicut se habet syllaba adlitteras et mixtum ad elementa; et tales partes dicuntur partes speciei etformae, sine quibus totum intelligi non potest, cum ponantur in eius diffini-tione. Quaedam vero partes sunt quae accidunt toti, in quantum huiusmodi,sicut semicirculus se habet ad circulum. Accidit enim circulo, quod suman-tur per divisionem duae eius partes aequales vel inaequales vel etiam plures;non autem accidit triangulo, quod in eo designentur tres lineae, quia ex hoctriangulus est triangulus. Similiter etiam per se competit homini quod inve-niatur in eo anima rationalis et corpus compositum ex quattuor elementis,unde sine his partibus homo intelligi non potest, sed haec oportet poni indiffinitione eius; unde sunt partes speciei et formae. Sed digitus, pes etmanus et aliae huiusmodi partes sunt post intellectum hominis, unde exeis ratio essentialis hominis non dependet; et homo sine his intelligi potest.Sive enim habeat pedes sive non, dummodo ponatur coniunctum ex animarationali et corpore mixto ex elementis propria mixtione, quam requirit talisforma, erit homo. Et hae partes dicuntur partes materiae, quae non po-nuntur in diffinitione totius, sed magis e converso. Et hoc modo se habentad hominem omnes partes signatae, sicut haec anima et hoc corpus et hicunguis et hoc os et huiusmodi. Hae enim partes sunt quidem partes es-sentiae sortis et Platonis, non autem hominis, in quantum homo; et ideopotest homo abstrahi per intellectum ab istis partibus, et talis abstractioest universalis a particulari.

Et ita sunt duae abstractiones intellectus. Una quae respondet unioniformae et materiae vel accidentis et subiecti, et haec est abstractio formae amateria sensibili. Alia quae respondet unioni totius et partis, et huic respon-det abstractio universalis a particulari, quae est abstractio totius, in quoconsideratur absolute natura aliqua secundum suam rationem essentialem,ab omnibus partibus, quae non sunt partes speciei, sed sunt partes acci-dentales. Non autem inveniuntur abstractiones eis oppositae, quibus parsabstrahatur a toto vel materia a forma; quia pars vel non potest abstrahia toto per intellectum, si sit de partibus materiae, in quarum diffinitioneponitur totum, vel potest etiam sine toto esse, si sit de partibus speciei,sicut linea sine triangulo vel littera sine syllaba vel elementum sine mixto.In his autem quae secundum esse possunt esse divisa, magis habet locum

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separatio quam abstractio. Similiter autem cum dicimus formam abstrahia materia, non intelligitur de forma substantiali, quia forma substantialiset materia sibi correspondens dependent ad invicem, ut unum sine alio nonpossit intelligi, eo quod proprius actus in propria materia fit. Sed intelligi-tur de forma accidentali, quae est quantitas et figura, a qua quidem materiasensibilis per intellectum abstrahi non potest, cum qualitates sensibiles nonpossint intelligi non praeintellecta quantitate, sicut patet in superficie etcolore, nec etiam potest intelligi esse subiectum motus, quod non intelligi-tur quantum. Substantia autem, quae est materia intelligibilis quantitatis,potest esse sine quantitate; unde considerare substantiam sine quantitatemagis pertinet ad genus separationis quam abstractionis.

Sic ergo in operatione intellectus triplex distinctio invenitur. Una se-cundum operationem intellectus componentis et dividentis, quae separatiodicitur proprie; et haec competit scientiae divinae sive metaphysicae. Aliasecundum operationem, qua formantur quiditates rerum, quae est abstrac-tio formae a materia sensibili; et haec competit mathematicae. Tertia se-cundum eandem operationem quae est abstractio universalis a particulari;et haec competit etiam physicae et est communis omnibus scientiis, quia inscientia praetermittitur quod per accidens est et accipitur quod per se est.Et quia quidam non intellexerunt differentiam duarum ultimarum a prima,inciderunt in errorem, ut ponerent mathematica et universalia a sensibilibusseparata, ut Pythagorici et Platonici.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mathematicus abstrahens non con-siderat rem aliter quam sit. Non enim intelligit lineam esse sine materiasensibili, sed considerat lineam et eius passiones sine consideratione ma-teriae sensibilis, et sic non est dissonantia inter intellectum et rem, quiaetiam secundum rem id, quod est de natura lineae, non dependet ab eo,quod facit materiam esse sensibilem, sed magis e converso. Et sic patetquod abstrahentium non est mendacium, ut dicitur in II physicorum.

Ad secundum dicendum quod materiale dicitur non solum id, cuius parsest materia, sed etiam illud, quod in materia esse habet, secundum quemmodum linea sensibilis materiale quoddam dici potest. Unde per hoc nonprohibetur quin linea sine materia intelligi possit. Non enim materia sen-sibilis comparatur ad lineam sicut pars, sed magis sicut subiectum, in quoesse habet, et similiter est de superficie et corpore. Non enim mathemati-cus considerat corpus, quod est in genere substantiae, prout eius pars estmateria et forma, sed secundum quod est in genere quantitatis tribus di-mensionibus perfectum, et sic comparatur ad corpus quod est in genere

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substantiae, cuius pars est materia physica, sicut accidens ad subiectum.Ad tertium dicendum quod materia non est principium diversitatis se-

cundum numerum nisi secundum quod in multas partes divisa in singulispartibus formam recipiens eiusdem rationis plura individua eiusdem specieiconstituit. Materia autem dividi non potest nisi ex praesupposita quanti-tate, qua remota omnis substantia indivisibilis remanet, et sic prima ratiodiversificandi ea, quae sunt unius speciei, est penes quantitatem. Quodquidem quantitati competit, in quantum in sui ratione situm quasi differ-entiam constitutivam habet, qui nihil est aliud quam ordo partium. Undeetiam abstracta quantitate a materia sensibili per intellectum adhuc con-tingit imaginari diversa secundum numerum unius speciei, sicut plures tri-angulos aequilateros et plures lineas rectas aequales.

Ad quartum dicendum quod mathematica non abstrahuntur a qualibetmateria, sed solum a materia sensibili. Partes autem quantitatis, a quibusdemonstratio sumpta quodammodo a causa materiali videtur sumi, nonsunt materia sensibilis, sed pertinent ad materiam intelligibilem, quae etiamin mathematicis invenitur, ut patet in VII metaphysicae.

Ad quintum dicendum quod motus secundum naturam suam non per-tinet ad genus quantitatis, sed participat aliquid de natura quantitatis al-iunde, secundum quod divisio motus sumitur vel ex divisione spatii vel exdivisione mobilis; et ideo considerare motus non pertinet ad mathematicum,sed tamen principia mathematica ad motum applicari possunt. Et ideo se-cundum hoc, quod principia quantitatis ad motum applicantur, naturalisconsiderat de divisione et continuitate motus, ut patet in VI physicorum. Etin scientiis mediis inter mathematicam et naturalem tractatur de mensurismotuum, sicut in scientia de sphaera mota et in astrologia.

Ad sextum dicendum quod in compositis simplicia salvantur et propri-etates eorum, licet per alium modum, sicut propriae qualitates elementorumet motus ipsorum proprii inveniuntur in mixto; quod autem est composi-torum proprium, non invenitur in simplicibus. Et inde est quod quantoaliqua scientia est abstractior et simpliciora considerans, tanto eius prin-cipia sunt magis applicabilia aliis scientiis. Unde principia mathematicaesunt applicabilia naturalibus rebus, non autem e converso, propter quodphysica est ex suppositione mathematicae, sed non e converso, ut patet inIII caeli et mundi. Et inde est quod de rebus naturalibus et mathematicistres ordines scientiarum inveniuntur. Quaedam enim sunt pure naturales,quae considerant proprietates rerum naturalium, in quantum huiusmodi,sicut physica et agricultura et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt pure math-

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ematicae, quae determinant de quantitatibus absolute, sicut geometria demagnitudine et arithmetica de numero. Quaedam vero sunt mediae, quaeprincipia mathematica ad res naturales applicant, ut musica, astrologia ethuiusmodi. Quae tamen magis sunt affines mathematicis, quia in earumconsideratione id quod est physicum est quasi materiale, quod autem estmathematicum est quasi formale; sicut musica considerat sonos, non inquantum sunt soni, sed in quantum sunt secundum numeros proportion-abiles, et similiter est in aliis. Et propter hoc demonstrant conclusionessuas circa res naturales, sed per media mathematica; et ideo nihil prohibet,si in quantum cum naturali communicant, materiam sensibilem respiciunt.In quantum enim cum mathematica communicant, abstractae sunt.

Ad septimum dicendum quod, quia scientiae mediae, de quibus dictumest, communicant cum naturali secundum id quod in earum considerationeest materiale, differunt autem secundum id quod in earum considerationeest formale, ideo nihil prohibet has scientias cum naturali habere interdumeasdem conclusiones. Non tamen per eadem demonstrant nisi secundumquod scientiae sunt immixtae et una interdum utitur eo quod est alterius,sicut rotunditatem terrae naturalis probat ex motu gravium, astrologusautem per considerationem lunarium eclipsium.

Ad octavum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Commentator ibidem, philoso-phus non intendit ibi distinguere scientias speculativas, quia de quolibetmobili, sive sit corruptibile sive incorruptibile, determinat naturalis. Math-ematicus autem, in quantum huiusmodi, non considerat aliquod mobile.Intendit autem distinguere res, de quibus scientiae speculativae determi-nant, de quibus seorsum et secundum ordinem agendum est, quamvis illatria genera rerum tribus scientiis appropriari possint. Entia enim incor-ruptibilia et immobilia praecise ad metaphysicum pertinent. Entia veromobilia et incorruptibilia propter sui uniformitatem et regularitatem pos-sunt determinari quantum ad suos motus per principia mathematica, quodde mobilibus corruptibilibus dici non potest; et ideo secundum genus en-tium attribuitur mathematicae ratione astrologiae. Tertium vero remanetproprium soli naturali. Et sic loquitur Ptolemaeus.

Articulus 4

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia divina non sit de rebusa motu et materia separatis. Scientia enim divina maxime videtur essede Deo. Sed ad Dei cognitionem pervenire non possumus nisi per effectus

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visibiles, qui sunt in materia et motu constituti, Rom. 1: invisibilia enimipsius et cetera. Ergo scientia divina non abstrahit a materia et motu.

Praeterea, illud, cui aliquo modo motus convenit, non est omnino a motuet materia separatum. Sed motus aliquo modo Deo convenit; unde diciturSap. 7 de spiritu sapientiae quod est mobilis et mobilior omnibus mobilibus.Et Augustinus dicit VIII super Genesim quod Deus movet se sine temporeet loco, et Plato posuit primum movens movere se ipsum. Ergo scientiadivina, quae de Deo determinat, non est omnino a motu separata.

Praeterea, scientia divina non solum habet considerare de Deo, sed etiamde Angelis. Sed Angeli moventur et secundum electionem, quia de bonisfacti sunt mali, et secundum locum, ut patet in illis qui mittuntur. Ergoilla, de quibus scientia divina considerat, non sunt omnino a motu separata.

Praeterea, ut videtur Commentator dicere in principio physicorum, omne,quod est, vel est materia pura vel forma pura vel compositum ex materiaet forma. Sed Angelus non est forma pura, quia sic esset actus purus, quodsolius Dei est, nec iterum est materia pura. Ergo est compositus ex materiaet forma. Et sic scientia divina non abstrahit a materia.

Praeterea, scientia divina, quae ponitur tertia pars speculativae philo-sophiae, est idem quod metaphysica, cuius subiectum est ens, et princi-paliter ens quod est substantia, ut patet in IV metaphysicae. Sed enset substantia non abstrahit a materia, alias nullum ens inveniretur quodhaberet materiam. Ergo scientia divina non est a materia abstrahens.

Praeterea, secundum philosophum in I posteriorum ad scientiam per-tinet considerare non solum subiectum, sed partes et passiones subiecti. Sedens est subiectum scientiae divinae, ut dictum est. Ergo ad ipsam pertinetconsiderare de omnibus entibus. Sed materia et motus sunt quaedam entia.Ergo pertinent ad considerationem metaphysicae, et sic scientia divina abeis non abstrahit.

Praeterea, sicut dicit Commentator in I physicorum, scientia divinademonstrat per tres causas, scilicet efficientem, formalem et finalem. Sedcausa efficiens non potest considerari sine consideratione motus, similiternec finis, ut dicitur in III metaphysicae. Unde in mathematicis propter hocquod sunt immobilia nulla demonstratio per huiusmodi causas datur. Ergoscientia divina non abstrahit a motu.

Praeterea, in theologia determinatur de creatione caeli et terrae et actibushominum et multis huiusmodi, quae in se materiam et motum continent.Ergo non videtur theologia a materia et motu abstrahere.

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Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit in VI metaphysicae quod primaphilosophia est circa separabilia, scilicet a materia, et immobilia. Primaautem philosophia est scientia divina, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo scientia div-ina est abstracta a materia et motu.

Praeterea, nobilissima scientia est de nobilissimis entibus. Sed scien-tia divina est nobilissima. Cum ergo entia immaterialia et immobilia sintnobilissima, de eis erit scientia divina.

Praeterea, philosophus dicit in principio metaphysicae quod scientia div-ina est de primis principiis et causis. Huiusmodi autem sunt immaterialiaet immobilia. Ergo de talibus est scientia divina.

Responsio. Dicendum quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis scire oportetquae scientia divina scientia dici debeat. Sciendum siquidem est quod quae-cumque scientia considerat aliquod genus subiectum, oportet quod consid-eret principia illius generis, cum scientia non perficiatur nisi per cognitionemprincipiorum, ut patet per philosophum in principio physicorum. Sed prin-cipiorum duo sunt genera. Quaedam enim sunt quae et sunt in se ipsisquaedam naturae completae et sunt nihilominus principia aliorum, sicutcorpora caelestia sunt quaedam principia inferiorum corporum et corporasimplicia corporum mixtorum. Et ideo ista non solum considerantur in sci-entiis ut principia sunt, sed etiam ut sunt in se ipsis res quaedam; et propterhoc de eis non solum tractatur in scientia quae considerat ipsa principiata,sed etiam habent per se scientiam separatam, sicut de corporibus caelestibusest quaedam pars scientiae naturalis praeter illam, in qua determinatur decorporibus inferioribus, et de elementis praeter illam, in qua tractatur decorporibus mixtis. Quaedam autem sunt principia, quae non sunt naturaecompletae in se ipsis, sed solum sunt principia naturarum, sicut unitas nu-meri et punctus lineae et forma et materia corporis physici, unde huiusmodiprincipia non tractantur nisi in scientia, in qua de principiatis agitur.

Sicut autem uniuscuiusque determinati generis sunt quaedam commu-nia principia quae se extendunt ad omnia principia illius generis, ita etiamet omnia entia, secundum quod in ente communicant, habent quaedamprincipia quae sunt principia omnium entium. Quae quidem principia pos-sunt dici communia dupliciter secundum Avicennam in sua sufficientia: unomodo per praedicationem, sicut hoc quod dico: forma est commune adomnes formas, quia de qualibet praedicatur; alio modo per causalitatem,sicut dicimus solem unum numero esse principium ad omnia generabilia.Omnium autem entium sunt principia communia non solum secundum pri-mum modum, quod appellat philosophus in XI metaphysicae omnia entia

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habere eadem principia secundum analogiam, sed etiam secundum modumsecundum, ut sint quaedam res eadem numero exsistentes omnium rerumprincipia, prout scilicet principia accidentium reducuntur in principia sub-stantiae et principia substantiarum corruptibilium reducuntur in substan-tias incorruptibiles, et sic quodam gradu et ordine in quaedam principiaomnia entia reducuntur. Et quia id, quod est principium essendi omnibus,oportet esse maxime ens, ut dicitur in II metaphysicae, ideo huiusmodiprincipia oportet esse completissima, et propter hoc oportet ea esse maximeactu, ut nihil vel minimum habeant de potentia, quia actus est prior et po-tior potentia, ut dicitur in IX metaphysicae. Et propter hoc oportet ea esseabsque materia, quae est in potentia, et absque motu, qui est actus exsis-tentis in potentia. Et huiusmodi sunt res divinae; quia si divinum alicubiexsistit, in tali natura, immateriali scilicet et immobili, maxime exsistit, utdicitur in VI metaphysicae.

Huiusmodi ergo res divinae, quia sunt principia omnium entium et suntnihilominus in se naturae completae, dupliciter tractari possunt: uno modo,prout sunt principia communia omnium entium; alio modo, prout sunt inse res quaedam. Quia autem huiusmodi prima principia quamvis sint in semaxime nota, tamen intellectus noster se habet ad ea ut oculus noctuaead lucem solis, ut dicitur in II metaphysicae, per lumen naturalis rationispervenire non possumus in ea nisi secundum quod per effectus in ea ducimur;et hoc modo philosophi in ea pervenerunt, quod patet Rom. 1: invisibiliaDei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. Unde et huiusmodires divinae non tractantur a philosophis, nisi prout sunt rerum omniumprincipia. Et ideo pertractantur in illa doctrina, in qua ponuntur ea quaesunt communia omnibus entibus, quae habet subiectum ens in quantum estens; et haec scientia apud eos scientia divina dicitur. Est autem alius moduscognoscendi huiusmodi res, non secundum quod per effectus manifestantur,sed secundum quod ipsae se ipsas manifestant. Et hunc modum ponitapostolus 1 Cor. 2: quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei. Nosautem non spiritum huius mundi accepimus, sed spiritum qui a Deo est, utsciamus. Et ibidem: nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum suum. Et perhunc modum tractantur res divinae, secundum quod in se ipsis subsistuntet non solum prout sunt rerum principia.

Sic ergo theologia sive scientia divina est duplex. Una, in qua consid-erantur res divinae non tamquam subiectum scientiae, sed tamquam prin-cipia subiecti, et talis est theologia, quam philosophi prosequuntur, quaealio nomine metaphysica dicitur. Alia vero, quae ipsas res divinas consid-

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erat propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientiae et haec est theologia, quae insacra Scriptura traditur. Utraque autem est de his quae sunt separata amateria et motu secundum esse, sed diversimode, secundum quod dupliciterpotest esse aliquid a materia et motu separatum secundum esse. Uno modosic, quod de ratione ipsius rei, quae separata dicitur, sit quod nullo modoin materia et motu esse possit, sicut Deus et Angeli dicuntur a materiaet motu separati. Alio modo sic, quod non sit de ratione eius quod sit inmateria et motu, sed possit esse sine materia et motu, quamvis quandoqueinveniatur in materia et motu. Et sic ens et substantia et potentia et actussunt separata a materia et motu, quia secundum esse a materia et motu nondependent, sicut mathematica dependebant, quae numquam nisi in mate-ria esse possunt, quamvis sine materia sensibili possint intelligi. Theologiaergo philosophica determinat de separatis secundo modo sicut de subiec-tis, de separatis autem primo modo sicut de principiis subiecti. Theologiavero sacrae Scripturae tractat de separatis primo modo sicut de subiectis,quamvis in ea tractentur aliqua quae sunt in materia et motu, secundumquod requirit rerum divinarum manifestatio.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa, quae non assumuntur in scien-tia nisi ad alterius manifestationem, non pertinent per se ad scientiam,sed quasi per accidens. Sic enim in naturalibus quaedam mathematica as-sumuntur, et per hunc modum nihil prohibet in scientia divina esse quaedamquae sunt in materia et motu.

Ad secundum dicendum quod moveri non attribuitur Deo proprie, sedquasi metaphorice, et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod impro-prie operatio intellectus vel voluntatis motus dicitur, et secundum hoc dic-itur aliquis movere se ipsum, quando intelligit vel diligit se. Et per huncmodum potest verificari dictum Platonis qui dixit quod primus motor movetse ipsum, quia scilicet intelligit et diligit se, ut Commentator dicit in VIIIphysicorum. Alio modo, secundum quod ipse effluxus causatorum a suiscausis nominari potest processio sive motus quidam causae in causatum,in quantum in ipso effectu relinquitur similitudo causae, et sic causa, quaeprius erat in se ipsa, postmodum fit in effectu per suam similitudinem.Et hoc modo Deus, qui similitudinem suam omnibus creaturis impartitusest, quantum ad aliquid dicitur per omnia moveri vel ad omnia procedere,quo modo loquendi utitur frequenter Dionysius. Et secundum hunc etiammodum videtur intelligi quod dicitur Sap. 7 quod omnium mobilium mobil-ior est sapientia et quod attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter. Hoc autemnon est proprie moveri, et ideo ratio non sequitur.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia divina, quae est per inspirationemdivinam accepta, non est de Angelis sicut de subiecto, sed solum sicut dehis, quae assumuntur ad manifestationem subiecti. Sic enim in sacra Scrip-tura agitur de Angelis sicut et de ceteris creaturis. Sed in scientia divina,quam philosophi tradunt, consideratur de Angelis, quos intelligentias vo-cant, eadem ratione qua et de prima causa, quae Deus est, in quantum ipsietiam sunt rerum principia secunda, saltem per motum orbium, quibus qui-dem nullus motus physicus accidere potest. Motus autem, qui est secundumelectionem, reducitur ad illum modum, quo actus intellectus vel voluntatismotus dicitur, quod est improprie dictum motu pro operatione sumpto.Motus etiam, quo dicuntur secundum locum moveri, non est secundum cir-cumscriptionem localem, sed secundum operationem, quam exercent in hocvel in illo loco, aut secundum aliquam aliam habitudinem, quam habentad locum, omnino aequivocam ab illa habitudine, quam habet corpus loca-tum ad locum. Et ideo patet quod eis non convenit motus, secundum quodnaturalia in motu esse dicuntur.

Ad quartum dicendum quod actus et potentia sunt communiora quammateria et forma; et ideo in Angelis, etsi non inveniatur compositio formaeet materiae, potest tamen inveniri in eis potentia et actus. Materia enim etforma sunt partes compositi ex materia et forma, et ideo in illis tantum in-venitur compositio materiae et formae, quorum una pars se habet ad aliamut potentia ad actum. Quod autem potest esse, potest et non esse; et ideopossibile est unam partem inveniri cum alia et sine alia, et ideo composi-tio materiae et formae non invenitur secundum Commentatorem in I caeliet mundi et in VIII metaphysicae nisi in his quae sunt per naturam cor-ruptibilia. Nec obstat quod aliquod accidens in aliquo subiecto perpetuoconservetur, sicut figura in caelo, cum tamen corpus caeleste impossibilesit esse sine tali figura et omnia accidentia consequuntur substantiam sicutcausam, et ideo subiectum se habet ad accidentia non solum ut potentiapassiva, sed etiam quodammodo ut potentia activa, et ideo aliqua acci-dentia naturaliter perpetuantur in suis subiectis. Materia autem non esthoc modo causa formae, et ideo omnis materia, quae subest alicui formae,potest etiam non subesse, nisi fortassis a causa extrinseca contineatur; sicutvirtute divina ponimus aliqua corpora etiam ex contrariis composita esseincorruptibilia, ut corpora resurgentium. Essentia autem Angeli secundumnaturam suam incorruptibilis est, et ideo non est in ea compositio formaeet materiae. Sed quia non habet esse a se ipso Angelus, ideo se habet inpotentia ad esse quod accipit a Deo, et sic esse a Deo acceptum comparatur

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ad essentiam eius simplicem ut actus ad potentiam. Et hoc est quod dici-tur quod sunt compositi ex quod est et quo est, ut ipsum esse intelligaturquo est, ipsa vero natura Angeli intelligatur quod est. Tamen si ex materiaet forma Angeli compositi essent, non tamen ex materia sensibili, a quaoportet et mathematica abstracta esse et metaphysica separata.

Ad quintum dicendum quod ens et substantia dicuntur separata a ma-teria et motu non per hoc quod de ratione ipsorum sit esse sine materiaet motu, sicut de ratione asini est sine ratione esse, sed per hoc quod deratione eorum non est esse in materia et motu, quamvis quandoque sint inmateria et motu, sicut animal abstrahit a ratione, quamvis aliquod animalsit rationale.

Ad sextum dicendum quod metaphysicus considerat etiam de singu-laribus entibus non secundum proprias rationes, per quas sunt tale vel taleens, sed secundum quod participant communem rationem entis, et sic etiampertinet ad eius considerationem materia et motus.

Ad septimum dicendum quod agere et pati non convenit entibus secun-dum quod sunt in consideratione, sed secundum quod sunt in esse. Math-ematicus autem considerat res abstractas secundum considerationem tan-tum, et ideo illae res, prout cadunt in consideratione mathematici, nonconvenit esse principium et finis motus, et ideo mathematicus non demon-strat per causas efficientem et finalem. Res autem, quas considerat divinus,sunt separatae exsistentes in rerum natura, tales quae possunt esse prin-cipium et finis motus; unde nihil prohibet quin per causas efficientem etfinalem demonstret.

Ad octavum dicendum quod sicut fides, quae est quasi habitus prin-cipiorum theologiae, habet pro obiecto ipsam veritatem primam et tamenquaedam alia ad creaturas pertinentia in articulis fidei continentur, in quan-tum contingunt aliquo modo veritatem primam, per eundem modum the-ologia est principaliter de Deo sicut de subiecto, de creaturis autem multaassumit ut effectus eius vel quomodolibet habentia habitudinem ad ipsum.

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quaestio 6

Deinde quaeritur de modis quos scientiis speculativis attribuit. Et circa hocquaeruntur quattuor.

Primo. Utrum oporteat versari in naturalibus rationabiliter, in mathe-maticis disciplinabiliter, in divinis intellectualiter.

Secundo. Utrum in divinis sit omnino imaginatio relinquenda.Tertio. Utrum intellectus noster possit ipsam formam divinam inspicere.Quarto. Utrum hoc possit fieri per viam alicuius scientiae speculativae.

Articulus 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non oporteat in naturalibus ra-tionabiliter versari. Philosophia enim rationalis contra naturalem dividitur.Sed rationabiliter procedere videtur proprie ad rationalem pertinere. Ergonon competenter attribuitur naturali.

Praeterea, philosophus frequenter in libro physicorum distinguit proces-sus ad aliquas conclusiones rationales et physicas. Ergo non est propriumnaturali scientiae rationabiliter procedere.

Praeterea, illud, quod est commune omnibus scientiis, non debet uniappropriari. Sed quaelibet scientia ratiocinando procedit discurrendo velex effectibus in causas vel ex causis in effectus vel ex aliquibus signis. Ergonon debet naturali appropriari.

Praeterea, ratiocinativum in VI Ethicorum contra scientificum distin-guitur a philosopho. Sed philosophia naturalis ad scientificum pertinet.Ergo non convenienter attribuitur ei rationabiliter procedere.

Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima quod ratio circaformas corporum versatur. Sed considerare corpora maxime pertinet adnaturalem. Ergo convenienter attribuitur ei rationabiliter procedere.

Praeterea, in V de consolatione Boethius dicit: ratio cum quid uni-versale respicit, nec imaginatione nec sensu utens imaginabilia tamen etsensibilia comprehendit. Sed imaginabilia et sensibilia comprehendere adsolum naturalem pertinet. Ergo rationalis processus convenienter naturaliattribuitur.

Ulterius videtur quod inconvenienter dicatur mathematica disciplina-biliter procedere. Disciplina enim nihil aliud esse videtur quam acceptioscientiae. Sed in qualibet parte philosophiae accipitur scientia, quia omnesdemonstrative procedunt. Ergo procedere disciplinaliter est commune om-nibus partibus philosophiae, et ita non debet appropriari mathematicae.

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Praeterea, quanto est aliquid certius, tanto facilius esse videtur, ut de eosit disciplina. Sed naturalia sunt certiora, ut videtur, quam mathematica,quia capiuntur sensu, a quo omnis nostra cognitio ortum habet. Ergo hicmodus magis competit naturali quam mathematico.

Praeterea, ut dicitur in V metaphysicae, initium in scientiis est, a quo fitfacilior disciplina. Sed initium addiscendi accipitur a logica, quam oportetpraeaddiscere mathematicae et omnibus aliis. Ergo disciplinalis modusmagis convenit logicae quam aliis.

Praeterea, modus naturalis scientiae et divinae assumitur a potentiis an-imae, scilicet a ratione et intellectu. Ergo similiter et modus mathematicaeab aliqua animae potentia sumi deberet, et sic non convenienter ponitureius modus disciplinabiliter versari.

Sed contra, disciplinaliter procedere est demonstrative procedere et percertitudinem. Sed, sicut Ptolemaeus in principio Almagesti dicit, solummathematicum genus, si quis huic diligentiam exhibeat inquisitionis, firmamstabilemque fidem intendentibus notitiam dabit, velut demonstratione perindubitabiles vias facta. Ergo disciplinaliter procedere maxime propriumest mathematici.

Praeterea, hoc patet per philosophum, qui in pluribus locis suorum li-brorum scientias mathematicas disciplinas nominat.

Ulterius videtur quod non sit conveniens modus divinae scientiae in-tellectualiter procedere. Intellectus enim secundum philosophum est prin-cipiorum, scientia autem conclusionum. Sed non omnia, quae in scientiadivina traduntur, sunt principia, sed quaedam etiam conclusiones. Ergointellectualiter procedere non est conveniens scientiae divinae.

Praeterea, in illis, quae omnem intellectum excedunt, intellectualiterversari non possumus. Sed divina excedunt omnem intellectum, ut Diony-sius dicit 1 c. de divinis nominibus et philosophus in libro de causis. Ergointellectualiter tractari non possunt.

Praeterea, Dionysius dicit 7 c. de divinis nominibus quod Angeli habentintellectualem virtutem, in quantum divinam cognitionem non congreganta sensibilibus aut a rebus divisis. Sed hoc est supra animae potestatem, utibidem subditur. Cum ergo divina scientia, de qua nunc agitur, sit scientiahumanae animae, videtur quod non sit proprius modus eius intellectualitertractare.

Praeterea, theologia praecipue videtur esse de his, quae fidei sunt. Sed inhis, quae fidei sunt, intelligere est finis. Unde dicitur Is. 7 secundum aliam

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litteram: nisi credideritis, non intelligetis. Ergo intellectualiter versari circadivina non debet poni theologiae modus, sed finis.

Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima quod intellectusest spirituum creatorum, intelligentia vero ipsius Dei. De his autem prae-cipue est scientia divina. Ergo intellectualiter procedere videtur esse ipsiusproprium.

Praeterea, modus scientiae debet respondere materiae. Sed res divinaesunt res intelligibiles per se ipsas. Ergo modus conveniens divinae scientiaeest intellectualiter procedere.

Responsio. Dicendum ad primam quaestionem quod processus aliquis,quo proceditur in scientiis, dicitur rationabilis tripliciter. Uno modo exparte principiorum, ex quibus proceditur, ut cum aliquis procedit ad aliq-uid probandum ex operibus rationis, cuiusmodi sunt genus et species etoppositum et huiusmodi intentiones, quas logici considerant. Et sic diceturaliquis processus esse rationabilis, quando aliquis utitur in aliqua scientiapropositionibus, quae traduntur in logica, prout scilicet utimur logica, proutest docens, in aliis scientiis. Sed hic modus procedendi non potest propriecompetere alicui particulari scientiae, in quibus peccatum accidit, nisi expropriis procedatur. Contingit autem hoc proprie et convenienter fieri inlogica et metaphysica, eo quod utraque scientia communis est et circa idemsubiectum quodammodo.

Alio modo dicitur processus rationalis ex termino in quo sistitur proce-dendo. Ultimus enim terminus, ad quem rationis inquisitio perducere debet,est intellectus principiorum, in quae resolvendo iudicamus; quod quidemquando fit non dicitur processus vel probatio rationabilis, sed demonstra-tiva. Quandoque autem inquisitio rationis non potest usque ad praedictumterminum perduci, sed sistitur in ipsa inquisitione, quando scilicet inquirentiadhuc manet via ad utrumlibet; et hoc contingit, quando per probabilesrationes proceditur, quae natae sunt facere opinionem vel fidem, non sci-entiam. Et sic rationabilis processus dividitur contra demonstrativum. Ethoc modo rationabiliter procedi potest in qualibet scientia, ut ex proba-bilibus paretur via ad necessarias probationes. Et hic est alius modus, quologica utimur in scientiis demonstrativis, non quidem ut est docens, sed utest utens. Et his duobus modis denominatur processus rationalis a scientiarationali; his enim modis usitatur logica, quae rationalis scientia dicitur, inscientiis demonstrativis, ut dicit Commentator in I physicorum.

Tertio modo dicitur aliquis processus rationalis a potentia rationali, inquantum scilicet in procedendo sequimur proprium modum animae ratio-

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nalis in cognoscendo, et sic rationabilis processus est proprius scientiae nat-uralis. Scientia enim naturalis in suis processibus servat proprium modumrationalis animae quantum ad duo. Primo quantum ad hoc, quod sicutanima rationalis a sensibilibus, quae sunt nota magis quoad nos, accipitcognitionem intelligibilium, quae sunt magis nota secundum naturam, itascientia naturalis procedit ex his, quae sunt nota magis quoad nos et mi-nus nota secundum naturam, ut patet in I physicorum, et demonstratio,quae est per signum vel effectum, maxime usitatur in scientia naturali. Se-cundo, quia cum rationis sit de uno in aliud discurrere, hoc maxime inscientia naturali observatur, ubi ex cognitione unius rei in cognitionem al-terius devenitur, sicut ex cognitione effectus in cognitionem causae. Et nonsolum proceditur ab uno in aliud secundum rationem, quod non est aliudsecundum rem, sicut si ab animali procedatur ad hominem. In scientiisenim mathematicis proceditur per ea tantum, quae sunt de essentia rei,cum demonstrent solum per causam formalem; et ideo non demonstraturin eis aliquid de una re per aliam rem, sed per propriam diffinitionem illiusrei. Etsi enim aliquae demonstrationes dentur de circulo ex triangulo vele converso, hoc non est nisi in quantum in circulo est potentia trianguluset e converso. Sed in scientia naturali, in qua fit demonstratio per causasextrinsecas, probatur aliquid de una re per aliam rem omnino extrinsecam.Et ita modus rationis maxime in scientia naturali observatur, et propterhoc scientia naturalis inter alias est maxime hominis intellectui conformis.Attribuitur ergo rationabiliter procedere scientiae naturali, non quia ei soliconveniat, sed quia ei praecipue competit.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de processu, qui dic-itur rationabilis secundum primum modum. Sic enim processus rationabilisest proprius rationali scientiae et divinae, non autem naturali.

Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de processu, qui diciturrationabilis secundo modo.

Ad tertium dicendum quod in omnibus scientiis servatur quantum adhoc modus rationis, quod proceditur de uno in aliud secundum rationem,non autem quod procedatur de una re in aliam, sed hoc est proprium nat-uralis scientiae. Et sic ei rationabiliter procedere attribuitur, ut dictumest.

Ad quartum dicendum quod philosophus ibi pro eodem ponit ratioci-nativum et opinativum, unde patet quod pertinet ad secundum modumassignatum. Ratiocinativo autem vel opinativo attribuit philosophus ibi-dem agibilia humana, de quibus est scientia moralis, ratione suae contin-

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gentiae. Unde potest ex dictis colligi quod primus modus rationabilitatisest maxime proprius scientiae rationali, secundus scientiae morali, tertiusscientiae naturali.

Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum quod disciplinaliter procedere at-tribuitur scientiae mathematicae, non quia ipsa sola disciplinaliter proce-dat, sed quia hoc ei praecipue competit. Cum enim discere nihil sit aliudquam ab alio scientiam accipere, tunc dicimur disciplinabiliter procedere,quando processus noster ad certam cognitionem perducit, quae scientia dic-itur; quod quidem maxime contingit in mathematicis scientiis. Cum enimmathematica sit media inter naturalem et divinam, ipsa est utraque cer-tior. Naturali quidem propter hoc quod eius consideratio est a motu etmateria absoluta, cum naturalis consideratio in materia et motu versetur.Ex hoc autem quod consideratio naturalis est circa materiam, eius cognitioa pluribus dependet, scilicet ex consideratione materiae ipsius et formae etdispositionum materialium et proprietatum quae consequuntur formam inmateria. Ubicumque autem ad aliquid cognoscendum oportet plura con-siderare, est difficilior cognitio; unde in I posteriorum dicitur quod minuscerta scientia est quae est ex additione, ut geometria arithmetica. Ex hocvero quod eius consideratio est circa res mobiles et quae non uniformiterse habent, eius cognitio est minus firma, quia eius demonstrationes fre-quenter procedunt, ut in maiori parte, ex hoc quod contingit aliquandoaliter se habere. Et ideo etiam quanto aliqua scientia magis appropinquatad singularia, sicut scientiae operativae, ut medicina, alchimia et moralis,minus possunt habere de certitudine propter multitudinem eorum quae con-sideranda sunt in talibus scientiis, quorum quodlibet si omittatur, sequeturerror, et propter eorum variabilitatem.

Est etiam processus mathematicae certior quam processus scientiae div-inae, quia ea, de quibus est scientia divina, sunt magis a sensibilibus re-mota, a quibus nostra cognitio initium sumit, et quantum ad substantiasseparatas, in quarum cognitionem insufficienter inducunt ea, quae a sensi-bilibus accipimus, et quantum ad ea quae sunt communia omnibus entibus,quae sunt maxime universalia et sic maxime remota a particularibus caden-tibus sub sensu. Mathematica autem ipsa in sensu cadunt et imaginationisubiacent, ut figura, linea et numerus et huiusmodi. Et ideo intellectushumanus a phantasmatibus accipiens facilius capit horum cognitionem etcertius quam intelligentiae alicuius vel etiam quam quiditatem substantiaeet actum et potentiam et alia huiusmodi. Et sic patet quod mathematicaconsideratio est facilior et certior quam naturalis et theologica, et multo plus

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quam scientiae aliae operativae, et ideo ipsa maxime dicitur disciplinaliterprocedere. Et hoc est quod Ptolemaeus dicit in principio Almagesti: aliaduo genera theorici potius quis opinionem quam conceptionem scientialemdicat: theologicum quidem propter inapparens ipsius et incomprehensibile,physicum vero propter materiae instabile et immanifestum. Solum autemmathematicum inquisitionis firmam stabilemque fidem intendentibus dabit,velut utique demonstratione per indubitabiles vias facta.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis in qualibet scientia disciplinaaccipiatur, tamen in mathematica facilius et certius, ut dictum est.

Ad secundum dicendum quod naturalia quamvis sensui subiaceant, ta-men propter sui fluxibilitatem non habent magnam certitudinem, cum extrasensum fiunt, sicut habent mathematica, quae sunt absque motu et tamensunt in materia sensibili secundum esse, et sic sub sensu et imaginationecadere possunt.

Ad tertium dicendum quod in addiscendo incipimus ab eo quod est magisfacile, nisi necessitas aliud requirat. Quandoque enim necessarium est inaddiscendo incipere non ab eo quod est facilius, sed ab eo, a cuius cogni-tione sequentium cognitio dependet. Et hac ratione oportet in addiscendo alogica incipere, non quia ipsa sit facilior ceteris scientiis, habet enim maxi-mam difficultatem, cum sit de secundo intellectis, sed quia aliae scientiae abipsa dependent, in quantum ipsa docet modum procedendi in omnibus sci-entiis. Oportet autem primo scire modum scientiae quam scientiam ipsam,ut dicitur in II metaphysicae.

Ad quartum dicendum quod a potentiis animae sumitur modus scien-tiarum propter modum quem habent potentiae animae in agendo. Undemodi scientiarum non respondent potentiis animae, sed modis quibus po-tentiae animae procedere possunt, qui non solum diversificantur penes po-tentias tantum, sed etiam penes obiecta; et sic non oportet quod moduscuiuslibet scientiae denominetur ab aliqua potentia animae. Potest tamendici quod sicut modus physicae sumitur a ratione, secundum quod a sensuaccipit, modus autem divinae scientiae ab intellectu, secundum quod nudealiquid considerat, ita etiam et modus mathematicae potest sumi a ratione,secundum quod accipit ab imaginatione.

Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum quod sicut rationabiliter procedereattribuitur naturali philosophiae, eo quod in ipsa maxime observatur modusrationis, ita intellectualiter procedere attribuitur divinae scientiae, eo quodin ipsa maxime observatur modus intellectus. Differt autem ratio ab intel-lectu, sicut multitudo ab unitate. Unde dicit Boethius in IV de consolatione

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quod similiter se habent ratio ad intelligentiam et tempus ad aeternitatemet circulus ad centrum. Est enim rationis proprium circa multa diffundi etex eis unam simplicem cognitionem colligere. Unde Dionysius dicit 7 c. dedivinis nominibus quod animae secundum hoc habent rationalitatem quoddiffusive circueunt exsistentium veritatem, et in hoc deficiunt ab Angelis;sed in quantum convolvunt multa ad unum, quodam modo Angelis aequan-tur. Intellectus autem e converso per prius unam et simplicem veritatemconsiderat et in illa totius multitudinis cognitionem capit, sicut Deus in-telligendo suam essentiam omnia cognoscit. Unde Dionysius ibidem dicitquod angelicae mentes habent intellectualitatem, in quantum uniformiterintelligibilia divinorum intelligunt.

Sic ergo patet quod rationalis consideratio ad intellectualem terminatursecundum viam resolutionis, in quantum ratio ex multis colligit unam etsimplicem veritatem. Et rursum intellectualis consideratio est principiumrationalis secundum viam compositionis vel inventionis, in quantum intel-lectus in uno multitudinem comprehendit. Illa ergo consideratio, quae estterminus totius humanae ratiocinationis, maxime est intellectualis consid-eratio. Tota autem consideratio rationis resolventis in omnibus scientiisad considerationem divinae scientiae terminatur. Ratio enim, ut prius dic-tum est, procedit quandoque de uno in aliud secundum rem, ut quandoest demonstratio per causas vel effectus extrinsecos: componendo quidem,cum proceditur a causis ad effectus; quasi resolvendo, cum proceditur abeffectibus ad causas, eo quod causae sunt effectibus simpliciores et magis im-mobiliter et uniformiter permanentes. Ultimus ergo terminus resolutionis inhac via est, cum pervenitur ad causas supremas maxime simplices, quae suntsubstantiae separatae. Quandoque vero procedit de uno in aliud secundumrationem, ut quando est processus secundum causas intrinsecas: compo-nendo quidem, quando a formis maxime universalibus in magis particulataproceditur; resolvendo autem quando e converso, eo quod universalius estsimplicius. Maxime autem universalia sunt, quae sunt communia omnibusentibus. Et ideo terminus resolutionis in hac via ultimus est consideratioentis et eorum quae sunt entis in quantum huiusmodi. Haec autem sunt, dequibus scientia divina considerat, ut supra dictum est, scilicet substantiaeseparatae et communia omnibus entibus. Unde patet quod sua consideratioest maxime intellectualis. Et exinde etiam est quod ipsa largitur principiaomnibus aliis scientiis, in quantum intellectualis consideratio est princip-ium rationalis, propter quod dicitur prima philosophia; et nihilominus ipsaaddiscitur post physicam et ceteras scientias, in quantum consideratio in-

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tellectualis est terminus rationalis, propter quod dicitur metaphysica quasitrans physicam, quia post physicam resolvendo occurrit.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectualiter procedere non attribui-tur scientiae divinae, quasi ipsa non ratiocinetur procedendo de principiisad conclusiones, sed quia eius ratiocinatio est intellectuali considerationipropinquissima et conclusiones eius principiis.

Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus est supra omnem intellectum crea-tum quantum ad comprehensionem, non autem supra intellectum increa-tum, cum ipse se ipsum intelligendo comprehendat. Est vero supra omnemintellectum viatoris quantum ad cognitionem, qua cognoscitur quid est, nonautem quantum ad cognitionem, qua cognoscitur an est. A beatis autemcognoscitur etiam quid est, quia vident eius essentiam. Et tamen scien-tia divina non est solum de Deo, sed et de aliis quae intellectum humanumetiam secundum statum viae non excedunt quantum ad quid est cognoscen-dum de eis.

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, humana consider-atio quantum ad sui terminum quodammodo pertingit ad angelicam cog-nitionem, non secundum aequalitatem, sed secundum quandam assimila-tionem. Unde Dionysius dicit 7 c. de divinis nominibus quod animae mul-torum convolutione ad unum sunt dignae habitae intellectibus aequalibusAngelis, in quantum animabus est proprium et possibile.

Ad quartum dicendum quod cognitio etiam fidei maxime pertinet adintellectum. Non enim ea rationis investigatione accipimus, sed simplici ac-ceptione intellectus tenemus. Dicimur autem ea non intelligere, in quantumintellectus eorum plenariam cognitionem non habet; quod quidem nobis inpraemium repromittitur.

Articulus 2

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in divinis oporteat ad imagina-tiones deduci. Scientia enim divina numquam competentius traditur quamin sacra Scriptura. Sed in sacra Scriptura in divinis deducimur ad imagina-tiones, dum divina nobis sub figuris sensibilibus describuntur. Ergo oportetin divinis ad imaginationes deduci.

Praeterea, divina non capiuntur nisi intellectu, unde et in eis intellectu-aliter versari oportet, ut dictum est. Sed non est intelligere sine phantas-mate, ut dicit philosophus in I et III de anima. Ergo in divinis oportet adimaginationes deduci.

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Praeterea, divina nobis innotescunt maxime per illustrationem diviniradii. Sed, sicut dicit Dionysius in 1 c. caelestis hierarchiae, impossibile estnobis aliter superlucere divinum radium nisi varietate sacrorum velaminumcircumvelatum; et vocat sacra velamina sensibilium imagines. Ergo in di-vinis oportet ad imaginationes deduci.

Praeterea, circa sensibilia oportet imaginabiliter versari. Sed divino-rum cognitionem ex sensibilibus effectibus accipimus, secundum illud Rom.1: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. Ergo indivinis oportet ad imaginationes deduci.

Praeterea, in cognoscitivis maxime regulamur per id quod est cognitionisprincipium, sicut in naturalibus per sensum, a quo nostra cognitio incipit.Sed principium intellectualis cognitionis in nobis est imaginatio, cum phan-tasmata hoc modo comparentur ad intellectum nostrum sicut colores advisum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo in divinis oportet ad imaginationemdeduci.

Praeterea, cum intellectus non utatur organo corporali, ex laesione or-gani corporalis non impeditur actio intellectus, nisi quatenus ad imagina-tionem convertitur. Sed per laesionem organi corporalis, scilicet cerebri,impeditur intellectus in consideratione divinorum. Ergo intellectus divinaconsiderans ad imaginationem deducitur.

Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit 1 c. mysticae theologiae ad Timo-theum loquens: tu, inquit, o amice Timothee, circa mysticas visiones sensusderelinque. Sed imaginatio non est nisi sensibilium, cum sit motus factusa sensu secundum actum, ut dicitur in II de anima. Ergo cum divinorumconsiderationes sint maxime mysticae, in eis non debemus ad imaginationesdeduci.

Praeterea, in cuiuslibet scientiae consideratione vitandum est illud quodin ea errorem facit. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus in I libro de Trinitate, primuserror circa divina est eorum, qui ea, quae de corporalibus rebus noverunt,ad res divinas transferre conantur. Cum ergo imaginatio non sit nisi cor-poralium rerum, videtur quod in divinis non debeamus ad imaginationesdeduci.

Praeterea, virtus inferior non se extendit in id quod est superioris pro-prium, ut patet per Boethium in V de consolatione. Sed cognoscere divinaet spiritualia pertinet ad intellectum et intelligentiam, ut dicitur in librode spiritu et anima. Cum ergo, ut ibidem dicitur, imaginatio sit infraintelligentiam et intellectum, videtur quod in divinis et spiritualibus nondebeamus ad imaginationem deduci.

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Responsio. Dicendum quod in qualibet cognitione duo est considerare,scilicet principium et terminum. Principium quidem ad apprehensionempertinet, terminus autem ad iudicium; ibi enim cognitio perficitur. Prin-cipium igitur cuiuslibet nostrae cognitionis est in sensu, quia ex apprehen-sione sensus oritur apprehensio phantasiae, quae est motus a sensu factus,ut dicit philosophus, a qua iterum oritur apprehensio intellectiva in nobis,cum phantasmata sint intellectivae animae ut obiecta, ut patet in III deanima.

Sed terminus cognitionis non semper est uniformiter: quandoque enimest in sensu, quandoque in imaginatione, quandoque autem in solo intel-lectu. Quandoque enim proprietates et accidentia rei, quae sensu demon-strantur, sufficienter exprimunt naturam rei, et tunc oportet quod iudiciumde rei natura quod facit intellectus conformetur his quae sensus de re demon-strat. Et huiusmodi sunt omnes res naturales, quae sunt determinatae admateriam sensibilem, et ideo in scientia naturali terminari debet cognitioad sensum, ut scilicet hoc modo iudicemus de rebus naturalibus, secundumquod sensus eas demonstrat, ut patet in III caeli et mundi; et qui sensumneglegit in naturalibus, incidit in errorem. Et haec sunt naturalia quaesunt concreta cum materia sensibili et motu et secundum esse et secundumconsiderationem.

Quaedam vero sunt, quorum iudicium non dependet ex his quae sensupercipiuntur, quia quamvis secundum esse sint in materia sensibili, tamensecundum rationem diffinitivam sunt a materia sensibili abstracta. Iudiciumautem de unaquaque re potissime fit secundum eius diffinitivam rationem.Sed quia secundum rationem diffinitivam non abstrahunt a qualibet ma-teria, sed solum a sensibili et remotis sensibilibus condicionibus remanetaliquid imaginabile, ideo in talibus oportet quod iudicium sumatur secun-dum id quod imaginatio demonstrat. Huiusmodi autem sunt mathematica.Et ideo in mathematicis oportet cognitionem secundum iudicium terminariad imaginationem, non ad sensum, quia iudicium mathematicum superatapprehensionem sensus. Unde non est idem iudicium quandoque de lineamathematica quod est de linea sensibili, sicut in hoc quod recta linea tangitsphaeram solum secundum punctum, quod convenit rectae lineae separatae,non autem rectae lineae in materia, ut dicitur in I de anima.

Quaedam vero sunt quae excedunt et id quod cadit sub sensu et id quodcadit sub imaginatione, sicut illa quae omnino a materia non dependentneque secundum esse neque secundum considerationem, et ideo talium cog-nitio secundum iudicium neque debet terminari ad imaginationem neque ad

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sensum. Sed tamen ex his, quae sensu vel imaginatione apprehenduntur,in horum cognitionem devenimus vel per viam causalitatis, sicut ex effectucausa perpenditur, quae non est effectui commensurata, sed excellens, velper excessum vel per remotionem, quando omnia, quae sensus vel imagi-natio apprehendit, a rebus huiusmodi separamus; quos modos cognoscendidivina ex sensibilibus ponit Dionysius in libro de divinis nominibus. Utiergo possumus in divinis et sensu et imaginatione sicut principiis nostraeconsiderationis, sed non sicut terminis, ut scilicet iudicemus talia esse div-ina, qualia sunt quae sensus vel imaginatio apprehendit. Deduci autem adaliquid est ad illud terminari. Et ideo in divinis neque ad imaginationemneque ad sensum debemus deduci, in mathematicis autem ad imaginationemet non ad sensum, in naturalibus autem etiam ad sensum. Et propter hocpeccant qui uniformiter in his tribus speculativae partibus procedere nitun-tur.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sacra Scriptura non proponit nobisdivina sub figuris sensibilibus, ut ibi intellectus noster remaneat, sed ut abhis ad immaterialia ascendat. Unde etiam per vilium rerum figuras divinatradit, ut minor praebeatur occasio in talibus remanendi, ut dicit Dionysiusin 2 c. caelestis hierarchiae.

Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus nostri operatio non est in prae-senti statu sine phantasmate quantum ad principium cognitionis; non tamenoportet quod nostra cognitio semper ad phantasmata terminetur, ut scilicetillud, quod intelligimus, iudicemus esse tale quale est illud quod phantasiaapprehendit.

Ad tertium dicendum quod auctoritas illa Dionysii loquitur quantum adprincipium cognitionis et non quantum ad terminum.

Ad quartum dicendum quod ex effectibus sensibilibus venimus in cog-nitionem divinorum tribus modis praedictis; non autem ita quod oporteatiudicium formari de divinis secundum modum, quo se habent isti sensibileseffectus.

Ad quintum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, quando principium cog-nitionis est sufficienter ducens in id, cuius cognitio quaeritur, et sic estprincipium sensus in naturalibus, non autem in divinis, ut dictum est.

Ad sextum dicendum quod phantasma est principium nostrae cognitio-nis, ut ex quo incipit intellectus operatio non sicut transiens, sed sicut per-manens ut quoddam fundamentum intellectualis operationis; sicut principiademonstrationis oportet manere in omni processu scientiae, cum phantas-mata comparentur ad intellectum ut obiecta, in quibus inspicit omne quod

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inspicit vel secundum perfectam repraesentationem vel per negationem. Etideo quando phantasmatum cognitio impeditur, oportet totaliter impediricognitionem intellectus etiam in divinis. Patet enim quod non possumusintelligere Deum esse causam corporum sive supra omnia corpora sive ab-sque corporeitate, nisi imaginemur corpora, non tamen iudicium divinorumsecundum imaginationem formatur. Et ideo quamvis imaginatio in qualibetdivinorum consideratione sit necessaria secundum statum viae, numquamtamen ad eam deduci oportet in divinis.

Articulus 3

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possimus ipsam formam div-inam ad minus in statu viae inspicere. Ut enim dicit Dionysius in primaepistula ad Gaium monachum, si quis videntium Deum intellexit quod vidit,non ipsum vidit, sed aliquid eorum quae sunt eius. Sed forma divina est ipseDeus. Ergo non possumus ipsam formam divinam inspicere.

Praeterea, forma divina est ipsa divina essentia. Sed Deum per essen-tiam nemo in statu viae videre potest, ergo nec ipsam divinam formaminspicere.

Praeterea, quicumque inspicit formam alicuius rei, aliquid de ipsa recognoscit. Sed secundum Dionysium in 1 c. mysticae theologiae intellectusnoster secundum quod melius potest Deo unitur, quando omnino nihil eiuscognoscit. Ergo non possumus divinam formam inspicere.

Praeterea, sicut dictum est, totius nostrae cognitionis principium est asensu. Sed ea, quae sensu percipimus, non sunt sufficientia ad demonstran-dum formam divinam nec etiam aliarum substantiarum separatarum. Ergonon possumus ipsam divinam formam inspicere.

Praeterea, secundum philosophum in II metaphysicae intellectus nosterse habet ad rerum manifestissima sicut oculus noctuae ad solem. Sed oculusnoctuae nullo modo potest videre solem, ergo nec intellectus noster formamipsam divinam et alias formas separatas quae sunt naturae manifestissima.

Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit Rom. 1 quod invisibilia Dei per eaquae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur a creatura mundi, id est homine,sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas. Nihil autem aliud est forma div-ina quam ipsa divinitas. Ergo ipsam formam divinam cognoscere intellectualiquo modo possumus.

Praeterea, Gen. 32 super illud: vidi dominum facie etc., dicit GlossaGregorii: nisi homo illam, scilicet veritatem divinam, utcumque conspiceret,

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non eam conspicere se non posse sentiret. Sed nos sentimus divinam essen-tiam non posse perfecte conspicere. Ergo aliquo modo ipsam conspicimus.

Praeterea, Dionysius dicit 2 c. caelestis hierarchiae quod humanus ani-mus assuescit extendi per visibilia in supermundanas altitudines, quae nihilaliud sunt quam ipsae formae separatae. Ergo formas separatas possumusaliquo modo cognoscere.

Responsio. Dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid cognoscitur: uno modo,dum scitur de eo an est, alio modo, dum scitur de eo quid est. Ad hocautem quod de aliqua re sciamus quid est, oportet quod intellectus nosterferatur in ipsius rei quiditatem sive essentiam vel immediate vel mediantibusaliquibus quae sufficienter eius quiditatem demonstrent. Immediate quidemintellectus noster ferri non potest secundum statum viae in essentiam Dei etin alias essentias separatas, quia immediate extenditur ad phantasmata, adquae comparatur sicut visus ad colorem, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et sicimmediate potest concipere intellectus quiditatem rei sensibilis, non autemalicuius rei intelligibilis. Unde dicit Dionysius 2 c. caelestis hierarchiae quodnostra analogia non valet immediate extendi in invisibiles contemplationes.Sed quaedam invisibilia sunt, quorum quiditas et natura perfecte exprimi-tur ex quiditatibus rerum sensibilium notis. Et de his etiam intelligibilibuspossumus scire quid est, sed mediate, sicut ex hoc quod scitur quid esthomo et quid est animal, sufficienter innotescit habitudo unius ad alterumet ex hoc scitur, quid est genus et quid est species. Sensibiles autem nat-urae intellectae non sufficienter exprimunt essentiam divinam neque etiamalias essentias separatas, cum non sint unius generis naturaliter loquendo etquiditas et omnia huiusmodi nomina fere aequivoce dicantur de sensibilibuset de illis substantiis. Unde similitudines rerum sensibilium ad substantiasimmateriales translatas vocat Dionysius 2 c. caelestis hierarchiae dissimilessimilitudines alio modo intellectualibus habentibus quae sensibilibus aliterdistributa sunt. Et sic per viam similitudinis non sufficienter illae substan-tiae ex his innotescunt. Neque etiam per viam causalitatis, quia ea, quaeab illis substantiis inveniuntur effecta in his inferioribus, non sunt effectusadaequantes earum virtutes, ut sic perveniri possit ad sciendum quod quidest de causa.

Unde de substantiis illis immaterialibus secundum statum viae nullomodo possumus scire quid est non solum per viam naturalis cognitionis,sed etiam nec per viam revelationis, quia divinae revelationis radius ad nospervenit secundum modum nostrum, ut Dionysius dicit. Unde quamvisper revelationem elevemur ad aliquid cognoscendum, quod alias esset nobis

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ignotum, non tamen ad hoc quod alio modo cognoscamus nisi per sensi-bilia. Unde dicit Dionysius in 1 c. caelestis hierarchiae quod impossibile estnobis superlucere divinum radium nisi circumvelatum varietate sacrorumvelaminum. Via autem quae est per sensibilia non sufficit ad ducendum insubstantias immateriales secundum cognitionem quid est. Et sic restat quodformae immateriales non sunt nobis notae cognitione quid est, sed solum-modo cognitione an est, sive naturali ratione ex effectibus creaturarum siveetiam revelatione quae est per similitudines a sensibilibus sumptas.

Et tamen sciendum quod de nulla re potest sciri an est, nisi quoquomodo sciatur de ea quid est vel cognitione perfecta vel saltem cognitioneconfusa, prout philosophus dicit in principio physicorum quod diffinita suntpraecognita partibus diffinitionis. Oportet enim scientem hominem esse etquaerentem quid est homo per diffinitionem scire quid hoc nomen homo sig-nificat. Nec hoc esset, nisi aliquam rem quoquo modo conciperet quam scitesse, quamvis nesciat eius diffinitionem. Concipit enim hominem secundumcognitionem alicuius generis proximi vel remoti et aliquorum accidentiumquae extra apparent de ipso. Oportet enim diffinitionum cognitionem, sicutet demonstrationum, ex aliqua praeexsistenti cognitione initium sumere.Sic ergo et de Deo et aliis substantiis immaterialibus non possemus scire anest, nisi sciremus quoquo modo de eis quid est sub quadam confusione.

Hoc autem non potest esse per cognitionem alicuius generis proximi velremoti, eo quod Deus in nullo genere est, cum non habeat quod quid estaliud a suo esse, quod requiritur in omnibus generibus, ut Avicenna dicit.Aliae autem substantiae immateriales creatae sunt quidem in genere, etquamvis logice considerando conveniant cum istis substantiis sensibilibusin genere remoto quod est substantia, naturaliter tamen loquendo non con-veniunt in eodem genere, sicut nec etiam corpora caelestia cum istis in-ferioribus. Corruptibile enim et incorruptibile non sunt unius generis, utdicitur in X metaphysicae. Logicus enim considerat absolute intentiones,secundum quas nihil prohibet convenire immaterialia materialibus et incor-ruptibilia corruptibilibus. Sed naturalis et philosophus primus considerantessentias secundum quod habent esse in rebus, et ideo ubi inveniunt diver-sum modum potentiae et actus et per hoc diversum modum essendi, dicuntesse diversa genera. Similiter etiam Deus non habet aliquod accidens, utinfra probabitur. Aliae vero immateriales substantiae si habent aliqua ac-cidentia, non sunt nobis nota.

Et ideo non possumus dicere quod confusa cognitione cognoscantur anobis substantiae immateriales per cognitionem generis et apparentium ac-

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cidentium. Sed loco cognitionis generis habemus in istis substantiis cogni-tionem per negationes, ut cum scimus quod huiusmodi substantiae sunt im-materiales, incorporeae non habentes figuras et alia huiusmodi. Et quantoplures negationes de eis cognoscimus, tanto et minus confusa est earum cog-nitio in nobis, eo quod per negationes sequentes prior negatio contrahitur etdeterminatur, sicut genus remotum per differentias. Unde etiam et corporacaelestia, in quantum sunt alterius generis ab istis inferioribus, a nobis utplurimum per negationes cognoscuntur, utpote quia neque sunt levia nequegravia neque calida neque frigida. Loco autem accidentium habemus in sub-stantiis praedictis habitudines earum ad substantias sensibiles vel secundumcomparationem causae ad effectum vel secundum comparationem excessus.Ita ergo de formis immaterialibus cognoscimus an est et habemus de eis lococognitionis quid est cognitionem per negationem, per causalitatem et perexcessum, quos etiam modos Dionysius ponit in libro de divinis nominibus.Et hoc modo Boethius intelligit esse inspiciendam ipsam divinam formamper remotionem omnium phantasmatum, non ut sciatur de ea quid est. Etper hoc patet solutio ad obiecta, quia primae rationes procedunt de cogni-tione quid est perfecta, aliae autem de cognitione imperfecta, qualis dictaest.

Articulus 4

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad formam divinam inspiciendamper scientias speculativas perveniri possit. Theologia enim pars scientiaespeculativae est, ut hic Boethius dicit. Sed ad theologiam pertinet ipsamformam inspicere divinam, ut hic dicitur. Ergo ad cognoscendam divinamformam potest perveniri per scientias speculativas.

Praeterea, de substantiis immaterialibus in aliqua scientia speculativadeterminatur, quia in scientia divina. Sed quaecumque scientia determi-nat de aliqua substantia, inspicit formam illius substantiae, quia omniscognitio est per formam et omnis demonstrationis secundum philosophumprincipium est quod quid est. Ergo inspicere formas separatas possumusper scientias speculativas.

Praeterea, ultima felicitas hominis secundum philosophos consistit in in-telligendo substantias separatas. Cum enim felicitas sit operatio perfectis-sima, oportet quod sit optimorum sub intellectu cadentium, ut potest accipiex philosopho in X Ethicorum. Est autem felicitas illa, de qua philosophiloquuntur, operatio a sapientia procedens, cum sapientia sit perfectissima

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virtus perfectissimae potentiae, scilicet intellectus, et haec operatio sit felic-itas, ut dicitur in X Ethicorum. Ergo per sapientiam intelliguntur substan-tiae separatae. Sed sapientia est scientia quaedam speculativa, ut patet inprincipio metaphysicae et in VI Ethicorum. Ergo per scientias speculativaspossumus intelligere substantias separatas.

Praeterea, frustra est quod non potest pertingere ad finem propter quemest. Sed omnium scientiarum speculativarum consideratio ordinatur sicutin finem in cognitionem substantiarum separatarum, quia perfectissimum inquolibet genere est finis. Ergo si per scientias speculativas huiusmodi sub-stantiae intelligi non possent, omnes scientiae speculativae essent frustra,quod est inconveniens.

Praeterea, omne, quod ordinatur naturaliter in finem aliquem, habet sibiindita aliqua principia, quibus potest pervenire in finem illum, ex quibusinclinatur etiam in finem illum; naturalium enim motionum principia suntintra. Sed homo naturaliter est ordinatus ad cognitionem substantiarumimmaterialium sicut ad finem, ut a sanctis et a philosophis traditur. Ergohabet in se aliqua principia illius cognitionis naturaliter indita. Sed omneillud, in quod possumus devenire ex principiis naturaliter notis, pertinetad considerationem alicuius scientiae speculativae. Ergo cognitio substan-tiarum immaterialium ad aliquas scientias speculativas pertinet.

Sed contra est quod Commentator dicit in III de anima quod ad hancpositionem sequitur vel quod scientiae speculativae nondum sint perfec-tae, cum illae scientiae nondum sint inventae, quibus possimus substantiasseparatas intelligere, et hoc, si contingat ex ignorantia aliquorum principi-orum quod nondum substantias praedictas intelligamus; vel si contingat exdefectu naturae nostrae quod non possimus illas scientias speculativas in-venire, quibus praedictae substantiae intelligantur, sequetur quod si aliquinati sunt huiusmodi scientias invenire, quod nos et ipsi simus aequivocehomines; quorum primum est improbabile, secundum autem est impos-sibile. Ergo non potest hoc per aliquas speculativas scientias esse quodsubstantias praedictas intelligamus.

Praeterea, in scientiis speculativis investigantur diffinitiones, quibus re-rum essentiae intelliguntur per viam divisionis generis in differentias et perinvestigationem causarum rei et accidentium ipsius quae magnam partemconferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est. Sed haec non possumus desubstantiis immaterialibus cognoscere, quia, ut iam dictum est, naturaliterloquendo non conveniunt in genere cum istis sensibilibus substantiis nobisnotis; causam autem vel non habent, ut Deus, vel est nobis occultissima,

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sicut causa Angelorum; accidentia etiam eorum sunt nobis ignota. Ergonon potest aliqua scientia speculativa esse, per quam perveniamus ad intel-ligendas substantias immateriales.

Praeterea, in scientiis speculativis rerum essentiae per diffinitiones cognos-cuntur. Diffinitio autem est sermo quidam compositus ex genere et differ-entiis. Substantiarum autem illarum essentiae sunt simplices, nec interciditin earum quiditatibus aliqua compositio, ut videtur per philosophum etCommentatorem in IX metaphysicae. Ergo per scientias speculativas nonpossumus substantias praedictas intelligere.

Responsio. Dicendum quod in scientiis speculativis semper ex aliquoprius noto proceditur tam in demonstrationibus propositionum quam etiamin inventionibus diffinitionum. Sicut enim ex propositionibus praecognitisaliquis devenit in cognitionem conclusionis, ita ex conceptione generis et dif-ferentiae et causarum rei aliquis devenit in cognitionem speciei. Hic autemnon est possibile in infinitum procedere, quia sic omnis scientia periret etquantum ad demonstrationes et quantum ad diffinitiones, cum infinita nonsit pertransire. Unde omnis consideratio scientiarum speculativarum re-ducitur in aliqua prima, quae quidem homo non habet necesse addiscere autinvenire, ne oporteat in infinitum procedere, sed eorum notitiam naturaliterhabet. Et huiusmodi sunt principia demonstrationum indemonstrabilia, utomne totum est maius sua parte et similia, in quae omnes demonstrationesscientiarum reducuntur, et etiam primae conceptiones intellectus, ut entiset unius et huiusmodi, in quae oportet reducere omnes diffinitiones scien-tiarum praedictarum.

Ex quo patet quod nihil potest sciri in scientiis speculativis neque perviam demonstrationis neque per viam diffinitionis nisi ea tantummodo, adquae praedicta naturaliter cognita se extendunt. Huiusmodi autem nat-uraliter cognita homini manifestantur ex ipso lumine intellectus agentis,quod est homini naturale, quo quidem lumine nihil manifestatur nobis, nisiin quantum per ipsum phantasmata fiunt intelligibilia in actu. Hic enim estactus intellectus agentis, ut dicitur in III de anima. Phantasmata autem asensu accipiuntur; unde principium cognitionis praedictorum principiorumest ex sensu et memoria, ut patet per philosophum in fine posteriorum, et sichuiusmodi principia non ducunt nos ulterius nisi ad ea quorum cognitionemaccipere possumus ex his quae sensu comprehenduntur.

Quiditas autem substantiarum separatarum non potest cognosci per eaquae a sensibus accipimus, ut ex praedictis patet, quamvis per sensibiliapossimus devenire ad cognoscendum praedictas substantias esse et aliquas

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earum condiciones. Et ideo per nullam scientiam speculativam potest sciride aliqua substantia separata quid est, quamvis per scientias speculativaspossimus scire ipsas esse et aliquas earum condiciones, utpote quod suntintellectuales, incorruptibiles et huiusmodi. Et haec est etiam sententiaCommentatoris in III de anima, quamvis Avempace contrarium dixerit exhoc quod aestimabat quiditates rerum sensibilium sufficienter exprimerequiditates immateriales, quod patet esse falsum, ut ibidem Commentatordicit, cum quiditas de utrisque dicatur quasi aequivoce.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Boethius non intendit dicere quod perscientiam theologiae possumus ipsam formam divinam contemplari quid est,sed solum eam esse ultra omnia phantasmata.

Ad secundum dicendum quod quaedam res sunt a nobis per se ipsascognoscibiles, et in talibus manifestandis scientiae speculativae utunturearum diffinitionibus ad demonstrandum ipsarum proprietates, sicut ac-cidit in scientiis quae demonstrant propter quid. Quaedam vero res sunt,quae non sunt nobis cognoscibiles ex se ipsis, sed per effectus suos. Etsi quidem effectus sit adaequans causam, ipsa quiditas effectus accipiturut principium ad demonstrandum causam esse et ad investigandum quid-itatem eius, ex qua iterum proprietates eius ostenduntur. Si autem siteffectus non adaequans causam, tunc diffinitio effectus accipitur ut princip-ium ad demonstrandum causam esse et aliquas condiciones eius, quamvisquiditas causae sit semper ignota, et ita accidit in substantiis separatis.

Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est felicitas hominis. Una imperfectaquae est in via, de qua loquitur philosophus, et haec consistit in contempla-tione substantiarum separatarum per habitum sapientiae, imperfecta tamenet tali, qualis in via est possibilis, non ut sciatur ipsarum quiditas. Aliaest perfecta in patria, in qua ipse Deus per essentiam videbitur et aliaesubstantiae separatae. Sed haec felicitas non erit per aliquam scientiamspeculativam, sed per lumen gloriae.

Ad quartum dicendum quod scientiae speculativae ordinantur in cogni-tionem substantiarum separatarum imperfectam, ut dictum est.

Ad quintum dicendum quod nobis sunt indita principia, quibus nospossimus praeparare ad illam cognitionem perfectam substantiarum sep-aratarum, non autem quibus ad eam possimus pertingere. Quamvis enimhomo naturaliter inclinetur in finem ultimum, non tamen potest naturaliterillum consequi, sed solum per gratiam, et hoc est propter eminentiam illiusfinis.

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7 St. Thomas Aquinas

DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA / ON BEING AND ESSENCE

Translator’s Note

The Latin text here is emended and divided according to the Leonine criticaledition; the English text was translated by C. Decaen in March 2009, andthen revised in June 2009, and again April 2010 with input from other tutorsreading the original version and “field-testing” it with their students.

Square brackets [. . . ] contain implied words, whereas curved brackets{. . . } contain alternate translations of the immediately preceding word orphrase, sometimes capturing a nuance in the Latin missed by the primarytranslation, and other times indicating an ambiguity in the Latin itself. Asusual, there’s no substitute for simply reading the Latin.

Because Latin does not have articles, the translator was forced to judgewhich kind was appropriate when. Whence the reader should be cautiousabout the articles in this translation, as the sense of the text might changewhether, for example, one takes St. Thomas to be speaking about a sub-stance or the substance or merely substance. Likewise, Latin does not havequotation marks, so the translator has supplied them when an author isquoted and, more significantly, when St. Thomas appears to be speak-ing chiefly about the spoken word and not so much about that which issignified by the spoken word. Nevertheless, the reader again should becautious about whether this addition is always correct, and about whetherSt. Thomas may sometimes be intentionally ambiguous.

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Prooemium

1. Quia parvus error in principio magnus est in fine secundum Philoso-phum in I Caeli et Mundi, ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo intellectuconcipiuntur, ut dicit Avicenna in principio suaeMetaphysicae, ideo ne exeorum ignorantia errare contingat, ad horum difficultatem aperiendam di-

5 cendum est quid nomine essentiae et entis significetur, et quomodo in diver-sis inveniatur, et quomodo se habeat ad intentiones logicas, scilicet genus,speciem et differentiam.

2. Quia vero ex compositis simplicium cognitionem accipere debemus etex posterioribus in priora devenire, ut a facilioribus incipientes convenien-

10 tior fiat disciplina, ideo ex significatione entis ad significationem essentiaeprocedendum est.

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De Ente et Essentia / On Being and Essence

Prologue

1. Because a small error in the beginning principle is a great one inthe end, following the Philosopher in I of De Caelo, but being and essenceare what are conceived by the first understanding, as Avicenna says inthe beginning of his Metaphysics, therefore, lest error befall one due to anignorance of them, for the sake of laying open the difficulty of these things 5R

it should be said what is signified by the name “essence” and “being,” andin what manner it is found in diverse things, and in what manner it holdsitself toward the logical intentions meanings, namely genus, species, anddifference.

2. But because we ought to take the cognition of simple things from 10R

composed ones, and to come from posterior things into prior ones, so that,beginning from easier things, the learning might come to be more fittingly,therefore one should proceed from the signification of “being” to the signi-fication of “essence.”

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Caput 1

1. Sciendum est igitur quod, sicut in V Metaphysicae Philosophus dicit,ens per se dicitur dupliciter: uno modo quod dividitur per decem genera,alio modo quod significat propositionum veritatem. Horum autem differ-entia est quia secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud de quo affirmativa

5 propositio formari potest, etiam si illud in re nihil ponat; per quem modumprivationes et negationes entia dicuntur; dicimus enim quod affirmatio estopposita negationi, et quod caecitas est in oculo. Sed primo modo nonpotest dici ens nisi quod aliquid in re ponit; unde primo modo caecitas ethuiusmodi non sunt entia.

10 2. Nomen igitur essentiae non sumitur ab ente secundo modo dicto;aliqua enim hoc modo dicuntur entia quae essentiam non habent, ut patetin privationibus; sed sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo dicto. UndeCommentator in eodem loco dicit quod ens primo modo dictum est quodsignificat essentiam rei. Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum

15 dividitur per decem genera, oportet ut essentia significet aliquid communeomnibus naturis per quas diversa entia in diversis generibus et speciebuscollocantur, sicut humanitas est essentia hominis, et sic de aliis.

3. Et quia illud per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel specieest hoc quod significatur per diffinitionem indicantem quid est res, inde est

20 quod nomen essentiae a philosophis in nomen quiditatis mutatur; et hocest quod Philosophus frequenter nominat quod quid erat esse, id est hocper quod aliquid habet esse quid. Dicitur etiam forma, secundum quodper formam significatur certitudo uniuscuiusque rei, ut dicit Avicenna inII Metaphysicae suae. Hoc etiam alio nomine natura dicitur accipiendo

25 naturam secundum primum modum illorum quattuor quos Boethius in libroDe Duabus Naturis assignat, secundum scilicet quod natura dicitur; omneillud quod intellectu quoquo modo capi potest, non enim res est intelligibilisnisi per diffinitionem et essentiam suam; et sic etiam Philosophus dicit inV Metaphysicae quod omnis substantia est natura. Tamen nomen naturae

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Chapter 1

1. It should be known, therefore, that, as the Philosopher says in Vof Metaphysics, “being” through itself is said in two ways: in one way asthat which is divided through the ten genera, and in the other way as thatwhich signifies the truth of propositions. But of these the difference isthat in the second way everything of which an affirmative proposition can 5R

be formed can be called a being, even if it posits nothing in the thing inreality. Through this way privations and negations are called beings, forwe say that an affirmation is opposed to a negation, and that blindness isin the eye. But in the first way “being” cannot be said unless it positssomething in the thing; whence in the first way blindness and things of this 10R

sort are not beings.2. The name “essence,” therefore, is not taken from “being” said in the

second way; for some things that do not have an essence are called beingsin this way, as is evident in privations. Rather, “essence” is taken from“being” said the first way. Whence the Commentator [Averroes] says in 15R

the same place that “being” said in the first way is that which signifies theessence of a thing. And because, as has been said, “being” said in this wayis divided through the ten genera, it must be such that “essence” signifiessomething common to all the natures through which [natures] the diversebeings are located within the diverse genera and species, such as humanity 20R

is the essence of man, and so on with the others.3. And because that through which a thing is constituted in its proper

genus or species is that which is signified through the definition indicatingwhat the thing is, thence it is that the name “essence” is changed by thephilosophers into the name “whatness”; and this is what the Philosopher 25R

frequently names the “what it was to be,” that is, that through which some-thing has it to be a what. It is also called “form,” according as through“form” is signified the exactness of anything whatsoever, as Avicenna says inII of his Metaphysics. And this also by another name is called the “nature,”taking “nature” according to the first mode of those four that Boethius as- 30R

signs in the book On the Two Natures, namely, according as everything thatcan in any way be seized upon by the understanding is called a “nature,”for a thing is not intelligible except through its own definition and essence;

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30 hoc modo sumptae videtur significare essentiam rei secundum quod habetordinem ad propriam operationem rei, cum nulla res propria operationedestituatur; quiditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc quod per diffinitionemsignificatur. Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habetesse.

35 4. Sed quia ens absolute et per prius dicitur de substantiis, et perposterius et quasi secundum quid de accidentibus, inde est quod essentiaproprie et vere est in substantiis, sed in accidentibus est quodammodo etsecundum quid. Substantiarum vero quaedam sunt simplices et quaedamcompositae, et in utrisque est essentia; sed in simplicibus veriori et nobiliori

40 modo, secundum quod etiam esse nobilius habent; sunt enim causa eorumquae composita sunt, ad minus substantia prima simplex quae Deus est.Sed quia illarum substantiarum essentiae sunt nobis magis occultae, ideoab essentiis substantiarum compositarum incipiendum est, ut a facilioribusconvenientior fiat disciplina.

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and so also the Philosopher in V of Metaphysics says that every substanceis a nature. Nevertheless, the name “nature” taken in this mode appears 35R

to signify the essence of a thing according as it has an order to the properoperation of the thing, since no thing is destitute of its proper operation;but the name “whatness” is taken from that which is signified through thedefinition. But “essence” is said according as through it, and in it, a beinghas existence. 40R

4. But because “being” absolutely and first through the prior is saidof substances, and secondarily through the posterior and, as it were, qual-ifiedly [it is said] of accidents, thence it is that essence properly and trulyis in substances, but is in a certain way and qualifiedly in accidents. Ofsubstances, some are simple and some composed, and an essence is in each 45R

of these; but it is in the simple ones in a truer and nobler way, according asthey also have a more noble existence; for they are the causes of those thatare composed, at least the first simple substance, which is God, is. Butbecause the essences of those substances are more hidden from us, there-fore one must begin from the essences of composed substances, so that from 50R

easier things the learning might come to be more fittingly.

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Caput 2

1. In substantiis igitur compositis forma et materia nota est, ut inhomine anima et corpus. Non autem potest dici quod alterum eorum tan-tum essentia esse dicatur. Quod enim materia sola non sit essentia rei,planum est, quia res per essentiam suam et cognoscibilis est, et in specie

5 ordinatur vel genere; sed materia neque cognitionis principium est, nequesecundum eam aliquid ad genus vel speciem determinatur, sed secundumid quod aliquid actu est. Neque etiam forma tantum essentia substantiaecompositae dici potest, quamvis hoc quidam asserere conentur. Ex his enimquae dicta sunt patet quod essentia est illud quod per diffinitionem rei sig-

10 nificatur; diffinitio autem substantiarum naturalium non tantum formamcontinet sed etiam materiam, aliter enim diffinitiones naturales et mathe-maticae non differrent. Nec potest dici quod materia in diffinitione substan-tiae naturalis ponatur sicut additum essentiae eius vel ens extra essentiameius, quia hic modus diffinitionis proprius est accidentibus, quae perfectam

15 essentiam non habent; unde oportet quod in diffinitione sua subiectum re-cipiant, quod est extra genus eorum. Patet ergo quod essentia comprehenditmateriam et formam.

2. Non autem potest dici quod essentia significet relationem quae estinter materiam et formam, vel aliquid superadditum ipsis, quia hoc de ne-

20 cessitate esset accidens et extraneum a re, nec per eam res cognosceretur;quae omnia essentiae conveniunt. Per formam enim, quae est actus mate-riae, materia efficitur ens actu et hoc aliquid; unde illud quod superadvenitnon dat esse actu simpliciter materiae, sed esse actu tale, sicut etiam ac-cidentia faciunt, ut albedo facit actu album. Unde et quando talis forma

25 acquiritur, non dicitur generari simpliciter sed secundum quid.

3. Relinquitur ergo quod nomen essentiae in substantiis compositis sig-nificat id quod ex materia et forma compositum est. Et huic consonatverbum Boethii in commento Praedicamentorum, ubi dicit quod usia sig-nificat compositum; usia enim apud Graecos idem est quod essentia apud

30 nos, ut ipsemet dicit in libro De duabus naturis. Avicenna etiam dicit quod

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Chapter 2

1. In composed substances, therefore, the form and the matter is known,such as in man the soul and the body. It cannot be said, however, that eitherof these alone is said to be the essence. For that matter alone is not theessence of the thing is plain, since a thing both is knowable and is orderedin species or genus through its essence; but matter is not a the principle of 5R

cognition, nor is something determined to a genus or species according to it,but rather according to that which something is in act. Nor even can formalone be called the essence of a composed substance, although some try toassert this. For from those things that have been said it is evident thatthe essence is that which is signified through the definition of the thing; 10R

the definition of natural substances, however, contains not only the form,but even the matter, for otherwise natural and mathematical definitionswould not be different. Nor can it be said that the matter is placed inthe definition of a natural substance as [something] added to its essence,or as a being outside its essence, since this way of defining is proper to 15R

accidents, which do not have a perfect essence; whence it must be that intheir definition they receive a subject, which is outside their genus. It isevident, therefore, that the essence comprehends the matter and the form.

2. Moreover, neither can it be said that “essence” signifies the relationthat is between the matter and the form, or something added over and 20R

above them, since this would necessarily be an accident and [something]extraneous to the thing, nor would the thing be known though it, all ofwhich belong to the essence. For through the form, which is the act ofthe matter, the matter is made to be a being in act and this something;whence that which comes over and above [it] does not give the matter actual 25R

existence simply, but such an actual existence, as also do accidents, suchas whiteness makes [it] actually white. Whence also when such a form isacquired, it is not said to be generated simply, but qualifiedly.

3. It remains, then, that the name “essence” in composed substancessignifies that which is composed from matter and form. And the words of 30R

Boethius in his commentary Of the Predicaments are consonant with this,where he says that “ousia” [Greek for “substance”] signifies the composite;for among the Greeks “ousia” is the same as “essence” among us, as he

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quiditas substantiarum compositarum est ipsa compositio formae et ma-teriae. Commentator etiam dicit super VII Metaphysicae: “Natura quamhabent species in rebus generabilibus est aliquod medium, id est composi-tum ex materia et forma.” Huic etiam ratio concordat, quia esse substantiae

35 compositae non est tantum formae nec tantum materiae, sed ipsius com-positi; essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur; unde oportetut essentia qua res denominatur ens non tantum sit forma neque tantummateria, sed utrumque, quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sitcausa. Sic enim in aliis videmus quae ex pluribus principiis constituuntur,

40 quod res non denominatur ex altero illorum principiorum tantum, sed ab eoquod utrumque complectitur; ut patet in saporibus, quia ex actione calididigerentis humidum causatur dulcedo, et quamvis hoc modo calor sit causadulcedinis, non tamen denominatur corpus dulce a calore sed a sapore quicalidum et humidum complectitur.

45 4. Sed quia individuationis principium materia est, ex hoc forte videtursequi quod essentia, quae materiam in se complectitur simul et formam,sit tantum particularis et non universalis; ex quo sequeretur quod univer-salia diffinitionem non haberent, si essentia est id quod per diffinitionemsignificatur. Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta

50 est individuationis principium, sed solum materia signata; et dico mate-riam signatam quae sub determinatis dimensionibus consideratur. Haecautem materia in diffinitione hominis in quantum est homo non ponitur,sed poneretur in diffinitione Socratis si Socrates diffinitionem haberet. Indiffinitione autem hominis ponitur materia non signata; non enim in diffi-

55 nitione hominis ponitur hoc os et haec caro, sed os et caro absolute quaesunt materia hominis non signata.

5. Sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et essentia Socratis non dif-ferunt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum; unde Commentator dicitsuper VII Metaphysicae: “Socrates nihil aliud est quam animalitas et ra-

60 tionalitas, quae sunt quiditas eius.” Sic etiam essentia generis et specieisecundum signatum et non signatum differunt, quamvis alius modus des-

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himself says in the book On the Two Natures. Avicenna also says that thewhatness of composed substances is the very composition of the form and 35R

matter. The Commentator also says, on VII of Metaphysics, “In generablethings the nature that species have is a certain mean, that is, [something]composed from the matter and the form.” Reason also is concordant withthis, since the existence of a composed substance is not only that of theform nor only that of the matter, but of the composite itself; the essence, 40R

however, is that according to which a thing is said to exist; whence it mustbe that the essence by which a thing is denominated a being is not only theform nor only the matter, but both, although in its own way only the formis the cause of existence of this sort. For thus we see in other things thatare constituted from many principles that the thing is not denominated 45R

from only one of those principles, but from that which encompasses both;this is evident in flavors, when sweetness is caused by the action of the hotdissolving the moist, and although in this way heat is the cause of sweetness,nevertheless the body is not denominated sweet from the heat, but fromthe flavor that encompasses the hot and the moist. 50R

4. But because the principle of individuation is matter, perhaps due tothis it appears to follow that an essence that encompasses in itself simul-taneously matter and form is only [the essence] of the particular and notof the universal; from that it would follow that universals would not havedefinition, if the essence is that which is signified through the definition. 55R

And therefore it should be known that the principle of individuation is notmatter taken in just any way, but only signate assigned, pointed-out mat-ter; and I call “signate matter” that which is considered under determinatedimensions. This matter, however, is not placed in the definition of man asman, but it would be placed in the definition of Socrates, if Socrates were to 60R

have a definition. Non-signate matter, however, is placed in the definitionof man; for this bone and this flesh are not placed in the definition of man,but bone and flesh absolutely, which are the non-signate matter of man.

5. Thus, therefore, it is evident that the essence of man and the essenceof Socrates do not differ except according to the signate and the non-signate; 65R

whence the Commentator says about VII of Metaphysics : “Socrates is noth-ing other than animality and rationality, which are his whatness.” So alsothe essence of the genus and of the species differ according to the signate and

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ignationis sit utrobique; quia designatio individui respectu speciei est permateriam determinatam dimensionibus, designatio autem speciei respectugeneris est per differentiam constitutivam quae ex forma rei sumitur. Haec

65 autem determinatio vel designatio quae est in specie respectu generis, nonest per aliquid in essentia speciei exsistens quod nullo modo in essentiageneris sit; immo quicquid est in specie est etiam in genere ut non determi-natum. Si enim animal non esset totum quod est homo sed pars eius, nonpraedicaretur de eo, cum nulla pars integralis de suo toto praedicetur.

70 6. Hoc autem quomodo contingat videri poterit, si inspiciatur qualiterdiffert corpus secundum quod ponitur pars animalis, et secundum quodponitur genus; non enim potest eo modo esse genus quo est pars integralis.Hoc igitur nomen quod est corpus multipliciter accipi potest. Corpus enimsecundum quod est in genere substantiae dicitur ex eo quod habet talem

75 naturam ut in eo possint designari tres dimensiones; ipsae enim tres di-mensiones designatae sunt corpus quod est in genere quantitatis. Contingitautem in rebus, ut quod habet unam perfectionem, ad ulteriorem etiamperfectionem pertingat; sicut patet in homine, qui et naturam sensitivamhabet, et ulterius intellectivam. Similiter etiam et super hanc perfectionem

80 quae est habere talem formam ut in ea possint tres dimensiones designari,potest alia perfectio adiungi, ut vita vel aliquid huiusmodi. Potest ergohoc nomen corpus significare rem quandam, quae habet talem formam exqua sequitur in ipsa designabilitas trium dimensionum, cum praecisione;ut scilicet ex illa forma nulla ulterior perfectio sequatur, sed si quid aliud

85 superadditur, sit praeter significationem corporis sic dicti. Et hoc modocorpus erit integralis et materialis pars animalis; quia sic anima erit praeterid quod significatum est nomine corporis, et erit superveniens ipsi corpori,ita quod ex ipsis duobus, scilicet anima et corpore, sicut ex partibus con-stituetur animal.

90 7. Potest etiam hoc nomen corpus hoc modo accipi ut significet rem

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non-signate, although there is a different manner of designation for both;since the designation of an individual in respect to a species is through mat- 70R

ter determined by dimensions, but the designation of a species in respect toa genus is through a constitutive difference that is taken from the form ofthe thing. Moreover, this determination or designation that is in a speciesin respect to a genus is not through something existing in the essence of thespecies that is in no way in the essence of the genus; indeed, whatever is 75R

in the species is also in the genus, as undetermined. For if animal were notthe whole [thing] that is the man but a part of it, then the former wouldnot be predicated of the latter, since no integral part is predicated of itswhole.

6. In what way this would happen, however, could be seen if one looks 80R

into how the body according to which a part of the animal is posited dif-fers from [the body] according to which the genus is posited; for it cannotbe a genus in the same way in which it is an integral part. This name“body,” then, can be taken in many ways. For “body” according as it isin the genus of substance is said from that which has such a nature that 85R

the three dimensions can be designated in it; for the three designated di-mensions themselves are the “body” that is in the genus of quantity. Ithappens in things, however, that that which has one perfection might reachout attain to an even further perfection; this is evident in man, who hasboth a sentient nature and even further an intellectual one. Likewise also, 90R

even above this perfection—which is to have such a form that the three di-mensions can be designated in it—another perfection can be adjoined, suchas life or something of this sort. Therefore this name “body” can signifya certain thing that has such a form from which there follows in it itselfthe designatability of the three dimensions, with a precision with a cutting 95R

away, exclusion—namely, such that no further perfection might follow fromthat form; but if some other what were added over and above [this], then itwould be outside the signification of “body” so said. And in this way thebody will be an integral and material part of the animal, since thus the soulwill be outside that which has been signified by the name “body,” and it 100R

will come upon the body itself, such that from the two themselves—namely,the soul and the body—as from parts the animal will be constituted.

7. This name “body” can also be taken in this way: such that it might

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quandam quae habet talem formam ex qua tres dimensiones possunt inea designari, quaecumque forma sit illa, sive ex ea possit provenire aliquaulterior perfectio, sive non; et hoc modo corpus erit genus animalis, quia inanimali nihil est accipere quod non implicite in corpore contineatur. Non

95 enim anima est alia forma ab illa per quam in re illa poterant designari tresdimensiones; et ideo, cum dicebatur quod “corpus est quod habet talemformam ex qua possunt designari tres dimensiones in eo,” intelligebaturquaecumque forma esset; sive anima, sive lapideitas, sive quaecumque alia.Et sic forma animalis implicite in forma corporis continetur, prout corpus

100 est genus eius.

8. Et talis est etiam habitudo animalis ad hominem. Si enim animalnominaret tantum rem quandam quae habet talem perfectionem ut possitsentire et moveri per principium in ipso existens, cum praecisione alteriusperfectionis, tunc quaecumque alia perfectio ulterior superveniret haberet se

105 ad animal per modum compartis, et non sicut implicite contenta in rationeanimalis; et sic animal non esset genus. Sed est genus secundum quodsignificat rem quandam ex cuius forma potest provenire sensus et motus,quaecumque sit illa forma; sive sit anima sensibilis tantum, sive sensibiliset rationalis simul.

110 9. Sic ergo genus significat indeterminate totum id quod est in specie,non enim significat tantum materiam. Similiter etiam differentia significattotum et non significat tantum formam; et etiam diffinitio significat totum,et etiam species. Sed tamen diversimode; quia genus significat totum utquaedam denominatio determinans id quod est materiale in re sine deter-

115 minatione propriae formae, unde genus sumitur ex materia—quamvis nonsit materia—ut patet quod corpus dicitur ex hoc quod habet talem perfec-tionem, ut possint in eo designari tres dimensiones; quae quidem perfec-tio est materialiter se habens ad ulteriorem perfectionem. Differentia veroe converso est sicut quaedam denominatio a forma determinate sumpta

120 praeter hoc quod de primo intellectu eius sit materia determinata, ut patet,cum dicitur animatum, scilicet illud quod habet animam; non enim deter-minatur quid sit, utrum corpus vel aliquid aliud; unde dicit Avicenna quodgenus non intelligitur in differentia sicut pars essentiae eius, sed solum si-

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signify a certain thing that has such a form due to which the three dimen-sions can be designated in it, whatever form it be, whether or not some 105R

further perfection can arise from it; and in this way body will be the genusof animal, since one can take nothing in animal that is not implicitly con-tained in body. For the soul is not a different form from that one throughwhich the three dimensions were able to be designated in that thing; andtherefore, when it was said that “body is that which has such a form due 110R

to which the three dimensions are able to be designated in it,” it was un-derstood whatever form it might be, whether the soul, or stoneness, orwhatever other [form]. And in this way, the form of animal is implicitlycontained in the form of body, insofar as body is its genus.

8. And this is also the bearing of animal toward man. For if “animal” 115R

were to name only a certain thing that has such a perfection that it is able tosense and move through a principle existing in it itself, with the precision thecutting away of another perfection, then whatever other further perfectionmight supervene, it would hold itself to animal through the way of a partand not as implicitly contained in the notion of animal, and in this way 120R

animal would not be a genus. But it is a genus according as it signifies acertain thing due to the form of which sense and motion can arise, whateverthat form be, whether it is a sensitive soul merely, or a sensitive and rationalone at once.

9. So then a genus signifies indeterminately the whole [thing] that is in 125R

the species, for it does not signify only the matter. Likewise also, a differ-ence signifies the whole and does not signify merely the form; and even thedefinition signifies the whole, and so does the species. But nevertheless, ina diverse way: For a genus signifies the whole as a certain denominationdetermining that which is material in the thing without a determination 130R

of the proper form, whence the genus is taken from matter—although it isnot matter—just as it is evident that it is called “body” from this, that ithas such a perfection that the three dimensions can be designated in it; thisperfection is holding itself materially with respect to further perfection. Buta difference, conversely, is as a certain denomination taken determinately 135R

from the form beyond that which, from its first understanding, is the de-terminate matter; this is evident when it is called “animate,” namely thatwhich has a soul, for what it is, whether a body or something else, is not

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cut ens extra essentiam, sicut etiam subiectum est de intellectu passionum.125 Et ideo etiam genus non praedicatur de differentia per se loquendo, ut

dicit Philosophus in III Metaphysicae et in IV Topicorum, nisi forte sicutsubiectum praedicatur de passione. Sed diffinitio vel species comprehenditutrumque, scilicet determinatam materiam quam designat nomen generis,et determinatam formam, quam designat nomen differentiae.

130 10. Ex hoc patet ratio quare genus, species et differentia se habentproportionaliter ad materiam et formam et compositum in natura, quamvisnon sint idem quod illa; quia neque genus est materia, sed a materia sump-tum ut significans totum; neque differentia forma, sed a forma sumpta utsignificans totum. Unde dicimus hominem esse animal rationale, et non ex

135 animali et rationali sicut dicimus eum esse ex anima et corpore; ex animaenim et corpore dicitur esse homo, sicut ex duabus rebus quaedam res ter-tia constituta quae neutra illarum est, homo enim neque est anima nequecorpus. Sed si homo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali esse dicatur, nonerit sicut res tertia ex duabus rebus, sed sicut intellectus tertius ex duobus

140 intellectibus. Intellectus enim animalis est sine determinatione specialisformae, exprimens naturam rei ab eo quod est materiale respectu ultimaeperfectionis; intellectus autem huius differentiae rationalis consistit in de-terminatione formae specialis; ex quibus duobus intellectibus constituiturintellectus speciei vel diffinitionis. Et ideo sicut res constituta ex aliquibus

145 non recipit praedicationem earum rerum ex quibus constituitur, ita nec in-tellectus recipit praedicationem eorum intellectuum ex quibus constituitur;non enim dicimus quod diffinitio sit genus aut differentia.

11. Quamvis autem genus significet totam essentiam speciei, non tamenoportet ut diversarum specierum quarum est idem genus, sit una essentia,

150 quia unitas generis ex ipsa indeterminatione vel indifferentia procedit. Nonautem ita quod illud quod significatur per genus sit una natura numero

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determined; whence Avicenna says that the genus is not understood [to be]in the difference as a part of its essence, but only as a being outside the 140R

essence, just as also a subject is of the understanding of the passions. Andtherefore also the genus is not predicated of the difference, speaking throughitself, as the Philosopher says in III of Metaphysics and in IV of Topics,unless perhaps as a subject is predicated of a passion. But a definition or aspecies comprehends both, namely [both] the determinate matter that the 145R

name of the genus designates, and the determinate form that the name ofthe difference designates.

10. From this is evident the reason why genus, species, and differencehold themselves proportionately to matter, form, and the composed in na-ture, although they are not the same as them; for neither is the genus 150R

matter, but [it has been] taken from the matter as signifying the whole;nor [is] the difference the form, but [it has been] taken from the form assignifying the whole. Whence, we say that man is a rational animal, andnot from animal and rational, as we say he is from soul and body; forman is said to be from soul and body as some third thing constituted from 155R

two things, which thing is neither of the two, for man is neither soul norbody. But if man were said to be in some way from animal and rational, itwill not be as a third thing from two things, but as a third understandingfrom two [other] understandings. For the understanding of animal is with-out the determination of a specific form, [an understanding] expressing the 160R

nature of the thing from that which is material with respect to the finalperfection; the understanding of this difference, rational, however, consistsin the determination of the specific form; from which two understandingsthe understanding of the species, or of the definition, is constituted. Andtherefore just as a thing constituted from certain things does not receive the 165R

predication of those things from which it is constituted, so neither does theunderstanding receive the predication of those understandings from whichit is constituted; for we do not say that the definition is the genus or thedifference.

11. However, although the genus signifies the whole essence of the 170R

species, nevertheless it is not necessary that there is one essence of the di-verse species of which the genus is the same, since the unity of the genusproceeds from the indetermination or indifference itself. This is not, how-

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in diversis speciebus, cui superveniat res alia quae sit differentia determi-nans ipsum, sicut forma determinat materiam quae est una numero; sedquia genus significat aliquam formam — non tamen determinate hanc vel

155 illam —, quam determinate differentia exprimit quae non est alia quam illa,quae indeterminate significabatur per genus. Et ideo dicit Commentator inXI Metaphysicae quod materia prima dicitur una per remotionem omniumformarum, sed genus dicitur unum per communitatem formae significatae.Unde patet quod per additionem differentiae remota illa indeterminatione

160 quae erat causa unitatis generis, remanent species per essentiam diversae.

12. Et quia, ut dictum est, natura speciei est indeterminata respectuindividui sicut natura generis respectu speciei; inde est quod sicut id quodest genus prout praedicabatur de specie implicabat in sua significatione,quam-vis indistincte, totum quod determinate est in specie, ita etiam et id

165 quod est species secundum quod praedicatur de individuo oportet quod sig-nificet totum id quod est essentialiter in individuo, licet indistincte. Et hocmodo essentia speciei significatur nomine hominis, unde homo de Socratepraedicatur. Si autem significetur natura speciei cum praecisione materiaedesignatae quae est principium individuationis, sic se habebit per modum

170 partis; et hoc modo significatur nomine humanitatis, humanitas enim sig-nificat id unde homo est homo. Materia autem designata non est id undehomo est homo, et ita nullo modo continetur inter illa, ex quibus homo ha-bet quod sit homo. Cum ergo humanitas in suo intellectu includat tantumea ex quibus homo habet quod sit homo, patet quod a significatione eius

175 excluditur vel praeciditur materia designata; et quia pars non praedicaturde toto, inde est quod humanitas nec de homine nec de Socrate praedicatur.Unde dicit Avicenna quod quiditas compositi non est ipsum compositumcuius est quiditas, quamvis etiam ipsa quiditas sit composita; sicut human-itas, licet sit composita, non est homo; immo oportet quod sit recepta in

180 aliquo quod est materia designata.

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ever, such that that which is signified through the genus is a nature onein number in diverse species, upon which comes another thing that is the 175R

difference determining it itself, as form determines matter that is one innumber; but rather, it is because the genus signifies some form—yet not de-terminately this or that one—which the difference expresses determinately,which [form] is not other than that one which was indeterminately signifiedthrough the genus. And therefore the Commentator says in XI of Meta- 180R

physics that first matter is said to be one through the removal of all forms,but a genus is said to be one through the commonness of the form signified.Whence it is evident that through the addition of the difference, that in-determination having been removed that was the cause of the unity of thegenus, there remain species essentially diverse. 185R

12. And because, as has been said, the nature of the species is inde-terminate with respect to the individual just as is the nature of the genuswith respect to the species, thence it is that just as that which is a genus,insofar as it is predicated of a species, implied in its own signification, al-beit indistinctly, the whole that is determinately in the species, so also even 190R

that which is a species, according as it is predicated of the individual, mustsignify the whole that is essentially in the individual, albeit indistinctly.And in this way the essence of the species is signified by the name “man,”whence man is predicated of Socrates. If, however, the nature of the specieswere signified with a precision of designated matter, which is the principle 195R

of individuation, then it will hold itself in this way through the mode of apart; and it is signified in this way by the name “humanity”; for “human-ity” signifies that whence a man is a man. Desig-nated matter, however, isnot that whence a man is a man; and thus, in no way is it contained amongthose things from which a man has it that he be a man. Therefore, since 200R

humanity includes in its understanding only those things from which a manhas it that he be a man, it is evident that designated matter is excludedor precinded from its significa-tion; and because a part is not predicatedof a whole, thence it is that humanity is predicated neither of man nor ofSocrates. Whence Avi-cenna says that the whatness of the composed thing 205R

is not the composed thing itself of which it is the whatness, although thewhatness itself is also composed; just as humanity, although it is composed,is not man; but rather it is necessary that it be received in some thing,

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13. Sed quia, ut dictum est, designation speciei respectu generis estper formam, designatio autem individui respectu speciei est per materiam,ideo oportet ut nomen significans id unde natura generis sumitur, cumpraecisione formae determinatae perficientis speciem, significet partem ma-

185 terialem totius, sicut corpus est pars materialis hominis; nomen autem sig-nificans id unde sumitur natura speciei, cum praecisione materiae desig-natae, significat partem formalem. Et ideo humanitas significatur ut formaquaedam, et dicitur quod est forma totius; non quidem quasi superadditapartibus essentialibus, scilicet formae et materiae, sicut forma domus su-

190 peradditur partibus integralibus eius; sed magis est forma, quae est totumscilicet formam complectens et materiam, tamen cum praecisione eorumper quae nata est materia designari.

14. Sic igitur patet quod essentiam hominis significat hoc nomen homoet hoc nomen humanitas, sed diversimode, ut dictum est; quia hoc nomen

195 homo significat eam ut totum, in quantum scilicet non praecidit designa-tionem materiae sed implicite continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum estquod genus continet differentiam; et ideo praedicatur hoc nomen homo deindividuis. Sed hoc nomen humanitas significat eam ut partem, quia noncontinet in significatione sua nisi id quod est hominis in quantum est homo,

200 et praecidit omnem designationem; unde de individuis hominis non praedi-catur. Et propter hoc etiam nomen essentiae quandoque invenitur praedica-tum de re, dicimus enim Socratem esse essentiam quandam; et quandoquenegatur, sicut dicimus quod essentia Socratis non est Socrates.

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which is designated matter.13. But because, as has been said, the designation of the species in 210R

respect of the genus is through the form, but the designation of the individ-ual in respect of the species is through the matter, therefore it is necessarythat the name signifying that whence the nature of the genus is taken wouldsignify the material part of the whole with the precision cutting away of thedeterminate form perfecting the species, just as body is the material part 215R

of man; however, the name signifying that whence the nature of the speciesis taken signifies the formal part [of the whole] with the precision of desig-nated matter. And therefore humanity is signified as a certain form, and itis said to be the form of the whole; [but] not as though [it were] added overand above the essential parts, namely the form and matter, just as the form 220R

of a house is added over and above its integral parts; but rather, it is morethe form that is the whole, namely, one encompassing form and matter, yetwith the precision of those things through which matter is naturally apt tobe designated.

14. Thus, it is therefore evident that this name “man” and this name 225R

“humanity” signify the essence of man, but in diverse ways, as has beensaid; for this name “man” signifies it as the whole, namely inasmuch as itdoes not precind from the designation of the matter, but it implicitly andindistinctly contains it, just as it was said that the genus contains the differ-ence; and therefore this name “man” is predicated of individuals. But this 230R

name “humanity” signifies it as a part, since it does not contain in its ownsignification [anything] but that which is of man inasmuch as he is man,and it precinds from every designation; whence it is not predicated of theindividuals of man. And on account of this also the name “essence” some-times is found predicated of the thing reality, for we do say that Socrates 235R

is some essence; and sometimes it is denied, as when we say that Socratesis not the essence of Socrates.

195


Caput 3

1. Viso igitur quid significetur nomine essentiae in substantiis com-positis, videndum est quomodo se habeat ad rationem generis et speciei etdifferentiae. Quia autem id cui convenit ratio generis vel speciei vel dif-ferentiae praedicatur de hoc singulari signato, impossibile est quod ratio

5 universalis, scilicet generis vel speciei, conveniat essentiae secundum quodper modum partis significatur, ut nomine humanitatis vel animalitatis; etideo dicit Avicenna quod rationalitas non est differentia sed differentiaeprincipium; et eadem ratione humanitas non est species nec animalitasgenus. Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei conve-

10 niat essentiae, secundum quod est quaedam res exsistens extra singularia,ut Platonici ponebant, quia sic genus et species non praedicarentur de hocindividuo; non enim potest dici quod Socrates sit hoc quod ab eo separatumest; nec iterum illud separatum proficeret in cognitionem huius singularis.Et ideo relinquitur quod ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae, secun-

15 dum quod significatur per modum totius, ut nomine hominis vel animalis,prout implicite et indistincte continet totum hoc, quod in individuo est.

2. Natura autem vel essentia sic accepta potest dupliciter considerari.Uno modo secundum rationem propriam, et haec est absoluta consideratioipsius; et hoc modo nihil est verum de ea nisi quod convenit sibi secundum

20 quod huiusmodi; unde quicquid aliorum attribuatur sibi, falsa est attribu-tio. Verbi gratia homini in eo quod est homo convenit rationale et animalet alia quae in diffinitione eius cadunt; album vero aut nigrum vel quicquidhuiusmodi quod non est de ratione humanitatis, non convenit homini in eoquod homo. Unde si quaeratur utrum ista natura sic considerata possit dici

25 una vel plures, neutrum concedendum est, quia utrumque est extra intellec-tum humanitatis, et utrumque potest sibi accidere. Si enim pluralitas essetde intellectu eius, nunquam posset esse una, cum tamen una sit secundumquod est in Socrate. Similiter si unitas esset de ratione eius, tunc esset unaet eadem Socratis et Platonis, nec posset in pluribus plurificari. Alio modo

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Chapter 3

1. It having been seen, therefore, what is signified by the name “essence”in composed substances, it ought to be seen in what way it holds itself tothe notion of genus, species, and difference. Since, however, that to whichthe notion of genus or species or difference belongs is predicated of thissignate singular, it is impossible that the notion of the universal universal 5R

notion, namely that of a genus or a species, would belong to an essenceaccording as it is signified through the mode of a part, as with the name“humanity” or “animality”; and therefore Avicenna says that rationalityis not the difference [i.e., rational], but the principle of the difference; andfor the same reason humanity is not a species, nor is animality a genus. 10R

Likewise also, it cannot be said that the notion of genus or species belongsto an essence according as it is a certain thing existing outside the singulars,as the Platonists used to posit, since in that way the genus and species wouldnot be predicated of this individual; for it cannot be said that Socrates isthat which is separated from him; nor again would that separate thing move 15R

one forward into profit one for the cognition of this singular. And thereforeit remains that the notion of a genus or species would belong to the essenceaccording as it is signified through the mode of a whole, as with the name“man” or “animal,” inasmuch as it implicitly and indistinctly contains thiswhole that is in the individual. 20R

2. The nature or essence, so taken, however, can be considered in twoways. In one way according to its proper notion, and this is the absoluteconsideration of it; and in this way nothing is true of it except that whichbelongs to it according as it is of this sort; whence whatever else mightbe attributed to it would be a false attribution. For example, rational 25R

and animal and other things belong to man in this that he is man, whichthings fall within his definition; but white or black, or whatever else is ofthis sort that it is not of the notion of humanity, do not belong to manin this that he is man. Whence, if it were sought whether such a natureso considered could be said to be one or many, neither of these should be 30R

conceded, since each is outside the understanding of humanity, and eachcan befall be an accident of it. For if plurality were of the understandingof it [i.e., humanity], then it could never be one, although nevertheless it

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30 consideratur secundum esse quod habet in hoc vel in illo; et sic de ipsaaliquid praedicatur per accidens ratione eius in quo est, sicut dicitur quodhomo est albus quia Socrates est albus, quamvis hoc non conveniat hominiin eo quod homo.

3. Haec autem natura duplex habet esse: unum in singularibus et aliud35 in anima, et secundum utrumque consequuntur dictam naturam accidentia;

in singularibus etiam habet multiplex esse secundum singularium diversi-tatem. Et tamen ipsi naturae secundum suam primam considerationem,scilicet absolutam, nullum istorum esse debetur. Falsum enim est dicerequod essentia hominis in quantum huiusmodi habeat esse in hoc singu-

40 lari, quia si esse in hoc singulari conveniret homini in quantum est homo,nunquam esset extra hoc singulare; similiter etiam si conveniret hominiin quantum est homo non esse in hoc singulari, nunquam esset in eo; sedverum est dicere quod homo, non in quantum est homo, habet quod sitin hoc singulari vel in illo aut in anima. Ergo patet quod natura hominis

45 absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat prae-cisio alicuius eorum. Et haec natura sic considerata est quae praedicaturde individuis omnibus.

4. Non tamen potest dici quod ratio universalis conveniat naturaesic acceptae, quia de ratione universalis est unitas et communitas; natu-

50 rae autem humanae neutrum horum convenit secundum suam absolutamconsiderationem. Si enim communitas esset de intellectu hominis, tunc inquocumque inveniretur humanitas inveniretur communitas; et hoc falsumest, quia in Socrate non invenitur communitas aliqua, sed quicquid est ineo est individuatum. Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel

55 speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum esse quod habet in individuis,quia non invenitur in individuis natura humana secundum unitatem ut situnum quid omnibus conveniens, quod ratio universalis exigit. Relinquiturergo quod ratio speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum illud esse quodhabet in intellectu.

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is one according as it is in Socrates. Likewise, if unity were of its notion,then there would be one and the same [humanity] of Socrates and Plato, 35R

nor could it be made many in many [men]. In the other way, [the natureor essence] is considered according to the existence that it has in this or inthat one; and in this way something is accidentally predicated of it itselfby reason of that in which it is, just as it is said that man is white becauseSocrates is white, although this would not belong to man in this that he is 40R

man.3. This nature, however, has a twofold existence: one in singulars and

another in the soul, and according to each there are accidents consequentupon nature so said; in singulars it has even a manifold existence, accordingto the diversity of the singulars. And nevertheless none of these existences 45R

is owed to the nature itself according to its first consideration, namely theabsolute one. For it is false to say that the essence of man, as such, hasexistence in this singular, since if existence in this singular were to belongto man as man, it would never be outside this singular; likewise also, ifit were to belong to man as man not to exist in this singular, it would 50R

never be in it; but it is true to say that man, not inasmuch as he is man,has it that it be in this singular or in that, or in the soul. Therefore it isevident that the nature of man considered absolutely abstracts from everyexistence whatsoever, nevertheless still such that there does not come to bea precision from any of them. And this nature, so considered, is that which 55R

is predicated of all the individuals [of that nature or essence].4. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the notion of the universal uni-

versal notion would belong to the nature so considered, since unity andcommonness are of the notion of a universal; however, neither of thesebelongs to human nature according to its absolute consideration. For if 60R

commonness were of the understanding of man, then in whatever one hu-manity were found there also would commonness be found; and this is false,since no commonness at all is found in Socrates, but whatever is in him isindividuated. Likewise also, it cannot be said that the notion of a genusor species befalls is an accident of human nature according to the existence 65R

that it has in individuals, since human nature is not found in individualsaccording to unity, such that it would be the one what belonging to allmen, which the notion of a universal requires. Therefore it remains that

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60 5. Ipsa enim natura humana in intellectu habet esse abstractum abomnibus individuantibus; et ideo habet rationem uniformem ad omnia in-dividua quae sunt extra animam, prout aequaliter est similitudo omnium etducens in omnium cognitionem in quantum sunt homines. Et ex hoc quodtalem relationem habet ad omnia individua, intellectus adinvenit rationem

65 speciei et attribuit sibi; unde dicit Commentator in principio De animaquod “intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in rebus”; hoc etiam Avi-cenna dicit in sua Metaphysica. Et quamvis haec natura intellecta habeatrationem universalis secundum quod comparatur ad res extra animam, quiaest una similitudo omnium, tamen secundum quod habet esse in hoc intel-

70 lectu vel in illo est quaedam species intellecta particularis. Et ideo patetdefectus Commentatoris in III De anima, qui voluit ex universalitate for-mae intellectae unitatem intellectus in omnibus hominibus concludere; quianon est universalitas illius formae secundum hoc esse quod habet in intel-lectu, sed secundum quod refertur ad res ut similitudo rerum; sicut etiam,

75 si esset una statua corporalis repraesentans multos homines, constat quodilla imago vel species statuae haberet esse singulare et proprium secundumquod esset in hac materia, sed haberet rationem communitatis secundumquod esset commune repraesentativum plurium.

6. Et quia naturae humanae secundum suam absolutam considera-80 tionem convenit quod praedicetur de Socrate, et ratio speciei non con-

venit sibi secundum suam absolutam considerationem, sed est de acciden-tibus, quae consequuntur eam secundum esse, quod habet in intellectu, ideonomen speciei non praedicatur de Socrate ut dicatur Socrates est species;quod de necessitate accideret, si ratio speciei conveniret homini secundum

85 esse quod habet in Socrate, vel secundum suam considerationem absolutam,scilicet in quantum est homo; quicquid enim convenit homini in quantumest homo praedicatur de Socrate.

7. Et tamen praedicari convenit generi per se, cum in eius diffinitione

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the notion of species befalls human nature according to that existence thatit has in the understanding. 70R

5. For in the understanding human nature itself has an existence ab-stracted from all things individuating; and therefore it has a uniform notionwith respect to all the individuals that are outside the soul, inasmuch asit is equally a likeness of all of them, and one leading into the cognitionof all of them as men. Also, due to this, that it has such a relation to all 75R

the individuals, the understanding comes to discovers the notion of speciesand attributes it to it [i.e., the nature]; whence the Commentator says inthe beginning of De Anima that “the understanding is what makes the uni-versality in things”; and Avicenna also says this in his Metaphysics. Andalthough this understood nature has the notion of a universal according as 80R

it is related to the things outside the soul, since it is one likeness of all ofthem, nevertheless according as it has existence in this or in that under-standing it is a certain particular understood species. And therefore theCommentator’s mistake in III of De Anima is evident, for he wanted toconclude from the universality of the understood form to the unity of the 85R

understanding in all men; for the universality of that form is not accordingto that existence that it has in the understanding, but according as it is re-ferred to the things as the likeness of the things; just as also if there were onebodily statue representing many men, it is certain that that image or thespecies of the statue would have a singular and proper existence according 90R

as it would be in this matter, but it would have the notion of commonnessaccording as it would be the common representative of the many.

6. And because it belongs to human nature according to an absoluteconsideration that it be predicated of Socrates, and the notion of a speciesdoes not belong to it [i.e., human nature] according to its absolute consid- 95R

eration, but [the notion of a species] is of the accidents that are consequentupon it according to the existence that it has in the understanding, there-fore the name “species” is not predicated of Socrates, such that it mightbe said that “Socrates is a species”; this would happen of necessity if thenotion of a species were to belong to man according to the existence that it 100R

has in Socrates, or according to its absolute consideration, namely insofaras he is man; for whatever belongs to man as man is predicated of Socrates.

7. And nevertheless, to be predicated belongs to a genus through itself,

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ponatur. Praedicatio enim est quiddam quod completur per actionem intel-90 lectus componentis et dividentis, habens fundamentum in re ipsa unitatem

eorum quorum unum de altero dicitur. Unde ratio praedicabilitatis potestclaudi in ratione huius intentionis, quae est genus, quae similiter per actumintellectus completur. Nihilominus tamen id cui intellectus intentionempraedicabilitatis attribuit, componens illud cum altero, non est ipsa inten-

95 tio generis, sed potius illud cui intellectus intentionem generis attribuit,sicut quod significatur hoc nomine animal.

8. Sic ergo patet qualiter essentia vel natura se habet ad rationemspeciei, quia ratio speciei non est de his quae conveniunt ei secundum suamabsolutam considerationem, neque est de accidentibus quae consequuntur

100 ipsam secundum esse quod habet extra animam, ut albedo et nigredo; sedest de accidentibus, quae consequuntur eam secundum esse quod habet inintellectu et per hunc modum convenit etiam sibi ratio generis vel differen-tiae.

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since it is placed in its definition. For predication is something completedthrough the action of the understanding composing and dividing, it having 105R

[as] a foundation in the thing reality itself the unity of those things ofwhich the one is said of the other. Whence the notion of predicability canbe included in the notion of this intention that is a genus, which is likewisecompleted through the act of the understanding. Nevertheless still, that towhich the understanding attributes the intention of predicability, composing 110R

it with the other, is not the very intention of a genus, but rather, that towhich the understanding attributes the intention of a genus, such as thatwhich is signified by this name “animal.”

8. So, therefore, it is evident how an essence or nature holds itself to thenotion of species, since the notion of species is not from those that belong 115R

to it according to its absolute consideration, nor is it of from among theaccidents that are consequent upon it according to the existence that ithas outside the soul, such as whiteness and blackness; rather, it is of theaccidents that are consequent upon it according to the existence that it hasin the understanding, and the notion of genus or difference also belong to 120R

it in this way.

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Caput 4

1. Nunc restat videre per quem modum sit essentia in substantiis sep-aratis, scilicet in anima, intelligentia et causa prima. Quamvis autem sim-plicitatem causae primae omnes concedant, tamen compositionem formaeet materiae quidam nituntur inducere in intelligentias et in animam; cuius

5 positionis auctor videtur fuisse Avicebron, actor libri Fontis vitae. Hocautem dictis philosophorum communiter repugnat, quia eas substantias amateria separatas nominant et absque omni materia esse probant. Cuiusdemonstratio potissima est ex virtute intelligendi quae in eis est. Videmusenim formas non esse intelligibiles in actu nisi secundum quod separantur

10 a materia et a condicionibus eius, nec efficiuntur intelligibiles in actu nisiper virtutem substantiae intelligentis, secundum quod recipiuntur in ea etsecundum quod aguntur per eam. Unde oportet quod in qualibet substantiaintelligente sit omnino immunitas a materia, ita quod neque habeat mate-riam partem sui, neque etiam sit sicut forma impressa in materia ut est de

15 formis materialibus.

2. Nec potest aliquis dicere quod intelligibilitatem non impediat ma-teria quaelibet, sed materia corporalis tantum. Si enim hoc esset rationemateriae corporalis tantum, cum materia non dicatur corporalis nisi se-cundum quod stat sub forma corporali, tunc oporteret quod hoc haberet

20 materia, scilicet impedire intelligibilitatem, a forma corporali; et hoc nonpotest esse, quia ipsa etiam forma corporalis actu intelligibilis est sicut etaliae formae, secundum quod a materia abstrahitur. Unde in anima vel inintelligentia nullo modo est compositio ex materia et forma, ut hoc modoaccipiatur essentia in eis sicut in substantiis corporalibus. Sed est ibi com-

25 positio formae et esse; unde in commento IX propositionis libri De causisdicitur quod intelligentia est habens formam et esse; et accipitur ibi formapro ipsa quiditate vel natura simplici.

3. Et quomodo hoc sit planum est videre. Quaecumque enim ita sehabent ad invicem quod unum est causa esse alterius, illud quod habet

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Chapter 4

1. Now it remains to see in what way essence is in separated substances,namely in a soul, in an intelligence, and in the first cause. However, al-though all men concede the simplicity to the first cause, nevertheless sometry to introduce a composition of form and matter into the intelligencesand into the soul; Avicebron, the writer of the Fountain of Life, appears 5R

to have been the author this position. This, however, is repugnant univer-sally to the things said by the philosophers, because they name them the“substances separated from matter,” and prove them to be without anymatter. The most potent demonstration of this is from the power of theunderstanding that is in them. For we see that forms are not intelligible 10R

in act except according as they are separated from matter and even fromits conditions; nor are they made to be intelligible in act except throughthe power of the understanding substance, according as they are receivedinto it, and according as they are made [actually intelligible] through it.Whence it must be that in every intelligent substance whatsoever there is 15R

a total freedom from matter, such that it neither has matter [as] its part,nor even is it as a form impressed in matter, as is so of material forms.

2. Neither can someone say that not every matter whatsoever impedesintelligibility, but only bodily matter. For if this [impeding of intelligibility]were of the notion of bodily matter only, since matter is not called bodily 20R

except according as it stands under a bodily form, then it would be neces-sary that matter has this—namely, that it impede intelligibility —due toa bodily form; and this cannot be, since even bodily form itself is intel-ligible in act, just as also other forms, according as it is abstracted frommatter. Whence in a soul or in an intelligence in no way is there a compo- 25R

sition from matter and form, such that in this way essence might be takenin them just as in bodily substances. But there is there a composition ofform and existence; whence in the comment on the ninth proposition of thebook Of Causes it is said that an intelligence is [something] having formand existence; and “form” there is taken for the very whatness or simple 30R

nature.3. And in what way this is so is plain to see. For whatever things hold

themselves to each other such that one is the cause of the existence of the

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30 rationem causae potest habere esse sine altero, sed non convertitur. Talisautem invenitur habitudo materiae et formae quod forma dat esse materiae,et ideo impossibile est esse materiam sine aliqua forma; tamen non estimpossibile esse aliquam formam sine materia, forma enim non habet ineo quod est forma dependentiam ad materiam. Sed si inveniantur aliquae

35 formae quae non possunt esse nisi in materia, hoc accidit eis secundum quodsunt distantes a primo principio quod est actus primus et purus. Unde illaeformae quae sunt propinquissimae primo principio sunt formae per se sinemateria subsistentes, non enim forma secundum totum genus suum materiaindiget, ut dictum est; et huiusmodi formae sunt intelligentiae, et ideo non

40 oportet ut essentiae vel quiditates harum substantiarum sint aliud quamipsa forma.

4. In hoc ergo differt essentia substantiae compositae et substantiaesimplicis, quod essentia substantiae compositae non est tantum forma, sedcomplectitur formam et materiam, essentia autem substantiae simplicis est

45 forma tantum. Et ex hoc causantur duae aliae differentiae. Una est quodessentia substantiae compositae potest significari ut totum vel ut pars, quodaccidit propter materiae designationem, ut dictum est. Et ideo non quoli-bet modo praedicatur essentia rei compositae de ipsa re composita; nonenim potest dici quod homo sit quiditas sua. Sed essentia rei simplicis quae

50 est sua forma non potest significari nisi ut totum, cum nihil sit ibi praeterformam quasi formam recipiens; et ideo quocumque modo sumatur essentiasubstantiae simplicis, de ea praedicatur. Unde Avicenna dicit quod “quid-itas simplicis est ipsummet simplex,” quia non est aliquid aliud recipiensipsam. Secunda differentia est quod essentiae rerum compositarum ex eo

55 quod recipiuntur in materia designata multiplicantur secundum divisionemeius, unde contingit quod aliqua sint idem specie et diversa numero. Sedcum essentia simplicis non sit recepta in materia, non potest ibi esse talismultiplicatio; et ideo oportet ut non inveniantur in illis substantiis pluraindividua eiusdem speciei, sed quot sunt ibi individua tot sunt ibi species,

60 ut Avicenna expresse dicit.

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other, that which has the notion of the cause can have existence withoutthe other, but this is not convertible. The bearing relationship of matter 35R

and form, however, is found to be such that the form gives existence to thematter, and therefore it is impossible that matter exist without some form;nevertheless it is not impossible that some form exist without matter, forform in that it is form does not have dependency on matter. But if thereare found some forms that cannot exist but in matter, this befalls them 40R

according as they are distant from the first principle that is the first andpure act. Whence those forms that are closest to the first principle are formssubsisting through themselves without matter, for form does not, accordingto its whole genus, need matter, as has been said; and the intelligences areforms of this sort, and therefore it is not necessary that the essences or 45R

whatnessess of these substances are other than the form itself.4. Therefore, the essence of a composed substance and that of a simple

substance differ in this, that the essence of a composed substance is notonly the form, but encompasses the form and the matter, but the essenceof a simple substance is only the form. And two other differences are caused 50R

by this: One is that the essence of a composed substance can be signifiedas a whole or as a part, which befalls it on account of the designation of thematter, as has been said. And therefore the essence of the composed thingis not predicated of the composed thing itself in every way whatsoever; for itcannot be said that a man is his own whatness. But the essence of a simple 55R

thing, which is its own form, cannot be signified except as a whole, sincethere is nothing else there besides the form to be, as it were, the recipient ofthe form; and therefore in whatever way it is taken the essence of a simplesubstance is predicated of it. Whence Avicenna says that “the whatness ofa simple thing is itself that simple thing,” since there is not something else 60R

receiving it. The second difference is that the essences of composed things,because they are received in designated matter, are multiplied accordingto the division of it; whence it happens that some things are the same inspecies and diverse in number. But since the essence of the simple is notreceived in matter, such multiplication cannot be there; and therefore it 65R

must be that in those substances are not found many individuals of thesame species, but rather, as many as are individuals are there also speciesthere, as Avicenna expressly says.

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5. Huiusmodi ergo substantiae, quamvis sint formae tantum sine mate-ria, non tamen in eis est omnimoda simplicitas nec sunt actus purus, sedhabent permixtionem potentiae; et hoc sic patet. Quicquid enim non est deintellectu essentiae vel quiditatis, hoc est adveniens extra et faciens compo-

65 sitionem cum essentia, quia nulla essentia sine his quae sunt partes essentiaeintelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia vel quiditas potest intelligi sine hocquod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo; possum enim intelligere quid est homovel phoenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura; ergo patetquod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quiditate. Nisi forte sit aliqua res cuius

70 quiditas sit ipsum suum esse, et haec res non potest esse nisi una et prima;quia impossibile est ut fiat plurificatio alicuius nisi per additionem alicuiusdifferentiae, sicut multiplicatur natura generis in species; vel per hoc quodforma recipitur in diversis materiis, sicut multiplicatur natura speciei indiversis individuis; vel per hoc quod unum est absolutum et aliud in aliquo

75 receptum, sicut si esset quidam calor separatus esset alius a calore non sep-arato ex ipsa sua separatione. Si autem ponatur aliqua res quae sit essetantum ita ut ipsum esse sit subsistens, hoc esse non recipiet additionemdifferentiae, quia iam non esset esse tantum sed esse et praeter hoc formaaliqua; et multo minus reciperet additionem materiae, quia iam esset esse

80 non subsistens sed materiale. Unde relinquitur quod talis res quae sit suumesse non potest esse nisi una; unde oportet quod in qualibet alia re praeteream aliud sit esse suum et aliud quiditas vel natura seu forma sua; undeoportet quod in intelligentiis sit esse praeter formam, et ideo dictum estquod intelligentia est forma et esse.

85 6. Omne autem quod convenit alicui vel est causatum ex principiis natu-rae suae, sicut risibile in homine; vel advenit ab aliquo principio extrinseco,sicut lumen in aere ex influentia solis. Non autem potest esse quod ipsumesse sit causatum ab ipsa forma vel quiditate rei, dico sicut a causa effi-ciente, quia sic aliqua res esset sui ipsius causa et aliqua res seipsam in esse

90 produceret; quod est impossibile. Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res cuius

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5. Therefore substances of this sort, although they are only forms with-out matter, nevertheless not every mode of simplicity is in them, nor are 70R

they pure act, but they have an admixture of potency; and this is evident asfollows: For whatever is not of the understanding of an essence or whatnesscomes to it from outside and makes a composition with the essence, sinceno essence can be understood without those things that are parts of theessence. Every essence or whatness, however, can be understood without 75R

this, that anything about its existence be understood; for I can understandwhat a man or a phoenix is and, nevertheless, be ignorant whether it hasexistence in the nature of things; therefore it is evident that the existenceis other than the essence or whatness. Unless perhaps if there is some thingthe whatness of which is itself its own existence, and this thing cannot ex- 80R

ist unless it is one and first; for it is impossible that a multiplication ofsomething occur except [either] through the addition of some difference, asthe nature of the genus is multiplied into species; or through this, that theform is received in diverse matters, as the nature of a species is multiplied indiverse individuals; or through this, that the one is absolute and the other 85R

is received in something, just as if there were some separated heat, it wouldbe other than the non-separated heat due to its very separation. If, how-ever, something were posited that is existence alone, such that the existenceitself is subsistent, then this existence would not receive the addition of adifference, since rightaway it would not be existence alone, but existence 90R

and, besides this, some form; and much less would it receive an additionof matter, since rightaway it would be not a subsisting existence but a ma-terial one. Whence it remains that such a thing that is its own existencecannot be but one; whence it must be that in every other thing besides thisits existence is other than its whatness or nature or form; whence it must 95R

be that in intelligences there is existence beside form, and therefore it wassaid that an intelligence is form and existence.

6. However, everything that belongs to something either is caused bythe principles of its own nature, such as the risibile in man, or it comes fromsome extrinsic principle, such as light in the air from the influence of the 100R

sun. It cannot be, however, that the existence itself is caused by the formitself or the whatness of the thing—I say as by an efficient cause—since thensome thing would be the cause of its very self, and some thing would lead

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esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat esse ab alio. Et quia omne quodest per aliud reducitur ad illud quod est per se sicut ad causam primam,oportet quod sit aliqua res quae sit causa essendi omnibus rebus eo quodipsa est esse tantum; alias iretur in infinitum in causis, cum omnis res quae

95 non est esse tantum habeat causam sui esse, ut dictum est. Patet ergo quodintelligentia est forma et esse, et quod esse habet a primo ente quod est essetantum et hoc est causa prima quae Deus est.

7. Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio est in potentia respectuillius, et hoc quod receptum est in eo est actus eius; ergo oportet quod

100 ipsa quiditas vel forma quae est intelligentia sit in potentia respectu essequod a Deo recipit, et illud esse receptum est per modum actus. Et itainvenitur potentia et actus in intelligentiis, non tamen forma et materianisi aequivoce. Unde etiam pati, recipere, subiectum esse et omnia huius-modi quae videntur rebus ratione materiae convenire, aequivoce conveniunt

105 substantiis intellectualibus et substantiis corporalibus, ut in III De animaCommentator dicit. Et quia, ut dictum est, intelligentiae quiditas est ip-samet intelligentia, ideo quiditas vel essentia eius est ipsum quod est ipsa, etesse suum receptum a Deo est id quo subsistit in rerum natura; et propterhoc a quibusdam dicuntur huiusmodi substantiae componi ex quo est et

110 quod est, vel ex quod est et esse, ut Boethius dicit.

8. Et quia in intelligentiis ponitur potentia et actus, non erit diffi-cile invenire multitudinem intelligentiarum, quod esset impossibile si nullapotentia in eis esset. Unde Commentator dicit in III De anima quod sinatura intellectus possibilis esset ignorata, non possemus invenire multi-

115 tudinem in substantiis separatis. Est ergo distinctio earum ad invicemsecundum gradum potentiae et actus, ita quod intelligentia superior quaemagis propinqua est primo habet plus de actu et minus de potentia, et sicde aliis.

9. Et hoc completur in anima humana, quae tenet ultimum gradum

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forth produce its very self into existence, which is impossible. Therefore itis necessary that every such thing whose existence is other than its nature 105R

would have existence from another. And because everything that is throughanother is led back reduced to that which is through itself as to a first cause,it must be that there is some thing that is the cause of existing for all thingsin that it itself is existence only; otherwise one would go into infinity inthe causes, since everything that is not existence only has a cause of its 110R

existence, as has been said. It is evident, therefore, that an intelligence isa form and existence, and that it has existence from the first being, whichis existence only, and this is the first cause, which is God.

7. However, everything that receives something from another is in po-tency with respect to that, and that which has been received in it is its act; 115R

therefore it must be that the very whatness or form that is an intelligence isin potency with respect to the existence that it receives from God, and thatthat received existence is through the mode of act. And in this way there isfound potency and act in the intelligences, yet not form and matter, exceptequivocally. Whence also to suffer, to receive, to be underlying, and all 120R

things of this sort that are seen to belong to things by reason of matter, be-long equivocally to the intellectual substances and bodily substances, as theCommentator says in III of De Anima. And because, as has been said, thewhatness of an intelligence is that very intelligence, therefore its whatnessor essence is the very thing that it itself is, and its existence, received from 125R

God, is that by which it subsists in the nature of things; and on account ofthis, substances of this sort are said, by some, to be composed from thatby which it is and that which it is, or from that which is and existence, asBoethius says.

8. And because potency and act are posited in intelligences, it will not 130R

be difficult to find a multitude of intelligences, which would be impossible ifthere were no potency in them. Whence the Commentator says in III of DeAnima that if the nature of the possible understanding were unknown, wewould not be able to find a multitude in the separated substances. Thereis, therefore, a distinction of them from each other according to the grade 135R

of potency and act, such that the higher intelligence, which is closer to thefirst, has more of act and less of potency, and so on of the others.

9. And this [gradation] is completed in the human soul, which holds

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120 in substantiis intellectualibus. Unde intellectus possibilis eius se habet adformas intelligibiles sicut materia prima, quae tenet ultimum gradum in essesensibili, ad formas sensibiles, ut Commentator in III De anima dicit; et ideoPhilosophus comparat eam tabulae, in qua nihil est scriptum. Et propterhoc quod inter alias substantias intellectuales plus habet de potentia, ideo

125 efficitur in tantum propinqua rebus materialibus ut res materialis trahaturad participandum esse suum; ita scilicet quod ex anima et corpore resultatunum esse in uno composito, quamvis illud esse prout est animae non sitdependens a corpore. Et ideo post istam formam quae est anima inveniunturaliae formae plus de potentia habentes et magis propinquae materiae, in

130 tantum quod esse earum sine materia non est; in quibus etiam invenitur ordoet gradus usque ad primas formas elementorum, quae sunt propinquissimaemateriae; unde nec aliquam operationem habent nisi secundum exigentiamqualitatum activarum et passivarum et aliarum quibus materia ad formamdisponitur.

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the ultimate last grade in the intellectual substances. Whence its possi-ble understanding holds itself to intelligible forms as prime matter, which 140R

holds the ultimate grade in sensible existence, is to the sensible forms, asthe Commentator says in III of De Anima; and therefore the Philosophercompares it to a tablet in which nothing has been written. And on accountof this, that among the other intellectual substances [the human soul] hasmore of potency, therefore it is made to be so close to material things that 145R

a material thing is drawn into participating sharing in its own existence;namely, such that from the soul and body there results one existence inone composite, although that existence, insofar as it is the soul’s, is notdependent on the body. And therefore after that form that is the [human]soul, other forms are found possessing more of potency and closer to mat- 150R

ter, inasmuch as their existence is not without matter; and even in thesethere is found an order and gradation, all the way to the first forms ofthe elements, which are the ones closest to matter; whence neither do theyhave any operation except that according to the requirement pressure ofthe active and passive qualities and the others by which matter is disposed 155R

to form.

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Caput 5

1. His igitur visis, patet quomodo essentia in diversis invenitur. In-venitur enim triplex modus habendi essentiam in substantiis. Aliquid enimest sicut Deus cuius essentia est ipsummet suum esse; et ideo inveniunturaliqui philosophi dicentes quod Deus non habet quiditatem vel essentiam,

5 quia essentia sua non est aliud quam esse eius. Et ex hoc sequitur quodipse non sit in genere; quia omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeatquiditatem praeter esse suum, cum quiditas vel natura generis aut specieinon distinguatur secundum rationem naturae in illis quorum est genus velspecies, sed esse est diversum in diversis.

10 2. Nec oportet, si dicimus quod Deus est esse tantum, ut in illorumerrorem incidamus qui Deum dixerunt esse illud esse universale quo quae-libet res formaliter est. Hoc enim esse quod Deus est huius condicionis estut nulla sibi additio fieri possit, unde per ipsam suam puritatem est essedistinctum ab omni esse; propter quod in commento IX propositionis libri

15 De causis dicitur quod individuatio primae causae, quae est esse tantum,est per puram bonitatem eius. Esse autem commune sicut in intellectu suonon includit aliquam additionem, ita non includit in intellectu suo praeci-sionem additionis; quia, si hoc esset, nihil posset intelligi esse in quo superesse aliquid adderetur.

20 3. Similiter etiam quamvis sit esse tantum, non oportet quod deficiantei reliquae perfectiones et nobilitates. Immo habet omnes perfectiones quaesunt in omnibus generibus, propter quod perfectum simpliciter dicitur, utPhilosophus et Commentator in V Metaphysicae dicunt; sed habet eas modoexcellentiori omnibus rebus, quia in eo unum sunt, sed in aliis diversitatem

25 habent. Et hoc est quia omnes illae perfectiones conveniunt sibi secundumesse suum simplex; sicut si aliquis per unam qualitatem posset efficere oper-ationes omnium qualitatum, in illa una qualitate omnes qualitates haberet,ita Deus in ipso esse suo omnes perfectiones habet.

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Chapter 5

1. With these things seen, therefore, it is evident in what way essenceis found in diverse things. For there is found in substances a threefoldway of having essence. For there is something, such as God, the essenceof Whom is His very existence; and therefore some philosophers are foundsaying that God does not have a whatness or essence, since His essence 5R

is not other than His existence. And from this it follows that He is notin a genus. For everything that is in a genus must have whatness besideits existence, since the whatness or nature of the genus or species is notdistinguished according to the notion of the nature in those things of whichit is the genus or species, but the existence is diverse in the diverse things. 10R

2. Nor is it necessary, if we say that God is existence only, that we wouldfall into the error of those who have said that that existence is the universalone by which each and every thing formally is. For this existence that isGod is of this condition, that no addition can be made to it; whence throughits very purity it is an existence distinct from every [other] existence; on 15R

account of which in the comment on the ninth proposition of the book OfCauses it is said that the individuation of the first cause, which is existenceonly, is through its pure goodness. The common existence, however, justas in its own understanding it does not include any addition, so also in itsunderstanding it does not include a precision of addition; since if this were 20R

so, then nothing could be understood to exist in which anything were addedover and above existence.

3. Likewise also, although He is existence only, it is not necessary thatthe remaining perfections and nobilities are lacking to Him. Indeed, Hehas all the perfections that are in all the genera, on account of which He 25R

is said to be perfect simply, as the Philosopher and Commentator say in Vof Metaphysics ; but He has them in a mode more excellent than all things[do], since in Him they are one but in other things they have diversity. Andthis is because all of those perfections belong to Him according to His ownsimple existence. Just as, if there were someone able to bring about the 30R

operations of all the qualities through one quality, then he would have allthe qualities in that one quality, so in this way God has all the perfectionsin His very existence.

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4. Secundo modo invenitur essentia in substantiis creatis intellectual-30 ibus, in quibus est aliud esse quam essentia earum, quamvis essentia sit sine

materia. Unde esse earum non est absolutum sed receptum, et ideo limita-tum et finitum ad capacitatem naturae recipientis; sed natura vel quiditasearum est absoluta, non recepta in aliqua materia. Et ideo dicitur in li-bro De causis quod intelligentiae sunt infinitae inferius et finitae superius;

35 sunt enim finitae quantum ad esse suum, quod a superiori recipiunt, nontamen finiuntur inferius quia earum formae non limitantur ad capacitatemalicuius materiae recipientis eas. Et ideo in talibus substantiis non inven-itur multitudo individuorum in una specie, ut dictum est, nisi in animahumana propter corpus cui unitur. Et licet individuatio eius ex corpore oc-

40 casionaliter dependeat quantum ad sui inchoationem, quia non acquiritursibi esse individuatum nisi in corpore cuius est actus; non tamen oportet utsubtracto corpore individuatio pereat, quia cum habeat esse absolutum exquo acquisitum est sibi esse individuatum ex hoc quod facta est forma huiuscorporis, illud esse semper remanet individuatum. Et ideo dicit Avicenna

45 quod individuatio animarum vel multiplicatio pendet ex corpore quantumad sui principium, sed non quantum ad sui finem.

5. Et quia in istis substantiis quiditas non est idem quod esse, ideosunt ordinabiles in praedicamento; et propter hoc invenitur in eis genus etspecies et differentia, quamvis earum differentiae propriae nobis occultae

50 sint. In rebus enim sensibilibus etiam ipsae differentiae essentiales ignotaesunt; unde significantur per differentias accidentales quae ex essentialibusoriuntur, sicut causa significatur per suum effectum; sicut bipes ponitur dif-ferentia hominis. Accidentia autem propria substantiarum immaterialiumnobis ignota sunt, unde differentiae earum nec per se nec per accidentales

55 differentias a nobis significari possunt.

6. Hoc tamen sciendum est quod non eodem modo sumitur genus etdifferentia in illis substantiis et in substantiis sensibilibus, quia in sensi-bilibus genus sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, differentia vero ab

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4. Essence is found in the second way in the created intellectual sub-stances, in which [their] existence is other than their essence, although it 35R

is an essence without matter. Whence their existence is not absolute butreceived, and therefore limited to and finished at the capacity of the re-ceiving nature; but their nature or whatness is absolute, not having beenreceived in some matter. And therefore in the book Of Causes it is saidthat the intelligences are infinite unbounded from below, but finite bounded 40R

from above; for they are finite with respect to their existence, which theyreceive from the superior, yet they are not finite from below, because theirforms are not limited to the capacity of some matter receiving them. Andtherefore in such substances there is not found a multitude of individuals inone species, as has been said, except in the human soul on account of the 45R

body to which it is united. And although its individuation depends on thebody as on an occasion, with respect to its beginning origin—since individ-uated existence is not acquired by it except in the body of which it is theact—nevertheless, it is not necessary that, with the body withdrawn [fromit], the individuation would cease. For since it [i.e., the human soul] has 50R

an absolute existence from which the individuated existence was acquiredby it because it was made the form of this body, that existence always re-mains individuated. And therefore Avicenna says that the individuationor multiplication of souls depends on the body with respect to its principlebeginning, but not with respect to its end. 55R

5. And because in such substances the whatness is not the same asthe existence, therefore they can be ordered in the predicament; and on ac-count of this genus, species, and difference are found in them, although theirproper differences are hidden to us. For even in sensible things the essentialdifferences themselves are unknown; whence they are signified through the 60R

accidental differences that arise from the essential ones, just as a cause issignified through its effect, such as [when] biped is posited as the differenceof man. The proper accidents of immaterial substances, however, are un-known to us; whence their differences can be signified by us neither throughthemselves nor through accidental differences. 65R

6. Nevertheless, this should be known, that genus and difference are nottaken in the same way in those substances and in the sensible substances,since in sensibles the genus is taken from that which is material in the

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eo quod est formale in ipsa; unde dicit Avicenna in principio libri sui De60 anima quod forma in rebus compositis ex materia et forma “est differentia

simplex eius quod constituitur ex illa”; non autem ita quod ipsa forma sitdifferentia, sed quia est principium differentiae, ut idem dicit in sua Meta-physica. Et dicitur talis differentia esse differentia simplex quia sumitur abeo quod est pars quiditatis rei, scilicet a forma. Cum autem substantiae

65 immateriales sint simplices quiditates, non potest in eis differentia sumi abeo quod est pars quiditatis, sed a tota quiditate; et ideo in principio De an-ima dicit Avicenna quod “differentiam simplicem non habent nisi speciesquarum essentiae sunt compositae ex materia et forma.”

7. Similiter etiam in eis ex tota essentia sumitur genus, modo tamen70 differenti. Una enim substantia separata convenit cum alia in immaterial-

itate, et differunt ab invicem in gradu perfectionis secundum recessum apotentialitate et accessum ad actum purum. Et ideo ab eo quod conse-quitur illas in quantum sunt immateriales sumitur in eis genus, sicut estintellectualitas vel aliquid huiusmodi; ab eo autem quod consequitur in eis

75 gradum perfectionis sumitur in eis differentia, nobis tamen ignota. Necoportet has differentias esse accidentales quia sunt secundum maiorem etminorem perfectionem, quae non diversificant speciem; gradus enim perfec-tionis in recipiendo eandem formam non diversificat speciem, sicut albiuset minus album in participando eiusdem rationis albedinem; sed diversus

80 gradus perfectionis in ipsis formis vel naturis participatis speciem diversifi-cat, sicut natura procedit per gradus de plantis ad animalia per quaedamquae sunt media inter animalia et plantas, secundum Philosophum in VIIDe animalibus. Nec iterum est necessarium ut divisio intellectualium sub-stantiarum sit semper per duas differentias veras, quia hoc est impossibile

85 in omnibus rebus accidere, ut Philosophus dicit in XI De animalibus.

8. Tertio modo invenitur essentia in substantiis compositis ex materiaet forma, in quibus et esse est receptum et finitum propter hoc quod ab

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thing, but the difference from that which is formal in it; whence Avicennasays in the beginning of his book On the Soul that in things composed 70R

from matter and form the form “is the simple difference of that which isconstituted from it [i.e., the form],” not, however, such that the form itselfis the difference, but because it is the principle of the difference, the sameas he says in his Metaphysics. And such a difference is said to be a simpledifference because it is taken from that which is a part of the whatness of 75R

the thing, namely from the form. Since immaterial substances, however, aresimple whatnessess, in them the difference cannot be taken from that whichis a part of the whatness, but from the whole whatness; and therefore inthe beginning of [his] De Anima Avicenna says that “species do not have asimple difference unless they be species the essences of which are composed 80R

from matter and form.”7. Likewise also, in them the genus is taken from the whole essence,

yet in a different way. For one separated substance agrees with another inimmateriality, and they differ from each other in the grade of perfection,according to a recession from potentiality and an accession toward pure 85R

act. And therefore in them the genus is taken from that which followsupon them inasmuch as they are immaterial, such as is intellectuality orsomething of this sort; the difference in them, however, is taken from thatwhich follows the grade of perfection in them, yet this is unknown to us.Nor must these differences be accidental because they are according to a 90R

greater and lesser perfection, which do not diversify a species. For the gradeof perfection in the thing receiving the same form does not diversify thespecies, just as [neither do] whiter and less white in the thing participatingin a whiteness of the same notion; but a diverse grade of perfection in thevery forms or natures participated does diversify the species, just as nature 95R

proceeds through grades from plants to animals through certain things thatare intermediate between animals and plants, according to the Philosopherin VII of De Animalibus. Nor, again, is it necessary that the division ofintellectual substances is always through two true differences, since it isimpossible that this happen in all things, as the Philosopher says in XI of 100R

De Animalibus.8. In the third way essence is found in substances composed from matter

and form, in which also there is a received and finite existence on account

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alio esse habent, et iterum natura vel quiditas earum est recepta in materiasignata. Et ideo sunt finitae et superius et inferius; et in eis iam propter

90 divisionem materiae signatae possibilis est multiplicatio individuorum inuna specie. Et in his qualiter se habet essentia ad intentiones logicas dictumest supra.

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of this, that they have existence from another, and again, their nature orwhatness is received in signate matter. And therefore they are finite both 105R

from above and below, and in them a multiplication of individuals in onespecies is possible rightaway on account of the division of the signate matter.And how the essence in these things holds itself to the logical intentions hasbeen said above.

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Caput 6

1. Nunc restat videre quomodo sit essentia in accidentibus; qualiterenim sit in omnibus substantiis, dictum est. Et quia, ut dictum est, essen-tia est id quod per diffinitionem significatur, oportet ut eo modo habeantessentiam quo habent diffinitionem. Diffinitionem autem habent incomple-

5 tam, quia non possunt diffiniri nisi ponatur subiectum in eorum diffinitione;et hoc ideo est quia non habent esse per se absolutum a subiecto, sed sicut exforma et materia relinquitur esse substantiale quando componuntur, ita exaccidente et subiecto relinquitur esse accidentale quando accidens subiectoadvenit. Et ideo etiam nec forma substantialis completam essentiam ha-

10 bet nec materia, quia etiam in diffinitione formae substantialis oportet quodponatur illud cuius est forma, et ita diffinitio eius est per additionem alicuiusquod est extra genus eius sicut et diffinitio formae accidentalis; unde et indiffinitione animae ponitur corpus a naturali qui considerat animam solumin quantum est forma physici corporis.

15 2. Sed tamen inter formas substantiales et accidentales tantum interestquia, sicut forma substantialis non habet per se esse absolutum sine eo cuiadvenit, ita nec illud cui advenit, scilicet materia; et ideo ex coniunctioneutriusque relinquitur illud esse in quo res per se subsistit, et ex eis effici-tur unum per se; propter quod ex coniunctione eorum relinquitur essentia

20 quaedam. Unde forma, quamvis in se considerata non habeat completamrationem essentiae, tamen est pars essentiae completae. Sed illud cui ad-venit accidens est ens in se completum subsistens in suo esse, quod quidemesse naturaliter praecedit accidens quod supervenit. Et ideo accidens su-perveniens ex coniunctione sui cum eo cui advenit non causat illud esse in

25 quo res subsistit, per quod res est ens per se; sed causat quoddam essesecundum sine quo res subsistens intelligi potest esse, sicut primum potestintelligi sine secundo. Unde ex accidente et subiecto non efficitur unumper se sed unum per accidens. Et ideo ex eorum coniunctione non resultatessentia quaedam sicut ex coniunctione formae ad materiam; propter quod

30 accidens neque rationem completae essentiae habet neque pars completaeessentiae est, sed sicut est ens secundum quid, ita et essentiam secundum

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Chapter 6

1. Now it remains to see in what way there is essence in accidents, forhow it is in all substances has been said. And because, as has been said, anessence is that which is signified through a definition, it must be that theway they have an essence is the way they have a definition. They have anincomplete definition, however, since they cannot be defined unless a subject 5R

is placed in their definition; and this is therefore because they do not haveexistence through themselves independent of absolved from a subject, butjust as substantial existence results from the form and matter when theyare composed, so also accidental existence results from the accident andsubject when the accident comes to the subject. And therefore also neither 10R

the substantial form nor the matter has a complete essence, since one mustplace that of which it is the form even in the definition of a substantialform, and thus its definition is through an addition of something that isoutside its genus, just as is the definition of an accidental form; whencealso the naturalist, who considers the soul only insofar as it is the form of 15R

a physical body, places the body in the definition of the soul.2. But nevertheless, between substantial and accidental forms there is

a great difference, since just as a substantial form does not have throughitself an absolute existence without that to which it comes, so neither doesthat to which it comes, namely matter; and therefore that existence results 20R

from the conjunction of both, and from them [something] one through itselfis brought to be; on account of which a certain essence results from theirconjunction. Whence the form, although considered in itself it does nothave the complete notion of an essence, still it is part of a complete essence.But that to which an accident comes is a being complete in itself, subsisting 25R

in its own existence, which existence indeed naturally precedes the accidentthat supervenes comes upon it. And therefore the supervening accident,due to its conjunction with that to which it comes, does not cause thatexistence in which the thing subsists, through which the thing is a beingthrough itself; rather, it causes a certain second existence without which the 30R

subsisting thing can be understood to exist, just as a first can be understood[to exist] without a second. Whence from an accident and a subject therecannot be brought to be [something] one through itself, but one accidentally.

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quid habet.

3. Sed quia illud quod dicitur maxime et verissime in quolibet genereest causa eorum quae sunt post in illo genere, sicut ignis qui est in fine ca-

35 liditatis est causa caloris in rebus calidis, ut in II Metaphysicae dicitur; ideosubstantia quae est primum in genere entis, verissime et maxime essentiamhabens, oportet quod sit causa accidentium, quae secundario et quasi secun-dum quid rationem entis participant. Quod tamen diversimode contingit.Quia enim partes substantiae sunt materia et forma, ideo quaedam acciden-

40 tia principaliter consequuntur formam et quaedam materiam. Forma auteminvenitur aliqua cuius esse non dependet ad materiam, ut anima intellec-tualis; materia vero non habet esse nisi per formam. Unde in accidentibusquae consequuntur formam est aliquid quod non habet communicationemcum materia, sicut est intelligere, quod non est per organum corporale, sicut

45 probat Philosophus in III De anima; aliqua vero ex consequentibus formamsunt quae habent communicationem cum materia, sicut sentire. Sed nullumaccidens consequitur materiam sine communicatione formae.

4. In his tamen accidentibus quae materiam consequuntur inveniturquaedam diversitas. Quaedam enim accidentia consequuntur materiam se-

50 cundum ordinem quem habet ad formam specialem, sicut masculinum etfemininum in animalibus, quorum diversitas ad materiam reducitur, ut dic-itur in X Metaphysicae; unde remota forma animalis dicta accidentia nonremanent nisi aequivoce. Quaedam vero consequuntur materiam secundumordinem, quem habet ad formam generalem; et ideo remota forma speciali

55 adhuc in ea remanent, sicut nigredo cutis est in Aethiope ex mixtione ele-mentorum et non ex ratione animae, et ideo post mortem in eis remanet.

5. Et quia unaquaeque res individuatur ex materia et collocatur in

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And therefore from their conjunction there does not result a certain essence,as [does] from the conjunction of form to matter; on account of which an 35R

accident has neither the notion of a complete essence nor is it a part of acomplete essence, but just as it is a being in a certain respect, so also it hasan essence in a certain respect.

3. But because that which is most of all and most truly [such] in anygenus whatsoever is the cause of those that are after it in that genus, such 40R

as fire, which is in the end boundary of heat, is the cause of heat in [other]hot things, as is said in II of Metaphysics ; therefore substance, which is thefirst in the genus of being, most truly and most of all having an essence,must be the cause of accidents, which secondarily and, as it were, in a cer-tain respect participate in the notion of being. Nevertheless this happens 45R

in diverse ways. For because the parts of substance are matter and form,therefore certain accidents principally are consequent upon the form andcertain ones on the matter. A certain form is found, however, the existenceof which is not dependent on matter, such as the intellectual soul; but mat-ter does not have existence except through form. Whence in accidents that 50R

are consequent upon form there is something that does not have any com-munication with matter, as is understanding, which is not through a bodilyorgan, as the Philosopher proves in III of De Anima; but of those [accidents]consequent upon the form there are some that have a communication withthe matter, such as sensing. But no accident is consequent upon the matter 55R

without a communication of the form.4. Yet in those accidents that are consequent upon the matter there

is found a certain diversity. For some accidents are consequent upon thematter according to an order that it has to the specific form, such as themasculine and the feminine in animals, the diversity of which is reduced 60R

leads back to the matter, as is said in X of Metaphysics ; whence with theform of the animal removed the aforesaid accidents do not remain, unlessequivocally. Some [accidents], however, are consequent upon the matteraccording to an order that it has to the general form; and therefore withthe specific form removed they yet remain in it, such as the blackness of 65R

the skin is in an Ethiopian due to the mixture of the elements and not byreason of the soul, and therefore it remains in them after death.

5. And because each thing whatever is individuated from the matter

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genere vel specie per suam formam, ideo accidentia quae consequuntur ma-teriam sunt accidentia individui, secundum quae individua etiam eiusdem

60 speciei ad invicem differunt; accidentia vero quae consequuntur formam suntpropriae passiones vel generis vel speciei, unde inveniuntur in omnibus par-ticipantibus naturam generis vel speciei, sicut risibile consequitur in homineformam, quia risus contingit ex aliqua apprehensione animae hominis.

6. Sciendum etiam est quod accidentia aliquando ex principiis essen-65 tialibus causantur secundum actum perfectum, sicut calor in igne, qui sem-

per est actu calidus; aliquando vero secundum aptitudinem tantum, sedcomplementum accidit ex agente exteriori, sicut diaphaneitas in aere, quaecompletur per corpus lucidum exterius; et in talibus aptitudo est accidensinseparabile, sed complementum quod advenit ex aliquo principio quod est

70 extra essentiam rei, vel quod non intrat constitutionem rei, est separabile,sicut moveri et huiusmodi.

7. Sciendum est etiam quod in accidentibus alio modo sumitur genus,differentia et species quam in substantiis. Quia enim in substantiis ex formasubstantiali et materia efficitur per se unum, una quadam natura ex earum

75 coniunctione resultante quae proprie in praedicamento substantiae collo-catur, ideo in substantiis nomina concreta quae compositum significantproprie in genere esse dicuntur, sicut species vel genera, ut homo vel an-imal. Non autem forma vel materia est hoc modo in praedicamento nisiper reductionem, sicut principia in genere esse dicuntur. Sed ex accidente

80 et subiecto non fit unum per se; unde non resultat ex eorum coniunctionealiqua natura cui intentio generis vel speciei possit attribui. Unde nominaaccidentalia concretive dicta non ponuntur in praedicamento sicut speciesvel genera, ut album vel musicum, nisi per reductionem, sed solum secun-dum quod in abstracto significantur, ut albedo et musica. Et quia accidentia

85 non componuntur ex materia et forma, ideo non potest in eis sumi genusa materia et differentia a forma sicut in substantiis compositis; sed oportetut genus primum sumatur ex ipso modo essendi, secundum quod ens diver-simode secundum prius et posterius de decem generibus praedicatur, sicutdicitur quantitas ex eo quod est mensura substantiae et qualitas secundum

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and is placed in the genus or species through its form, therefore the acci-dents that are consequent upon the matter are accidents of the individual, 70R

according to which the individuals of the same species also differ from eachother; accidents that are consequent upon the form, however, are the properpassions either of the genus or of the species; whence they are found in allthose participating in the nature of the genus or species, just as risible isconsequent upon the form in man, since laughter happens from a certain 75R

apprehension of a man’s soul.6. It should also be known that accidents sometimes are caused accord-

ing to perfect act by the essential principles, such as heat in fire, which isalways hot in act; but sometimes [they are caused] according to aptitudeonly, but the completion happens due to an exterior agent, such as trans- 80R

parency in air, which is completed through an exterior luminous body; andin such things the aptitude is an inseparable accident, but the completion,which comes to it from some principle that is outside the essence of thething, or does not enter into the constitution of the thing, is separable,such as being moved and things of this sort. 85R

7. It should also be known that the genus, difference, and species aretaken in accidents in a different way from [those] in substance. For be-cause in substances [something] one through itself is brought to be from thesubstantial form and matter, with some one nature resulting from their con-junction, which [nature] is properly placed in the predicament of substance, 90R

therefore in substances the concrete names, which signify the composedthing, are said to be properly in a genus as species or genera, such as manor animal. Neither the form nor the matter, however, is in the predicamentin this way except through a reduction, just as principles are said to be inthe genus. But [something] one through itself does not come to be from an 95R

accident and a subject; whence there results from their conjunction no na-ture to which the intention of genus or species could be attributed. Whenceaccidental names said concretely, such as white or musical, are not placed inthe predicament as species or genera except through a reduction, but [theyare so placed] only according as they are signified in the abstract, such as 100R

whiteness and music. And because accidents are not composed from matterand form, therefore in them the genus cannot be taken from matter and thedifference from form, as [was so] in composed substances; rather, it must be

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90 quod est dispositio substantiae, et sic de aliis secundum Philosophum in IXMetaphysicae.

8. Differentiae vero in eis sumuntur ex diversitate principiorum exquibus causantur. Et quia propriae passiones ex propriis principiis subiecticausantur, ideo subiectum ponitur in diffinitione eorum loco differentiae si

95 in abstracto diffiniuntur, secundum quod sunt proprie in genere, sicut dici-tur quod simitas est nasi curvitas. Sed e converso esset si eorum diffinitiosumeretur secundum quod concretive dicuntur; sic enim subiectum in eorumdiffinitione poneretur sicut genus, quia tunc diffinirentur per modum sub-stantiarum compositarum in quibus ratio generis sumitur a materia, sicut

100 dicimus quod simum est nasus curvus. Similiter etiam est si unum accidensalterius accidentis principium sit, sicut principium relationis est actio etpassio et quantitas; et ideo secundum haec dividit Philosophus relationemin V Metaphysicae. Sed quia propria principia accidentium non semper suntmanifesta, ideo quandoque sumimus differentias accidentium ex eorum ef-

105 fectibus, sicut congregativum et disgregativum dicuntur differentiae colorisquae causantur ex abundantia vel paucitate lucis, ex quo diversae speciescolorum causantur.

9. Sic ergo patet quomodo essentia est in substantiis et accidentibus, etquomodo in substantiis compositis et simplicibus, et qualiter in his omnibus

110 intentiones universales logicae inveniuntur; excepto primo quod est in finesimplicitatis, cui non convenit ratio generis aut speciei et per consequensnec diffinitio propter suam simplicitatem; in quo sit finis et consummatiohuius sermonis. Amen.

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that the first genus is taken from the very mode of existing, according asbeing is predicated of the ten genera in diverse ways, according to a prior 105R

and a posterior, just as quantity is said from this, that it is the measure ofsubstance, and quality according as it is the disposition of substance, andso on of the others, according to the Philosopher in IX of Metaphysics.

8. The differences in them, however, are taken from the diversity ofthe principles by which they are caused. And because proper passions 110R

are caused by the proper principles of the subject, therefore the subject isplaced in their definition in the place of a difference, if they are definedin the abstract, according to which they are properly in the genus, suchas snubness is the curvature of a nose. But the converse would be so iftheir definitions were taken according as they are said concretely; for thus 115R

the subject would be placed in their definition as the genus, since then theywould be defined through mode of composed substances, in which the notionof the genus is taken from the matter, such as when we say that the snubis a curved nose. It is likewise the case even if one accident is a principleof another accident, such as action, passion, and quantity are principles of 120R

relation; and therefore the Philosopher divides relation according to themin V of Metaphysics. But because the proper principles of accidents are notalways manifest, therefore sometimes we take the differences of accidentsfrom their effects, such as collective and dispersive concentrated and rarifiedare called the differences of color, which are caused by the abundancy or 125R

paucity of the light due to which the diverse species of color are caused.9. So, therefore, it is evident in what way essence is in substances and

accidents, and in what way in composed and simple substances, and how theuniversal intentions of logic are found in all these things—the first excepted,Who is in the end of simplicity, and to Whom do not belong the notion of a 130R

genus or a species, and consequently neither a definition, on account of Hissimplicity; in Whom let be the end and consummation of this discussion.Amen.

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