selective dft attacks against e0

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Selective DFT Attacks against E0 Jingjing WANG, Kefei CHEN

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Selective DFT Attacks against E0. Jingjing WANG, Kefei CHEN. Outline. Brief introduction to DFT, DFT Attack, E0 Selective DFT Filter for Nonlinear Filter Generator Our Attack against E0 And combiner with memory in general. What is DFT?. DFT = discrete Fourier transform - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

Selective DFT Attacks against E0

Jingjing WANG, Kefei CHEN

Page 2: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

Outline

• Brief introduction to– DFT, DFT Attack, E0

• Selective DFT Filter for Nonlinear Filter Generator

• Our Attack against E0– And combiner with memory in general

Page 3: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

What is DFT?

• DFT = discrete Fourier transform– Used in analysis of signals

• Fourier transform has one amazing feature– Sin signal

– After Fourier transform

– Is much simpler!

Page 4: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

What is DFT Attack?

• Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) Attack– Do DFT for periodic sequence, resulting in

equations in GF(2^n)– For unknowns, solve it in GF(2^n)

• Selective DFT Attack proposed for nonlinear filter by G. GONG– Unknowns: DFT coefficients of the LFSR sequence– Solve equations by: selective DFT filter

Page 5: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

Selective DFT Filter

• Selective DFT filter speeds up the DFT attack by– Filtering out few* components of the DFT result of

the keystream– *the optimal number is one and the number of

corresponding unknowns is no greater than n

Page 6: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

What is E0 Keystream Generator?

• E0 is a combiner with memory– 4 LFSRs– 2-bit memory with update function

– Combine and output:

Page 7: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

Extend DFT Attack to Combiner with Memory

• To eliminate most items– Selective DFT filter needs:– Same equation– Filter function corresponds to the linear combination

(the eliminates the items)

• Challenge:– No same equation guaranteed– Filter function originally defined over consecutive

equations

Page 8: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

• Step 1.– Convert update function into one equation*– *The equation is different from Armknecht’s– =>

1 1 2

2 1 1 1 1 2

1 1 2

1

2

1 1

2 3 4

1 1 1

1 1 1

1

1 1 2

0

( ) ( )

( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

( 1) ( 1) ( )(1 ) ( 1) ( )

( 1) ( 1) ( ) (1 ) ( 1) ( )

t t t t

t t t t t t t t t t

t t t t t

t

t t t t

z z z z

t z z z z z z z z z z

t z z z z t z t

t t t z t t

t z t t z z t t z

2 1 22

1

2

1 1 1 2

( 1) ( 1) ( )(1 ) ( 1) ( )

( 2) ( 2) ( )(1 ) ( 2) ( )t

t

t t t z t t

t t t z t t

Page 9: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

• The equation has such items that– Are products of zt , zt+1 … and unknowns

• => unknowns with unpredictable coefficients because of unpredictable behavior of zt

• Goal: make coefficients predictable!

Page 10: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

• Step 2.– Convert the equation into 16 equations– According to the value of zt , zt+1, zt+2, zt+3

– =>zt+zt+1+zt+2+zt+3+1 = g(at, bt, ct, dt)zt+zt+1+zt+2+zt+3+1 = g(at, bt, ct, dt)+π1(t+2)π2(t+1)+π1(t+2)+ π1(t+2)π1(t+1)zt+zt+1+zt+2+zt+3+1 = g(at, bt, ct, dt)+π3(t+1) … …zt+zt+1+zt+2+zt+3+1 = g(at, bt, ct, dt)+π1(t+1)+π2(t+1)+π3(t+1)zt+zt+1+zt+2+zt+3+1 = g(at, bt, ct, dt) +π1(t+1)+π2(t+1)+π1(t+2)π2(t+1)+π1(t+2)+π3(t+1)

Page 11: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

• Step 3.– Select equations where π1(t+1) can be filtered

out*– *We do that by gcd the characteristic polynomial

of π1(t+1) and that of the other items

– *And pick these with gcd = 1

Page 12: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

• Step 4.– Compute selective discrete Fourier transform

filter for the equation E selected Complexity?

• Trick:– Use the characteristic polynomial of the other

items computed in the last step; denote it by h(x)– Find linear combination of xt that mod h(x) = 0• for {t} that gives the equation E

Page 13: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

• Step 5.– Use the linear combination produced in the last

step– To filter out an equation for π1(t+1)

– Collect and solve equations

Page 14: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

• Some Remarks– Step 1, 2, 3 are done offline – Step 1 and 2 are applicable for all instances of E0– Step 3 are done once for one set of parameters of

E0

• Success of attack relies on Step 3• Complexity of attack is dominated by Step 4

Page 15: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

Conclusion

• Selective DFT filter for combiner– Can be reduced to selective DFT filter for

nonlinear filter– After O(N^3) computation, N ~ (n d)

• Selective DFT filter for Estream Candidate?– Possible if its state update can be converted into

an algebraic equation like E0.

Page 16: Selective DFT Attacks against E0

• Thank you!