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Security in Software Defined Networking P f Ad l Jk Professor : Admela Jukan Supervisor : Marcel Caria Student : Siqian Zhao

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Security in Software Defined Networking

P f Ad l J k• Professor : Admela Jukan• Supervisor : Marcel Caria • Student : Siqian Zhao

Overview • Software Defined Networking (SDN)

Legacy Networking VS. SDN d t f SDN advantages of SDN

• the security problems in SDN caused by malicious attack d b i fi ti caused by misconfiguration

• SDN research project in IDA

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 2

Routing in Legacy Networking

• Routing : select a path to forward packets from sender to receiver.• In Legacy networking :In Legacy networking :

Each network node has its own control plane. Information is collected individually from all network nodes.→ Problem

Management Plane

Control Control Control Control Control ControlControlPlane

ControlPlane

ControlPlane

ControlPlane

ControlPlane

ControlPlane

Data Plane

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 3

Routing in SDN• Centralized control in SDN :

API

App App App App App

SDN controller

Data PlanePlane

• The controller maintains the forwarding table on all nodes across the network!• Benefits : centralized control and programmability.

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 4

SDN Deployment and Market • Deployment example --- Google• 2010: Google started implementing SDN.

O t b 2012 G l id th t it' i t t d it t i t ti l SDN b d• October 2012: Google said, that it's going to extend its current international SDN-based inter-data center network.

(source: http://www.sdncentral.com/sdncentral-library-sdn-market-report/)

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 5

SDN Future

• According to SDN Central :

(source: http://www.sdncentral.com/sdncentral-library-sdn-market-report/)Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 6

Security Concern in SDN

• Since the beginning of 2013, various working groups have been established to study the security in SDN.

• Such as : ONF,ETSI,ITU Id i t f d i i it i f th t t• Idea : importance of designing security in from the start.

• However, SDN hardware, software and services which are already in production and service lack of consideration of security implication!

• Mission : explore techniques and policies to overcome the SDN security challenges• Mission : explore techniques and policies to overcome the SDN security challenges.

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 7

Security in SDN---Challenges • Security Challenges :

Attack on the centralized controllerT t bl b t t ll d ft li tiTrust problem between controller and software applicationsAttack on the communication channel between controller and devicesConflicting flow rules F di lForwarding loops

Application Malicious Application

SDN Controller

SDN SwitchSDN Switch

SDN SwitchSDN Switch

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 8

Security in SDN---DoS • Attack on the controller : Denial of Service

Flow matched ? ---forward packet.No flow matched ? send packet to the controllerNo flow matched ? ---send packet to the controller.

• Thus , an attacker can execute a DoS attack on the node by setting up constantly new and unknown flows.

SDN controllerSDN controller

step 2 step 3

step 1 step 4packet

sender switch receiver

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 9

Security in SDN---DoS • Possible solution to DoS attack :

Run the device in proactive mode or using FirewallFi ll ft h d b d t k it t th t t l th• Firewall : a software or hardware-based network security system that controls the incoming and outgoing network traffic based on applied rule set.

Internet

Header

Header

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 10

Security in SDN---Malicious Applications • Trust issue between controller and applications

A

SDN controller

App App App App

• Malicious application can now be easily developed and deployed on controllers.• Possible solutions : software attestation.

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 11

Security in SDN---Control Channel Attack • Attack on the control channel

SDN Controller

control channelSSL

• Attack can either pretend to be the controller or the switch!• Possible solution 1: encrypt the channel by SSL.

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 12

Security in SDN---Control Channel Attack • Possible solution 2 to the attack on the control channel :

Separate the network

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 13

Security in SDN---Misconfiguration

• Conflicting flow rules by OF switch : Multiple OF applications run on a network controller device. Diff t li ti i t diff t t l li i d i ll Different applications insert different control policies dynamically.

conflicting flow rules may arise! App 1 : A to B ; Modify SRC IP to X.

App 2 : X to B ; Modify DST IP to CSDN controller App 2 : X to B ; Modify DST IP to C.

App 3 : X to C , Forward.

BLOCK : A C Host B

Host A Host X Host C

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 14

Security in SDN---Misconfiguration • Forwarding loops

10 1 t Bl 1010.1.x.x ; to Blue 10.x.x.x10.x.x.x ; to B

10.1.x.x

PacketPacket Packet

PacketPacket

PacketPacket

PacketPacketPacketPacket

10.1.x.x ; to A10.x.x.x ; to Green

Packet

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 15

Security in SDN---Misconfiguration • Nox Controller Nox : an open-source platform that simplifies the creation of software for controlling or

monitoring networksmonitoring networks.

: relay flow rules from OF application t th it hto the switch

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 16

Security in SDN---Misconfiguration • Possible solution : Fortnox --- an extension to the NOX controller by providing non-

bypass flow rules.

when flow ruleswhen flow rules are

conflict,comparethe level of

h i iauthorization roles.

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 17

Security in SDN---Misconfiguration

• Role-based Source Authentication : assign priority to a candidate flow rule , recognize 3 standard authorization levels

among flow rule producersamong flow rule producers.

OF Operator Level : define authoritative security policy

OF Security Level :add flow constraints to combat live

threat activity

OF Application Level : legacy OF Apps

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 18

Security in SDN---OpenDaylight Controller • Another possible solution in OpenDaylight Controller : Defense4All.

Monitoring behavior of protected traffic Diverting attacked traffic to selected AMSs

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 19

SDN Security Research in IDA • SASER : Safe And Secure European Routing

--- Start date : August 2012E d S t b 2015--- End : September 2015

--- Total Budget : about 80 million Euros--- Effort : more than 500 person yearsSDN l t d h• SDN related researches :---Security concept for a new architecture based on software defined networking.---General architecture specification ---Network optimization …

• Challenges coexist with opportunities .

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 20

Conclusion • The evolvement of SDN from the legacy network • Security challenges in SDN and possible solutions

SDN h i IDA• SDN research in IDA

Technische Universität Braunschweig – Seite 21