security, drugs, and violence in mexico: a survey prepared for the sixth north american forum 2010
TRANSCRIPT
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SECURITY, DRUGS, AND
VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: A SURVEY
PREPARED FOR THE SIXTH NORTH
AMERICAN FORUM 2010
Eduardo Guerrero-Gutiérrez
(With the collaboration of Eunises Rosillo, Roberto Arnaud and Ricardo Téllez)
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Security, Drugs, and Violence in Mexico: A Survey
Preface
Acronyms
I. Diagnosis
1. The Security Sector
a. Main Areas
i. Federal Level
ii. State and Local Level
b. Budget
i. Federal Level
ii. State Level
c. Military and Police Forces
i. Military Forces
ii. Police Forces
(a) Federal Police
(b) State and Local Police
d. Regulatory Framework
e. Security Policy (2007-2010)
2. The Logic of Mexican Organized Crime
a. Cooperation between Cartels and Gangs
b. Other Organized Crime Businesses: Kidnapping, Extortion, Vehicle Thefts
and Weapons Traffic
II. Organized Crime Violence
1. The Evolution of Violence
a. National Level
b. State and Local Levels
2. Causes of Violence
III. Government‟s Strategy and Actions against Organized Crime
1. Strategy
2. Actions
a. Arrests
b. Seizures
i. Drugs
ii. Weapons and Vehicles
c. Dismantled Laboratories and Crop Eradication
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IV. Drug Market
1. Production
2. Prices
3. Data Analysis of Drug State Prices
4. Market Value and Estimated Income
5. Transportation and Distribution
a. Points of Entry, Routes of Transportation and Point of Exit
b. Violence and Geography of Business
6. Consumption
a. International Comparisons
b. Consumption at the State Level
V. Public Opinion and the War on Drugs
VI. A Final Assessment
Appendix
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Acronyms
AFI Agencia Federal de Investigación [Federal Investigation Agency]
ATF U. S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
CIDAC Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo [Research for Development Center]
CISEN Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional [Investigation and National Security Center]
CONADIC Consejo Nacional de Adicciones [National Addictions Council]
CSN Consejo de Seguridad Nacional [National Security Council]
FASP Fondo de Aportaciones a la Seguridad Pública [Public Security Contributions Fund]
ICESI Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad [Citizens Institute for Security Studies]
INEGI Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía [National Institute of Statistics and Geography]
INM Instituto Nacional de Migración [National Migration Institute]
INSYDE Instituto para la Seguridad y la Democracia
[Institute for Security and Democracy]
NAFTA North America Free Trade Agreement
NDIC U. S. National Drug Intelligence Center
PF Policía Federal [Federal Police]
PFP Policía Federal Preventiva [Federal Preventive Police]
PGR Procuraduría General de la República [General Attorney Office]
PJE Procuraduría de Justicia del Estado [State Attorney Office]
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SAT Servicio de Administración Tributaria [Tax Service Administratio]
SEDENA Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional [Secretary of National Defense]
SEGOB Secretaría de Gobernación [Secretary of the Interior]
SEMAR Secretaría de Marina [Secretary of the Navy]
SHCP Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público [Secretary of Finance]
SIEDO Subprocuraduría de Investigación Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada [Specialized Deputy Attorney on Organized Crime Investigation]
SNSP Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública [Public Security National Systema]
SRE Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores [Secretary of Foreign Affairs]
SS Secretaría de Salud [Secretary of Health]
SSP Secretaría de Seguridad Pública [Secretary of Public Security]
USAID United States Agency for International Development
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Preface
This survey was written under the auspices of the North American Forum Co-Chair Pedro Aspe-Armella, former Mexican Minister of Finance, to serve as a reference document at the Sixth North American Forum (NAF). NAF is an annual meeting of American, Canadian and Mexican government and business representatives to discuss a broad regional policy agenda that includes security, energy, and economic issues. The Sixth NAF will be held at the city of San Miguel de Allende, Mexico (September 30 - October 2, 2010).
Pedro Aspe-Armella requested Eduardo Guerrero-Gutierrez the elaboration of the survey. The survey provides an overview of the security sector in Mexico, the logic of Mexican organized crime, the dynamics of organized crime violence, the government‟s strategy and actions against organized crime, the main features of the Mexican drug market, and the recent public opinion trends in Mexico regarding the “war on drugs”.
Survey’s Data Sources
The survey exhibits extensive public data from Mexican government agencies, and from American and international agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice and United Nations. Some tables and figures derive from three databases constructed by the author, through the systematic recollection of information in newspapers, weekly magazines, and press releases from official agencies.
The first database shows the number of organized crime executions. For its construction more than 25,000 news articles related to organized crime homicides were collected. These articles were taken from the following 19 national and regional newspapers: Crónica, El Economista, El Financiero, El Gráfico, El Norte, El Sol de México, El Universal, Excélsior, Imagen, Impacto, La Jornada, La Prensa, La Razón, La Segunda de Ovaciones, Metro, Milenio, Ovaciones, Reforma, and UnoMásUno.
The second and third databases show the number of arrests, seizures, and dismantled laboratories. The second database was constructed by analyzing 1,500 PGR press bulletins, and the third one was constructed by collecting and analyzing around 20,000 press articles from the newspapers mentioned above.
About the Author Eduardo Guerrero-Gutierrez is a University of Chicago trained political scientist who, as a policy and political analyst, has received the following awards: Joseph Cropsey Prize (University of Chicago), Carlos Pereyra Award (Nexos Foundation, México), National Essay Award (Federal Electoral Institute, Mexico), and the Accountability Award (Chamber of Federal Deputies, Mexico). Eduardo Guerrero has held executive posts at the Ministry of Social Development, the Federal Institute of Access to Information, and the Federal Electoral Institute. Eduardo Guerrero has also held advisory posts at the Office of the President, the Center for Investigation and National Security, and the Chamber of Deputies. At present, Eduardo Guerrero is partner of Lantia Consultores (www.lantiaconsultores.com), a consultant firm in public affairs.
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I. Diagnosis
1. Security Sector
a. Main Areas
i. Federal Level Despite the efforts made over the last decade to improve the coherence, coordination and cooperation of the Mexican security sector, the problems of shifting and duplicated responsibilities in a number of agencies, and of general instability, persist. These problems have resulted in uncoordinated efforts (and often animosity) across federal, state, and local security and law enforcement agencies (particularly among police agencies). National security responsibilities are carried out by the president and seven cabinet ministries: the Secretary of the Interior (SEGOB), the Secretary of Public Security (SSP), the General Attorney‟s Office (PGR), the Secretary of Finance (SHCP), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (SRE), the Secretary of National Defense (SEDENA), and the Secretary of the Navy (SEMAR). Two important security agencies are subordinated to a couple of these ministries: the main agency of civil intelligence (CISEN) is a branch of the SEGOB, and the Federal Police (PF) is a decentralized body of the SSP. Security responsibilities are often duplicated across agencies because jurisdictional roles are not clearly defined in the legislation, which in turn leads to overlapping jurisdictions. For instance, drug interdiction activity is implemented by SEMAR, SEDENA, SSP and PGR. While overlapping roles may provide checks and balances across agencies, the main issue is that there seems to be confusion regarding hierarchy and responsibilities, which ultimately has led to bureaucratic turf battles across agencies. The most recent case was a confrontation between SSP and PGR regarding the scope and limits of PF investigative powers vis-à-vis the investigative power of the Ministerial Police. Such confrontation ended with the resignation of the General Attorney in September 2009 and the approval in Congress of a new PF law (June 2009) that created a branch of federal police with investigative powers (see Appendix I Section d). Five security agencies have experienced a high turnover rate at the executive level, which has produced extreme instability. In the previous 45-month period, the following five agencies have switched their top officials: the Ministry of Interior (four times), PGR (three times, the National Public Security System (four times), the National Security Council (four times), and the PF (five times). (See Appendix I Table 1) Each of the two chambers of Congress has a Commission on Public Security, and there is also a Bicameral Commission on National Security. Formally, according to the Work Plan 2009-2010 of the Public Security Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, its powers include the following: strengthening coordination between institutions; promoting experience exchange and technical support among the three levels of government; drafting studies about current criminal trends and rates; and creating and managing the crime and violence database.
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Formally, according to the Committee on Public Security of the Senate‟s Work Plan 2006-20121, its lines of work are the following: to learn about the national and international mechanisms of police functioning and organization; to analyze, discuss, diagnose and determine the bills referred to this Committee; to disseminate and establish a communication link with citizens and public agencies at the three levels of government; to promote the allocation of adequate budgetary resources for public security and justice; and to properly distribute the Federal Funds for Public Security to states and municipalities. Formally, the policies and actions related to national security are subject to monitoring and evaluation from the Congress through the Bicameral Commission for National Security. Formally, this commission has the following powers: 1) to request specific reports to different public security sector institutions when discussing a law or a case study concerning this subject; 2) to know the annual project of the National Risks Agenda and issue an opinion about it; 3) to know the activity reports sent to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (CSN) in order to make appropriate recommendations; 4) to know the compliance reports given by the Executive Secretary of the CSN; and 5) to ask the appropriate authorities the results of the reviews, audits and procedures to which they have been subjected.2 When the powers of the Bicameral Commission are reviewed, it is immediately perceived that legislative monitoring and the evaluation of decisions and actions on national security matters are a mere aspiration. Indeed, the powers of the Bicameral Commission are only directed at knowing the content of reports or projects or, at best, to request information. Therefore, the Commission lacks the necessary de facto powers to fully comply with its obligations to monitor and evaluate policies and actions related to national security. So far, the only genuine, but limited, instrument of legislative oversight of national security agencies is the Chamber of Deputies Audit Agency3, which reviews public accounts through financial audits related to performance. Finally, a crucial factor that has exacerbated the insecurity problem in Mexico has to do with the performance of the judicial system. For example, about 75 percent of those arrested for alleged drug-related crimes are acquitted. This is mainly due to two reasons: corruption in the courts and the ineffectiveness of the investigative police and the public prosecutor (ministerio público, which is subordinated to the Executive branch) to provide evidence.
ii. State and Local Level The public security sector at the state level is composed by the state public security secretary, the state attorney, the police corps (preventive and investigative) and the penitentiary system. The role of the municipal police is to maintain order and peace in the community. To fulfill these functions, the municipal police force and its subsidiary bodies should ideally perform the following activities: conduct surveillance and take preventive measures over criminal activities, detention of felons and assistance provision to the Public Attorney in prosecuting offenders, organize municipal criminal information and keep
1 Mexico, Cámara de Senadores. Retrieved from the Internet on September 6, 2010, http://www.senado.gob.mx/comisiones/LX/seguridadpublica/content/informe_plan/docs/plan_trabajo.pdf, Pp. 10-11. 2 Mexico, Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional. Retrieved from the Internet on September 6, 2010, http://www.cisen.gob.mx/espanol/mecanismos_poder_leg_comision.htm 3 Auditoría Superior de la Federación.
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databases, keep custody of municipal detention centers, communicate and coordinate efforts with state police agencies, conduct surveillance of vehicles and pedestrians within the municipality and organize municipal police archives.4 The situation of the penitentiary centers is an acute security problem in all the states. Overcrowding and linkages between inmate groups and organized crime in these centers have compromised the control of the authorities to such an extent that sometimes inmates carry out crimes outside the prison with the help of the authorities. Recently, in July 2010, a group of inmates were allowed to leave the prison house to execute 17 people in Durango. The prison authorities did not only let the inmates abandon the prison; they also lent them their weapons and vehicles to commit the crime. The levels of penitentiary overcrowding in Mexico can be illustrated with data. Average national prison overcrowding was approximately 22% in 2009 and it is about 21% in 2010. The ten states with the most severe problem of prison overcrowding are Distrito Federal, Nayarit, Sonora, Estado de México, Jalisco, Morelos, Puebla, Chiapas, Guerrero and Tabasco. In these states, prison overcrowding in 2010 ranges between 40 and 110 percent. The states with the largest penitentiary sub-population are Zacatecas, Tlaxcala and Michoacán, where the population is 35 percent below its total accommodation capacity.
b. Budget
i. Federal Level
SEDENA receives the largest share of the security budget (around 39 percent), while SSP has experienced the largest budget increase in the last four years (from 22.2 percent of total security budget to 28.9 percent). It is worth mentioning that CISEN barely represents 1.9 percent of the total security budget. SEDENA and SSP received most of the total expenditure budget allocated to the security sector (almost 70 percent). It is also striking to see the low amount of resources allocated to the national intelligence agency (CISEN) in comparison to the other security agencies over the 2007-2010 period. This is consistent with the federal strategic goal of developing a more professional and skilled federal police force. Finally, it is important to consider that total security expenditures ranged between 5.6 and 4.6 percent of federal budget from 2007 to 2010.
4 Mexico, Secretaría de Gobernación. Retrieved from Internet on September 6, 2010, http://www.inafed.gob.mx/wb/ELOCAL/ELOC_La_seguridad_publica_municipal
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Table 1. Budget Expenditure by Security Agency (in Millions of Pesos)
Agency 2007 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010* %
SEGOB 6,827.3 7.4 7,712.0 8.1 9,695.9 7.7 8,370.6 7.5
SEDENA 39,623.0 43.1 39,493.1 41.4 49,407.1 39.3 43,632.4 38.9
SEMAR 14,113.2 15.3 16,123.0 16.9 17,938.0 14.3 15,991.9 14.3
PGR 10,949.9 11.9 9,521.8 10.0 11,906.0 9.5 11,781.5 10.5
SSP 20,447.4 22.2 22,490.3 23.6 36,879.6 29.3 32,437.8 28.9
SEGOB* (CISEN) 1,292.7 1.4 1,351.6 1.4 2,615.2 2.1 2,140.6 1.9
Total 91,960.8 100 95,340.2 100 125,826.5 100 112,214.2 100
Total as percentage of total federal government expenditures
5.6% 4.0% 4.7% 4.6%
*Allocated budget. Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación and Cuenta de la Hacienda Pública Federal, 2007, 2008, 2009. A GDP deflator, based on the first quarter of each year, was used to calculate the budget amount at constant prices (2010 chained pesos). Note: In 2007 the total exercised budget was 1,634,181.6 million pesos, in 2008 it was 2,371,510.7 million pesos, and in 2009 it was 2,703,128.5 million pesos. The total Federal Budget Expenditure in 2010 was 2,425,552.7 million pesos.
All security agencies experienced a budget increase between 2008 and 2009 (in the cases of SSP and CISEN the increase was 64 and 93.5 percent, respectively). However, during 2010 all agencies experience a budget decrease between 1.0 and 18.1 percent mainly due to the global economic crisis. The two agencies that were least affected by these budget cuts were SEMAR and PGR, which suggests that these two agencies are top priorities for the current administration.
Table 2. Annual Budget Variation by Security Agency
Agency 2008 2009 2010*
SEGOB 13.0 25.7 -13.7
SEDENA -0.3 25.1 -11.7
SEMAR 14.2 11.3 -10.8
PGR -13.0 25.0 -1.0
SSP 10.0 64.0 -12.0
SEGOB* (CISEN) 4.6 93.5 -18.1
Total 3.7 32.0 -10.8
*Assigned budget
Tables 3, 4 and 5 in Appendix I show the differences between assigned resources and spent resources by each agency of the security sector in 2007, 2008 and 2009. In sum, in 2007 occurred an over-expenditure of the budget with an average of 11.5 percent. It can be noted that SSP spent 29 percent more than its assigned budget for 2007. In 2008, SEMAR is the agency that spent more (13.2 percent more in relation to the assigned budget), while PGR spent 3.8 less of its assigned resources. Finally, for 2009, in average, there is no under-expenditure in public security. Nevertheless, SEGOB and PGR have spent less, with an 8 and 12 percent respectively.
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ii. State Level
As shown on Table 2 of Appendix I, the state5 with the largest expenditure on security and law enforcement in the country is D.F. Its expenditure on security and law enforcement takes up the largest share of its total budget (12.9 percent). The second state that spends most on security (as a percentage of its total budget) is Baja California, with 7.9. A remarkable fact is that D.F. spends 27 percent of the total security budget allocated to all states. As shown on Figure 1, state level security spending is not statistically significant nor exist a strong correlation associated with state levels of crime and violence. Note that there is no correlation between a high incidence of crime and violence (as displayed in Chihuahua, Baja California, Estado de México, Sinaloa, and Guerrero) and the proportion of the budget that each state allocates to security expenditure. D. F. is by far the state with the largest per capita security and law enforcement budget and it is not the state with the highest incidence of violence and crime. This may be a result of both the population density and that it is the country capital and seat of the federal government, and as such it needs to invest more in security and law enforcement due to the highest risks it faces.
Figure 1. Per Capita Budget on Security and Law Enforcement vis-à-vis the Criminal Incidence and Violence Index (2009-2010)
Source: Presupuestos de Egresos Estatales, 2010. Índice de Incidencia Delictiva y Violencia 2009, CIDAC. http://www.cidac.org/es/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1000087
The Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Pública (FASP) is a federal fund to transfer resources to each state's public security budgets. These resources are intended for recruitment, training, evaluation of
5 As stated in Article 44 of the Mexican Constitution, the Federal District is the seat of the Powers of the Union and capital of Mexico.
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public security human resources, police equipment, establishment of the national telecommunications network, and the national emergency line. These resources are allocated using the following criteria: number of inhabitants (35%), crime rates (10%), prison occupancy rate (20%), progress in implementing the National Program of Public Security (10%), agreed national projects in progress (20%), application of FOSEG6 resources in programs and/or preventive actions (4%), and resources spent by municipalities on public security programs and/or actions (1%).
During 2009 (January to September) a total of 6337.3 million pesos were allocated to states through FASP, an average of 198 million dollars per state. The three entities that received the greatest proportion of resources were Estado de México (495.1 million pesos), Distrito Federal (390.5 million) and Veracruz (299.5 million). The states that received the fewest resources were Colima (94.8 million), Aguascalientes (97 million) and Campeche (97 million). However, these funds registered high under-expenditure levels. In 2009, for example, only 38.7% of the FASP was spent. Between January and September 2009, the states with the highest levels of money spent were Baja California (78.7%), Colima (76.2%) and San Luis Potosi (75.5%). The states with the lowest expenditure levels were Jalisco (8.6%), Quintana Roo (10.6%) and Guanajuato (11.3%).
According to information contained in the quarterly reports submitted to the SHCP7, the main reasons why the funds are not exercised in full are the following: (a) delays on both the presentation and the approval of the Technical Annexes of the agreements of coordination by the Executive Secretary of the National Public Security System; (b) delays in issuing guidelines for spending the resources; (c) the lack of timely administration of budgeted resources by SHCP; (d) a prolonged bidding process for procurement contracts, leases and services; and (e) a long and complicated process to analyze and determine the programs and goals that will be carried out. SUBSEMUN (Subsidio para la Seguridad Pública Municipal) is a group of federal resources transferred to the states, which in turn must be transferred to previously chosen municipalities. The aim of these transfers is to advance in the New Police Model by means of professionalization, equipment and infrastructure. The criteria for their allocation are the following: a) that during the previous year the municipality was incorporated in SUBSEMUN; b) to have a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants; c) to be geographically located in the state border; d) to be part of a conurbation (two or more localities from different municipalities with a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants). The states with the largest amount of resources transferred by concept of SUBSEMUN are D.F. (338.6 million pesos), Estado de México (338.6 million pesos) and Baja California (275 million pesos). The states with the fewest received resources are Baja California Sur, Campeche, Tlaxcala and Zacatecas, which received 30 million pesos each.
6 Fondos de Seguridad Pública, in which are summed together FASP resources and others from state contributions. 7 “Formato Único” annexes to each of the quarterly reports published online by SHCP. http://www.shcp.gob.mx/FINANZASPUBLICAS/Paginas/InformeTrimestral_2.aspx
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c. Military and Police Forces
i. Military Forces As can be seen in Figure 2, SEDENA personnel registered a gradual increase since 1991, from circa 150,000 soldiers to 200,000 soldiers in 2009. The increase in the number of soldiers means that, over a period of 20 years, the number of SEDENA available soldiers grew by 35 percent. In contrast with the ascending trend in SEDENA personnel, over the last 20 years the number of SEMAR personnel remained relatively stable.
According with the Third Government Report of President Calderón, SEDENA elements have get better job benefits than previous years. For example, in 2009 their benefits were 55.9 percent higher than in 2006; they received 7,234 house loans; working hours were more flexible; and finally, the elements received specialized training equivalent to more than 15 days. All these have decreased desertion by 39.98 percent compared to 2008. On the other hand, SEMAR has only promoted members and increased technical training by $1,000 pesos a month to class and marine rankings.
Figure 2. Number of Military Personnel
Source: Data from Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are linearly projected based on monthly averages.
ii. Police Forces
In total, there are 2,122 independent police agencies in Mexico, with jurisdiction at the federal, state and municipal levels (see Table 3). Most policing services are provided at the state and local levels. Currently, Mexico has approximately 407,7088 federal, state and municipal police officers, but approximately 90 percent (361,133) are under the control of state and local authorities. The remaining 43,000 officers are under federal control. Of the universe of 2,440 municipalities in the country, 2,021 had a municipal police force (83 percent). This raises excessively the number of police agencies. At the time this survey was written, legislators were
8 This figure results from adding up the elements of federal police (46,575), state police (195,646) and local police (165,487).
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discussing a reform proposal that aims to fuse municipal police corps into a single state police force. Some analysts also defend the idea of a single national force that absorbs state and local agencies.
Table 3. Number of Police
Agencies by Government Level
Government Level Number of
Police Agencies
Federal Preventive, PGR (Judiciary), Migration
3
State
Preventive 32
Judiciary 32
Transit 11
Bank, Commercial, Auxiliary 13
Touristic, Rural, Others 10
Municipal 2,021
Total 2,122
Source: Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, 2009. Information Request No. 2210300015709.
(a) Federal Police The Federal Police structure includes personnel from three agencies: the SSP, PGR, and the National Migration Institute (INM)9. In the case of SSP, there was a significant personnel increase of its preventive police during the 2007-2009 period, when it doubled. INM personnel also increased, while the PGR personnel was reduced. There has also been a significant increase in the number of federal police personnel over the 2009-2010 period (more than 10 percent in the case of preventive police officers). The number of migration police officers has shown a notable increase too (24 percent). In contrast, ministerial police officers shrank by 20 percent. This reduction could be due to the fact that the new Ley de la Policía Federal gives investigative power to the preventive police.
9 The INM is a decentralized agency of SEGOB.
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Table 4. Federal Police Personnel Variation (2007 and 2009)
Federal Police Agencies
SSP
2007 2009 Percentage
Variation 2010
Percentage Variation
Preventive Police 15,464 32,276 108.7 35,712 10.6
Jail Guards 1,301 1,670 28.4 2,055 23.1
Total 16,765 33,946 102.5 37,767 11.3
PGR
Ministerial Police 5,900 4,347 -26.3 3,472 -20.1
Total 5,900 4,347 -26.3 3,472 -20.1
INM
Preventive Police 2,832 4,298 51.8 5,336 24.2
Total 2,832 4,298 51.8 5,336 24.2
Source: Own elaboration with information from SNSP-CON, 2007, 2009 and 2010.
(b) State and Local Police
Article 21 of the Federal Constitution mandates that public security is a shared responsibility among the federal, state and municipal authorities. Nevertheless, due to low wages, lack of professionalization, and inadequate recruiting processes, corruption is a widespread phenomenon especially among local police officers.
The laws and programs related to public security implemented by Presidents Zedillo and Fox underlined the importance of cooperation and collaboration among the three levels of government. Under President Calderón, the issue of interagency coordination was again included, but it has not been achieved. When he started its campaign against organized crime, President Calderón‟s government found local police deeply infiltrated by organized crime.
Figure 3 shows that there seems to be no strong correlation between the number of municipal and state police officers, and criminal and violence incidence.
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Figure 3. State and Municipal Police Officers per 10,000 Inhabitants and Criminal Incidence and Violence (2009)
Lack of cooperation and coordination among the three levels of government is the major weakness of the current Mexican struggle against drug trafficking organizations. States and municipalities do not collaborate with the Federal Government. The reasons behind this situation might be the following: 1) current legislation indicates that organized crime related felonies are under federal competence; thus state and municipal governments shy away from getting involved in these type of incidents; 2) state and municipal authorities (especially municipal police corps) are highly infiltrated by organized crime; and 3) the federal authorities frequently deploy operatives against organized crime in different states without previous consultation with local authorities, bringing about frictions among levels of government. Sometimes these interventions by the federal government trigger waves of violence. The lack of involvement in the federal strategy against organized crime on the side of state and local police agencies is in part a byproduct of assigned legal jurisdictions, which depend on the type of the crime. This typology distinguishes crimes on “common” or “federal” jurisdictions. “Common” jurisdiction felonies (delitos del fuero común) are those whose effect falls on the affected person because of the behavior of the criminal (for example, threats, property damage, sexual offenses, frauds, homicides, house robbery, vehicle theft). These crimes are prosecuted by the Common Jurisdiction Public Attorney, investigated by justice attorneys and judged by the Judiciary branch of each state. “Federal” jurisdiction felonies (delitos del fuero federal) are those that affect the health, economy and security of the country or the interests of the federation (for example, attacks to transport or communication routes, smuggling, fiscal fraud, ecological crimes, drug trafficking, illegal possession of weapons, copyright violations, money laundering, human trafficking, electoral crimes, etc). These crimes are prosecuted by the
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Federal Public Attorney, investigated by the General Attorney and judged by the Federal Judiciary branch.10 The lack of state and local police collaboration and involvement in the strategy against organized crime is patent when we observe the evolution of the number of police officers in each state over the last few years. For example, as shown in Table 5, Chihuahua (the most violent state in the country) did not increase its number of police officers between 2007 and 2010. In fact, during this period the number of police officers in this state decreased 3.3 percent. Something similar happened in Guerrero, Michoacán, Nuevo León, Baja California, Durango and Tamaulipas between 2007 and 2009. In all these states, where there is a high presence of organized crime, the efforts to strengthen police forces seem to be below the required level. Finally, it is important to point out the increase in the number of police forces between 2009 and 2010 in states such as Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo, Baja California, Guerrero, Nayarit, Zacatecas and Durango.
10 Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre Inseguridad, Retrieved from the Internet on Septmeber 6, 2010, http://www.icesi.org.mx/publicaciones/gacetas/federalismo_e_inseguridad.asp
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Table 5. State Police Officers Variation
State
State Police
2007 2009 Percentage
Variation 2010
Percentage Variation
Aguascalientes 469 491 4.7 524 6.7
Baja California 403 447 10.9 980 119.2
Baja California Sur 18 15 -16.7 258 1,620.0
Campeche 627 939 49.8 917 -2.3
Coahuila 606 732 20.8 712 -2.7
Colima 658 631 -4.1 705 11.7
Chiapas 4,501 4,501 0.0 4,438 -1.4
Chihuahua 1,217 1,217 0.0 1,177 -3.3
Distrito Federal 77,132 80,803 4.8 83,973 3.9
Durango 126 172 36.5 255 48.3
Guanajuato 870 1,187 36.4 1,333 12.3
Guerrero 2,395 2,395 0.0 5,140 114.6
Hidalgo 2,586 2,707 4.7 2,707 0.0
Jalisco 4,213 5,361 27.2 5,800 8.2
México 30,694 35,367 15.2 36,675 3.7
Michoacán 3,091 3,091 0.0 3,117 0.8
Morelos 1,597 1,623 1.6 1,738 7.1
Nayarit 185 185 0.0 346 87.0
Nuevo León 2,062 2,072 0.5 2,176 5.0
Oaxaca 5,750 6,009 4.5 6,009 0.0
Puebla 6,892 6,710 -2.6 6,712 0.0
Querétaro 775 720 -7.1 720 0.0
Quintana Roo 945 299 -68.4 1,060 254.5
San Luis Potosí 3,759 3,882 3.3 3,882 0.0
Sinaloa 396 1,303 229.0 1,303 0.0
Sonora 261 719 175.5 417 -42.0
Tabasco 2,975 5,008 68.3 3,862 -22.9 Tamaulipas 1,192 1,464 22.8 1,428 -2.5
Tlaxcala 2,067 1,711 -17.2 1,954 14.2
Veracruz 10,437 11,826 13.3 11,651 -1.5
Yucatán 2,525 3,075 21.8 3,075 0.0
Zacatecas 295 400 35.6 602 50.5
Total 171,719 187,062 8.9 195,646 4.6
Average 5,366 5,846 8.9 6,114 4.6
Source: Own elaboration with information from SNSP-CON, 2007, 2009 and 2010.
In contrast with the increase of 4.6 percent in the state police corps between 2009 and 2010, municipal police forces increased, on average, 3.8 percent. The only state that notably increased its number of municipal police officers was Chihuahua (the most violent state in the country) with a 61.9 percent increase. According to the Federal Public Security Secretary, organized crime spends 1,270 million pesos each year in municipal police bribery, equivalent to a monthly payment of 7,967 pesos to each municipal police officer.11 This represents a 155 percent increase in relation to the monthly average salary of a municipal police officer in 2009.
11 Reforma, “Completa Narco Sueldo de Policías”, Sección Justicia, Retrieved from the Internet on August 6, 2010, http://www.reforma.com/nacional/articulo/569/1136782/
13
Table 6. Municipal Police Officers Variation
State
Municipal Police
2007 2009 Percentage
Variation 2010
Percentage Variation
Aguascalientes 2,111 2,141 1.4 2,244 4.8
Baja California 6,697 6,528 -2.5 6,371 -2.4
Baja California Sur 1,837 2,005 9.1 2,387 19.1
Campeche 957 920 -3.9 869 -5.5
Coahuila 3,528 3,973 12.6 3,664 -7.8
Colima 1,186 1,126 -5.1 1,330 18.1
Chiapas 5,956 7,187 20.7 7,187 0.0
Chihuahua 4,603 4,482 -2.6 7,258 61.9
Distrito Federal * *
Durango 2,336 2,678 14.6 2,693 0.6
Guanajuato 8,061 8,848 9.8 9,198 4.0
Guerrero 6,885 6,885 0.0 7,838 13.8
Hidalgo 3,448 3,499 1.5 3,499 0.0
Jalisco 12,278 13,505 10.0 13,622 0.9
México 18,875 22,650 20.0 23,156 2.2
Michoacán 5,203 5,203 0.0 6,113 17.5
Morelos 3,546 3,578 0.9 3,651 2.0
Nayarit 1,691 1,691 0.0 1,865 10.3
Nuevo León 6,395 8,055 26.0 7,897 -2.0
Oaxaca 4,299 4,688 9.0 4,688 0.0
Puebla 6,208 6,460 4.1 6,460 0.0
Querétaro 1,922 2,357 22.6 2,357 0.0
Quintana Roo 3,146 3,528 12.1 3,528 0.0
San Luis Potosí 3,037 3,240 6.7 3,230 -0.3
Sinaloa 6,008 6,144 2.3 6,144 0.0
Sonora 4,637 4,777 3.0 4,912 2.8
Tabasco 3,819 4,172 9.2 4,265 2.2
Tamaulipas 5,384 5,777 7.3 5,617 -2.8
Tlaxcala 1,540 1,700 10.4 1,829 7.6
Veracruz 7,748 5,913 -23.7 5,913 0.0
Yucatán 1,329 3,465 160.7 3,465 0.0
Zacatecas 2,115 2,237 5.8 2,237 0.0
Total 146,785 159,412 8.6 165,487 3.8
Average 4,735 5,142 8.6 5,338 3.8
Source: Own elaboration with information from SNSP-CON, 2007, 2009 and 2010. The next figure shows that the states which have a number of police officers (per 1,000 inhabitants) above the UN recommended average are D.F. (with an excessive figure of 9.5 police officers per 1,000 inhabitants), Baja California Sur, Guerrero, Estado de México, Tabasco, Quintana Roo, Yucatán, Colima, Tlaxcala, Morelos, Oaxaca, San Luis Potosí and Sinaloa (that is 13 out of 32). States with a high organized crime presence such as Coahuila, Durango, Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Baja California, Michoacán and Chihuahua are below the UN recommended average.
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Despite the fact D.F. has almost the double of population than Nuevo León (96.5 percent more), the number of police officers per 1,000 inhabitants in D.F is far superior because it employs 83,973 officers, compared to 2,176 officers employed in Nuevo León.
Figure 4. Number of Police Officers in the Mexican States and the Minimum Number of Police Officers Recommended by the United Nations Per 1,000 Persons (2010)
Source: Own elaboration with information from SNSP-CON, 2007, 2009 and 2010. Population: CONAPO 2005-2050 projection.
d. Regulatory Framework
Out of the most relevant eleven federal legislative pieces that relate to security and organized crime, four have been approved during the current presidential term (see the topics of Appendix I Section d). These laws regulate the intergovernmental public security system, the federal police law, the domain extinction law, and the new PGR organic law. The laws are the following:
1. Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República (General Attorney Organic Law): This law aims to organize the General Attorney‟s Office.
2. Ley de la Policía Federal 2009 (Federal Police Law): This law regulates the organization and operation of the Federal Police in its respective area of competence.
3. Ley Federal de Extinción de Dominio 2009 (Federal Law on Domain Extinction): This law regulates forfeiture of property by the State.
4. Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública 2009 (General Law of the National Public Security System): This law regulates the integration, organization and operation of the National Public Security System.
To a certain extent, at the state level, public security efforts have been expressed through public security laws, public programs, and other kinds of regulations. In this regard, all states have their own Public
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Security Law; fourteen states (out of 32) have a Public Security Program, and only six states have regulations on police professionalization. States with a high criminal incidence like Baja California, Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero, Michoacán, Nuevo León and Sinaloa, do not have a public security program or regulations over police professionalization. Also, during the current administration have been reformed two constitutional articles in relation to public and security (see Appendix I Section d). These articles are the following:
1. Article 21 of the Mexican Constitution (2008): Before the reform, this article gave the sole
responsibility over criminal investigations to the public prosecutor, it did not state any principles over which police actions shall be carried out, or provided a description of public security and the principles that govern the actions of the respective agencies. The reform of the Article 21 covered three dimensions: judiciary procedures, police professionalization and public security.
2. Article 29 of the Mexican Constitution (2007): Article 29 states the procedure to suspend civil guarantees in the whole country or in a determined place. This article was reformed in 2007. Before the reform, the article said that in case of “invasion or a grave disruption of public peace that puts the society in danger or conflict” (Art. 29, paragraph 1), the President, in accordance with the state ministers, administrative departments, PGR and with the approval of Congress, can suspend guarantees in the whole country or in certain parts.
e. Security Policy (2007-2010)
Security policy objectives
1. Disruption of criminal organizations (short term) 2. Recovery of public spaces (short term) 3. Institutional strengthening (long term) 4. Decrease drug consumption (long term)
Policy achievements
1. In relation with the first objective, the government has implemented an active strategy. However, high-level organized crime arrests have provoked, in some cases, divisions within the cartels and with this the emergence of new organizations. These divisions and the retaliatory actions of organized crime against the government have caused an abrupt increase of violence.
2. Regarding the second objective, the fragmentation of criminal organizations has led to their geographic dispersion throughout the national territory, which has impeded the recovery of public spaces. Now, criminal organizations maintain a stable presence in more municipalities than they used to have back in 2006.
3. Regarding institutional strengthening, the federal government has moved ahead with the following actions:
Creation of a new federal police with rigorous professional standards and investigative powers.
Strengthening of the Attorney General‟s Office. Two kinds of actions have been intensified: professionalization of public attorneys and the detention of networks of public officials linked to organized crime groups.
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Consolidation of the criminal database Plataforma Mexico in order to implement the Sistema Único de Información Criminal (Single System of Criminal Information), which centralizes information shared by federal, state and municipal governments.
Strengthening of the Armed Forces. Considerable increase in the armed forces budget, which has had two main effects: important improvements in personnel wages (especially in low ranking officers) and improvement in equipment and operative capacity.
Reform of the criminal justice system. The penal justice system has adopted oral trials, become more simplified and transparent, as well as a regime of victims‟ rights protection.
In terms of public opinion, the government has recently made some changes that should improve its communications efforts and capacity to manage information. Calderón recently appointed Alejandro Poiré as Technical Secretary of the National Security Council and spokesperson. Till now there was no federal government spokesperson for public security issues, so Poiré‟s appointment could solve the issues in communicating the federal strategy to the public
The government has recently made significant strides in setting up the means for going after the financial side of cartel activities, including efforts to limit and monitor cash deposits, money exchanges, and cash purchases, as well as legislation to help the government tackle money laundering.
4. Finally, regarding drug consumption levels, the most recent national addictions surveys from 2002 and 2008 reveal an important increase in cocaine consumption patterns (which grew by 100 percent during this period). In the case of marijuana, the increase in the level of consumption was 20 percent. This shows that despite the preventive efforts of the government, drug consumption is on an ascending trend. However, the number of Mexican citizens that consume drugs is still very small in comparative terms.
High-Profile Arrests
1. Compared with previous administrations, the current government has been especially efficient in arresting or killing criminal bosses.
2. During the first four years of the current administration the number of bosses arrested (18) has dramatically increased in relation to previous administrations. They are the following: four from the Sinaloa Cartel (Sandra Ávila Beltrán, Jesús Zambada García, Vicente Zambada Niebla and Ignacio Coronel); six from the Beltrán Leyva Cartel (Alfredo Beltrán Leyva, Ever Villafañe Martínez, Carlos Beltrán Leyva, Gerardo Álvarez Vázquez ,Édgar Valdez Villareal and Enrique Villareal Barragán); three from the Tijuana Cartel (Eduardo Arellano Félix, Teodoro García Simental and Manuel García Simental); one from the Zetas Cartel (Jaime González Durán); three from La Familia Michoacana Cartel (Alberto Espinoza Barrón, Rafael Cedeño Hernández and Arnoldo Rueda Medina); and one from the Juárez Cartel (Vicente Carrillo Leyva).
3. Current governmental actions against organized crime have also resulted in the death of some important cartel bosses. This has been the case with the deaths of Arturo Beltrán Leyva in December 16, 2009, boss of the Beltrán Leyva cartel, and Ignacio Coronel Villareal in July 29, 2010, boss of the Sinaloa cartel.
2. The Logic of Mexican Organized Crime
According to new institutional economic literature, criminal organizations are companies that provide illicit goods and services for which there is a high demand. Two essential features allow these companies to operate successfully: the exercise of violence and the exercise of bribery. The first allows them to maintain
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internal discipline, resolve disputes, prevent the entry of competitors, monitor their territory, and respond to military or police harassment. The ability to corrupt, in turn, decreases or neutralizes the government's action against the organization, which reduces the incentives of its members to defect and strengthens internal cohesion.12
Once the criminal organization has a monopoly of violence in a given territory (a few blocks or a neighborhood), its aspiration is to exercise quasi-governmental functions such as charging taxes (extortion) and selling protection. So far, in several Mexican municipalities no organization has successfully imposed itself over the others, hence the ongoing violence between drug cartels. Number of Cartels, Internal Structure, and Modus Operandi. Within the Mexican illegal drug market two types of organizations coexist: i) the large cartels that have the capacity to coordinate at the national and international levels and which are involved mainly in illegal drugs exports to the United States; and ii) the smaller organizations that compete locally for drug distribution and selling. The largest criminal organizations have achieved a high level of vertical integration, which gives them a high degree of coordination.13 In general, the larger criminal organizations strive to achieve some of the next features: a centralized and hierarchical structure that maintains internal cohesion and reduces infiltration risks; controlling monopoly prices to save resources by avoiding competition; increasing their corrupting capacity; and, finally, obtaining access to the international financial markets.14 Typically, cartels have a hierarchical structure of five levels: the first is the “bosses” level; in the second level are the specialized operators such as lawyers and accountants; in the next level are the lieutenants and military leaders, known as logistics operators; the gunmen are located in the fourth level; and the lowest level is the operative base, composed by drug dealers, drivers and drug smugglers. Kinship and cronyism are important foundations for authority and legitimacy within the organization. Based on these criteria, the cartels are able to maintain high, though vulnerable, levels of cohesion and internal solidarity. Geographical Location. Zetas, Sinaloa, and Golfo are the three cartels with the most extended presence, in 19, 16 and 9 states, respectively. In six states there is only one established drug cartel: Campeche (Golfo), Distrito Federal (La Barbie), Hidalgo (Zetas), Tabasco (Zetas) and Zacatecas (Zetas). The presence of just one cartel is relevant because territorial struggles between two or more cartels leads to higher levels of violence. In the absence of competition, the average number of executions per state is 37 per year; on the contrary, in a contested territory the number of executions increases to 378 per year.15 Tlaxcala is the only state without record of stable drug cartel presence.
12 Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman, “Introduction”, in The Economics of Organized Crime, New York: Cambridge University Press. 13 Vertically integrated companies are united through a hierarchy and share a common leader. The members of this hierarchy combine different tasks to accomplish a common goal: to generate economies of scale in each company, and synergies within the corporation to increase profits. Oil companies, for example, have a high level of vertical integration as they have under their control such diverse tasks such as exploration, drilling, production, transportation, refining, marketing and sales. 14 Fiorentini and Peltzman, Op. Cit., pp. 5-6. 15 This figure resulted from a MCO regression with a dummy variable. The figure is not significant at a 10 per cent level, which may be due to the size of the sample (it only considers data from 2009), however it still shows an existing correlation.
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Table 7. Cartel Presence per State (As of August 2010)16
State ZET SIN OTH GOL LB LF MIL PS JUA DZP TIJ
Aguascalientes X X X
Baja California X X
Baja California Sur
X
Campeche X
Coahuila X X X
Colima X X
Chiapas X X X X X
Chihuahua X X X
Distrito Federal X
Durango X X
Guanajuato X X X X
Guerrero X X X X
Hidalgo X
Jalisco X X X X
México X X X X X
Michoacán X X
Morelos X X X X
Nayarit X X X
Nuevo León X X
Oaxaca X X X
Puebla X X X
Querétaro X X
Quintana Roo X X X
San Luis Potosí X X
Sinaloa X X
Sonora X X
Tabasco X
Tamaulipas X X X
Tlaxcala
Veracruz X X
Yucatán X X
Zacatecas X
Total 19 16 11 9 5 5 4 4 3 1 1
16 Cartel Key: ZET: Zetas, SIN: Sinaloa, OTH: Others, GOL: Golfo, LB: La Barbie, LF: La Familia, MIL: Milenio, PS: Pacífico Sur, JUA: Juárez, DZP: Díaz Parada, and TIJ: Tijuana.
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Over the last four years there has been an increase in the number of Mexican cartels. In 2007 there were seven large cartels: Sinaloa, Golfo-Zetas, Tijuana, Juárez, La Familia Michoacana, Milenio and Díaz Parada. By 2010, three new organizations appeared. First appeared the Zetas, originally Golfo hitmen. This group is present in 19 states, and is considered to be the most aggressive and dangerous. Secondly, we have La Barbie Cartel and, thirdly, the Pacífico Sur Cartel. These last two appeared as a result of a split within the Beltrán Leyva cartel after the death of its leader, Arturo Beltrán Leyva. However, La Barbie was arrested on August 30, 2010, so its small organization is at risk of disappearing. Between 2007 and 2010, the number of intercartel conflicts has grown from four to eight. Yet, as the number of conflicts between cartels has increased so has the number of alliances among them. Each cartel is continually looking for ways to geographically expand its presence and control new points of entry/exit and transport routes. This leads to local alliances among cartels as a way to ensure safe passage through certain areas or to counterbalance rival cartels. In 2007 there were three cartel alliances (Sinaloa and Juárez; Golfo and Zetas; and Sinaloa and Milenio); in 2010 there are six (Sinaloa and a faction of Tijuana; Zetas and a Beltrán Leyva faction; Juárez and Zetas; Sinaloa, Milenio and La Familia; Golfo, Sinaloa and La Familia; and Zetas and Juárez). The Sinaloa and Zetas cartels are the most active alliance-seeking cartels. From April 2008 to December 2009 the geographical location of criminal organizations radically changed. This was, in part, a consequence of the Beltrán Leyva cartel split from the Sinaloa cartel. The Beltrán Leyva organization (which rapidly became a cartel itself), made alliances in nine states with the Tijuana, Juárez, and Zetas cartels to remove the Sinaloa cartel from strategic places for drug trafficking. The ensuing confrontation between the Beltrán Leyva Cartel (and its allies) against the Sinaloa Cartel drastically increased the levels of violence in the municipalities where the confrontations took place. The death of the Beltrán Leyva cartel leader (Arturo Beltrán Leyva) in December 2009 divided the organization. Interestingly, the drastic increase of violence between April 2008 and December 2008, and between December 2009 and May 2010 have their immediate causes on federal government action aimed at arresting Alfredo Beltrán Leyva in March 2008, and Arturo Beltrán Leyva (who died in the confrontation) in December 2009. The Beltrán Leyva Cartel allied itself with three cartels (Tijuana, Zetas and Juárez) to extend its presence in nine states. The Beltrán Leyva cartel saw the alliance alternative as a practical way to gain entrance to new markets and counterbalance rival organizations with a strong presence in those states. Cartel Presence in Central America and the Southern Border More than 200 gangs, with some 3,000 members, operate in the Mexican southern border states and Central America. They control illegal traffic of people, drugs and weapons from Central America to Mexico and the United States.17 Some of these gangs have established close connections with drug cartels, assisting them in drugs and weapons traffic along the border. For example, Zetas are settling in Guatemala, establishing training camps and recruiting former Kaibiles (Guatemalan elite soldiers).18
17 USAID, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, April 2006, p. 6. 18 El Universal, “Presumen que Zetas y Kaibiles Entrenan Juntos,” March 30, 2008, retrieved from the Internet in July 12, 2010: http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/494002.html
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Table 8. Cartels in the Southern Border States
State Cartel
Chiapas
Zetas Golfo
Sinaloa Milenio
Quintana Roo
Zetas Sinaloa Golfo
Campeche Golfo
Tabasco Zetas
In January 2009 the Chief of the Colombian National Police informed that the “gravity center” of the Latin American drug trafficking industry was in Mexico and that Colombian cartels only performed a subordinated role in it.19 Now Colombian drug cartels are partners to their Mexican counterparts; they are mainly drug producers and do not control transport routes and distribution networks in the U.S., at least not to the same extent as Mexican drug cartels.20 Proof of this relationship was the detention in Mexico in July 2008 of Ever Villafañe Martínez, considered one of the seven most important Colombian cartels bosses. Villafañe, boss of the Colombian Norte del Valle Cartel, was Arturo Beltrán Leyva‟s partner in a cocaine production and distribution network that started in Colombia, passed through Mexico and concluded in the U.S. In this relationship the Colombians were just drug providers; the Mexicans bestowed transportation routes and distribution networks into every major American city. The 2009 Latinobarómetro21 notes that the citizens of Central America have not rejected the idea of a military government, and many feel a coup d’état would be acceptable in circumstances of state corruption or where crime has been allowed to get out of control. The perception that crime is out of control often leads to the perception that the police are incompetent, undermining public confidence in the government as a whole. Even worse, in many areas of this region, the police are viewed as actively contributing to the crime problem.
a. Cooperation Between Cartels and Gangs Mexican cartels are dynamic organizations with a high adaptation capacity to new conditions. The logic of the war waged by the government against drug cartels and other criminal organizations, together with the business logic of expanding markets and rising profits, have pushed the cartels to take decisive steps towards their professionalization. One of these steps is the practice of outsourcing specialized services provided by the gangs, with which the cartels have established a relationship of mutual convenience. Gangs offer various services to the cartels in the areas of drug enforcement, freight transport, distribution and sale. Together with the cartels, gangs are also actively forayed into kidnapping, extortion, human trafficking, money laundering, vehicle theft, and weapons traffic, which are typical organized crime activities.
19 El Universal, “México, Centro de Gravedad del Narco: Colombia,” January 25, 2009, retrieved from the Intenet on August 31, 2010: http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/571796.html 20 National Drug Intelligence Center, 2010. National Drug Threat Assessment, Washington: U.S Department of Justice, p. 9. 21
Latinobarómetro 2009, Retrieved form Internet on September 10, 2010 http://www.latinobarometro.org/
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There are at least five factors for which cartels hire gangs and the services they can provide:
1. The first factor is risk reduction and protection for the cartels. When they operate with semi-autonomous cells, the leaders of the cartels reduce the probability of infiltration by government agents or other criminal groups. Also, when gang members are arrested by the authorities or recruited by rival cartels, they cannot provide information about the modus operandi of the cartel because they simply do not have it: they have worked for the cartel but outside of it.
2. A second factor is related with the logistical, informational and operational advantages. The gangs are located in various parts of the country and each one knows in detail the space they inhabit. Cartel-gang collaboration allows them to carry out their activities swiftly, and it also increases information flows between the leaders and its various cells across the country. In addition, outsourcing increases versatility and specialization within the cartel.
3. A third factor is the effective exercise of violence. The gangs‟ ability to display gang violence throughout the country (especially in border areas in the north and south), is increasingly being employed by the cartels. The ability to inflict high degrees of violence, together with the capacity to bribe and corrupt, are essential assets for any organized crime organization.
4. The fourth factor is of economics nature: with gangs, cartels save resources. Outsourcing a gang to perform certain tasks is cheaper than maintaining a bloated bureaucracy of gunmen.
5. Finally, the fifth factor is gang members are often drug consumers, resulting in considerable sales and profits for the cartels.
Cooperation between gangs and cartels is maintained and assured in terms of mutual convenience. There are at least five reasons why the gangs would collaborate with the cartels.
1. The first reason is financial gain. The cartels have resources to pay for the gangs‟ services, to reward efficiency and loyalty, and to encourage future cooperation. In addition, they often give "concessions" to the gang to collect rents from retail drug dealers.
2. Second, by allying themselves with cartels, gangs ensure regular supplies of drugs (with discounts).
3. Third, the link between gangs and cartels protects the gangs from police interference, and also makes them immune to arrests or convictions.
4. Fourth, gang affiliation to a cartel creates a sense of solidarity between them and ensures their continuity.
5. Finally, with this alliance gangs receive recognition from a drug cartel, which in turn strengthen its group identity.
In Ciudad Juárez there are between 300 and 500 gangs, of which 30 have between 500 and 1,500 members. The largest gangs, like Barrio Azteca and Mexicles, exceed two thousand active members. These two gangs cooperate, respectively, with the Juarez and Sinaloa cartels. However, these are not the only two cartels that have developed networks with gangs in Juárez. Other large and aggressive gangs
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have links with the cartels of Tijuana, Golfo and Zetas.
According to reports from the U.S. Department of Justice, Barrio Azteca is a "transnational" gang that operates in both Mexican and American territory with a degree of sophistication rarely seen in groups of that nature. According to the U.S. authorities, Barrio Azteca‟s capacities are largely due to the financial and logistical support it received from the Juárez cartel. The degree of organization of Barrio Azteca is such that to avoid interception of their messages they have developed secret codes based on Náhuatl numerology and phrases. Another place where there has been an abrupt increase in the number of street gangs in Nuevo León, where 1,500 gangs exist, of which 700 are located in the Monterrey metropolitan area. Information from the local police indicates that 20 of these gangs are linked with the Zetas cartel. These gangs are smaller than the Juárez gangs and are low drug consumers. Given hostile police actions towards them, gang leaders induce their members to collaborate with drug cartels as a way to protect themselves from police harassment. Local police officers frequently extort gang members, and cartels punish the police officers who assault gang members.
In summary, youth gangs are becoming an important asset for Mexican cartels. With them, drug dealers‟ criminal activities have multiplied and become more efficient. Furthermore, gangs that operate with cartels have become more effective in avoiding and confronting law enforcement agencies. The overwhelming presence of gangs in several parts of the country provides almost unlimited human resources for the cartels. Hence, in order to disarticulate the gang-drug cartel link the Mexican government will have to deploy, alongside the military and police offensive, a comprehensive policy that combines social and security issues.
b. Other Organized Crime Businesses: Kidnapping, Extortion, Vehicle Thefts and Weapons Traffic
In absolute figures the states with the highest incidence of kidnappings are Chihuahua, Estado de México, Baja California, Michoacán and D.F. Regarding extortion, the states with the highest incidence are D.F. Estado de México, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Veracruz and Chiapas. Finally, the states with the highest incidence of vehicle theft are Estado de México, Baja California, D.F., Chihuahua and Nuevo León. These three are typical organized crime felonies. There is a strong and positive correlation between executions and kidnappings (0.75), vehicle thefts and kidnappings (0.77) and vehicle thefts and extortions (0.78). Interestingly, the correlation between execution and extortion is very low: 0.05. This shows that extortion is closely linked to intimidation activities against civilians that are threatened in several ways but who are not killed to obtain potential financial gains. As shown in organized crime theory, in the areas where extortion is prevalent the objective is not to generate violence, but to perform criminal activities. Finally, the correlation between kidnapping and extortion is 0.43. Weapons Traffic. Weapons smuggled through the Northwest border region have contributed to escalated violence in Mexico. According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Mexican cartel members or associates acquire thousands of weapons each year in Arizona, California and Texas and smuggle them across the border to Mexico.
23
One of the main reasons behind the increasing traffic of weapons has been the neglect of the U.S. authorities to contain the problem. In 2004, neither Congress nor the Executive ratified the Assault Weapons Ban, or any laws prohibiting the sale of high-powered weapons and other lethal weapons. Since then, weapons are sold almost without restriction in the United States. In the American Southern border states there are more than 7,000 gun shops.
To illustrate the extent of this problem, note that during the last three and a half years more than 76,000 weapons have been seized, of which more than half are assault rifles. Over 90 percent of these seized weapons were produced and sold in the U.S. In addition, the government has seized more than 5,400 grenades and more than 8 million cartridges. Most of the weapons seized by the Mexican government were bought in the border states of Texas, California and Arizona. Well-armed traffickers increasingly outgun Mexican authorities, and nearly all of the illegal guns seized in Mexico have been smuggled in from the United States. The weapons trade in many ways mirrors the dynamics of the drug market. Drugs flow north from Mexico to the United States, and guns flow south from the United States to Mexico. In 2004, it was estimated that there were 16.5 million illegal weapons in Mexico. ATF data show that 90-95 percent of the guns used in drug violence in Mexico enter illegally from the United States. Official numbers reveal that, between December 2000 and December 2005, Mexican customs officials were able to confiscate a mere 1,791 weapons: not even one per day. In 2007, the number of guns confiscated jumped to 9,000. In addition, in 2007, the ATF started Project Gunrunner, an effort to stop the smuggling of guns into Mexico. In 2005, ATF reported that more than 6,400 guns had been sent illegally into Mexico from the United States. By the end of September 2007, after Project Gunrunner had been implemented, that estimate had dropped to about 3,200.22
22 Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Benjamin Bahney and Kevin Jack Riley, 2009, Security in Mexico. Implications for U.S. Policy Options, Santa Monica: RAND, p. 37.
24
II. Organized Crime Violence
1. The Evolution of Violence
a. National Level What are the main patterns of Mexican violence? In general, it is a selective type of violence led by rival organizations and police and military authorities, driven by the chronic instability of criminal networks (to which the government has contributed significantly), and their goal to win and retain routes and territories for drug trafficking. Figure 5 shows a dramatic increase in the number of executions in Mexico over the last 44 months. In February 2007 there were approximately 100 executions per month; in August 2010 there were about 1,100. From January 2007 to June 2008 the number of executions oscillated between a 100 and 400 margin. However, in July 2008 the number of executions began to grow systematically until it reached its current figure. There are two violence cycles triggered by a cartel boss detention in January 2008, which caused the split of the Beltrán Leyva faction from the Sinaloa Cartel, and the death of Arturo Beltrán Leyva in December 2009. Cartel‟s boss detentions have increased the national levels of violence.
Figure 5. Number of Executions per Month at the National Level (Jan. 2007-Aug. 2010)
Source: Own elaboration with data retrieved from Reforma (2007-2009). Data for 2010 was collected from execution information from 19 national and regional newspapers. For 2007: Rolando Herrera, “Cimbra al país narcoviolencia”, Reforma, January 7, 2008, retrieved from Internet on August 11, 2010: http://busquedas.gruporeforma.com/reforma/Documentos/DocumentoImpresa_libre.aspx?ValoresForma=944688-1066,ejecutadospormes2007&md5libre=5ea8feb75f2d7d3041e9188d3ba5ab0d For 2008: “Ejecutómetro”, Reforma, retrieved from Internet on August 11, 2010: http://gruporeforma.reforma.com/graficoanimado/nacional/ejecutometro_2009/ For 2009: Benito Jiménez, “Superan ejecuciones la cifra de todo 2009”, Reforma, August 8, 2010, retrieved from Internet on August 11, 2010: http://busquedas.gruporeforma.com/reforma/Documentos/DocumentoImpresa_libre.aspx?ValoresForma=1204495-1066,ejecuciones2009&md5libre=3683c5148a45ffe5766715585a0f4237
25
Recently, the Mexican government has revealed some figures related to Mexican violence. According to the National Security Council Technical Secretary, from December 2006 to July 2010 there have been 28,353 organized crime related homicides. According to this version, 80 percent of the organized crime related violence was caused by seven conflicts among cartels. These conflicts are the following:
1. Cártel de Sinaloa versus Cártel de Juárez (Chihuahua, Durango and Sinaloa) 2. Cártel de Sinaloa versus Cártel de los Beltrán Leyva (Sinaloa, Sonora, Durango, Nayarit, Jalisco
and Guerrero) 3. Cártel de Sinaloa versus Cártel del Golfo (Durango, Coahuila, Sinaloa, Guerrero, Tabasco,
Quintana Roo and Chiapas) 4. Cártel de Sinaloa versus Cártel de Tijuana (Baja California) 5. Cártel de La Familia Michoacana versus Cártel de los Zetas (Michoacán, Estado de México,
Guerrero and Guanajuato) 6. Cártel del Golfo versus Cártel de los Zetas (Tamaulipas and Nuevo León) 7. Cártel de La Familia Michoacana versus Cártel de los Beltrán Leyva (Guerreo and Morelos)
Furthermore, according to the federal government, this 80 percent of the executions have taken place in 162 municipalities around the country. If the killings continue to increase at the current rate the total number of executions will rise to about 75,000 by the time the government's term in office ends in December 2012.
26
b. State and Local Level
Violence increased in 21 of Mexico's 32 states during the first half of 2010. In 12 states (which include the six northern border states of Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas) the growth of violence has been associated with increased collaboration between gangs and cartels.
Table 9. Violence Trends by Mexican State (Based on January-June 2010 Executions)
State Trend State Trend
Aguascalientes Morelos
Baja California Nayarit
BCS Nuevo León
Campeche Oaxaca
Coahuila Puebla
Colima Querétaro
Chiapas Quintana Roo
Chihuahua SLP
Distrito Federal Sinaloa
Durango Sonora
Guanajuato Tabasco
Guerrero Tamaulipas
Hidalgo Tlaxcala
Jalisco Veracruz
México Yucatán
Michoacán Zacatecas
Note: Trends calculated with a linear projection by the least squares method based on the known information.
In Ciudad Juárez, for example, located in Chihuahua, the largest and most violent gangs (such as Barrio Azteca or Mexicles, each with about 3,000 members) are employed by drug cartels to smuggle, import weapons, murder, extort and kidnap. Frequent police action against gangs is often the decisive factor that pushes them to co-operate with the cartels, which offer them protection, among other benefits.
But in Mexico there are other types of violence that are not associated with gangs, which have distinct dynamics. For example, in states such as Sinaloa, Michoacán and Durango violence is not linked to gangs, but to clashes between disciplined bureaucracies of gunmen engaged in transporting and guarding drug routes and territories.
Table 10 shows that the five most violent states in terms of executions between January 2007 and June 2010 were Chihuahua (5,708), Sinaloa (2,935), Guerrero (1,766), Michoacán (1,605), Durango (1,492) and Baja California (1,463). In nine states the number of executions decreased from 2008 to 2009, these states are: Aguascalientes (38-34), Baja California (617-320), Campeche (3-2), Estado de México (360-354), Hidalgo (37-36), Oaxaca (49-6), San Luis Potosí (40-7), Tamaulipas (110-49) and Yucatán (17-0). The national total grew from 5,207 in 2008 to 6,587 in 2009.
27
Table 10. Number of Executions by State
State 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* Total
Aguascalientes 2 27 38 34 11 112
Baja California 163 154 617 320 209 1,463
Baja California Sur 1 1 0 1 6 9
Campeche 3 2 3 2 6 16
Coahuila 17 29 53 151 188 438
Colima 2 0 5 12 20 39
Chiapas 14 12 30 30 34 120
Chihuahua 130 147 1,652 2,082 1,697 5,708
D.F. 137 145 138 173 72 665
Durango 64 124 272 637 395 1,492
Estado de México 31 111 360 354 251 1,107
Guanajuato 25 40 61 146 56 328
Guerrero 186 253 294 638 395 1,766
Hidalgo 16 37 37 36 8 134
Jalisco 45 92 148 212 160 657
Michoacán 543 238 233 371 220 1,605
Morelos 10 17 28 77 84 216
Nayarit 1 2 5 22 109 139
Nuevo León 50 107 79 99 217 552
Oaxaca 17 33 49 6 59 164
Puebla 4 2 15 26 19 66
Querétaro 0 4 7 14 6 31
Quintana Roo 9 34 18 27 26 114
San Luis Potosí 1 13 40 7 26 87
Sinaloa 350 346 686 767 786 2,935
Sonora 61 125 137 152 218 693
Tabasco 19 24 20 54 22 139
Tamaulipas 181 88 110 49 379 807
Tlaxcala 0 1 1 3 0 5
Veracruz 25 48 30 55 45 203
Yucatán 0 1 17 0 1 19
Zacatecas 12 13 24 30 7 86
Total 2,119 2,270 5,207 6,587 5,732 21,915
Source: Own elaboration with data from Reforma for 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, and 2010 from a database with data from 19 national and state newspapers. http://gruporeforma.reforma.com/graficoanimado/nacional/ejecutometro_2009/ Note: Data for 2010 is from January to June 2010
28
During the first semester of 2010 the most violent municipalities have been Juarez (17.5 percent of the executions), Chihuahua (4.7), Culiacán (4.5), Tijuana (3.3), Torreón (2.7), Gómez Palacio (2.3) and Mazatlán (2.3). At the local level, violence is concentrated in six clusters or high-violence zones. The following table enlists the municipalities that integrate each of these clusters and map 2 shows the clusters locations
Table 11. Six Clusters of Violent Municipalities (2007-2010) Zone 1 (Baja California)
Zone 2 (Chihuahua)
Zone 3 (Chihuahua)
Zone 4 (Sinaloa)
Zone 5 (Michoacán)
Zone 6 (Guerrero)
Ensenada Casas Grandes Chihuahua Ahome Morelia Zihuatanejo Tijuana Ascensión Cuauhtémoc San Ignacio Uruapan Petatlán Tecate Juárez Delicias Guasave Apatzingán Técpan Guadalupe Camargo Sinaloa La Huacana Acapulco Ahumada Hidalgo del Parral Salvador Alvarado Lázaro Cárdenas Chilpancingo Mocorito Iguala Navolato Arcelia Culiacán Pungarabato Badiraguato Coyuca
Source: Own ellaboration.
29
Map 1. Six Violent Municipalities Clusters (2007-2010)
30
At the local level, during 2010 the phenomenon of executed majors has intensified. As September 2010 nine mayors have been executed by organized crime (two from Chihuahua, two from Oaxaca, and one from Guerrero, Durango, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas and San Luis Potosí). (See Appendix III Table 18) Ciudad Juárez: Causes and Mechanisms of Violence Given the exceptional violence levels reached in Ciudad Juárez, maybe here it is possible to see more clearly the internal mechanisms that generate, amplify, escalate and spill over violence. Ciudad Juárez is, by far, the most violent municipality in the country. During the January 2007-June 2010 period around 4,500 executions have been registered in this municipality. In mid-2008 the number of executions in Ciudad Juárez increased till it accumulated 20 percent of national total of executions. This trend has sustained along 2009 and 2010. Probably, Ciudad Juárez will close the year with 2,861 executions; this is about 21 percent of the national projected total.23 How did violence arrive to Ciudad Juárez? Why it has increased exponentially? Along the process of violence in Ciudad Juárez can be distinguished the following groups of events:
1. Alfredo Beltrán Leyva arrest → Detachment of the Beltrán Leyva faction from the Sinaloa Cartel → Frame of a coalition of organizations (Beltrán Leyva-Zeta-Juárez) to displace the Sinaloa Cartel from the border passage in Ciudad Juárez-El Paso. This sequence of events had the effect of activating or "igniting" the conflict in Ciudad Juarez, so this is called the "igniting effect."
2. The conflicting cartels hired teams of hitmen to undertake and sustain the war → There was a massive recruitment of gang members by cartels → There was an alignment of gangs with the warring sides in Ciudad Juárez → The cartels provided weapons to the gangs. This sequence of events has the effect of "amplifying" the conflict, to swell the manpower and weaponry of each side; this is why it is named the "amplification effect."
3. Neither side have sufficient capacity to defeat the other → The authorities are not involved in direct confrontation to the sides in dispute → Security and law enforcement agencies are not able to investigate the vast majority of violent events and to enforce the law. There were a few random arrests. These events have the effect to "escalate" the conflict and the levels of violence, so it is categorized as the "escalation effect."
4. The exacerbation of violence encouraged the involvement of more criminal organizations and gangs in the dispute to strengthen the ranks of each party → The decapitation of such organizations and gangs often encouraged fragmentation → Territorial disputes provoked that some criminal organization and gangs move to other places. These events have the effect of "spreading" violence to other areas, thus increasing violence in new, towns or municipalities that is why it is referred to as "spillover effect".
23 Trends calculated with a linear projection by the least squares method based on the known information from a database retrieved from 19 national and local newspapers.
31
2. Causes of Violence Even though a systematic study about the causes of the increasing violence in Mexico has not been made, there are two promising hypotheses. According to the U.N. 2010 World Drug Report, one reason behind the violence in Mexico is that drug traffickers are fighting over a shrinking cocaine market. Indeed, cocaine consumption has fallen significantly in the United States over the past few years. The retail value of the U.S. cocaine market has declined by about two-thirds in the 1990s, and by about one quarter in the past decade. However, the U.N. 2010 World Drug Report does not elaborate on this idea and does not mention the specific mechanisms that have triggered Mexican violence. The second hypothesis has to do with the effects of arrests and seizures on executions. A detailed analysis of the data available reveals the following patterns of impact for detentions:
1. The impact of arrests on violence spreads to several months after they were performed. 2. The arrests of drug cartel bosses increase levels of violence, regardless of the cartel to which they
belong. 3. The arrests of cartel members operating for the Juárez, Tijuana and Beltrán Leyva cartels have
decreased violence (probably several of them were hitmen leaders). The same thing happened in 2009 with the arrests of members of the Golfo Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel members (although in the latter case, the violence took a month to drop).
4. However, in the case of arrests of members from La Familia Michoacana and Zetas detentions have increased levels of violence.
In the case of seizures: 1. The impact of seizures on violence can extend several months after the seizures event, and their
effect is also mixed: there are seizures that increase violence and others that decrease it. 2. Seizures of heroin, cocaine and marijuana have steadily increased the levels of violence in the past
three years. 3. The seizure of weapons and money systematically decreased violence.
This type of analysis could be useful in designing a new strategy that, in addition to weaken organized crime, avoids triggering uncontrollable waves of violence. But for such strategy to be viable two conditions are required: that the security agencies have the ability to implement a targeted strategy of arrests and seizures; and that the decrease, or at least the containment, of violence becomes the new additional objective of the government strategy. A focused strategy of arrests and seizures means favoring police actions that reduce violence, such as the arrest of hitmen leaders and multi-homicides and the seizures of weapons and money. It must also be designed a specific strategy to confront the most violent cartels such as Zetas or La Familia Michoacana. This is because these cartels‟ organization, and their operation and deployment tactics, make them a singular threat.24
24 Eduardo Guerrero, “Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico (2007-2009): Empirical Explorations.” Mexico, D.F.: Lantia Consultores, April 2010, 36 pp.
32
III. Government Strategy and Actions against Organized Crime
1. Strategy The main objective of the Mexican government with its “war on drugs” seems to be the generation of hundreds of small criminal organizations that do not represent (for their size) a threat to the state and its monopoly on the use of force (as in Colombia). This implies the replacement of current large cartels in extended parts of the country with a variety of small drug enterprises. Without denying that this goal could be achieved at some point, the fact is that given the size, number, resources, capacities (of violence, among others), and the social base that the Mexican cartels currently have, the transition could be long and costly in terms of social welfare and human lives. Moreover, in this hypothetical scenario the drug market would not be affected; quite on the contrary, there would be a more competitive market composed of businesses that, because of their small size and high mobility, would be more elusive to the authorities. President Calderón has deployed an estimated 40,000 troops since December 2006, launching his first military antidrug operation (Operación Michoacán) on December 11 of that year. Michoacán was particularly hard hit by violence in 2006: there were more than 560 murders and 17 beheadings, and six police officers were assassinated. This mixed operation involved 7,000 personnel, 5,300 of whom came from various forces, and included armored cars, aircraft and surface vessels. Also, in 2006, Mexico launched the Northern Border Initiative, a federal-state effort to fight violence that included the deployment of 800 federal police officers to Nuevo Laredo, who joined the 300 federal officers already deployed there under Operación México Seguro. According to President Calderon Third Government Report (2009), SEDENA has deployed a monthly average of 48,750 soldiers (24.1 percent of the total) that have participated in anti-drug operatives between September 1, 2008 and June 2009. Hence, from January 2008 to June 2008 and 2009 periods, SEMAR has deployed a monthly average of 7,324 navy elements (14.1 percent of the total for both years) in anti-drug traffic operatives. In sum, the total number of military elements deployed by both agencies is 56,074, which represents 22 percent of the total in 2008 and 2009.
2. Actions
a. Arrests The number of detainees in 2004 rose well above the national average registered between 1994 and 2003. During the first half of the current government, however, the number of detainees was similar to those from the last two years of the previous government. Thus it can be said that the number of detainees per year has been stable since 2004.
33
Figure 6. Detainees Related to Drug Trafficking Activities (1994-2009)
Source: Data from Informes de Gobierno from 1994 to 2008 (Government Reports). 2009 figures are lineally projected based on the same year‟s monthly average.
When we classify the number of detainees by hierarchical level, the distribution is quite uneven: 96 percent of detainees belong to the lowest two ranks of organized crime organizations, 0.2 percent of detainees are top members, and 3.8 percent are specialized or logistics operators.
Figure 7. Percentage of Detainees by Hierarchy Level
Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins
The following table shows that the current government has made great efforts to increase the number of detainees belonging to the three highest levels within criminal organizations. That is, although the total number of detainees linked to organized crime remains more or less the same since 2004, top-level arrests have increased year by year from 2007 to 2010 (as shown in Table 12 below). For example, Sinaloa, Golfo, Zetas, La Familia Michoacana and Beltrán Leyva suffered the highest number of boss detentions during 2009 in comparison with those suffered in the first two years of this government. It is quite likely that the increase in bosses‟ arrests is linked with the increase in conflicts and confrontations among criminal organizations and between criminal organizations and the government.
-
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Detainees Average
0.2% 2.0%
1.8%
40.8%
55.2%
Boss
Specialized Operator
Logistics Operator
Hitmen/Guardian
Operative Base
34
Table 12. Detainees by Cartel and Hierarchy Level
Cartel Hierarchical Level 2007 2008 2009 Total
Sinaloa/Pacífico
Bosses
2
9
1
12
1
23
2
Specialized Operator 1 8 9 18
Logistics Operator 1 2 3
Golfo
Bosses
10
9
19
1
38
1
Specialized Operator 2 3 10 15
Logistics Operator 8 6 8 22
Zetas
Bosses
3
10
16
3
29
3
Specialized Operator 6 6
Logistics Operator 3 10 7 20
Beltrán Leyva
Bosses
0
2
8
1
10
1
Specialized Operator 4 4
Logistics Operator 2 3 5
La Familia Michoacana
Bosses
0
1
12
3
13
3
Specialized Operator 3 3
Logistics Operator 1 6 7
Tijuana / Arellano Félix Bosses
4 1
0
0
4 1
Specialized Operator 3 3
Juárez / Carrillo Fuentes
Bosses
1
11
1
1
13
1
Specialized Operator 1 1
Logistics Operator 1 10 11
Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins. This table does not include data for Milenio, Díaz Parada and Colima cartels.
Six cartel bosses have been extradited to the U.S during the current administration. One of them was a Colombian cartel boss and partner of the Beltrán Leyva cartel. PGR information reveals that until February 2010, 316 criminals have been extradited, of which 299 have been extradited to the U.S.
Table 13. Cartel Bosses Extradited to U.S. During the Current Administration (December 2006 to August 2010)
Name Organization Extradition Date
Héctor Palma Salazar Sinaloa January 19, 2007 Osiel Cárdenas Guillén Golfo January 20, 2007 Miguel Caro Quintero Sonora February 25, 2009
Ever Villafañe Martínez Beltrán Leyva and Norte del
Valle (Colombia) April 17, 2009
Vicente Zambada Niebla Sinaloa February 18, 2010 Óscar Arriola Márquez Los Arriola March 4, 2010
b. Seizures
i. Drugs
From December 2006 to February 2010, 90.4 percent of the national marijuana seizures took place in only 10 states, and 26.4 percent of the total occurred in Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua alone, the region known as the “Golden Triangle”. In the case of cocaine seizures, the vast majority of seizures occurred in Oaxaca, with 26.5 percent. Also, the number of cocaine seizures was highly concentrated in 10 states. In the case of heroin seizures, 59.5 percent occurred in three states: Sonora, Sinaloa and Chihuahua. Finally,
35
99.6 percent of methamphetamine seizures happened in just six states, in which Baja California represented 25.7 percent of the seizures. In an aggregated sense, Michoacán, Estado de México and Jalisco consistently appeared on the top four seizures list.
Table 14. States with the Largest Proportions of Drug Seizures (December 2006 - February 2010)
Place Marijuana Seizures Cocaine Seizures Heroin Seizures
Methamphetamine Seizures
State % State % State % State %
1 Sonora 21.3 Oaxaca 26.5 Sinaloa 26.3 Baja California 25.7
2 Tamaulipas 13.5 D.F. 13.8 Sonora 21.1 Michoacán 10.5
3 Sinaloa 12.4 Sonora 10.4 Chihuahua 12.1 México 10.1
4 Baja California 11.8 Chiapas 5.9 Nayarit 10.5 Jalisco 9.9
5 Durango 7.3 México 5.8 D.F. 10.0 Sinaloa 8.1
6 Chihuahua 6.7 Tamaulipas 5.6 Baja California 4.7 Sonora 7.9
7 Nuevo León 6.2 Guerrero 4.6 Jalisco 4.2 Colima 7.7
8 Michoacán 4.5 Quintana Roo 4.5 Michoacán 3.7 Chiapas 4.2
9 Coahuila 3.4 Campeche 3.5 Zacatecas 3.2 D.F. 4.0
10 Jalisco 3.3 1.3
Total 90.4 81.7 95.8 88.1
Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins and with data from nine national newspapers, and ten regional or state newspapers.
As shown in the following figures (Figures 8, 9,10 and 11), the amount of marijuana seized during the current administration is similar to the amount seized during President Fox‟s administration, and both are well above the amounts seized during President Zedillo‟s term. Regarding cocaine seizures, 2007 was well above average. In the case of opium gum seizures, the average has decreased in comparison with 2001 and 2004 levels. Heroin seizures have been constant between 2000 and 2009. According to U.S. authorities, the Mexican government‟s increased pressure on cartels coincided with cocaine shortages in 37 U.S. cities and a 24 percent increase in the retail price of cocaine, from $95.89 to $118.70 per gram, from January to September 2007.25 According to the National Drug Threat Assessment 2010 (NDTA), the decrease registered since 2007 in the amount of seized marijuana is because the army is focused on the campaign against organized crime instead of crop eradication. Besides its regular duties in case of an emergency caused by natural disaster, the army also participates in public security responsibilities and surveillance over strategic sites.
25 Executive Office of the President, U.S. National Drug Control Policy Report (October 2007).
36
Figure 8. Marijuana Seizures (Tons)
Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.
Figure 9. Cocaine Seizures (Tons)
Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.
Figure 10. Opium Gum Seizures (Kilograms)
Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Marijuana Average
-
10
20
30
40
50
60
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Cocaine Average
-
200
400
600
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Opium Gum Average
37
Figure 11. Heroin Seizures (Kilograms)
Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.
ii. Weapons and Vehicles
There has been an important increase in the number of weapons and vehicles seizures. These two are fundamental resources for organized crime business. In the case of weapons seizures it is possible that this increase might be related to a higher availability of weapons in the country.
Figure 12. Weapons Seizures (Units, Includes Long and Short Weapons)
Source: Own elaboration with data from Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.
In the case of vehicles, organized crime frequently uses them for drugs and weapons transportation. It is remarkable that the amount of confiscated vehicles over the last three years is superior to the amount seized during the previous 13 years.
-
200
400
600
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Heroine Average
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Weapons Average
38
Figure 13. Seized Vehicles (Units)
Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.
c. Dismantled Laboratories and Crop Eradication
In terms of dismantled laboratories and crop eradication, these actions have been concentrated in nine states. Between these two actions there is also a high degree of concentration of dismantled laboratories in Michoacán, with 22.9 percent; and crop eradication in Sinaloa, with 28.4 percent (see Appendix IV Table 27). Regarding marijuana and poppy crop eradication, it is possible to note that during President Calderon‟s administration, the amount of eradicated crops is below the registered average since 1994. Above average eradication occurred between 1999 to 2006 in the case of marijuana, and 2000 to 2006 in the case of poppy. The next figure shows a dramatic increase in the number of dismantled illegal drug laboratories. In the first two years of President Calderón‟s term, the levels were kept within the average from previous years.
Figure 14. Dismantled Laboratories (2000-2009)
Source: Vicente Fox, Quinto Informe de Gobierno (Fifth Government Report); Felipe Calderón, First, Second and Third Government Reports; Fifth Attorney General Management Report (2005). Note: There is no available data for 2006.
-
5,000
10,000
15,000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Vehicles Average
0
50
100
150
200
250
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009
Laboratories Dismantled Average
39
Figure 15. Marijuana Eradication (Hectares)
Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.
Figure 16. Poppy Eradication (Hectares)
Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.
In terms of the number of drug seizures, Baja California occupies the first place in amphetamine stimulant seizures, Sinaloa is the first one in eradicated crops and heroin seizures, Sonora holds the first place in marijuana seizures and marijuana eradication, and Oaxaca is first place regarding cocaine. (See Appendix IV Table 22) Table 15 shows that eradication of marijuana decreased in 2009 with relation to 2007 and poppy eradication increased in the same period. The number of seizures of marijuana and cocaine dropped in 2009 with relation to 2007. On the contrary, opium, heroin, vehicles and weapons seizures increased during this period. In relation to detentions, they only decreased in the case of foreigners detained.
-
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Marijuana Average
-
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Poppy Average
40
Table 15. Variation in Seizures, Crop Eradication and Detentions (2007 and 2009)
Concept 2007 2009* Variation
Crop Eradication (Hectares)
Marijuana 23,316 15,994 -31.40
Poppy 11,411 19,133 67.68
Seizures
Marijuana (ton.) 2,213 1,349 -39.06
Cocaine (ton.) 48 24 -50.00
Opium (kg.) 307 312 1.37
Heroin (kg.) 317 407 28.37
Vehicles (iu.) 5,400 11,764 117.85
Weapons (iu.) 9,527 60,064 530.46
Detentions
Mexicans 22,184 22,594 1.85
Foreigners 100 90 -10.00
Publicly Released* 1,028 2,820 174.3
Affiliated to Cartels 338 1,811 435.80
*These detentions appeared in PGR press bulletins from 2007 to 2009.
41
IV. The Drug Market
1. Production According to the National Drug Threat Assessment 2010 the production of heroin in Mexico increased from 17 pure metric tons in 2007 to 38 pure metric tons in 2008. The same source shows that marijuana production in Mexico also increased from 15,800 metric tons in 2007 to 21,500 metric tons in 2008. NDTA also indicates that methamphetamine production has increased sharply in Mexico because of traffickers‟ ability to circumvent restrictions on chemical precursors and employ alternative production methods, despite strong restrictions on ephedrine and pseudoephedrine imports on the side of the Mexican Government. Finally, NDTA points out that it is very likely that the amount of cocaine being transported from Colombia through the U.S-Mexico border decreased in 2009. Marijuana, poppy, heroin and amphetamines are produced in states such as Chihuahua and Sinaloa. In the cases of Durango and Guerrero, marijuana, poppy and heroin are produced. There are states where just one kind of drug is produced like Puebla (poppy) or Tamaulipas (heroin). The states with the highest illegal drug production incidence are Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Sonora, Durango, Guerrero, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, Baja California, Baja California, Baja California Sur, Oaxaca and Zacatecas. (See Appendix V Table 28)
2. Prices The next figure shows the wholesale prices of different drugs in the U.S, Canada and Mexico. In all cases, the lowest wholesale prices are found in Mexico. Drug prices increase according to how far they are from its place of origin. Thus, a drug produced in Mexico tends to be more expensive in Canada than in the U.S. This is because usually the protractor or distributor has to pay to local personnel in order to move its illegal drug shipment.
Figure 17. Wholesale Price in USD per Kilogram (2008)
Source: Own elaboration with data from U.N. 2010 World Drug Report. Data for amphetamines in Mexico taken from Encuesta Nacional de Adicciones 2008, Secretaría de Salud.
Prices at the state level. The Mexican National Addictions Survey has been conducted twice: in 2002 and 2008. The price per dose for twelve different drugs is publicly available in the 2008 survey. The available data and information regarding prices in the survey has several limitations, so a caveat exists to the analysis resulting from it. This is, however, the only public and systematic available information on the
119,431
38,761
5,935 16,687
57,500
26,500
6,690
36,660 35,000
12,500 80
7,846
0
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60,000
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Heroin Cocaine Cannabis Herb Methamphetamine
Canada USA Mexico
42
matter in Mexico. Limitations include that the price of a drug is based on a "dose" measurement, and thus it is not clearly specified. Also, the price of an illicit substance greatly depends on its level of purity, and this factor is not considered in survey answers. Finally, figures are shown for just one year and not all illicit substances have enough observations to estimate a state-level representative price for the illicit drug. Tables 29 and 30 in the Appendix show that drug prices differ across the country. There are states, such as Chiapas and Estado de México, where the maximum drug price for one heroin dose is 3,000 and 2,000 pesos respectively, while in states like Durango and Aguascalientes the highest price for the same drug dose is 100 and 50 pesos, respectively. Regarding marijuana, the minimum dose price is 50 pesos (Yucatán) and the maximum is 1,500 pesos (Tlaxcala). In the case of cocaine, the highest price is 1,000 pesos (Baja California and Tabasco) and the lowest is 200 pesos (Coahuila, Colima, Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, Sinaloa and San Luis Potosí). Finally, the price for an amphetamines dose varies from 15 pesos (Oaxaca) to 1,200 pesos (Estado de México). Using a geometric mean26, the states where are found the cheapest illicit drug doses are Chihuahua (where none of the drug prices is above average, except hallucinogens), Hidalgo and Michoacán (where only one drug price is above average). The states with the most expensive drugs are Campeche (where 12 drug prices are above average), Estado de México, Quintana Roo and Tabasco (where nine drug prices are above average). The most expensive drug dose in the country is a tranquilizer dose in Morelos (547.7 pesos) and the cheapest drug dose is a sedative/barbiturates dose in Colima (2.0 pesos). At the national level, the highest drug price for a dose is for heroin (186 pesos) and the lowest average drug price is for inhalable drugs (27.1 pesos). The drugs with the widest price variation per dose are tranquilizers (29.2-547.7 pesos), ecstasy (38.7-353.6 pesos), heroin (50-350 pesos), others (20-300 pesos) and hallucinogens (26.6-300 pesos). On the contrary, the drugs with narrowest price variations per dose are marijuana (21.8-88.7 pesos), inhalable drugs (11.1-100), cocaine (82.5-184.6 pesos), crack (46.8-173.2 pesos) and sedatives and barbiturates (2-202.1 pesos). Based on price ranges, the cheapest drugs are opium and inhalable drugs, and the most expensive drugs are heroin, sedatives/barbiturates, cocaine and ecstasy. It is important to note that the one peso dose is sometimes used as a means to “hook” potential consumers, that is, as an introductory price for consumers with the purpose to promote addiction and, consequently, increase the price of the same drug in future transactions.
3. Data Analysis of Drug State Prices
An exploratory analysis of state price data for 2008 leads to interesting findings regarding the factors that influence price variations of the major drugs in Mexico (marijuana, heroin, cocaine and amphetamine). The factors which influence state-level prices are the following: consumption, state ranking for each drug seizure, level of detentions, number of elements in the state police and number of elements in the municipal police.
26 A geometric mean allows considering all the prices, nevertheless it gives less weight to extreme values, eliminating
bias provoked by outliers.
43
The next figure illustrates a statistically significant relationship between the price of marijuana and the national ranking of the seizures of marijuana. This relationship implies that as states are positioned among the first places in marijuana seizures, they have lower prices compared to those states that are positioned below in the ranking. This allows us to infer that in the marijuana market, seizures do not reduce the quantity offered and consequently the price of this drug is not affected when scarcity increases. Under this premise the states with the highest seizure events and lowest prices are those that can be considered major marijuana producers in Mexico. Such is the case in the states of Sonora, Sinaloa, Durango, Tamaulipas, Chiapas and Baja California.
Figure 18. Correlation between State Ranking in Number of Marijuana Seizures and Prices
On the other hand, data analysis shows that, in the case of Mexico, the price of one dose of heroin increases 6.8 pesos (equivalent to an increase of 4.6 percent) for every position increase in the national ranking of heroin seizures. This also applies to marijuana, where a higher position in the marijuana seizures ranking increases the price of a dose by 2.6 percent. It is interesting to note that the increase in state and municipal police officers has a positive impact, although very marginal, in the increase in prices of doses of marijuana and heroin.
AGS BC BCS
CAMP
COAH COL
CHIS
CHI DF DUR
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HGO
JAL
MÉX MICH
MOR
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State Ranking on Marijuana Seizures
44
4. Market Value and Estimated Income Recently the Federal Secretary of Public Security produced an estimate of the potential consumption and wholesale market in Mexico. According to these figures, it is a market of around $560 million USD.
Table 16. Mexican Drug Wholesale Market
Drug Potential
Consumption (Tons) Wholesale Market
(million dollars)
Marijuana 514.9 41.2
Cocaine 27.7 345.7
Heroin 3.9 138.2
Amphetamine 4.3 33.7
Total 550.7 558.8
Average 137.7 139.7
Source: Informe del Estado de la Seguridad Pública en México. 2010. Centro Nacional de Atención Ciudadana de la Policía Federal (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública) http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_publica.pptx.
The size of the Mexican market contrasts with the American market, which according to SSP data has an estimated retail value of $61,384.2 million USD.
Table 17. U.S. Drug Market Value
Drug Potential
Consumption/Potential Export (tons)
Wholesale Value per Ton (USD millions)
Wholesale Market (USD
millions)
Retail Value per Ton (USD
millions)
Retail Market (USD
millions)
Estimate Gross Profit
Marijuana 4,067.3 2.0 8,134.6 10.4 42,299.9 34,165.3
Cocaine 88.0 28.5 2,508.3 97.4 8,572.2 6,063.9
Heroin 43.3 71.2 3,081.5 131.6 5,696.7 2,615.2
Amphetamine 37.7 65.8 2,479.5 127.7 4,815.4 2,335.9
Total 4,236.3 16,203.9 61,384.2 45,180.3
Source: Informe del estado de la Seguridad Pública en México. 2010. Centro Nacional de Atención Ciudadana de la Policía Federal (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública) http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_publica.pptx.
The drug that generates the largest income to Mexican drug traffickers is cocaine, followed by marijuana. Given the lack of reliable data about the drug market, the estimated income ranges are wide. Other studies have estimated the income of the illegal drug trade to be between $2,660 and $7,980 million USD.
45
Table 18. Estimated Income for the Illegal Drugs Trade
Drug Export Volume (tons)
Value per tons (USD millions)
Estimated Income (USD millions)
Lower Limit Upper Limit Lower Limit Upper Limit Lower Limit Upper Limit
Cocaine 165 320 10 15 1,650 4,800
Marijuana 1,000 2,000 1 1 550 2,000
Heroin 6 10 50 70 300 700
Methamphetamine 16 32 10 15 160 480
Total 1,187 2,362 2,660 7,980
Source: U.N. 2010 World Drug Report and Informe del Estado de la Seguridad Pública en México. 2010. Centro Nacional de Atención Ciudadana de la Policía Federal (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública) http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_publica.pptx.
In relation to drug traffic income, various American agencies give different estimates: the National Drug Intelligence Center estimates between $13,600 and $48,400 million USD (for Mexico and Colombia); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement estimates between $19,000 and $29,000 million USD (Mexico only); and the drug Enforcement Agency estimates between $8,300 and $24,900 million USD (only Mexico). The U.N. 2010 World Drug Report states that total income for cocaine, heroin and marijuana would be $5,300 million USD. Clearly there is no agreement regarding this information.
5. Transportation and Distribution
a. Points of Entry, Routes of Transportation and Points of Exit
The next tables and map show that there is a close relationship between organized crime violence and the geography of the drug business. Table 19 shows municipalities considered strategic points of entry or exit for drug traffic in Mexico. Coincidentally, most of these municipalities register high levels of violence. It is important to note that all the points of entry are located along the Pacific Ocean, and all the points of exit are located along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Table 19. Violent Municipalities in Drug Entry and Exit Zones
Entry or Exit Zone Number
Municipalities
Entry Zone 1 Acapulco, Tecpan de Galeana, Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo and Coyuca (Guerrero), Lázaro Cárdenas (Michoacán)
Entry Zone 2 Mazatlán, Navolato, San Ignacio and Ahome (Sinaloa)
Entry Zone 3 Ensenada and Punta Baja (Baja California)
Exit Zone 1 Reynosa (Tamaulipas)
Exit Zone 2 Ciudad Juárez and Guadalupe de Bravo (Chihuahua)
Exit Zone 3 Nogales (Sonora)
Exit Zone 4 Mexicali, Tecate and Tijuana (Baja California)
Table 20 shows violent municipalities located between points of entry and exit within Mexico forming drug transport routes. However, not all of them show the same degree of violence. Low levels of violence may be a delineating result of the following circumstances: 1) there is a predominant cartel in the municipality and it exerts control over the route; 2) the municipal police is corrupted and controlled by the predominant cartel; and, 3) there are no internal disputes within the predominant cartel. For example, the cases of Salina
46
Cruz, Oaxaca, and Manzanillo, Colima are two points of entry along the Pacific Ocean with low violence rates.
Table 20. Violent Municipalities in Drug Transport Routes Entry and Exit Zones Transport Routes Violent Municipalities
Entry Zone 1 to Exit Zone 1
Route 1 Chilpancingo, Iguala, Cuernavaca and Distrito Federal
Route 2 Ciudad Altamirano, Morelia and Monterrey
Route 3 Apatzingán, Uruapan, Morelia and Monterrey
Entry Zone 1 to Exit Zone 2
Route 1 Ciudad Altamirano, Uruapan, Aguascalientes, Torreón-Gómez Palacio, Camargo, Delicias and Chihuahua
Route 2 Ciudad Altamirano, Uruapan, Guadalajara, Durango, Hidalgo del Parral and Chihuahua
Route 3 Apatzingán, Uruapan, Guadalajara, Durango, Hidalgo del Parral and Chihuahua
Entry Zone 2 to Exit Zone 1 Route 1 Pueblo Nuevo, Durango, Torreón-Gómez Palacio and Monterrey
Entry Zone 2 to Exit Zone 2
Route 1 Pueblo Nuevo, Durango, Hidalgo del Parral and Chihuahua
Route 2 Culiacán, Badiraguato, Guadalupe Calvo, Hidalgo del Parral and Chihuahua
Route 3 Guasave, Guamuchil, Mocorito, Badiraguato, Guadalupe Calvo, Hidalgo del Parral and Chihuahua
Entry Zone 2 to Exit Zone 3 Route 1 Culiacán, Guamuchil, Guasave, Ciudad Obregón and Hermosillo
Entry Zone 2 to Exit Zone 4 Route 1 Culiacán, Guamuchil, Guasave, Ciudad Obregón, Hermosillo and Caborca
Note: There are no violent municipalities in the route between Entry Zone 3 and Exit Zone 4.
b. Violence and the Geography of Business
The next map shows the points of entry in the southern region of the country, and the exit points along the Mexico-U.S. border. The red spots show violent municipalities that are also drug points of entry and exit. The green lines are drug transport routes to Mexico; the orange lines indicate land transport routes within Mexico; the blue lines show sea transport routes within Mexico; and the grey lines show routes into the U.S.
47
Map 2. Drug Trafficking Routes and Violent Municipalities
48
6. Consumption
a. International Comparisons Levels of consumption have grown in the United States and Mexico in all cases. However, in contrast with the United States the problem is not yet a social security problem in Mexico. In the United States almost half of the population has tried a drug at least once in a lifetime, while in Mexico this figure is 5.2 percent.
Table 21. U.S.* and México**
Illicit Drug Consumption Comparison 2002 2008
Period U.S. Mexico U.S. Mexico
Millions
At least once in lifetime 108.3 2.89 117.3 3.9
Last year 35.1 0.57 35.5 1.1
Last month 19.5 0.34 20.1 0.7
Percentage of population
At least once in lifetime 46.0 4.2 47.0 5.2
Last year 14.9 0.8 14.2 1.4
Last month 8.3 0.5 8.0 0.9
* Source: National Survey on Drug Use and Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2008 and U.S. Census Bureau ** Source: National Addictions Survey 2008, CONADIC, Secretaría de Salud, Mexico
The most commonly used drug, in both the United States and Mexico, is marijuana by far, followed by cocaine, methamphetamines and heroin. The United States registered a slight decrease in the consumption of methamphetamines. This phenomenon had no equivalence in Mexico, where the levels of consumption for this drug increased during the same period.
Table 22. U.S.* and Mexico** Illicit Drugs Consumption Comparison: At least one dose in lifetime
2002 2008
Drug U.S. Mexico U.S. Mexico
Millions
Marijuana 94.9 2.43 102.4 3.1
Cocaine 33.9 0.86 36.8 1.8
Heroin 3.7 0.06 3.8 0.1
Methamphetamines 15.4 0.06 12.6 0.2
Percentage of population
Marijuana 40.4 3.5 41.0 4.2
Cocaine 14.4 1.2 14.7 2.4
Heroin 1.6 0.1 1.5 0.1
Methamphetamines 6.5 0.1 5.0 0.3
*Source: National Survey on Drug Use and Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2008 and U.S. Census Bureau ** Source: National Addictions Survey 2002 and 2008, CONADIC, Secretaría de Salud, Mexico
49
The age distribution among drug users has a similar pattern in both countries. Both countries have their largest share of consumers between the ages of 35 to 65. In Mexico, cocaine use doubled from 1.2 percent to 2.4 percent between 2002 and 2008.
b. Consumption at the State Level
At the state level, 13 states are above the national average on marijuana use. The five states with the highest incidence are Quintana Roo, Tamaulipas, Baja California, Hidalgo and Distrito Federal.
Figure 19. Cumulative Incidence for Marijuana Use by State Total Population (12 to 65 Years Old)
Source: National Addictions Survey 2008, CONADIC, Secretaría de Salud, Mexico. Note: The adjective “Cumulative” refers to the “consumption history” of the individual who answers the survey.
In the case of cocaine use incidence, 13 states are above the national average. The five states with the highest incidence are Quintana Roo, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Durango and Hidalgo.
Figure 20. Cumulative Incidence for Cocaine use by State Total Population (12 to 65 Years Old)
Source: National Addictions Survey 2008, CONADIC, Secretaría de Salud, Mexico
0
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% Cocaine Average
50
For amphetamines, nine states are above the national average. The five states with the highest amphetamine incidence are Baja California, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, Hidalgo and D.F.
Figure 21. Cumulative Incidence for Amphetamine-Type Stimulant Use by State Total Population (12 to 65 years old)
Source: National Addictions Survey 2008, CONADIC, Secretaría de Salud
0
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a
% Amphetamine-type Stimulants Average
51
V. Public Opinion and the War on Drugs The Evolution of Public Support over Governmental Actions. A February 2010 survey conducted by Buendía y Laredo shows that most of the public considers that the country is less safe now as a result of President Calderón‟s public security policies: 50 percent of the population thinks that the country is less safe because of the government strategies, 21 percent thinks the country is now safer and 20 percent thinks that the current strategy has had no repercussion on security.27 The same survey by Buendía y Laredo also indicates that for 47 percent of the population the current insecurity situation in the country is a sign of the Government‟s strategy failure.28 Another Buendía y Laredo survey from May 2010 ranks President Calderón‟s approval at 59 percent, while 52 percent considers that the current administration must change its course because the main problems have not been properly addressed.29 (See Appendix VI Figure 10) Evolution of Public Confidence over Security Forces. While trust in Mexican public institutions has historically been low, confidence in the police is particularly worrying. According to opinion polls, police officers are considered corrupt by 80 percent of Mexico‟s population, while the armed forces are the most highly respected public institution in the country.30 A national survey conducted by the Citizen‟s Institute for Security Studies (ICESI) in 2009, showed that 72 percent of the respondents do not trust local police, and 57 percent of the population does not trust federal police either.31 The same survey asked the respondents to grade, from 1 to 10, the service they received from several public security agencies: the Federal Police received a 6.6 and the local police (state and municipal) received a 5.7.32 (See Appendix VI Figure 12) Evolution of Public Perception over Insecurity. Personal security concerns include increased crime and lawlessness, police corruption and street gangs. These concerns are apparent in available survey data. For instance, in one survey conducted by ICESI in 2009, 65 percent of respondents reported not feeling safe in the state they inhabit.33 These ICESI surveys also reveal public perceptions about insecurity in Mexico at a municipal and state level. In the case of D.F. where there is no strong presence of cartels, the high perception of insecurity is a result of predatory criminal activities, such as robbery. However, in states such as Durango, Chihuahua, Baja California, Coahuila or Sinaloa, the public perception of insecurity is closely related with the presence of organized crime. At the municipal level the results do not differ greatly, where Chihuahua, D.F., Durango and Baja California also appear with the highest perceptions of insecurity.34 (See Appendix VI Figure 13) Another survey by Buendía y Laredo shows that the three most worrying issues for Mexicans are related with organized crime: kidnapping, drug cartel violence and robbery, which represented 76 percent of answers.35
27 Buendía y Laredo, February 2010, Encuesta Nacional. Seguridad y Narcotráfico, p.11. 28 Ibid., p. 13. 29 Buendía y Laredo, May 2010, Encuesta Nacional. Aprobación Presidencial, p. 7. 30 Gereben et al, Op. Cit. p. xiii. 31 ICESI, 2009, Sexta Encuesta Nacional sobre Inseguridad, p. 81. 32 Ibid., p. 86. 33 Ibid., p. 66. 34 Ibid., p. 66-67. 35 Buendía y Laredo, February 2010, Los Miedos de México, p.3.
52
A survey made by Consulta Mitofsky in June 2010 showed that economic and security issues are the most worrisome topics for the Mexican people. Consistently, over the last four years economic issues have been above security issues. However, since January 2010 the gap between the two has been closing: in January 2010 the difference was 46.8, in June the difference was 21.9.36 (See Appendix VI Figure 9)
36 Consulta Mitofsky, July 2010, Economía, Política y Gobierno, p. 7.
53
VI. Final Assessment
1. Lack of a precise initial diagnosis. Given the results of the Mexican “war on drugs”, during the last three years it seems that the federal government lacked strategic information regarding the following issues.
About the enemy:
a. Its modern, diverse and powerful set of weapons. Its highly sophisticated logistics. The ease with which weapons enter the national territory.
b. Its high intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities. The cartels have penetrated the upper echelons of the SSP and the PGR, as has been revealed by the arrests of Fernando Rivera (SIEDO Intelligence Director), Noé Rodríguez Mandujano (SIEDO), Édgar Enrique Bayardo (PFP Operations Inspector), Gerardo Garay (PFP Commissioner), Francisco Navarro (PFP Head of Special Operations), and Jorge Cruz (PFP Tactical Analysis Director).
c. Its abundance of human resources (typically young men grouped into gangs or farmers from the central and southern regions of the country), which allows it to sustain a long and costly war.
d. The social protection that it has in countless communities across the country, given its role as a populace benefactor.
e. The specific capabilities and vulnerabilities of each of the cartels. About its own capabilities:
a. Low intelligence capabilities among the military and the preventive and ministerial police. b. Organized crime penetration in the highest ranks of security governmental agencies. c. The inadequate regulatory framework for undertaking a war against organized crime. d. Bureaucratic conflicts among various security agencies that obstruct their coordination, a key
condition of a successful strategy. e. Deficient collaboration and support from the state and municipal forces. Even in some cases,
local police agencies have boycotted the work of the federal police and the army.
2. Multiple, vague and sometimes incompatible objectives of the antidrug strategy. The strategy pursues objectives of diverse nature. These objectives lack precise indicators to measure progress. Finally, achieving certain objectives of the strategy hinders the achievement of others. One example: the disarticulation of criminal organizations not only obstructs the recovery of public spaces, but brings about the invasion of new territories.
3. The strategy is focused on processes, not outcomes. The government favors a strategy where high
profile arrests and several types of seizures are central components. However, these actions have not had an impact on indicators related to typical organized crime offenses, like kidnapping and extortion.
4. The federal strategy is not backed by state and municipal governments. Probably, this is the major
weakness of the federal antidrug strategy. State and municipal authorities have not taken actions to strengthen their institutional capabilities. At the state and municipal levels of government, the security sector budgets are stable, and processes like police professionalization are stagnated.
5. The federal government has advanced in its ambitious agenda of institutional reforms (including a
reform to the penal code, the Attorney General‟s Office, police professionalization and certification,
54
data management technology, etc.). However these reforms will not have an immediate impact on the dynamics of the Mexican security sector nor in the logic of organized crime activities.
6. Violence has increased systematically in the last three and a half years. Violence trends announce
more and more violence in the near future. Government authorities conceive violence as an unavoidable consequence of the strategy, and do not consider it as an indicator of failure.
7. Mexican violence is a phenomenon with distinctive features in each region, linked to specific traits of drug cartels and the presence (or absence) of gangs. Other variables that may change the local dynamics of violence depend on the type of activity in which the violent actor is involved with in the drug market, the extent of police corruption in the region, and the level of social collusion with organized crime. All these factors should be addressed by any program that seriously aims to stabilise or reduce violence in Mexico in the near future.
55
Appendix I. Diagnosis
c. Main Areas
Table 1. Instability in Directive Positions in the Security Sector (December 2006-August 2010) Name of the Agency Name of the Public Official Date of Appointment Date of Resignation
Secretaría de Gobernación
Francisco Ramírez Acuña
Juan Camilo Mouriño
Fernando Gómez Mont
December 2006
January 2008
November 2008
July 2010
January 2008
November 2008
July 2010
Present José Francisco Blake Mora
Procuraduría General de la
República
Eduardo Medina Mora December 2006 September 2009
Juan Miguel Alcantara Soria September 7, 2009 September 24, 2009
Arturo Chávez Chávez September 2009 Present
Sistema Nacional de
Seguridad Pública (Executive
Secretary)
Roberto Campa December 2006 September 2008
Monte Alejandro Rubido September 2008 March 2009
Jorge Tello Peón March 2009 December 2009
Juan Miguel Alcántara Soria January 2010 Present
Consejo de Seguridad
Nacional (Technical
Secretary)
Sigrid Arzt December 2006 April 2009
Monte Alejandro Rubido April 2009 September 2009
Jorge Tello Peón January 2010 August 2010
Alejandro Poiré August 2010 Present
Policía Federal
(Commisioned)
Ardelio Vargas Fosado December 2006 March 2007
Edgar Millán Gómez March 2007 May 2008
Gerardo Garay May 2008 November 2008
Rodrigo Esparza Cristerna November 2008 June 2009
Facundo Rosas June 2009 Present
d. Budget
i. Federal Level
Table 2. Security Sector Agencies
Expenditure Budget (Amounts in Millions of Mexican Pesos)
Agency 2007 2008 2009 2,010
SEGOB 5,896.6 7,167.1 10,543.9 8,370.6
SEGOB (CISEN) 1,292.7 1,351.6 2,615.2 2,140.6
SEDENA 37,353.4 37,087.3 47,942.3 43,632.4
SEMAR 12,703.7 14,237.4 17,649.3 15,991.9
PGR 10,691.3 9,902.2 13,528.6 11,781.5
SSP 15,851.2 20,970.4 36,175.8 32,437.8
SSP (PF) 5,477.1 8,449.8 16,757.7 15,681.1
Total 82,496.3 89,364.4 125,839.9 112,214.2
Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación 2007, 2008, 2009 y 2010. A GDP deflator, based on the first quarter of each of the two years was used to calculate the amount of the budget at a constant value (based in 2010).
56
Table 3. Expenditure Compared with the Budget of the
Security Sector Agencies, 2007 (Amounts in Millions of Mexican Pesos)
Agency 2007
Budget Expenditure % Variation
SEGOB 5,896.6 6,827.3 15.8
SEDENA 37,353.4 39,623.0 6.1
SEMAR 12,703.7 14,113.2 11.1
PGR 10,691.3 10,949.9 2.4
SSP 15,851.2 20,447.4 29.0
Total 82,496.3 91,960.8 11.5
Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación and Cuenta de la Hacienda Pública Federal, 2007. A GDP deflator, based on the first quarter of each of the two years was used to calculate the amount of the budget at a constant value (2010 base).
Table 4. Expenditure Compared with the Budget of the
Security Sector Agencies, 2008 (Amounts in Millions of Mexican Pesos)
Agency 2008
Budget Expenditure % Variation
SEGOB 7,167.1 7,712.0 7.6
SEDENA 37,087.3 39,493.1 6.5
SEMAR 14,237.4 16,123.0 13.2
PGR 9,902.2 9,521.8 -3.8
SSP 20,970.4 22,490.3 7.2
Total 89,364.4 95,340.2 6.7
Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación and Cuenta de la Hacienda Pública Federal, 2008. A GDP deflator, based on the first quarter of each of the two years was used to calculate the amount of the budget at a constant value (2010 base).
Table 5. Expenditure Compared with the Budget of the
Security Sector Agencies, 2009 (Amounts in Millions of Mexican Pesos)
Agency 2009
Budget Expenditure % Variation
SEGOB 10,543.9 9,695.9 -8.0
SEDENA 47,942.3 49,407.1 3.1
SEMAR 17,649.3 17,938.0 1.6
PGR 13,528.6 11,906.0 -12.0
SSP 36,175.8 36,879.6 1.9
Total 125,839.9 125,826.5 0.0
Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación and Cuenta de la Hacienda Pública Federal, 2009. A GDP deflator, based on the first quarter of each of the two years was used to calculate the amount of the budget at a constant value (2010 base).
57
ii. State Level
Table 6. State Budgets
State Budget SSP and
PGJ (millions of pesos)
Percentage in Relation to State
Budget
Percentage of Total Security Sector Budget Assigned by Mexican
State
FASP Federal Transfer
(millions of pesos) (3)
Percentage of Spent FASP (3)
Aguascalientes 706.4 6.1 1.1 97.0 49.7
Baja California (1) 2,217.0 7.9 3.6 253.2 78.7
Baja California Sur (1) 420.9 5.6 0.7 125.0 48.8
Campeche 508.5 4.1 0.8 97.0 62.3
Chiapas 1,650.0 3.0 2.7 259.5 12.1
Chihuahua 1,945.7 5.2 3.1 214.8 66.9
Coahuila 1,164.4 3.9 1.9 175.8 27.3
Colima 510.9 7.5 0.8 94.8 76.2
Distrito Federal 16,685.0 12.9 27.0 390.5 11.6
Durango 524.6 2.9 0.8 147.2 34.5
Guanajuato 2,380.8 5.9 3.8 224.8 11.3
Guerrero 1,545.0 4.6 2.5 185.3 36.0
Hidalgo 636.0 2.9 1.0 156.5 29.2
Jalisco 3,578.6 5.8 5.8 279.1 8.6
México 6,087.6 4.5 9.8 495.1 32.8
Michoacán 2,433.9 5.9 3.9 224.4 44.2
Morelos 598.4 4.1 1.0 133.1 14.8
Nayarit 544.4 4.3 0.9 119.9 26.6
Nuevo León 1,905.9 4.1 3.1 238.6 30.3
Oaxaca 1,639.5 4.2 2.6 196.4 41.4
Puebla 2,064.5 4.2 3.3 236.2 40.3
Querétaro 653.1 3.7 1.1 118.7 39.0
Quintana Roo 855.8 5.1 1.4 127.4 10.6
San Luis Potosí 332.9 1.3 0.5 179.3 75.5
Sinaloa 1,667.4 5.6 2.7 176.9 32.5
Sonora 1,763.4 5.4 2.8 252.4 72.1
Tabasco (2) 1,521.6 4.1 2.5 144.4 21.4
Tamaulipas 1,268.4 4.4 2.0 231.0 17.4
Tlaxcala 416.1 6.0 0.7 115.9 30.8
Veracruz 2,076.3 3.0 3.4 299.5 58.2
Yucatán 825.0 4.8 1.3 134.6 59.9
Zacatecas 772.1 4.3 1.2 212.9 37.9
Total 61,900.2 6,337.3
Average 1,934.4 4.9 3.1 198.0 38.7
1. Figures corresponding to State Budget Expenditures 2009
2. Figures corresponding to State Budget Expenditures 2008
3. FASP figures corresponding to January-September 2009, http://www.cefp.gob.mx/notas/2009/notacefp0902009.pdf
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Table 7. SUBSEMUN Contributions to Each State
State
2008 2009
Federal Contribution
Municipal Contribution
Federal Contribution
Municipal Contribution
Aguascalientes 87.3 29.1 86.2 28.7
Baja California 287.2 95.7 275.0 91.7
Baja California Sur 18.0 6.0 30.0 10.0
Campeche 18.0 6.0 30.0 10.0
Chiapas 66.5 22.2 108.4 36.1
Chihuahua 240.7 80.2 230.0 76.7
Coahuila 96.5 32.2 104.9 35.0
Colima 27.0 9.0 41.5 13.8
Distrito Federal 287.2 95.7 338.6 112.9
Durango 40.1 13.4 44.8 14.9
Guanajuato 152.4 50.8 182.5 60.8
Guerrero 79.1 26.4 94.9 31.6
Hidalgo 18.0 6.0 40.0 13.3
Jalisco 236.9 79.0 266.6 88.9
México 287.2 95.7 338.6 112.9
Michoacán 131.2 43.7 159.0 53.0
Morelos 27.0 9.0 56.4 18.8
Nayarit 31.4 10.5 54.6 18.2
Nuevo León 187.9 62.6 198.3 66.1
Oaxaca 23.6 7.9 36.3 12.1
Puebla 125.2 41.7 135.0 45.0
Querétaro 121.8 40.6 125.0 41.7
Quintana Roo 58.3 19.4 66.0 22.0
San Luis Potosí 118.8 39.6 136.6 45.5
Sinaloa 178.1 59.4 174.2 58.1
Sonora 146.9 49.0 152.7 50.9
Tabasco 57.6 19.2 97.5 32.5
Tamaulipas 155.4 51.8 158.8 52.9
Tlaxcala 18.0 6.0 30.0 10.0
Veracruz 126.8 42.3 200.9 67.0
Yucatán 121.1 40.4 115.0 38.3
Zacatecas 18.0 6.0 30.0 10.0
Total 3589.4 1196.5 4137.9 1379.3
Average 112.2 37.4 129.3 43.1
Source: Cámara de Diputados, 2008 and 2009. http://www.cefp.gob.mx/notas/2008/notacefp0172008.pdf http://www3.diputados.gob.mx/camara/content/download/223013/576691/file/presentacion_subsemun.pdf
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Figure 1. Percentage of Security and
Enforcement Budget and Crime Incidence per State (2008-2009)
Source: Presupuestos de Egresos Estatales, 2010. Índice de Incidencia Delictiva y Violencia 2008 y 2009, CIDAC. http://www.cidac.org/es/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1000087.
Figure 2. State and Municipal Police Officers
per 1,000 Inhabitants and Security Spending (2009)
Source: Own elaboration with State Budget Expenditures, 2009 and information from SNSP-CON, 2007, 2009 and 2010.
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0B
aja
Cal
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ia
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Budget (2009) Police per 1,000 inhabs. (2009)
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e. Military and Police Forces
iii. Military Forces
Table 8. Military Personnel
Year SEDENA SEMAR
Elements Specialized Training Elements Specialized Training
1980 102,975 76 2,990 32 632
1985 124,497 216 3,044 34,164 79 512
1990 151,178 246 3,589 41,816 136 2,206
1991 155,218 214 4,145 43,737 168 1,278
1992 157,142 249 4,225 46,687 113 1,138
1993 162,169 237 5,619 48,072 95 2,535
1994 168,773 276 5,056 48,170 156 1,683
1995 171,952 242 3,642 53,128 184 2,955
1996 179,038 665 4,271 53,128 148 2,151
1997 182,328 357 9,506 54,247 141 957
1998 182,328 496 9,991 53,566 159 2,418
1999 182,329 396 9,031 54,972 124 2,044
2000 182,329 598 10,079 55,223 144 3,159
2001 185,143 4,173 10,790 49,165 186 1,550
2002 188,143 1,106 6,874 50,026 1,138 1,124
2003 191,143 740 4,705 47,304 1,043 1,410
2004 191,143 799 5,329 47,316 445 1,040
2005 191,143 402 5,618 47,644 432 1,764
2006 196,767 320 4,640 47,471 381 1,152
2007 196,710 325 5,489 50,032 387 1,125
2008 202,355 333 5,781 51,680 259 1,761
2009 202,355 60* 2,485* 52,350 216* 802*
Average 174,871 594 5,924 49,043 283 1,647
Source: Data from Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). *Figures for 2009 are linearly projected based on monthly averages.
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Figure 3. SEMAR Personnel
Source: Data from Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report).
Figure 4. SEDENA and SEMAR Personnel (1980-2009)
Source: Data from Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report).
d. Regulatory Framework
Federal laws and recent Constitutional reforms linked to security and criminal issues:
1. Ley de Extradición Internacional 1975 (International Extradition Law): This law establishes the
cases and conditions to deliver to the requesting States indicted or convicted individuals for ordinary crimes, when there is no international treaty.
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
SEMAR Average
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
SEDENA and SEMAR Average
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2. Ley Orgánica del Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos 1986 (Mexican Army and Air Force Organic Law): This law establishes that the Mexican Army and Air Force are permanent armed forces and have the following general missions:
a. Defend the integrity, independence and sovereignty of the nation; b. Ensure internal security; c. Assist the civilian population in cases of public necessity; d. Perform civic actions and social work that strives for the progress of the country; e. In the event of a disaster, assist in law enforcement duties, rescue of persons and
property, and reconstruction of the affected areas.
3. Ley Federal contra la Delincuencia Organizada 1996 (Federal Law against Organized Crime): This law establishes rules for investigation, prosecution, punishment, and enforcement of penalties for crimes committed by organized crime members.
4. Ley de Seguridad Nacional 2005 (National Security Law): It aims to establish the basis for institutional coordination by the authorities responsible for preserving national security in their respective areas of responsibility. It also establishes the means and terms in which the state and municipal authorities work with the federal authority in this task.
5. Ley Federal de Seguridad Privada 2006 (Federal Law on Public Security): This law aims to regulate the provision of private security services when these are provided in two or more states.
6. Ley General que Establece las Bases de Coordinación del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública
1995-Repealed on January 2, 2009 (General Law that Establishes the Basis of Coordination of the National Public Security System): This law establish the basis of coordination among the federation, the states, the Federal District and the municipalities for the integration and operation of the National System of Public Security.
7. Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República 2002-Repealed on May 29, 2009 by the
new Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República (General Attorney Organic Law): This law aims to organize the General Attorney‟s Office. It was based on principles of certainty, legality, objectivity, impartiality and professionalism in the exercise of its functions and actions of law enforcement.
8. Ley de la Policía Federal Preventiva (Federal Preventive Police Law)1999-Repealed on June 1,
2009 by the Ley de la Policía Federal 2009 (Federal Police Law): This law regulates the organization and operation of the Federal Police in its respective area of competence. The Federal Police is a decentralized administrative agency of the Secretary of Public Security.
9. Ley Federal de Extinción de Dominio 2009 (Federal Law on Domain Extinction): This law regulates
forfeiture of property by the State. It establishes the procedures and actions corresponding to the authorities involved, the effects that the issued decision has, and the means of intervention by third parties affected by the action.
10. Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública 2009 (General Law of the National Public
Security System): This law regulates the integration, organization and operation of the National
63
Public Security System. It establishes the distribution of competences and coordination among the federal, state and municipal governments in this sphere.
Reform to the Article 21 of the Mexican Constitution (2008) Before the reform, this article gave the sole responsibility over criminal investigations to the public prosecutor, it did not state any principles over which police actions shall be carried out, or provided a description of public security and the principles that govern the actions of the respective agencies. The reform of the Article 21 covered three dimensions: judiciary procedures, police professionalization and public security. Judiciary procedures. The reform changes the situation of all participants in a criminal proceeding: the public prosecutor now shares the duties of the investigative police (Art. 21, paragraph 1), and loses exclusive control over penal action because the victims in this area receive greater guarantees, and in certain case, specified by law, these guarantees can be exercised before a judicial authority by criminal proceedings (Art. 21, paragraph 2). Police professionalization. Regarding police forces it recognizes their participation during the investigation of a crime (Art. 21, paragraph 1). It continues by stating that police operations shall be civil, disciplined, professional and coordinated and that these principles must guide the three levels of government in the national public security structure (Art. 21, paragraph 10). Public security. It introduces a description of public security "... it is a task of the Federation, the Federal District, states and municipalities, including the prevention of crimes, the investigation and prosecution to make it effective, and the penalties of administrative offenses, under the terms of the law"(Art. 21, paragraph 9). It adds to the principles that govern the actions of public security institutions (principles of legality, efficiency, professionalism and honesty) the principles of objectivity and respect for Human Rights (Art. 21, paragraph 9). Reform to the Article 29 of the Mexican Constitution (2007) Article 29 states the procedure to suspend civil guarantees in the whole country or in a determined place. This article was reformed in 2007. Before the reform, the article said that in case of “invasion or a grave disruption of public peace that puts the society in danger or conflict” (Art. 29, paragraph 1), the President, in accordance with the state ministers, administrative departments, PGR and with the approval of Congress, can suspend guarantees in the whole country or in certain parts. The 2007 reform removed the administrative departments of the list of governmental agencies needed to be in accordance with the President to suspend guarantees. This reform to the article facilitates the process of suspension of civil guarantees.
64
Table 9. Legal Framework of Public Security at the State Level
State
Public Security Law
(Date of Last
Amendment)
Public Security Program
(Years Comprised in the
Program)
Police Professionalization
Regulation
(Date Passed in Local Congress)
Aguascalientes 1-09-2008 2004-2010 No Regulation
Baja California 6-09-2007 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Baja California Sur 8-07-2008 2005-2011 No Regulation
Campeche 3-03-2008 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Chiapas 20-12-2006 2007-2012 No Regulation
Chihuahua 1-04-2009 As Part of Sexennial Plan 1-04-2009 (Law)
Coahuila 19-06-2009 As Part of Sexennial Plan 14-09-1999
Colima 17-07-2006 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Distrito Federal 20-05-2003 2007-2012 No Regulation
Durango 24-07-2005 2005-2010 No Regulation
Estado de México 26-03-1999 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Guanajuato 20-05-2005 As Part of Sexennial Plan 17-09-2007
Guerrero 16-02-2007 2005-2011 No Regulation
Hidalgo 8-08-2005 2005-2011 No Regulation
Jalisco 24-02-2007 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Michoacán 12-02-2008 2008-2012 No Regulation
Morelos 11-05-2005 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Nayarit 23-05-2009 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Nuevo León 22-09-2008 2009-2015 No Regulation
Oaxaca 22-03-2005 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Puebla 2-09-2002 2005-2011 No Regulation
Querétaro 14-09-2006 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Quintana Roo 27-11-2007 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
San Luis Potosí 30-08-2003 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Sinaloa 4-02-2009 2005-2010 No Regulation
Sonora 12-12-2003 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Tabasco 13-09-2006 2007-2012 No Regulation
Tamaulipas 17-08-2006 As Part of Sexennial Plan 4-7-2000
Tlaxcala 25-09-2006 2005-2011 No Regulation
Veracruz 12-08-2005 As Part of Sexennial Plan 14-03-2008
Yucatán 31-05-2004 As Part of Sexennial Plan 26-06-1994
Zacatecas 24-12-2008 2004-2010 No Regulation
The Penal System Reform (2008) An extensive penal reform regarding public security, criminal justice and organized crime was published on June 19, 2008. In some areas, it represents an improvement to the judiciary system; in other sectors it means a clear draw back. A major challenge to this reform would be the terms of implementations of improvements to the system, lack of professionalization, structural inertia and conflicting interests. 1. Oral Trial System. It consists of a set of institutions that seek to achieve a qualitative and quantitative improvement to the criminal justice system. It constructs an accusatorial system (a balance between powers of prosecutors and the judge, giving greater relevance to criminal proceedings and not to the preliminary investigation) and adversarial (equality between the prosecutors and the defense), with oral,
65
publicity and balance between formal authority and citizen guarantees (Art. 20). Key highlights regarding this aspect of the reform include: a) the judge becomes the axis of the criminal justice system; she rules the process and controls the police and prosecuting authorities; b) all oral hearings shall be recorded; c) there will be a process with an impartial judge between the parties; d) the public hearing gives transparency to the process; e) system of alternative solutions: for a system that seeks to efficiently and effectively implement this process model, a requirement is that no more than 7% or 10% of cases reach oral trial. The remaining cases are channeled to "alternative solutions." This system of alternate exits is covered by the new constitutional text (Art. 17, paragraph 3): "The laws provide mechanisms for alternative dispute resolution. It should be implemented in criminal matters, it will ensure reparation of damages and it establishes the cases in which judicial oversight is required.” These mechanisms are compounded by the possibility that the prosecution may justify the termination of the investigation: "The prosecutor may consider employing criteria of opportunity for the exercise of criminal proceedings in the cases and conditions determined by law" (Art. 21, paragraph 7). 2. New roles for actors in the criminal procedure. The reform changes the situation of all participants in a criminal proceeding: a) Judges: The judge becomes the key player restoring its status as ruler of the process; b) Prosecutor: The prosecutor's office receives the challenge to reinvent itself as a public servant to investigate through modern means all that allows him to assist in pursuing the offender effectively and with respect to Human Rights; the prosecution now shares the duties of the investigative police (Art. 21, paragraph 1), and loses sole control over penal action because the victims in this area receive greater guarantees. In exchange it gains the ability to overturn the investigation of minor crimes where there is insufficient evidence and win a strategic role in the use of alternative solutions; c) Victims: It gives more rights to victims (Article 20, paragraph C), including the possibility that in certain cases specified by law, they can be exercised before a judicial authority by criminal proceedings (Art. 21, paragraph 2); d) Lawyers: A system such as this demands more professionalism and expertise on the side of the lawyers involved in the criminal justice system, so defenders are required to be lawyers. The reform notes that an adequate system of public defenders must be developed in order to avoid a disadvantageous process for poor people (Art. 17, paragraph 6 ); e) Police: Regarding police forces it recognizes their participation during the investigation of a crime (Art. 21, paragraph 1 ), whose operations shall be civil, disciplined, professional and coordinated (Art. 21, paragraph 10). In relation to municipal police, it links their performance with guidelines established by the state legislature and introduces the possibility that the municipal police can receive orders from the state governor (Art. 115): "The preventive police will be under the Major‟s command in terms with the „The State‟s Public Security Law‟. It will comply with the orders of the State Governor of the State in those cases where considered of serious disturbance of public order." 3. Preventive incarceration. The prosecutor is no longer required to prove or "demonstrate" to the judge the evidence he has against a certain person in order to be able to capture him (Art. 16, paragraph 2) or initiate a penal process (Art. 19, paragraph 1) against him. Now it only requests to present data that "... establishes that the individual has performed an action that the law considers a crime and that there is a likelihood that the suspect participated in it” (Art. 19, paragraph 1). The "standard" processing is reduced, in accordance with the new model, but the preventive detention regime retains many of the previous system‟s features. Although the new law indicates that preventive incarceration would be the last measure to be considered, it establishes “inexcarcelable” crimes, that is, the commission of any of these crimes is sufficient for the process to be started and the person must stay in jail until sentencing. The reform establishes as “inexcarcelable” crimes: "... in cases of organized crime, homicide, rape, kidnapping, crimes committed by violent means such as weapons and explosives" (Art. 19, paragraph 2). It also establishes that the law may also consider preventive detention for crimes "... against national security, the free development of
66
personality and health" (Art. 19, paragraph 2). 4. Organized crime. The new adversarial model or system of oral trials, bets on a professional investigative service and judicial control in favor of the guarantees of the accused and the victims. However, in cases in which the authorities accuse a person on the grounds of organized crime, it is acceptable to preserve many of the vices of the previous system in order to "facilitate" prosecution of these crimes. That is, it reduces the guarantees that the reform gives to the rest of the people in the new system and maintains "grants" to poor prosecution, granting benefits to the public prosecutor. In all cases the individual accused of organized crime will suffer preventive incarceration detention, he may be held in a special detention center, and the accused may be held without charge, detained for up to 80 days. 5. Public Security. This reform gives powers of investigation to the police (Art. 21, paragraph 1). It introduces a description of public security "... it is a task of the Federation, the Federal District, states and municipalities, including the prevention of crimes, the investigation and prosecution to make it effective, and the penalties of administrative offenses, under the terms of the law"(Art. 21, paragraph 9). It adds to the principles that govern the actions of public security institutions (principles of legality, efficiency, professionalism and honesty) the principles of objectivity and respect for Human Rights (Art. 21, paragraph 9). Emphasis is placed on the provisions on professionalizing guidance and coordination that must guide the three levels of government in the national public security structure. 6. The Terms of the Reform. Part of the complexity of this reform is that some of the provisions already established in the Constitution will take effect in different terms. For example, reforms aimed at the restoration of the accusatorial system and oral trials, and alternative solutions would take effect in no more than eight years. The referred actions relating to public security would take effect in six months, and the adjustments to local legislation must be passed a year after the reform was passed. The prison reforms (change the term "rehabilitation" for "reinsertion" and the establishment of a sentences control judge) would take effect in three years. The provisions regarding organized crime must come into effect immediately. Source: Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona. 2008. “La Reforma Constitucional en Materia Penal de Junio de 2008. Claroscuros de una Oportunidad Histórica para Transformar el Sistema Penal Mexicano” in Análisis Plural, no. 3.
67
e. Security Policy (2007-2010)
Table 10. Important Arrests (2006-2010)
Cartel Name Function/Rank Date
Sinaloa Sandra Ávila Beltrán aka “La Reina del Pacífico”
Money laundering network boss, contact with Colombian cartels
September 28, 2007
Beltrán Leyva Alfredo Beltrán Leyva aka “El Mochomo” Boss January 20, 2008
Beltrán Leyva Ever Villafañe Martínez Beltrán Leyva‟s principal cocaine supplier from Colombia
July 31, 2008
Sinaloa Jesús Zambada García Boss October 22, 2008
Tijuana Eduardo Arellano Félix Boss October 26, 2008
Zetas Jaime González Durán aka “El Hummer” Boss November 7, 2008
La Familia Michoacana
Alberto Espinoza Barrón aka “El Fresa” Boss December 30, 2008
Sinaloa Vicente Zambada Niebla aka “El Vicentillo”
Money laundering network boss
March 18, 2009
Juárez Vicente Carrillo Leyva Money laundering network boss
April 2, 2009
La Familia Michoacana
Rafael Cedeño Hernández Boss April 20, 2009
La Familia Michoacana
Arnoldo Rueda Medina aka “La Minsa” Boss July 11, 2009
Beltrán Leyva Carlos Beltrán Leyva Boss December 30, 2009
Tijuana Teodoro García Simental aka “El Teo” Lieutenat January 12, 2010
Tijuana Manuel García Simental aka “El Chiquilín”
Hitmen boss February 7, 2010
Beltrán Leyva Gerardo Álvarez Vázquez aka “El Indio” Fraction boss April 21, 2010
Beltrán Leyva Édgar Valdez Villareal aka “La Barbie” Fraction boss August 30, 2010
Beltrán Leyva Enrique Villareal Barragán aka “El Grande”
Fraction boss September 12, 2010
Table 11. U.S.* and México**
Illicit Drugs Consumption Comparison by Ages (2008)
Age
At least one dose in lifetime
Last month Last year
U.S. Mexico U.S. Mexico U.S. Mexico
Millions
12-17 6.7 1.4 4.9 0.2 2.4 0.1
18-34 19.3 1.1 11.4 0.6 6.7 0.4
35-65 93.8 1.4 20.1 0.2 11.5 0.2
Total 117.3 3.9 35.5 1.1 20.1 0.7
Percentage of population
12-17 26.2 4.8 19.0 1.5 9.3 0.8
18-34 56.6 7.4 33.5 2.0 19.6 1.3
35-65 48.0 4.5 10.3 0.6 5.9 0.6
Total 47.0 5.2 14.2 1.4 8.0 0.9 * Source: National Survey on Drug Use and Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2008 and U.S. Census Bureau ** Source: National Addictions Survey 2002 and 2008, CONADIC, Secretaría de Salud, Mexico
68
Table 12. Cumulative Drug Use Incidence by State
State %
Marijuana %
Cocaine % Amphetamine-type Stimulants
% Heroin % Illegal Drugs
Aguascalientes 3.3 2.6 0.1 0.1 4.8
Baja California 7.5 3.9 2.7 0.4 9.3
Baja California Sur 6.0 3.8 1.6 0.0 7.2
Campeche 4.6 1.7 0.2 0.0 5.0
Coahuila 2.5 1.7 0.2 0.2 3.1
Colima 1.7 1.5 0.3 0.1 2.4
Chiapas 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.7
Chihuahua 6.2 4.8 1.0 1.0 7.5
Distrito Federal 6.6 3.1 0.8 0.5 7.8
Durango 5.8 4.0 0.8 0.1 7.8
Guanajuato 3.1 2.1 0.4 0.0 5.7
Guerrero 3.4 3.4 0.3 0.0 4.7
Hidalgo 6.7 4.0 0.9 0.1 8.3
Jalisco 4.1 1.9 0.7 0.1 5.0
México 3.9 1.8 0.4 0.3 4.6
Michoacán 3.2 2.4 0.6 0.0 4.3
Morelos 3.5 2.0 0.1 0.1 4.1
Nayarit 4.8 3.9 0.5 0.0 6.6
Nuevo León 3.2 1.9 0.5 0.2 4.1
Oaxaca 2.7 1.4 0.0 0.0 3.4
Puebla 2.8 0.9 0.4 0.0 3.4
Querétaro 6.2 2.3 0.4 0.1 6.7
Quintana Roo 8.6 6.0 0.4 0.1 10.1
San Luis Potosí 2.7 0.6 0.1 0.1 3.0
Sinaloa 3.8 3.7 0.7 0.1 6.3
Sonora 3.6 2.9 0.6 0.0 5.1
Tabasco 5.5 2.2 0.3 0.0 5.9
Tamaulipas 8.3 6.0 0.3 0.1 10.3
Tlaxcala 1.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 2.2
Veracruz 2.6 0.9 0.1 0.1 2.7
Yucatán 3.8 0.7 0.3 0.1 3.9
Zacatecas 4.9 3.3 0.5 0.0 6.0
Average 4.3 2.6 0.5 0.1 5.4
Source: National Addictions Survey 2008.
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Appendix II. The Logic of Mexican Organized Crime
Table 13. Intra and Inter Cartel Conflicts Year 2007 2010
Cartels in dispute
Sinaloa vs. Tijuana Sinaloa vs. Juárez
Sinaloa vs. Golfo-Zetas La Familia vs. Zetas
Sinaloa vs. Tijuana
Golfo vs. Juárez Sinaloa vs. Golfo-Zetas
La Familia vs. Zetas Sinaloa vs. Beltrán Leyva
Sinaloa vs. Beltrán Leyva-Zetas Golfo vs. Zetas
Pacífico Sur vs. La Barbie
Total 4 8
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Figure 5. Intra and Inter Cartel Confrontations
2007 2008
2009 2010
Note: Red arrows represent conflict, blue arrows represent alliance.
71
Figure 6. Inter Cartel Alliances
2007 2008
2009 2010
72
a. Other Organized Crime Businesses: Kidnapping, Extortion and Vehicle Thefts
Table 14. Kidnapping, Extortion and Stolen Vehicles Per State (2009)
States Kidnapping Extortion Vehicles
Theft
Aguascalientes 16 319 2,199
Baja California 103 694 25,142
Baja California Sur 3 160 837
Campeche 0 373 51
Chiapas 12 1,138 1,511
Chihuahua 204 797 22,546
Coahuila 17 392 2,123
Colima 1 106 304
Distrito Federal 85 8,465 26,210
Durango 37 263 2,626
Guanajuato 78 1,386 6,365
Guerrero 51 475 3,277
Hidalgo 15 368 2,665
Jalisco 17 2,039 7,313
México 127 8,316 39,647
Michoacán 98 532 4,968
Morelos 33 639 4,135
Nayarit 4 86 735
Nuevo León 13 897 12,797
Oaxaca 33 397 1,700
Puebla 27 826 3,817
Querétaro 3 776 1,825
Quintana Roo 6 507 1,206
San Luis Potosí 21 506 1,970
Sinaloa 18 402 5,864
Sonora 4 281 4,372
Tabasco 16 813 1,722
Tamaulipas 52 696 5,837
Tlaxcala 3 176 522
Veracruz 0 1,216 2,567
Yucatán 0 876 408
Zacatecas 31 237 1,186
Total 1,128 35,154 198,447
Average 35 1,099 6,202
Source: Extortion reports from Informe del estado de la Seguridad Pública en México. 2010. Centro Nacional de Atención Ciudadana de la Policía Federal (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública). http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_publica.pptx; and Kidnapping and Vehicle Theft reports, INEGI, http://www.inegi.org.mx/inegi/default.aspx?s=est&c=15274
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Table 15. Extortion Reports Registered by the Federal Police (2008-2009)
State
2008 2009
Total Reports
Accomplished Attempts Total
Reports Accomplished Attempts
Aguascalientes 930 60 870 319 22 297
Baja California 765 73 692 694 79 615
Baja California Sur 185 15 170 160 12 148
Campeche 442 31 411 373 27 346
Coahuila 735 74 661 392 32 360
Colima 293 19 274 106 3 103
Chihuahua 1,079 107 972 797 90 707
Chiapas 993 81 912 1,138 88 1,050
Distrito Federal 11,223 964 10,259 8,465 734 7,731
Durango 433 46 387 263 31 232
Guerrero 825 92 733 475 81 394
Guanajuato 2,249 205 2,044 1,386 116 1,270
Hidalgo 618 59 559 368 40 328
Jalisco 2,532 222 2,310 2,039 188 1,851
México 11,318 1,197 10,121 8,316 944 7,372
Michoacán 936 105 831 532 66 466
Morelos 1,014 83 931 639 50 589
Nayarit 293 19 274 86 9 77
Nuevo León 1,017 103 914 897 92 805
Oaxaca 635 57 578 397 57 340
Puebla 1,073 123 950 826 108 718
Querétaro 1,183 79 1,104 776 64 712
Quintana Roo 1,169 71 1,098 507 33 474
Sinaloa 560 66 494 402 58 344
San Luis Potosí 1,021 81 940 506 46 460
Sonora 232 29 203 281 38 243
Tabasco 979 62 917 813 56 757
Tamaulipas 816 79 737 696 52 644
Tlaxcala 276 24 252 176 21 155
Veracruz 1,874 187 1,687 1,216 151 1,065
Yucatán 956 55 901 876 43 833
Zacatecas 464 45 419 237 28 209
Total 49,118 4,513 44,605 35,154 3,459 31,695
Average 1,535 141 1,394 1,099 108 990
Source: Extortion reports from Informe del estado de la Seguridad Pública en México. 2010. Centro Nacional de Atención Ciudadana de la Policía Federal (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública). http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_publica.pptx
74
Appendix III. Organized Crime Violence 1. The Evolution of Violence
a. National Level
Figure 7. Number of Drug related Executions from
January 2007 to June 2010 (Linear Projection from July 2010 to December 2012)
Note 1: Own elaboration with data from Reforma (January 2007-December 2009), and from a database retrieved from 19 national and local newspapers (January-June 2010). http://gruporeforma.reforma.com/graficoanimado/nacional/ejecutometro_2009/ Note 2: These figures are calculated based on official public information from Diálogos por la Seguridad (28,353 executions from December 2006 to July 2010). Note 3: Trends calculated with a linear projection by the least squares method based on information adjusted from a 30.17 percent subestimation in relation to the total for the same period (19,800) obtained from newspaper‟s information.
19,800
34,857
43,542
53,190
63,799
75,370
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Ja
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7
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07
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v-1
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12
No
v-1
2
De
c-1
2
January 2007 - July 2010 (1) January 2007 - July 2010 (2) July 2010 - December 2010 January 2011 - June 2011
July 2011 - December 2011 January 2012 - June 2012 July 2012 - December 2012
28,354
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Figure 8. Execution by Year (2001-2010*)
Note 1: Own elaboration with data from Trans-Border Institute (2001-2009), and from a database retrieved from 19 national and local newspapers (January-June 2010). Note 2: These figures are calculated based on official public information from Diálogos por la Seguridad (28,353 executions from December 2006 to July 2010). Note 3: Trends calculated with a linear projection by the least squares method based on information adjusted from 30.17 percent under-estimation in relation to the total for the same period (19,800) obtained from newspaper‟s information.
1080 1230 1290 1304 1776
2270
5207
6587
2119 3118
7136
9025
11803
14481
18207 15578
18333
22181
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Executions (1) Executions (2) Projected Executions (1) Projected Executions (2)
76
b. State and Local Level
Table 16. Municipalities with the Highest Number of Executions (Second Semester 2009)
July 2009 to December 2009
State Municipality Total %
Chihuahua Juárez 1078 28.8
Sinaloa Culiacán 198 5.3
Baja California Tijuana 156 4.2
Chihuahua Chihuahua 122 3.3
Durango Gómez Palacio 98 2.6
Guerrero Acapulco de Juárez 60 1.6
Sinaloa Mazatlán 57 1.5
Sinaloa Navolato 53 1.4
Sonora Nogales 53 1.4
Coahuila Torreón 37 1.0
Durango Pueblo Nuevo 33 0.9
Guerrero Chilpancingo de los Bravo 31 0.8
Chihuahua Nuevo Casas Grandes 29 0.8
Chihuahua Guadalupe 28 0.8
Durango Durango 26 0.7
Total 2057 55
Source: Own elaboration with data from 19 national and state newspapers.
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Table 17. Municipalities with the Highest Number of Executions (First Semester 2010)
January 2010 to June 2010
State Municipality Total %
Chihuahua Juárez 968 17.5
Chihuahua Chihuahua 262 4.7
Sinaloa Culiacán 249 4.5
Baja California Tijuana 182 3.3
Coahuila Torreón 151 2.7
Durango Gómez Palacio 129 2.3
Sinaloa Mazatlán 124 2.3
Sinaloa Ahome 91 1.7
Sonora Nogales 90 1.6
Durango Durango 81 1.5
Guerrero Acapulco de Juárez 78 1.4
Sinaloa Navolato 69 1.2
Nayarit Tepic 64 1.2
Tamaulipas Miguel Alemán 60 1.1
Tamaulipas Reynosa 58 1.0
Total 2657 48
Source: Own elaboration with data from 19 national and state newspapers.
Table 18. Mayors Killed in 2010
Name Municipality Date
1. Ramón Mendívil Sotelo Guadalupe y Calvo, Chihuahua February 18 2. Manuel Estrada Escalante El Mezquital, Durango February 23 3. José Santiago Agustino Zapotitlán Tablas, Guerrero April 28 4. Jesús Manuel Lara Rodríguez Guadalupe, Chihuahua June 19 5. Óscar Venancio Rivera San José del Progreso, Oaxaca June 20 6. Nicolás García Ambrosio Santo Domingo de Morelos, Oaxaca June 30 7. Edelmiro Cavazos Leal Santiago, Nuevo León August 15 8. Marco Antonio Leal García Hidalgo, Tamaulipas August 29 9. Alexander López García El Naranjo, San Luis Potosí September 8
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Appendix IV. Government Strategy and Actions Against Organized Crime
1. Actions
a. Arrests
Table 19. Detainees by Hierarchy Level Hierarchical Level 2007 2008 2009 Total %
Boss 1 1 11 13 0.2
Specialized Operator 11 30 68 109 2.0
Logistics Operator 17 35 42 94 1.8
Hitmen/Guardian 214 667 1,288 2,169 40.8
Operative Base 785 737 1,411 2,933 55.2
Total 1,028 1,470 2,820 5,318 100
Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins.
b. Seizures
i. Drugs
Table 20. Illicit Drugs and Vehicles Seizures (1994-2009)
Year
Seizures
Marijuana Cocaine Opium gum
Heroin Psychotropics Vehicles
(Tons) (Kilos) (Units)
1994 133 6 n.d. n.d. n.d. 139
1995 273 7 n.d. n.d. n.d. 231
1996 428 7 n.d. n.d. n.d. 683
1997 440 12 n.d. n.d. n.d. 679
1998 528 13 n.d. n.d. n.d. 718
1999 750 28 n.d. n.d. n.d. 658
2000 2,054 23 469 299 3,418,369 3,297
2001 1,841 30 517 270 8,350,246 2,679
2002 1,635 13 310 283 5,343,064 2,029
2003 2,248 21 199 306 8,894,604 2,059
2004 2,213 27 465 303 21,834,732 2,705
2005 1,787 31 276 459 11,359,511 2,173
2006 1,902 21 124 334 3,364,768 1,521
2007 2,213 48 307 317 2,657,002 5,400
2008 1,685 19 183 296 32,154,760 9,306
2009* 1,349 24 312 407 17,839,030 11,764
Average 1,343 21 316 327 11,521,609 2,878
Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Calderón Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). *Figures for 2009 are linearly projected based on monthly averages., n.d.= no data available.
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Table 21.
Illicit Crop Eradication (1994-2009)
Year
Illicit Crop Eradication (hectares)
Total Marijuana Poppy
1994 17,908 8,956 8,951
1995 28,393 15,811 12,582
1996 27,694 16,444 11,249
1997 30,004 17,043 12,961
1998 30,704 17,807 12,897
1999 37,799 25,659 12,140
2000 46,779 31,061 15,718
2001 47,852 28,735 19,117
2002 49,933 30,775 19,158
2003 56,619 36,585 20,034
2004 46,778 30,852 15,926
2005 52,452 30,843 21,609
2006 47,051 30,162 16,890
2007 34,726 23,316 11,411
2008 31,751 18,561 13,190
2009* 35,127 15,994 19,133
Average 38,848 23,663 15,185
Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Calderón Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). *Figures for 2009 are linearly projected based on monthly averages.
80
Table 22. State Ranking of Drug Seizures Frequency (December 2006 - February 2010)
State Dismantled
Laboratories Eradicated
Crops Marijuana Seizures
Cocaine Seizures
Heroin Seizures
Methamphetamine Seizures
Aguascalientes 7
Baja California 8 4 6 1
Baja California Sur
Campeche 9
Coahuila 9
Colima 7
Chiapas 9 4 8
Chihuahua 6 3
Distrito Federal 6 2 5 9
Durango 3 5
Guanajuato
Guerrero 4 7
Hidalgo
Jalisco 2 2 10 7 4
México 3 5 3
Michoacán 1 5 8 8 2
Morelos
Nayarit 10 4
Nuevo León 9 7
Oaxaca 1
Puebla
Querétaro
Quintana Roo 8
San Luis Potosí
Sinaloa 4 1 3 1 5
Sonora 5 6 1 3 2 6
Tabasco
Tamaulipas 10 2 6
Tlaxcala
Veracruz
Yucatán
Zacatecas 8 7 9
Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins and with data from nine national newspapers and ten regional or state newspapers.
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ii. Weapons and Vehicles
Table 23. Confiscated Weapons (1994-2009)
Years Weapons
1994 4,026
1995 11,589
1996 12,237
1997 9,743
1998 9,002
1999 7,271
2000 7,494
2001 8,466
2002 8,381
2003 5,626
2004 5,577
2005 5,115
2006 4,220
2007 9,527
2008 21,046
2009* 30,032
Average 9,960
Source: Own elaboration with data from Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). *Figures for 2009 are linearly projected based on monthly averages.
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Table 24. Percentage of Seized Weapons (December 2006 to February 2010)
State Percentage of Seizures
Short Guns
Long Guns
Artillery Cartridge Explosive
Aguascalientes 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.0
Baja California 3.4 3.9 0.0 2.7 1.6
Coahuila 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 3.1
Colima 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chiapas 1.7 2.0 0.0 2.0 3.1
Chihuahua 4.0 4.6 0.0 2.7 3.1
Distrito Federal 35.4 19.5 25.0 35.6 15.6
Guanajuato 1.7 2.0 0.00 2.0 3.1
Guerrero 3.4 3.9 0.00 1.3 3.1
Hidalgo 0.6 1.3 0.00 0.7 0.00
Jalisco 6.3 6.5 12.5 5.4 6.3
México 4.0 3.3 12.5 5.4 4.7
Michoacán 14.3 19.5 25.0 15.4 25.0
Morelos 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nayarit 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.7 1.6
Nuevo León 1.1 2.6 12.5 2.0 1.6
Oaxaca 1.1 1.3 0.0 0.7 0.0
Puebla 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Querétaro 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0
Quintana Roo 1.7 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.0
Sinaloa 1.7 3.9 0.0 3.4 1.6
Sonora 2.3 4.6 0.0 4.7 4.7
Tamaulipas 9.7 14.3 0.0 10.1 14.1
Tlaxcala 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.7 1.6
Veracruz 4.0 3.3 12.5 1.3 6.3
Zacatecas 0.56 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Own elaboration with data from PGR press bulletins.
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Table 25. Guns Seized from Each Cartel (From December 2006 to February 2010)
State
Cartels
Sinaloa Golfo Zetas Beltrán Leyva
La Familia Michoacana
Tijuana Juárez Milenio Díaz Parada
Aguascalientes 100.0
Baja California 10.0 90.0
Coahuila n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Colima
Chiapas 100.0
Chihuahua 100.0
Distrito Federal 10.0 20.0 15.0 25.0 10.0 15.0 5.0
Guanajuato 100.0
Guerrero 11.1 55.6 33.3
Hidalgo 25.0 75.0
Jalisco 33.4 11.1 11.1 22.2 11.1 11.1
México 28.6 14.3 14.3 42.9
Michoacán 3.3 10.0 3.3 83.3
Morelos 100.0
Nayarit 33.3 66.7
Nuevo León 50.0 33.3 16.7
Oaxaca 50.0 50.0
Puebla n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Querétaro n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Quintana Roo 66.67 33.3
Sinaloa 66.7 33.3
Sonora 60.0 40.0
Tamaulipas 66.7 26.7 6.7
Tlaxcala 33.3 66.7
Veracruz 28.6 71.4
Zacatecas 100.0
Source: Own elaboration with data from PGR press bulletins. n.d.: There is information about weapon seizures happening in these states; however, this information does not specify to which cartel the weapons belonged to.
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Table 26. Weapons Seizures in Each State (December 2006 to February 2010)
State Number of Seizures
Total Short Guns
Long Guns
Artillery Cartridges Explosives
Aguascalientes 1 1 0 1 0 3
Baja California 6 6 0 4 1 17
Baja California Sur 0 0 0 0 0 0
Coahuila 2 0 0 1 2 5
Colima 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chiapas 3 3 0 3 2 11
Chihuahua 7 7 0 4 2 20
Distrito Federal 62 30 2 53 10 157
Guanajuato 3 3 0 3 2 11
Guerrero 6 6 0 2 2 16
Hidalgo 1 2 0 1 0 4
Jalisco 11 10 1 8 4 34
México 7 5 1 8 3 24
Michoacán 25 30 2 23 16 96
Morelos 0 1 0 0 0 1
Nayarit 1 1 0 1 1 4
Nuevo León 2 4 1 3 1 11
Oaxaca 2 2 0 1 0 5
Puebla 1 1 0 0 0 2
Querétaro 0 0 0 2 0 2
Quintana Roo 3 1 0 1 0 5
Sinaloa 3 6 0 5 1 15
Sonora 4 7 0 7 3 21
Tamaulipas 17 22 0 15 9 63
Tlaxcala 0 1 0 1 1 3
Veracruz 7 5 1 2 4 19
Zacatecas 1 0 0 0 0 1
Total 175 154 8 149 64 550
Average 6.48 5.70 0.30 5.52 2.37 20.37
Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins and with data from nine national newspapers and ten regional or state newspapers.
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c. Dismantled Laboratories and Crop Eradication
Table 27. Dismantled Laboratories and Eradicated Crops (December 2006 - February 2010)
Place Dismantled Laboratories Eradicated Crops
State % State %
1 Michoacán 22.9 Sinaloa 28.4
2 Jalisco 14.3 Jalisco 16.6
3 México 11.5 Durango 10.2
4 Sinaloa 8.6 Guerrero 10.0
5 Sonora 7.2 Michoacán 9.7
6 D.F. 6.9 Sonora 9.5
7 Aguascalientes 6.6 Zacatecas 4.7
8 Zacatecas 6.3 Baja California 3.1
9 Nuevo León 5.7 Chiapas 2.8
10 Tamaulipas 3.7 Nayarit 2.6
Total 93.7 97.6
Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins and with data from nine national newspapers and ten regional or state newspapers.
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Appendix V. Drug Market
1. Production
Table 28. Illegal Drug Production in the Mexican States State Marijuana Poppy Heroin Amphetamines
Aguascalientes
Baja California X X
Baja California Sur X X
Campeche
Chiapas X
Chihuahua X X X X
Coahuila
Colima X
Distrito Federal X
Durango X X X
Estado de México
Guanajuato
Guerrero X X X
Hidalgo
Jalisco X X X
Michoacán X X X
Morelos
Nayarit X X X
Nuevo León X
Oaxaca X X
Puebla X
Querétaro
Quintana Roo
San Luis Potosí
Sinaloa X X X X
Sonora X X X
Tabasco
Tamaulipas X
Tlaxcala
Veracruz
Yucatán
Zacatecas X X
Source: PGR press bulletins and data from 19 national and regional newspapers.
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2. Prices
Table 29. Drug Price Variation per State (Maximum and Minimum Price)
Source: Own elaboration with data retrieved from the National Addictions Survey 2008 database
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Table 30. Drug Price Variation per State (Geometric Mean)
Source: Own elaboration with data retrieved from the National Addictions Survey 2008 database.
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Appendix VI. Public Opinion and the War on Drugs
Figure 9. In your Opinion, What is the Major Problem in the Country?
Source: Own elaboration with data from Buendía & Laredo (September-2009, February-2009, June-2010, August-2010) and GEA-ISA (November-2009, March-2010, May-2010). http://www.buendiaylaredo.com/publicaciones/120/APROBACION_INFORME.pdf http://www.isa.org.mx/contenido/GIMX1005p.pdf
Figure 10. How Do You Grade the Federal Government in Relation to… (Very Good, Good, Bad, Very Bad)?
Source: Own elaboration with data from Buendía & Laredo (September-2009, February-2009, June-2010, August-2010) http://www.buendiaylaredo.com/publicaciones/120/APROBACION_INFORME.pdf
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Sep-09 Nov-09 Feb-10 Mar-10 May-10 Jun-10 Aug-10
Public Security Economic Political
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Very Good Good Bad Very Bad
Combating drug trafficking Combating insecurity Fighting Corruption
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Figure 11. How Successful has been the Federal Government in Relation to...? (Answers with “Very Successful”)
Source: Own elaboration with data from GEA-ISA (November-2009, March-2010, May-2010). http://www.isa.org.mx/contenido/GIMX1005p.pdf
Figure 12. Do You Agree or Disagree with the Direct Participation of the Army in Combating Drug Traffic Organizations?
Source: Own elaboration with data from GEA-ISA (November-2009, March-2010, May-2010). http://www.isa.org.mx/contenido/GIMX1005p.pdf
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Combating drug trafficking Combating insecurity Fighting Corruption
Mar-10 May-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
May-08 Aug-08 Nov-08 Mar-09 Nov-09 Mar-10 May-10
Agree Disagree
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Figure 13. In Comparison with Six Months Ago, Do You Think that Today Insecurity in the Country is Higher, Same, or Lower?
Source: Own elaboration with data from GEA-ISA (November-2009, March-2010, May-2010). http://www.isa.org.mx/contenido/GIMX1005p.pdf
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Mar-09 May-09 Aug-09 Nov-09 Mar-10 May-10
Higher Equal Minor
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Appendix VII. Illicit Drugs Glossary This section provides information on the five categories of illicit drugs (narcotics, stimulants, depressants or sedatives, hallucinogens and cannabis). These categories include many drugs legally produced and prescribed by doctors as well as those illegally produced and sold outside of medical channels.37 Amphetamine: Is a psychostimulant drug that is known to produce increased wakefulness and focus in
association with decreased fatigue and appetite. Cannabis (Cannabis sativa): Is the common hemp plant, which provides hallucinogens with some sedative
properties, and includes marijuana (pot, Acapulco gold, grass, reefer), tetrahydrocannabinol (THC, Marinol), hashish (hash) and hashish oil (hash oil).
Coca (mostly Erythroxylum coca): Is a bush with leaves that contain the stimulant used to make cocaine. Cocaine: Is a stimulant derived from the leaves of the coca bush. Depressants (sedatives): Are drugs that reduce tension and anxiety and include chloral hydrate,
barbiturates (Amytal, Nembutal, Seconal, phenobarbital), benzodiazepines (Librium, Valium), methaqualone (Quaalude), glutethimide (Doriden), and others (Equanil, Placidyl, Valmid).
Drugs: Are any chemical substances that produce a physical, mental, emotional, or behavioral change in an individual.
Drug abuse: Is the use of any licit or illicit chemical substance that results in physical, mental, emotional, or behavioral impairment in an individual.
Hallucinogens: Are drugs that affect sensation, thinking, self-awareness, and emotion. Hallucinogens include LSD (acid, microdot), mescaline and peyote (mexc, buttons, cactus), amphetamine variants (PMA, STP, DOB), phencyclidine (PCP, angel dust, hog), phencyclidine analogues (PCE, PCPy, TCP), and others (psilocybin, psilocyn).
Hashish: Is the resinous exudate of the cannabis or hemp plant (Cannabis sativa). Heroin: Is a semisynthetic derivative of morphine. Mandrax: Is a trade name for methaqualone, a pharmaceutical depressant. Marijuana: Is the dried leaf of the cannabis or hemp plant (Cannabis sativa). Methaqualone: Is a pharmaceutical depressant, referred to as mandrax in Southwest Asia and Africa. Narcotics: Are drugs that relieve pain, often induce sleep, and refer to opium, opium derivatives, and
synthetic substitutes. Natural narcotics include opium (paregoric, parepectolin), morphine (MS-Contin, Roxanol), codeine (Tylenol with codeine, Empirin with codeine, Robitussin AC), and thebaine. Semisynthetic narcotics include heroin (horse, smack), and hydromorphone (Dilaudid). Synthetic narcotics include meperidine or Pethidine (Demerol, Mepergan), methadone (Dolophine, Methadose), and others (Darvon, Lomotil).
Opium: Is the brown, gummy exudate of the incised, unripe seedpod of the opium poppy. Opium poppy (Papaver somniferum): Is the source for the natural and semisynthetic narcotics. Poppy straw: Is the entire cut and dried opium poppy-plant material, other than the seeds. Opium is
extracted from poppy straw in commercial operations that produce the drug for medical use. Psychotropics: Are generally defined as any chemical substance that crosses the blood-brain barrier and
acts primarily upon the central nervous system where it alters brain function, resulting in changes in perception, mood, consciousness, cognition and behavior. However, the United Nations Office on
37 Definitions from Central Intelligence Agency, 2010, The World Factbook. Definitions and References, retrieved from the Internet on August 3, 2010: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html#I and United Nations, 1971, Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p. 28.
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Drugs and Crime gives in its Convention on Psychotropic Substances a list with the chemical substances considered psychotropic. The drugs enlisted in the convention are the ones considered psychotropic in this report.
Qat (kat, khat): Is a stimulant from the buds or leaves of Catha edulis that is chewed or drunk as tea. Quaaludes: Is the North American slang term for methaqualone, a pharmaceutical depressant. Stimulants: Are drugs that relieve mild depression, increase energy and activity, and include cocaine
(coke, snow, crack), amphetamines (Desoxyn, Dexedrine), ephedrine, ecstasy (clarity, essence, doctor, Adam), phenmetrazine (Preludin), methylphenidate (Ritalin), and others (Cylert, Sanorex, Tenuate).