securing the surrender-marines in the occupation of japan ......fighting and sacrifice, japan was...

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SECURING THE SURRENDER

MARINES IN THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN (SFT)

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DISTRIBUTION: PCN 19000314280

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Securing the Surrender:Marines in the Occupation of Japanby Charles R. Smith

t noon on 15 August1945, people gath-ered near radios andhastily setup loud-speakers in homes,

offices, factories, and on citystreets throughout Japan. Eventhough many felt that defeat wasnot far off, the vast majorityexpected to hear new exhortationsto fight to the death or the officialannouncement of a declaration ofwar on the Soviet Union.

The muted strains of the nation-al anthem immediately followedthe noon time-signal. Listenersthen heard State Minister HiroshiShimomura announce that thenext voice they would hear wouldbe that of His Imperial Majesty theEmperor. In a solemn voice,Emperor Hirohito read the firstfateful words of the ImperialRescript:

After pondering deeplythe general trend of theworld situation and the actu-al state of Our Empire, Wehave decided to effect a set-tlement of the present crisisby resort to an extraordinarymeasure. To Our good andloyal subjects, we hereby con-vey Our will. We have com-manded Our Government tocommunicate to the Govern-ments of the United States,

On the Cover: Passing a black-uni-formed Japanese policeman, the 26thMarines move into the heart of Sasebo.National Archives Photo 127-N-139167

At Left: Japanese children, seeing aMarine for the first time, eagerly reachfor chocolates offered them by SSgt HenryA. Weaver, III. National ArchivesPhoto 127-N-139887

Great Britain, China and theSoviet Union that Our Em-pire accepts the terms of theirJoint Declaration.Although the word "surrender"

was not mentioned and few knewof the Joint Declaration of theAllied Powers calling for uncondi-tional surrender of Japan, theyquickly understood that theEmperor was announcing the ter-mination of hostilities on termslaid down by the enemy. Aftermore than three and a half years offighting and sacrifice, Japan wasaccepting defeat.

On Guam, 1,363 nautical milesto the south, the men of the 6thMarine Division had turned inearly the night before after a longday of combat training. At 2200,lights on the island suddenly cameon. Radio reports had confirmedrumors circulating for daysthroughout the division's camp onthe high ground overlooking PagoBay: the Japanese had surrenderedand there would be an immediateceasefire. As some Marines cladonly in towels or skivvies dancedin the streets and members of the22d Marines band conducted animpromptu parade, most of the4th Marine Regimental CombatTeam was on board ship, ready toleave for "occupational and possi-ble light combat duty in Japanese -held territory." No less happythan their fellow Marines ashore,they remained cynical. TheJapanese had used subterfugebefore. Who could say they werenot being deceptive now?

In May 1945, months before thefighting ended, preliminary plansfor the occupation of Japan wereprepared at the headquarters of

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General of the Army DouglasMacArthur in Manila and FleetAdmiral Chester W. Nimitz onGuam. Staff studies, based on thepossibility of the sudden collapseor surrender of the JapaneseGovernment and High Command,were prepared and distributed atarmy and fleet level for planningpurposes. In early summer, asfighting still raged on Okinawaand in the Philippines, dual-plan-ning went forward for both thesubjugation of Japan by force inOperations Olympic and Coronet,and its peaceful occupation inOperations Blacklist and Campus.

Many essential elements ofMacArthur's Olympic and Black-list plans were similar. The SixthArmy, which was slated to makethe attack on the southern islandof Kyushu under Olympic, wasgiven the contingent task of occu-pying southern Japan underOperation Blacklist. Likewise, theEighth Army, using the wealth ofinformation it had accumulatedregarding the island of Honshu inplanning for Coronet, was desig-nated the occupying force fornorthern Japan. The Tenth Army,a component of the Honshu inva-sion force, was given the missionof occupying Korea. AdmiralNimitz's plan envisioned the ini-tial occupation of Tokyo Bay andother strategic areas by the ThirdFleet and Marine forces, pendingthe arrival of formal occupationforces under General MacArthur'scommand.

When the Japanese governmentmade its momentous decision tosurrender in the wake of atomicbombings and the Soviet Union's

(Continued on page 3)

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The Invasion That Never Wasy May 1945, as bitter fighting continued onOkinawa and Americans celebrated Germany'ssurrender, Pacific strategists had developed

detailed plans for Operation Downfall, the two-phasedinvasion of the Japanese home islands to begin on 1November. More than 5 million Allied troops wouldconduct the two largest planned amphibious assaults inhistory. As planned, all six Marine divisions and threeMarine aircraft wings would play major combat roles.

Operation Olympic, the first phase of OperationDownfall, would involve the seizure of southernKyushu by 14 divisions of the U.S. Sixth Army. Theirobjectives were to seize airfields, harbors, and stagingareas for the subsequent buildup and launching ofOperation Coronet, the amphibious assault by 23 divi-sions of the U. S. First and Eighth Armies on 1 March1946 against the industrial and political heart of Japan,the Kanto Plain on Honshu. The Marine ground com-ponent for Olympic was V Amphibious Corps, com-posed of the 2d, 3d, and 5th Marine Divisions, underthe command of Major General Harry Schmidt. ForCoronet it was III Amphibious Corps (1st, 4th, and 6thMarine Divisions) under Major General Keller E.Rockey.

On 1 November, three corps of three divisions eachwould conduct simultaneous amphibious assaultsagainst three separate locations on southern Kyushu.General Schmidt's V Amphibious Corps would seize abeachhead near Kushikino and then clear the SatsumaPeninsula, bordering the west side of Kagoshima Bay.The Army's XI Corps would land at Ariake Bay andtake the eastern peninsula. I Corps would land furtherup the island's east coast. The three corps would movenorth and establish a defensive line, stretching from

If peace had not come, scores of suicide motorboats were readyfor use against American invasion troops.

National Archives Photo 127-N-140564

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Sendai in the west to Tsuno in the east, effectively block-ing Japanese reinforcements from moving souththrough the central mountains. If needed, a fourthcorps and two additional divisions would reinforce thethree assault corps.

The Japanese defensive plan for Kyushu encom-passed three phases. First, thousands of suicide aircraftand boats would attack the American fleet, targetingtroop transports in an effort to disrupt the landings.Second, newly organized defense divisions occupyingheavy fortifications overlooking the beaches, wouldattempt to prevent the landing force from gaining afoothold. Finally, mobile divisions based inland wouldcounterattack toward threatened positions. In August1945, Japanese ground forces on Kyushu consisted of 14divisions and several independent brigades, about600,000 die-hard troops, most of whom were deployednear the invasion area.

Ideally, an attacking force should have at least athree-to-one superiority in numbers over the defenders.On Kyushu, American and Japanese ground forceswould be of almost equal strength. In addition to regu-lar military units, Allied forces would also face a largecitizen militia, armed with whatever was at hand. Thebattle was expected to be bloody and costly. LieutenantGeneral Thomas A. Wornham, who commanded the

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27th Marines and would have taken part in the assault,later noted that when he commanded the 3d MarineDivision he would often commute between Japan andOkinawa and "we'd fly right over Kagoshima, and youcould see the beaches where Operation Olympic was tobe. . . . Every time I flew over I'd say: Thank God thatthe Japanese decided to call the war off when they did,because I don't think any of us would have made it.' Itwas pretty wild country down there."

With Kyushu-based fighters furnishing air support,Operation Coronet would be launched in March 1946.First Army would land two corps abreast at Katakaiand Chosbi on the Pacific Coast east of Tokyo. TheXXIV Corps (three divisions) and General Rockey's IIIAmphibious Corps would seize the peninsula flankingTokyo Bay. The Eighth Army's two corps would land at

Sagami Bay and seize the vital Yokohama-Yokosukaport complex. In subsequent operations, the First Armywould advance on Tokyo from the east while the EighthArmy would attack the capital from the southwest.Facing Allied troops would be nine divisions totallingsome 300,000 men, with an additional 27 to 35 divisionsavailable as reinforcement.

The dropping of the atomic bombs ended the warand the need for an invasion of the Japanese homeislands. If the invasion had proceeded, it would havebeen costly. While there is no way to accurately predictcasualities, there is no doubt that the Japanese wouldhave suffered immense losses, both military and civil-ian, dwarfing those inflicted by the atomic bombs. AndAmerican casualties certainly would have been in thehundreds of thousands.

(Continued from page 1)entry into the war, MacArthur'sand Nimitz's staffs quickly shiftedtheir focus from OperationOlympic to Blacklist and Campus,their respective plans for the occu-pation. In the process of coordi-natmg the two plans, MacArthur'sstaff notified Nimitz's representa-tives that "any landing whatsoev-er by naval or marine elementsprior to CINCAFPAC's [Mac-Arthur's] personal landing isemphatically unacceptable tohim." MacArthur's objections toan initial landing by naval andaccompanying Marine forces wasbased upon his belief that theywould be unable to cope with anyJapanese military opposition and,more importantly, because "itwould be psychologically offen-sive to ground and air forces of thePacific Theater to be relegatedfrom their proper missions at thehour of victory."

Despite apparent disagree-ments, MacArthur's plan for theoccupation, Blacklist, was accept-ed. But with at least a two-weeklag predicted between the surren-der and a landing in force, bothMacArthur and Nimitz agreedthat the immediate occupation ofJapan was paramount and shouldbe given the highest priority. Theonly military unit available with

sufficient power "to take Japaninto custody at short notice andenforce the Allies' will until occu-pation troops arrived" wasAdmiral William F. Halsey's ThirdFleet, then at sea 250 miles south-east of Tokyo, conducting carrierair strikes against Hokkaido andnorthern Honshu. On 8 August,advance copies of Halsey'sOperation Plan 10-45 for the occu-pation of Japan setting up TaskForce 31 (TF 31), the YokosukaOccupation Force, were distrib-uted. The task force's mission,based on Nimitz's basic concept,was to clear the entrance to TokyoBay and anchorages, occupy andsecure the Yokosuka Naval Base,seize and operate YokosukaAirfield, support the release ofAllied prisoners, demilitarize allenemy ships and defenses, andassist U.S. Army troops in prepar-ing for the landing of additionalforces.

Three days later, Rear AdmiralOscar C. Badger, Commander,Battleship Division 7, was desig-nated by Halsey to be commander,TF 31. The carriers, battleships,and cruisers of Vice Admiral JohnS. McCain's Task Force 38 alsowere alerted to organize andequip naval and Marine landingforces. At the same time, FleetMarine Force, Pacific, directed the

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6th Marine Division to furnish aregimental combat team to theThird Fleet for possible occupa-tion duty. Major General Keller E.Rockey, Commanding General, IIIAmphibious Corps, on the recom-mendation of Major GeneralLemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., nominat-ed Brigadier General William T.Clement, the division's assistantcommander, to head the combinedFleet landing force.

The decision of which of thedivision's three regiments wouldparticipate was an easy one forGeneral Shepherd. "Without hesi-tation [he] selected the 4thMarines," Brigadier General LouisMetzger, Clement's former chief ofstaff, later wrote. "This was asymbolic gesture on his part, asthe old 4th Marine Regiment hadparticipated in the PhilippineCampaign in 1942 and had beencaptured along with other U.S.forces in the Philippines. Now thenew 4th Marines would be themain combat formation takingpart in the initial landing andoccupation of Japan."

Preliminary plans for the activa-tion of Task Force Able were pre-pared by III Amphibious Corps.The task force was to consist of askeletal headquarters of 19 officersand 44 enlisted men, which waslater augmented, and the 4th

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Marines, Reinforced, with astrength of 5,156. An amphibiantractor company and a medicalcompany were added bringing thetotal task force strength up to5,400. Officers designated to formGeneral Clement's staff were alert-ed and immediately began plan-fling to load out the task force. III

Amphibious Corps issued warn-ing orders to the division's trans-port quartermaster section direct-ing that the regimental combatteam, with attached units, beready to embark 48 hours prior tothe expected time of the ships'arrival. This required the com-plete re-outfitting of all elements

of the task force which wereundergoing rehabilitation follow-ing the Okinawa campaign.

Requirements for clothing, ord-nance, and equipment and sup-plies had to be determined andarranged for from the 5th FieldService Depot. Initially, thisproved to be difficult due to the

Brigadier General William T. Clementeading the 4th Marines ashore at Yokosuka on 30August was a memorable event in BrigadierGeneral William T. Clement's life and career.

Clement was 48 and had been a Marine Corps officerfor 27 years at the time he was given command of theFleet Landing Force that would make the first landingon the Japanese home islands following the nation'sunconditional surrender. He was born in Lynchburg,Virginia, and graduated from Virginia MilitaryInstitute. Less than a month after reporting for activeduty in 1917, Clement sailed for Haiti where he joinedthe 2d Marine Regiment and its operations against rebelbandits.

Upon his return to the United States in 1919, hereported for duty at Marine Barracks, Quantico, wherehe remained until 1923, when he became post adjutantof the Marine Detachment at the American Legation inPeking, China. In 1926, he was assigned to the 4thMarine Regiment at San Diego as adjutant and inOctober of the same year was given command of a com-pany of Marines on mail guard duty in Denver,Colorado, where he remained for three months untilrejoining the 4th Marines. Clement sailed with the reg-iment for duty in China in 1927 and was successively acompany commander and regimental operations andtraining officer. Following his return to the UnitedStates in 1929, he became the executive officer of theMarine Recruit Depot, San Diego, and then command-ing officer of the Marine Detachment on board the WestVirginia. Clement spent most of the 1930s at Quantico,first as a student, then an as instructor, and finally as abattalion commander with the 5th Marines.

The outbreak of World War II found Clement servingon the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet inthe Philippines. Although quartered at Corregidor, heserved as a liaison among the Commandant, 16th NavalDistrict; the Commanding General, U.S. Armed Forcesin the Far East; and particularly with the forces engagedon Bataan until ordered to leave on board the U.S. sub-marine Snapper for Australia in April 1942. For his han-dling of the diversified units engaged at Cavite NavyYard and on Bataan, he was awarded the Navy Cross.

Following tours in Europe and at Quantico, Clement

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joined the 6th Marine Division in November 1944 asassistant division commander and took part in theOkinawa campaign. Less than two months after theYokosuka landing, he rejoined the division in NorthernChina. When the division was redesignated the 3dMarine Brigade, Clement became commanding generaland in June 1946 was named Commanding General,Marine Forces, Tsingtao Area.

Returning to the United States in September, he wasappointed President, Naval Retiring Board, and thenDirector, Marine Corps Reserve. In September 1949, heassumed command of Marine Corps Recruit Depot, SanDiego, holding that post until his retirement in 1952.Lieutenant General Clement died in 1955.

secret nature of the operation andthat all requisitions for supportfrom supply agencies and theIsland Command on Guam had tobe processed through IIIAmphibious Corps. At 0900 on 12August, the veil of secrecy sur-rounding the proposed operationwas lifted so that task force unitscould deal directly with all neces-sary service and supply agencies.All elements of the task force andthe 5th Field Service Depot thenwent on a 24-hour work day tocomplete the resupply task. Theregiment not only lacked supplies,but it also was understrength. Sixhundred enlisted replacementswere obtained from the FMFPacTransient Center, Marianas, to fillgaps in its ranks left by combatattrition and rotation to the UnitedStates.

Dump areas and dock spacewere allotted by the IslandCommand to accommodate thefive transports, a cargo ship, and adock landing ship of TransportDivision 60 assigned to carry TaskForce Able. The mounting-outprocess was considerably aided bythe announcement that all ships

would arrive in port on 14 August,24 hours later than originallyscheduled. On the evening of the13th, however, "all loading plansfor supplies were thrown intochaos" by information that thelarge transport, Harris (APA 2),had been deleted from the groupof ships assigned and that theGrimes (APA 172), a smaller trans-port with 50 percent less capacitywould be substituted. The resul-tant reduction of shipping spacewas partially made up by theassignment of a landing ship, tank(LST) to the transport group. IIIAmphibious Corps informed thetask force that no additional shipwould be allocated. Later, afterthe task force departed Guam, asecond LST was allotted to lift aportion of the remaining suppliesand equipment, including theamphibian tractors of CompanyA, 4th Amphibian Tractor Batt-alion.

On the afternoon of 14 August,loading began and continuedthroughout the night. The troopsboarded between 1000 and 1200the following day, and by 1600 alltransports were loaded. By 1900

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that evening, the transport divi-sion was ready to sail for its ren-dezvous at sea with the ThirdFleet. Within approximately 96hours, the regimental combatteam, it was reported, "had beencompletely re-outfitted, all equip-ment deficiencies corrected, allelements provided with an initialallowance to bring them up toT/ 0 and T/ A levels, and a thirtyday re-supply procured for ship-ment."

Two days prior to the departureof the main body of Task ForceAble, General Clement and thenucleus of his headquarters staffleft Guam on the landing ship,vehicle Ozark (LSV 2), accompa-nied by the Shadwell (LSV 15) andtwo destroyers, to join the ThirdFleet. As no definite mission hadbeen assigned to the force, littlepreliminary planning had takenplace so time enroute was spentstudying intelligence summariesof the Tokyo area. Few maps wereavailable and those that wereproved to be inadequate. The tripto the rendezvous point wasuneventful except for a reportedtorpedo wake across the Ozark'sbow. Several depth charges weredropped by the destroyer escortswith unknown results.

Halsey's ships were sighted on18 August, and next morning,Clement and key members of hisstaff transferred to the battleshipMissouri (BB 63) for the first of sev-eral rounds of conferences on theupcoming operation. At the con-ference, Task Force 31 was tenta-tively established and Clementlearned, for the first time, that theThird Fleet Landing Force wouldplay an active part in the occupa-tion of Japan by landing on MiuraPeninsula, 30 miles southwest ofTokyo. The primary task assignedby Admiral Halsey to Clement'sforces was seizure and occupationof Yokosuka airfield and navalbase in preparation for initial

National Archives Photo 80-G-332828

BGen William T. Clement, Fleet Landing Force commander, meets with Adm Halsey'schiefof staff, RAdm Robert B. Carney, on board the Missouri to discuss plans for thelandings in Tokyo Bay and the securing of Yokosuka Naval Base..

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landings by air of the 11thAirborne Division. Located southof Yokohama, 22 miles fromTokyo, the sprawling base con-tained two airfields, a seaplanebase, aeronautical research center,optical laboratory, gun factory andordnance depot, torpedo factory,munitions and aircraft storage,tank farms, supply depot, ship-yard, and training schools andhospitals. During the war approx-imately 70,000 civilians and 50,000naval ratings worked or trained atthe base.

Collateral missions includedthe demilitarization of the entireMiura Peninsula, which formedthe western arm of the headlandsenclosing Tokyo Bay, and theseizure of the Zushi area, includ-ing Hayama Imperial Palace,General MacArthur's tentativeheadquarters, on the southwestcoast of the peninsula. Two alter-native schemes of maneuver wereproposed to accomplish these mis-sions. The first contemplated alanding by assault troops on the

beaches near Zushi, followed by afive-mile drive east across thepeninsula in two columns over thetwo good roads to secure the navalbase for the landing of suppliesand reinforcements. The secondplan involved simultaneous land-ings from within Tokyo Bay on thebeaches and docks of Yokosukanaval base and air station, to befollowed by the occupation of theZushi area, thus sealing off andthen demilitarizing the entirepeninsula. The Zushi landingplan was preferred since it did notinvolve bringing ships into therestricted waters south of TokyoBay until assault troops had dealtwith "the possibility of Japanesetreachery." Following the confer-ence, Admiral Halsey recom-mended to Lieutenant GeneralRobert L. Eichelberger, comman-der of the Eighth Army, whomMacArthur had appointed to com-mand forces ashore in the occupa-tion of northern Japan, that theZushi plan be adopted.

At 1400 on 19 August, Task

Force 31 was officially organizedand Admiral Badger formed theships assigned to the force into aseparate tactical group, the trans-ports and large amphibious shipsin column, with circular screenscomposed of destroyers and highspeed transports. In addition,three subordinate task units wereformed: Third Fleet MarineLanding Force; Third Fleet NavalLanding Force; and a landingforce of sailors and Royal Marinesfrom Vice Admiral Sir BernardRawling's British Carrier TaskForce. To facilitate organizationand establish control over thethree provisional commands, thetransfer of American and Britishsailors and Marines and theirequipment to designated trans-ports by means of breeches buoysand cargo slings began immedi-ately. Carriers, battleships, andcruisers were brought along bothsides of a transport to expedite theoperation. In addition to the land-ing battalions of sailors andMarines, fleet units formed basemaintenance companies, a navalair activities organization to oper-ate Yokosuka airfield, and nucleuscrews to seize and secure Japanesevessels. In less than three days,the task of transferring at sea some3,500 men and hundreds of tons ofweapons, equipment, and ammu-nition was accomplished withoutaccident. As soon as they reportedon board their transports, thenewly organized units began anintensive program of training forground combat operations andoccupation duties.

On 20 August, the ships carry-ing the 4th Marine RegimentalCombat Team joined the burgeon-ing task force and GeneralClement and his staff transferredfrom the Ozark to the Grimes.Clement's command now includ-ed the 5,400 men of the reinforced4th Marines; a three-battalion reg-iment of approximately 2,000

Somewhere at sea off the coast of Japan, the carrier Yorktown maintains a course with-in 75 feet of the landing ship Ozark, as a breeches buoy is strung between the two shipsand a sea-going Marine is hauled across to the Ozark.


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Marines from the ships of TaskForce 38; 1,000 sailors from TaskForce 38 organized into two land-ing battalions; a battalion of nucle-us crews for captured shipping;and a British battalion of 200 sea-men and 250 Royal Marines. Toact as a floating reserve, five addi-tional battalions of partiallyequipped sailors were organizedfrom within Admiral McCain'scarrier battle group.

The next day, General Eichel-berger, who had been informed ofthe alternative plans formulatedby Admirals Halsey and Badger,directed that the landing be madeat the naval base rather than in theZushi area. Although there wasmounting evidence that theenemy would cooperate fully withthe occupying forces, the Zushiarea, Eichelberger pointed out,had been selected by MacArthuras his headquarters area and wastherefore restricted. His primaryreason, however, for selectingYokosuka rather than Zushi as thelanding site involved the overlandmovement of the landing force."This overland movement [fromZushi to Yokosuka]," BrigadierGeneral Metzger later noted,"would have exposed the landingforce to possible enemy attackwhile its movement was restrictedover narrow roads and through aseries of tunnels which were easi-ly susceptible to sabotage. Fur-ther, it would have delayed theearly seizure of the major Japanesenaval base."

Eichelberger's dispatch alsoincluded information that the 11thAirborne Division would make itsinitial landing at Atsugi airfield, afew miles northwest of the north-ern end of the Miura Peninsula,instead of at Yokosuka. The origi-nal plans, which were prepared onthe assumption that GeneralClement's men would seizeYokosuka airfield for the airborneoperation, had to be changed to

provide for a simultaneous Army-Navy landing. A tentative area ofresponsibility, including the citiesof Uraga, Kubiri, Yokosuka, andFunakoshi, was assigned toClement's force. The remainder ofthe peninsula was assigned toMajor General Joseph M. Swing's11th Airborne Division. WhileEcihelberger's directive affectedthe employment of the FleetLanding Force it did not place theforce under Eighth Army control.

To insure the safety of alliedwarships entering Tokyo Bay,Clement's operation plan detailed

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the British Landing Force to occu-py and demilitarize three smallisland forts in the Uraga Strait atthe entrance to Tokyo Bay. Toerase the threat of shore batteriesand coastal forts, the 2d Battalion,4th Marines, supported by anunderwater demolition team anda team of 10 Navy gunner's matesto demilitarize the heavy coastaldefense guns, was given the mis-sion of landing on Futtsu Saki, along, narrow peninsula which jut-ted from the eastern shore intoUraga Strait at the mouth of TokyoBay After completing its mission,

the battalion was to reembark inits landing craft to take part in themain landing as the regiment'sreserve battalion. Nucleus crewsfrom the Fleet Naval LandingForce were to enter Yokosuka'sinner harbor prior to H-Hour andtake possession of the damagedbattleship Nagato, whose gunscommanded the landing beaches.

The 4th Marines, with the 1stand 3d Battalions in assault, wasscheduled to make the initial land-ing at Yokosuka on L-Day. Thebattalions of the Fleet Marine andNaval Landing Forces were toland in reserve and take control ofspecific areas of the naval base andairfield, while the 4th Marinespushed inland to link up with ele-ments of the 11th Airborne Di-vision landing at Atsugi airfield.The cruiser San Diego (CL 53),Admiral Badger's flagship; 4

destroyers; and 12 assault craftwere to be prepared to furnishnaval gunfire support on call.Four observation planes wereassigned to observe the landing,and although there were to be no

combat planes in direct support,more than 1,000 carrier-basedplanes would be armed and avail-able if needed. Though it washoped that the Yokosuka landingwould be uneventful, Task Force31 was prepared to deal witheither organized resistance orindividual fanaticism on the partof the Japanese.

L-Day was originally scheduledfor 26 August, but on the 20th,storm warnings indicating that atyphoon was developing 300 milesto the southeast forced AdmiralHalsey to postpone the landingdate to the 28th. Ships were toenter Sagami Wan, the vast outerbay which led to Tokyo Bay, on Lminus 2 day. To avoid thetyphoon, all task forces wereordered to proceed southwesttoward a "temporary point" offSofu-gan, where they were replen-ished and refueled. On 25 August,word was received from GeneralMacArthur that the typhoon dan-ger would delay Army air opera-tions for 48 hours, and L-Day wasconsequently set for 30 August,

with the Third Fleet entry intoSagami Wan on the 28th.

The Japanese had been instruct-ed as early as 15 August to beginminesweeping in the waters offTokyo to facilitate the operationsof the Third Fleet. On the morningof the entrance into Sagami Wan,Japanese emissaries and pilotswere to meet with Rear AdmiralRobert B. Carney, Halsey's Chiefof Staff, and Admiral Badger onboard the Missouri to receiveinstructions relative to the surren-der of the Yokosuka Naval Baseand to guide the first allied shipsinto anchorages. Halsey was notanxious to keep his ships, many ofthem small vessels crowded withtroops, at sea in typhoon weather,and he asked and received permis-sion from MacArthur to put intoSagami Wan one day early.

Early on the 27th, the Japaneseemissaries reported on board theMissouri. Several demands werepresented, most of which centeredupon obtaining information rela-tive to minefields and shippingchannels. Japanese pilots andinterpreters were then put onboard a destroyer and delivered tothe lead ships of Task Force 31.Due to a lack of suitable mine-sweepers which had preventedthe Japanese from clearing SagamiWan and Tokyo Bay, the channelinto Tokyo Bay was immediatelycheck-swept with negative results.By late afternoon, the movementof Admiral Badger's task force tosafe anchorages in Sagami Wanwas accomplished without mci-

At 0900 on 28 August, the firstAmerican task force, consisting ofthe combat elements of Task Force31, entered Tokyo Bay anddropped anchor off Yokosuka at1300. During the movement,Naval Task Forces 35 and 37 stoodby to provide fire support if need-ed. Carrier planes of Task Force 38conducted an air demonstration in

Marines of the Fleet Landing Force on board the Ozark receive a final brief from LtColFred D. Beans, the 4th Marines' commanding officer, prior to landing at Yokosuka.


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such force "as to discourage anytreachery on the part of theenemy." In addition, combat airpatrols, direct support aircraft,and planes patrolling outlying air-fields flew low over populatedareas to reinforce the allied pres-ence.

Shortly after anchoring, ViceAdmiral Michitore Totsuka,Commandant of the First NavalDistrict and Yokosuka Naval Base,and his staff reported to AdmiralBadger in the San Diego for furtherinstructions regarding the surren-der of his command. They wereinformed that the naval base areawas to be cleared of all personnelexcept for skeletal maintenanceand guard crews; guns of the forts,ships, and coastal batteries com-manding the bay were to be ren-dered inoperative; the breech-blocks were to be removed fromall antiaircraft and dual-purposeguns and their positions markedwith white flags visible four milesto seaward; and, Japanese guidesand interpreters were to be on thebeach to meet the landing force.Additionally, guards were to sta-tioned at each warehouse and

building with a complete invento-ry on its contents and appropriatekeys.

As the naval commanders madearrangements for the Yokosukalanding, a reconnaissance party ofArmy Air Force technicians withemergency communications andairfield engineer equipment land-ed at Atsugi airfield to prepare theway for the airborne operation onL-Day. Radio contact was estab-lished with Okinawa where the11th Division was waiting to exe-cute its part in Blacklist. The atti-tude of the Japanese officials, bothat Yokosuka and Atsugi, was uni-formly one of outward sub-servience and docility. But yearsof bitter experiences caused manyallied commanders and troops toview the emerging picture of theJapanese as meek and harmlesswith a jaundiced eye. As AdmiralCarney noted at the time: "It mustbe remembered that these are thesame Japanese whose treachery,cruelty, and subtlety broughtabout this war; we must be contin-ually vigilant for overt treachery.

They are always dangerous."During the Third Fleet's first

night at anchor, there was a freshreminder of Japanese brutality.Two British prisoners of warhailed one of the fleet's picketboats in Sagami Wan and weretaken on board the San Juan (CL54), command ship of the speciallyconstituted Allied Prisoner of WarRescue Group. Their descriptionof life in the prison camps and ofthe extremely poor physical condi-tion of many of the prisoners, laterconfirmed by an International RedCross representative, promptedHalsey to order the rescue groupinto Tokyo Bay and to stand by foraction on short notice. At 1420 onthe 29th, Admiral Nimitz arrivedby seaplane from Guam andauthorized Halsey to begin rescueoperations immediately, althoughMacArthur had directed the Navynot begin recovery operationsuntil the Army was ready. Specialteams, guided by carrier planesoverhead, quickly began the taskof bringing in allied prisonersfrom the Omori and Ofuna campsand the Shanagama hospital. By1910 that evening, the first prison-ers of war arrived on board thehospital ship Benevolence (AH 13),

Just after dawn on 30 August, Marines of the 2d Battalion, 4thMarines, hit the beaches of Futtsu Saki to neutralize the shore

batteries prior to the main landing at Yokosuka. They found theJapanese had followed their surrender instructions to the letter.


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and at midnight 739 men had beenbrought out. After evacuatingcamps in the Tokyo area, the SanJuan moved south to the Nagoya-Hamamatsu area and then northto the Sendai-Karnaishi area.During the next 14 days, morethan 19,000 allied prisoners wereliberated.

Also that evening, for the firsttime since Pearl Harbor, the shipsof the Third Fleet were illuminat-ed. As General Metzger later re-membered: "Word was passed toilluminate ship, but owing to thelong wartime habit of alwaysdarkening ship at night, no shipwould take the initiative in turn-ing their lights on. Finally, afterthe order had been repeated a cou-ple of times lights went on. It wasa wonderful picture with all theships flying large battle flags bothat the foretruck and the stern. Inthe background was snowcappedMount Fuji." Movies were shownon the weather decks. While theapprehension of some lessened,lookouts were still posted, radarscontinued to search, and the shipsremained on alert.

Long before dawn on L-Day,three groups of Task Force 31transports, with escorts, movedfrom Sagami Wan into Tokyo Bay

The first group of transports car-ried the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines;the second the bulk of the landingforce, consisting of the rest of the4th Marines and the Fleet Marineand Naval Landing Forces; andthe third, the British LandingForce. All plans of the YokosukaOccupation Force had been basedon an H-Hour for the main land-ing of 1000, but last-minute wordwas received from GeneralMacArthur on the 29th that thefirst transport planes carrying the11th Airborne Division would belanding at Atsugi airfield at 0600.To preserve the value and impactof simultaneous Army-Navy oper-ations, Task Force 31's plans werechanged to allow for the earlierlanding time.

As their landing craft ap-proached the beaches of FuttsuSaki, the Marines of 2d Battalion,4th Marines spotted a sign left onshore by their support team: "USNAVY UNDERWATER DEMOLI-TION TEAMS WELCOMEMARINES TO JAPAN." At 0558,the ramps dropped and CompanyG, under First Lieutenant GeorgeB. Lamberson, moved ashore.While Lamberson's company andanother seized the main fort andarmory, a third landed on the tip

10

of the peninsula and occupied thesecond fort. The Japanese, theyfound, had followed their instruc-tions to the letter. The German-made coastal and antiaircraft gunshad been rendered useless andonly a 22-man garrison remainedto oversee the peaceful turnover.As the Japanese soldiers marchedaway, the Marines, as StaffSergeant Edward Meagher laterreported, "began smashing up therifles, machine guns, bayonets andantiaircraft guns. They made afearful noise doing it. Quite obvi-ously, they hadn't enjoyed doinganything so much in a long, longtime." By 0845, after raising theAmerican flag over both forts, thebattalion, its mission accom-plished, reembarked for theYokosuka landing, scheduled for0930. With the taking of the FuttsuSaki forts and the landing of thefirst transports at Atsugi, the occu-pation of Japan was underway.

With first light came dramaticevidence that the Japanese wouldcomply with the surrender terms.Lookouts on board Task Force 31ships could see white flags flyingover abandoned and inoperativegun positions. A 98-man nucleuscrew. from the battleship SouthDakota (BB 57) boarded the battle-ship Nagato at 0805 and receivedthe surrender from a skeletonforce of officers and technicians;the firing locks of the ship's mainbattery had been removed and allsecondary and antiaircraft gunsrelocated to the Navy Yard. "Atno time was any antagonism,resentment, arrogance or passiveresistance encountered; both offi-cers (including the captain) andmen displaying a very meek andsubservient attitude," noted NavyCaptain Thomas J. Flynn in hisofficial report. "It seemed almostincredible that these bowing,scraping, and scared men were thesame brutal, sadistic enemies whohad tortured our prisoners,


Marines of the 4th Regiment come ashore at Yokosuka from landing craft as they haddone many times before, but this time no one is firing.

Is

reports of whose plight werebeing received the same day."

The morning was warm andbright. There was hardly a rippleon the water as the 4th Marines,commanded by Lieutenant Col-onel Fred D. Beans, scrambled intolanding craft. Once on board, theyadjusted their heavy packs andjoked and laughed as thecoxswains powered the crafttoward the rendezvous point afew miles off shore. Officers andsenior enlisted men remindedtheir marines of orders given daysbefore: weapons would be lockedand not used unless fired upon;insulting epithets in connectionwith the Japanese as a race or indi-viduals would not be condoned;and all personnel were to presenta smart military bearing and prop-er deportment. "When you hit thebeach, Navy cameramen who willland earlier will be there,"Lieutenant Colonel George B. Bellsaid to the men of the 1stBattalion. "They will be takingpictures. Pictures of you menlanding. I don't want any of youmugging the lenses. Simply getashore as quickly as possible anddo your job."

As the Marines of 1st Battalionand 3d Battalion gave their gear alast minute check, the coxswain inthe lead craft signaled with bothhands aloft and the boats, nowabreast, moved toward the shoreexactly on schedule. Out of habit,the Marines crouched low in theboat. "No one knew what wouldhappen on the beach. You could-n't be absolutely certain. You weredealing with the Nip." Accom-panying the Marines were"enough correspondents, photog-raphers and radio men," oneMarine observed, "to make up afull infantry company"

At 0930, Marines of LieutenantColonel Bell's 1st Battalion landedon Red Beach southeast ofYokosuka airfield and those of the

3d Battalion, led by Major WilsonB. Hunt, on Green Beach in theheart of the Navy Yard. There wasno resistance. The few unarmedJapanese present wore white arm-bands, as instructed, to signifythat they were essential mainte-nance troops, officials, or inter-preters. Hot-heads and othersconsidered unable to abide by theEmperor's decree had beenremoved. Oriented by the fewremaining personnel, the twoMarine battalions rapidly movedforward, fanning out aroundhangers and buildings. Leavingguards at warehouses and otherprimary installations, the Marinesmoved across the airfield andthrough the Navy Yard, checkingall buildings and each gun posi-tion to insure that the breechblockhad been removed and "drivingall non-essential Japanese beforethem." With the seizure ofYokosuka, the three island forts inSurago Channel, and the landingon Azuma Peninsula by Britishforces, the initial phase of the

occupation was completed.General Clement and his staff

landed at 1000 on Green Beachwhere they were met by JapaneseNavy Captain Kiyoshi Masudaand his staff who formally surren-dered the naval base. "They wereinformed that non-cooperation oropposition of any kind would beseverely dealt with." Clementthen proceeded to the Japaneseheadquarters building where anAmerican flag was raised withappropriate ceremony at 1015.The flag used was the same raisedby the First Provisional Brigade onGuam's Orote Peninsula and bythe 6th Marine Division onOkinawa.

Vice Admiral Michitore Totsukahad been ordered to be present onthe docks of the naval base to sur-render the First Naval District toAdmiral Carney, acting forAdmiral Halsey, and AdmiralBadger. At 1030, the San Diego,with Carney and Badger on board,tied up at the dock at Yokosuka.With appropriate ceremony, the

BGen William T. Clement with Vice Admiral Michitore Totsuka, center, commander ofthe First Naval District, proceed to the formal surrender ceremony at Yokosuka.


11

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formal surrender took place at1045, after which Badger, accom-panied by Clement, departed forthe former naval base headquar-ters building, the designated sitefor Task Force 31 and FleetLanding Force headquarters.

At noon, with operations pro-ceeding satisfactorily at Yokosukaand in the occupation zone of the11th Airborne Division, GeneralEichelberger assumed operationalcontrol of the Fleet Landing Forcefrom Halsey. Both of the topAmerican commanders in theAllied drive across the Pacific setfoot on Japanese soil on L-Day.General MacArthur landed atAtsugi airfield and subsequentlyset up temporary headquarters inYokohama's Grand Hotel, one ofthe few buildings in the city toescape serious damage. Admira.lNimitz, accompanied by Halsey,came ashore at Yokosuka at 1330to make an inspection of the navalbase.

Reserves and reinforcementslanded at Yokosuka during themorning and early afternoonaccording to schedule. The FleetNaval Landing Force took over

the Navy Yard area secured by 3dBattalion, and the Fleet MarineLanding Force occupied the air-field installations seized by 1stBattalion. The British LandingForce, after evacuating allJapanese personnel from the

island forts, landed at the naviga-tion school in the naval base andtook over the area between thesectors occupied by the FleetNaval and Marine LandingForces. Azuma Peninsula, a largehill mass extensively tunneled as asmall boat supply base, which waspart of the British occupation area,was investigated by a force ofRoyal Marines and found aban-doned.

Relieved by the other elementsof the landing force, the 4thMarines moved out to the InitialOccupation Line and set up aperimeter defense for the navalbase and airfield. There they metgroups of uniformed policebrought down from Tokyo osten-sibly to separate the occupationalforces from the local Japanesepopulation. Later, patrol contactwas made with the 11th AirborneDivision, which had landed 4,200men during the day.

The first night ashore was quiet.Guards were posted at majorinstallations while small roving

National Archives Photo 306-NT-316B-27

Flanked by LtGen Robert L. Eichelberger, hands folded at right, General DouglasMacArthur talks with reporters shortly after landing at Atsugi airfield.

Adm William Halsey, right, discusses the occupation of Yokosuka Naval Base withFAdm Chester Nimitz and BGen Clement on the afternoon of the landings.


12

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Among the few Marines present at the surrender ceremony onboard the Missouri, other than the ship's Marine detachment,were LtGen Roy S. Geiger, his aide Maj John Q. Owsley, BGenJoseph H. Fellows, BGen William T. Clement, and lstLt WilliamF. Harris, the son of BGen Field Harris. Captured onCorregidor, lstLt Harris was one of four Americans rescued

Navy Yard had been cleared." The4th Marines had carried outGeneral MacArthur's orders todisarm and demobilize withamazing speed. There was no evi-dence that the Japanese would doanything but cooperate. It wasclear, for the moment, that theoccupation would succeed.

On 31 August, Clement's forcescontinued to consolidate theirhold on the naval base and thesurrounding defense area. Onorders from General Eichelberger,Company L, 3d Battalion, sailed intwo destroyer transports toTateyama Naval Air Station on thenortheastern shore of Sagami Wanto accept its surrender and toreconnoiter the beach approachesand cover the 3 September landingof the Army's 112th CavalryRegimental Combat Team. Withthe complete cooperation of the

from Japanese prison camps and brought on board the Missourito witness the surrender. The other three, all naval personnel,were Cdr Arthur L. Mosher, of the Houston, Lt James WCondit, of the Yorktown, and MM2cI L. C. Shaw of theGrenadier.


Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 134639Elements of the 4th Marines move into grounds of the Experimental Aircraft Factoryat Yokosuka.

patrols covered the larger areas onwhich no guards were posted. Abeer ration was issued to those noton duty. "We got a couple oftrucks and went up to Yokohama,"

Lieutenant Colonel Beans notedlater, "and brought two truckloadsof beer back at night, which wepaid for in cash. We had no trou-ble whatever. . . because the entire

13

2-A-;

Marine Corps Photo (MAG-31)

Col John C. Munn brought MAG-31 intoYokosuka to support the occupation ofnorthern Japan. The group had partic-ipated in the Marshall Island andOkinawa Campaigns before moving intoJapan.

Japanese Army, Navy, and ForeignOffice, the company quicklyreconnoitered the beaches andthen set up its headquarters at theair station. Likewise, elements of1st Battalion, 15th Marines, underLieutenant Colonel Walter S.Osipoff, moved south to acceptthe surrender and demilitarizeJapanese garrisons in the Uraga-Kurihama area. Less than 500yards from where CommodoreMatthew Perry and his Marinedetachment landed 92 years earli-er, Osipoff, in a simple ceremony,took control of the KurihamaNaval Base. Japanese officialsturned over complete inventoriesof all equipment and detailedmaps of defensive installations,including guns so carefully cam-ouflaged that it would have takenMarine patrols weeks to findthem. Here, as at Tateyama, theJapanese carried out the surrenderinstructions without resistance.As Lieutenant Colonel Osipoffnoted:

When the Japanese captainpresented his sword to me, itwas evident that he and his

officers were taking the sur-render inwardly quite hard.Here was a man passing overto a foreign power every-thing that he stood for. Yet helooked me straight in the eye.He wasn't haughty. He did-n't turn away. But he wasobviously deeply moved. I

felt sure he must be thinkingthat his surrender was some-thing that went along withthe military profession. Youfight and lose and you mustface the consequences.Occupation operations contin-

ued to run smoothly as prepara-tions were made to accept the for-mal surrender of the JapaneseEmpire on board the Missouri,where leading Allied commandershad gathered from every corner ofthe Pacific. At 0930 on 2

September, under the flag thatCommodore Perry had flown inTokyo Bay, the Japanese represen-tative of the Emperor, ForeignMinister Mamoru Shigemitsu, andof the Imperial General Staff,General Yoshijiro Umezu, signedthe surrender documents. Gen-

Colorfully dressed Geisha girls watch as a

14

eral MacArthur then signed asSupreme Commander for theAllied Powers (SCAP) andAdmiral Nimitz for the UnitedStates. They were followed in turnby other senior allied representa-tives. The war that began at PearlHarbor now officially was endedand the occupation begun. Whenlater asked how many troopswould be needed to occupy Japan,MacArthur said that 200,000would be adequate. LieutenantGeneral Roy S. Geiger, Com-manding General, FMFPac,agreed. "Sure," he said, "that'll beenough. There's no fight left inthe Japs." Then he added: "Why,a squad of Marines could handlethe whole affair."

As the surrender ceremony tookplace on the main deck of theMissouri, advance elements of theEighth Army's occupation forceentered Tokyo Bay. Ships carryingthe Headquarters of the XI Corpsand the 1st Cavalry Divisiondocked at Yokohama. Transportswith the 112th Cavalry on boardmoved to Tateyama, and on 3September the troopers landed

Marine makes his nightly rounds.Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 136212

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and relieved Company L, 3dBattalion, 4th Marines, which thenreturned to Yokosuka.

With the occupation proceedingsmoothly, plans were made to dis-solve the Fleet Landing Force andTask Force 31. The 4th Marineswas selected to assumed responsi-bility for the entire naval base areaand airfield. The first unit toreturn to the fleet was the BritishLanding Force, which wasrelieved by the 3d Battalion, 4thMarines, of the area between theNavy Yard and the airfield on 4September. The Fleet MarineLanding Force was then relievedof its control in the TorpedoSchool, followed by the relief ofthe Fleet Naval Landing Force inthe eastern end of the Navy Yardby the 3d Battalion. By 6September, the 1st Battalion hadrelieved the remaining elements ofthe Fleet Marine Landing Force ofthe airfield and all ships' detach-ments of sailors and Marines hadreturned to their parent vesselsand the provisional landing unitsdeactivated.

While a large part of thestrength of the Fleet LandingFOrce was returning to normalduties, a considerable augmenta-tion to Marine strength in north-

em Honshu was being made. On23 August, AirFMFPac had desig-nated Marine Aircraft Group 31(MAG-31), then at Chimu airfieldon Okinawa, to move to Japan as asupporting air group for thenorthern occupation. ColonelJohn C. Munn, the group's com-manding officer, reconnoiteredYokosuka airfield and its facilitiessoon after the initial landing anddirected necessary repairs to run-ways and taxiways in addition toassigning areas to each unit of thegroup. On 7 September, the groupheadquarters, operations, intelli-gence, and the 24 F4U Corsairsand men of Marine FighterSquadron 441 flew in fromOkinawa. The group was joinedby Marine Fighter Squadron 224on the 8th; Marine FighterSquadron 311 on the 9th; MarineNight Fighter Squadron 542 on the10th; and Marine Torpedo BomberSquadron 131 on the 12th. "Theentire base," the group reported,"was found [to be in] extremelypoor police and all structures andliving quarters in a bad state ofrepair. All living quarters werepoliced.., under the supervisionof the medical department, priorto occupation."

As additional squadrons ar-

rived, the air base was trans-formed. Complete recreationalfacilities were established, consist-ing of a post exchange, theater,basketball courts, and enlistedrecreation rooms in each of thesquadron's barracks.

When not engaged in renovat-ing the air base or on air missions,liberty parties were organized andsent by boat to Tokyo. Preferencewas given to personnel who wereexpected to return to the UnitedStates for discharge. Fratern-zation, although originally forbid-den by the American high com-mand, was allowed after the firstweek. "The Japanese Geisha girlshave taken a large share of theattention of the many curioussight-seers of the squadron,"reported Major Michael R. Yunck,commanding officer of MarineFighter Squadron 311. "TheOriental way of life is somethingvery hard for an American to com-prehend. The opinions on howthe occupation job 'should bedone' range from the most gener-ous to the most drastic—all agree-ing on one thing, though, that it isa very interesting experience."

Prostitution and the resultantwidespread incidence of venerealdiseases were ages old in Japan."The world's oldest profession"was legal and controlled by theJapanese government; licensedprostitutes were confined torestricted sections. Placing thesesections out of bounds toAmerican forces did not solve theproblem of venereal exposure, for,as in all ports such as Yokosuka,clandestine prostitution continuedto flourish. In an attempt to pre-vent uncontrolled exposure, allwaterfront and backstreet housesof prostitution were placed out ofbounds. A prophylaxis stationwas established at the entrance toa Japanese police-controlled"Yashuura House" (a house ofprostitution exclusively for the use

BGen Clement gives orders issued by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers toJapanese naval and Army officers at Yokosuka.


15

Qn6 September 1945, more than 120 4th Marine

survivors of Bataan and Corregidor, who werefreed from Japanese prison camps and were

physically able, were invited to a regimental guardmount at Yokosuka Naval Base, the fallen bastion ofJapanese naval might. Their hosts were the officers andmen of the new 4th Marines. Reactivated in February1944, the new regiment was composed of men from thefour Marine raider battalions; men who could carry onthe name of the old 4th—the legendary China Regimentwhich protected American interests in the Far East from1927 to 1941 and caught the first full impact of theJapanese in the Philippines.

Alighting from trucks they were met by a huge signwhich read: "Welcome, Old 4th!" Overwhelmed, theolder men immediately threw their arms around thenew in their first display of emotion since being res-cued. A number said that the Japanese had markedthem for death in the event another atomic bomb wasdropped.

Looking thin but fit in newly issued dungarees andcanvas sneakers or fabric split-toed shoes purchasedfrom Japanese civilians, they quickly lined up threedeep in parade formation in front of the base's woodennaval barracks where each was given a small MarineCorps emblem. "We're damned glad to have you here,"said Brigadier General William T. Clement. "Some ofyou have changed a bit since I last saw you, but this isthe happiest moment of my life just to be able to bringyou back to the Fourth Marines."

In a mess hall where Japanese suicide pilots ate lessthan a month before, members of the new regimenttreated members of the old to an American-style steakdinner with tomatoes, mashed potatoes, gravy, oranges,and coffee while a strolling Marine band played the lat-

Liberated 4th Marines enjoy a steak dinner to the accompani-ment of jazz tunes.

est jazz tunes. Horror tales of Japanese imprisonmentwere exchanged for stories of Pacific victories. Twohalf-brothers, one in the old regiment and one in thenew, were reunited after never expecting to see eachother again. Following the dinner, they reviewed aguard mount in their honor and drank their firstAmerican canned beer in more than three years. As theband struck up the Marine Corps Hymn, "one returnedprisoner, a tough-looking leatherneck with a face like abulldog's, began to sob. Tears streamed down thechecks of half a dozen more, and those who weren'tweeping were swallowing hard."

As the truck convoy pulled away to carry them to theships waiting to take them back to the United States,one veteran remarked: "Hell, I don't want to go backhome. I want to stay with the Marines and just as soonas I get to the United States I'm going to ask for a trans-fer back to the Fourth Regiment. I've been in theMarines since I was 17 and it's the easiest life I know."

16

New 4th Honors Members of the Old 4th


BGen Clement chats with Cpl William R. Linderfeld, whowas captured on Bataan.

National Archives Photo 127-N- 49

Members of the new 4th pass in review for members of the old4th Marines.


It A

of occupation forces), another inthe center of the Yokosuka libertyzone, and a third at the fleet land-ing. These stations were mannedby hospital corpsmen under thesupervision of a full-time venerealdisease-prevention medical offi-cer. In addition, a continuous edu-cational campaign was carried outurging continence and warning ofthe dangerous diseased conditionof prostitutes. These proceduresresulted in a drastic decline inreported cases of diseases origi-nating in the Yokosuka area.

On 8 September, the group'sCorsairs and Hellcats, stripped ofabout two and a half tons of com-bat weight, began surveillanceflights over the Tokyo Bay areaand the Kanto Plain north of thecapital. The purpose of the mis-sions was to observe and reportany unusual activity by Japanesemilitary forces and to survey allairfields in the area. Initially,Munn's planes served underThird Fleet command, but on the16th, operational control of MAG-31 was transferred to the Fifth AirForce. A month later, the groupwas returned to Navy control andreconnaissance flights in theTokyo area and Kanto Plain dis-continued. Operations of the airgroup were confined largely tomail, courier, transport, and train-ing flights to include navigation,tactics, dummy gunnery, andground control approach practice.By mid-October, the physical con-dition of the base had beenimproved to such an extenf thatthe facilities were adequate toaccommodate the remainder ofthe group's personnel. On 7December, the group's four tacti-cal squadrons were placed underthe operational control of the FarEastern Air Force and surveillanceand reconnaissance flights againresumed.

On 8 September, AdmiralBadger's Task Force 31 was dis-

solved and the Commander, FleetActivities, Yokosuka, assumedresponsibility for the naval occu-pation area. General Clement'scommand, again designated TaskFOrce Able, continued to functionfor a short time thereafter whilemost of the reinforcing units of the4th Marines loaded out for returnto Guam. On the 20th, LieutenantColonel Beans relieved GeneralClement of his responsibilities atYokosuka, and the general and hisstaff flew back to Guam to rejointhe 6th Division. Before he left,Clement was able to take part in aceremony honoring more than 120officers and men of the "Old" 4thMarines, captured on Bataan andCorregidor.

After the initial major contribu-tion of naval land forces to theoccupation of northern Japan, theoperation became more and morean Army task. As additionaltroops arrived, the Eighth Army'sarea of effective control grew toencompass all of northern Japan.In October, the occupation zone ofthe 4th Marines was reduced toinclude only the naval base, air-

17

field, and town of Yokosuka. Ineffect, the regiment became anaval base guard detachment, andon 1 November, control of the 4thMarines passed from Eighth Armyto the Commander, U.S. FleetActivities, Yokosuka.

While the Marine presencegradually diminished, activity inthe surrounding area began toreturn to normal. Japanese civil-ians started returning to the city ofYokosuka in large numbers. "Thealmost universal attitude was atfirst one of timidity and fear, thencuriosity," it was reported. "Banksopened and started to operate.Post offices and telegraph officesstarted to function smoothly, andmovie houses began to fill withcivilian crowds."

Unlike Tokyo and Yokohama,the Yokosuka area had escapedmuch destruction and wasremarkably intact. On base, evac-uated Japanese barracks werequickly cleaned up and made rea-sonably liveable. The Japanesefurnished cooks, mess boys, andhousekeeping help, allowingMarines more time to explore the


Hundreds of neatly stacked torpedoes are inspected by Marines. They are a small partof the tons of war materiel Marines found at the naval base.

Marine Corps' Demobilization Plan

Following the surrender of Japan, the Secretary ofthe Navy announced details of the Marine Corps'plan for demobilization of personnel. Intended to

supplement existing policies and directives concerningdischarges and releases, the plan provided the mostequitable means of establishing the priority for therelease of Marines by computing their service credits.

The Point System, as the plan was commonly known,applied to both officers and enlisted men. Each Marinereceived one for point each month of service from 16September 1940; one point for each month served over-seas or afloat from 16 September 1940; five points forthe first and each additional award of the Medal ofHonor, Navy Cross, Distinguished Service Cross(Army), Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit,Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Navy andMarine Corps Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal,Purple Heart, and Bronze Service Star; and 12 points foreach child under the age of 18, up to a limit of three chil-dren. With 12 May 1945 as the original cutoff date forcomputations, the critical score to be used when theplan went into effect on 1 September 1945 was 85 pointsfor male Marines and 25 points for Women Reservists.Subsequent reductions in critical scores would reflectchanges in the missions, and therefore personnelrequirements, of the Marine Corps.

The plan also provided that enlisted personnel withsufficient points for discharge could remain on activeduty so long as there was a need for their services.Conversely, key personnel or those with specializedskills who had amassed the required score would beretained on active duty until their reliefs could be pro-cured and trained. Since the number of officers to bereleased would be relatively smaller than the number ofenlisted men involved, the immediate needs of the ser-vice and the necessity of keeping male officers whoapplied for transfer to the regular Marine Corps wouldbe of primary concern.

Barely a month after the program began, the criticalscore was lowered to 60 points and all enlisted person-nel with three or more children under 18 years of agecould request discharge. The point score was furtherreduced to 50 on 1 November and to 45 on 1 February1946. To some this was not fast enough. A few Marinesin Hawaii were, as Lieutenant General Roy S. Geigernoted, "infected. . . by the insidious bug that has bittenthe Army and caused Army personnel to stage massmeetings protesting their demobilization program." Afew hours before Marines were scheduled to meet atCamp Catlin, Pearl Harbor, Geiger issued ordersagainst any demonstration meetings. Other Marines atEwa Marine Air Station circulated a demobilizationprotest petition and were confined for disobeying alawful order. "It isn't necessary for the men to hold ameeting to make their grievances known," his chief ofstaff, Brigadier General Mervin H. Silverthorn, said."The Marines have had a standard method as long as Ican remember whereby any man at any time can see hiscompany or unit commander to discuss his troublesand receive an answer." By 1 July 1946, as the numberof Marine Corps commitments in the Pacific fell andmore replacements were trained and sent out, inducteesor reservists with 30 months of active duty regardlessof points acquired, became eligible for discharge.

The increased flow of discharges required to bringthe Corps to the planned postwar limit of 108,200,reduced the strength of the Marine Corps from a peakof 483,977 on V-J Day, the day that the surrender wassigned, to 155,592 by the end of June 1946. Because ofpublic pressure to release veterans from the ArmedServices, the flow was accelerated in October 1946 andall reservists and selectees, regardless of length of ser-vice, became eligible for discharge. With fewer replace-ments and additional discharges, the Marine Corps'strength continued to fall until just prior to the KoreanWar when it stood at 74,279.

rice-paddy and beach resort-dot-ted countryside, and liberty intown. Allowed only five hoursliberty three times a week, mostenlisted Marines saw little ofJapan, except for short sight-see-ing tours to Tokyo or Kamakura.Yokosuka, a small city with longbeer lines, quickly lost its noveltyand Yokohama was off limits toenlisted personnel. So mastMarines would "have a few brewsand head back for the base at 4p.m. when the beer sales cease."Their behavior was remarkable

considering only a few monthsbefore they had fought a hard andbloody battle on Okinawa.Crimes against the local Japanesepopulation were few and, for themost part, petty. It was thereplacement, not the combat veter-an, who, after a few beers, would"slug a lap" or curse them to theirfaces.

Of the few problems, two stoodout—rape and the black market.Japanese women, so subdued, ifpropositioned would comply andlater charge "rape." "Our courts

18

gave severe sentences, which Iapproved," noted one senior com-mander. "This satisfied theJapanese honor. I expected thesentences to be greatly reduced, asthey were, in the United States.The sooner these men werereturned home, the better for allhands, including the Japanese." Inaddition, the utter lack and con-comitant demand for consumergoods caused some Marines tosmuggle items, such as cigarettes,out to the civilian market wherethey brought a high price.

••4 ,,

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Although attempts were made tocurb the practice, many unneces-sary and expensive courts-martialwhere held "which branded ourmen with bad conduct dis-charges."

In addition to routine dutiesand security and military policepatrols, the Marines also carriedout Eighth Army demilitarizationdirectives, collecting and dispos-ing of Japanese military and navalmateriel. In addition, they search-ed their area of responsibility forcaches of gold, silver, and plat-inum. During the search, no offi-cial naval records, other thaninventories and a few maps andcharts, were found. It was laterlearned that the Japanese had beenordered to burn or destroy all doc-

uments of military value to theAllies.

The surrender of all garrisonshaving been taken, motorizedpatrols with truck convoys weresent out to collect as many smallarms, weapons, and as muchammunition as possible. The largeamount of such supplies in theYokosuka area made the task anextensive one. In addition, week-ly patrols from the regimentsupervised the unloading atUraga of Japanese troops andcivilians returning from such by-passed Pacific outposts as Wake,Yap, and Truk. Although therewas concern that some Japanesesoldiers might cause trouble, nonedid.

On 20 November, the 4th

19

Marines was removed from theadministrative control of the 6thDivision and placed directlyunder FMFPac. Orders werereceived directing that prepara-tions be made for 3d Battalion torelieve the regiment of its duties inJapan, effective 31 December. Incommon with the rest of theArmed Forces, the Marine Corpsfaced great public and Congres-sional pressure to send its menhome for discharge as rapidly aspossible. The Corps' world-widecommitments had to be examinedwith this in mind. The Japaneseattitude of cooperation with occu-pation authorities fortunately per-mitted considerable reduction oftroop strength. In Yokosuka,Marines who did not meet the age,

Watercolor by Cdr Standish Backus, USNR, Navy Art Collection

"Yokosuka Airfield and Tokyo Bay During the American Occupation"

X TSUSHIMA4b

4.

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Relief Map ofKyushu

3%)

- TAHEGA-SllMA

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service, or dependency pointtotals necessary for discharge inDecember or January were trans-ferred to the 3d Battalion, whilemen with the requisite number ofpoints were concentrated in the1st and 2d Battalions.

On 1 December, the 1st Battal-ion completed embarkation onboard the carrier Lexington (CV 16)and sailed for the West Coast to bedisbanded. On the 24th, the 3dBattalion, reinforced by regimen-tal units and a casual companyformed to provide replacementsfor Fifth Fleet Marine detach-ments, relieved 2d Battalion of allguard responsibilities. The 2dBattalion, with RegimentalWeapons and Headquarters andService Companies, began loadingout operations on the 27th andsailed for the United States onboard the attack cargo ship Lumen(AKA 30) on New Year's Day.Like the 1st, the 2d Battalion andthe accompanying two unitswould be disbanded. All receivedwar trophies: Japanese rifles andbayonets were issued to enlistedmen; officers received swords lessthan 100 years old; pistols werenot issued and field glasses wererestricted to general officers.

At midnight on 31 December,Lieutenant Colonel Bruno A.Hochmuth, the regiment's execu-tive officer, took command of the3d Battalion, as the battalionassumed responsibility for thesecurity of the Naval Station,Marine Air Base, and the city ofYokosuka. A token regimentalheadquarters remained behind tocarry on the name of the 4thMarines. Six days later, the head-quarters detachment left Japan torejoin the 6th Marine Divisionthen in Tsingtao, China.

On 15 February, the 3d Battalionwas redesignated the 2d SeparateGuard Battalion (Provisional),Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Aninternal reorganization was car-

ned out and the battalion was bro-ken down into guard companies.Its military police and securityduties in the naval base area andcity of Yokosuka remained thesame. The major task of demilita-rization in the naval base havingbeen completed, the battalion set-tled into a routine of guard duty,ceremonies, and training, little dif-ferent from that of any Navy yardbarracks detachment in the UnitedStates.

In January, the Submarine Basewas returned to Japanese control.With the return of the TorpedoSchool-Supply Base Area, therelief of all gate posts by navalguards, and the detachment ofmore than 300 officers and men inMarch, the 2d and 4th GuardCompanies were disbanded andthe security detail drawn from aconsolidated 1st Guard CompanyOn 1 April, MAG-31 relieved the3d Guard Company of securityresponsibility for the Air Base andthe company was disbanded.With additional drafts of person-nel for discharge or reassignmentand an order to reduce the Marinestrength to 100, the Commander,U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka,responded. "I reacted," CaptainBenton W. Decker later wrote,"reporting that the security of thebase would be jeopardized andthat 400 Marines were necessary,whereupon the order was can-celed, and a colonel was orderedto relieve Lieutenant ColonelBruno Hochmuth. Again, I insist-ed that Lieutenant ColonelHochmuth was capable of com-manding my Marine unit to mycomplete satisfaction, so again,Washington canceled an order."On 15 June, the battalion, reducedin strength to 24 officers and 400men, was redesignated MarineDetachment, U.S. Fleet Activities,Yokosuka, Lieutenant ColonelHochmuth commanding.

The continued cooperation of

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the Japanese with occupationdirectives and the lack of anyovert signs of resistance also less-ened the need for the fightersquadrons of MAG-31. Personneland unit reductions similar tothose experienced by the 4thMarines also affected the Marineair group. By the spring of 1946,reduced in strength and relievedof all routine surveillance mis-sions by the Fifth BomberCommand, MAG-31, in earlyMay, received orders to return as aunit to the United States.

Prior to being released of allflight duties, the group performedone final task. Largely due to anextended period of inclementweather and poor sanitary condi-tions, the Yokosuka area hadbecome infested with large blackflies, mosquitoes, and fleas, caus-ing the outbreak and spread ofcommunicable diseases. Alarmedthat service personnel might beaffected, accessible areas weredusted with DDT by jeepsequipped with dusting attach-ments. The spraying effort waseffective except in the city's alleysand surrounding narrow valleys,occupied by small houses andinnumerable cesspools. "For-tunately we had a solution," wroteCaptain Decker. MAG-31 wasasked to tackle the job. "Daily,these young, daring flyers wouldzoom up the hills following thepathways, dusting with DDT. Thechildren loved to run out in theopen, throw wide their jackets,and become hidden momentarilyin the clouds of DDT. It was funfor them and it helped us indelousing the city"

On 18 June, with the finaldestruction of all but two of theseven wind tunnels at theJapanese First Technical Air Depotand the preparation of equipmentfor shipment, loading began.Earlier, the group's serviceable air-craft were either flown to

securing the surrender-marines in the occupation of japan ......fighting and sacrifice, japan was...

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