ORIGINAL RESEARCH

Secure and distributed video surveillance via portable devices

Pietro Albano • Andrea Bruno • Bruno Carpentieri •

Aniello Castiglione • Arcangelo Castiglione • Francesco Palmieri •

Raffaele Pizzolante • Kangbin Yim • Ilsun You

Received: 3 December 2012 / Accepted: 21 March 2013

� Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Abstract In this work we present a system for distributed

video surveillance based on the Client-Server model. The

system we present can be accessed via portable devices. In

many real-world scenarios is useful, or sometimes neces-

sary, to have portable devices that can receive real-time

data from a selected camera, to prevent or to manage

anomalous activities. The system provides reliable, high

speed, secure and real-time communication among all its

components, which are the Repository, the Node and the

Portable Device. Both Repository and Node can act as a

server. The Repository can provide services to both Nodes

and Portable Devices, while the Nodes provide services

only to the Portable Device. The portable device can only

act as a client, using the services offered by the other two

parts. In our system, a portable device is assumed to know

only the location of the Repository which permits to get the

list of nodes connected with one or more camera(s). When

a portable device gets the list, it can choose which node

intends to connect to, to get the images of its connected

camera(s). The security of the interaction among Node-

Repository and Node-Portable Device is guaranteed by

using the SSL/TLS protocol. The interaction among nodes

and portable devices is secured by using an invisible digital

watermarking algorithm on each image, before that image

is sent from a node to a portable device. The latter extracts

the watermark from the image and verifies the identity of

the node.

Keywords Remote video surveillance � Remote personal

security � Mobile video surveillance � Homeland security �Real time communication � Security and privacy

enforcement

1 Introduction

Video surveillance is today an important and increasingly

used tool for the monitoring of areas and environments

P. Albano � A. Bruno � B. Carpentieri � A. Castiglione �A. Castiglione � R. Pizzolante (&)

Dipartimento di Informatica, Universita degli Studi di Salerno,

84084 Fisciano, SA, Italy

e-mail: rpizzolante@unisa.it

P. Albano

e-mail: pietro.albano@gmail.com

A. Bruno

e-mail: andrea.bruno@antaresnet.org

B. Carpentieri

e-mail: bc@dia.unisa.it

A. Castiglione

e-mail: castiglione@ieee.org; castiglione@acm.org

A. Castiglione

e-mail: arccas@dia.unisa.it

F. Palmieri

Dipartimento di Ingegneria dell’Informazione,

Seconda Universita di Napoli, 81031 Aversa, CE, Italy

e-mail: fpalmier@unina.it

K. Yim

Department of Information Security Engineering,

Soonchunhyang University, Asan, Korea

e-mail: yim@sch.ac.kr

I. You

School of Information Science, Korean Bible University,

Seoul, Korea

e-mail: isyou@bible.ac.kr

123

J Ambient Intell Human Comput

DOI 10.1007/s12652-013-0181-z

(Muller-Schneiders et al. 2005; Norris et al. 2002). Video

surveillance is commonly used in many real-world sce-

narios and can be applied both in civil (Srinivasan et al.

2004; Norris et al. 2002; Collins et al. 2000) and military

(Huang et al. 2009) fields. For example, important appli-

cations of video surveillance can be found in the identifi-

cation of individuals and objects (Ko 2008) as well as in

the prevention and detection of other abnormal activities

(Nasution and Emmanuel 2007; Duque et al. 2007). Video

surveillance is also helpful in other fields such as agricul-

ture (for the prevention of fires Foresti and Snidaro 2002;

Toreyin et al. 2005, 2006; Chen et al. 2003, 2004), traffic

monitoring (Tseng et al. 2002), etc.. Video surveillance

brings many advantages with respect to classical surveil-

lance, for instance it reduces the number of people who

work for surveillance and therefore it reduces the resources

and the costs that are necessary to security. Through a

video surveillance system it is possible to detect and also to

record activities that could be useful for offline analysis

and, in some cases, the recorded information that can be

used as evidence of crimes (Nieto 1997).

It is well-known that portable devices have changed our

lives giving us a handy tool for several and different uses.

Moreover, their adoption introduced several security issues

Castiglione et al. (2009) that have been dealt with by

introducing applications making use of cryptographic

primitives (De Santis et al. 2010; Castiglione et al. 2011;

Castiglione et al. 2012).

On the contrary, from a positive point of view, with the

diffusion of portable devices having an enhanced power of

computation and advanced features, it is now possible to

perform surveillance and monitoring activities directly

through these devices. This feature can be very useful for

example when traveling or, in general, if someone needs to

control an environment when moving frequently from one

place to another.

In this work we propose a secure distributed system for

video surveillance based on the Client-Server model which

provides the opportunity of remote connections using por-

table devices, for the sake of real-time monitoring. A pre-

liminary version of this work appears in (Albano et al.

2012). The system architecture is composed by three main

components: a central server (Repository), one or more

collector Node(s) and one or more Portable Device(s). The

Repository has a list of collector nodes which are connected

with one or more camera(s). The Portable Devices who want

to access the system have to know only the location (host-

name or IP address) of the Repository. When the connection

is established, the Repository sends to the Portable Device a

list of nodes, so that this device can choose which Node it

intends to connect to, and, after this choice is made, the

device connects to the Node and gets the image frames or

any other multimedia contents obtainable by the camera(s).

The remainder of this work is organized as follows: in

Sect. 2 we focus on the proposed distributed architecture.

In Sect. 3 we analyze the security issues of the proposed

system and we illustrate our decisions regarding the design

and the development of the prototype we made. In Sect. 4

we describe the interaction among the system and the end-

user, and, finally, in Sect. 5, we present our conclusion and

highlight our future work directions.

2 The distributed client-server architecture

The Repository mainly deals with the localization of the

Nodes, it interacts with them and with the Portable Devices

which want to access the system. For this reason, the

Repository holds a list of all Nodes that already joined the

system.

A collector Node is connected with one (ore more) cam-

era(s) and interacts with the Portable Devices interested in

monitoring the areas controlled by that Node. The Portable

Device has to know only the location (IP address or host-

name) of the Repository, which gives them a list of all the

available collector Nodes as well as other descriptive infor-

mation about them. When a Portable Device has joined the

system, it receives, at fixed intervals, the images obtained by

the selected camera(s) connected to the selected Node.

Figure 1 shows an overview of the proposed system, in

particular it illustrates the system architecture.

2.1 Interaction Node–Repository

The interaction between a Node and the Repository takes

place through a TCP connection over a SSL/TLS tunnel.

The use of these protocols is fundamental for the security

Fig. 1 An overview of the proposed system architecture

P. Albano et al.

123

of our system, since, without a secure (encrypted and

authenticated) connection, a ‘‘fake’’ Node could easily join

the system and send manipulated/tampered images to the

incoming Portable Devices. The messages exchanged

between a Node and the Repository are of three types:

Login, Register, and Disconnect. These commands are

encoded through XML sequences.

Figure 2 shows a complete exchange of messages dur-

ing the interaction among the above parties, including each

of the three messages.

The Node uses the Login command for authenticating

itself to the Repository. If the authentication succeeds, the

Node gets as a response the ‘‘200’’ return code, otherwise,

the Repository denies the access for that Node. Figure 3

shows the XML structure representing an example of Login

command sent from a Node to the Repository.

The Node uses the Register command for sending its

descriptive information to the Repository. If the authenti-

cation succeeds, the Node gets an ID from the Repository

which uses this ID to uniquely identify the Node. The ID is

also used by the Node during its disconnection process

from the Repository. Figure 4 shows an example of Reg-

ister command sent from a Node to the Repository.

When a Node wants to disconnect from the Repository,

it sends a Disconnect command. Figure 5 shows an

example of Disconnect command sent from a Node to the

Repository.

2.2 Interaction Repository–Portable Device

As for the interaction between a Node and the Repository,

also in those between the Repository and the Portable

Devices, it is used a TCP connection over a SSL/TLS

tunnel.

The interaction among these two parts occurs after the

invocation of one of the following three commands by the

Portable Device: ListServer, Update and Desc. By using

the ListServer command the Portable Device requests the

Repository to download the list of all Nodes currently

registered. The reply of the Repository can be either a

‘‘530’’ return code in case of error, or a string that has the

following structure:

where:

n is the number of entries;

ts is a timestamp used to indicate the time at which the

request has been sent, it is used with the Update command,

to check if the list is updated;

IDi is a unique identifier associated to node

i (1 B i B n);

Namei is the alias or the name of the node i (1 B i B n);

IPAddressi is the IP address of the node i (1 B i B n).

The Portable Device uses the Update command to check

if its local list of Nodes is updated. The Update command

takes as parameter the timestamp, that is used by the

Repository to verify that the list of Nodes maintained by the

Portable Device is updated. The Repository can reply with

a ‘‘400’’ return code if there are no updates, or otherwise it

replies with a string structured as follows:

where:

n is the number of the entries (n);

Fig. 2 A graphical representation of a complete interaction between

a Node and the Repository. From left to right are shown the

commands (in orange) sent from a Node to the Repository, from rightto left are shown the responses (in light blue) from the Repository to

the Node (color figure online)

Fig. 3 The XML structure of the Login command

Fig. 4 The XML structure of the Register command

Fig. 5 The XML structure of the Disconnect command

Secure and distributed video surveillance via portable devices

123

ts is a timestamp which is used for indicating when the

request has been sent;

1IDi is the node with the identifier IDi that has been

registered after the last request of update, or

2IDi is the node with the identifier IDi that has been

disconnected after the last request of update;

Namei is the alias or the name of node i (1 B i B n);

IPAddressi is the IP address of the node i (1 B i B n).

2.3 Overhead reduction for repository–portable devices

communication

For the reply messages from the Repository to the Portable

Devices the use of textual strings instead of XML

sequences has been adopted. This choice permits to reduce

the communication overhead among these two communi-

cating parts.

Consider, as an example, the Fig. 6, and suppose that

this is the XML sequence of the minimum length that could

be used by the Repository to reply the Portable Device.

In Table 1 is shown the number of additional bytes

introduced by using the XML sequence of Fig. 6 compared

to the usage of a textual string that represents the same

information. Clearly, these additional bytes can be seen as

an overhead. In this example, we assume that each char-

acter costs one byte, and that also in the XML sequence

there are no blank spaces or other tabulation characters.

The first column shows the number (n) of Nodes connected

to the Repository, the second and third column show the

number of overhead bytes needed respectively by using the

XML sequence and the textual strings. The fourth column

indicates the difference in percentage between the two

types (XML and textual strings) of overhead.

Figure 7 shows a graphical representation of the over-

head trend with a large number of Nodes, the red dotted

line represents the overhead trend of the minimal length

XML sequences, while the blue one represents the trend of

the textual strings.

2.4 Interaction Node–Portable Device

The communication among these two parts takes place via

TCP socket, using an FTP-like protocol for the exchange of

both commands and data. The main difference between the

standard FTP and the one introduced by the authors, is that

in the former the client can open two communication

channels (one for the messages and one for the data), while

in the latter a Portable Device, connected via a GPRS/

UMTS connection, cannot open more than one communi-

cation channel because of the restrictions and policies

imposed by mobile phone operators.

In our ad-hoc protocol, the Server (Node) opens two

sessions, each of them having its own communication

Table 1 Trend of the overhead between minimal length XML

sequences and textual strings

Numberof nodes

XML(overhead)

Textual(overhead)

Differencepercentage

1 42 8 78.57

2 63 13 79.37

3 84 17 79.76

4 105 21 80.00

5 126 25 80.16

6 147 29 80.27

7 168 33 80.36

8 189 37 80.42

9 210 41 80.48

10 231 45 80.52

Fig. 6 An example of a possible minimal length XML sequence

Fig. 7 Graphical comparison of the overhead (in bytes) on Y-axis, in

relation to the number of Nodes (on X-axis) between the messages

sent by using XML minimal length sequences approach (red dottedline) and textual messages approach (blue line) (color figure online)

P. Albano et al.

123

channel, while the Client (Portable Device) opens only a

single channel. The Node communicates to the Portable

Device the port of the other opened channel, and in this

way we can resemble to the standard FTP bypassing the

restrictions imposed by mobile phone operators. The three

commands used during the interaction between these two

parts are Login, List, and MGet.

The Portable Device uses the Login command for

authenticating itself to the Node. The Login operation can

be successful or not. On success, the Portable Device gets

from the Node a message containing the ‘‘200’’ return code

and the interaction among these two parts continues nor-

mally. On failure, the Portable Device gets an alert mes-

sage on its display.

The List command is used by the Portable Device to

request a snapshot (which is stored as a JPEG compressed

image) of all the environments monitored by the Node to

which it is connected. When a Node receives this command

it takes a snapshot from each of its connected cam-

era(s) and send it to the Portable Device.

Finally, the Portable Device uses the MGet command to

request the monitoring of a particular area that is identified

by an univocal code. When the Node receives this com-

mand it creates a data channel by which it can send mul-

timedia frames at fixed intervals.

3 The system security architecture

The design and development of architectures and distrib-

uted protocols that can guarantee security in video sur-

veillance is a challenging issue as shown in Zhang et al.

(2005) and Dufaux et al. (2006). With the generic term

‘‘security’’ we intend controlled and authenticated access to

the system, privacy protection and authentication among

the parts constituting the system (see Liu et al. (2005)).

In order to achieve a secure system with respect to the

security definitions given above, several solutions in the

literature have been proposed, and all of them are based on

the use of cryptosystems. The development of secure

architectures, providing controlled access, privacy protec-

tion, content confidentiality and authenticity, is one of the

most challenging issues in the video surveillance area, and

several solutions, based on the use of cryptography have

been proposed (e.g., Castiglione et al. 2011, 2012; Fleck

and Straßer 2010).

Furthermore, the existence of a surveillance system

strongly depends on legal boundaries (Hunker and Probst

2011) that states ‘‘what’’ is allowed to be monitored, what

is not, and also ‘‘who’’ is authorized to perform monitoring.

In these cases, the data produced by surveillance activities

must be properly secured against unauthorized accesses or

misuses of the collected images.

To define the security of our system, we have to con-

sider all the possible interactions among the parties, and

therefore the various security issues that may arise. For this

reason, in the current section we focus on the Node–

Repository interaction and subsequently on that on between

Node and Portable Device. In the first case of interaction

(and also in that between Repository and Portable Device)

security is guaranteed by using the SSL/TLS protocols, so

that the communication across a network is secured against

eavesdropping and tampering. The same protocol can be

also used for strong cryptographic mutual authentication.

However, there may still be Portable Devices that for

efficiency or hardware limitations, can support only par-

tially (or not support at all) the cryptographic primitives and

protocols which constitute the basis of SSL/TLS. For this

reason, we decided to use digital watermarking techniques

to guarantee a sufficient level of security during the inter-

action among a Node and a Portable Device, even when the

latter has a (very) limited computational power. In partic-

ular, to ensure that an image is not tampered, before sending

the image, each Node includes in such image a digital

invisible watermark. When the Portable Device receives the

image, it extracts the watermark in order to verify whether

the image has been tampered or not.

3.1 Digital watermarking to improve the security

of the proposed system

Digital watermarking is one of the most commonly used

techniques to insert and hide data into digital contents.

When a signal is protected by using a robust digital

watermark, then the associated hidden information will be

also included in all its copies. Watermarking is also fre-

quently used to prevent unauthorized copy of digital media.

There are different embedding methods to include hid-

den data into digital contents, such as, for example Spread-

Spectrum (Liang and Ding 2008; Wang et al. 2000; Bender

et al. 1996), or Amplitude Modulation (Kutter et al. 1998).

In the spread-spectrum method, the signal affected by

the digital watermark is obtained by using an additive

modification. Also in the amplitude modulation the marked

signal is obtained by using the same type of modification

used in the spread-spectrum embedding method, but in this

case the watermark is only embedded in the spatial domain.

Before sending the images, each Node embeds a digital

invisible watermark. When the Portable Device receives

the image, it extracts the watermark in order to verify that

each image has not been tampered.

The watermarking algorithm used in our system has

been proposed by Pizzolante and Carpentieri (2012), and it

is based on a modified version of the one proposed by

Langelaar et al. (1996). It takes four inputs: the source

image, the watermark string, a seed and a threshold T. The

Secure and distributed video surveillance via portable devices

123

watermark string is converted into a bit matrix, in which

each character is converted in a 5 9 8 sub-matrix of bits

(an example is reported in Fig. 8). The resulting string of

bits is obtained by reading the bit matrix line-by-line from

the left-top corner. The seed represents an ID (such as a

numeric PIN) which is used to embed the watermark into

the image, and then to extract it from the watermarked

image. The last parameter is a threshold T, which is a real

number indicating the robustness of the watermark that will

be embedded into the image.

We use the following algorithm to embed a digital

invisible watermark into an image:

1. Convert the image from the RGB domain to the

YUV domain.

2. Convert the watermark string into a bit matrix.

Convert each into a 5 9 8 matrix of bits (see the

example in Fig. 8). The resulting matrix will be

embedded into the original image line-by-line from

the left-top corner.

3. Select, in a pseudo-random way, a block B of 8 9 8

pixels from the image, to embed one bit of the

watermark string.

4. Generate a fixed binary pseudo-random pattern of the

same size of B.

5. Calculate the I0, I1 and D quantities from B. I0 and I1

are obtained by calculating the averages of the

luminance values in B, respectively where the

random pattern is 0 and where the random pattern

is 1. D is the difference between I1 and I0 (D = I1 -

I0).

6. Calculate B0, a reduced quality block obtained from B

by applying on it the quantization and the 8 9 8 DCT

(Discrete Cosine Transform).7. Calculate the I0

0, I1

0and D0 quantities from B0. I0

0and I1

0

are obtained by calculating the averages of the

luminance values in B0, respectively where the

random pattern is 0 and where the random pattern

is 1. D0 is the difference among I0

0and I0

^0

(D^0 = I0

0- I0

^0).

8. If the bit to embed has value 1 then go to step 10.

9. In order to embed the bit value 0, if D and D0 are

greater than the threshold T, subtract the binary

pseudo-random pattern from the block B. The steps

Fig. 10 The repository GUI

Fig. 11 The node GUI

Fig. 8 Example of conversion from the character ‘e’ to the matrix of

bits composed by 5 9 8 (40*bits). The white cells are represented by

the value 0 and the black cells are represented by the value 1

Fig. 9 a The original ‘‘Lena’’ image; b The ‘‘Lena’’ image affected

by a digital invisible watermark

P. Albano et al.

123

6–8, and 10 are repeated iteratively until both

differences are less or equal than -T. Go to step 12.

10. In order to embed the bit value 1, if D and D0 are less

or equal than the threshold T, add the binary pseudo-

random pattern to the block B. The steps 6–8, and 11

are repeated iteratively until both differences are

greater than T.

11. Apply the steps from 4 to 11 to all the pseudo-

randomly selected blocks until all the bits of the

watermark string are embedded.

12. Convert the image in YUV domain back to the RGB

domain.

In Fig. 9a and b are shown respectively the original

‘‘Lena’’ image and the ‘‘Lena’’ image which embeds a digital

invisible watermark of 200 bits (the string ‘‘SeCAM’’)

obtained applying the previously described algorithm of

watermarking. It is easy to see that there are no perceptible

(by the human eye) differences between the two images.

Analogously, we use the following algorithm to extract

the digital invisible watermark:

1. Convert the image from the RGB domain to the YUV

domain.

2. Select, in a pseudo-random way, a block B of 8 9 8

pixels from the image to read one bit of the watermark

string.

3. Generate a fixed binary pseudo-random pattern of the

same size of B.

4. Calculate I0, I1 and D from B. I0 and I1 are then

obtained by calculating the averages of the luminance

values in B, respectively where the random sequence is

0 and where the random sequence is 1. D is the

difference between I1 and I0 (D = I1 - I0).

5. If D [ 0, then the embedded bit has value 1 else it has

value 0.

4 The end-user interface

From the end-user perspective, the system we propose is

composed by three basic components, each of one is rep-

resented in a graphical user interface (GUI) and allows the

interaction between an end-user and the system. These

components are:

– The Repository GUI (described in Sect. 4.1)

– The Node GUI (described in Sect. 4.2)

– The Portable Device GUI (described in Sect. 4.3)

These components are designed and developed in order

to make the interaction between the end-user and the sys-

tem as user-friendly as possible. Moreover, several checks

are performed about the correctness of the entered inputs.

With these checks, the possibility that the end-user enters

incorrect or malformed data is strongly reduced.

4.1 The Repository GUI

The GUI of the Repository is very intuitive and simple. It is

composed by two panels: the first one permits to start the

discovery service provided by the Repository to the Por-

table Devices and to the other Nodes that want to join the

system, while the second one allows to configure the

information about the Repository when it acts as a Node

Fig. 12 a Shows an example of the first step of the Portable Device GUI; b shows an example of the Portable Device GUI with the list of the

nodes; c shows an example of the image obtained by the selected camera of the Node

Secure and distributed video surveillance via portable devices

123

(i.e., the username, the password and so on). An example of

the Repository GUI is shown in Fig. 10.

4.2 The GUI of a Node

The GUI of a Node allows an end-user to enter five

information: the username and the password (obtained

during the registration process), that will be used by each

Node for authenticating itself to the Repository, the Name

or the alias, that will be used by the Repository to identify

the Node, the hostname (or the IP address) of the Reposi-

tory, and, finally, a description of the Node.

Figure 11 shows an example of the Node GUI.

4.3 The Portable Device GUI

This GUI allows the Portable Device to join the system and

to use the services that it provides. The interaction with the

entire system takes place in two phases. In the first one

(Fig. 12a) the end-user have to input the information

regarding the connection with the Repository. In more

details, the information required are the following: user-

name, password and host. These information are used by

the Portable Device to connect and authenticate itself to

the Repository. In the second one (Fig. 12b) the Portable

Device shows to the end-user the list of Nodes obtained

from the Repository. For each node the portable device

GUI provides the opportunity to invoke three commands:

Details, Update and Connect. The Details command allows

the Portable Device to obtain a detailed description of the

Node. The Update command allows the Portable Device to

request the update of its local list of Nodes. The Connect

command allows the Portable Device to connect with a

specific Node and to obtain the frame sequence captured by

the camera(s) to which that Node is connected. Finally, the

Exit command allows the Portable Device to disconnect

from the system and stop all the operations.

5 Conclusions and future research directions

Nowadays, video surveillance has became an important

and increasingly used tool for monitoring areas and envi-

ronments. Video surveillance is used in many real-world

scenarios and can be applied both to civil and military

fields. With the diffusion of portable devices with enhanced

power of computation and advanced features, it is now

possible to perform surveillance and monitoring activities

directly by using these devices. This features can be very

useful for example when traveling or, in general, in situa-

tions in which is needed to control an environment when

moving from one place to another.

In this work, we propose a secure distributed system for

video surveillance based on the client-server model, which

provides the opportunity of remote connections using

portable devices, for the sake of real-time monitoring.

Future research will consider the migration of the proposed

system architecture from the client-server model to the

peer-to-peer (P2P) model, so in this way we intend to

support the scalability of the system when the number of

nodes grows up. In addition, the above migration will allow

to remove all the ‘‘bottlenecks’’ derived by having a single

server that provides all the services. Consider for example

if, for some reasons, the Repository is not available. In this

case the Nodes that have already joined the system cannot

be discovered by the Portable Device, and also, the

incoming Nodes that would to join the system cannot

perform this operation because the system can be accessed

only through the Repository.

Moreover, using video and audio streaming could allow

the portable device to invoke advanced commands such as:

Play, Pause, Stop, Frame Capture and any other standard

function commonly provided by a ‘‘multimedial’’ operating

systems.

Another future research direction is to include in our

system a Motion Detection Engine, in this way the end-user

could be notified, using several communication methods, if

an anomaly has been detected, even when one is not con-

nected to the system.

Finally, it could be meaningful to consider the possi-

bility to send/transfer from a Node to a Portable Device a

compressed short video with audio.

References

Albano P, Bruno A, Carpentieri B, Castiglione A, Castiglione A,

Palmieri F, Pizzolante R, You I (2012) A secure distributed

video surveillance system based on portable devices. In: CD-

ARES, LNCS 7465, pp 403–415

Bender W, Gruhl D, Morimoto N, Lu A (1996) Techniques for data

hiding. IBM Syst. J. 35(3–4):313 –336 (ISSN: 0018-8670)

Castiglione A, De Prisco R, De Santis A (2009) Do you trust your

phone. In: Noia T, Buccafurri F (eds) E-commerce and web

technologies. Lecture notes in computer science, vol 5692.

Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp 50–61 (ISBN: 978-3-642-

03963-8). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03964-5_6

Castiglione A, Cattaneo G, De Maio G, Petagna F (2011) Secure end-

to-end communication over 3G telecommunication networks. In:

Proceedings of 5th international conference on innovative

mobile and internet services in ubiquitous computing (IMIS)

pp 520–526. doi:10.1109/IMIS.2011.65

Castiglione A, Cattaneo G, Cembalo M, De Santis A, Faruolo P,

Petagna F, Petrillo UF (2012) Engineering a secure mobile

messaging framework. Comput Secur 31(6):771–781 (ISSN:

0167-4048). doi:10.1016/j.cose.2012.06.004

Chen TH, Kao CL, Chang SM (2003) An intelligent real-time fire-

detection method based on video processing. In: Proceedings of

P. Albano et al.

123

IEEE 37th annual 2003 international Carnahan conference on

security technology, pp 104–111

Chen TH, Wu PH, Chiou YC (2004) An early fire-detection method

based on image processing. In: Proceedings of IEEE ICIP’04,

international conference on image processing, 2004, vol 3,

pp 1707–1710

Collins RT, Lipton A, Kanade T, Fujiyoshi H, Duggins D, Tsin Y,

Tolliver D, Enomoto N, Hasegawa O, Burt P, et al (2000) A

system for video surveillance and monitoring, vol 102. The

Robotics Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh

De Santis A, Castiglione A, Cattaneo G, Cembalo M, Petagna F,

Petrillo UF (2010) An extensible framework for efficient secure

SMS. In: Proceedings of CISIS, 4th international conference on

complex, intelligent and software intensive iystems, Krakow,

Poland, pp 843–850. doi:10.1109/CISIS.2010.81

Dufaux F, Ouaret M, Abdeljaoued Y, Navarro A, Vergnenegre F,

Ebrahimi T et al (2006) Privacy enabling technology for video

surveillance. Proc SPIE 6250:205–216

Duque D, Santos H, Cortez P (2007) Prediction of abnormal

behaviors for intelligent video surveillance systems. In: Pro-

ceedings of IEEE symposium on computational intelligence and

data mining, CIDM 2007, pp 362–367

Fleck S, Straßer W (2010) Towards secure and privacy sensitive

surveillance. In: Proceedings of the 4th ACM/IEEE international

conference on distributed smart cameras, ICDSC ’10, ACM

2010, New York, NY, USA, pp 126–132 (ISBN: 978-1-4503-

0317-0). doi:10.1145/1865987.1866008.

Foresti GL, Snidaro L (2002) A distributed sensor network for video

surveillance of outdoor environments. In: Proceedings of IEEE

2002 international conference on image processing 2002, vol 1,

pp 1–525

Huang Z, Ren S, Chen Y, Jiang W (2009) Research on the military

video surveillance system with conditional access information.

Inf Technol Manage 10:028

Hunker J., Probst CW (2011) Insiders and insider threats—an

overview of definitions and mitigation techniques. J Wirel

Mob Netw Ubiquitous Comput Dependable Appl (JoWUA)

2(1):4–27

Ko T (2008) A survey on behavior analysis in video surveillance for

homeland security applications. In: Proceedings of IEEE 37th

IEEE workshop on applied imagery pattern recognition,

AIPR’08, pp 1–8

Kutter M, Jordan FD, Bossen F (1998) Digital watermarking of color

images using amplitude modulation. J Electr Imag 7:326–332.

doi:10.1117/1.482648

Langelaar GC, van der Lubbe JCA, Biemond J (1996) Copy

protection for multimedia data based on labeling techniques.

In: Proceedings of 17th symposium on information theory in the

Benelux

Liang Q, Ding Z (2008) Spread spectrum watermark for color image

based on wavelet tree structure. In: Proceedings of international

conference on computer science and software engineering, vol 3,

pp 692–695. doi:10.1109/CSSE.2008.958

Liu Z, Peng D, Zheng Y, Liu J (2005) Communication protection in

IP-based video surveillance systems. In: Proceedings of 7th

IEEE international symposium on multimedia, December 2005,

Irvine, Calif, USA, pp 69–78

Muller-Schneiders S, Jager T, Loos HS, Niem W (2005) Performance

evaluation of a real time video surveillance system. In:

Proceedings of 2nd Joint IEEE International Workshop on

visual surveillance and performance evaluation of tracking and

surveillance, pp 137–143

Nasution AH, Emmanuel S (2007) Intelligent video surveillance for

monitoring elderly in home environments. In: Proceedings of

IEEE 9th workshop on multimedia signal processing, MMSP

2007, pp 203–206

Nieto M (1997) Public video surveillance: is it an effective crime

prevention tool? California Research Bureau, California State

Library Sacramento, CA

Norris C, McCahill M, Wood D (2002) The growth of CCTV: a

global perspective on the international diffusion of video

surveillance in publicly accessible space. Surveill Soc 2(2/3):

110–135

Pizzolante R, Carpentieri B (2012) Copyright protection for images

on mobile devices. In: Proceedings of 6th international confer-

ence on innovative mobile and internet services in ubiquitous

computing (IMIS), pp 585–590. doi:10.1109/IMIS.2012.73

Srinivasan S, Latchman H, Shea J, Wong T, McNair J (2004)

Airborne traffic surveillance systems: video surveillance of

highway traffic. In: Proceedings of the ACM 2nd international

workshop on video surveillance and sensor networks, VSSN ’04,

ACM, New York, NY, USA, pp 131–135. (ISBN 1-58113-934-

9) doi:10.1145/1026799.1026821

Toreyin BU, Dedeoglu Y, Cetin AE (2005) Flame detection in video

using hidden markov models. In: Proceedings of IEEE interna-

tional conference on image processing, ICIP 2005, vol 2,

pp 1230–1233

Toreyin BUT, Dedeoglu Y, Gudukbay UCetin AE (2006) Computer

vision based method for real-time fire and flame detection.

Pattern Recogn Lett 27(1):49–58

Tseng BL, Lin CY, Smith JR (2002) Real-time video surveillance for

traffic monitoring using virtual line analysis. In: Proceedings

of IEEE international conference on multimedia and expo,

ICME’02, vol 2, pp 541–544

Wang YP, Chen MJ, Cheng PY (2000) Robust image watermark with

wavelet transform and spread spectrum techniques. In: Proceed-

ings of conference record of the 34th Asilomar conference on

signals, systems and computers, vol 2, 29 Nov 2000, pp 1846–

1850. doi:10.1109/ACSSC.2000.911307

Zhang W, Cheung SC, Chen M (2005) Hiding privacy information in

video surveillance system. In: Proceedings of the 12th IEEE

international conference on image processing, pp 868–871

Secure and distributed video surveillance via portable devices

123