Section 702 Case Neg

Strat SheetTheir 1AC and a sample 1NC are included below. The plan text doesn’t specify which agency does the plan but their solvency evidence specifies congress so you can read XO if you want. Other than XO, there is T-Domestic, a PIC for “tangible” w/ the net benefit of terror, specific Terror DA links and a Security K. The PIC argues that “tangible threat” is too specific and doesn’t take in account fake threats. We should analyze all threats regardless of being fake or real.

1NC – Security K, PIC w/ Terror DA, T-Domestic, Case2NC- Security K or PIC, Case1NR – Terror DA2NR – Security K or PIC w/ Terror DA, Case

-Allen XuQuestions? Email xuallen99@gmail.com

Their 1AC

1AC – Inherency

The recent USA Freedom Act, did not reform the NSA’s the mass collection of domestic communication under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.Goitein 15, Elizabeth, Co-Director of the Brennan Center for Justice’s Liberty and National Security Program, 6-5-2015, "Who really wins from NSA reform?," MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/freedom-act-who-really-wins-nsa-reform

The USA Freedom Act will end the bulk collection of phone metadata and prohibit similar programs for any type of business records under foreign intelligence collection authorities. For phone records, the government may obtain metadata on an ongoing basis only for suspected terrorists and those in contact with them. For other types of records, the government must tie its request for records to a “specific selection term,” such as a person, address, or account. Given the surge in surveillance since 9/11, the USA Freedom Act’s imposition of constraints on collection is historic. Indeed, the USA Freedom Act is the most significant limitation on foreign intelligence surveillance since the 1970s. If faithfully implemented – a critical caveat, to be sure – the law will meaningfully curtail the

overbroad collection of business records. Even under USA Freedom, however, the government is still able to pull in a great deal of information about innocent Americans. Needless to say, not everyone in contact with a suspected terrorist is guilty of a crime; even terrorists call for pizza delivery. Intelligence officials also may need to obtain records – like flight manifests – that include information about multiple people, most of whom have nothing to do with terrorism. Some of this “overcollection” may be inevitable, but its effects could be mitigated. For instance, agencies could be given a short period of time to identify information relevant to actual suspects, after which they would have to destroy any remaining information. USA Freedom fails to impose such limits. More fundamentally, bulk collection of

business records is only one of the many intelligence activities that abandoned the individualized suspicion approach after 9/11. Until a few years ago, if the NSA, acting within the United States, wished to obtain communications between Americans and foreigners, it had to convince the FISA Court that the individual target was a foreign power or its agent. Today, under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, the NSA may target any foreigner overseas and collect his or her communications with Americans without obtaining any individualized court order. Under Executive Order 12333, which governs the NSA’s activities when it conducts surveillance overseas,

the standards are even more lax. The result is mass surveillance programs that make the phone metadata program seem dainty in comparison. Even though these programs are nominally targeted at foreigners, they “incidentally” sweep in massive amounts of Americans’ data, including the content of calls, e-mails, text messages, and video chats. Limits on keeping and using such information are weak and riddled with exceptions. Moreover, foreign targets are not limited to suspected terrorists or even agents of foreign powers. As the Obama administration recently acknowledged, foreigners have privacy rights too, and the ability to eavesdrop on any foreigner overseas is an indefensible violation of those rights. Intelligence officials almost certainly supported USA Freedom because they hoped it would relieve the post-Snowden pressure for reform. Their likely long-term goal is to avoid changes to Section 702, Executive Order

12333, and the many other authorities that permit intelligence collection without any individualized showing of wrongdoing. Privacy advocates who supported USA Freedom did so because they saw it as the first skirmish in a long battle to rein in surveillance authorities. Their eye is on the prize: a return to the principle of individualized suspicion as the basis for surveillance. If intelligence officials are correct in their calculus, USA Freedom may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory. But if the law clears the way for further reforms across the full range of surveillance programs, history will vindicate the privacy

advocates who supported it. The answer to what USA Freedom means for our liberties lies, not in the text of the law, but in the unwritten story of what happens next.

And, the NSA has massively expanded its surveillance since 2008, American internet communication have been intercepted by NSA surveillance operations far more often than the intended surveillance targets. Gellman, 2014Barton Gellman, Washington Post national staff. Contributed to three Pulitzer Prizes for The Washington Post, 7-5-2014, "In NSA-intercepted data, those not targeted far outnumber the foreigners who are," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/

Ordinary Internet users, American and non-American alike, far outnumber legally targeted foreigners in the communications intercepted by the National Security Agency from U.S. digital networks, according to a

four-month investigation by The Washington Post. Nine of 10 account holders found in a large cache of intercepted conversations, which former NSA contractor Edward Snowden provided in full to The Post, were not the intended surveillance targets but were caught in a net the agency had cast for somebody else. Many of them were Americans. Nearly half of the surveillance files, a strikingly high proportion, contained names, e-mail addresses or other details that the NSA marked as belonging to U.S. citizens or residents. NSA analysts masked, or “minimized,” more than 65,000 such references to protect Americans’ privacy, but The Post found nearly 900 additional e-mail addresses, unmasked in the files, that could be strongly linked to U.S.

citizens or U.S.residents. The surveillance files highlight a policy dilemma that has been aired only abstractly in public. There are discoveries of considerable intelligence value in the intercepted messages — and collateral harm to privacy on a scale that the Obama administration has not been willing to address. Among the most valuable contents — which The Post will not describe in detail, to avoid interfering with ongoing operations — are fresh revelations about a secret overseas nuclear project, double-dealing by an ostensible ally, a military calamity that befell an unfriendly power, and the identities of aggressive intruders into U.S. computer networks. Months of tracking communications across more than 50 alias accounts, the files show, led directly to the 2011 capture in Abbottabad of Muhammad Tahir Shahzad, a Pakistan-based bomb builder, and Umar Patek, a suspect in a 2002 terrorist bombing on the Indonesian island of Bali. At the request of CIA officials, The

Post is withholding other examples that officials said would compromise ongoing operations. Many other files, described as useless by the analysts but nonetheless retained, have a startlingly intimate, even voyeuristic quality. They tell stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons, mental-health crises, political and religious conversions, financial anxieties and disappointed hopes. The daily lives of more than 10,000 account holders who were not targeted are catalogued and recorded nevertheless. In order to allow time for analysis and outside reporting, neither

Snowden nor The Post has disclosed until now that he obtained and shared the content of intercepted communications. The cache Snowden provided came from domestic NSA operations under the broad authority granted by Congress in 2008 with amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. FISA content is generally stored in closely controlled data repositories, and for more than a year, senior government officials have depicted it as beyond Snowden’s reach.The Post reviewed roughly 160,000 intercepted e-mail and instant-message conversations, some of them hundreds of pages long, and 7,900 documents taken from more than 11,000 online accounts. The material

spans President Obama’s first term, from 2009 to 2012, a period of exponential growth for the NSA’s domestic collection. Taken together, the files offer an unprecedented vantage point on the changes wrought by Section 702 of the FISA amendments, which enabled the NSA to make freer use of methods that for 30 years had required probable cause and a warrant from a judge. One program, code-named PRISM, extracts content stored in user accounts at Yahoo,

Microsoft, Facebook, Google and five other leading Internet companies. Another, known inside the NSA as Upstream, intercepts data on the move as it crosses the U.S. junctions of global voice and data networks. No government oversight body, including the Justice Department, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, intelligence committees in Congress or the president’s Privacy

and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, has delved into a comparably large sample of what the NSA actually collects — not only from its targets but also from people who may cross a target’s path.

1AC – Privacy RightsAdvantage One is PrivacyFirst, surveillance under Section 702 is a substantial invasive of privacy because of the broad targetting guidelines in the FISA Amendments Act.Laperruque, 2014, Jake, Center for Democracy and Tehcnology Fellow on Privacy, Surveillance, and Security. Previously served as a law clerk for Senator Al Franken on the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law, and as a policy fellow for Senator Robert Menendez. "Why Average Internet Users Should Demand Significant Section 702 Reform," Center For Democracy & Technology., 7-22-2014, https://cdt.org/blog/why-average-internet-users-should-demand-significant-section-702-reform/

Section 702 Surveillance Is Fundamentally More Invasive

While incidental collection of the communications of a person who communicates with a target is an inevitable feature of communications

surveillance, it is tolerated when the reason for the surveillance is compelling and adequate procedural checks are in place. In other instances of communications surveillance conducted in the US, surveillance requires court approval of a target, and that target must be a suspected wrongdoer or spy, a terrorist, or another agent of a foreign power. Section 702 requires neither of these elements.

Under Section 702, targeting can occur for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information even though there is no court review of any particular target. Instead, the super secret FISA court merely determines whether the guidelines under which the surveillance is conducted are reasonably designed to result in the targeting of non-Americans abroad

and that “minimization guidelines” are reasonable. This means incidental surveillance may occur purely because someone communicated with an individual engaged in activities that may have broadly defined “foreign intelligence” value. For example, the communications of someone who communicates with a person abroad whose activities might relate to the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs can be collected, absent any independent assessment of necessity or accuracy.

As another example, under traditional FISA – for intelligence surveillance in the U.S. of people in the U.S. – your communications could be incidentally collected only if you were in direct contact with a suspected agent of a foreign power, and additionally if the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Court had affirmed this suspicion based on probable cause. Under Section 702, your personal information could be scooped up by the NSA simply because your attorney, doctor, lover, or accountant was a person abroad who engaged in peaceful political activity such as protesting a G8 summit.

And, these invasions are magnified because the data is the full content of the communication.Goitein 15, Elizabeth, Co-Director of the Brennan Center for Justice’s Liberty and National Security Program., 6-5-2015, "Who really wins from NSA reform?," MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/freedom-act-who-really-wins-nsa-reform

Some of this “overcollection” may be inevitable, but its effects could be mitigated. For instance, agencies could be given a short period of time to identify information relevant to actual suspects, after which they would have to destroy any remaining information. USA Freedom fails to impose such limits. More fundamentally, bulk collection of business records is only one of the many

intelligence activities that abandoned the individualized suspicion approach after 9/11. Until a few years ago, if the NSA, acting within the United States, wished to obtain communications between Americans and foreigners, it had to convince the FISA Court that the individual target was a foreign power or its agent. Today, under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, the NSA may target any foreigner overseas and collect his or her communications with Americans without obtaining any individualized court order. Under Executive Order 12333,

which governs the NSA’s activities when it conducts surveillance overseas, the standards are even more lax. The result is mass surveillance programs that make the phone metadata program seem dainty in comparison. Even though these programs are nominally targeted at foreigners, they “incidentally” sweep in massive amounts of Americans’ data, including the content of calls, e-mails, text messages, and video chats. Limits on keeping and using such information are weak and riddled with exceptions. Moreover, foreign targets are not limited to suspected terrorists or even agents of foreign powers. As the Obama administration recently acknowledged, foreigners have privacy rights

too, and the ability to eavesdrop on any foreigner overseas is an indefensible violation of those rights. Intelligence officials almost certainly supported USA Freedom because they hoped it would relieve the post-Snowden pressure for reform. Their likely long-term goal is to avoid changes to Section 702, Executive Order 12333, and the many other authorities that permit intelligence collection without any individualized showing of wrongdoing. Privacy advocates who supported USA Freedom did so because they saw it as the first skirmish in a long battle to rein in surveillance authorities. Their eye is on the prize: a return to the principle of individualized suspicion as the basis for surveillance. If intelligence officials are correct in their calculus, USA Freedom may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory. But if the law clears the way for further reforms across the

full range of surveillance programs, history will vindicate the privacy advocates who supported it. The answer to what USA Freedom means for our liberties lies, not in the text of the law, but in the unwritten story of what happens next.

And, indiscriminate wide-scale NSA Surveillance erodes privacy rights and violates the constitutionSinha, 2014G. Alex Sinha is an Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties Union, July 2014 “With Liberty to Monitor All How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy” Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/node/127364

The United States government today is implementing a wide variety of surveillance programs that, thanks to

developments in its technological capacity, allow it to scoop up personal information and the content of personal communications on an unprecedented scale. Media reports based on revelations by former National Security

Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden have recently shed light on many of these programs. They have revealed,

for example, that the US collects vast quantities of information—known as “metadata”—about phone calls made to, from, and within the US. It also routinely collects the content of international chats, emails, and voice calls. It has engaged in the large-scale collection of massive amounts of cell phone location data. Reports have also revealed a since-discontinued effort to track internet usage and email patterns in the US; the comprehensive interception of all of phone calls made within, into, and out of Afghanistan and the Bahamas; the daily collection of millions of images so the NSA can run facial recognition programs; the acquisition of hundreds of millions of email and

chat contact lists around the world; and the NSA’s deliberate weakening of global encryption standards. In response to public concern over the programs’ intrusion on the privacy of millions of people in the US and around the world, the US government has at times acknowledged the need for reform. However, it has taken few meaningful steps in that direction. On the contrary, the US—particularly the intelligence community—has forcefully defended the surveillance programs as essential to protecting US national security. In a world of constantly shifting global threats, officials argue that the US simply cannot know in advance which global communications may be relevant to its intelligence activities, and that as a result, it needs the authority to collect and monitor a broad swath of communications. In our interviews with them, US officials argued that the programs are effective, plugging operational gaps that used to exist, and providing the US with valuable intelligence. They also insisted the programs are lawful and subject to rigorous and multi-layered oversight, as well as rules about how the information obtained through them is used. The government has emphasized that it does not use the information gleaned from these programs for illegitimate purposes, such as persecuting political

opponents. The questions raised by surveillance are complex. The government has an obligation to protect national security, and in some cases, it is legitimate for government to restrict certain rights to that end.

At the same time, international human rights and constitutional law set limits on the state’s authority to engage in activities like surveillance, which have the potential to undermine so many other rights. The current, large-scale, often indiscriminate US approach to surveillance carries enormous costs. It erodes global digital privacy and sets a terrible example for other countries like India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and others that are in the process of expanding their surveillance capabilities. It also damages US credibility in advocating internationally for internet

freedom, which the US has listed as an important foreign policy objective since at least 2010.As this report documents, US surveillance programs are also doing damage to some of the values the United States claims to hold most dear. These include freedoms of expression and association, press freedom, and the right to counsel, which are all protected by both international human rights law and the US Constitution.

And, these privacy violations are more dangerous than any risk of terrorism, which is magnified by the fact that surveillance fails to prevent attacks. Schneier, 2014Bruce Schneier a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the CTO at Resilient Systems, Inc.,1-6-2014, "Essays: How the NSA Threatens National Security," Schneier On Security, https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2014/01/how_the_nsa_threaten.html

We have no evidence that any of this surveillance makes us safer. NSA Director General Keith Alexander responded to these stories in June by claiming that he disrupted 54 terrorist plots. In October, he revised that number downward to 13, and then to "one or

two." At this point, the only "plot" prevented was that of a San Diego man sending $8,500 to support a Somali militant group. We have been repeatedly told that these surveillance programs would have been able to stop 9/11, yet the NSA didn't detect the Boston bombings—even though one of the two terrorists was on the watch list and the other had a sloppy

social media trail. Bulk collection of data and metadata is an ineffective counterterrorism tool. Not only is ubiquitous surveillance ineffective, it is extraordinarily costly. I don't mean just the budgets, which will continue to skyrocket. Or the diplomatic costs, as country after country learns of our surveillance programs against their citizens. I'm also talking about the

cost to our society. It breaks so much of what our society has built. It breaks our political systems, as Congress is unable to provide any meaningful oversight and citizens are kept in the dark about what government does. It breaks our legal systems, as laws

are ignored or reinterpreted, and people are unable to challenge government actions in court. It breaks our commercial systems, as U.S. computer products and services are no longer trusted worldwide. It breaks our technical systems, as the very protocols of the

Internet become untrusted. And it breaks our social systems; the loss of privacy, freedom, and liberty is much more damaging to our society than the occasional act of random violence. And finally, these systems are susceptible to abuse. This is not just a hypothetical problem. Recent history illustrates many episodes where this information was, or would have been, abused: Hoover and his FBI spying, McCarthy, Martin Luther King Jr. and the civil rights movement, anti-war Vietnam

protesters, and—more recently—the Occupy movement. Outside the U.S., there are even more extreme examples. Building the surveillance state makes it too easy for people and organizations to slip over the line into abuse.

The First impact is the loss of personal autonomy and agency. Privacy is a gateway right, it enables all of our other freedoms. PoKempne 2014, Dinah, General Counsel at Human Rights Watch, “The Right Whose Time Has Come (Again): Privacy in the Age of Surveillance” 1/21/14 http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/essays/privacy-in-age-of-surveillance

Technology has invaded the sacred precincts of private life, and unwarranted exposure has imperiled our security, dignity, and most basic values. The law must rise to the occasion and protect our rights. Does

this sound familiar? So argued Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in their 1890 Harvard Law Review article announcing “The Right to Privacy.” We are again at such a juncture. The technological developments they saw as menacing—photography and the rise of the mass circulation press—appear rather quaint to us now. But the harms to emotional, psychological,

and even physical security from unwanted exposure seem just as vivid in our digital age.Our renewed sense of vulnerability comes as almost all aspects of daily social life migrate online. At the same time, corporations and governments have acquired frightening abilities to amass and search these endless digital records, giving them the power to “know” us in extraordinary detail.

In a world where we share our lives on social media and trade immense amounts of personal information for the ease and

convenience of online living, some have questioned whether privacy is a relevant concept. It is not just relevant, but crucial.

Indeed, privacy is a gateway right that affects our ability to exercise almost every other right, not least our freedom to speak and associate with those we choose, make political choices, practice our religious beliefs, seek medical help, access education, figure out whom we love, and create our family life. It is nothing less than the shelter in which we work out what we think and who we are; a fulcrum of our autonomy as individuals.

The importance of privacy, a right we often take for granted, was thrown into sharp relief in 2013 by the steady stream

of revelations from United States government files released by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden,

and published in the Guardian and other major newspapers around the world. These revelations, supported by highly classified

documents, showed the US, the UK, and other governments engaged in global indiscriminate data interception, largely unchecked by any meaningful legal constraint or oversight, without regard for the rights of millions of people who were not suspected of wrongdoing.

The Second impact is Totalitarianism, the loss of autonomy due to surveillance enables “turnkey totalitarianism,” destroying democracy.

Haggerty, 2015Kevin D. Professor of Criminology and Sociology at the University of Alberta, “What’s Wrong with Privacy Protections?” in A World Without Privacy: What Law Can and Should Do? Edited by Austin Sarat p. 230

Still others will say I am being alarmist. My emphasis on the threat of authoritarian forms of rule inherent in populations

open to detailed institutional scrutiny will be portrayed as overblown and over dramatic, suggesting I veer towards the

lunatic fringe of unhinged conspiracy theorists.66 But one does not have to believe secret forces are operating behind

the scenes to recognize that our declining private realm presents alarming dangers. Someone as conservative and

deeply embedded in the security establishment as William Binney – a former NSA senior executive – says the security surveillance infrastructure he helped build now puts us on the verge of “turnkey totalitarianism.”67 The contemporary expansion of surveillance, where monitoring becomes an ever-more routine part of our lives, represents a tremendous shift in the balance of power between citizens and organizations. Perhaps the greatest danger

of this situation is how our existing surveillance practices can be turned to oppressive uses. From this point forward our expanding surveillance infrastructure stands as a resource to be inherited by future generations of

politicians, corporate actors, or even messianic leaders. Given sufficient political will this surveillance infrastructure can be re-purposed to monitor – in unparalleled detail – people who some might see as undesirable due to their political opinions, religion, skin color, gender, birthplace, physical abilities, medical history, or any number of an almost limitless list of factors used to pit people against one another. The twentieth century provides notorious examples of such repressive uses of surveillance. Crucially, those tyrannical states exercised fine-grained political control by relying on surveillance infrastructures that today seem laughably rudimentary, comprised as they were of paper files, index cards, and elementary telephone tapping.68 It is no more alarmist to acknowledge such risks are germane to our own societies than it is to recognize the future will see wars, terrorist attacks, or environmental disasters – events that could themselves prompt surveillance structures to be re-calibrated towards more coercive ends. Those who think this massive surveillance infrastructure will not, in the fullness of time, be turned to repressive purposes are either innocent as to the realities of power, or whistling past a graveyard. But one does not have to dwell on the most extreme possibilities to be unnerved by how enhanced surveillance

capabilities invest tremendous powers in organizations. Surveillance capacity gives organizations unprecedented abilities to manipulate human behaviors, desires, and subjectivities towards organizational ends – ends

that are too often focused on profit, personal aggrandizement, and institutional self-interest rather than human betterment.

Freedom and dignity are ethically prior to security. Cohen, 2014Elliot D. Ph.D., ethicist and political analyst. He is the editor in chief of the International Journal of

Applied Philosophy, Technology of Oppression: Preserving Freedom and Dignity in an Age of Mass, Warrantless Surveillance.. DOI: 10.1057/9781137408211.0011.

The threat posed by mass, warrantless surveillance technologies

Presently, such a threat to human freedom and dignity lies in the technological erosion of human privacy through the ever-evolving development and deployment of a global, government system of mass, warrantless surveillance. Taken to its logical conclusion, this is a systematic means of spying on, and ultimately manipulating and controlling, virtually every aspect of everybody's private life—a thoroughgoing,

global dissolution of personal space, which is supposed to be legally protected. In such a governmental state of "total (or virtually

total) information awareness," the potential for government control and manipulation of the people's deepest and most personal beliefs, feelings, and values can transform into an Orwellian reality—and nightmare. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the technology that has the potential to remove such scenarios from the realm of science fiction to that of true

science is currently being developed. This is not to deny the legitimate government interest in "national security"; however, the exceptional disruption of privacy for legitimate state reasons cannot and should not be mistaken for a usual and customary rule of mass invasion of people's private lives without their informed consent. Benjamin Franklin wisely and succinctly expressed the point: "Those who surrender freedom for security will not have, nor do they deserve, either one." In relinquishing our privacy to government, we also lose the freedom to control, and act on, our personal information, which is what defines us individually, and collectively, as free agents and a free nation. In a world devoid of freedom to control who we are, proclaiming that we are "secure" is an empty platitude.

1AC – Economy AdvantageAdvantage Two is the Economy.NSA surveillance has put the US ecomony and competive advantage at risk because of losses in the technology sector. The USA freedom act won’t solve the problem. Mindock 2015 Clark Mindock - Reporting Fellow at International Business Times – Internally quoting The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. ITIF is a non-partisan research and educational institute – a think tank “NSA Surveillance Could Cost Billions For US Internet Companies After Edward Snowden Revelations” - International Business Times - June 10 2015 http://www.ibtimes.com/nsa-surveillance-could-cost-billions-us-internet-companies-after-edward-snowden-1959737

Failure to reform National Security Administration spying programs revealed by Edward Snowden could be more economically taxing than previously thought, says a new study published by the Information Technology and Innovation

Foundation Tuesday. The study suggests the programs could be affecting the technology sector as a whole, not just the cloud-computing sector, and that the costs could soar much higher than previously expected. Even modest declines in cloud computing revenues from the revealed surveillance programs, according to a

previous report, would cost between $21.5 billion and $35 billion by 2016. New estimates show that the toll “will likely far exceed ITIF’s

initial $35 billion estimate.” “The U.S. government’s failure to reform many of the NSA’s surveillance programs has damaged the competitiveness of the U.S. tech sector and cost it a portion of the global market share,” a summary of the report said. Revelations by defense contractor Snowden in June 2013 exposed massive U.S. government

surveillance capabilities and showed the NSA collected American phone records in bulk, and without a warrant. The bulk phone-record

revelations, and many others in the same vein, including the required complacency of American telecom and Internet companies in

providing the data, raised questions about the transparency of American surveillance programs and prompted outrage from privacy advocates. The study, published this week, argues that unless the American government can vigorously reform how NSA surveillance is regulated and overseen, U.S. companies will lose contracts and, ultimately, their competitive edge in a global market as consumers around the world choose cloud computing and technology options that do not have potential ties to American surveillance programs. The report comes amid a debate in Congress on what to do with the Patriot Act, the law that provides much of the

authority for the surveillance programs. As of June 1, authority to collect American phone data en masse expired, though questions remain as to whether letting that authority expire is enough to protect privacy. Supporters of the

programs argue that they provide the country with necessary capabilities to fight terrorism abroad. A further reform made the phone records collection process illegal for the government, and instead gave that responsibility to the telecom companies.

Reform is necessary to regain US leadership in the global marketplace.Castro and Mcquinn 2015Daniel Castro is the Vice President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation and Director of the Center for Data Innovation; Alan McQuinn is a Research Assistant with The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. Prior to joining ITIF, he was a telecommunications fellow for Congresswoman Anna Eshoo, an Honorary Co-Chair of ITIF, 6/9/15, “Beyond the USA Freedom Act: How U.S. Surveillance Still Subverts U.S. Competitiveness” “Information Technology & Innovation Foundation” http://www.itif.org/publications/2015/06/09/beyond-usa-freedom-act-how-us-surveillance-still-subverts-us-competitiveness

When historians write about this period in U.S. history it could very well be that one of the themes will be how the United States lost its global technology leadership to other nations. And clearly one of the factors they would point to is the long-standing privileging of U.S. national security interests over U.S. industrial and commercial interests when it comes to U.S. foreign policy. This has occurred over the last few years as the U.S. government has done relatively little to address the rising commercial challenge to U.S. technology companies, all the

while putting intelligence gathering first and foremost. Indeed, policy decisions by the U.S. intelligence community have reverberated throughout the global economy. If the U.S. tech industry is to remain the leader in the global marketplace, then the U.S. government will need to set a new course that balances economic interests with national security interests. The cost of inaction is not only short-term economic losses for U.S. companies, but a wave of protectionist policies that will systematically weaken U.S. technology competiveness in years to come, with impacts on economic growth, jobs, trade balance, and national security through a weakened industrial base. Only by taking decisive steps to reform its digital surveillance activities will the U.S. government enable its tech industry to effectively compete in the global market.

The US is the driving force behind global economic recoveryEconomist 2015

“American shopper,” 2-14, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643188-world-once-again-relying-too-much-american-consumers-power-growth-american-shopper

A Global economy running on a single engine is better than one that needs jump leads. The American economy is motoring again, to the relief of exporters from Hamburg to Hangzhou. Firms added more than 1m net new jobs in the past three months, the best showing since 1997 (see article). Buoyed up by cheap petrol, Americans are spending; in

January consumer sentiment jumped to its highest in more than a decade. The IMF reckons that American growth will hit 3.6% in 2015, faster than the world economy as a whole. All this is good. But growing dependence on the American economy—and on consumers in particular—has unwelcome echoes. A decade ago American consumers borrowed heavily and recklessly. They filled their ever-larger houses with goods from China; they fuelled gas-guzzling cars with imported oil. Big exporters recycled their earnings back to America, pushing down interest rates which in turn helped to feed further borrowing. Europe was not that different. There, frugal Germans financed debt binges around the euro area’s periphery.After the financial crisis, the hope was of an end to these imbalances. Debt-addicted Americans and Spaniards would chip away at their obligations; thrifty German and Chinese consumers would start to enjoy life for once. At first,

this seemed to be happening. America’s trade deficit, which was about 6% of GDP in 2006, had more than halved by 2009. But now the world is slipping back into some nasty habits. Hair grows faster than the euro zone, and what growth there is depends heavily on exports. The countries of the single currency are running a current-account surplus of about 2.6% of GDP, thanks largely to exports to America. At 7.4% of GDP, Germany’s trade surplus is as large as it has ever been. China’s growth, meanwhile, is slowing—and once again relying heavily on spending elsewhere. It notched up its own record trade surplus in January. China’s exports have actually begun to drop, but imports are down by more. And over the past year the renminbi, which rose by more than 10% against the dollar in 2010-13, has begun

slipping again, to the annoyance of American politicians. America’s economy is warping as a result. Consumption’s contribution to growth in the fourth quarter of 2014 was the largest since 2006. The trade deficit is widening.

Strip out oil, and America’s trade deficit grew to more than 3% of GDP in 2014, and is approaching its pre-recession peak of about 4%. The world’s reliance on America is likely to deepen. Germans are more interested in shipping savings abroad than investing at home (see article). Households and firms in Europe’s periphery are overburdened with debt, workers’ wages squeezed and banks in no mood to lend. Like Germany, Europe as a whole is relying on exports. China is rebalancing, but not fast enough: services have yet to account for more than half of annual Chinese output.

Additionally, NSA surveillance has created a global move towards “data nationalisation” which threatens to fragment the internet.

Omtzigt 15, Pieter Herman Omtzigt is a Dutch politician. As a member of the Christian Democratic Appeal he was an MP from June 3, 2003 to June 17, 2010 and is currently an MP since October 26, 2010. He focuses on matters of taxes, pensions and additions. “Explanatory memorandum by Mr Pieter Omtzigt, rapporteur” Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Mass surveillance Report, 1/26/2015, http://website-pace.net/documents/19838/1085720/20150126-MassSurveillance-EN.pdf

108. In response to growing discontent with US surveillance, one political response has been to push for more “technological sovereignty” and “data nationalisation”. The Snowden disclosures have therefore had

serious implications on the development of the Internet and hastened trends to “balkanize” the Internet to the detriment of the development of a wide, vast and easily accessible online network. The Internet as we knew it, or believed we knew it, is a global platform for exchange of information, open and free debate, and commerce. But Brazil and the European Union, for example, announced plans to lay a $185 million undersea fibre-optic cable between them to thwart US surveillance. German politicians also called for the development of a “German internet” for German customers’ data to circumvent foreign servers and the information to stay on networks that

would fully be under Germany’s control. 159 Russia passed a law obliging internet companies to store the data of Russian users on servers in Russia.160 After a six-month inquiry following the Snowden disclosures, the European Parliament adopted a report on the NSA surveillance programme in February 2014 161, which argues that the EU should suspend bank data and ‘Safe Harbour’ agreements on data privacy (voluntary data protection standards for non-EU companies transferring EU citizens’ personal data to the US) with the United States. MEPs added that the European Parliament should only give its consent to the EU-US free trade deal (TTIP) that is

being negotiated, if the US fully respects EU citizens’ fundamental rights. The European Parliament seeks tough new data protection rules that would place US companies in the difficult situation of having to check with EU authorities before complying with mandatory requests made by US authorities. The European Parliament’s LIBE Committee also advocated the creation of a “European data cloud” that would require all data from European consumers to be stored or

processed within Europe, or even within the individual country of the consumer concerned. Some nations, such as Australia, France, South Korea, and India, have already implemented a patchwork of data-localisation requirements according to two legal scholars.162

This regional fragmentation of the internet would collapse the global economy and create the necessary conditions for global instability.Jardine, 2014Eric CIGI Research Fellow, Global Security & Politics, 9-19-2014, "Should the Average Internet User in a Liberal Democracy Care About Internet Fragmentation? ," Cigi, https://www.cigionline.org/blogs/reimagining-internet/should-average-internet-user-liberal-democracy-care-about-internet-fragme

Even though your average liberal democratic Internet user wouldn’t see it, at least at the content level, the fragmentation of the Internet would matter a great deal. If the Internet was to break apart into regional or even national blocks, there would be large economic costs in terms of lost future potential for global GDP growth. As a recent McKinsey & Company report illustrates, upwards of 15 to 25 percent of Global GDP is currently determined by the movement of goods, money, people and data. These global flows (which admittedly include more than just data flows) contribute yearly between 250 to 400 billion dollars to global GDP growth. The contribution of global flows to global GDP growth is only likely to grow in the future, provided that the Internet remains a functionally universal system that works extraordinarily well as a platform for e-commerce. Missing out on lost GDP growth harms people economically in liberal democratic countries and elsewhere. Average users in the liberal democracies should care, therefore, about the fragmentation of the broader Internet because it will cost them dollars and cents, even if the fragmentation of the Internet would not really affect the content that they themselves access.Additionally, the same Mckinsey & Company report notes that countries that are well connected to the global system have GDP growth that is up to 40 percent higher than those countries that have fewer connections to the wider world. Like interest rates, annual GDP growth compounds itself, meaning that early gains grow exponentially. If the non-Western portions of the Internet wall themselves off from the rest (or even if parts of what we could call the liberal democratic Internet do

the same), the result over the long term will be slower growth and a smaller GDP per capita in less well-connected nations. Some people might look at this situation and be convinced that excluding people in non-liberal democracies from the economic potential of the Internet is not right. In normative terms, these people might deserve to be connected, at the very least so that they can benefit from the same economic boon as those in more well connected advanced liberal democracies. In other words, average Internet users in liberal democracies should care about Internet fragmentation because it is essentially an issue of equality of opportunity.Other people might only be convinced by the idea that poverty, inequality, and relative deprivation, while by no means sufficient causes of terrorism, insurgency, aggression and unrest, are likely to contribute to the potential for an increasingly conflictual world. Most average Internet users in Liberal democracies would likely agree that preventing flashes of unrest (like the current ISIL conflict in Iraq and Syria) is better than having to expend blood and treasure to try and fix them after they have broken out. Preventive measures can include ensuring solid GDP growth through global interconnection in every country, even if this is not, as I mentioned before, going to be enough to fix every problem every time. Overall, the dangers of a fragmented Internet are real and the average user in liberal democracies should care. With truly global forces at play, it is daunting to think of what the average user might do to combat fragmentation. Really only one step is realistic. Users need to recognize that the system works best and contributes most to the content and material well-being of all Internet users when it approaches its ideal technical design of universal interoperability. Societies will rightly determine that some things need to be walled off, blocked or filtered because this digital content has physical world implications that are not acceptable (child pornography, vitriolic hate speech, death threats, underage bullying on social media, etc.). However, in general, citizens should resist Internet fragmentation efforts in any form by putting pressure on their national politicians, Internet Service Providers, and content intermediaries, like Google, to respect the fundamental (and fundamentally beneficial) universally interoperable structure of the Internet. To do otherwise is to accept the loss of potential future global prosperity and to encourage a world that is unequal and prone to conflict and hardship.

The impact of economic decline is great power war.James, 2014

Harold, Princeton history professor,“Debate: Is 2014, like 1914, a prelude to world war?”, 7-2, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/read-and-vote-is-2014-like-1914-a-prelude-to-world-war/article19325504/

Some of the dynamics of the pre-1914 financial world are now re-emerging. Then an economically declining power, Britain, wanted to use finance as a weapon against its larger and faster growing competitors, Germany and the United States. Now America is in turn obsessed by being overtaken by China –

according to some calculations, set to become the world’s largest economy in 2014. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, financial institutions appear both as dangerous weapons of mass destruction, but also as potential instruments for the application of national power. In managing the 2008 crisis, the dependence of foreign banks on U.S. dollar funding constituted a major weakness, and required the provision of large swap lines by the Federal Reserve. The United States provided that support to some countries, but not others, on the basis of an explicitly political logic, as Eswar Prasad demonstrates in his new book on the “Dollar

Trap.” Geo-politics is intruding into banking practice elsewhere. Before the Ukraine crisis, Russian banks were trying to

acquire assets in Central and Eastern Europe. European and U.S. banks are playing a much reduced role in Asian trade finance. Chinese banks are being pushed to expand their role in global commerce. After the financial crisis, China started to build up the renminbi as a major international currency. Russia and China have just proposed to create a new credit rating agency to avoid what they regard as the political bias

of the existing (American-based) agencies. The next stage in this logic is to think about how financial power can be directed to national advantage in the case of a diplomatic tussle. Sanctions are a routine (and not terribly successful) part of the pressure applied to rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. But financial pressure can be much more powerfully applied to countries that are deeply embedded in the world economy. The test is in the Western imposition of sanctions after the Russian annexation of Crimea. President Vladimir Putin’s calculation in response is that the European Union and the United States cannot possibly be serious about the financial war. It would turn into a boomerang: Russia would be less affected than the more developed and complex financial markets of

Europe and America. The threat of systemic disruption generates a new sort of uncertainty, one that mirrors the decisive feature of the crisis of the summer of 1914. At that time, no one could really know whether clashes would escalate or not. That feature contrasts remarkably with almost the entirety of the Cold War, especially since the

1960s, when the strategic doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction left no doubt that any superpower conflict would inevitably escalate. The idea of network disruption relies on the ability to achieve advantage by surprise, and to win at no or low cost. But it is inevitably a gamble, and raises prospect that others might, but also might not be able to, mount the same sort of operation. Just as in 1914, there is an enhanced temptation to roll the dice, even though the game may be fatal.

1AC – Internet FreedomNSA spying has undermined American foreign policy. It undercut any credibility to push for democratic freedom in repressive regimes, repressive surveillance is growing worldwide as a result.Schneier 15 Bruce Schneier a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the CTO at Resilient Systems, Inc 3/2/15, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World. P. 106

In 2010, then secretary of state Hillary Clinton gave a speech declaring Internet freedom a major US foreign policy goal. To this end, the US State Department funds and supports a variety of programs worldwide, working to counter censorship,

promote encryption, and enable anonymity, all designed "to ensure that any child, born anywhere in the world, has access to the global Internet as an open platform on which to innovate, learn, organize, and express herself free from undue interference or censorship." This agenda has been torpedoed by the awkward realization that the US and other democratic governments conducted the same types of surveillance they have criticized in more repressive countries. Those repressive countries are seizing on the opportunity, pointing to US surveillance as a justification for their own more draconian Internet policies: more surveillance, more censorship, and a more isolationist Internet that gives individual countries more control over what their citizens see and say. For example, one of the defenses the government of Egypt offered for its plans to monitor social media was that "the US listens in to phone calls, and supervises anyone who could threaten its national security." Indians are worried that their government will cite the US's actions to justify

surveillance in that country. Both China and Russia publicly called out US hypocrisy. This affects Internet freedom worldwide.

Historically, Internet governance—what little there was—was largely left to the United States, because everyone

more or less believed that we were working for the security of the Internet instead of against it. But now that the US has lost much

of its credibility, Internet governance is in turmoil. Many of the regulatory bodies that influence the Internet are trying to figure out what sort of leadership model to adopt. Older international standards organizations like the International Telecommunications Union

are trying to increase their influence in Internet governance and develop a more nationalist set of rules. This is the cyber sovereignty movement, and it threatens to fundamentally fragment the Internet. It's not new, but it has been given an enormous boost from the revelations of NSA spying. Countries like Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia are pushing for much more autonomous control over the portions of the Internet within their borders. That, in short, would be a disaster. The Internet is fundamentally a global platform. While countries continue to censor and control, today people in repressive regimes can still read information from and exchange ideas with the rest of the world. Internet freedom is a human rights issue, and one that the US should support.

Further, this hypocrisy has created the conditions that will accelerate the global rise of authoritarianism.Chenoweth & Stephan 2015Erica Chenoweth, political scientist at the University of Denver.& Maria J. Stephan, Senior Policy Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.7-7-2015, "How Can States and Non-State Actors Respond to Authoritarian Resurgence?," Political Violence @ a Glance, http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/07/07/how-can-states-and-non-state-actors-respond-to-authoritarian-resurgence/

Chenoweth: Why is authoritarianism making a comeback? Stephan: There’s obviously no single answer to this. But part of

the answer is that democracy is losing its allure in parts of the world. When people don’t see the economic and governance

benefits of democratic transitions, they lose hope. Then there’s the compelling “stability first” argument. Regimes around the world, including China and Russia, have readily cited the “chaos” of the Arab Spring to justify heavy-handed policies and consolidating their grip on power. The “color revolutions” that toppled autocratic regimes in Serbia, Georgia, and

Ukraine inspired similar dictatorial retrenchment. There is nothing new about authoritarian regimes adapting to changing circumstances. Their resilience is reinforced by a combination of violent and non-coercive measures. But authoritarian paranoia seems to have grown more piqued over the past decade. Regimes have

figured out that “people power” endangers their grip on power and they are cracking down. There’s no better evidence of the effectiveness of civil resistance than the measures that governments take to suppress it—something you detail

in your chapter from my new book. Finally, and importantly, democracy in this country and elsewhere has taken a hit lately. Authoritarian regimes mockingly cite images of torture, mass surveillance, and the catering to the radical fringes

happening in the US political system to refute pressures to democratize themselves. The financial crisis here and in Europe did not inspire much confidence in democracy and we are seeing political extremism on the rise in places like Greece and Hungary.

Here in the US we need to get our own house in order if we hope to inspire confidence in democracy abroad.

American surveillance is the primary driver behind this authoritarian accelleration. The plan is necessary to restore US credibility.Jackson, 2015 Dean Jackson is an assistant program officer at the International Forum for Democratic Studies. He holds an M.A. from the University of Chicago’s Committee on International Relations, 7-14-2015, "The

Authoritarian Surge into Cyberspace," International Forum For Democratic Studies, http://www.resurgentdictatorship.org/the-authoritarian-surge-into-cyberspace/

This still leaves open the question of what is driving authoritarian innovation in cyberspace. Deibert identifies increased government emphasis on cybersecurity as one driver: cybercrime and terrorism are serious concerns, and governments

have a legitimate interest in combatting them. Unfortunately, when democratic governments use mass surveillance and other tools to police cyberspace, it can have the effect of providing cover for authoritarian regimes to use similar techniques for repressive purposes—especially, as Deibert notes, since former NSA contractor Edward

Snowden’s disclosure of US mass surveillance programs. Second, Deibert observes that authoritarian demand for cybersecurity technology is often met by private firms based in the democratic world—a group that Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls the “Corporate Enemies of the Internet.” Hacking Team, an Italian firm mentioned in the RSF report, is just one example: The Guardian reports that leaked internal documents suggest Hacking Team’s clients include the governments of “Azerbaijan,

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.” Deibert writes that “in a world where ‘Big Brother’ and ‘Big Data’ share so many of the same needs, the political economy of cybersecurity must be singled out as a major driver of resurgent authoritarianism in cyberspace.” Given these powerful forces, it will be difficult to reverse the authoritarian surge in cyberspace. Deibert offers some possible solutions: for starters, he writes that the “political economy of cybersecurity” can be altered through stronger export controls, “smart sanctions,” and a monitoring system to detect abuses. Further, he recommends that cybersecurity trade fairs open their doors to civil society watchdogs who can help hold governments and the private sector accountable. Similarly, Deibert suggests that opening regional cybersecurity initiatives to civil society participation could mitigate violations of user rights. This might seem unlikely to occur within some authoritarian-led intergovernmental organizations, but setting a

normative expectation of civil society participation might help discredit the efforts of bad actors. Deibert concludes with a final recommendation that society develop “models of cyberspace security that can show us how to prevent disruptions or threats to life and property without sacrificing liberties and rights.” This might restore democratic states to the moral high ground and remove oppressive regimes’ rhetorical cover, but developing such models will require confronting powerful vested interests and seriously examining the tradeoff between cybersecurity and Internet freedom. Doing so would be worth it: the Internet is far too important to cede to authoritarian control.

The impact – the failure of global democratic consolidation causes extinction.Diamond, 1995 Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of

tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional

threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers

important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic

governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and

enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their

environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties,

property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

1AC – Plan

Plan: The United States federal government should limit the scope of its domestic surveillance under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to communications whose sender or recipient is a valid intelligence target and whose targets pose a tangible threat to national security.

1AC – SolvencyThe plan solves, limiting the purposes of 702 collection to a “tangible threat to national security” is critical to solve overcollection.Sinha, 2014G. Alex Sinha is an Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties Union, July 2014 “With Liberty to Monitor All How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy” Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/node/127364

Narrow the purposes for which all foreign intelligence surveillance may be conducted and limit such surveillance to individuals, groups, or entities who pose a tangible threat to national security or a

comparable state interest. o Among other steps, Congress should pass legislation amending Section 702 of FISA and

related surveillance authorities to narrow the scope of what can be acquired as “foreign intelligence information,” which is now defined broadly to encompass, among other things, information related to “the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.” It should be restricted to what is necessary and proportionate to protect

legitimate aims identified in the ICCPR, such as national security. In practice, this should mean that the government may acquire information only from individuals, groups, or entities who pose a tangible threat to national security narrowly defined, or a comparable compelling state interest.

And, this limit solves without damaging counterterrorism.Laperruque 2014, Jake, CDT’s Fellow on Privacy, Surveillance, and Security. Previously served as a law clerk for Senator Al Franken on the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law, and as a policy fellow for Senator Robert Menendez. "Why Average Internet Users Should Demand Significant Section 702 Reform," Center For Democracy & Technology., 7-22-2014, https://cdt.org/blog/why-average-internet-users-should-demand-significant-section-702-reform/

Where Do We Go From Here? There are sensible reforms that can significant limit the collateral damage to privacy caused by Section 702 without impeding national security. Limiting the purposes for which Section 702 can be conducted will narrow the degree to which communications are monitored between

individuals not suspected of wrongdoing or connected to national security threats. Closing retention loopholes present in the Minimization Guidelines governing that surveillance will ensure that when Americans’ communications are incidentally collected, they are not kept absent national security needs. And closing the backdoor search loophole would ensure that when Americans’ communications are retained because they communicated with a target of Section 702 surveillance, they couldn’t be searched unless the standards for domestic surveillance of the American are met.

And, the plan eliminates the collection of communication “about” targets -that solves upstream collection.Nojeim, 2014

Greg, Director, Project on Freedom, Security & Technology Comments To The Privacy And Civil Liberties Oversight Board Regarding Reforms To Surveillance Conducted Pursuant To Section 702 Of Fisa April 11, 2014 https://d1ovv0c9tw0h0c.cloudfront.net/files/2014/04/CDT_PCLOB-702-Comments_4.11.13.pdf

C. Collection of communications “about” targets that are neither to nor from targets should be prohibited. The Government takes the position that Section 702 permits it to collect not only communications that are to or from a foreign intelligence target, but also communications that are “about” the target because they mention an identifier associated with the target.17 The practice directs the focus of surveillance away from suspected wrongdoers and permits the NSA to target communications between individuals

with no link to national security investigations. Because this is inconsistent with the legislative history of the statute, and raises profound constitutional and operational problems, PCLOB should recommend that “about” collection be ended, and that Section 702 surveillance be limited to communications to and from targets. Section 702 authorizes the government to target the communications of persons reasonably believed to be abroad, but it never defines the term “target.” However, throughout Section 702, the term is used to refer to the targeting of an individual rather content of a communication.18 Further, the entire congressional debate on Section 702 includes no reference to collecting communications “about” a

foreign target, and significant debate about collecting communications to or from a target.19 To collect “about” communications, the NSA engages in “upstream” surveillance on the Internet backbone,20 meaning “on fiber cables and infrastructure

as data flows past,”21 temporarily copying the content of the entire data stream so it can be searched for the same “selectors” used for the downstream or “PRISM” surveillance. As a result, the NSA has the capability to search

any Internet communication going into or out of the U.S.22 without particularized intervention by a provider. Direct access creates direct opportunity for abuse, and should not be permitted to a military intelligence agency. This dragnet scanning also results in the collection of “multi-communication transactions,” (MCTs) which include tens of thousands wholly domestic communications each year.23 The FISC required creation of new minimization rules for MCTs in 2011, but did not limit their collection.24 The mass searching of communications content inside the United States, knowing that it the communications searched include tens of thousands of

wholly domestic communications each year, raises profound constitutional questions. Abandoning collection of communications “about” targets would remove any justification for upstream collection, eliminate the serious problems posed by direct government access to the Internet infrastructure, eliminate the collection of tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications in contravention of the statute, an make surveillance under Section 702 consistent with the congressional intent.

And, these limits restore US leadership. Edgar, 2015 Timothy H. Edgar is a visiting scholar at the Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies. He was the first-ever director of privacy and civil liberties for the White House National Security Staff. Under George W. Bush, he was the first deputy for civil liberties for the director of national intelligence, from 2006 to 2009. He was the national security counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union from 2001 to 2006. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School and Dartmouth College, 4-13-2015, "The Good News About Spying," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-04-13/good-news-about-spying

The United States should also pivot from its defensive position and take the lead on global privacy. The United States has an impressive array of privacy safeguards, and it has even imposed new ones that protect citizens of every country.

Despite their weaknesses, these safeguards are still the strongest in the world. The U.S. government should not be shy about trumpeting them, and should urge other countries to follow its lead. It could begin by engaging with close allies, like the United Kingdom, Germany, and other European countries, urging them to increase transparency and judicial supervision of their own communications surveillance activities.

Finally, the plan is a critical step to fight the politics of fear and regain privacy rights.Snowden, 2015, Edward J. Snowden, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer and National Security Agency contractor, is a director of the Freedom of the Press Foundation. 6-4-2015, "Edward Snowden: The World Says No to Surveillance," New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/opinion/edward-snowden-the-world-says-no-to-surveillance.html

Though we have come a long way, the right to privacy — the foundation of the freedoms enshrined in the United States Bill

of Rights — remains under threat. Some of the world’s most popular online services have been enlisted as partners in the N.S.A.’s mass surveillance programs, and technology companies are being pressured by governments around

the world to work against their customers rather than for them. Billions of cellphone location records are still being intercepted without regard for the guilt or innocence of those affected. We have learned that our government

intentionally weakens the fundamental security of the Internet with “back doors” that transform private lives into open books. Metadata revealing the personal associations and interests of ordinary Internet users is still being intercepted and monitored on a scale unprecedented in history: As you read this online, the United States government makes a note. Spymasters in Australia, Canada and France have exploited recent tragedies to seek intrusive new powers despite evidence such programs would not have prevented attacks. Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain recently mused, “Do we want to allow a means of communication between people which we cannot read?” He soon found his answer, proclaiming that “for too long, we have been a passively

tolerant society, saying to our citizens: As long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone.” At the turning of the millennium, few imagined that citizens of developed democracies would soon be required to defend the concept of an open society against their own leaders. Yet the balance of power is beginning to shift. We are witnessing the emergence of a post-terror generation, one that rejects a worldview defined by a singular tragedy. For the first time since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, we see the outline of a politics that turns away from reaction and fear in favor of resilience and reason. With each court victory, with every change in the law, we

demonstrate facts are more convincing than fear. As a society, we rediscover that the value of a right is not in what it hides, but in what it protects.

Sample 1NC

T-Domestic Interpretation – Domestic surveillance deals with communication inside the US HRC 14 (Human Rights Council 2014, IMUNC2014, https://imunc.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/hrc-study-guide.pdf)

Domestic surveillance: Involves the monitoring, interception, collection, analysis, use, preservation, retention of, interference with, or access to information that includes, reflects, or arises from or a person’s communications in the past, present or future with or without their consent or choice, existing or occurring inside a particular country.

Violation – the affirmative limits the scope of foreign intelligence collection under section 702 of FISA, which is distinct from domestic surveillanceMcCarthy 6 (Andrew, former assistant U.S. attorney, now contributing editor of National Review and a senior fellow at the National Review Institute, National Review It’s Not “Domestic Spying”; It’s Foreign Intelligence Collection, May 15, 2006, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/122556/its-not-domestic-spying-its-foreign-intelligence-collection-andrew-c-mccarthy)

Eggen also continues the mainstream media’s propagandistic use of the term “domestic surveillance [or 'spying'] program.” In actuality, the

electronic surveillance that the NSA is doing — i.e., eavesdropping on content of conversations — is not “domestic.” A call is not considered “domestic” just because one party to it happens to be inside the U.S., just as an investigation is not “domestic” just because some of the subjects of interest happen to reside inside our country. Mohammed Atta was an agent of a foreign power, al Qaeda. Surveilling him — had we done it — would not have been

“domestic spying.” The calls NSA eavesdrops on are “international,” not “domestic.” If that were not plain enough on its face, the Supreme Court made it explicit in the Keith case (1972). There, even though it held that

judicial warrants were required for wiretapping purely domestic terror organizations, the Court excluded investigations of threats posed by foreign organizations and their agents operating both within and without the U.S. That is, the Court understood what most Americans understand but what the media, civil libertarians and many members of Congress refuse to

acknowledge: if we are investigating the activities of agents of foreign powers inside the United States, that is not DOMESTIC surveillance. It is FOREIGN counter-intelligence. That, in part, is why the statute regulating wiretaps on foreign powers operating within the U.S. — the one the media has suddenly decided it loves after bad-mouthing it for years as a

rubber-stamp — is called the FOREIGN Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The United States has never needed court permission to conduct wiretapping outside U.S. territory; the wiretapping it does inside U.S. territory for national security purposes is FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, not “domestic surveillance.”

Voters:1. Limits- The aff’s interpretation allows them to have a surveillance policy that affects any country, which overstretches the neg’s research burden by a factor 196, because all surveillance becomes topical, no matter what the target country is.

Security KFraming the economy in terms of security discourse leads states to implement unreliable policies, destroying the economic strength they attempt to preserveLipschutz 98 (Ronnie Lipschutz, PhD in Politics and Director at UC Santa Cruz, 1998, “On Security” p. 11-12, http://people.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/index.html/A.Lipschutz%20VITA.11.pdf)

The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and "economic security." What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic

liberalization? How is the security component of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: "Hawks, Doves, but no Owls:

The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence") shows how strategic economic interdependence--a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the increasing availability of advanced

technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle--undermines the ability of states to control those technologies that, it is often argued, are critical to economic strength and military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening. (Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that have been imposed

in recent years have all come at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.) What, then, is the solution to this "new security dilemma," as Crawford has stylized it? According to Crawford, state decisionmakers can respond in three ways. First, they can try to restore state autonomy through self- reliance although, in doing so, they are likely to undermine state strength via reduced competitiveness. Second, they can try to restrict technology transfer to potential enemies, or the trading partners of potential enemies, although this begins to include pretty much everybody. It also threatens to limit the market shares of those corporations that produce the most innovative technologies. Finally, they can enter into co-production projects or encourage strategic alliances among firms. The former approach may slow down technological development; the latter places control in the hands of actors who are driven by market, and not military, forces. They are, therefore, potentially unreliable. All else being equal, in all three cases, the state appears to be a net loser where its security is concerned. But this does not prevent the state from trying to gain.

Limiting surveillance to resolve the fear of apocalypse creates an endless cycle of violence and governmentalityCoviello 2K (Peter, Professor of English and Acting Program Director of Africana Studies – Bowdoin College, Queer Frontiers, p. 40-41, https://books.google.com/books/about/Queer_frontiers.html?id=GR4bAAAAYAAJ)

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way

postapocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed-it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with

(in Jacques Derrida's suitably menacing phrase) `remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,"6 then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance,

apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished "general population:' This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's

incisive observation, from 1989, that, "Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not `Apocalypse Now' but 'Apocalypse from Now On."" The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on,

at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it

is ever useful. That is, through the perpetual threat of destruction-through the constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse-agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, "life-administering:' Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life . . . [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations:' In his brief comments on what he calls "the atomic situation;' however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken

for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race," agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of the existence of everyone:' Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, potentially annihilating. "If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power;' Foucault writes, " this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population:'8 For a state that would arm itself not with the

power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

Reject the affirmative’s fear-drive politics-critical analysis of the politics of security and resultant militarism gives us a new political view to articulate a truly democratic politics---activating your role as an ethical educator is the only way to avoid warGiroux 13 (Henry, Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, Violence, USA, 2013, monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa)

In addition, as the state is hijacked by the financial-military-industrial complex, the “most crucial decisions regarding national policy are not

made by representatives, but by the financial and military elites.”53 Such massive inequality and the suffering and political corruption it produces point to the need for critical analysis in which the separation of power and politics can be understood. This means developing terms that clarify how power becomes global even as politics continues to function largely at the national level , with the effect of reducing the state primarily to custodial, policing, and punishing functions—at least for those populations considered disposable. The state exercises its slavish role in the form of lowering taxes for the rich, deregulating corporations, funding wars for the benefit of the defense industries, and devising other welfare services for the ultra-rich. There is no escaping the global politics of finance capital and the global network of violence it has produced.

Resistance must be mobilized globally and politics restored to a level where it can make a difference in fulfilling the promises of a global democracy. But such a challenge can only take place if the political is made more pedagogical and matters of education take center stage in the struggle for desires, subjectivities, and social relations that refuse the normalizing of violence as a source of gratification,

entertainment, identity, and honor. War in its expanded incarnation works in tandem with a state organized around the production of widespread violence. Such a state is necessarily divorced from public values and the formative cultures that make a democracy possible. The result is a weakened civic culture that allows violence and punishment to circulate as part of a culture of commodification, entertainment, distraction, and exclusion. In opposing the emergence of the

United States as both a warfare and a punishing state, I am not appealing to a form of left moralism meant simply to mobilize outrage and condemnation. These are not unimportant registers, but they do not constitute an adequate form of resistance.

What is needed are modes of analysis that do the hard work of uncovering the effects of the merging of institutions of capital, wealth, and power, and how this merger has extended the reach of a military-industrial-carceral and academic complex, especially since the 1980s. This complex of ideological and institutional elements designed for the production of violence must be addressed by making visible its vast national and global interests and militarized networks, as indicated by the fact that the United States has over 1,000 military bases abroad.54 Equally important is

the need to highlight how this military-industrial-carceral and academic complex uses punishment as a structuring force to shape national

policy and everyday life. Challenging the warfare state also has an important educational component. C. Wright

Mills was right in arguing that it is impossible to separate the violence of an authoritarian social order from the cultural apparatuses that nourish it. As Mills put it, the major cultural apparatuses not only “guide experience, they also expropriate the very chance to have an experience rightly called ‘our own.’”55 This narrowing of experience shorn of public values locks people into private interests and the hyper-individualized orbits in which they live. Experience itself is now privatized, instrumentalized, commodified,

and increasingly militarized. Social responsibility gives way to organized infantilization and a flight from responsibility. Crucial here is the need to develop new cultural and political vocabularies that can foster an engaged mode of citizenship capable of naming the corporate and academic interests that support the warfare state and its apparatuses of violence, while simultaneously mobilizing social movements to challenge and dismantle its vast networks of power. One central pedagogical and political task in dismantling the warfare state is, therefore, the challenge of creating the cultural conditions and public spheres that would enable the U.S. public to move from being spectators of war and everyday violence to being informed and engaged citizens. Unfortunately, major cultural apparatuses like public and higher education, which have been historically responsible for educating the public, are becoming little more than market-driven and militarized knowledge factories. In this particularly insidious role,

educational institutions deprive students of the capacities that would enable them not only to assume public responsibilities, but also to actively participate in the process of governing. Without the public spheres for creating a formative culture equipped to challenge the educational, military, market, and

religious fundamentalisms that dominate U.S. society, it will be virtually impossible to resist the normalization of war as a matter of domestic and foreign policy. Any viable notion of resistance to the current authoritarian order must also address the issue of what it means pedagogically to imagine a more democratically oriented notion of knowledge, subjectivity, and agency and what it might mean to bring such notions into the public sphere. This is more than what Bernard Harcourt calls “a new grammar of political disobedience.”56 It is a reconfiguring of the nature and substance of the political so that matters of pedagogy become central to the very definition of what constitutes the political and the practices that make it meaningful. Critical understanding motivates transformative action, and the affective investments it demands can only be brought about by breaking into the hardwired forms of common sense that give war and state-supported violence their legitimacy. War does not have to be a permanent social relation, nor the primary organizing principle of everyday life, society, and foreign policy. The war of all-against-all and the social Darwinian imperative to respond positively only to one’s own self-interest represent the death of politics, civic responsibility, and ethics, and set the stage for a dysfunctional democracy, if not an emergent authoritarianism. The existing neoliberal social order produces individuals who have no commitment, except to profit, disdain social responsibility, and loosen all ties to any viable notion of the public good.

This regime of punishment and privatization is organized around the structuring forces of violence and militarization, which produce a surplus of fear, insecurity, and a weakened culture of civic engagement—one in which there is little room for reasoned debate, critical dialogue, and informed intellectual exchange.

Patricia Clough and Craig Willse are right in arguing that we live in a society “in which the production and circulation of death functions as political and economic recovery.”57 The United States understood as a warfare state prompts a new urgency for a collective politics and a social movement capable of negating the current regimes of political and economic power, while imagining a different and more democratic social order. Until the ideological and structural foundations of violence that are pushing U.S. society over the abyss are addressed, the current warfare state will be transformed into a full-blown authoritarian state that will shut down any vestige of democratic values, social relations, and public spheres. At the very least, the U.S. public owes it to its children and future generations, if not the future of democracy itself, to make visible and dismantle this machinery of violence while also reclaiming the spirit of a future that works for life rather than

death—the future of the current authoritarianism, however dressed up they appear in the spectacles of consumerism and celebrity culture. It

is time for educators, unions, young people, liberals, religious organizations, and other groups to connect the dots, educate themselves, and develop powerful social movements that can restructure the fundamental values and social relations of democracy while establishing the institutions and formative cultures that make it possible. Stanley Aronowitz is right in arguing that: the system survives on the eclipse of the radical imagination, the absence of a viable political opposition with roots in the general population, and the conformity of its intellectuals who, to a large extent, are subjugated by their secure berths in the academy [and though] we can take some solace in 2011, the year of the protester…it would be premature to predict that decades of retreat, defeat and silence can be reversed overnight without a commitment to what may be termed “a long march” through the institutions, the workplaces and the streets of the capitalist metropoles.58 The current protests among young people, workers, the unemployed, students, and others are making clear that

this is not—indeed, cannot be—only a short-term project for reform, but must constitute a political and social movement of sustained growth, accompanied by the reclaiming of public spaces, the progressive

use of digital technologies, the development of democratic public spheres, new modes of education, and the safeguarding of places where democratic expression, new identities, and collective hope can be nurtured and mobilized. Without broad political and social movements standing behind and uniting the call on the part of young

people for democratic transformations, any attempt at radical change will more than likely be cosmetic. Any viable challenge to the new authoritarianism and its theater of cruelty and violence must include developing a variety of cultural discourses and sites where new modes of agency can be imagined and enacted, particularly as they work to reconfigure a new collective subject, modes of sociality, and “alternative conceptualizations of the self and its relationship to others.”59 Clearly, if the United States is to make a claim to democracy, it must develop a politics that views violence as a moral monstrosity and war as virulent pathology . How such a claim to politics unfolds remains to be seen. In the meantime, resistance proceeds, especially among the young people who now carry the banner of struggle against an encroaching authoritarianism that is working hard to snuff out all vestiges of democratic life.

CounterplanPlan: The United States federal government should limit the scope of its domestic surveillance under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to communications whose sender or recipient is a valid intelligence target and whose targets pose a threat to national security.

Tangible threat requires facts of dangerSupreme Court of Georgia 6 (“Decatur County v. Bainbridge Post Searchlight”, SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, Fulton County D. Rep. 2191, July 6, 2006, Lexis)

In our litigious society, a governmental agency always faces some threat of suit. To construe the term “potential litigation” to include an unrealized or idle threat of litigation would seriously undermine the purpose of the Act. Such a construction is overly broad. HN4Go to this Headnote in the case. Construing OCGA § 50-14-2 (1) narrowly, we hold that a meeting may not be closed to discuss potential litigation under

the attorney-client exception unless the governmental entity can show a realistic and tangible threat of legal action against it or its

officer[s] or employee[s], a threat that goes beyond a mere fear or suspicion of being sued. A realistic and tangible threat of litigation is one that can be characterized with reference to objective factors which may include, but which are not limited to, (1) a formal demand letter or some comparable writing that presents the party's claim and manifests a solemn intent to sue, [cit.]; (2) previous or pre-existing litigation between the parties or proof of ongoing litigation concerning similar claims, [cit.]; or (3) proof that a party has both retained counsel with respect to the claim at issue and has expressed an intent to sue, [cit.] This list is not intended to be exhaustive but merely illustrative of circumstances that a trial court may consider, in the exercise of its discretion, that take the threat of litigation out of the realm of “remote and speculative” and into the realm of “realistic and tangible.”

NSA surveillance on real and fake treats have thwarted terrorism Sterman et al 14 (David, a program associate at New America and holds a master's degree from Georgetown’s Center for Security Studies, gis work focuses on homegrown extremism and the maintenance of New America's datasets on terrorism inside the United States and the relative roles of NSA surveillance and traditional investigative tools in preventing such terrorism, Emily Schneider, senior program associate for the International Security Program at New America, Peter Bergen, Vice President, Director of Studies, Director, International Security, Future of War, and Fellows Programs, “DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?”, January 13th 2014, https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/do-nsas-bulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/)

On June 5, 2013, the Guardian broke the first story in what would become a flood of revelations regarding the extent and nature of the NSA’s surveillance programs. Facing an uproar over the threat such programs posed to privacy, the Obama administration scrambled to defend them as legal and essential to U.S. national security and counterterrorism. Two weeks after the first leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden

were published, President Obama defended the NSA surveillance programs during a visit to Berlin, saying: “We know of at least 50 threats that have been averted because of this information not just in the United States, but, in some cases, threats here in Germany. So lives have been saved.” Gen. Keith Alexander, the director of the NSA, testified before Congress that:

“the information gathered from these programs provided the U.S. government with critical leads to help prevent over 50 potential terrorist events in more than 20 countries around the world.” Rep. Mike

Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said on the House floor in July that “54 times [the NSA programs] stopped and thwarted terrorist attacks both here and in Europe – saving real lives.”

Increasing transparency alerts terrorists of NSA tactics – increases the risk of cyberterrorism De 14 (Rajesh,General Counsel, National Security Agency, “The NSA and Accountability in an Era of Big Data”, JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY, May 8th 2014,p.4, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/The-NSA-and-Accountability-in-an-Era-of-Big-Data.pdf)

Perhaps the most alarming trend is that the digital communications infrastructure is increasingly also becoming the domain for foreign threat activity. In other words, it is no longer just a question of “collecting” or even “connecting” the dots in order to assess foreign threats amidst more and more digital noise, it is also a question of determining which of the so-called “dots” may constitute the threat itself. As President Obama has recognized, “the cyber threat to our nation is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face.” Many of us read in the papers every day about cyber-attacks on commercial entities. Hackers come in all shapes and sizes, from foreign government actors, to criminal syndicates, to lone individuals. But as former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned a few

months ago, “the greater danger facing us in cyberspace goes beyond crime and it goes beyond harassment. A cyber-attack perpetrated

by nation states or violent extremist groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11.” And as the President

warned in his recent State of the Union address, we know that our enemies are “seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, our air-traffic control systems.” We also have seen a disturbing trend in the evolution of the cyber threat around the world. As General Keith Alexander, the Director of NSA, describes it, the trend is one from “exploitation” to “disruption” to “destruction.” In fundamental terms, the cyber threat has evolved far beyond simply stealing – the stealing of personal or proprietary information, for example-to include more disruptive activity, such as distributed denial of service attacks that may temporarily degrade websites; and more alarmingly, we now see an evolution toward truly destructive activity. Secretary Panetta, for example, recently discussed what he described as “probably the most destructive attack the private sector has seen to date” – a computer virus used to infect computers in the Saudi Arabian State Oil Company Aramco in mid-2012, which virtually destroyed 30,000 computers. *** Within this context, big data presents opportunities and challenges for the government and the private sector. Improving our ability to gain insights from large and complex collections of data holds the promise of accelerating progress across a range of fields from health care to earth science to biomedical research. But perhaps nowhere are the challenges and opportunities of big data as stark as in the national security field, where the stakes are so high – both in terms of the threats we seek to defeat, and of the liberties we simultaneously seek to preserve. This reality is readily apparent in the evolving and dynamic cyber environment, and perhaps no

more so than for an agency at the crossroads of the intelligence and the defense communities, like NSA. Of course, NSA must necessarily operate in a manner that protects its sources and methods from public view. If a person being investigated by the FBI learns that his home phone is subject to a wiretap, common sense tells us that he will not use that telephone any longer.

The same is true for NSA. If our adversaries know what NSA is doing and how it is doing it – or even what NSA is not doing and why it is not doing it – they could well find ways to evade surveillance, to obscure themselves and their activities, or to manipulate anticipated action or inaction by the U.S. government. In sum, they could more readily use the ocean of big data to their advantage.

Cyberterrorists could break into computers and launch an attack on a nuclear state—triggers global nuclear war

Fritz 09

(Jason, May 2009, International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,” Jason is a defense researcher, served as a cavalry officer in the US Army for 6 years, masters in IR @ Bond University, icnnd.org/documents/jason_fritz_hacking_nc2.doc, 7/15/15)

In order to see how cyber terrorists could detonate a nuclear weapon it is important to identify the structures which they would be attempting to penetrate. Nuclear command and control (NC2), sometimes referred to as nuclear command and control and communications (NC3) includes the

personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, organisation, procedures, and chain of command involved with maintaining a nuclear weapon capability. A Command and Control Centre is typically a secure room, bunker, or building in a government or military facility that operates as the agency's dispatch centre, surveillance monitoring centre, coordination office and alarm monitoring centre all in one. A state may have multiple command and control centres within the government and military branches which can act independently or, more commonly, be used in the event a higher node is incapable of performing its function. A minimum of eight states possess a nuclear arsenal, providing eight varying nuclear command and control structures for cyber terrorist to target. The eight states which possess nuclear weapons are, in order of acquisition, the US, Russia (former Soviet Union), the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. South Africa formerly possessed nuclear weapons, but has since dismantled its arsenal. Israel is also widely believed to have nuclear weapons, but has not officially

confirmed their status as a nuclear state. There are approximately 20,000 active nuclear weapons in the world. The vast majority of these belong to the US and Russia, stemming from the Cold War. ∂ Nuclear command and control has inherent weaknesses in relation to cyber warfare. The concept of mutually assured destruction means a state must have the capability to launch nuclear weapons in the event of a decapitating strike. This requires having nuclear weapons spread out in multiple locations (mobility and redundancy), so an enemy could not destroy all of their capabilities. Examples of this include land based mobile launch platforms and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). This provides terrorists with multiple locations for attaining access to these weapons. Further, under NATO nuclear weapons sharing, the US has supplied nuclear weapons to Belgium, Germany,

Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey for storage and possible deployment. This further increases the number of access points for terrorists, allowing them to assess not only installations and procedures, but also which borders and state specific laws may be easier to circumvent. The weapons themselves may all be under the complete control of the US, but the operational plans of terrorists may include items such as reconnaissance, social engineering, and crossing borders which remain unique between states. The potential collapse of a state also presents a challenge. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were in possession of nuclear weapons. These have since been transferred to Russia, but there was, and still is, considerable concern over the security and integrity of those weapons, especially

in the face of a destabilized government and civilian hardship. Mutually assured destruction also promotes a hair trigger launch posture and the need for launch orders to be decided on quickly. The advent of SLBMs increased this high pressure tension, as

the ability of a submarine to sneak up close to a state’s border before launch significantly reduced response time. These short decision times make it easier for terrorists to provoke a launch as little time, and little discussion, is given to assess a situation in full. The desire to reduce the time it takes to disseminate plans to nuclear forces may expand the use of computers in nuclear command and control, or lead to the introduction of fail-deadly and autonomous systems.∂ This chapter is by no means comprehensive, However it sheds some light on the operations of nuclear command and control and the difficulties in defending those systems from cyber terrorism. Many of the details of nuclear command and control are classified, so the information provided below may be outdated. However it points towards a pattern, and there is no certainty these systems and procedures have been updated since entering open source knowledge. Further, terrorists do not have to restrict themselves to unclassified data, and therefore may be able to obtain up to date information.∂ The United States∂ The US employs a nuclear deterrence triad consisted of nuclear-capable long range bombers, SLBMs, and land based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), as well as an arsenal of nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear weapons. US nuclear command and control covers a geographically dispersed force with the US President, as Commander in Chief, being the highest authority in the decision to make a nuclear launch. There is a hierarchy of succession in the event the President cannot perform this duty, such as if the President were killed in an attack. Additionally, once the order to launch is given, it travels down a chain of command; the President does not press the button, so to speak, nor is the President physically present at the launch location. These locations would be targets in a nuclear war, so it is imperative that the leader not be there. Additionally, multiple independent launch locations make this impossible (except for cases in which multiple missiles are tied together in a Single Integrated Operational Plan). So it is theoretically possible to subvert this control by falsifying the order at any number of locations down that chain of command. The infrastructure that supports the President in his decision to launch nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS). “The NCCS must support situation monitoring, tactical warning and attack assessment of missile launches, senior leader decision making, dissemination of Presidential force-direction orders, and management of geographically dispersed forces” (Critchlow 2006).∂ Key US nuclear command centres include fixed locations, such as the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the Raven Rock Mountain Complex (Site R), and mobile platforms, such as the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) and the Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC). The US seeks to integrate its nuclear forces into its vision of command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) hinting towards a greater reliance on computer technology in maintaining and upgrading its nuclear force, not only to combat against Cold War style nuclear war, but also against perceived emerging threats from China, Iran and North Korea. In particular the US recognises these states’ potential to use nuclear weapons detonated at high altitude to create an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The threat of EMP was known during the Cold War, and a considerable amount of attention has been paid to hardening nuclear systems (Critchlow 2006).∂ The Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN) links to the ICBMs, bombers, and submarine forces. Information widely available on the internet shows the US is seeking to upgrade the MEECN’s satellite communications capability through Advanced Extremely High Frequency and the Transformational Communications Satellite programs. Cyber terrorists may use this knowledge to research these new forms, or to expose weaknesses in the old system before upgrades are completed. Early warning systems and communications are essential to assessing whether a nuclear launch has been made and communicating the orders to launch a retaliatory strike. Falsifying the data provided by either of these systems would be of prime interest to terrorists. Commands emanating from the NAOC for example, include Extremely High Frequency and Very Low Frequency/Low Frequency links, and its activation during a traditional terrorist attack, as happened on 9/11, could provide additional clues as to its vulnerabilities. Blogging communities have also revealed that the 9/11 terrorist attacks revealed insights into the US continuity of operations plan as high level officials were noted heading to specific installations (Critchlow 2006).∂ One tool designed by the US for initiating a nuclear launch is the ‘nuclear football’. It is a specially outfitted briefcase which can be used by the President to authorize a nuclear strike when away from fixed command centres. The President is accompanied by an aide carrying the nuclear football at all times. This aide, who is armed and possibly physically attached to the football, is part of a rotating crew of Presidential aides (one from each of the five service branches). The football contains a secure satellite communication link and any other material the President may need to refer to in the event of its use, sometimes referred to as the ‘playbook’. The attack options provided in the football include single ICBM launches and large scale pre-determined scenarios as part of the Single Integrated Operational Plan. Before initiating a launch the President must be positively identified using a special code on a plastic card, sometimes referred to as ‘the gold codes’ or ‘the biscuit’. The order must also be approved by a second member of the government as per the two-man rule (Pike 2006). ∂ In terms of detecting and analysing a potential attack, that is, distinguishing a missile attack from the launch of a satellite or a computer glitch, the US employs dual phenomenology. This means two different systems must be used to confirm an attack, such as radar and satellite. Terrorists trying to engage a launch by falsifying this data would need to

determine which two systems were being used in coordination at the target location and spoof both systems. Attempting to falsify commands from the President would also be difficult. Even if the chain of command is identified, there are multiple checks and balances. For example, doctrine recommends that the President confer with senior commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the primary military advisor to the President. However, the President may choose to consult other advisors as well. Trying to identify who would be consulted in this system is difficult, and falsification may be exposed at any number of steps. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes that new systems of command and control must be survivable in the event of cyber warfare attacks. On the one hand, this shows that the US is aware of the potential danger posed by computer network operations and are taking action to prevent it. On the other hand, this shows that they themselves see computer network operations as a weakness in their system. And the US continues to research new ways to integrate computer systems into their nuclear command and control, such as IP-based communications, which they admit, “has not yet been proven to provide the high degree of

assurance of rapid message transmission needed for nuclear command and control” (Critchlow 2006).∂ The US nuclear arsenal remains designed for the Cold War. This means its paramount feature is to survive a decapitating strike. In order to do so it must maintain hair-trigger posture on early warning and decision-making for approximately one-third of its 10,000 nuclear weapons. According to Bruce G. Blair, President of the Center for Defense Information, and a former

Minuteman launch officer:∂ Warning crews in Cheyenne Mountain, Colo., are allowed only three minutes to judge whether initial attack indications from satellite and ground sensors are valid or false. Judgments of this sort are rendered daily, as a result of events as diverse as missiles being tested, or fired — for example, Russia’s firing of Scud missiles into Chechnya — peaceful satellites being lofted into space, or wildfires and solar reflections off oceans and clouds. If an incoming missile strike is anticipated, the president and his top nuclear advisors would quickly convene an emergency telephone conference to hear urgent briefings. For example, the war room commander in Omaha would brief the president on his retaliatory options and their consequences, a briefing that is limited to 30 seconds. All of the large-scale responses comprising that briefing are designed for destroying Russian targets by the thousands, and the president would have only a few minutes to pick one if he wished to ensure its effective implementation. The order would then be sent immediately to the underground and undersea launch crews, whose own mindless firing drill would last only a few minutes (Blair 2003). ∂

These rapid response times don’t leave room for error. Cyber terrorists would not need deception that could stand up over time; they would only need to be believable for the first 15 minutes or so. The amount of firepower that could be unleashed in these 15 minutes, combined with the equally swift Russian response, would be equivalent to approximately 100,000 Hiroshima bombs ( Blair 2008).

Case

Privacy Rights Surveillance outweighs and privacy violations are overstretched post-Snowden – solves security threatsGallington 13 -- (Daniel J. Gallington, senior policy and program adviser at the George C. Marshall Institute in Arlington VA, served in senior national policy positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of ?Justice, and as bipartisan general counsel for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “The Case for Internet Surveillance,” US News, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/09/18/internet-surveillance-is-a-necessary-part-of-national-security, Accessed 07-02-15)

If the answer to these questions continues to be yes – and it most likely is – then the recent public debate brought on by Edward Snowden's disclosures is far more mundane, and far less sensational than the media would perhaps like it to be. Also In that case, the real issue set boils down to the following set of key questions, best answered by our Congress – specifically the Intelligence committees working with some other key committees – after a searching inquiry and a series of hearings, as many of them open as possible. Were the established and relevant laws, regulations and procedures complied with? Are the established laws, regulations and procedures up to date for current Internet and other technologies? Is there reason to add new laws, regulations and procedures? Is there a continued requirement – based on public safety – to be able to do intrusive surveillance, including Internet surveillance,

against spies, terrorists or criminals? In sum, the idea that we have somehow "betrayed" or "subverted" the Internet (or the telephone for that matter) is – as my mom also used to say – "just plain silly." Such kinds of inaccurate statements are emotional and intended mostly for an audience with preconceived opinions or that hasn't thought very hard about the dangerous consequences of an Internet totally immune from surveillance. In fact, it seems time for far less sensationalism – primarily by the media – and far more objectivity. In the final analysis, my mom probably had it right: "Those kind of people, sure".

The public doesn’t feel strongly about surveillance.Rieff 13

(David, Author with focus on immigration, international conflict, and humanitarianism, “Why Nobody Cares About the Surveillance State”, August 22, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/22/why-nobody-cares-about-the-surveillance-state/, kc)

And yet, apart from some voices from the antiwar left and the libertarian right, the reaction from this deceived public has been strangely muted. Polls taken this summer have shown the public almost evenly split on whether the seemingly unlimited scope of these surveillance programs was doing more harm than good. Unlike on issues such as immigration and abortion, much of the public outrage presupposed by news coverage of the scandal does not, in reality, seem to exist.¶ It is true that the revelations have caused at least some on the mainstream right, both in Congress and in conservative publications like National Review, to describe the NSA’s activities as a fundamental attack on the rights of citizens. For their part, mainstream Democrats find themselves in the uncomfortable position of either defending what many of them view as indefensible or causing trouble for a beleaguered president who seems increasingly out of his depth on most questions of national security and foreign policy.¶ The press can certainly be depended on to pursue the story, not least because of a certain “guild” anger over the detention recently of Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwald’s partner, David Miranda, by British police at London’s Heathrow Airport, and the British government’s decision to force the Guardian to destroy the disks it had containing Snowden’s data — in the paper’s London office with two officials from CGHQ, the

British equivalent of the NSA, looking on. But while the surveillance scandal has both engaged and enraged the elites, when all is said and done, the general public does not seem nearly as concerned.¶

Why? In an age dominated by various kinds of techno-utopianism — the conviction that networking technologies are politically and socially emancipatory and that massive data collection will unleash both efficiency in business and innovation in science — the idea that Big Data might be your enemy is antithetical to everything we have been encouraged to believe. A soon-to-be-attained critical mass of algorithms and data has been portrayed as allowing individuals to customize the choices they make throughout their lives. Now, the data sets and algorithms that were supposed to set us free seem instead to have been turned against us.

No impact to Totalitarianism – privacy is just as likely to be used to cursh dissent Siegel 11 (Lee Siegel, a columnist and editor at large for The New York Observer, is the author of “Against the Machine: How the Web Is Reshaping Culture and Commerce — and Why It Matters. “‘The Net Delusion’ and the Egypt Crisis”, February 4, 2011, http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/04/the-net-delusion-and-the-egypt-crisis)

¶Morozov takes the ideas of what he calls “cyber-utopians” and shows how reality perverts them in one political situation after another. In Iran, the regime used the internet to crush the internet-driven protests in June 2009. In Russia, neofascists use the internet to organize pogroms. And on and on. Morozov has written hundreds of pages to make the point that technology is amoral and cuts many different ways. Just as radio can bolster democracy or — as in Rwanda — incite genocide, so the internet can help foment a revolution but can also help crush it. This seems obvious, yet it has often been entirely lost as grand claims are made for the internet’s positive, liberating qualities. ¶And suddenly here are Tunisia and, even more dramatically, Egypt, simultaneously proving and refuting Morozov’s argument. In both cases, social networking allowed truths that had been whispered to be widely broadcast and commented upon. In Tunisia and Egypt — and now across the Arab world — Facebook and Twitter have made people feel less alone in their rage at the governments that stifle their lives. There is nothing more politically emboldening than to feel, all at once, that what you have experienced as personal bitterness is actually an objective condition, a universal affliction in your society that therefore can be universally opposed. ¶Yet at the same time, the Egyptian government shut off the internet, which is an effective way of using the internet. And according to one Egyptian blogger, misinformation is being spread through Facebook — as it was in Iran — just as real information was shared by anti-government protesters. This is the “dark side of internet freedom” that Morozov is warning against. It is the freedom to wantonly crush the forces of freedom. ¶All this should not surprise anyone. It seems that, just as with every other type of technology of communication, the internet is not a solution to human conflict but an amplifier for all aspects of a conflict. As you read about pro-government agitators charging into crowds of protesters on horseback and camel, you realize that nothing has changed in our new internet age. The human situation is the same as it always was, except that it is the same in a newer and more intense way. Decades from now, we will no doubt be celebrating a spanking new technology that promises to liberate us from the internet. And the argument joined by Morozov will occur once again.

EconGrowth rates are unsustainable – we are exceeding the earth’s biophysical limitsKlitgaar and Krall 11 (Kent A. Klitgaard, , Lisi Krall, ,“Ecological economics, degrowth, and institutional change”, 12/12/2011, Ecological Economics journal issue no. 84 pages 247-248, www.elsevier.com/ locate/ecolecon)

The age of economic growth is coming to an end. The mature economies of the industrial North have already entered the initial stages of the era of degrowth. This is evidenced by data that show overall economic activity has increased at a decreasing rate since the “Golden Age” of 1960s postwar capitalism turned into the era of stagflation in the 1970s. Despite the supposed revival of growth in the neoliberal age, percentage growth rates have continued their secular decline. In the United States real GDP growth was lower in the1980s and 1990s than in the 1970s and lower still in the first years of the 21st century (Tables 1). While percentage growth rates may have declined over the last five decades the absolute size of the economy, as measured by real gross domestic product (for all its flaws) has increased, more than tripling from 1970 until 2011. This creates a dilemma within our present institutional context. Absolute growth, which uses more resources, especially fossil fuel resources, destroys more habitat, and emits more carbon and other pollutants into the planet's sinks, has grown exponentially. At the same time, relative, or percentage growth, upon which employment depends, has fluctuated over the same decades and shows a downward trend. We are growing too fast to remain within the limits of the biophysical system. At the same time the world economy is growing too slowly to provide sufficient employment and there appears to be a secular decline at work. Despite rapid and sustained rates of economic growth in many newly emerging market economies (e.g. Brazil, India and China) patterns of declining growth rates also exist for the world economy (Table 2). The reduction in the long-term growth rates, especially for mature market economies, is not something we must contend with in the distant future. They have been occurring for decades. Neither are they simply the result of “misguided” policy, as growth rates have fallen in times of both liberal and conservative policy regimes. Rather, we believe the growth rate decline is embedded deeply within the institutional structure of the economy, as well as within biophysical limits. Clearly a better understanding of the complex dynamics of the interactions of the economic and biophysical systems is needed to provide important insights for the degrowth and steady-state agendas. While ecological economics has addressed ecological limits, it has not explored as fully the limits to growth inherent in a market system. The analysis of biophysical limits has been the strength of ecological economics. Beginning with the work of Herman Daly, who placed the economy within the context of a finite and non-growing biophysical system, through the first 1997 text by Robert Costanza and colleagues, ecological economists have carefully delineated limits such as the climate change, the human appropriation of the products of photosynthesis, and biodiversity loss (Costanza et al., 1997). Subsequent analyses by Rees and Wackernagel showed that the human ecological footprint now exceeds the earth's biocapacity, and the Limits to Growth studies by Meadows et al. concluded that human activity has overshot the carrying capacity and the scale of human activity is unlikely to be maintained into the next century. The work of many energy analysts (Campbell, 2005; Campbell and Laherrere, 1998; Deffeyes, 2001; Hall and Klitgaard, 2011; Hallock et al., 2004; Heinberg, 2005; Simmons, 2006) concludes that we are at or near the global peak of fossil hydrocarbons and future economic activity will be impacted strongly by more expensive and less available petroleum. The second set of limits is internal and is to be found in the dynamics of the accumulation process, involving the complex structural interaction of production, consumption, and distribution. The internal limits that gear the

economy toward both cyclical variation and secular stagnation have not been considered systematically by ecological economists. When the economy reached these limits historically the result has been a series of periodic recessions and depressions. Renewed growth has been the answer, just as it is now. If the system reaches its own internal limits at the same time the world reaches its external biophysical limits we will have a profound challenge because we need a way to facilitate decent standards of living when economic growth can no longer be the vehicle to maintain incomes and assure social stability. In the last instance, a system in overshoot can neither growits way out of its inherent tendency toward stagnation, nor can it grow its way into sustainability. We believe it is unlikely that the present system of capitalism, dominated by multinational corporations, globalization, speculative finance, and dependence upon fossil fuels, can adjust to the era of degrowth and remain intact as is. In order to devise an economy that meets human needs as it approaches both sets of limits, ecological economics needs to understand more fully the structural and institutional dimensions of the internal and external limits, as well as the interaction between the two. This is our challenge, and it is a difficult one. Ecological economics can better understand the necessary institutional configuration of the non-growing economy only by an improved understanding of the dynamics of growth and capital accumulation, because it is here that the inherent tendencies to stagnate and the resolution to stagnation are found.

Only econ collapse solves in the necessary timeframeAbramsky 10 (Koyla, visiting fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Science, Technology and Society; fmr. coordinator of the Danish-based World Wind Energy Institute, Racing to "Save" the Economy and the Planet: Capitalist or Post capitalist Transition to a Post-petrol World?, in Sparking A Worldwide Energy Revolution, ed. Koyla Abramsky, pg. 7)

The stark reality is that the only two recent periods that have seen a major reduction in global CO2 emissions both occurred in periods of very sudden, rapid, socially disruptive, and painful periods of forced economic degrowth-namely the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the current financial-economic crisis. Strikingly, in May 2009, the International Energy Agency reported that, for the first time since 1945, global demand for electricity was expected to fall. Experience has town that a lot of time and political energy have been virtually wasted on developing a highly - ineffective regulatory framework to tackle climate change. Years of COPs and MOPs-the international basis for regulatory efforts have simply proven to be hot am And, not surprisingly, hot air has resulted in global warming. Only unintended degrowth has had the effect that years of intentional regulations sought to achieve. Yet, the dominant approaches to-climate change continue to focus on promoting regulatory reforms, rather than on more fundamental changes in social relations. This is true for governments, multilateral institutions, and also large sectors of so-called 'civil society:' especially the major national and international trade unions and their federations, and NOOs. And despite the patent inadequacy of this approach, regulatory efforts will certainly continue to be pursued. Furthermore, they may well contribute to shoring up legitimacy, at least in the short term, and in certain predominantly-northern countries where the effects Of climate changes are less immediately visible and impact on pepplds lives less directly. Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that solutions will not be found at this level.

The impact is linear – the greater growth, the quicker extinction happens. It magnifies all impacts and social problemsPradanos 15 (Luis Pradanos, writer and Assistant Professor of Spanish at Miami University, “An economy focused solely on growth is environmentally and socially unsustainable”, 4/7/2015, The

Conversation, http://theconversation.com/an-economy-focused-solely-on-growth-is-environmentally-and-socially-unsustainable-39761)

Most world leaders seem to believe that economic growth is a panacea for many of society’s problems. Yet there are many links between our society’s addiction to economic growth, the disturbing ecological crisis, the rapid rise of social inequality and the decline in the quality of democracy. These issues tend to be explored as disconnected topics and often misinterpreted or manipulated to match given ideological preconceptions and prejudices. The fact is that they are deeply interconnected processes. A large body of data and research has emerged in the last decade to illuminate such connections. Studies in social sciences consistently show that, in rich countries, greater economic growth on its own does very little or nothing at all to enhance social well-being. On the contrary, reducing income inequality is an effective way to resolve social problems such as violence, criminality, imprisonment rates, obesity and mental illness, as well as to improve children’s educational performance, population life expectancy, and social levels of trust and mobility. Comparative studies have found that societies that are more equal do much better in all the aforementioned areas than more unequal ones, independent of their gross domestic product (GDP). Economist Thomas Piketty, in his recent book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, has assembled extensive data that shows how unchecked capitalism historically tends to increase inequality and undermine democratic practices. The focus of a successful social policy, therefore, should be to reduce inequality, not to grow the GDP for its own sake. Placing economic growth above all else contributes to environmental degradation and social inequality. Concurrently, recent developments in earth system science are telling us that our frenetic economic activity has already transgressed several ecological planetary boundaries. One could argue that the degradation of our environmental systems will jeopardize socioeconomic stability and worldwide well-being. Some scientists suggest that we are in a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene, in which human activity is transforming the earth system in ways that may compromise human civilization as we know it. Many reports insist that, if current trends continue, humanity will soon face dire and dramatic consequences. If we consider all these findings as a whole, a consistent picture emerges, and the faster the global economy grows, the faster the living systems of the planet collapse. In addition, this growth increases inequality and undermines democracy, multiplying the number of social problems that erode human communities. In a nutshell, we have created a dysfunctional economic system that, when it works according to its self-imposed mandate of growing the pace of production and consumption, destroys the ecological systems upon which it depends. And when it does not grow, it becomes socially unsustainable. In a game with these rules, there is no way to win!

Decoupling means US isn’t key to the global economy Bloomberg 10 [“Wall Street Sees World Economy Decoupling From U.S.”, October 4th, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-03/world-economy-decoupling-from-u-s-in-slowdown-returns-as-wall-street-view.html, Chetan]

The main reason for the divergence: “Direct transmission from a U.S. slowdown to other economies through exports is just not large enough to spread a U.S. demand problem globally,” Goldman Sachs economists Dominic Wilson and Stacy Carlson wrote in a Sept. 22 report entitled “If the U.S. sneezes...” Limited Exposure Take the so-called BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China. While exports account for almost 20 percent of their gross domestic product, sales to the U.S. compose less than 5

percent of GDP, according to their estimates. That means even if U.S. growth slowed 2 percent, the drag on these four countries would be about 0.1 percentage point, the economists reckon. Developed economies including the U.K., Germany and Japan also have limited exposure, they said. Economies outside the U.S. have room to grow that the U.S. doesn’t, partly because of its outsized slump in house prices, Wilson and Carlson said. The drop of almost 35 percent is more than twice as large as the worst declines in the rest of the Group of 10 industrial nations, they found. The risk to the decoupling wager is a repeat of 2008, when the U.S. property bubble burst and then morphed into a global credit and banking shock that ricocheted around the world. For now, Goldman Sachs’s index of U.S. financial conditions signals that bond and stock markets aren’t stressed by the U.S. outlook. Weaker Dollar The break with the U.S. will be reflected in a weaker dollar, with the Chinese yuan appreciating to 6.49 per dollar in a year from 6.685 on Oct. 1, according to Goldman Sachs forecasts. The bank is also betting that yields on U.S. 10-year debt will be lower by June than equivalent yields for Germany, the U.K., Canada, Australia and Norway. U.S. notes will rise to 2.8 percent from 2.52 percent, Germany’s will increase to 3 percent from 2.3 percent and Canada’s will grow to 3.8 percent from 2.76 percent on Oct. 1, Goldman Sachs projects. Goldman Sachs isn’t alone in making the case for decoupling. Harris at BofA Merrill Lynch said he didn’t buy the argument prior to the financial crisis. Now he believes global growth is strong enough to offer a “handkerchief” to the U.S. as it suffers a “growth recession” of weak expansion and rising unemployment, he said. Giving him confidence is his calculation that the U.S. share of global GDP has shrunk to about 24 percent from 31 percent in 2000. He also notes that, unlike the U.S., many countries avoided asset bubbles, kept their banking systems sound and improved their trade and budget positions. Economic Locomotives A book published last week by the World Bank backs him up. “The Day After Tomorrow” concludes that developing nations aren’t only decoupling, they also are undergoing a “switchover” that will make them such locomotives for the world economy, they can help rescue advanced nations. Among the reasons for the revolution are greater trade between emerging markets, the rise of the middle class and higher commodity prices, the book said. Investors are signaling they agree. The U.S. has fallen behind Brazil, China and India as the preferred place to invest, according to a quarterly survey conducted last month of 1,408 investors, analysts and traders who subscribe to Bloomberg. Emerging markets also attracted more money from share offerings than industrialized nations last quarter for the first time in at least a decade, Bloomberg data show. Room to Ease Indonesia, India, China and Poland are the developing economies least vulnerable to a U.S. slowdown, according to a Sept. 14 study based on trade ties by HSBC Holdings Plc economists. China, Russia and Brazil also are among nations with more room than industrial countries to ease policies if a U.S. slowdown does weigh on their growth, according to a policy- flexibility index designed by the economists, who include New York-based Pablo Goldberg. “Emerging economies kept their powder relatively dry, and are, for the most part, in a position where they could act countercyclically if needed,” the HSBC group said. Links to developing countries are helping insulate some companies against U.S. weakness. Swiss watch manufacturer Swatch Group AG and tire maker Nokian Renkaat of Finland are among the European businesses that should benefit from trade with nations such as Russia and China where consumer demand is growing, according to BlackRock Inc. portfolio manager Alister Hibbert. “There’s a lot of life in the global economy,” Hibbert, said at a Sept. 8 presentation to reporters in London.

No impact—statistics proveDrezner 12 – Daniel is a professor in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts. (“The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked”, October 2012, http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf)

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40 None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

Internet FreedomAnd US allies destroy i-freedom signalHanson 10/25/12, Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/10/25-ediplomacy-hanson-internet-freedom

Another challenge is dealing with close partners and allies who undermine internet freedom. In August 2011, in the midst of the Arab uprisings, the UK experienced a different connection technology infused movement, the London Riots. On August 11, in the heat of the crisis, Prime Minister Cameron told the House of Commons: Free flow of information can be used for good. But it can also be used for ill. So we are working with the police, the intelligence services and industry to look at whether it would be right to stop people communicating via these websites and services when we know they are plotting violence, disorder and criminality. This policy had far-reaching implications. As recently as January 2011, then President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, ordered the shut-down of Egypt’s largest ISPs and the cell phone network, a move the United States had heavily criticized. Now the UK was contemplating the same move and threatening to create a rationale for authoritarian governments everywhere to shut down communications networks when they threatened “violence, disorder and criminality.” Other allies like Australia are also pursuing restrictive internet policies. As OpenNet reported it: “Australia maintains some of the most restrictive Internet policies of any Western country…” When these allies pursue policies so clearly at odds with the U.S. internet freedom agenda, several difficulties arise. It undermines the U.S. position that an open and free internet is something free societies naturally want. It also gives repressive authoritarian governments an excuse for their own monitoring and filtering activities. To an extent, U.S. internet freedom policy responds even-handedly to this challenge because the vast bulk of its grants are for open source circumvention tools that can be just as readily used by someone in London as Beijing, but so far, the United States has been much more discreet about criticising the restrictive policies of allies than authoritarian states.

Even absent data localization private companies will voluntarily self-censor – nominal internet freedom is irrelevantMorozov 11 (Evgeny Morozov, visting scholar at Stanford University, Schwartz Fellow at the New America Foundation, 2011, “The Net Delusion,” ch. 8)

What is clear is that, contrary to the expectations of many Western policymakers, Facebook is hardly ideal for promoting democracy; its own logic, driven by profits or ignorance of the increasingly global context in which it operates, is, at times, extremely antidemocratic. Were Kafka to pen his novel The Trial—in which the protagonist is arrested and tried for reasons that are never explained to him—today, El Ghazzali's case could certainly serve as inspiration. That much of digital activism is mediated by commercial intermediaries who operate on similar Kafkaesque principles is cause for concern, if only because it introduces too much unnecessary uncertainty into the activist chain, imagine that El Ghazzali's group was planning a public protest on the very day that its page got deleted: The protest could have easily been derailed. Until there is complete certainty that a Facebook group won't be removed at the most unfortunate moment, many dissident groups will shy away from making it their

primary channel of communication. In reality, there is no reason why Facebook should even bother with defending freedom of expression in Morocco, which is not an appealing market to its advertisers, and even if it were, it would surely be much easier to make money there without crossing swords with the country's rulers. We do not know how heavily Facebook polices sensitive political activity on its site, but we do know of many cases similar to El Ghazzali s. In February 2010, for example, Facebook was heavily criticized by its critics in Asia for removing the pages of a group with 84,298 members that had been formed to oppose the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, the pro-establishment and pro-Beijing party. According to the group's administrator, the ban was triggered by opponents flagging the group as "abusive" on Facebook. This was not the first time that Facebook constrained the work of such groups. In the run-up to the Olympic torch relay passing through Hong Kong in 2008, it shut down several groups, while many pro-Tibetan activists had their accounts deactivated for "persistent misuse of the site." It's not just politics: Facebook is notoriously zealous in policing other types of content as well. In July 2010 it sent multiple warnings to an Australian jeweler for posting photos of her exquisite porcelain doll, which revealed the doll's nipples. Facebook's founders may be young, but they are apparently puritans. Many other intermediaries are not exactly unbending defenders of political expression either. Twitter has been accused of silencing online tribute to the 2008 Gaza War. Apple has been bashed for blocking Dalai Lama-related iPhone apps from its App Store for China (an application related to Rebiya Kadeer, the exiled leader of the Uighur minority, was banned as well). Google, which owns Orkut, a social network that is surprisingly popular in India, has been accused of being too zealous in removing potentially controversial content that may be interpreted as calling for religious and ethnic violence against both Hindus and Muslims. Moreover, a 2009 study found that Microsoft has been censoring what users in the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Algeria, and Jordan could find through its Bing search engine much more heavily than the governments of those countries.

SolvencyAnd the exec can circumvent via national security lettersSanchez 15 (Julien, a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Don’t (Just) Let the Sun Go Down on Patriot Powers, May 29, 2015, http://motherboard.vice.com/read/dont-just-let-the-sun-go-down-on-patriot-powers)

Also permanent are National Security Letters or NSLs, which allow the FBI to obtain a more limited range of telecommunications and financial records without even needing to seek judicial approval. Unsurprisingly, the government loves these streamlined tools, and used them so promiscuously that the FBI didn’t even bother using 215 for more than a year after the passage of the Patriot Act. Inspector General reports have also made clear that the FBI is happy to substitute NSLs for 215 orders when even the highly accommodating FISC manages a rare display of backbone. In at least one case, when the secret court refused an application for journalists’ records on First Amendment grounds, the Bureau turned around and obtained the same data using National Security Letters.

Plan is too small to overcome requirements that are necessary to change the status quoKehl et al 14 (Danielle Kehl is a Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (OTI). Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI, Robyn Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI, and Robert Morgus is a Research Associate at OT, New America’s Open Technology Institute Policy Paper, Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity, July 2014)

Two months later, many of the same companies and organizations issued another letter supporting surveillance transparency legislation proposed by Senator Al Franken (D-MN) and Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) that would have implemented many of the original letter’s recommendations.334 Elements of both bills, consistent with the coalition’s recommendations, were included in the original version of the USA FREEDOM Act introduced in the House and the Senate—as were new strong transparency provisions requiring the FISA court to declassify key legal opinions to better educate the public and policymakers about how it is interpreting and implementing the law. Such strong new transparency requirements are consistent with several recommendations of the President’s Review Group335 and would help address concerns about lack of transparency raised by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.336

Offcase

T-Domestic Interpretation – Domestic surveillance deals with communication inside the US HRC 14 (Human Rights Council 2014, IMUNC2014, https://imunc.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/hrc-study-guide.pdf)

Domestic surveillance: Involves the monitoring, interception, collection, analysis, use, preservation, retention of, interference with, or access to information that includes, reflects, or arises from or a person’s communications in the past, present or future with or without their consent or choice, existing or occurring inside a particular country.

Violation – the affirmative limits the scope of foreign intelligence collection under section 702 of FISA, which is distinct from domestic surveillanceMcCarthy 6 (Andrew, former assistant U.S. attorney, now contributing editor of National Review and a senior fellow at the National Review Institute, National Review It’s Not “Domestic Spying”; It’s Foreign Intelligence Collection, May 15, 2006, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/122556/its-not-domestic-spying-its-foreign-intelligence-collection-andrew-c-mccarthy)

Eggen also continues the mainstream media’s propagandistic use of the term “domestic surveillance [or 'spying'] program.” In actuality, the

electronic surveillance that the NSA is doing — i.e., eavesdropping on content of conversations — is not “domestic.” A call is not considered “domestic” just because one party to it happens to be inside the U.S., just as an investigation is not “domestic” just because some of the subjects of interest happen to reside inside our country. Mohammed Atta was an agent of a foreign power, al Qaeda. Surveilling him — had we done it — would not have been

“domestic spying.” The calls NSA eavesdrops on are “international,” not “domestic.” If that were not plain enough on its face, the Supreme Court made it explicit in the Keith case (1972). There, even though it held that

judicial warrants were required for wiretapping purely domestic terror organizations, the Court excluded investigations of threats posed by foreign organizations and their agents operating both within and without the U.S. That is, the Court understood what most Americans understand but what the media, civil libertarians and many members of Congress refuse to

acknowledge: if we are investigating the activities of agents of foreign powers inside the United States, that is not DOMESTIC surveillance. It is FOREIGN counter-intelligence. That, in part, is why the statute regulating wiretaps on foreign powers operating within the U.S. — the one the media has suddenly decided it loves after bad-mouthing it for years as a

rubber-stamp — is called the FOREIGN Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The United States has never needed court permission to conduct wiretapping outside U.S. territory; the wiretapping it does inside U.S. territory for national security purposes is FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, not “domestic surveillance.”

Voters:1. Limits- The aff’s interpretation allows them to have a surveillance policy that affects any country, which overstretches the neg’s research burden by a factor 196, because all surveillance becomes topical, no matter what the target country is.

PIC “Tangible”

1NCPlan: The United States federal government should limit the scope of its domestic surveillance under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to communications whose sender or recipient is a valid intelligence target and whose targets pose a threat to national security.

Tangible threat requires facts of dangerSupreme Court of Georgia 6 (“Decatur County v. Bainbridge Post Searchlight”, SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, Fulton County D. Rep. 2191, July 6, 2006, Lexis)

In our litigious society, a governmental agency always faces some threat of suit. To construe the term “potential litigation” to include an unrealized or idle threat of litigation would seriously undermine the purpose of the Act. Such a construction is overly broad. HN4Go to this Headnote in the case. Construing OCGA § 50-14-2 (1) narrowly, we hold that a meeting may not be closed to discuss potential litigation under

the attorney-client exception unless the governmental entity can show a realistic and tangible threat of legal action against it or its

officer[s] or employee[s], a threat that goes beyond a mere fear or suspicion of being sued. A realistic and tangible threat of litigation is one that can be characterized with reference to objective factors which may include, but which are not limited to, (1) a formal demand letter or some comparable writing that presents the party's claim and manifests a solemn intent to sue, [cit.]; (2) previous or pre-existing litigation between the parties or proof of ongoing litigation concerning similar claims, [cit.]; or (3) proof that a party has both retained counsel with respect to the claim at issue and has expressed an intent to sue, [cit.] This list is not intended to be exhaustive but merely illustrative of circumstances that a trial court may consider, in the exercise of its discretion, that take the threat of litigation out of the realm of “remote and speculative” and into the realm of “realistic and tangible.”

NSA surveillance on real and fake treats have thwarted terrorism Sterman et al 14 (David, a program associate at New America and holds a master's degree from Georgetown’s Center for Security Studies, gis work focuses on homegrown extremism and the maintenance of New America's datasets on terrorism inside the United States and the relative roles of NSA surveillance and traditional investigative tools in preventing such terrorism, Emily Schneider, senior program associate for the International Security Program at New America, Peter Bergen, Vice President, Director of Studies, Director, International Security, Future of War, and Fellows Programs, “DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?”, January 13th 2014, https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/do-nsas-bulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/)

On June 5, 2013, the Guardian broke the first story in what would become a flood of revelations regarding the extent and nature of the NSA’s surveillance programs. Facing an uproar over the threat such programs posed to privacy, the Obama administration scrambled to defend them as legal and essential to U.S. national security and counterterrorism. Two weeks after the first leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden

were published, President Obama defended the NSA surveillance programs during a visit to Berlin, saying: “We know of at least 50 threats that have been averted because of this information not just in the United States, but, in some cases, threats here in Germany. So lives have been saved.” Gen. Keith Alexander, the director of the NSA, testified before Congress that:

“the information gathered from these programs provided the U.S. government with critical leads to help prevent over 50 potential terrorist events in more than 20 countries around the world.” Rep. Mike

Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said on the House floor in July that “54 times [the NSA programs] stopped and thwarted terrorist attacks both here and in Europe – saving real lives.”

***Insert Net Benefit of Terrorism DA***

2NCBroad NSA access to US data is crucial to preventing terrorist attacks in the US – their authors vastly underestimate the probability of attack. You need to evaluate link through a very high probability of attempted attackLewis 14 (James, senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate, http://csis.org/files/publication/141209_-Lewis_UnderestimatingRisk_Web.pdf)

Americans are reluctant to accept terrorism is part of their daily lives, but attacks have been planned or attempted against American targets (usually airliners or urban areas) almost every year since 9/11. Europe faces even greater risk, given the thousands of European Union citizens who will return hardened and radicalized from fighting in Syria and Iraq. The threat of attack is easy to exaggerate, but that does not mean it is nonexistent. Australia’s then-attorney general said in August 2013 that communications surveillance had stopped four “mass casualty events”

since 2008. The constant planning and preparation for attack by terrorist groups is not apparent to the public. The dilemma in assessing risk is that it is discontinuous. There can be long periods with no noticeable activity, only to have the apparent calm explode. The debate over how to reform communications surveillance has discounted this risk. Communications surveillance is an essential law enforcement and intelligence tool. There is no replacement for it. Some suggestions for alternative approaches to surveillance, such as the idea that the National Security Agency (NSA) only track known or suspected terrorists, reflect wishful thinking, as it is the unknown terrorist who will inflict the greatest harm. The Evolution of Privacy Some of the unhappiness created by the Edward Snowden leaks reflects the unspoken recognition that online privacy has changed irrevocably. The precipitous decline in privacy since the Internet was commercialized is the elephant in the room we ignore in the surveillance debate. America’s privacy laws are both limited in scope and out of date. Although a majority of Americans believe privacy laws are inadequate, the surveillance debate has not led to a useful discussion of privacy in the context of changed technologies and consumer preferences. Technology is more intrusive as companies pursue revenue growth by harvesting user data. Tracking online behavior is a preferred business model. On average, there are 16 hidden tracking programs on every website. The growing market for “big data” to predict consumer behavior and target advertising will further change privacy. Judging by their behavior, Internet users are willing to exchange private data for online services. A survey in a major European country found a majority of Internet users disapproved of Google out of privacy concerns, but more than 80 percent used Google as their search engine. The disconnect between consumer statements and behavior reduces the chances of legislating better protections. We have global rules for finance and air travel, and it is time to create rules for privacy, but governments alone cannot set these rules, nor can a single region impose them. Rules also need to be reciprocal. NSA bears the brunt of criticism, but its actions are far from unique. All nations conduct some kind of communications surveillance on their own populations, and many collect against foreign targets. Getting this consensus will be difficult. There is no international consensus on privacy and data protection. EU efforts to legislate for the entire world ignore broad cultural differences in attitudes toward privacy, and previous EU privacy rules likely harmed European companies’ ability to innovate. Finding a balance between privacy, security, and innovation will not be easy since unconstrained collection creates serious concerns while a toorestrictive approach threatens real economic harm. Espionage and Counterterrorism NSA carried out two kinds of signals intelligence programs: bulk surveillance to support counterterrorism and collection to support U.S. national security interests. The debate over surveillance unhelpfully conflated the two programs. Domestic bulk collection for counterterrorism is politically problematic, but assertions that a collection program is useless because it has not by itself prevented an attack reflect unfamiliarity with intelligence. Intelligence does not work as it is portrayed in films—solitary agents do not make startling discoveries that lead to dramatic, last-minute success. Success is the product of the efforts of teams of dedicated individuals from many agencies, using many tools and techniques, working together to assemble fragments of data from many sources into a coherent picture. In practice, analysts must simultaneously explore many possible scenarios. A collection program contributes by not only what it reveals, but also what it lets us reject as false. The Patriot Act Section 215 domestic bulk telephony metadata program provided information that allowed analysts to rule out some scenarios and suspects. The consensus view from interviews with current and former intelligence officials is that while metadata collection is useful, it is the least useful of the collection programs available to the intelligence community. If there was one surveillance program they had to give up, it would be 215, but this would not come without an increase in risk. Restricting metadata collection will make it

harder to identify attacks and increase the time it takes to do this. Spying on Allies NSA’s mass surveillance programs for counterterrorism were carried out in cooperation with more than 30 countries. Unilateral U.S. collection programs focused on national security problems: nonproliferation, counterintelligence (including Russian covert influence operations in Europe), and arms sales to China. The United States failed to exercise sufficient oversight over intelligence collection, but the objectives set for NSA reflect real security problems for the United States and its allies. The notion that “friends don’t spy on friends” is naive. The United States

has friends that routinely spy on it and yet are strong security partners. Relations among powerful states are complex and not explained by simple bromides drawn from personal life. The most startling thing about U.S. espionage against Germany was the absence of a strategic calculation of risk and benefit. There are grounds for espionage (what other major power has a former leader on Russia’s payroll?), but the benefits were outweighed by the risk to the relationship. The case for spying on Brazil is even weaker. While Brazil is often antagonistic, it poses no risk to national security. If economic intelligence on Brazil is needed, the private sector has powerful incentives and legitimate means to

obtain information and usually has the best data. Risk Is Not Going Away Broad surveillance of communications is the least intrusive and most effective method for discovering terrorist and espionage activity. Many countries have expanded surveillance programs since the 9/11 attacks to detect and prevent terrorist activity, often in cooperation with other countries, including the United States. Precise metrics on risk and effectiveness do not exist for surveillance, and we are left with conflicting opinions from intelligence officials and civil libertarians as to what makes counterterrorism successful. Given

resurgent authoritarianism and continuing jihad, the new context for the surveillance debate is that the likelihood of attack is increasing. Any legislative change should be viewed through this lens.

NSA mass surveillance is critical – we’re drawing down in every other area of intelligence gathering which means it’s essential to preventing terrorism Wittes 14 (Benjamin, Senior Fellow @ the Brookings Institute, "Is Al Qaeda Winning: Grading the Administration's Counter terrorism Policy”, April 8th 2014 Brookings Institute)

As I said at the outset of this statement, the question of intelligence collection under Section 702 of the FAA may seem connected to the

AUMF’s future in only the most distant fashion. In fact, the connection between intelligence collection authorities and the underlying regime authorizing the conflict itself is a critical one. Good intelligence is key to any armed conflict and good technical intelligence is a huge U.S. strength in the fight against Al Qaeda. Yet ironically, the more one attempts to narrow the conflict, the more important technical intelligence becomes. The fewer boots on the ground we have in Afghanistan, for example, the greater our reliance will become on technical collection. The more we rely on drone strikes, rather than large troop movements, in areas where we lack large human networks, the more we rely on technical intelligence. Particularly if one imagines staying on offense against a metastasizing Al Qaeda in the context of a withdrawal from Afghanistan and a narrowing—or a formal end—of the AUMF conflict, the burden on technical intelligence collection to keep us in the game will be huge even ignoring the many other foreign

intelligence and national security interests Section 702 surveillance supports.¶ Section 702 is a complicated statute, and it is only one part

of a far more complicated, larger statutory arrangement. But broadly speaking, it permits the NSA to acquire without an individualized warrant the communications of non-US persons reasonably believed to be overseas when those communications are transiting the United States or stored in the United States. Under these circumstances, the NSA can order production of such communications from telecommunications carriers and internet companies under broad programmatic orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which reviews both targeting and minimization procedures under which the collection then takes place. Oversight is thick, both within the executive branch, and in reporting requirements to the congressional

intelligence committees.¶ Make no mistake: Section 702 is a very big deal in America’s counterterrorism arsenal. It is

far more important than the much debated bulk metadata program, which involves a few hundred queries a year. Section 702 collection, by contrast, is vast, a hugely significant component not only of contemporary counterterrorism but of foreign intelligence collection more generally. In 2012, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence wrote that “[T]he authorities provided [under section 702] have greatly increased the government’s ability to collect information

and act quickly against important foreign intelligence targets. . . . [The] failure to reauthorize [section 702] would ‘result in a loss of significant intelligence and impede the ability of the Intelligence Community to respond quickly to new threats and intelligence opportunities.’”[8] The President’s Review Group on Intelligence

and Communications Technologies, after quoting this language, wrote that “Our own review is not inconsistent with this assessment. . . . [W]e are persuaded that section 702 does in fact play an important role in the nation’s effort to prevent terrorist attacks across the globe.”[9] The Washington Post has reported that 702 was in 2012 the single most prolific contributor to the President’s Daily Brief.[10]

Terror DA

LinksIncreasing transparency alerts terrorists of NSA tactics – increases the risk of cyberterrorism De 14 (Rajesh,General Counsel, National Security Agency, “The NSA and Accountability in an Era of Big Data”, JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY, May 8th 2014,p.4, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/The-NSA-and-Accountability-in-an-Era-of-Big-Data.pdf)

Perhaps the most alarming trend is that the digital communications infrastructure is increasingly also becoming the domain for foreign threat activity. In other words, it is no longer just a question of “collecting” or even “connecting” the dots in order to assess foreign threats amidst more and more digital noise, it is also a question of determining which of the so-called “dots” may constitute the threat itself. As President Obama has recognized, “the cyber threat to our nation is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face.” Many of us read in the papers every day about cyber-attacks on commercial entities. Hackers come in all shapes and sizes, from foreign government actors, to criminal syndicates, to lone individuals. But as former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned a few

months ago, “the greater danger facing us in cyberspace goes beyond crime and it goes beyond harassment. A cyber-attack perpetrated

by nation states or violent extremist groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11.” And as the President

warned in his recent State of the Union address, we know that our enemies are “seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, our air-traffic control systems.” We also have seen a disturbing trend in the evolution of the cyber threat around the world. As General Keith Alexander, the Director of NSA, describes it, the trend is one from “exploitation” to “disruption” to “destruction.” In fundamental terms, the cyber threat has evolved far beyond simply stealing – the stealing of personal or proprietary information, for example-to include more disruptive activity, such as distributed denial of service attacks that may temporarily degrade websites; and more alarmingly, we now see an evolution toward truly destructive activity. Secretary Panetta, for example, recently discussed what he described as “probably the most destructive attack the private sector has seen to date” – a computer virus used to infect computers in the Saudi Arabian State Oil Company Aramco in mid-2012, which virtually destroyed 30,000 computers. *** Within this context, big data presents opportunities and challenges for the government and the private sector. Improving our ability to gain insights from large and complex collections of data holds the promise of accelerating progress across a range of fields from health care to earth science to biomedical research. But perhaps nowhere are the challenges and opportunities of big data as stark as in the national security field, where the stakes are so high – both in terms of the threats we seek to defeat, and of the liberties we simultaneously seek to preserve. This reality is readily apparent in the evolving and dynamic cyber environment, and perhaps no

more so than for an agency at the crossroads of the intelligence and the defense communities, like NSA. Of course, NSA must necessarily operate in a manner that protects its sources and methods from public view. If a person being investigated by the FBI learns that his home phone is subject to a wiretap, common sense tells us that he will not use that telephone any longer.

The same is true for NSA. If our adversaries know what NSA is doing and how it is doing it – or even what NSA is not doing and why it is not doing it – they could well find ways to evade surveillance, to obscure themselves and their activities, or to manipulate anticipated action or inaction by the U.S. government. In sum, they could more readily use the ocean of big data to their advantage.

Requiring individualized determinations for targets creates a massive bureaucratic drain, disturbing investigationsCordero 15 (Carrie, Director of National Security Studies, Georgetown University Law Center, Adjunct Professor of Law, “The Brennan Center Report on the FISA Court and Proposals for FISA Reform” 4/2, Lawfare, http://www.lawfareblog.com/brennan-center-report-fisa-court-and-proposals-fisa-reform)

1. “End Programmatic Surveillance”…”or If Programmatic Surveillance Continues, Reform It” One of the major criticisms of the government’s use of FISA to emerge in the recent debate is that the Court has shifted from approving individual surveillance or search requests directed at a particular agent of a foreign power or foreign power, to a practice of approving “programmatic” requests for collection authority. The criticism is a repudiation of not only the bulk telephone metadata program, but also of section 702 of FISA, which was added to the Act in 2008. Section 702 authorizes the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to issue directives to communications service providers under a set of procedures and certifications that have been approved by FISC. Referring to the collection authorized by Section 702 as “programmatic”

can lead to misunderstanding. Acquisition under section 702 is programmatic in the sense that the Court approves rules and procedures by which the acquisition takes place. The Court does not, under section 702, make a substantive finding about a particular target. It does not approve individual requests for collection. Instead, the FISC approves the rules and procedures, and then intelligence community personnel abide by a decision-making process in which there are actual intended targets of acquisition. In his February 4, 2015 remarks at Brookings, ODNI General Counsel Bob Litt described it this way: “Contrary to some

claims, this [section 702 collection] is not bulk collection; all of the collection is based on identifiers, such

as telephone numbers or email addresses, that we have reason to believe are being used by non-U.S. persons abroad to communicate or receive foreign intelligence information.” Regardless of the characterization, however, it is correct to say that

section 702 allows the intelligence community, not the Court, to make the substantive determination about what targets to collect against. Those decisions are made consistent with intelligence community leadership and policymaker strategic priorities, which Litt also discussed in his February 4th remarks.

Targets are selected based on their anticipated or demonstrated foreign intelligence value. And targeting decisions are subject to continuous oversight by compliance, legal and civil liberties protection authorities internal to NSA, and external at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice. The question, then, is why was the change needed in 2008? And, if the Brennan Center’s recommendation were accepted, what would be the alternatives? What follows is a shorthand answer to the first question (which I previously addressed here): basically, the change was needed because the pre-2008 definitions in FISA technically required that the government obtain a probable-cause based order from the Court in order to collect the communications of Terrorist A in Afghanistan with Terrorist B in Iraq. This was a problem for at least two reasons: one, as non-U.S. persons outside the United States, Terrorist A and

Terrorist B are not entitled to Constitutional protections; and two, the bureaucratic manpower it took to supply and check facts, prepare applications and present these matters to the Court were substantial. As a result, only a subset of targets who may have been worth covering for foreign intelligence purposes were able to be covered. This is an extremely condensed version of the justification for 702 and does not cover additional reasons that 702

was sought. But, from my perspective, it is the bottom line, and one that cannot be overlooked when suggestions are made to scale back 702 authority.

Section 702 has empirically been used to stop terrorist attacksYoung 14 (Mark, President and General Counsel of Ronin Analytics, LLC. and former NSA senior leader, “National Insecurity: The Impacts of Illegal Disclosures of Classified Information”, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 2014, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2013/11/Young-Article.pdf)

The Deputy Attorney General has noted that the Federal Bureau of Investigation benefited from NSA’s Section 702 collection in the fall of 2009.

Using Section 702 collection and “while monitoring the activities of Al Qaeda terrorists in Pakistan, the National Security Agency

( NSA) noted contact from an individual in the U.S. that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) subsequently

identified as Colorado-based Najibulla Zazi. The U.S. Intelligence Community, including the FBI and NSA, worked in concert to determine his relationship with Al Qaeda, as well as identify any foreign or domestic terrorist links.”44 “The FBI tracked Zazi as he traveled to New York to meet with co-conspirators, where they were planning

to conduct a terrorist attack. Zazi and his co-conspirators were subsequently arrested. Zazi, upon indictment, pled guilty to conspiring to bomb the NYC subway system. Compelled collection (authorized under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, Section 702) against foreign terrorists was critical to the discovery

and disruption of this threat against the U.S.”45 Regardless of the accuracy of the information released by Snowden, the types of programs described by the material contribute to national security and its release, regardless of its validity, will negatively impact US security.

Limiting section 702 means probable cause requirements would be applied to foreign investigationsCordero 15 (Carrie, Director of National Security Studies, Georgetown University Law Center, Adjunct Professor of Law, “The Brennan Center Report on the FISA Court and Proposals for FISA Reform” 4/2, Lawfare, http://www.lawfareblog.com/brennan-center-report-fisa-court-and-proposals-fisa-reform)

Which brings us to the second question I posed above—what are the alternatives if Section 702 authority, were, as the Brennan Center

recommends, repealed? One option is to revert to the pre-2008 practice: obtaining Court approval based on probable cause for non-U.S. persons located outside the United States. The operational result would be to forego collection on legitimate targets of foreign intelligence collection, thereby potentially losing insight on important national security threats. Given the challenging and complex national security picture the United States faces today, I would think that most responsible leaders and policymakers would say, “no thanks” to that option. A second option would be to conduct the acquisition, but without FISC supervision. This would be a perverse outcome of the surveillance debate. It is also,

probably, in the current environment, not possible as a practical matter, because an additional reason 702 was needed was to be able to serve lawful process, under a statutory framework, on communications service providers, in order to effectuate the collection. In light of these options: collect less information pertaining to important foreign intelligence targets, or, collect it without statutory grounding (including Congressional

oversight requirements) and judicial supervision, the collection framework established under 702 looks pretty good.

Security K

1NCFraming the economy in terms of security discourse leads states to implement unreliable policies, destroying the economic strength they attempt to preserveLipschutz 98 (Ronnie Lipschutz, PhD in Politics and Director at UC Santa Cruz, 1998, “On Security” p. 11-12, http://people.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/index.html/A.Lipschutz%20VITA.11.pdf)

The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and "economic security." What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic

liberalization? How is the security component of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: "Hawks, Doves, but no Owls:

The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence") shows how strategic economic interdependence--a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the increasing availability of advanced

technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle--undermines the ability of states to control those technologies that, it is often argued, are critical to economic strength and military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening. (Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that have been imposed

in recent years have all come at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.) What, then, is the solution to this "new security dilemma," as Crawford has stylized it? According to Crawford, state decisionmakers can respond in three ways. First, they can try to restore state autonomy through self- reliance although, in doing so, they are likely to undermine state strength via reduced competitiveness. Second, they can try to restrict technology transfer to potential enemies, or the trading partners of potential enemies, although this begins to include pretty much everybody. It also threatens to limit the market shares of those corporations that produce the most innovative technologies. Finally, they can enter into co-production projects or encourage strategic alliances among firms. The former approach may slow down technological development; the latter places control in the hands of actors who are driven by market, and not military, forces. They are, therefore, potentially unreliable. All else being equal, in all three cases, the state appears to be a net loser where its security is concerned. But this does not prevent the state from trying to gain.

Limiting surveillance to resolve the fear of apocalypse creates an endless cycle of violence and governmentalityCoviello 2K (Peter, Professor of English and Acting Program Director of Africana Studies – Bowdoin College, Queer Frontiers, p. 40-41, https://books.google.com/books/about/Queer_frontiers.html?id=GR4bAAAAYAAJ)

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way

postapocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed-it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with

(in Jacques Derrida's suitably menacing phrase) `remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,"6 then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance,

apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished "general population:' This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's

incisive observation, from 1989, that, "Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not `Apocalypse Now' but 'Apocalypse from Now On."" The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on,

at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it

is ever useful. That is, through the perpetual threat of destruction-through the constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse-agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, "life-administering:' Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life . . . [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations:' In his brief comments on what he calls "the atomic situation;' however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken

for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race," agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of the existence of everyone:' Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, potentially annihilating. "If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power;' Foucault writes, " this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population:'8 For a state that would arm itself not with the

power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

Reject the affirmative’s fear-drive politics-critical analysis of the politics of security and resultant militarism gives us a new political view to articulate a truly democratic politics---activating your role as an ethical educator is the only way to avoid warGiroux 13 (Henry, Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, Violence, USA, 2013, monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa)

In addition, as the state is hijacked by the financial-military-industrial complex, the “most crucial decisions regarding national policy are not

made by representatives, but by the financial and military elites.”53 Such massive inequality and the suffering and political corruption it produces point to the need for critical analysis in which the separation of power and politics can be understood. This means developing terms that clarify how power becomes global even as politics continues to function largely at the national level , with the effect of reducing the state primarily to custodial, policing, and punishing functions—at least for those populations considered disposable. The state exercises its slavish role in the form of lowering taxes for the rich, deregulating corporations, funding wars for the benefit of the defense industries, and devising other welfare services for the ultra-rich. There is no escaping the global politics of finance capital and the global network of violence it has produced.

Resistance must be mobilized globally and politics restored to a level where it can make a difference in fulfilling the promises of a global democracy. But such a challenge can only take place if the political is made more pedagogical and matters of education take center stage in the struggle for desires, subjectivities, and social relations that refuse the normalizing of violence as a source of gratification,

entertainment, identity, and honor. War in its expanded incarnation works in tandem with a state organized around the production of widespread violence. Such a state is necessarily divorced from public values and the formative cultures that make a democracy possible. The result is a weakened civic culture that allows violence and punishment to circulate as part of a culture of commodification, entertainment, distraction, and exclusion. In opposing the emergence of the

United States as both a warfare and a punishing state, I am not appealing to a form of left moralism meant simply to mobilize outrage and condemnation. These are not unimportant registers, but they do not constitute an adequate form of resistance.

What is needed are modes of analysis that do the hard work of uncovering the effects of the merging of institutions of capital, wealth, and power, and how this merger has extended the reach of a military-industrial-carceral and academic complex, especially since the 1980s. This complex of ideological and institutional elements designed for the production of violence must be addressed by making visible its vast national and global interests and militarized networks, as indicated by the fact that the United States has over 1,000 military bases abroad.54 Equally important is

the need to highlight how this military-industrial-carceral and academic complex uses punishment as a structuring force to shape national

policy and everyday life. Challenging the warfare state also has an important educational component. C. Wright

Mills was right in arguing that it is impossible to separate the violence of an authoritarian social order from the cultural apparatuses that nourish it. As Mills put it, the major cultural apparatuses not only “guide experience, they also expropriate the very chance to have an experience rightly called ‘our own.’”55 This narrowing of experience shorn of public values locks people into private interests and the hyper-individualized orbits in which they live. Experience itself is now privatized, instrumentalized, commodified,

and increasingly militarized. Social responsibility gives way to organized infantilization and a flight from responsibility. Crucial here is the need to develop new cultural and political vocabularies that can foster an engaged mode of citizenship capable of naming the corporate and academic interests that support the warfare state and its apparatuses of violence, while simultaneously mobilizing social movements to challenge and dismantle its vast networks of power. One central pedagogical and political task in dismantling the warfare state is, therefore, the challenge of creating the cultural conditions and public spheres that would enable the U.S. public to move from being spectators of war and everyday violence to being informed and engaged citizens. Unfortunately, major cultural apparatuses like public and higher education, which have been historically responsible for educating the public, are becoming little more than market-driven and militarized knowledge factories. In this particularly insidious role,

educational institutions deprive students of the capacities that would enable them not only to assume public responsibilities, but also to actively participate in the process of governing. Without the public spheres for creating a formative culture equipped to challenge the educational, military, market, and

religious fundamentalisms that dominate U.S. society, it will be virtually impossible to resist the normalization of war as a matter of domestic and foreign policy. Any viable notion of resistance to the current authoritarian order must also address the issue of what it means pedagogically to imagine a more democratically oriented notion of knowledge, subjectivity, and agency and what it might mean to bring such notions into the public sphere. This is more than what Bernard Harcourt calls “a new grammar of political disobedience.”56 It is a reconfiguring of the nature and substance of the political so that matters of pedagogy become central to the very definition of what constitutes the political and the practices that make it meaningful. Critical understanding motivates transformative action, and the affective investments it demands can only be brought about by breaking into the hardwired forms of common sense that give war and state-supported violence their legitimacy. War does not have to be a permanent social relation, nor the primary organizing principle of everyday life, society, and foreign policy. The war of all-against-all and the social Darwinian imperative to respond positively only to one’s own self-interest represent the death of politics, civic responsibility, and ethics, and set the stage for a dysfunctional democracy, if not an emergent authoritarianism. The existing neoliberal social order produces individuals who have no commitment, except to profit, disdain social responsibility, and loosen all ties to any viable notion of the public good.

This regime of punishment and privatization is organized around the structuring forces of violence and militarization, which produce a surplus of fear, insecurity, and a weakened culture of civic engagement—one in which there is little room for reasoned debate, critical dialogue, and informed intellectual exchange.

Patricia Clough and Craig Willse are right in arguing that we live in a society “in which the production and circulation of death functions as political and economic recovery.”57 The United States understood as a warfare state prompts a new urgency for a collective politics and a social movement capable of negating the current regimes of political and economic power, while imagining a different and more democratic social order. Until the ideological and structural foundations of violence that are pushing U.S. society over the abyss are addressed, the current warfare state will be transformed into a full-blown authoritarian state that will shut down any vestige of democratic values, social relations, and public spheres. At the very least, the U.S. public owes it to its children and future generations, if not the future of democracy itself, to make visible and dismantle this machinery of violence while also reclaiming the spirit of a future that works for life rather than

death—the future of the current authoritarianism, however dressed up they appear in the spectacles of consumerism and celebrity culture. It

is time for educators, unions, young people, liberals, religious organizations, and other groups to connect the dots, educate themselves, and develop powerful social movements that can restructure the fundamental values and social relations of democracy while establishing the institutions and formative cultures that make it possible. Stanley Aronowitz is right in arguing that: the system survives on the eclipse of the radical imagination, the absence of a viable political opposition with roots in the general population, and the conformity of its intellectuals who, to a large extent, are subjugated by their secure berths in the academy [and though] we can take some solace in 2011, the year of the protester…it would be premature to predict that decades of retreat, defeat and silence can be reversed overnight without a commitment to what may be termed “a long march” through the institutions, the workplaces and the streets of the capitalist metropoles.58 The current protests among young people, workers, the unemployed, students, and others are making clear that

this is not—indeed, cannot be—only a short-term project for reform, but must constitute a political and social movement of sustained growth, accompanied by the reclaiming of public spaces, the progressive

use of digital technologies, the development of democratic public spheres, new modes of education, and the safeguarding of places where democratic expression, new identities, and collective hope can be nurtured and mobilized. Without broad political and social movements standing behind and uniting the call on the part of young

people for democratic transformations, any attempt at radical change will more than likely be cosmetic. Any viable challenge to the new authoritarianism and its theater of cruelty and violence must include developing a variety of cultural discourses and sites where new modes of agency can be imagined and enacted, particularly as they work to reconfigure a new collective subject, modes of sociality, and “alternative conceptualizations of the self and its relationship to others.”59 Clearly, if the United States is to make a claim to democracy, it must develop a politics that views violence as a moral monstrosity and war as virulent pathology . How such a claim to politics unfolds remains to be seen. In the meantime, resistance proceeds, especially among the young people who now carry the banner of struggle against an encroaching authoritarianism that is working hard to snuff out all vestiges of democratic life.

2NC – FrameworkInterp: The aff must defend the political implications of the plan as well as the epistemological and methodological groundings of the 1AC. The securitized ideology of the 1ac must be justified, before moving on to questions of policy.Giroux says Debate is primarily an educational activity – the signal sent intellectually outweighs any specific policy proposal- our method is comparatively better than any roleplaying strategy- we must use pedagogical approaches to deconstruct the securitized logic. Only through critical analysis can we create a new political vocabulary that challenges the militarism of the squo

1. Education –A) Real world – as intellectuals we can move thought in the direction of a new modernity that challenges securitization and the assumptions behind the plan – the same way that intellectuals during the Enlightenment contributed to a general shift in human thinking – if our vision of the world would result in less violence, you should vote for it.B) Policy failure – if their assumptions continually result in data/error replication, there is no reason to use debate to train us to be advocates in that system – focusing on short-term problem solving instead of broader theoretical issues guarantees policy failure – that’s Cuomo- we have to deal with the way war is woven into the fabric of life or else it will result in crisis politics that results in constant securitization – look at what happened after 9/11 and WW2

Security politics assures the constant reproduction of the very problems it seeks to eradicate Dillon & Reid 00 (Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, & Julian, Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of War Studies at King's College London, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 25:1, Jan-Mar, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency,” http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644986?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)

More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as

well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle,

there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem.

Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations.¶ Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem

with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact

both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis

that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35]¶ Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly

adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information

and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.¶ In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[ 36] It is here that

the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.

2NC - LinksDemocratic global peace is an act of securitization that ensures total warBurke 7 (Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer at School of Politics and International Relations at University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War against the Other pg 231-232,https://books.google.com/books/about/Security_Strategy_and_Critical_Theory.html?id=RYgi4GOgy_0C)

Yet the first act in America's 'forward strategy of freedom' was to invade and attempt to subjugate Iraq, suggesting that, if 'peace' is its object, its means is war: the engine of history is violence, on an enormous and tragic scale, and violence is ultimately its only meaning. This we can glimpse in 'Toward a Pacific Union', a deeply disingenuous chapter of Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man. This text divides the earth between a 'post-historical' world of affluent developed democracies where 'the old rules of power-politics have decreasing relevance', and a world still 'stuck in history' and 'riven with a variety of religious, national and ideological conflicts'. The two worlds will maintain 'parallel but separate existences' and interact only along axes of threat, disturbance and crucial strategic interest: oil, immigration, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction. Because 'the relationship between democracies and nondemocracies will still be characterised by mutual distrust and fear', writes Fukuyama, the 'post-historical half must still make use of realist methods when dealing with the part still in history ... force will still be the ultima ratio in their relations'. For all the book's Kantian pretensions, Fukuyama naturalises war and coercion as the dominant mode of dealing with billions of people defined only through their lack of 'development' and 'freedom'. Furthermore, in his advocacy of the 'traditional moralism of American foreign policy' and his dismissal of the United Nations in favour of a NATO-style 'league of truly free states ... capable of much more forceful action to protect its collective security against threats arising from the non-democratic part of the world' we can see an early premonition of the historicist unilateralism of the Bush administration. 72 In this light, we can see the invasion of Iraq as continuing a long process of 'world-historical' violence that stretches back to Columbus' discovery of the Americas , and the subsequent politics of genocide, warfare and dispossession through which the modem United States was created and then expanded - initially with the colonisation of the Philippines and coercive trade relationships with China and Japan, and eventually to the self-declared role Luce had argued so forcefully for: guarantor of global economic and strategic order after 1945. This ro le involved the hideous destruction of Vietnam and Cambodia, 'interventions' in Chile, El Salvador, Panama, Nicaragua and Afghanistan (or an ever more destructive 'strategic' involvement in the Persian Gulf that saw the United States first building up Iraq as a formidable regional military power, and then punishing its people with a 14-year sanctions regime that caused the deaths of at least 200,000 people), all of which we are meant to accept as proof of America's benign intentions, of America putting its 'power at the service of principle'. They are merely history working itself out, the 'design of nature' writing its bliss on the world.73 The bliss 'freedom' offers us, however, is the bliss of the graveyard, stretching endlessly into a world marked not by historical perfection or democratic peace, bu t by the eternal recurrence of tragedy, as ends endlessly disappear in the means of permanent war and permanent terror . This is how we must understand both the prolonged trauma visited on the people of Iraq since 1990, and the inflammatory impact the US invasion will have on the new phenomenon of global antiWestern terrorism. American exceptionalism has deluded US policymakers into believing that they are the only actors who write history, who know where it is heading, and how it will play out, and that in its service it is they (and no-one else) who assume an unlimited freedom to act. As a senior adviser to Bush told a journalist in 2002: 'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality . . We're history's actors."

Economic security discourse attempts to violently re-order the worldNeocleous 08 (Mark, Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University 2008, “Critique of Security”, Pg. 101-102, https://books.google.com/books/about/Critique_of_Security.html?id=OFaB6_OgP94C)

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the

doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-

ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’. Despite the fact that ‘economic security’ would never be formally defined beyond ‘economic order’ or economic well-being’, the significant conceptual consistency between economic security and

liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasize economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and ‘social equality’. Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bourgeoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. “The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the glove. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere… It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them… to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.” In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about it part under the

guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of fifteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance

policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital-accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, economic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular.

Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also ‘secured’ everywhere.

Their model of economic security commodifies risk by framing the future as a product to be appropriated by private actorsKessler 2011 (Oliver, Kyung Hee University, South Korea and University of Groningen, The Netherlands, “Beyond sectors, before the world: Finance, security and risk,” Security Dialogue 42:2, http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/42/2/197.)

For example, in security studies the argument is made that the concept of security prevalent within the discipline of international relations does not capture contemporary security practices.21 While the notion of security signifies an existential threat that triggers the employment of

exceptional measures, the notion of risk highlights how security practices have become part of our everyday lives and take place in airports, railway stations and the private home computer. The change from security to

risk highlights how the exception becomes routinized, how the exception becomes everyday experience. Within political

economy, it has been pointed out that economic risk models are constitutive for financial practices and have

created their own reality (see, in particular, MacKenzie, 2006). Economics is a part of economic practices, yet it is unable to reflect the

consequences of a practical application of economic models. Further, economists’ general disregard for true uncertainty has blinded them to questions related to the systemic risks that new practices like securitization produce (see Kessler, 2009b). In both areas, the notion of risk captures the way in which the future is ‘commodified’ or made subject to the art of government. In security studies, for example, it highlights the changing relationship between the present and the future by introducing ideas of precaution. Through an assemblage of material and discursive elements, risk enacts actors and is therefore not just a characteristic of

our society but is ‘ordering our world through managing social problems and surveying populations’ (Aradau

and Van Munster, 2007: 97). In particular, the employment of precautionary measures acting on the ‘limits’ of knowledge, or probably even beyond those limits, enables the governance of the unknown. As a result,

‘ global risks’ are divided and controlled through proactive security policies and the surveillance of populations and movements (or circulations), where private actors make profits not by reducing risks (even if they claim otherwise), but by managing and controlling contingency . In finance, the trends are quite similar:

banks do not make money from the risks they avoid, but from the risks they make tradable. The temporality of derivatives is detached from production chains and markets and works on the level of anticipated cash flows , movements, futures. In the social dimension, we witness in both areas a de-bordering of world politic s. Up to the 1970s, the risk discourse formed part of a broader discourse of war and peace. Major economic topics like

exchange rates or capital controls were subject to security considerations. Since the 1980s, however, the transformation of global finance and the redefinition of national borders that accompanied it have brought new ‘masters of risk’ (Sinclair, 2005) who are dispersed globally. Today, financial data are given meaning by an assemblage of economic actors, models and practices – and not by nation-states’ representatives. In addition, the ‘war on terror’ has been redefining the social dimension of world society in three ways. First, we witness the advent of new security actors

and practices. Increasingly, insurance companies and banks are seen as security actors that shape practices

(Aradau & Van Munster, 2007). Insurances and banks may hedge terrorism-related risks, dividing those risks up and selling them to those willing to take the risks (Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). Second, private military companies are increasingly seen as stand-alone actors. Third, as Mick Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero (2008) have pointed out, security is not something that takes

place at national borders, but affects our everyday lives (see also Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). New security practices change the ways in which ‘human beings’ are included and excluded. Ultimately, risk even impacts on how things, events, facts are produced. Risk redefines the boundary between knowledge and non-knowledge, defining the kind of knowledge that is constitutive for producing something as a political,

legal or financial entity. In this context, it is noteworthy that some commentators speak of a commodification of the future, of life and of security (Krahmann, 2006: 379–404).

Democratic peace theory is used to justify military interventions and mask war-making—it doesn’t result in democracy Mueller 9 (John, pol sci prof and IR, Ohio State. Widely-recognized expert on terrorism threats in foreign policy, AB from U Chicago, MA in pol sci from UCLA and PhD in pol sci from UCLA, Faulty Correlation, Foolish Consistency, Fatal Consequence: Democracy, Peace, and Theory in the Middle East, 15 June 2007, http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/KENT2.pdf)

Philosophers and divines not only encased democracy in a vaporously idealistic or ideological mystique, they have done the same for the democracy-peace correlation. After all, if correlation is taken to be cause, it follows that peace will envelop the earth right after democracy does. Accordingly

for those who value peace, the promotion of democracy, by force or otherwise, becomes a central mission. This notion has been brewing for some time. Woodrow Wilson's famous desire to "make the world safe for democracy" was in large part an antiwar motivation. He and many others in Britain, France, and the United States had become convinced that, as Britain's Lloyd George put it, "Freedom is the only warranty of Peace" (Rappard 1940, 42-44). With the growth in the systematic examination of the supposed peace-democracy connection by the end of the century, such certain pronouncements became commonplace. Notes Bruce Russett, sentiments like those have "issued from the White House ever since the last year of the Reagan administration" (2005, 395). Foolish consistency, fatal consequence: the role of little statesmen It was left to George W. Bush to put mystique into practice. As he stressed to reporter Bob Woodward during the runup to his war with Iraq, "I say that freedom is not America's gift to the world. Freedom is God's gift to everybody in the world. I believe that. As a matter of fact, I was the person that wrote that line, or said it. I didn't write it, I just said it in a speech. And it became part of the jargon. And I believe that. And I believe we have a duty to free people. I would hope we wouldn't have to do it militarily, but we have a duty" (2004, 88-89). And in an address shortly before the war, he confidently proclaimed, "The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life" (quoted, Frum and Perle 2003, 158). In this, Bush was only trying to be consistent (foolishly so, perhaps, but nonetheless), a quality that endears him to so

many of his followers. If democracy is so wonderful, and if in addition it inevitably brings both peace and creates favorable policy preferences, then forcefully jamming it down the throats of the decreasing number of nondemocratic countries in the world must be all to the good. He had already done something like that, with a fair amount of success, in Afghanistan; his father had crisply slapped Panama into shape; Reagan had straightened out Grenada; and Bill Clinton had invaded Haiti and bombed the hell out of Bosnia and Serbia with the same lofty goal at least partly in mind. Further, the Australians had recently done it in East Timor and the British in Sierra Leone (Mueller 2004, ch. 7). Critics have argued that democracy can't be spread at the point of a gun, but these cases, as well as the experience with the defeated enemies after World War II, suggests that it sometimes can be, something that supporters of the administration were quick to point out (Kaplan and Kristol 2003, 98-99. Frum and Perle 2003, 163). Even Russett, a prominent democratic-peace analyst, eventually, if rather reluctantly, concedes the possibility (2005, 398-400; see also Peceny and Pickering 2006).

However, Bush and some of his supporters--particularly those in the neo-Conservative camp--foolishly, if consistently, extrapolated to develop an even more extravagant mystique. Not only would the invasion crisply bring viable democracy to Iraq, but success there would have a domino effect: democracy would eventually spread from its Baghdad bastion to envelop the Middle East. This would not only bring (it needs hardly to be said) blissful peace in its wake (because, as we know, democracies never fight each other), but the new democracies would also adopt all sorts of other policies as well including, in particular, love of, or at least much diminished hostility toward, the United States and Israel (because, as we know, the democratic process itself has a way of making people think nice thoughts). Vice President Dick Cheney attests, reports Woodward, to Bush's "abiding faith that if people were given freedom and democracy, that would begin a transformation process in Iraq that in years ahead would change the Middle East" (Woodward 2004, 428). Moreover, since force can establish democracy and since democracies rather automatically embrace peaceful and generally nice thoughts, after Iraq was forced to enter the democratic (and hence peaceful and nice-thinking) camp, military force would be deftly applied as necessary to speed up the domino-toppling process wherever necessary in the area. Such extravagant, even romantic, visions

fill war-advocating neo-Conservative fulminations. In their book, The War Over Iraq, Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol apply due reverence to the sanctified correlation--"democracies rarely, if ever, wage war against one another"--and then extrapolate fancifully to conclude that "The more democratic the world becomes, the more likely it is to be congenial to America" (2003, 104-5). And war architect Paul Wolfowitz also seems to have believed that the war would become an essential stage on the march toward freedom and democracy (Woodward 2004, 428). In a 2004 article proposing what he calls "democratic realism," Charles Krauthammer urges taking "the risky but imperative course of trying to reorder the Arab world," with a "targeted, focused" effort that would (however) be "limited" to "that Islamic crescent stretching from North Africa to Afghanistan" (2004 23, 17). And in a speech in late 2006, he continued to champion what he calls "the only plausible answer," an ambitious undertaking that involves "changing the culture of that area, no matter how slow and how difficult the process. It starts in Iraq and Lebanon, and must be allowed to proceed." Any other policy, he has divined, "would ultimately bring ruin not only on the U.S. but on the very idea of freedom." And Kaplan and Kristol stress that "The mission begins in Baghdad, but does not end there....War in Iraq represents

but the first installment...Duly armed, the United States can act to secure its safety and to advance the cause of liberty--in

Baghdad and beyond" (2003, 124-25). With that, laments Russett, democracy and democratic peace theory became "Bushwhacked" (2005). Democratic processes of pressure and policy promotion were deftly used by a dedicated group to wage costly war to establish both peace and congenial policy in the otherwise intractable Middle East. It could be argued, then, that the little statesmen of the Bush administration had the courage of the mystical convictions of the democracy and democratic peace philosophers and divines. However, although Bush's simple faith in democracy may perhaps have its endearing side, how deeply that passion is (or was) really shared by his neo-Conservative allies could be questioned. That is, did they really believe that the United States which, as Francis Fukuyama notes, "cannot eliminate poverty or raise test scores in Washington, DC," could "bring democracy to a part of the world that has stubbornly resisted it and is virulently anti-American to boot" (2004, 60)? Although they hype democracy, David Frum and Richard Perle carefully caution that "in the Middle East, democratization does not mean calling immediate elections and then living with whatever happens next," but rather "opening political spaces," "creating representative institutions," "deregulating the economy," "shrinking and reforming the Middle Eastern pubic sector," and "perhaps above all" changing the educational system (2003, 162-63). Similarly, Krauthammer's "democratic realism" approach doesn't seem, actually, to stress democracy all that much. (Its wildly extravagant calls for massive warfare over a very substantial portion of the globe--only "limited" in comparison to Bush's exuberant crusadery--suggests it is rather lacking in realism as well.) Most interesting is a call issued by neo-Conservatism's champion guru, Norman Podhoretz, in the runup to the war. He strongly advocated expanding Bush's "axis of evil" beyond Iraq, Iran, and North Korea "at a minimum" to embrace "Syria and Lebanon and Libya, as well as 'friends' of America like the Saudi royal family and Egypt's

Hosni Mubarak, along with the Palestinian Authority." However, Podhoretz proved to be less mystical (or simply less devious) than other neocons about democracy by pointedly adding "the alternative to these regimes could easily turn out to be worse, even (or especially) if it comes into power through democratic elections." Accordingly, he emphasized, "it will be necessary for the United States to impose a new political culture on the defeated parties."14 (Although Podhoretz may be more realistic that others about democracy, his extravagant notion that the US would somehow have the capacity to impose a new political culture throughout the non-Israeli Middle East

is, like Krauthammer's comparable vision, so fantastic as to border on the deranged.) Indeed, after one looks beneath the boilerplate about democracy and the democratic peace, what seems to be principally motivating at least some of these people is a strong desire for the United States to use military methods to make the Middle East finally and once and for all safe for Israel (Drew 2003, 22; Fukuyama 2004; Roy 2003). All of them are devoted supporters of Israel, and they seem to display far less interest in advocating the application of military force to deal with unsavory dictatorial regimes in other parts of the world that do not seem to threaten Israel--such as Burma, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Haiti, or Cuba. As John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt point out in their discussion of what they call "The Israel Lobby" (2006), such policy advocacy is entirely appropriate and fully democratic: "There is nothing improper about American Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway US policy" (although they also note that Jewish Americans generally actually were less likely to support the war than was the rest of the population). Democracy, as noted earlier, is centrally characterized by the

contestings of isolated, self-serving, and often tiny special interest groups and their political and bureaucratic allies. What happened with Iraq policy was democracy in full flower. It does not follow, of course, that policies so generated are necessarily wise, and Mearsheimer and Walt consider that the results of much of the Lobby's efforts--certainly in this case--have been detrimental to American (and even Israeli) national interest, although their contentions that the Lobby was "critical" or "a key factor" in the decision to go to war or that that decision would "have been far less likely" without the Lobby's efforts would need more careful analysis. It is also their view that the Lobby has too much influence over U.S foreign policy--a conclusion, as it happens, that is shared by 68 percent of over 1000 international relations scholars who responded to a 2006 survey.15 However that may be, it could certainly be maintained that, as an Israeli scholar puts it, the United States by its action eliminated what Israel considered at the time to be a most "threatening neighbor" (Baram 2007). Following this line of thinking,

then, the Israel Lobby and its allies skillfully and legitimately used democracy to Bushwhack the democracy and democratic peace mystiques as part of its effort to nudge, urge, or impel the United States into a war that, as it happens, has proven to be its greatest foreign debacle in its history after Vietnam . It should be noted, however, that, although Bush and Cheney and at least some of the neocons may actually have believed their pre-war fantasies about the blessings that imposed democracy would in turn impose on the Middle East, the arguments they proffered for going to war stressed national security issues, not democracy ones--the notion that Saddam's Iraq was a threat to the United States because of its development, or potential development, of weapons of mass destruction and of

its connections to terrorist groups out to get the United States (Roy 2003). The democracy argument rose in significance, notes Russett, only after those security arguments for going to war proved to be empty (2005, 396). As Fukuyama has crisply put it, a prewar request to spend "several hundred billion dollars and several thousand American lives in order to bring democracy to...Iraq" would "have been laughed out of court" (2005). Moreover, when given a list of foreign policy goals, the American public has rather consistently ranked the promotion of democracy lower--often much lower--than such goals as combating international terrorism, protecting American jobs, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, strengthening the United Nations, and protecting American businesses abroad (see Figure 1).

2NC – Alternative A complete rejection of dominant security allows us to recraft security to include a structuralist and pluralist paradigm-The affsvision views of security fail in the context of Latin AmericaPettiford 96 (Lloyd, “Changing Conceptions of Security in the Third World” Third World Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 2, pg. 289-306, Published by Taylor and Francis Group, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993094)

Security is potentially a more complex concept than is traditionally understood ¶ and the increasing number of people

working on the concept suggests that it will ¶ be an important area for future investigation. The traditional Realist definition of ¶ security in International Relations is relatively simple. However, Pluralist and ¶ Structuralist paradigms emphasise that other linkages exist between various ¶ actors and issues, the inclusion of which might enrich current concepts of ¶ security. ¶ Security as understood in the traditional sense is not free of political meaning ¶ and interest. The traditional definition of security developed to represent the ¶ view of the most important issue for Western developed states. Security thus ¶ came to be a dominant organizing concept in the study of International Relations ¶ but it was not the only way of looking at the subject. Non-Realist interpretations ¶ 303 ¶ This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 23 Jul 2013 20:53:29 PM¶ All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsLLOYD PETTIFORD ¶ of International Relations from the Pluralist and Structuralist paradigms suggest ¶

that traditional concepts of security have kept important issues off the political ¶ agenda. Of course, attempts to re-conceptualise security will not be free of ¶ political implications either. ¶ With the ending of the Cold War and the recognition of, for example, ¶ environmental problems, even for Western developed states, other concerns have ¶ become a part of the mainstream political

and International Relations agenda. ¶ Thus some attempts to expand the concept of security seem to fit the new ¶ interests of the world's powerful in the extent to which they include environmen- ¶ tal matters and the definition of sustainable development used. In redefining ¶ security to include the environment in ways which do not suggest the need for ¶ significant restructuring of the global political economy, the concerns of the ¶ world's most powerful states are kept at the forefront of International Relations. ¶ In this sense the definition of security may be changing but it will still be a ¶ concept which, while it can be applied to the Third World, will be

inadequate ¶ for a full understanding of it. ¶ One can go beyond the traditional definition of security or the limited ¶

expansion envisaged by those arguing for environmental security. Security can ¶ be re-conceptualised as, or including, ecological sustainability and the need for ¶ fundamental structural changes in the political system. There seems to be an ¶ important danger in this; too many new concerns may be squeezed into security, ¶ causing the concept to become so broad that the division between security and ¶ International Relations in general become very blurred. ¶ It is thus difficult to avoid the conclusion that the debate over expanding ¶ security is

not entirely useful. Traditional concepts of security developed for ¶ reasons which were valid at the time for the people who used them. However, ¶ they are clearly limited in attempting to understand Third World regions such as ¶ Central America. But getting involved in complex debates over how to redefine ¶ security may not be the answer. To improve our understanding of InternThe traditional concept of security does not show itself amenable to stretching. ¶ Stretching causes the concept to lose meaning without offering any compensat- ¶ ing advantage. Thus, rather than redefine security, as traditionally understood, it ¶ might be enough to recognise its limitations in terms of when and where it ¶ should be applied, and to investigate its linkages to other areas of International ¶ Relations. Traditional security could then continue to exist alongside more ¶ serious considerations of problems of more interest to Third World states, such ¶ as environmental problems and survival within the world economy, using ¶ non-Realist tools of analysis. ¶ The current period of change and uncertainty about the future suggests that ¶ International Relations would be well served by a period of coexistent ational ¶ Relations it may be more important to recognise that the current historical ¶ juncture allows us to broaden the

focus of what is seen as important and worthy ¶ of study. Pluralist and Structuralist paradigms make us aware of actors and ¶ issues other than the state and its security from external attack, and consequently ¶ give new insights into International Relations. In the case of Central America, ¶ a Structuralist approach, based on sustainability, would seem a particularly ¶ valuable path to take. ¶ The traditional concept of security does not show itself amenable to stretching. ¶ Stretching causes the concept to lose meaning without offering any

compensat- ¶ ing advantage. Thus, rather than redefine security, as traditionally understood, it ¶ might be enough to

recognise its limitations in terms of when and where it ¶ should be applied, and to investigate its linkages to other areas of International ¶ Relations . The current period of change and uncertainty about the future suggests that ¶ International

Relations would be well served by a period of coexistent paradigms. However, if the position of Realism is not weakened the conse- ¶ quences might be serious. The evidence brought to light by research on Central ¶ America suggests that a traditional Realist concept of security fails to recognise ¶ or adequately deal with important environmental problems which may ultimately ¶ threaten life on earth; neither does it address fundamental structural disadvan- ¶ tages in the world economy which condemn ever larger numbers of people to ¶ live in misery.

Your intellectual choices influence war more than specific policy – academic actvity is keyJones 99 (Richard Wyn, Professor International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, p. 155-163, https://books.google.com/books/about/Security_Strategy_and_Critical_Theory.html?id=RYgi4GOgy_0C)

The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony. This task is accomplished through educational activity, because , as Gramsci argues,

“every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350). Discussing the relationship of the “philosophy of praxis” to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend to leave the “simple” in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and “simple” it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332-333). According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative “intellectual-moral bloc” should take place under the auspices of the Communist Party – a body he described as the “modern prince.” Just as Niccolo Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtu-ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern price could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125-205). Gramsci’s relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the 1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of domination – for example, in the case of gender – to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those associated with class conflict.1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the “infallible party” has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost

caution. Parties are necessary, but their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security. These examples may be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality. One clear security-related example of

the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident defense intellectuals (the “alternative defense” school) encouraged and drew strength from peace activism. Together they had an effect not only on short-term policy but on the dominant discourses of strategy and security, a far more important result in the long run. The synergy

between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed

particularly clearly in the fate of common security. As Thomas Risse-Kappen points out, the term “common security” originated in the contribution of peace researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse-Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by the Palme

Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic; it certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world.

However, notions of common security were taken up by a number of different intellectuals communities, including the liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the center-left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet “institutchiks” – members of the influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such as the United States of America

and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52-54; Risse-Kappen 1994: 196-200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, “in response to social movement pressure, German social organizations such as churches and trade

unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD” (Risse-Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration . As Risse-Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard-liners into power, the US arms

control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace movement and what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse-Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993: 90-110). Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and intellectuals persuaded the

Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that it did at least have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior. The most dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense

ideas was felt in the Soviet Union. Through various East-West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty

contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as “nonoffensive defense” (these links are detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994;

Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group , including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin , and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders Boserup and

Lutz Unterseher (Risse-Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s subsequent championing of common

security may be attributed to several factors. It is clear, for example, that new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East-West relations in order to facilitate much-needed domestic reforms (“the interaction of ideas and

material reality”). But what is significant is that the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common

security in order to justify its expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective security before it

(Claude 1984: 223-260), are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonsrates in relation to NATO expansion). The example of common

security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role – a significant

one at that – in making the world a better and safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular. Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution in society. CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND THE THEORY-PRACTICE NEXUS Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of Gramsci’s theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R.

Walker 1994). Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society : of the poor, the

disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” (Said 1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the

experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’etat the prism through which problems are viewed. Here the project stands full-square within the critical

theory tradition. If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing – even if they are self-consciously aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the survival of minority cultures –

can become “a force for the direction of action.” Again, Gramsci’s work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramsci’s terminology, “historic blocs” (Gramsci 1971: 323-377). Gramsci adopted Machiavelli’s view of power as a centaur, ahlf man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. Obviously, for Gramsci, there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change. In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marx’s well-worn phrase, “All that is solid melts into the air.” Gramsci’s intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971: 229-239). Gramsci argues

that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular, struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of

critical security studies to adopt in relating their theorizing to political practice. THE TASKS OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of war of position, then the main task of those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, that is, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals, traditional or organic, whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order. This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking about security behind its positivist façade . In this sense, proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth” (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of “speaking truth to power” (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking “truth against the world.” Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that “strategists must be prepared to ‘speak truth to power’” (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions without questioning the basis of their

power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth” (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350; see

also the discussion of critical pedagogy in Neufeld 1995: 116-121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the approach is simultaneously playing apart in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position. There are a number of avenues of avenues open to critical security specialists in

pursuing this educational strategy. As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly

unquenchable thirst of the media for instant pundistry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: “As teachers, we try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture …. As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” (Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of

the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992:

vii) Such “unobtrusive yet insistent work” does not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against. Rather, through their educational activities, proponent of critical security studies should aim to provide support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, critical theorists can perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social movements. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New

Zealand’s antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the country’s political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also COrtright 1993: 5-13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and succor from each other’s efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of the a “message in a bottle,” but in this case, contra Adorno’s expectations, they were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be naïve to understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused by

what he describes as the growing “professionalisation” of academic life (Said 1994: 49-62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are extremely risk-averse. It pays – in all senses – to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons”). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in marginalizing dissent. Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.” The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.

Individual analysis of security allows us to resituate our relationship to othersBurke 7 (Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer at School of Politics and International Relations at University of New South Wales, “Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War Against the Other”,https://books.google.com/books?id=4vd9AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA52&lpg=PA52&dq=It+is+perhaps+easy+to+become+despondent,+but+as+countless+struggles+for+freedom&source=bl&ots=Mg50LDvj3o&sig=vMxj5FZMultitajyYke6z5Th0K4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAGoVChMIrYnS8Ir1xgIVSaseCh3WSwXp#v=onepage&q=It%20is%20perhaps%20easy%20to%20become%20despondent%2C%20but%20as%20countless%20struggles%20for%20freedom&f=false)

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available—and where they are not, the ef fort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired—which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing. This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we are. Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these levels that we

can intervene. We can critique the machinic frame works of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web. This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of rebellion to one that understands

both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the discur sive order and influence its shifting boundaries. ... By doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible." Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many-levels—that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cul tural, and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that security seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Connolly, and Moira Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship that thinks difference not on the basis of the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might, allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics"—an encounter that involves a transformation of the self rather than the other. Thus while the sweep

and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on "ourselves"—a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to ask if there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possi bilities might be.

Voting neg opens up the space necessary for emancipation from endless securitizationNeocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University 2008, “Critique of Security”, Pg. 185-186, https://books.google.com/books/about/Critique_of_Security.html?id=OFaB6_OgP94C)

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else,

most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and

negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the

world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics ,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings,

reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams,

co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the

grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state . That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to

the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of

bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant

securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being

and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it

requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

2NC – ImpactThis quest for security in an inherently chaotic and insecure world guarantees extinction Burke 7 (Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer at School of Politics and International Relations at University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War against the Other, https://books.google.com/books/about/Security_Strategy_and_Critical_Theory.html?id=RYgi4GOgy_0C)

Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this

comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68 # We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam: For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his

bread...69 # There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of

man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit

without injuring or afflicting any'.70 # And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the

Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation. Doubts and Fears: Technology as Ontology # If Bacon could not reasonably be expected to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed: ...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.71 # By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture: We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72 # Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which

refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. Man's empire over creation -- his discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment now threatened its total and absolute destruction. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon. #

Oppenheimer -- who resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that the weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are 'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men unprepared to deal with it.'75 # Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science'.76 Yet as the

essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest, technology and its relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force for good. # Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic

translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty . Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many

rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth. # Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing reserve' of energy. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77 # This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind demands that 'nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a

system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes trapped within its logic. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. In strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter.

Focus on security undermines human security and human rightsAravena 2 (Francisco Rojas, Aravena is Director of the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)-Chile, Human Security: Emerging Concept of Security in the Twenty-First Century, 2002, http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/UNIDIR_pdf-art1442.pdf)

Globalization has universalized such values as human rights, democracy and the market.22 This ‘universalization’ has a strongly western flavour. Associated technological and economic processes have generated greater global interdependence with both positive and negative aspects, such as increased trade, wider dissemination of scientific knowledge and more global information. There is also greater danger to the environment, terrorism has acquired a global dimension, organized crime is worldwide, and financial crises know no borders. Generating stability and global governance without proper institutions is hard. Significant deficiencies can be observed in this area. In turn, there is increasing differentiation and multiplication of international actors and that has a bearing on the degree of importance and means of power with which each one deals with the processes and seeks to influence future courses of action. A vision of

the future is essential. In this framework within the international system’s current period, various different global concepts in specific areas such as security have not been honed. Human security visualizes a new global order founded on global humanism. The core issue is to solve the population’s basic needs within the framework of globalization and interdependence. This delicate balance demands, on the one hand, a tendency to unify behaviour, consumption and ideals centred on universal values and, on the other, the requirement to recognize and respect diversity and particular identities and cultures. We have seen, however, that globalization also increases differences and does not—in and of

itself—meet any needs. It also has an adverse effect on cultural practices and national and local identities. All of this is taking place in a context of economic and social polarization in various areas of the world. The result is local ungovernability, which transfers instability to the global system and regional sub-systems. A ‘zero-sum’ security concept asserts that there is no absolute security and that the greater security of one actor must mean a greater degree of insecurity for another. In the case of human security, we can assert that the vulnerabilities of one are manifested as vulnerabilities of all. For example, in Latin America this requires that we pay greater attention to and seek more alternatives for the Colombian conflict.

2NC – Perm

The permutation fails – you can’t re-appropriate your security discourse—the 1AC leaves it unquestionedBurke 2 (Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer at School of Politics and International Relations at University of New South Wales “Aporias of Security,” January-March 2002, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645035?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)

Thus humanist critiques of security uncover an aporia within the concept of security. An aporia is an event that prevents a metaphysical discourse from fulfilling its promised unity--not a contradiction that can be brought into the dialectic, smoothed over, and resolved into the unity of the concept, but an untotalizable problem at the heart of the concept, disrupting its trajectory, emptying out its fullness, opening out its closure. Derrida writes of aporia being an "impasse," a path that cannot be traveled; an "interminable experience" that, however, "must remain if one wants to think, to make come or to let come any event of decision or responsibility." (13) As an

event, Derrida sees the aporia as something like a stranger crossing the threshold of a foreign land: yet the aporetic stranger "does not simply cross a given threshold" but "affects the very experience of the threshold . . . to the point of annihilating or rendering indeterminate all the distinctive signs of a prior identity, beginning with the very border that delineated a legitimate home and assured lineage, names and language." (14) Thus it

is important to open up and focus on aporias: they bring possibility, the hope of breaking down the hegemony and assumptions of powerful political concepts, to think and create new social, ethical, and economic relationships outside their oppressive structures of political and epistemological order--in short, they help us to think new paths. Aporias mark not merely the failure of concepts but a new potential to experience and imagine the impossible. This is

where the critical and life-affirming potential of genealogy can come into play. My particular concern with humanist discourses of security is that, whatever their critical value, they leave in place (and possibly strengthen) a key structural feature of the elite strategy they oppose: its claim to embody truth and fix the contours of the real. In particular, the ontology of security/threat or security/insecurity--which forms the basic condition of the real for mainstream discourses of international policy--remains powerfully in place, and security's broader function as a defining condition of human experience and modern political life remains invisible and unexamined. This is to abjure a powerful critical approach that is able to question the very categories in which our thinking, our experience, and actions remain confined.

Permutation only masks the security logic of the 1AC guaranteeing violenceBurke 7 (Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer at School of Politics and International Relations at University of New South Wales, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” December 7th 2007,https://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html)

Schmitt claims that his theory is not biased towards war as a choice ('It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political deed a military action...it neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor

pacifism') but it is hard to accept his caveat at face value.36 When such a theory takes the form of a social discourse (which it does in a general form) such an ontology can only support, as a kind of originary ground, the

basic Clausewitzian assumption that war can be a rational way of resolving political conflicts -- because the import of Schmitt's argument is that such 'political' conflicts are ultimately expressed through the possibility of war. As he says: 'to the enemy concept belongs the ever-present possibility of combat'.37 Where Schmitt meets Clausewitz, as I explain further below, the existential and rationalistic ontologies of war join into a closed circle of mutual support and justification.

The permutation’s is a cover for a flawed ontology—dooms their action to replicate violence.Burke 7 ((Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer at School of Politics and International Relations at University of New South Wales, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” December 7th 2007, https://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html)

I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more

radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory.82 # In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' --

which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed reifies) antagonisms. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.85 # My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual

abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature,

or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation.

Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress,

modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter

into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 # What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

Case

Economy Advantage

DeDev – 1NCGrowth rates are unsustainable – we are exceeding the earth’s biophysical limitsKlitgaar and Krall 11 (Kent A. Klitgaard, , Lisi Krall, ,“Ecological economics, degrowth, and institutional change”, 12/12/2011, Ecological Economics journal issue no. 84 pages 247-248, www.elsevier.com/ locate/ecolecon)

The age of economic growth is coming to an end. The mature economies of the industrial North have already entered the initial stages of the era of degrowth. This is evidenced by data that show overall economic activity has increased at a decreasing rate since the “Golden Age” of 1960s postwar capitalism turned into the era of stagflation in the 1970s. Despite the supposed revival of growth in the neoliberal age, percentage growth rates have continued their secular decline. In the United States real GDP growth was lower in the1980s and 1990s than in the 1970s and lower still in the first years of the 21st century (Tables 1). While percentage growth rates may have declined over the last five decades the absolute size of the economy, as measured by real gross domestic product (for all its flaws) has increased, more than tripling from 1970 until 2011. This creates a dilemma within our present institutional context. Absolute growth, which uses more resources, especially fossil fuel resources, destroys more habitat, and emits more carbon and other pollutants into the planet's sinks, has grown exponentially. At the same time, relative, or percentage growth, upon which employment depends, has fluctuated over the same decades and shows a downward trend. We are growing too fast to remain within the limits of the biophysical system. At the same time the world economy is growing too slowly to provide sufficient employment and there appears to be a secular decline at work. Despite rapid and sustained rates of economic growth in many newly emerging market economies (e.g. Brazil, India and China) patterns of declining growth rates also exist for the world economy (Table 2). The reduction in the long-term growth rates, especially for mature market economies, is not something we must contend with in the distant future. They have been occurring for decades. Neither are they simply the result of “misguided” policy, as growth rates have fallen in times of both liberal and conservative policy regimes. Rather, we believe the growth rate decline is embedded deeply within the institutional structure of the economy, as well as within biophysical limits. Clearly a better understanding of the complex dynamics of the interactions of the economic and biophysical systems is needed to provide important insights for the degrowth and steady-state agendas. While ecological economics has addressed ecological limits, it has not explored as fully the limits to growth inherent in a market system. The analysis of biophysical limits has been the strength of ecological economics. Beginning with the work of Herman Daly, who placed the economy within the context of a finite and non-growing biophysical system, through the first 1997 text by Robert Costanza and colleagues, ecological economists have carefully delineated limits such as the climate change, the human appropriation of the products of photosynthesis, and biodiversity loss (Costanza et al., 1997). Subsequent analyses by Rees and Wackernagel showed that the human ecological footprint now exceeds the earth's biocapacity, and the Limits to Growth studies by Meadows et al. concluded that human activity has overshot the carrying capacity and the scale of human activity is unlikely to be maintained into the next century. The work of many energy analysts (Campbell, 2005; Campbell and Laherrere, 1998; Deffeyes, 2001; Hall and Klitgaard, 2011; Hallock et al., 2004; Heinberg, 2005; Simmons, 2006) concludes that we are at or near the global peak of fossil hydrocarbons and future economic activity will be impacted strongly by more expensive and less available petroleum. The second set of limits is internal and is to be found in the dynamics of the accumulation process, involving the complex structural interaction of production, consumption, and distribution. The internal limits that gear the

economy toward both cyclical variation and secular stagnation have not been considered systematically by ecological economists. When the economy reached these limits historically the result has been a series of periodic recessions and depressions. Renewed growth has been the answer, just as it is now. If the system reaches its own internal limits at the same time the world reaches its external biophysical limits we will have a profound challenge because we need a way to facilitate decent standards of living when economic growth can no longer be the vehicle to maintain incomes and assure social stability. In the last instance, a system in overshoot can neither growits way out of its inherent tendency toward stagnation, nor can it grow its way into sustainability. We believe it is unlikely that the present system of capitalism, dominated by multinational corporations, globalization, speculative finance, and dependence upon fossil fuels, can adjust to the era of degrowth and remain intact as is. In order to devise an economy that meets human needs as it approaches both sets of limits, ecological economics needs to understand more fully the structural and institutional dimensions of the internal and external limits, as well as the interaction between the two. This is our challenge, and it is a difficult one. Ecological economics can better understand the necessary institutional configuration of the non-growing economy only by an improved understanding of the dynamics of growth and capital accumulation, because it is here that the inherent tendencies to stagnate and the resolution to stagnation are found.

Only econ collapse solves in the necessary timeframeAbramsky (visiting fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Science, Technology and Society; fmr. coordinator of the Danish-based World Wind Energy Institute) 10(Koyla, Racing to "Save" the Economy and the Planet: Capitalist or Post capitalist Transition to a Post-petrol World?, in Sparking A Worldwide Energy Revolution, ed. Koyla Abramsky, pg. 7)

The stark reality is that the only two recent periods that have seen a major reduction in global CO2 emissions both occurred in periods of very sudden, rapid, socially disruptive, and painful periods of forced economic degrowth-namely the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the current financial-economic crisis. Strikingly, in May 2009, the International Energy Agency reported that, for the first time since 1945, global demand for electricity was expected to fall. Experience has town that a lot of time and political energy have been virtually wasted on developing a highly - ineffective regulatory framework to tackle climate change. Years of COPs and MOPs-the international basis for regulatory efforts have simply proven to be hot am And, not surprisingly, hot air has resulted in global warming. Only unintended degrowth has had the effect that years of intentional regulations sought to achieve. Yet, the dominant approaches to-climate change continue to focus on promoting regulatory reforms, rather than on more fundamental changes in social relations. This is true for governments, multilateral institutions, and also large sectors of so-called 'civil society:' especially the major national and international trade unions and their federations, and NOOs. And despite the patent inadequacy of this approach, regulatory efforts will certainly continue to be pursued. Furthermore, they may well contribute to shoring up legitimacy, at least in the short term, and in certain predominantly-northern countries where the effects Of climate changes are less immediately visible and impact on pepplds lives less directly. Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that solutions will not be found at this level.

The impact is linear – the greater growth, the quicker extinction happens. It magnifies all impacts and social problemsPradanos 15 (Luis Pradanos, writer and Assistant Professor of Spanish at Miami University, “An economy focused solely on growth is environmentally and socially unsustainable”, 4/7/2015, The

Conversation, http://theconversation.com/an-economy-focused-solely-on-growth-is-environmentally-and-socially-unsustainable-39761)

Most world leaders seem to believe that economic growth is a panacea for many of society’s problems. Yet there are many links between our society’s addiction to economic growth, the disturbing ecological crisis, the rapid rise of social inequality and the decline in the quality of democracy. These issues tend to be explored as disconnected topics and often misinterpreted or manipulated to match given ideological preconceptions and prejudices. The fact is that they are deeply interconnected processes. A large body of data and research has emerged in the last decade to illuminate such connections. Studies in social sciences consistently show that, in rich countries, greater economic growth on its own does very little or nothing at all to enhance social well-being. On the contrary, reducing income inequality is an effective way to resolve social problems such as violence, criminality, imprisonment rates, obesity and mental illness, as well as to improve children’s educational performance, population life expectancy, and social levels of trust and mobility. Comparative studies have found that societies that are more equal do much better in all the aforementioned areas than more unequal ones, independent of their gross domestic product (GDP). Economist Thomas Piketty, in his recent book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, has assembled extensive data that shows how unchecked capitalism historically tends to increase inequality and undermine democratic practices. The focus of a successful social policy, therefore, should be to reduce inequality, not to grow the GDP for its own sake. Placing economic growth above all else contributes to environmental degradation and social inequality. Concurrently, recent developments in earth system science are telling us that our frenetic economic activity has already transgressed several ecological planetary boundaries. One could argue that the degradation of our environmental systems will jeopardize socioeconomic stability and worldwide well-being. Some scientists suggest that we are in a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene, in which human activity is transforming the earth system in ways that may compromise human civilization as we know it. Many reports insist that, if current trends continue, humanity will soon face dire and dramatic consequences. If we consider all these findings as a whole, a consistent picture emerges, and the faster the global economy grows, the faster the living systems of the planet collapse. In addition, this growth increases inequality and undermines democracy, multiplying the number of social problems that erode human communities. In a nutshell, we have created a dysfunctional economic system that, when it works according to its self-imposed mandate of growing the pace of production and consumption, destroys the ecological systems upon which it depends. And when it does not grow, it becomes socially unsustainable. In a game with these rules, there is no way to win!

DeDev – 2NCGrowth is not sustainable—models proveFagnart 14 (Jean-Francois Fagnart, Marc Germain, “Energy, complexity and sustainable long-term growth”, Elsevier, September 2nd, 2014)

This note has reconsidered what type of long-term growth is possible in a model with expanding product variety a la Gross- man and Helpman

(1991) where all human activities require en- ergy. In this framework, we have linked the complexity of final production to the number of different components (or inputs) en- tering into its assembly process. We have considered two cases, whether complexity is costly or

not, i.e. whether product complex- ity increases the energy requirements of production operations or not. A balanced growth path combining ‘‘quantitative’’ and ‘‘non- quantitative’’ growth has appeared possible only if the potential of energy efficiency gains is unbounded in all (production and re- search) activities. This requires in particular a decrease (towards zero) of the

energy intensiveness of final production in spite of its increased complexity. Less optimistic assumptions unavoidably lead to less favourable long-term growth scenarios. If the energy intensiveness of intermediate and/or final productions is bounded

from below by a strictly positive constant, quantitative growth is not sustainable in the long-run but a purely ‘‘non-quantitative’’ growth path remains possible (i) if the impact of complexity on energy consumption is nil or not too strong and (ii)

if the energy intensiveness of the innovation process (the research activities in the present model) tends towards zero. If either one of these two conditions is not met, zero-growth is the most favourable long-run scenario. It is not obvious to assess the realism of the conditions under which long-term growth (even limited to its ‘‘non quantitative’’ dimension) is possible. First, even though common perception suggests an increasing complexity of human productions and pro- cesses, and of the economy as a whole, we do not have at our dis- posal an ‘‘objective’’ index of the complexity of our economies. A fortiori, we do not have a quantification of the link between complexity and energy intensiveness at the aggregate level. How- ever, the present note tends to reinforce the pessimistic view of ecological economics with respect to the feasibility of long-term growth: in a finite world, even the intermediary case of a purely non-quantitative long-term growth is only feasible under rather restrictive conditions, as discussed above.

Economic growth kills the environment – scientific study provesAhmet Atıl Asici, Istanbul Technical University, 6-18-2012, “Economic growth and its impact on environment: A panel data analysis” Ecological Indicators.

3. Methodology 3.1. Data and descriptive analysis: With a panel of 213 low, middle and high-income countries, between 1970 and 2008, we employ a panel regression analysis to investigate the relationship between log real per capita income and log real pressure on nature. Our dependent variable, per capita pressure on nature, in constant 2005 US $, is defined as; Pressure on nature p.c. = carbon dioxide damage p.c. +mineral depletion p.c. +energy depletion p.c.

+net forest depletion p.c. Unless otherwise indicated, all variables are extracted from World Development Indicator (WDI) database3 of the World Bank (World Bank, 2012), and are summarized in Table 2. See Table A1 for a detailed explanation and sources of all variables. Table 1 shows that the pressure on nature takes different forms in different income groups. Comparatively, net deforestation and mineral depletion in low-income countries, energy depletion and CO2 damage in middle-income countries and energy depletion in high-income countries constitute the major sources of the pressure on nature. When we look at the shares of each component in the total pressure on

nature, we come up with a similar picture. In Fig. 1 we see that, in high and middle income countries CO2 damage and energy depletion constitute the majority of the total pressure on nature, whereas in low income countries, it is dominated by forest depletion, followed by CO2 damage and mineral depletion. This uneven distribution of components across different income groups requires more attention and we will turn back to this issue in the regression analysis

part. Preliminary cross-country analysis, by using the plot diagram in Fig. 2, reveals that there is a positive relationship between income and pressure on nature. In other words, as countries grow richer, so do their pressure on nature. However, the relationship is not linear across different income groups. Due to the possible existence of endogeneity and omitted variable biases cross-country relationship does not necessarily prove causation. Consider for example Turkey and Finland. Finland is richer and

exerts less pressure on her nature, so a simple crosscountry comparison would suggest that higher per capita income causes less pressure on nature. But the right question to ask should be whether a country is more likely to exert less pressure on nature as it becomes richer or not. In Fig. 3, we plot the changes in log per capita income against changes in pressure on nature between 1970 and 2008. This helps to eliminate the time-invariant country- fixed effects. But even after eliminating them, the positive relation between income and pressure on nature remains. While differencing variables helps to remove the time-invariant characteristics of countries, it does not necessarily heal the simultaneity bias. That is, the positive relationship emerged in the plot-diagram may be arisen due to some other factor affecting both economic growth and pressure on nature. The preliminary analysis of the data by plot diagrams presented in Figs. 2 and 3 helps us to find the right econometric method to study the economic growth-environmental pressure relationship. We will come back to this issue in the next subsection. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the observations included in the regression analysis.

Economic growth kills the environment – data shows income, trade, and open structure increase pressure on natureAhmet Atıl Asici, Istanbul Technical University, 6-18-2012, “Economic growth and its impact on environment: A panel data analysis” Ecological Indicators.

In other components, like mineral depletion and CO2 damage, regression results indicate a negative scale effect of increasing income. As for energy depletion, we do not find a statistically significant effect. Lastly, we investigate the influences of some structural and institutional covariates. Table 7 presents the fixed-effects IV model results. The results are fairly supportive of the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis which asserts that countries tend to lower down their environmental standards

in order to attract more investment. Increasing integration to the global system through trade increases the pressure on environment. We found that 10% increase in openness ratio increases the per capita pressure on nature by 9.5%. This is in line with the

conclusion reached by Borghesi and Vercelli (2003). The regression results support our hypothesis that the governance structure is positively related with environmental sustainability which also confirms the findings of the earlier studies mentioned above. More

specifically, we found that a unit increase in the rule of law indicator decreases the per capita pressure on nature by 0.5%. Together with the effects of increasing openness to trade, the positive relationship between rule of law (or quality of institutions) and environmental protection calls for a closer look at the current globalization patterns . The environmental consequences of deregulation efforts by international institutions like IMF, WB and WTO during the sample period is worth to mention. As Tisdell (2001) and Esty (2001) argue, existing environmental and social constraints were gradually eroded by the indiscriminate deregulation of world trade. In the same spirit, Daly (1993) argues that free trade promotes competition that results in lowering of environmental standards as well as wages, which in turn, increases environmental degradation in developing and unemployment in high-income countries. The experience of Mexico, as a middleincome country receiving a good deal of foreign direct investment especially after the NAFTA agreement is telling. Steininger (1994) reports that lower environmental standards in Mexico played a crucial role in the concentration of maquiladoras along the USbordering area, and this resulted in increasing unemployment in US and environmental damage and health problems in Mexico. Coming to the education, we find a statistically significant result between the secondary school enrollment rate and pressure on nature, yet the positive sign of the estimate is not as expected, possibly due to the very limited availability of data especially for low and middle-income countries. Overall, we see that even after controlling for various structural and institutional indicators, the positive relationship between income and pressure on nature continues to hold. 5.

Concluding remarks Our results suggest that there is a positive relationship between income per capita and per capita pressure on nature. The effect is much stronger in middle-income countries than in low and high-income countries. After controlling for various covariates, institutional and structural, the positive effect still

continues to hold. Our conclusions are fairly robust to the inclusion of these covariates, and to the inclusion and exclusion of countries from the sample.

The regression results shed doubts on the environmental sustainability of the growth process especially in middle-income countries. Increasing prosperity leads more consumption and thereby more pressure on nature especially in the form of CO2 damage and mineral depletion. However, we found an opposite effect on forestry

resources. The institutional quality, as measured by the extent of enforceability of rule of law, has a significant negative effect on the pressure on nature along with our expectations. Our results suggest that increasing trade has a negative impact on environment and this finding clearly can be taken as a support for race-to-the-bottom hypothesis. Although the formulation of MDGs clearly demonstrates that economic growth and environmental protection are mutually reinforcing, there are serious doubts on our ability in decoupling of economic growth from pressure on nature in absolute terms (Moldan et al., 2011). Our results

support those studies indicating that the current economic growth paradigm is unsustainable especially in middle-income countries. Given the increasing importance of these countries as recipients of FDI flows and as producers in the global supply chain, achieving environmental sustainability without jeopardizing the other determinants of human welfare continues to be a big challenge that has to be confronted.

Global Econ Resiliant – 1NC

It’s resilient—global economic governance worked Drezner 12 – Daniel is a professor in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts. (“The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked”, October 2012, http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf)

It is equally possible, however, that a renewed crisis would trigger a renewed surge in policy coordination.

As John Ikenberry has observed, “the complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates some expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms,

interest groups and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system.”103 The post-2008 economic order has remained open, entrenching these interests even more across the globe. Despite uncertain times, the open economic system that has been in operation since 1945 does not appear to be closing anytime soon.

Global Econ Resiliant – 2NCNow, the global economy is resilient – 2008 proves economic decline could trigger renewed growth measurements that are likely to maintain the post 2008 economic order. Assumes their warrants for diversionary theory and decoupling – That’s Drezner

Aff is one sided scenario planning – economic decline could solve all conflict - Your evidence Merlini 11 (Senior Fellow – Brookings)

(Cesare. A Post-Secular World? Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 – 130)

The opposite scenario contemplates not an unprecedented era of peace and prosperity, but rather continuity in the international system, with further consolidation rather than rupture. Current conflicts and those most likely to emerge from existing tensions are contained,

thanks to diplomatic or coercive instruments, and major wars are avoided. Economic and

financial give-and-take is kept under control and gives way to a more stable global game, including increased safeguarding of public goods such as the health of the planet. This scenario

does not entail the United Nations becoming a global government, nor the European Union turning into a fully fledged federation, nor the various ‘Gs’ becoming boards of a global corporation. But these international organisations, reformed to improve representativeness and effectiveness, would remain to strengthen the rule of law globally.

Global Economy is resilientZakaria, 9 — Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University and Editor of Newsweek International (Fareed, “The Secrets of Stability”, Newsweek, 12/21/2009, lexis)

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of -globalization--about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology--were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations

over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis--soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?" This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy--through central banks and national treasuries--they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again--the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

US Not Key – 1NC

Decoupling means US isn’t key to the global economy Bloomberg 10 [“Wall Street Sees World Economy Decoupling From U.S.”, October 4th, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-03/world-economy-decoupling-from-u-s-in-slowdown-returns-as-wall-street-view.html, Chetan]

The main reason for the divergence: “Direct transmission from a U.S. slowdown to other economies through exports is just not large enough to spread a U.S. demand problem globally,” Goldman Sachs economists Dominic Wilson and Stacy Carlson wrote in a Sept. 22 report entitled “If the U.S. sneezes...” Limited Exposure Take the so-called BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China. While exports account for almost 20 percent of their gross domestic product, sales to the U.S. compose less than 5 percent of GDP, according to their estimates. That means even if U.S. growth slowed 2 percent, the drag on these four countries would be about 0.1 percentage point, the economists reckon. Developed economies including the U.K., Germany and Japan also have limited exposure, they said. Economies outside the U.S. have room to grow that the U.S. doesn’t, partly because of its outsized slump in house prices, Wilson and Carlson said. The drop of almost 35 percent is more than twice as large as the worst declines in the rest of the Group of 10 industrial nations, they found. The risk to the decoupling wager is a repeat of 2008, when the U.S. property bubble burst and then morphed into a global credit and banking shock that ricocheted around the world. For now, Goldman Sachs’s index of U.S. financial conditions signals that bond and stock markets aren’t stressed by the U.S. outlook. Weaker Dollar The break with the U.S. will be reflected in a weaker dollar, with the Chinese yuan appreciating to 6.49 per dollar in a year from 6.685 on Oct. 1, according to Goldman Sachs forecasts. The bank is also betting that yields on U.S. 10-year debt will be lower by June than equivalent yields for Germany, the U.K., Canada, Australia and Norway. U.S. notes will rise to 2.8 percent from 2.52 percent, Germany’s will increase to 3 percent from 2.3 percent and Canada’s will grow to 3.8 percent from 2.76 percent on Oct. 1, Goldman Sachs projects. Goldman Sachs isn’t alone in making the case for decoupling. Harris at BofA Merrill Lynch said he didn’t buy the argument prior to the financial crisis. Now he believes global growth is strong enough to offer a “handkerchief” to the U.S. as it suffers a “growth recession” of weak expansion and rising unemployment, he said. Giving him confidence is his calculation that the U.S. share of global GDP has shrunk to about 24 percent from 31 percent in 2000. He also notes that, unlike the U.S., many countries avoided asset bubbles, kept their banking systems sound and improved their trade and budget positions. Economic Locomotives A book published last week by the World Bank backs him up. “The Day After Tomorrow” concludes that developing nations aren’t only decoupling, they also are undergoing a “switchover” that will make them such locomotives for the world economy, they can help rescue advanced nations. Among the reasons for the revolution are greater trade between emerging markets, the rise of the middle class and higher commodity prices, the book said. Investors are signaling they agree. The U.S. has fallen behind Brazil, China and India as the preferred place to invest, according to a quarterly survey conducted last month of 1,408 investors, analysts and traders who subscribe to Bloomberg. Emerging markets also attracted more money from share offerings than industrialized nations last quarter for the first time in at least a decade, Bloomberg data show. Room to Ease Indonesia, India, China and Poland are the developing economies least vulnerable to a U.S. slowdown,

according to a Sept. 14 study based on trade ties by HSBC Holdings Plc economists. China, Russia and Brazil also are among nations with more room than industrial countries to ease policies if a U.S. slowdown does weigh on their growth, according to a policy- flexibility index designed by the economists, who include New York-based Pablo Goldberg. “Emerging economies kept their powder relatively dry, and are, for the most part, in a position where they could act countercyclically if needed,” the HSBC group said. Links to developing countries are helping insulate some companies against U.S. weakness. Swiss watch manufacturer Swatch Group AG and tire maker Nokian Renkaat of Finland are among the European businesses that should benefit from trade with nations such as Russia and China where consumer demand is growing, according to BlackRock Inc. portfolio manager Alister Hibbert. “There’s a lot of life in the global economy,” Hibbert, said at a Sept. 8 presentation to reporters in London.

US Not Key – 2NCNow, the US isn’t key to the global economy - internal resolution states with countries disincentives massive violence by limiting the effects of a single nation’s economic decline, proved recently by the economic devastation in Greece’s minimal impact on the economy. – That’s Bloomberg

U.S. not key to the global economy.Caryl 10 [Christian, Senior Fellow at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a contributing editor to Foreign Policy. His column, "Reality Check," appears weekly on ForeignPolicy.com, Crisis? What Crisis? APRIL 5, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/05/crisis_what_crisis?page=full]

Many emerging economies entered the 2008-2009 crisis with healthy balance sheets. In most cases governments reacted quickly and flexibly, rolling out stimulus programs or even expanding poverty-reduction programs. Increasingly, the same countries that have embraced globalization and markets are starting to build social safety nets. And there's another factor: Trade is becoming more evenly distributed throughout the world. China is now a bigger market for Asian exporters than the United States. Some economists are talking about "emerging market decoupling." Jonathan Anderson, an emerging-markets economist at the Swiss bank UBS, showed in one recent report how car sales in emerging markets have actually been rising during this latest bout of turmoil -- powerful evidence that emerging economies no longer have to sneeze when America catches a cold. Aphitchaya Nguanbanchong, a consultant for the British-based aid organization Oxfam, has studied the crisis's effects on Southeast Asian economies. "The research so far shows that the result of the crisis isn't as bad as we were expecting," she says. Indonesia is a case in point: "People in this region and at the policy level learned a lot from the past crisis." Healthy domestic demand cushioned the shock when the crisis hit export-oriented industries; the government weighed in immediately with hefty stimulus measures. Nguanbanchong says that she has been surprised by the extent to which families throughout the region have kept spending money on education even as incomes have declined for some. And that, she says, reinforces a major lesson that emerging-market governments can take away from the crisis: "Governments should focus more on social policy, on health, education, and services. They shouldn't be intervening so much directly in the economy itself."

Doesn’t Lead to War – 1NCNo impact—statistics proveDrezner 12 – Daniel is a professor in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts. (“The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked”, October 2012, http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf)

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder.

The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40

None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

Doesn’t Lead to War – 2NCNow, there Economic decline doesn’t cause war – would be dis-incentivized to escalate to war if the internal state within a particular country – Prefer decoupling model – their Clarfeld evidence says countries like Europe are key to the global economy meaning the Greece debt transaction should have escalated.

Europe should have escalated – your evidence Clarfeld 12[Rob, Forbes Contributor, Decouple This!, 1/25/12, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robclarfeld/2012/01/25/decouple-this/, accessed 7/20/15)

During the first few weeks of 2012, the markets are following the prevailing narrative that the U.S. economy has “decoupled” from the widely known troubles of Europe, and the somewhat less discussed prevailing risks from China. In a “decoupling” scenario, a country or region is deemed to be able to withstand the troubles going on outside of its own borders because of its own internal economic strength. I see two major problems with this thesis. First, the U.S. economy is not growing at the recently predicted robust rate of 4-5%; rather it is struggling to achieve a rate of 2-2.5%. This leaves little cushion to withstand the “contagion” from a major economic fallout from either Europe or China, or for that matter, economic shocks that have yet to surface. A significant European debt default, banking failure, natural disasters or geopolitical events, would surely impact the U.S. economy and markets beyond the current level of fragile growth – we simply don’t have the levels of productivity requisite to absorb a major blow. Second, it was only a few years ago when the decoupling thesis was widely espoused following the U.S. banking crisis and ensuing recession. At the time the thinking was that the robust growth experienced in the emerging markets would be able to withstand the U.S. slowdown and pick up some of the slack in the global economy. We now know how that worked out – it didn’t! When the U.S. went into a major recession it dragged down the rest of the world with it. We need to deal with it — the global economy remains highly interdependent. If a number of dominoes begin to fall, it is highly unlikely that any individual country or region will be able to escape the carnage. Again, any financial crisis would be occurring from levels of growth that have not yet fully recovered from their recessionary lows. In relative terms, some countries and regions will do better than others, but the “decoupling” thesis is highly flawed.

No link between economic decline or government instability and conflict initiation Sirin 11 (Cigdem V. Sirin, , University of Texas at El Paso, Department of Political Science, “Is it cohesion or diversion? Domestic instability and the use of force in international crises,” International Political Science Review 2011 32: 303, 5/12/11) DOI: 10.1177/0192512110380554

Specifically, when a country suffers from increased mass violence, a leader may choose to use external force with the anticipation that such foreign policy action will increase national solidarity and consequently (although indirectly) solve the problem of mass violence.4 By comparison, an economic downturn or government instability will not necessarily generate incentives for the cohesionary use of force, since increasing national solidarity does not typically constitute a possible solution for dealing with such domestic problems. In sum, exploring the cohesionary incentives of political leaders and examining mass violence as a causal factor presents a more plausible route to untangling the relationship between domestic instability and the use of force in international crises (see DeRouen and Goldfinch, 2005). These considerations lead to my baseline hypothesis: Hypothesis 1: A country’s likelihood of using external force in an international crisis increases in the presence of an increased level of mass violence within its borders. There exists a consensus among scholars that external conflict increases internal cohesion and political centralization. That said, most scholars note that the level of cohesion in a group achieved by an external conflict also depends on certain conditions pertaining to the nature of the group and Downloaded from ips.sagepub.com at Harvard Libraries on October 5, 2014 308 International Political Science Review 32(3) the nature of the external conflict (see Coser, 1956; Stein, 1976). Among these necessary preconditions (which act as intervening variables), the most important factors that scholars propose are (1) the presence of a degree of group consensus (solidarity) pre-dating the external conflict, and (2) a given group’s perception of the external conflict as a severe threat. Regarding the nature of the external conflict, Coser (1956) – who sought to systematize and qualify Simmel’s (1955) original in-group/out-group argument – differentiates between violent and non-violent conflict by arguing that only violent conflict generates a sense of a serious threat to a given group and thereby increases cohesion. Taking into account this qualification, I focus on international crises that involve violent military acts. To capture the role of pre-existing group solidarity, I take into consideration whether a given country is made up of a heterogeneous society with ethno-religious divisions. Many scholars suggest that civil violence seems to break out more frequently in countries with multiple ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups (e.g. Ellingsen, 2000; Vanhanen, 1999). I expect that one’s attachment to the nation as a whole (rather than to his or her sub-national ethnic group) is likely to be weaker in a country that is composed of ethnically diverse groups compared with a country that is ethnically more homogenous. This is because sub-national group affiliations in an ethnically plural society may inhibit the potential for developing strong overall group identity affiliations at the national level. Consequently, given an identity divided between national and ethnoreligious attachments, external conflict is less likely to elicit as much cohesionary power in a plural society as it is in a more homogenous one. In such cases, the political leader of an ethnically divided country may have less incentives to resort to cohesionary external conflict and may thus choose to deal with ongoing mass violence through other policy means such as the suppression of violent groups or the co-opting of opposition groups (see Bueno de Mesquita, 1980: 361–98; Richards et al., 1993). On the other hand, I expect that a political leader of a homogenous society has more incentives to engage in external conflict in the presence of increased social unrest. This occurs because the presence of minimum divisions beyond an existing group identity at the national

level makes external conflict a viable venture for increasing cohesion and, therefore, stopping ongoing mass violence. These considerations lead to the following hypothesis on the effect of mass violence, which is conditional upon the level of ethno-religious heterogeneity in a country: Hypothesis 2: Countries with lower levels of ethno-religious heterogeneity are more likely to use external force in an international crisis in the presence of an increased level of mass violence within their borders. Nevertheless, even in the presence of ethnic and religious divisions in a country, a sense of national identity may persist, especially if the defining characteristics and membership rules of such national identity go beyond ethno-religious attributes (as in the case of the United States). This brings us to the difference between civic and ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism concerns one’s membership and loyalty to a state in terms of citizenship, common laws, and political participation regardless of ethnicity and lineage (Brown, 2000; Ipperciel, 2007). Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, defines an individual’s membership in and loyalty to a nation-state in terms of ethnicity and lineage; hence, individuals belonging to different ethnicities, even if they reside in and are citizens of a state, cannot become part of the dominant national group (Alter, 1994; Ignatieff, 1993; Smith, 1991). In the case of ethnic nationalism, there already exists a strong sense of cohesion among the dominant group and little interest in extending the cohesion to domestic out-groups (see Shulman, 2002). In such instances, options for dealing with rising mass violence are likely to exclude cohesionary policy acts, since pre-existing ethnic nationalist group solidarity often produces a ‘ceiling Downloaded from ips.sagepub.com at Harvard Libraries on October 5, 2014 Sirin 309 effect’, which limits the cohesionary influence that the external use of force may have for curbing mass violence. On the other hand, civic nationalism often fails to be the sole (or at least primary) basis for group identification and falls short of evoking strong emotional attachment to the nation. As Shulman (2002: 580) puts it: most civic components of nationhood are external to the individual, whereas ethnic and cultural components are internal. Territory, political institutions and rights, and citizenship exist outside the individual, whereas ancestry, race, religion, language, and traditions are a part of a person’s physical and psychological makeup. As a result, the intensity of attachment to communities founded predominantly on the latter will likely exceed those founded predominantly on the former. When one considers regime type differences from the theoretical framework of cohesionary incentives, democracies are more likely than autocracies to promote a civic (rather than ethnic) nationalist identity (Habermas, 1996; Ipperciel, 2007; Kymlicka, 2001). Under conditions of increased mass violence, therefore, the incentives for democratic leaders to attempt to increase national cohesion through external conflict should be stronger. Accordingly, in terms of regime differences on the cohesionary use of force, I hypothesize that: Hypothesis 3a: Democracies are likely to use external force in an international crisis in the presence of an increased level of mass violence within their borders. Hypothesis 3b: In contrast to democracies, autocracies are unlikely to use external force in an international crisis in the presence of an increased level of mass violence within their borders. As a separate note, a dominant perception in the diversionary literature is that different factors of domestic instability are interchangeable with one another such that selecting one of them is a matter of conceptual taste and analytical convenience (but see, e.g., Pickering and Kisangani, 2005; Russett, 1990, 123–40). However, if different sources of domestic disturbance generate different policy incentives, the measures of domestic problems may not always act as proxies or alternatives to each other. In that sense, it would be better to incorporate these different measures simultaneously in an analytical model to control for and compare their distinctive impact on the propensity for leaders to use external force. Data and research design For empirical testing of my hypotheses, I employ data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project that covers 139 countries

from 1918 to 2005. The ICB dataset is unique in the sense that it provides data on international crises and different forms of domestic problems (i.e. social, economic, and political) for a broad range of countries within a long time span. The ICB project allows one to examine the data on two different levels: actor level and system level. The variables that I use in my analyses are from the actor-level ICB dataset, with the exception of the variable ‘contiguity’, which I adopt from the system-level dataset. I exclude all the intra-war crises within this period to avoid confounding the results, given that such crises have already escalated to violence and war (see Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000; DeRouen and Sprecher, 2004). I employ a monadic analysis because the theoretical focus of this project centers on whether and how specific sources of instability in a country determine the incentives and utility of that country for using force in international crises. Specifically, I am testing whether particular sources of Downloaded from ips.sagepub.com at Harvard Libraries on October 5, 2014 310 International Political Science Review 32(3) domestic strife have an independent effect on a state’s international crisis behavior rather than whether certain characteristics of the target state will influence the behavior of that state. Thus, the research question at hand requires a monadic test. Accordingly, the analytical models used here are not designed to elucidate strategic interactions between crisis actors, such as whether democracies or autocracies tend to use force against states with similar or different political systems in international crises or whether likely targets may strategically avoid violent conflict with states experiencing domestic instability. I do, however, introduce several control variables into my models to account for certain international environmental characteristics (such as power discrepancy) and crisis-specific factors (such as crisis trigger) that have been shown to affect a state’s likelihood of using force in an international crisis.5 Dependent variable External use of force. The ICB ‘major response’ variable identifies the specific action a state takes after it perceives a threat from an event or act that triggers a crisis. This variable ranges across nine categories, from no action to violent military action. Since the focus of my analysis is the use of force, I determine the cut-off criterion for the dependent variable as violent versus non-violent acts. I collapse the variable into a dichotomous measure by coding the events that involve violent military action where the crisis actor resorts to the use of force (ICB categories 8–9; e.g. invasion of air space, border clash, etc.) as ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise (ICB categories 1–7; e.g. no response, verbal acts such as protest, economic acts such as embargo, etc.). Major independent variables Mass violence. This variable assesses the level of violence within the society of the crisis actor as evidenced by insurrections, civil war, and revolution. The ICB dataset uses a code of ‘1’ if there is a significant increase in the level of domestic violence during the relevant period preceding the crisis, a code of ‘2’ if the level is normal, and a code of ‘3’ if there is a significant decrease. I collapse the ICB variable into a dichotomous variable and code it as ‘1’ if there is a significant increase in the level of mass violence and ‘0’ otherwise. In this way, I obtain a more direct measure to test my hypotheses. Last, the ICB dataset uses a code of ‘4’ if the crisis actor is a newly independent state. I exclude the observations of this category from the analysis for this variable (as well as for the measures of economic downturn and government instability), since such cases do not provide information on the level of the domestic problem under investigation. Economic downturn. This variable assesses the overall state of the economy for the crisis actor during the period preceding a crisis. I base this measure on the ICB variable labeled ‘economic status of actor’, which provides a summary indicator of the cost of living, unemployment, food prices, labor disruption, and consumer goods shortages. Since there is a considerable amount of missing data for a number of individual economic indicators, this composite index takes advantage of the available partial information, and thus enables a more parsimonious model. The data are examined from the year of the crisis to the fourth preceding year. The ICB dataset has the values coded as ‘1’ if there is an increase in

economic problems, ‘2’ if the economic situation is normal, and ‘3’ if there is a decrease in economic problems. For a more direct measure of worsening economic conditions, I generate a dichotomous variable and code the cases where there is a significant increase in economic problems as ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. Downloaded from ips.sagepub.com at Harvard Libraries on October 5, 2014 Sirin 311 Government instability. The ICB actor-level dataset provides information on whether the crisis actor experiences government instability, which may include executive, constitutional, legal, and/ or administrative structure changes within the relevant period preceding an international crisis. For this measure, the ICB dataset codes the observations as ‘1’ if there is a significant increase in government instability, ‘2’ if the government is stable, and ‘3’ if there is a significant decrease in government instability. For a more direct measure of escalating governmental instability, I create a dichotomous variable coding the cases where there is a significant increase in the level of government instability as ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. Ethno-religious heterogeneity. For the operationalization of this concept, I use two different measures that I adopt from the dataset of Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) study. The first measure is the number of distinct languages spoken by groups exceeding 1 percent of the country’s population (see Grimes and Grimes, 1996). The second alternative measure captures the level of religious fractionalization, which Fearon and Laitin constructed using data from the CIA Factbook and other sources. In order to test my interactive hypothesis (H2), I generate two alternative multiplicative variables by interacting mass violence separately with each of the two measures of ethno-religious heterogeneity. Regime type. The ICB dataset provides five different categories of this indicator including democratic regime, civil authoritarian regime, military-direct rule, military-indirect rule, and military dual authority. I generate a dummy variable where ‘1’ denotes democratic regimes and ‘0’ denotes authoritarian regimes, mainly because the original variable does not differentiate between levels of democracy while providing dissimilar types of authoritarianism.6 Control variables Power discrepancy. Several studies of state dyads have demonstrated that disparity in a dyad’s capabilities reduces the likelihood of violence initiation (see, e.g., Bremer, 1992). On the other hand, some scholars argue that states that possess a power advantage over an adversary are much more likely to take military action in crisis situations (see, e.g., Prins, 2005). My model controls for this external determinant of interstate conflict by including the ICB variable ‘power discrepancy’. The ICB dataset assigns a power score for each crisis actor and its principal adversary based on six separate scores measuring population size, GNP, territorial size, alliance capability, military expenditure, and nuclear capability at the onset of a crisis. The power that a crisis actor possesses and has at its disposal from alliance partners (i.e. those countries that are connected to the crisis actor through some type of collective security agreement) immediately prior to an international crisis is then compared with that of the actor’s principal adversary (or adversaries) to create a final power discrepancy score, which ranges from −179 to +179. Negative values indicate a power discrepancy that is to the disadvantage of a crisis actor whereas positive values demonstrate that a crisis actor is stronger than an adversary. To generate a measure that indicates less power disparity as the score gets closer to zero (and vice versa), I take the square of the original ICB power discrepancy variable. This allows one to also capture the potential non-linear nature of this variable. Contiguity. On contiguity, Geller (2000: 413) presents two major perspectives. The first is that geographic opportunity provides physical opportunity for wars and increases a nation’s Downloaded from ips.sagepub.com at Harvard Libraries on October 5, 2014 312 International Political Science Review 32(3) involvement in a foreign conflict. The second thesis suggests that proximity structures the ‘context of interaction’, which increases the probability of conflictual relations and enhances the motivations for war. At the dyad level, proximity is the strongest predictor of war probability (see Henderson, 1997;

Vasquez, 1993). Hence, I control for this factor with the expectation that when crisis actors share a border, there will be a greater likelihood of the external use of force. The ICB system level data refers to this variable as the geographical proximity of principal adversaries. The coding values are ‘1’ distant, ‘2’ near neighbors, and ‘3’ contiguous. Gravity. This ICB variable identifies the ‘gravest’ threat a crisis actor faces during a crisis, which ranges from 0 to 7. Most studies suggest that increases in this measure lead to increases in the likelihood of violence in an international crisis (see Hewitt and Wilkenfeld, 1999; Trumbore and Boyer, 2000). That said, DeRouen and Sprecher (2004) find that gravity – as a measure of domestic political loss – has a negative impact on the use of force due to a tendency to reject violence as an initial policy option when the regime is threatened. Following DeRouen and Sprecher, I recode the original ICB variable as ‘1’ if there is a political threat and ‘0’ otherwise to capture any serious political risk a crisis actor faces during a crisis. Trigger level. The trigger or precipitating cause of a foreign policy crisis refers to the specific act, event, or situational change that leads to (1) a crisis actor’s perception of the crisis as a threat to one’s basic values, (2) constrained time pressure for responding to the threat, and (3) heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000). It is reasonable to expect that states will react to a crisis with the level of action (be it economic, diplomatic, or military) that matches the level of the trigger (see Trumbore and Boyer, 2000). More specifically, I expect that the likelihood of the use of force will increase in response to more violent triggers. For this variable, I employ the original ICB indicator ‘trigger to foreign policy crisis’, which ranges from 1 (verbal act) to 9 (violent act) in line with the trigger’s level of intensity. Empirical results Some states are more likely than others to get involved in international crises, such as major powers and enduring rivals. An attempt to identify possible factors that are specific to each crisis actor would be a strenuous and redundant task. Instead, I employ a panel-estimated approach – random effects probit – to control for country-specific effects likely to be present in the error term. In accordance with my theoretical framework, I adopt the crisis actor as my unit of analysis. The baseline analytical model is as follows: Pr(Y ij = 1 | X ij , v i ) = f(b 0 + b 1 (mass violence) ij + b 2 (economic downturn) ij + b 3 (government instability) ij + b 4 (power discrepancy) ij + b 5 (contiguity) ij + b 6 (gravity) ij + b 7 (trigger level) ij + b 8 (regime type) ij + v i ) where Pr(Y ij = 1 | X ij , v i ) denotes the probability of external use of force; vi represents unit-specific effects. For the analysis of the interactive effects of mass violence and ethno-religious heterogeneity, I add a multiplicative interaction variable to the baseline model, along with the constitutive terms of that interaction. For the testing of my hypotheses regarding regime type differences, I run the baseline model (excluding the regime type variable) for the subsets of democracies and autocracies. As the Wald λ2 results of the analyses demonstrate (see Tables 2, 3 and 4), the fit of each model is good. Downloaded from ips.sagepub.com at Harvard Libraries on October 5, 2014 Sirin 313 Table 1. Frequency of the Use of Force according to a Crisis Actor’s Experience of Domestic Problems Prior to an International Crisis, 1918–2005 Mass violence Economic downturn Government instability 0 1 0 1 0 1 No use of force Use of force 443 226 76 52 317 178 151 67 403 212 117 64 Use of force % 33% 40% 36% 30% 34% 35% Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the cross-tabulations of the use of force in international crises with three different forms of domestic problems (mass violence, economic downturn, and government instability). Among crisis actors who experience increased mass violence prior to the crisis, 40 percent use force. By comparison, if the country does not experience an increase in mass violence, only 33 percent resort to the use of force. In cases of economic decline, 30 percent of crisis actors use force, whereas cases of no economic downturn demonstrate the use of force 36 percent of the time. Finally, a change in the level of government instability indicates almost no variation across the use of force and non-use of force options (34 percent for no government instability

and 35 percent for increased government instability). These preliminary results fall in line with my theoretical expectations that increased mass violence is more likely to lead to the use of force rather than other forms of domestic problems.

Internet Freedom Advantage

Doesn’t Solve I-Freedom 1NCAnd US allies destroy i-freedom signalHanson 10/25/12, Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/10/25-ediplomacy-hanson-internet-freedom

Another challenge is dealing with close partners and allies who undermine internet freedom. In August 2011, in the midst of the Arab uprisings, the UK experienced a different connection technology infused movement, the London Riots. On August 11, in the heat of the crisis, Prime Minister Cameron told the House of Commons: Free flow of information can be used for good. But it can also be used for ill. So we are working with the police, the intelligence services and industry to look at whether it would be right to stop people communicating via these websites and services when we know they are plotting violence, disorder and criminality. This policy had far-reaching implications. As recently as January 2011, then President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, ordered the shut-down of Egypt’s largest ISPs and the cell phone network, a move the United States had heavily criticized. Now the UK was contemplating the same move and threatening to create a rationale for authoritarian governments everywhere to shut down communications networks when they threatened “violence, disorder and criminality.” Other allies like Australia are also pursuing restrictive internet policies. As OpenNet reported it: “Australia maintains some of the most restrictive Internet policies of any Western country…” When these allies pursue policies so clearly at odds with the U.S. internet freedom agenda, several difficulties arise. It undermines the U.S. position that an open and free internet is something free societies naturally want. It also gives repressive authoritarian governments an excuse for their own monitoring and filtering activities. To an extent, U.S. internet freedom policy responds even-handedly to this challenge because the vast bulk of its grants are for open source circumvention tools that can be just as readily used by someone in London as Beijing, but so far, the United States has been much more discreet about criticising the restrictive policies of allies than authoritarian states.

Doesn’t Solve I-Freedom – 2NCNow, the Aff doesn’t solve internet freedom – The United States believes that countries inherently want free internet access and have criticized actions of authoritarian states, such as China and Iran – That’s Hanson

Gambling ban spills over to internet freedom generallyHammond 3/12/14, writer for RedState http://www.redstate.com/diary/mikehammond/2014/03/12/crony-online-gambling-ban-threatens-gun-owners-rights/

And, frankly, the fact is that neither the sponsors nor the beneficiaries of the Internet gambling regulation are people who have given a lot of thought to constitutional principle — or the precedential impact of extending regulation into this area. Sen. Dean Heller (R-NV) is sponsoring the ban on behalf of the owner of a Las Vegas casino, and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) is reportedly jumping on board. Heller represents Nevada and will hawk the interests of the casino owners who handed Harry Reid his current six-year term. Thanks for that! Graham has a different reason for his involvement. Billionaire casino owner Sheldon Adelson has pledged to “spend whatever it takes” to have it the federal ban enacted. And Graham, after years of stabbing conservatives in the back, has his back against the wall. With a contentious primary and polls suggesting Graham could be forced into a runoff, he would like nothing more than a billionaire casino owner to rain campaign ads from the heavens to help him survive. True, billionaire Las Vegas casino owners are on both sides of this issue. And I certainly don’t begrudge billionaires their billions. But I’m staking my claim with the billionaires who don’t believe that Big Government should stick its heavy hand into the market in order to protect their billions. The bottom line? This “camel’s nose in the tent” of Internet regulation creates a dangerous precedent for those concerned about Internet freedom. It should scare those who want to stop Chuck Schumer and his gun-grabber choir form moving the central element of Barack Obama’s gun control agenda. To coin a phrase, “Ideas have consequences.” And regulation of Internet gaming opens the door to regulation of other things congressmen or billionaire political spenders find objectionable. Obviously, that includes firearms.

China undermines global i-freedomChang 14 (Research Associate, Technology & National Security Program, the Center for a New American Security)

(Amy Chang, How the 'Internet with Chinese Characteristics' Is Rupturing the Web, 12/15/2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amy-chang-/china-internet-sovereignty_b_6325192.html)

China is openly undermining the United States' vision of a free and open Internet. Motivated by maintaining the fragile balance between information control, social and political stability, and continued modernization and economic growth for an online population of over 600 million, the Chinese government is attempting to alter how nations understand their role in Internet governance through a concept called "Internet sovereignty."

Internet sovereignty refers to the idea that a country has the right to control Internet activity within its own borders, and it is what China refers to as a natural extension of a nation-state's authority to handle its own domestic and foreign affairs. For the United States and other Western nations, however, Internet governance is delegated to an inclusive and distributed set of stakeholders including government, civil society, the private sector, academia, and national and international organizations (also known as the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance).

Gambling ban undoes internet freedom promotionAronson 14 Institute for International Economic Policy Working Paper Series Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University Can Trade Policy Set Information Free? IIEP-WP-2014-9 Susan Ariel Aaronson George Washington University

http://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/2014WP/AaronsonIIEPWP20149.pdf

T here is a contradiction at the heart of the Internet. Al though the Internet has become a platform for trade, trade policies have both enhanced and undermined Internet freedom and the open Internet. Two recent events illuminate this paradox. First, The New York Times ( America’s paper of record ) reported it had b een repeatedly hacked after it published several articles delineating the financial holdings of the families of China’s highest leaders. The hackers inserted malware and stolen its employees’ e - mail account passwords, allegedly to find out information abou t the Times’ sources. Soon thereafter, The Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Bloomberg, Voice of America and other media outlets publicly claimed their computers were hacked, allegedly also by Chinese hackers. And in late February the government of A ntigua announced that it would retaliate against America’s ban of Antiguan online gambling sites. The World Trade Organization (WTO) gave the small island nation approval to sell items protected under US copyright law as a means of compensation for trade p ractices that “devastated” its economy. Antigua plans to set up a website to sell US - copyrighted material without paying the copyright holders. In short , while China was using trade to steal information and in so doing reduce Internet openness , Antigua will use trade to undermine property rights while advancing information flows. Although t he global Internet is creating a virtuous circle of expanding growth, opportunity, and information flows , policymakers and market actors are taking steps tha t undermine access to information, reduce freedom of expression and splinter the Internet. Almost every country has adopted policies to protect privacy, enforce intellectual property rights, protect national security, or thwart cyber - theft, hacking, and sp am. While these actions may be necessary to achieve important policy goals, these policies may distort cross - border information flows and trade. Meanwhile, US, Canadian and European firms provide much of the infrastructure as well as censor ware or blockin g services to their home governments and repressive states such as Iran, Russia, and China

US Online gambling ban kills internet freedom signalKibbe 4/28/14 (Matt, FreedomWorks, "Coalition Letter: No Federal Ban on Internet Gambling")

We, the undersigned individuals and organizations, are writing to express our deep concerns about the Restoration of America’s Wire Act (H.R. 4301), which would institute a de facto ban on internet gaming in all 50 states. The legislation is a broad overreach by the federal government over matters traditionally

reserved for the states. H.R. 4301 will reverse current law in many states and drastically increase the federal government’s regulatory power. As we have seen in the past, a ban will not stop online gambling. Prohibiting states from legalizing and regulating the practice only ensures that it will be pushed back into the shadows where crime can flourish with little oversight. In this black market, where virtually all sites are operated from abroad, consumers have little to no protection from predatory behavior.¶ Perhaps even more concerning is the fact that this bill allows the federal government to take a heavy hand in regulating the Internet, opening the door for increased Internet regulation in the future. By banning a select form of Internet commerce, the federal government is setting a troubling precedent and providing fodder to those who would like to see increased Internet regulation in the future. We fear that H.R. 4301 will begin a dangerous process of internet censorship that will simultaneously be circumvented by calculated international infringers while constraining the actions of private individuals and companies in the United States.

Online gambling is the BIGGEST internal linkBraithwaite and Blitz 5/6/9 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7d47231c-3a82-11de-8a2d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3E1KKpH4h staff, Financial Times

Barney Frank, chairman of the House financial services committee, presented legislation on Wednesday that would legalise internet gambling in the US and pave the way for overseas companies to return to the market. Calling existing law “the single biggest example of an intrusion” into internet freedom, Mr Frank said he was confident of some cross-party support for the bill, which would regulate and tax online gambling.

Doesn’t Solve Censorship – 1NC

Even absent data localization private companies will voluntarily self-censor – nominal internet freedom is irrelevantMorozov 11 (Evgeny Morozov, visting scholar at Stanford University, Schwartz Fellow at the New America Foundation, 2011, “The Net Delusion,” ch. 8)

What is clear is that, contrary to the expectations of many Western policymakers, Facebook is hardly ideal for promoting democracy; its own logic, driven by profits or ignorance of the increasingly global context in which it operates, is, at times, extremely antidemocratic. Were Kafka to pen his novel The Trial—in which the protagonist is arrested and tried for reasons that are never explained to him—today, El Ghazzali's case could certainly serve as inspiration. That much of digital activism is mediated by commercial intermediaries who operate on similar Kafkaesque principles is cause for concern, if only because it introduces too much unnecessary uncertainty into the activist chain, imagine that El Ghazzali's group was planning a public protest on the very day that its page got deleted: The protest could have easily been derailed. Until there is complete certainty that a Facebook group won't be removed at the most unfortunate moment, many dissident groups will shy away from making it their primary channel of communication. In reality, there is no reason why Facebook should even bother with defending freedom of expression in Morocco, which is not an appealing market to its advertisers, and even if it were, it would surely be much easier to make money there without crossing swords with the country's rulers. We do not know how heavily Facebook polices sensitive political activity on its site, but we do know of many cases similar to El Ghazzali s. In February 2010, for example, Facebook was heavily criticized by its critics in Asia for removing the pages of a group with 84,298 members that had been formed to oppose the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, the pro-establishment and pro-Beijing party. According to the group's administrator, the ban was triggered by opponents flagging the group as "abusive" on Facebook. This was not the first time that Facebook constrained the work of such groups. In the run-up to the Olympic torch relay passing through Hong Kong in 2008, it shut down several groups, while many pro-Tibetan activists had their accounts deactivated for "persistent misuse of the site." It's not just politics: Facebook is notoriously zealous in policing other types of content as well. In July 2010 it sent multiple warnings to an Australian jeweler for posting photos of her exquisite porcelain doll, which revealed the doll's nipples. Facebook's founders may be young, but they are apparently puritans. Many other intermediaries are not exactly unbending defenders of political expression either. Twitter has been accused of silencing online tribute to the 2008 Gaza War. Apple has been bashed for blocking Dalai Lama-related iPhone apps from its App Store for China (an application related to Rebiya Kadeer, the exiled leader of the Uighur minority, was banned as well). Google, which owns Orkut, a social network that is surprisingly popular in India, has been accused of being too zealous in removing potentially controversial content that may be interpreted as calling for religious and ethnic violence against both Hindus and Muslims. Moreover, a 2009 study found that Microsoft has been censoring what users in the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Algeria, and Jordan could find through its Bing search engine much more heavily than the governments of those countries.

Doesn’t Solve Censorship – 2NC

Non-state actors and social media monitoring make censorship impossible to counterMorozov 11 (Evgeny Morozov, visting scholar at Stanford University, Schwartz Fellow at the New America Foundation, 2011, “The Net Delusion,” ch. 4)

But governments do not need to wait until breakthroughs in artificial intelligence to make more accurate decisions about what it is they need to censor. One remarkable difference between the Internet and other media is that online information is hyperlinked. To a large extent, all those links act as nano-endorsements. If someone links to a particular page, that page is granted some importance. Google has managed to aggregate all these nano-endorsements—making the number of incom- ing links the key predictor of relevance for search results—and build a mighty business around it. Hyperlinks also make it possible to infer the context in which particular bits of information appear online without having to know the meaning of those bits. If a dozen antigovernment blogs link to a PDF published on a blog that was previously unknown to the Internet police, the latter may assume that the document is worth blocking without ever reading it. The links—the "nano-endorsements" from antigovernment bloggers—speak for themselves. The PDF is simply guilty by association. Thanks to Twitter, Facebook, and other social media, such associations are getting much easier for the secret police to trace. If authoritarian governments master the art of aggregating the most popular links that their opponents share on Twitter, Facebook, and other social media sites, they can create a very elegant, sophisticated, and, most disturbingly, accurate solution to their censorship needs. Even though the absolute amount of information—or the number of links, for that matter—may be growing, it does not follow that there will be less "censorship" in the world. It would simply become more fine-tuned. If anything, there might be less one-size-fits-all "wasteful" censorship, but this is hardly a cause for celebration. The belief that the Internet is too big to censor is dangerously naive. As the Web becomes even more social, nothing prevents governments— or any other interested players—from building censorship engines powered by recommendation technology similar to that of Amazon and Netflix. The only difference, however, would be that instead of being prompted to check out the "recommended" pages, we'd be denied access to them. The "social graph"—a collection of all our connections across different sites (think of a graph that shows everyone you are connected to on different sites across the Web, from Facebook to Twitter to YouTube)—a concept so much beloved by the "digerati," could encircle all of us. The main reason why censorship methods have not yet become more social is because much of our Internet browsing is still done anonymously. When we visit different sites, the people who administer them cannot easily tell who we are. There is absolutely no guarantee that this will still be the case five years from now; two powerful forces may destroy online anonymity. From the commercial end, we see stronger integration between social networks and different websites— you can now spot Facebook's "Like" button on many sites—so there are growing incentives to tell sites who you are. Many of us would eagerly trade our privacy for a discount coupon to be used at the Apple store. From the government end, growing concerns over child pornography, copyright violations, cybercrime, and cyberwarfare also make it more likely that there will be more ways in which we will need to prove our identity online. The future of Internet control is thus a function of numerous (and rather complex) business and social forces; sadly, many of them originating in free and democratic societies. Western governments and foundations can't

solve the censorship problem by just building more tools; they need to identify, publicly debate, and, if necessary, legislate against each of those numerous forces. The West excels at building and supporting effective tools to pierce through the firewalls of authoritarian governments, but it is also skilled at letting many of its corporations disregard the privacy of their users, often with disastrous implications for those who live in oppressive societies. Very litde about the currently fashionable imperative to promote Internet freedom suggests that Western policymakers are committed to resolving the problems that they themselves have helped to create. We Don't Censor; We Outsource! Another reason why so much of today's Internet censorship is invisible is because it's not the governments who practice it. While in most cases it's enough to block access to a particular critical blog post, it's even better to remove that blog post from the Internet in its entirety. While governments do not have such mighty power, companies that enable users to publish such blog posts on their sites can do it in a blink. Being able to force companies to police the Web according to a set of some broad guidelines is a dream come true for any government. It's the companies who incur all the costs, it's the companies who do the dirty work, and it's the companies who eventually get blamed by the users. Companies also are more likely to catch unruly content, as they know their online communities better than government censors. Finally, no individual can tell companies how to run those communities, so most appeals to freedom of expression are pointless. Not surprisingly, this is the direction in which Chinese censorship is evolving. According to research done by Rebecca MacKinnon, who studies the Chinese Internet at New America Foundation and is a former CNN bureau chief in Beijing, censorship of Chinese user-generated content is "highly decentralized," while its "implementation is left to the Web companies themselves". To prove this, in mid-2008 she set up anonymous accounts on a dozen Chinese blog platforms and published more than a hundred posts on controversial subjects, from corruption to AIDS to Tibet, to each of them. MacKinnon's objective was to test if and how soon they would be deleted. Responses differed widely across companies: The most vigilant ones deleted roughly half of all posts, while the least vigilant company censored only one. There was little coherence to the companies' behavior, but then this is what happens when governments say "censor" but don't spell out what it is that needs to be censored, leaving it for the scared executives to figure out. The more leeway companies have in interpreting the rules, the more uncertainty there is as to whether a certain blog post will be removed or allowed to stay. This Kafkaesque uncertainty can eventually cause more harm than censorship itself, for it's hard to plan an activist campaign if you cannot be sure that your content will remain available. This also suggests that, as bad as Google and Facebook may look to us, they still probably undercensor compared to most companies operating in authoritarian countries. Global companies are usually unhappy to take on a censorship role, for it might cost them dearly. Nor are they happy to face a barrage of accusations of censorship in their own home countries. (:Local companies, on the other hand, couldn't care less Social networking sites in Azerbaijan probably have no business in the United States or Western Europe, nor are their names likely to be mispronounced at congressional hearings.) But this is one battle that the West is already losing. Users usually prefer local rather than global services; those are usually faster, more relevant, easier to use, and in line with local cultural norms. Look at the Internet market in most authoritarian states, and you'll probably find at least five local alternatives to each prominent Web 2.0 start-up from Silicon Valley. For a total online population of more than 300 million, Facebook's 14,000 Chinese users, by one 2009 count, are just a drop in the sea (or, to be exact, 0.00046 percent). Companies, however, are not the only intermediaries that could be pressured into deleting unwanted content. RuNet (the colloquial name for the Russian-speaking Internet), for example, heavily relies on "com-munities," which are somewhat akin to Facebook groups, and those are run by dedicated

moderators. Most of the socially relevant online activism in Russia happens on just one platform, Livejournal. When in 2008 the online community of automobile lovers on Livejournal became the place to share photos and reports from a wave of unexpected protests organized by unhappy drivers in the far eastern Russian city of Vladivostok, its administrators immediately received requests from FSB, KGB's successor, urging them to delete the reports. They complied, although they complained about the matter in a subsequent report that they posted to the community's webpage (within just a few hours that post disappeared as well). Formally, though, nothing has been blocked; this is the kind of invisible censorship that is most difficult to fight. The more intermediaries—whether human or corporate—are involved in publishing and disseminating a particular piece of information, the more points of control exist for quietly removing or altering that information. The early believers in "dictator's dilemma" have grossly underestimated the need for online intermediaries. Someone still has to provide access to the Internet, host a blog or a website, moderate an online community, or even make that community visible in search engines. As long as all those entities have to be tied to a nation state, there will be ways to pressure them into accepting and facilitating highly customized censorship that will have no impact on economic growth.

Privacy Advantage

Surveillance Good – 1NCSurveillance outweighs and privacy violations are overstretched post-Snowden – solves security threatsGallington 13 -- (Daniel J. Gallington, senior policy and program adviser at the George C. Marshall Institute in Arlington VA, served in senior national policy positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of ?Justice, and as bipartisan general counsel for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “The Case for Internet Surveillance,” US News, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/09/18/internet-surveillance-is-a-necessary-part-of-national-security, Accessed 07-02-15)

If the answer to these questions continues to be yes – and it most likely is – then the recent public debate brought on by Edward Snowden's disclosures is far more mundane, and far less sensational than the media would perhaps like it to be. Also In that case, the real issue set boils down to the following set of key questions, best answered by our Congress – specifically the Intelligence committees working with some other key committees – after a searching inquiry and a series of hearings, as many of them open as possible. Were the established and relevant laws, regulations and procedures complied with? Are the established laws, regulations and procedures up to date for current Internet and other technologies? Is there reason to add new laws, regulations and procedures? Is there a continued requirement – based on public safety – to be able to do intrusive surveillance, including Internet surveillance,

against spies, terrorists or criminals? In sum, the idea that we have somehow "betrayed" or "subverted" the Internet (or the telephone for that matter) is – as my mom also used to say – "just plain silly." Such kinds of inaccurate statements are emotional and intended mostly for an audience with preconceived opinions or that hasn't thought very hard about the dangerous consequences of an Internet totally immune from surveillance. In fact, it seems time for far less sensationalism – primarily by the media – and far more objectivity. In the final analysis, my mom probably had it right: "Those kind of people, sure".

Public Perception – 1NCThe public is only mildly concernedDukeman 14

(Ryan, European Union Program Undergraduate Fellow at Princeton University, “Surprisingly mild reaction to NSA surveillance”, February 11, 2014, http://dailyprincetonian.com/opinion/2014/02/surprisingly-mild-reaction-to-nsa-surveillance/, kc)

One of the legacies 2013 will leave behind, as Andrea Peterson wrote recently in The Washington Post, is that it was “the year that proved your

paranoid friend right.” Since January of last year, we’ve learned that the National Security Agency is collecting massive amounts of phone call metadata, emails, location information of cell phones and is even listening to Xbox Live. Shocking as this obviously was to me, as a citizen of the country of “We the People,” one founded on civil liberties, what was perhaps more shocking was how mild the reaction of many Americans was. While polls showed that a small majority of U.S. citizens opposed the NSA’s collection of

phone and Internet usage data, after months of reassurances by the President that the programs would be reformed and used responsibly, the numbers seem to have changed (or at least, the story seems to be dying down).¶

The problem here is that a story like this shouldn’t ever go away, not until the sought reforms are accomplished or at least until we as a society reach an informed consensus about the core issues at stake. Every day that we wait, every day that such programs are allowed to continue without public scrutiny or reform, is a day in which rights are unduly sacrificed without the informed consent of the public.

Privacy is already dead- companies surveil more than the government and will not change Gillmor 14

(Dan, Professor of Digital Media Literacy and Entrepreneurship at Arizona State University, “As we sweat government surveillance, companies like Google collect our data”, April 18, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/18/corporations-google-should-not-sell-customer-data, kc)

As security expert Bruce Schneier (a friend) has archly observed, "Surveillance is the business model of the internet." I don't expect this to change unless and until external realities force a change – and I'm not holding my breath.¶

Instead, the depressing news just seems to be getting worse. Google confirmed this week what many people had assumed: even if you're not a Gmail user, your email to someone who does use their services will be scanned by the all-seeing search and the advertising company's increasingly smart machines. The company updated their terms of service to read:¶ Our automated systems analyze your content (including e-mails) to provide you personally relevant product features, such as customized search results, tailored advertising, and spam and malware detection. This analysis occurs as the content is sent, received, and when it is stored.¶ My system doesn't do this to your email when you send me a message. I pay a web-hosting company that keeps my email on a server that isn't optimized for data collection and analysis. I would use Gmail for my email, if Google would let me pay for service that didn't "analyze (my) content" apart from filtering out spam and malware. Google doesn't offer that option, as far as I can tell, and

that's a shame – if not, given its clout, a small scandal.¶ Also this week, Advertising Age, a top trade journal for the ad industry, reported that tech companies led by Google, Microsoft, Apple and Facebook are moving swiftly

to fix what they plainly see as a bug in the system: It's more difficult to spy on us as effectively when we use our mobile devices than when we're typing and clicking away on our laptops. Here's a particularly creepy quote in the story, courtesy of a mobile advertising executive:¶ The universal ID today in the world is your Facebook log-in. This industry-wide challenge of mobile tracking has sort of quietly been solved, without a lot of fanfare.¶ Facebook may be getting the message that people don't trust it, which shouldn't be surprising given the company's long record of bending its rules to give users less privacy. CEO Mark Zuckerberg told the New York Times' Farhad Manjoo that many upcoming products and services wouldn't even use the name "Facebook," as the company pushes further and further into its users' lives. The report concluded:¶ If the new plan succeeds, then, one day large swaths of Facebook may not look like Facebook — and may not even bear the name Facebook. It will be everywhere, but you may not know it.¶ Maybe. But Facebook will know you. And like Google, Facebook won't let me pay for its otherwise excellent service, something I'd gladly do if it would agree not to spy on me.¶ Barring that, what I do to employ countermeasures wherever possible, and to make choices in the services I use – such as relying more and more on the DuckDuckGo search engine. DuckDuckGo isn't as likely to give me the results I want as easily as Google, but it has proved to be good enough for most purposes.¶ But in a week when news organizations (like this one) won Pulitzer prizes for revealing vast abuses of

surveillance by the government, one might hope that corporations would show even the slightest sign of retreating from their longstanding practices that, if conducted by the government, would give most citizens pause.

The public doesn’t feel strongly about surveillance.Rieff 13

(David, Author with focus on immigration, international conflict, and humanitarianism, “Why Nobody Cares About the Surveillance State”, August 22, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/22/why-nobody-cares-about-the-surveillance-state/, kc)

And yet, apart from some voices from the antiwar left and the libertarian right, the reaction from this deceived public has been strangely muted. Polls taken this summer have shown the public almost evenly split on whether the seemingly unlimited scope of these surveillance programs was doing more harm than good. Unlike on issues such as immigration and abortion, much of the public outrage presupposed by news coverage of the scandal does not, in reality, seem to exist.¶ It is true that the revelations have caused at least some on the mainstream right, both in Congress and in conservative publications like National Review, to describe the NSA’s activities as a fundamental attack on the rights of citizens. For their part, mainstream Democrats find themselves in the uncomfortable position of either defending what many of them view as indefensible or causing trouble for a beleaguered president who seems increasingly out of his depth on most questions of national security and foreign policy.¶ The press can certainly be depended on to pursue the story, not least because of a certain “guild” anger over the detention recently of Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwald’s partner, David Miranda, by British police at London’s Heathrow Airport, and the British government’s decision to force the Guardian to destroy the disks it had containing Snowden’s data — in the paper’s London office with two officials from CGHQ, the British equivalent of the NSA, looking on. But while the surveillance scandal has both engaged and enraged the elites, when all is said and done, the general public does not seem nearly as concerned.¶

Why? In an age dominated by various kinds of techno-utopianism — the conviction that networking technologies are politically and socially emancipatory and that massive data collection will unleash both efficiency in business and innovation in science — the idea that Big Data might be your enemy is antithetical to everything we have been encouraged to believe. A soon-to-be-attained critical mass of algorithms and data has been portrayed as allowing individuals to customize the choices they make throughout their lives. Now, the data sets and algorithms that were supposed to set us free seem instead to have been turned against us.

Public Perception – 2NCFacebook proves- consumers have “privacy fatigue”- don’t care about privacy anymoreHuffington Post 11

(Huffington Post, “Facebook Users Experience Privacy Fatigue”, 03/11/2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/11/03/facebook-users-privacy-fatigue_n_1073131.html, kc)

Facebook Users Experience Privacy Fatigue -- Facebook users are struggling to keep up with the "dizzying" number of changes to privacy settings made by the social network, a survey has found.¶ Almost half (48%) of those questioned by consumer magazine Which? Computing confessed they had failed to keep track of all the security changes that had been introduced, while almost a fifth (19%) said they had never altered their privacy settings.¶ Despite concerns about the amount of

personal information being published by users of the website, many could be suffering "privacy fatigue", the magazine suggested.¶ Although Facebook has introduced a slew of changes over the past two years, respondents had on average changed their privacy settings just twice.¶ Rob Reid, scientific policy adviser for Which?, said: "Many Facebook users have never

changed their privacy settings and those who have do it far less often than Facebook makes changes.¶ "This may reflect a disregard or lack of awareness for privacy or, more worryingly, privacy fatigue stimulated by the dizzying number of changes."¶ Which? Computing interviewed 953 people in September about their Facebook use.

Public apathy about privacy violations. Kelly 13

(Heather, Technology Reporter for CNNMoney, Writer/Producer at CNN Digital, Degree in Journalism from NYU, “Some shrug at NSA snooping: Privacy's already dead”, June 10, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/07/tech/web/nsa-internet-privacy, kc)

A series of revelations about the National Security Agency's surveillance programs sparked outrage among many this week, including the

expected privacy activists and civil libertarians.¶ But there seems to be a gap between the roiling anger online and the attitudes of other people, especially younger ones, who think it's just not that big a deal.¶ It's the rare issue that crosses party lines in terms of outrage, apathy and even ignorance. When interviewing people about the topic in downtown San Francisco,

we found a number of people of all ages who had not heard the news, and more than one who asked what the NSA was.¶ The rest had various reasons for not being terribly concerned. ¶ Privacy is already dead ¶ When the news broke on Wednesday, a number of people responded online by saying an extensive government surveillance program wasn't surprising and just confirmed what they already knew.¶ The lack of shock wasn't limited to savvy technologists who have been following reports

from organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, or EFF, that cover possible monitoring going back to 2007. Many people already assumed that information online was easily accessible by corporations and the government. ¶ A

survey conducted by the Allstate/National Journal Heartland Monitor just days before the NSA news broke found that 85% of Americans already believed their phone calls, e-mails and online activity were being monitored.¶ Allen Trember from San Luis Obispo, California, said he knew when he started using the Internet that his information wasn't going to be private, but

still lamented that privacy no longer exists.¶ "I don't like it, but what can I do about it?" he said. "I'm just glad that we have as much freedom as we do."

Efficiency gains from surveillance outweighSwire 99 – Peter P. Swire, Chief Counselor for Privacy—United States Office of Management and Budget, Professor at the Ohio State University College of Law, 1999 (“F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium: The Modernization of Financial Services Legislation: Article: Financial Privacy and The Theory of High-Tech Government Surveillance,” LexisNexis Academic, Accessed 06-29-2015)

In discussing the advantages of allowing flows of financial data to government, the focus has been on preventing or prosecuting illegal behavior. Greater information flows can restrict money laundering, help track deadbeat parents who fail to pay child support, and otherwise reduce the harms to society that inefficient surveillance permits. An even more general rationale, however, often exists for providing information to the government - efficiency . Free flows of information, in both the public and private sector, can lead to a variety of efficiency gains. Think, for example, of the burden of filling out government paperwork. Suppose that in an electronic future an individual would never have to provide information more than once to any government. In this technocratic utopia, the

record would be entered once and then be available automatically for all authorized uses. With this efficiency in assembling and matching data, there would be far less burden on individuals who wish to apply for government benefits, enter into a contract with any government unit, file a report in connection with environmental or other regulatory programs, or otherwise transfer

information to the government. Better coordination might also be possible between governments at the local, state, national, and even international levels. In the private sector, free flows of financial data also create efficiency gains. From a seller's point of view, detailed information about the buyer allows more efficient provision of goods and services. Detailed information permits "one-to-one" marketing, so buyers get precisely what they most value, and so sellers can avoid unwanted inventory and can produce exactly what buyers want. n87 Ever-expanding computing power and the growth of the Internet mean that the costs of assembling, processing, and communicating personal data continue to fall rapidly. As the private sector develops new means for processing personal information, the information also becomes potentially available to the government. [*493] In the area of information processing, the public and private sectors

are linked more closely than is often realized. Any data in private hands are only a subpoena away from the government. The efficiency gains in the private sector mean efficiency gains for law enforcement and the government more generally.

Doesn’t Solve Totalitarianism – 1NCNo impact to Totalitarianism – privacy is just as likely to be used to cursh dissent Siegel 11 (Lee Siegel, a columnist and editor at large for The New York Observer, is the author of “Against the Machine: How the Web Is Reshaping Culture and Commerce — and Why It Matters. “‘The Net Delusion’ and the Egypt Crisis”, February 4, 2011, http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/04/the-net-delusion-and-the-egypt-crisis)

¶Morozov takes the ideas of what he calls “cyber-utopians” and shows how reality perverts them in one political situation after another. In Iran, the regime used the internet to crush the internet-driven protests in June 2009. In Russia, neofascists use the internet to organize pogroms. And on and on. Morozov has written hundreds of pages to make the point that technology is amoral and cuts many different ways. Just as radio can bolster democracy or — as in Rwanda — incite genocide, so the internet can help foment a revolution but can also help crush it. This seems obvious, yet it has often been entirely lost as grand claims are made for the internet’s positive, liberating qualities. ¶And suddenly here are Tunisia and, even more dramatically, Egypt, simultaneously proving and refuting Morozov’s argument. In both cases, social networking allowed truths that had been whispered to be widely broadcast and commented upon. In Tunisia and Egypt — and now across the Arab world — Facebook and Twitter have made people feel less alone in their rage at the governments that stifle their lives. There is nothing more politically emboldening than to feel, all at once, that what you have experienced as personal bitterness is actually an objective condition, a universal affliction in your society that therefore can be universally opposed. ¶Yet at the same time, the Egyptian government shut off the internet, which is an effective way of using the internet. And according to one Egyptian blogger, misinformation is being spread through Facebook — as it was in Iran — just as real information was shared by anti-government protesters. This is the “dark side of internet freedom” that Morozov is warning against. It is the freedom to wantonly crush the forces of freedom. ¶All this should not surprise anyone. It seems that, just as with every other type of technology of communication, the internet is not a solution to human conflict but an amplifier for all aspects of a conflict. As you read about pro-government agitators charging into crowds of protesters on horseback and camel, you realize that nothing has changed in our new internet age. The human situation is the same as it always was, except that it is the same in a newer and more intense way. Decades from now, we will no doubt be celebrating a spanking new technology that promises to liberate us from the internet. And the argument joined by Morozov will occur once again.

Doesn’t Solve Totalitarianism – 2NCNow, the Aff doesn’t promote dissent against Totalitarianism states - New cyber utopian societies are extremely influenced by technology Increased Freedom could result in increased technology – For example Iran government officals utilized massive freedom to quell rebel - That’s Siegel

No evidence that the internet actually spurs democratizationAday et al. 10 (Sean Aday is an associate professor of media and public affairs and international affairs at The George Washington University, and director of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication. Henry Farrell is an associate professor of political science at The George Washington University. Marc Lynch is an associate professor of political science and international affairs at The George Washington University and director of the Institute for Middle East Studies. John Sides is an assistant professor of political science at The George Washington University. John Kelly is the founder and lead scientist at Morningside Analytics and an affiliate of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University. Ethan Zuckerman is senior researcher at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University and also part of the team building Global Voices, a group of international bloggers bridging cultural and linguistic differences through weblogs. August 2010, “BLOGS AND BULLETS: new media in contentious politics”, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/pw65.pdf)

New media, such as blogs, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, have played a major role in episodes of contentious political action. They are often described as important tools for activists seeking to replace authoritarian regimes and to promote freedom and democracy, and they have been lauded for their democratizing potential. Despite the prominence of “Twitter revolutions,” “color revolutions,” and the like in public debate, policymakers and scholars know very little about whether and how new media affect contentious politics. Journalistic accounts are inevitably based on anecdotes rather than rigorously designed research. Although data on new media have been sketchy, new tools are emerging that measure linkage patterns and content as well as track memes across media outlets and thus might offer fresh insights into new media. The impact of new media can be better understood through a framework that considers five levels of analysis: individual transformation, intergroup relations, collective action, regime policies, and external attention. New media have the potential to change how citizens think or act, mitigate or exacerbate group conflict, facilitate collective action, spur a backlash among regimes, and garner international attention toward a given country. Evidence from the protests after the Iranian presidential election in June 2009 suggests the utility of examining the role of new media at each of these five levels. Although there is reason to believe the Iranian case exposes the potential benefits of new media, other evidence—such as the Iranian regime’s use of the same social network tools to harass, identify, and imprison protesters—suggests that, like any media, the Internet is not a “magic bullet.” At best, it may be a “rusty bullet.” Indeed, it is plausible that traditional media sources were equally if not more important. Scholars and policymakers should adopt a more nuanced view of new media’s role in democratization and social change, one that recognizes that new media can have both positive and negative effects. Introduction In January 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton articulated a powerful vision of the Internet as promoting freedom and global political

transformation and rewriting the rules of political engagement and action. Her vision resembles that of others who argue that new media technologies facilitate participatory politics and mass mobilization, help promote democracy and free markets, and create new kinds of global citizens. Some observers have even suggested that Twitter’s creators should receive the Nobel Peace Prize for their role in the 2009 Iranian protests.1 But not everyone has such sanguine views. Clinton herself was careful to note when sharing her vision that new media were not an “unmitigated blessing.” Pessimists argue that these technologies may actually exacerbate conflict, as exemplified in Kenya, the Czech Republic, and Uganda, and help authoritarian regimes monitor and police their citizens. 2 They argue that new media encourage self-segregation and polarization as people seek out only information that reinforces their prior beliefs, offering ever more opportunities for the spread of hate, misinformation, and prejudice.3 Some skeptics question whether new media have significant effects at all. Perhaps they are simply a tool used by those who would protest in any event or a trendy “hook” for those seeking to tell political stories. Do new media have real consequences for contentious politics—and in which direction?4 The sobering answer is that, fundamentally, no one knows. To this point, little research has sought to estimate the causal effects of new media in a methodologically rigorous fashion, or to gather the rich data needed to establish causal influence. Without rigorous research designs or rich data, partisans of all viewpoints turn to anecdotal evidence and intuition

Mobilization and Internet access are not correlated – other factors are more important Kuebler 11 (Johanne Kuebler, contributor to the CyberOrient journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1, 2011, “Overcoming the Digital Divide: The Internet and Political Mobilization in Egypt and Tunisia”, http://www.cyberorient.net/article.do?articleId=6212)

The assumption that the uncensored accessibility of the Internet encourages the struggle for democracy has to be differentiated. At first sight, the case studies seem to confirm the statement, since Egypt, featuring a usually uncensored access to the Internet, has witnessed mass mobilisations organised over the Internet while Tunisia had not. However, the mere availability of freely accessible Internet is not a sufficient condition insofar as mobilisations in Egypt took place when a relative small portion of the population had Internet access and, on the other hand, mobilisation witnessed a decline between 2005 and 2008 although the number of Internet users rose during the same period. As there is no direct correlation between increased Internet use and political action organised through this medium, we have to assume a more complex relationship. A successful social movement seems to need more than a virtual space of debate to be successful, although such a space can be an important complementary factor in opening windows and expanding the realm of what can be said in public. A political movement revolves around a core of key actors, and "netizens" qualify for this task. The Internet also features a variety of tools that facilitate the organisation of events. However, to be successful, social movements need more than a well-organised campaign. In Egypt, we witnessed an important interaction between print and online media, between the representatives of a relative elitist medium and the traditional, more accessible print media. A social movement needs to provide frames resonating with grievances of

the public coupled with periods of increased public attention to politics in order to create opportunity structures. To further transport their message and to attract supporters, a reflection of the struggle of the movement with the government in the "classical" media such as newspapers and television channels is necessary to give the movement momentum outside the Internet context.

Solvency

No Solvency – Circumvention

FISA will circumventBendix and Quirk 15 (assistant professor of political science at Keene State College; Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the University of British Columbia)

(William Bendix and Paul J. Quirk, Secrecy and negligence: How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance, Issues in Governance Studies, March 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligence-congres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf)

Even if Congress at some point enacted new restrictions on surveillance, the executive might ignore the law and continue to make policy unilaterally. The job of reviewing executive conduct would again fall to the FISA Court.56 In view of this court’s history of broad deference to the executive, Congress would have a challenge to ensure that legislative policies were faithfully implemented.

And the exec can circumvent via national security lettersSanchez 15 (a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute)

(Julian Don’t (Just) Let the Sun Go Down on Patriot Powers, May 29, 2015, http://motherboard.vice.com/read/dont-just-let-the-sun-go-down-on-patriot-powers)

Also permanent are National Security Letters or NSLs, which allow the FBI to obtain a more limited range of telecommunications and financial records without even needing to seek judicial approval. Unsurprisingly, the government loves these streamlined tools, and used them so promiscuously that the FBI didn’t even bother using 215 for more than a year after the passage of the Patriot Act. Inspector General reports have also made clear that the FBI is happy to substitute NSLs for 215 orders when even the highly accommodating FISC manages a rare display of backbone. In at least one case, when the secret court refused an application for journalists’ records on First Amendment grounds, the Bureau turned around and obtained the same data using National Security Letters.

No Solvency – Foreign Surveillance

Foreign, not domestic, surveillance is what is driving data pull out – restrictions on domestic surveillance will onlu further this pushChander and Le 15 (Director, California International Law Center, Professor of Law and Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Scholar, University of California, Davis; Free Speech and Technology Fellow, California International Law Center; A.B., Yale College; J.D., University of California, Davis School of Law)

Anupam Chander and Uyên P. Lê, DATA NATIONALISM, EMORY LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 64:677, http://law.emory.edu/elj/_documents/volumes/64/3/articles/chander-le.pdf)

First, the United States, like many countries, concentrates much of its surveillance efforts abroad. Indeed, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is focused on gathering information overseas, limiting data gathering largely only when it implicates U.S. persons.174 The recent NSA surveillance disclosures have revealed extensive foreign operations.175 Indeed, constraints on domestic operations may well have spurred the NSA to expand operations abroad. As the Washington Post reports, “Intercepting communications overseas has clear advantages for the NSA, with looser restrictions and less oversight.”176 Deterred by a 2011 ruling by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court barring certain broad domestic surveillance of Internet and telephone traffic,177 the NSA may have increasingly turned its attention overseas. Second, the use of malware eliminates even the need to have operations on the ground in the countries in which surveillance occurs. The Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad reports that the NSA has infiltrated every corner of the world through a network of malicious malware.178 A German computer expert noted that “data was intercepted here [by the NSA] on a large scale.”179 The NRC Handelsblad suggests that the NSA has even scaled the Great Firewall of China,180 demonstrating that efforts to keep information inside a heavily secured and monitored ironclad firewall do not necessarily mean that it cannot be accessed by those on the other side of the earth. This is a commonplace phenomenon on the Internet, of course. The recent enormous security breach of millions of Target customers in the United States likely sent credit card data of Americans to servers in Russia, perhaps through the installation of malware on point-of-sale devices in stores.

No Solvency – No Reverse Perception

The Aff can’t undo the overwhelming perception of US surveillanceFontaine 14 (President of the Center for a New American Security)

(Richard, Bringing Liberty Online: Reenergizing the Internet Freedom Agenda in a Post-Snowden Era, SEPTEMBER 2014, Center for New American Security)

Such moves are destined to have only a modest effect on foreign reactions. U.S. surveillance will inevitably continue under any reasonably likely scenario (indeed, despite the expressions of outrage, not a single country has said that it would cease its surveillance activities). Many of the demands – such as for greater transparency – will not be met, simply due to the clandestine nature of electronic espionage. Any limits on surveillance that a govern- ment might announce will not be publicly verifiable and thus perhaps not fully credible. Nor will there be an international “no-spying” convention to reassure foreign citizens that their communications are unmonitored. As it has for centuries, state- sponsored espionage activities are likely to remain accepted international practice, unconstrained by international law. The one major possible shift in policy following the Snowden affair – a stop to the bulk collection of telecommunications metadata in the United States – will not constrain the activ- ity most disturbing to foreigners; that is, America’s surveillance of them. At the same time, U.S. offi- cials are highly unlikely to articulate a global “right to privacy” (as have the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and some foreign officials), akin to that derived from the U.S. Constitution’s fourth amendment, that would permit foreigners to sue in U.S. courts to enforce such a right.39 The Obama administration’s January 2014 presidential directive on signals intelligence refers, notably, to the “legiti- mate privacy interests” of all persons, regardless of nationality, and not to a privacy “right.”40

Plan is too small to overcome requirements that are necessary to change the status quoKehl et al 14 (Danielle Kehl is a Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (OTI). Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI, Robyn Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI, and Robert Morgus is a Research Associate at OTI)(New America’s Open Technology Institute Policy Paper, Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity, July 2014)

Two months later, many of the same companies and organizations issued another letter supporting surveillance transparency legislation proposed by Senator Al Franken (D-MN) and Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) that would have implemented many of the original letter’s recommendations.334 Elements of both bills, consistent with the coalition’s recommendations, were included in the original version of the USA FREEDOM Act introduced in the House and the Senate—as were new strong transparency provisions requiring the FISA court to declassify key legal opinions to better educate the public and policymakers about how it is interpreting and implementing the law. Such strong new transparency requirements are consistent with several recommendations of the President’s Review Group335 and would help address concerns about lack of transparency raised by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.336