Security Dynamics In

Banking Sector

AimThe aim of today’s session is to acquaint you with security dynamics in Banking Sector

Country Security Situation

Security AssessmentMilitancy

• The TTP central shura unanimously decided not to extend

the ‘ceasefire’ but would keep the dialogue option open.

Analysis • While the Government exhibited flexibility in continuing with

talks amidst violence and releases of prisoners (19) , the TTP insisted on their demands of ‘demilitarized peace zone’ and release of more prisoners.

• Although the talks were in progress under announced ceasefire yet the security matrix of the country did not really improve. We saw two deadly attacks in Rawalpindi and one train put on fire near Sibi, among other bombings.

Security Assessment

Analysis

• The TTP has little or no control over a wide range of militant factions or splinter groups and therefore cannot influence them effectively to reign in their attacks.

• Some analysts opine that withdrawl of ceasefire is perhaps a way to put more pressure on a government, as the militants have kept the negotiations option open.’

• Clashes among major splinter groups of militants have surfaced. Mehsud and Khurasani groups oppose peace talks and may have influenced TTP shura to roll back ceasefire.

Militancy• Due to truncated leadership, reduced capacity and split among

militants, we are likely to see reduced militant attacks in mid to long terms while the current situation is likely to remain fluid in coming days where periodic spike in attacks shall remain a possibility.

• While the militants shall look to launch a big attack to exert their writ, it is expected that most of these attacks shall be low in intensity as well as frequency. However, most of their attacks are likely to be directed against LEAs and soft targets.

• Balochistan continues to experience low intensity conflict with occasional spike. The main issues centre around sectarian killings, kidnappings and attack against Gas Pipelines / Trains by insurgent.

Security Assessment

Managing Security in Banking Sector

Security Process Flow

• Detect Procedural

• Deter Physical

• Delay Analysis /

Assessment

• Defend Response

• Business Continuity

Philosophy

Risk Threat

Threat’s Acuity

Adversary

Capabilities

Intentions

Reasoning

10

POLICIES, PROCEDURES &

PLANS

RISK ASSESSMENT&

RISK MANAGEMENT

EFFECTIVE SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE

AWARENESS&

TRAINING

BUSINESS CONTINUITY

SECURITYMANAGEMENT

Security Management Cycle

Security Management

Threat Assessment

Threat

Identification

Threat IdentificationThreat AssessmentProactive Security Management

Contours Of Security Strategy

Terrorism Bomb Threat Bomb Attack

Armed Robbery Hostage Situation Asset Loss Reputation Loss

Cash Snatching

Cash Swindling

Law and Order Vandalism Arson

Burglary

Threat Matrix

Evaluation of • Threat of Terrorism• Branch/Office Location• Local Political Dynamics• Crime Rate and Category of Crime• Pressure Groups/Gangs in the Area• Vandalism Record/Past History

• Follow up Actions Share with Stakeholders Periodic Review

Threat / Risk Assessment

Demography

Pressure Groups

Slums,Escape routes

Area Crime History

Ethnic/Political/Sectarian

Security Assessment - Area

Risk Assessment

J

B

FD

AE

C

H

G

ALiyari/KharadarLyari, Kharadar, Ranchor, Lines, old city area, Eidgagh, Saddar, Jamshed Quarter,Machar colonyPolitical Influence : PPP,Crime : Extortion, Kidnapping, Drugs mafia, Ethnic violence.

BGulistan Johar Pehlwan goth, Rabia City, Kiran Society, Saforan Goth, Sani view Political Influence : MQM, ANPCrime : Extortion, Land mafia, Ethnic violence Kidnapping,

CLandhiAshrafi Goth, Muslimabad, Ajmer Col, Dawood Chowrangi, Burmee Col.Political Influence : MQM, PPP, ANPCrime : Extortion, land/ Drugs Mafia

DBaldia Town / Orangi TownIttehad Town, Nai abadi, Saeedabad, Mohajir Camp, Rasheedabad Political Influence : MQM, ANP, Crime : Extortion, Sectarian /Sectarian violence EKorangiIbrahim Hyderi, Industrial Area, Korangi CreekPolitical Influence : ANP, MQM, MQM(H)Crime : Land Mafia, Extortion Kidnapping

FSohrab GothAbulhasan Isphani Road, Gulshan Maymar, Mobina Town, Sohrab GothPolitical Influence : ANP, MQM,Crime : Land/Drug Mafia, Politics, Kidnapping , Extortion

GNorth KarachiKati Phari, Sarjani Town, New Karachi, Nagan ChowrangiPolitical Influence : MQM, Crime : Land Mafia, Kidnapping, snatching Extortion

J

Shah Faisal Col.Natha Khan Goth, Drigh Col, Al-Falah SocietyPolitical Influence : MQM, ANP,Crime : Ethnic violence, snatching

H

NazimabadPaposh Nagar, Liaquatabad, Golimar, Orangi, Katti Pahari.Political Influence : MQM, MQM(H), Crime : Kidnapping, snatching

Vulnerable Areas

Sohrab Goth

Landhi

Shah Faisal

Glustan-e-Jauhar

Orangi

Nazimabad

Korangi

Lyari

North Karachi

Crime Trend

Robberies 2011- 2014

Robbery

Amount

2011 2012 2013 2014

4831 35

69.6 M

43.07 M

66.6 M

23

71.4 M

Robberies- Analysis • Selection and scrutiny of Guarding / Alarming Company

• Untrained and under verified guards

• Placement of guards

• Inadequate Floor Management

• Insufficient training to staff

• Casualness in Critical timings

• No consideration for critical branches(Bunkers, vantage points)

• Indolent QRF and Response

Street Crime

Karachi

Lahore

Peshawar

Quetta

51%38%

6% 5%

20

Street Crimes

Terrorism

Ethnic / Sectarian violence

Kidnap / Extortion

Robberies

Crime Ratio

14%

20%

22%

40%

4%

Region’s Violence Rate

SindBalochistanPunjabKP/FATAIslamabad

45%

25%

20%

8 %

2 %

Impact of Security State-Banking Sector

Reputation

Staff

Customer

Asset

Business

Impact

Physical

Measure

s

Technological

Measure

s

Trainings and Awarene

ss

Threat Mitigation

Security Management

Guards Quality and Strength of Guards During Day Remove Night Guards Placement of Sentries on Upper Floor/Vantage Point/Roof Tops

Smart and Trained Vigilance Staff

QRF

Efficient Floor Management

Efficient Night Patrolling

Proactive Control Room Team

Physical Measures

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Guards Placement

Strength

Routes

knowledge

Communicati

on

Training

Placement in terms

of ETAs

Type of

vehicle

required

Number of QRF

required

Quick Reaction Force

Technological Measures

Establishment of Effective Control Room (s) Effective Remote CCTV Monitoring of All Branches Simultaneous Display of Vault Doors and ATM’s

Effective Alarm System Backed by Efficient Response PIR Devices/Motion Detectors Vibration Sensors Bolt Locks

Integrated System

Pop up Alerts for Branch Arming Disarming, Fire Alarms, DVR Faults, Camera Faults etc.

Sufficient and Uninterrupted Power Backup.

Ensure uninterrupted power

supply

Ensure

security of

Data.

DVR Bolting

Ensure

operation

al status of DVR

Vaults/

ATM during

silent

hours

External view

at Opening/closing

Placement

of CCTV cameras(Vault,

ATM ,banki

ng Hall etc)

Surveillance

Dual ConnectivityLand line and GSM

Provision of Panic Buttons

Armed Vault With Duress code

Alarm System

30

30

What do skimming devices look like?Spot the difference….. Can you tell now?

Top photo shows an unadulterated ATM fascia. The flashing FDI indicator is easily observed.

A skimming device has been fitted over the card reader slot. Although the device has been given the appearance of being a standard part of the terminal it is in fact an additional fitted piece & clearly is different from the above photo. Note: No flashing lead-through light can be seen and the shape of the bezel is also clearly different.

Facts - ATM Skimming Attacks

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Spot the difference….. Can you tell now?

Facts - ATM Skimming Attacks

32

Upon closer inspection of the merchandising unit, you can clearly see the pin hole camera installed on the bottom side, capturing an image of the keypad and subsequently, the customers PIN

PIN Capturing Devices

33

PIN Capturing Devices

Criminals tend to attach skimming devices either late at night or early in the morning and during periods of low traffic

Despite this skimming devices generally only take a few minutes to install and therefore can be attached at any time

Skimming devices are usually attached for a few hours only

Criminals install equipment on at least 2 regions of an ATM to steal both the ATM card number and the PIN

Inspect the front of the ATM closely for unusual or non standard appearance/items. Scratches, marks, adhesive or tape residues could be indictors of tampering.

Familiarize yourself with the look and feel of your ATM fascia. Particularly pay attention to all of the touch and action points. (keypad, card entry slot, etc.)

Report any unusual issues immediately

By being vigilant you can play a part in reducing the risk of a skimming attack!

Facts On ATM Skimming Attacks

Training & Awareness • Situational Training• Guards OJTs• Anti Robbery, Bomb and Evacuation Drills• Online Training• E-Learning Module• Security Awareness weeks• Interaction with senior LEA’s • Security Publications.• Regular Staff Awareness

Travel Advisories Fortnightly Security Updates On Occurrence Security Advice

Awareness Week

• Be proactive rather than reactive

• Adequate reliance on Technology

• Quality of Manpower & Timely response

• Vertical and Horizontal Staff awareness

Essence of Security Management

Thank You