search & seizure cases

8/12/2019 Search & Seizure Cases

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G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP), vs. GEN. RENATODE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICTCOMMAND (NCRDC)

FACTS:

On 20 January 1987, the NCRDC was activated pursuant to Letterof Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP,with the mission of conducting security operations within its areaof responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose ofestablishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peaceand order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,economic and political development of the National CapitalRegion. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, theNCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela,Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of saidcheckpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of beingharassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning thecheckpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are beingsubjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at nightor at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or courtorder.

Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipalityof Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold bloodby the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint alongMcArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/orrefusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing tospeed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air.

Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he hadgone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his carsubjected to search/check-up without a court order or searchwarrant.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give therespondents a blanket authority to make searches and/orseizures without search warrant or court order in violation of theConstitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a citizen,while not killed, had been harassed.

ISSUE: WON the checkpoints conducted are violative of rightagainst unreasonable search and seizure.

HELD: Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at beingharassed by the military manning the checkpoints are notsufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal.

No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in thecourse of their routine checks, the military indeed committedspecific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful searchand seizure or other rights.

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches andseizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rightshave been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search andseizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,determinable from a consideration of the circumstancesinvolved. 5

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he hadbeen stopped and searched without a search warrant by themilitary manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., withoutstating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation ofhis right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to

enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation ofValmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure.

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which arereasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to bedetermined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved accordingto the facts of each case.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (andprobably in other areas) may be considered as a securitymeasure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission ofestablishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peaceand order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also beregarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the

government, in the interest of public security.

In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shiftto urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement,so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police andmilitary men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention theabundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise inlawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of whichare reported in media, most likely brought about by deterioratingeconomic conditions which all sum up to what one can rightlyconsider, at the very least, as abnormal times.

Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existenceand promote public welfare and an individual's right against awarrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, theformer should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible ofabuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that allgovernmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost ofoccasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to thecitizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, whenconducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we payfor an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in MetroManila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement ofthe rules in the conduct of the police and military manning thecheckpoints was ordered by the National Capital RegionalCommand Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. Nos. 129756-58 January 28, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIAN DEEN ESCAVIRGILIO TOME USANA and JERRY CASABLOPEZ, accused, VIRGILIO TOME USANA and JERCASABAAN LOPEZ, accused-appellants.

FACTS:


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Accused-appellants Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez, togetherwith Julian D. Escao, were charged before the RTC of MakatiCity, with violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 ("HASHISH",a prohibited drug), as amended. Escao and Usana were alsocharged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition inviolation of PD 1866. The cases were consolidated and jointlytried. The trial court convicted Escao and herein appellants inCriminal Case No. 95-936, Escao in Criminal Case No. 95-937,and appellant Usana in Criminal Case No. 95-938.

The prosecution has this version of the events:

On the 5th of April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, somelaw enforcers of the Makati Police were manning a checkpoint atthe corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South LuzonExpressway (SLEX). They were checking the cars going to PasayCity, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merelya running stop on the others.

At about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car. PO3 Subasaw a long firearm on the lap of the person seated at thepassenger seat, who was later identified as Usana. They asked thedriver, identified as Escao, to open the door. PO3 Suba seizedthe long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escao,

upon order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., theother passengers were search for more weapons. Their searchyielded a .45 caliber firearm which they seized from Escao.

The 3 passengers were thereafter brought to the police station,Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to thedesk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of thevehicle, he requested Escao to open the trunk. Escao readilyagreed and opened the trunk himself using his key .16 Theynoticed a blue bag inside it ,17 which they asked Escao to open.The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape ,18 which, uponexamination by NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosaldos, wasfound positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms .19

A certification was issued by the Firearms and Explosive Office ofthe NAPOLCOM to the effect that Escao was not alicensed/registered firearms holder of any kind and caliber.Usana, however, according to the same certification is alicensed/registered holder of a pistol Colt .45 caliber with licenseissued on 14 October 1994 and to expire on April 1996. Usanaalso has an application for a pistol Uzi Cal. 9mm. Neither of thetwo guns seized were licensed/registered with the NAPOLCOM.

Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint inquestion was conducted. They contend that the checkpointmanned by elements of the Makati Police should have beenannounced. They also complain of its having been conducted inan arbitrary and discriminatory manner.

ISSUED: WON Checkpoints should be ANNOUNCED in order notto be violative of the right against unreasonable S&S.

HELD:

We take judicial notice of the existence of the COMELECresolution 46 imposing a gun ban during the election period issuedpursuant to Section 52(c) in relation to Section 26(q) of theOmnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881). The national and localelections in 1995 were held on 8 May, the second Monday of themonth. The incident, which happened on 5 April 1995, was wellwithin the election period.

This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Thosewhich are warranted by the exigencies of public order and areconducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed .47

For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certainextent, on motorists' right to "free passage without interruption,"but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a briefdetention of travelers during which the vehicle's occupants arerequired to answer a brief question or two. For as long as thevehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body

search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visualsearch , said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of anindividual's right against unreasonable search. In fact, theseroutine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even lessintrusive.

The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gunban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard putto implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to avisual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose forwhich such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gunduring said period would know that they only need a car to beable to easily perpetrate their malicious designs.

The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation ofthe constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search andseizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping carsthey deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows areheavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carryingguns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside thecars they would stop, without opening the car's doors orsubjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothingdiscriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands.

We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as theaccused have invoked. Not only would it be impractical, itwould also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban.Even so, badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred

from their fixed location and the regularized manner in whichthey are operated.

Usana and Lopez also question the validity of the search. The trialcourt, in convicting the three accused for violation of R.A. No.6425, accepted as aboveboard the search done by the MakatiPolice of the trunk of the car. Jurisprudence recognizes sixgenerally accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1)search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3)evidence in plain view; (4) customs searches; (5) consentedwarrantless search ;50 and (6) stop-and-frisk situations .51

Even though there was ample opportunity to obtain a searchwarrant, we cannot invalidate the search of the vehicle, for there

are indications that the search done on the car of Escao wasconsented to by him. Both Lopez and Usana testified that Escaowas with the police officers when they searched the car .52 Therewas no apparent objection made by Escao as he seemed to havefreely accompanied the police officers to the car.

PO3 Suba, on the other hand, testified that "Escao readily agreedto open the trunk," upon request of SPO4 de los Santos .53 Butaccording to Escao, he refused the request of the police officersto search his car .54 We must give credence to the testimony ofPO3 Suba. Not only is it buttressed by the testimony of Usana andLopez that Escao freely accompanied the police officers to thecar, it is also deemed admitted by Escao in failing to appeal the
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decision. The findings of fact of the trial court are thus deemedfinal as against him.

Despite the validity of the search, we cannot affirm the convictionof Usana and Lopez for violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) thecar belonged to Escao; (2) the trunk of the car was not openedsoon after it was stopped and after the accused were searched forfirearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the placewhere it was stopped until the police station; (4) the car's trunk

was opened, with the permission of Escao, without the presenceof Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station anduntil the opening of the car's trunk, the car was in the possessionand control of the police authorities.

No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashishfound in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escao inthe latter's car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime afterthe lapse of an appreciable time and without their presence leftmuch to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling,distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, therewas no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence ofhashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before itwas seized.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, that portion of the challenged decision of theRTC, Makati, insofar as Criminal Case No. 95-936 is concernedwith regard to accused-appellants VIRGILIO T. USANA and JERRYC. LOPEZ, holding them guilty of violation of Section 4, Article IIof R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE and another is hereby rendered ACQUITTING themtherein on ground of reasonable doubt and ORDERING theirimmediate release from confinement at the New Bilibid Prison.

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKSand KARL BECKvs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity asSECRETARY OF JUSTICE

Upon application of the officers of the government hereinafterreferred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, ondifferent dates, 3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitionersherein 4 and/or the corporations of which they wereofficers, 5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the personsabove-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehousesand/or residences, and to seize and take possession of thefollowing personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,and other documents and/or papers showing all businesstransactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceedsor fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as themeans of committing the offense," which is described in theapplications adverted to above as "violation of Central BankLaws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and theRPC."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null andvoid, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court,

petitioners filed with the SC this original action for certiorariprohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pendingfinal disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminaryinjunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, theiragents and /or representatives from using the effects seized asaforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation casesalready adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decisionbe rendered quashing the contested search warrants anddeclaring the same null and void, and commanding therespondents, their agents or representatives to return topetitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of theRules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneysseized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

This Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for inthe petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writwas partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documentsand things seized from the offices of the corporations abovementioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained asregards the papers, documents and things found and seized in theresidences of petitioners herein.

HELD:

The docs, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority ofthe warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups,namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of theaforementioned corporations , and (b) those found and seized inthe residences of petitioners herein.

I - CORPORATION

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners hereinhave no cause of action to assail the legality of the contestedwarrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for thesimple reason that said corporations have their respectivepersonalities, separate and distinct from the personality of hereinpetitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of theinterest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever theoffices they hold therein may be.

Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can becontested only by the party whose rights have been impairedthereby, 9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizureis purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10

Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the usein evidence against them of the documents, papers and thingsseized from the offices and premises of the corporations advertedto above, since the right to object to the admission of said papersin evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom theseized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporateofficers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

II - RESIDENCE

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in theresidences of petitioners herein, this Court in a Resolutionrestrained herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them inevidence against petitioners herein.

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrantsare in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, theseizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void.

In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects


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against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to bedetermined by the judge after examination under oath oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

NONE of these requirements has been complied with in thecontested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued uponapplications stating that the natural and juridical person therein

named had committed a " violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariffand Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and RPC."

In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in saidapplications. The averments thereof with respect to the offensecommitted were abstract . As a consequence, it was impossible forthe judges who issued the warrants to have found the existenceof probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction ofcompetent proof that the party against whom it is sought hasperformed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,violating a given provision of our criminal laws. NOTE that Theevil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision abovequoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants.

As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do notallege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It wouldbe the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,Internal Revenue (Code) and RPC," as alleged in theaforementioned applications without reference to anydeterminate provision of said laws

Under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shallnot issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specificoffense ." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court addedthereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issuefor more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the applicationfor the contested search warrants was compounded by thedescription therein made of the effects to be searched for andseized, to wit: Books of accounts, financial records x x x x x x x x

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure ofrecords pertaining to all business transactions of petitionersherein, regardless of whether the transactionswere legal or illegal . The warrants sanctioned the seizure of allrecords of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicitcommand of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seizedbe particularly described as well as tending to defeat itsmajor objective: the elimination of general warrants.

To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competentevidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a givencrime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, thenthere is no reason why the applicant should not comply with therequirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if hehas no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for theJudge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, nojustification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possibleexplanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessityof fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, thisfishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence toestablish a probable cause.

We hold, therefore, that the warrants for the search of 3residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution ofJune 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizurestherein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunctionheretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers andother effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitionersis hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted,insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized inthe aforementioned residences are concerned; that theaforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendmentshould be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein isdismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards thedocuments, papers and other effects seized in the 29 places,offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,without special pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN et al. vs. THE HON. RAMON MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Manila, Branch 35

ISSUES: WON the constitutional rights of Beltran were violatedwhen respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrestwithout personally examining the complainant and the witnesses,

if any, to determine probable cause; and

HELD:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in theirpersons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonablesearches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purposeshall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrestshall issue except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge after examination nder oath oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he mayproduce, and particularly describing the place to be searched andthe persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word"determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officersas may be authorized by law," has apparently convincedpetitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge topersonally examine the complainant and his witnesses in hisdetermination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants ofarrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personalresponsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of theexistence of probable cause.

In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for theissuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required topersonally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Followingestablished doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personallyevaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted bythe fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on thebasis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basisthereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal'sreport and require the submission of supporting affidavits ofwitnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to theexistence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would beunduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation


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of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing anddeciding cases filed before their courts.

On June 30, 1987, the SC unanimously adopted Circular No. 12,setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest.The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in thisresolution.

It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated fromthe prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance ofthe warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could notbe held liable for libel because of the privileged character or thepublication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts andthat such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciateafter receiving the evidence of the parties.

As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case toproceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, theCourt finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.

The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, throughtheir separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amountto lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari andprohibition prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting toexcess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the publicrespondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R.Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the statusquo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 isLIFTED.

G.R. No. 104961 October 7, 1994

CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR. vs. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS and DOJ SPECIAL TASK FORCE

FACTS:

In preparation for the synchronized national and local electionsscheduled on 11 May 1992, the COMELEC issued on 11 December1991 Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the "GunBan," promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carryingand transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, onsecurity personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by membersof security agencies or police organizations, and organization ormaintenance of reaction forces during the electionperiod. Subsequently, on 26 December 1991 COMELEC issued

Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualificationof candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting offirearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spotcheckpoints.

Pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote petitioner who was thenCongressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the returnof the 2 firearms issued to him by the HR. Upon being advised ofthe request by his staff, petitioner immediately instructed hisdriver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner'shouse at Valle Verde and return them to Congress.

Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day,the PNP headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set upa checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some 20 meters awayfrom its entrance. About 30 minutes later, the policemenmanning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano asit approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and foundthe firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bagin the trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended anddetained. He explained that he was ordered by petitioner to getthe firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives.

The police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the CityProsecutor for inquest. The referral did not include petitioner asamong those charged with an election offense.

The City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on thecircumstances mentioned in Arellano's sworn explanation.Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary investigation toconfirm Arellano's statement but also wrote the City Prosecutorurging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano didnot violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with itwhen apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and,that he was petitioner's driver, not a security officer nor a

bodyguard.

The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which,among other matters, recommended that the case againstArellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge againstpetitioner be also dismissed. 6

Nevertheless,, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829 directingthe filing of information against petitioner and Arellano forviolation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known asthe Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No.7166; 7 and petitioner to show cause why he should not bedisqualified from running for an elective position, pursuant toCOMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sec. 32, 33 and 35

of R.A. 7166, and Sec. 52, par. (c), of B.P. Blg. 881. 8

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Res. No. 2327. Heargues that acts mentioned in the resolution are not within theletter or spirit of the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code;that the resolution did away with the requirement of finalconviction before the commission of certain offenses; thatinstead, it created a presumption of guilt as a candidate may bedisqualified from office in situations (a) where the criminalcharge is still pending, (b) where there is no pending criminalcase, and (c) where the accused has already been acquitted, allcontrary to the requisite quantum of proof for one to bedisqualified from running or holding public office under theOmnibus Election Code, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. As a

result, petitioner concludes, Resolution No. 2327 violates thefundamental law thus rendering it fatally defective.

But, the issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running inthe 11 May 1992 synchronized elections was rendered mootwhen he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections thatensued. Consequently, it is now futile to discuss the implicationsof the charge against him on his qualification to run for publicoffice.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner can be validly prosecuted forinstructing his driver to return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the HR


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the 2 firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gatheredfrom the warrantless search of his car.

HELD:

SEARCH & SEIZURE

As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrantduly issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is notabsolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, awarrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehiclesand the seizure of evidence in plain view, 17 as well as the searchconducted at police or military checkpoints which we declaredare not illegal per se , and stressed that the warrantless search isnot violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle isneither searched nor its occupants subjected to a bodysearch, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited toa visual search. 18

Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano'swaist nor placed within his reach, and that they were neatlypacked in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car.Significantly, COMELEC did not rebut this claim. The records donot show that the manner by which the package was bundled ledthe PNP to suspect that it contained firearms. There was nomention either of any report regarding any nervous, suspicious

or unnatural reaction from Arellano when the car was stoppedand searched. Given these circumstances and relying on its visualobservation, the PNP could not thoroughly search the car lawfullyas well as the package without violating the constitutionalinjunction.

An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to ifthe officers conducting the search had reasonable or probablecause to believe before the search that either the motorist was alaw offender or that they would find the instrumentality orevidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle tobe searched.

In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up 20meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforceResolution No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that thepolicemen were impelled to do so because of a confidentialreport leading them to reasonably believe that certain motoristsmatching the description furnished by their informant wereengaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizingspecial strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there anyindication from the package or behavior of Arellano that couldhave triggered the suspicion of the policemen.

Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to theculpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not bevalid. The action then of the policemen unreasonably intrudedinto petitioner's privacy and the security of his property, in

violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, thefirearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right againstwarrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in anyproceeding.

The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about 5o'clock in the afternoon of 13 January 1992. The search was madesoon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was not shown thatnews of impending checkpoints without necessarily giving theirlocations, and the reason for the same have been announced inthe media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informalcheckpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the public of thepurpose of its operation.

As a result, motorists passing that place did not have any inklingwhatsoever about the reason behind the instant exercise. Withthe authorities in control to stop and search passing vehicles, themotorists did not have any choice but to submit to the PNP'sscrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit innocentwould raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the policeto arrest the motorist and to conduct an extensive search of hisvehicle.

In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time

it was stopped for inspection. As conceded by COMELEC, driverArellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the faceof 14 armed policemen conducting the operation, 29 driverArellano being alone and a mere employee of petitioner could nothave marshalled the strength and the courage to protest againstthe extensive search conducted in the vehicle.

In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was any,could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano'spart to the search, and "consent" given under intimidating orcoercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of theconstitutional guaranty.

DUE PROCESS

Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC proceeded againstpetitioner runs counter to the due process clause of theConstitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among thosecharged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code.Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminaryinvestigation for such offense. The non-disclosure by the CityProsecutor to the petitioner that he was a respondent in thepreliminary investigation is violative of due process whichrequires that the procedure established by law should beobeyed.

COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the change to beheard because he was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutorregarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver,

and that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of explanationregarding the incident. This does not satisfy the requirement ofdue process the essence of which is the reasonable opportunityto be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in supportof his defense. 31 Due process guarantees the observance of bothsubstantive and procedural rights, whatever the source of suchrights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule ofcourt.

In Go v. CA, we held that While the right to preliminaryinvestigation is statutory rather than constitutional in itsfundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is acomponent part of due process in criminal justice . The right tohave a preliminary investigation conducted before being boundover to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of

incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal ortechnical right; it is a substantive right . . . . [T]he right to anopportunity to avoid a process painful to anyone save, perhaps,to hardened criminals is a valuable right. To deny petitioner'sclaim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive himof the full measure of his right to due process.

Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during thepreliminary investigation of Arellano to corroborate thelatter's explanation. Petitioner then was made to believethat he was not a party respondent in the case, so that hiswritten explanation on the incident was only intended toexculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. Hence, it cannot beseriously contended that petitioner was fully given the


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opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was notapprised that he was himself a respondent when he appearedbefore the City Prosecutor.

WAIVER

Finally, it must be pointed out too that petitioner's filing of amotion for reconsideration with COMELEC cannot be consideredas a waiver of his claim to a separate preliminary investigationfor himself. The motion itself expresses petitioner's vigorousinsistence on his right. Petitioner's protestation started as soon

as he learned of his inclusion in the charge, and did not ease upeven after COMELEC's denial of his motion for reconsideration.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The warrantlesssearch conducted by the PNP on 13 January 1992 is declaredillegal and the firearms seized during the warrantless searchcannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against petitioner.Consequently, COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April1992 being violative of the Constitution is SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986

JOSEFINO S. ROANvs. THE HONORABLE ROMULO T.GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OFMARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF

MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PC-INPMARINDUQUE

FACTS:

The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondentjudge on May 10, 1984. 2 The petitioner's house was searchedtwo days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant wasdiscovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the search foundin the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and 18 live bulletswhich they confiscated. They are now the bases of the chargeagainst the petitioner.

The petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search andseizure conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized

from him are sought to be used as evidence in his prosecution forillegal possession of firearms. He asks that their admission betemporarily restrained (which we have) 1 and thereafterpermanently enjoined.

HELD:

That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IVof the 1973 Constitution:

SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures ofwhatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and nosearch warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other

responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examinationunder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses hemay produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched,and the persons or things to be seized.

SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shagbe inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when publicsafety and order require otherwise.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the precedingsection shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v.Chief of Staff 6 as referring to "such facts and circumstances whichwould lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe thatan offense has been committed and that the objects sought inconnection with the offense are in the place sought to besearched." As held in a long line of decisions, the probable causemust refer to only one specific offense.

Moreover, under the Rules of Court provided in what was thenRule 126:

SEC. 4.Examination of the applicant. The municipal or city judgemust, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath oraffirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produceand take their depositions in writing, and attach them to therecord, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.

The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by therespondent judge in accordance with the above rule, but this isnot entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken ofthe complainant's two witnesses in addition to the affidavitexecuted by them. It is correct to say, however, that thecomplainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.

Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared: Thetruth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed hisapplication for a search warrant, he appear before me in thecompany of his 2 witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida,both of whom likewise presented to me their respective affidavitstaken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator assigned to thePC-INP command at Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As the applicationwas not yet subscribed and sworn to, I proceeded to examineCaptain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, amongothers, if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, hesubscribed and swore to the same before me. 10

By his own account, what he did was question Captain Quillosaon the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain, among others, ifhe knew and understood the same," and only because "theapplication was not yet subscribed and sworn to." The suggestionis that he would not have asked any questions at all if theaffidavit had already been completed when it was submitted tohim. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. Helimited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take theapplicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the record,together with the affidavit presented to him.

In Mata v. Bayona : Mere affidavits of the complainant and hiswitnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to takedepositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses hemay produce and attach them to the record. Such writtendeposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to

properly determine the existence or non-existence of theprobable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if itwill be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted withillegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essentialrequisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching themto the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to haveapplicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he wasapplying for a search warrant on the basis of the information


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provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions asaforementioned had already been taken by the undersigned." 12

In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of thesearch warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not ofinformation personally known to him, as required by settledjurisprudence."

The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide aground for a prosecution for perjury in case the applicant'sdeclarations are found to be false. His application, standing alone,was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. Itwas therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by theirown personal information, to establish the applicant's claims.

It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing andexhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimedprobable cause is to be established. The examining magistratemust not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but mustmake his own inquiry on the intent and justification of theapplication. 15

A study of the depositions taken from witnesses EsmaelMoradaand Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligenceinformers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatementof their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were madein the form of answers to the questions put to them by therespondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made byTohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because hewas a follower of the opposition candidate in the forthcomingelection (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge'sown suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to themotivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possiblemisrepresentations from them.

The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received thewitnesses' statement that they saw eight men deliver arms to thepetitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This was supposedlydone overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything through anopen window of the house while he was near the gate. 18 He couldeven positively say that six of the weapons were.45 caliberpistols and two were.38 caliber revolvers. 19

One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondentjudge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to thecaliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, orwhether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why hispresence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were reallydone openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering thatthese acts were against the law. These would have been judiciousquestions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, thedeclarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the

search warrant sought was issued forthwith.

The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrantinvalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General argues that whateverdefect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarilysubmitted to the search and manifested his conformity inwriting. We do not agree.

What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities,who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposedwaiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge later to thevalidity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with thearmed presence of the military and the presumptive authority of

a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. Thiswas not, as we held in a previous case, 21 the manifestationmerely of our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect forauthority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcosregime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that thepetitioner could not resist.

Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search isvalid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no validsearch warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto

was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the militaryofficers who entered the petitioner's premises had no right to bethere and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol andbullets.

It does not follow that because an offenseis malumprohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal perse. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of thiskind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because theyare prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.

Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of theaccepted exceptions. The respondents cannot even claim thatthey stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that these

things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view whenthey were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and noexception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner'spistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore areprotected by the exclusionary principle.

Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expresslyaffirmed in the 1973 Constitution. While conceding that theremay be occasions when the criminal might be allowed to go freebecause "the constable has blundered," Chief Justice Concepcionobserved that the exclusionary rule was nonetheless "the onlypractical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction"against abuse. The decision cited Judge Learned Hand'sjustification that "only in case the prosecution which itself

controls the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by theirwrong, will the wrong be repressed. "

The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidenceagainst the petitioner in the criminal action against him for illegalpossession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case, however,the said articles must remain in custodia legis.

Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming tothis Court, filed a motion for the quashal of the search warrant bythe respondent judge in accordance with the normal procedure.But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flawnotwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view ofthe seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised. 28

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondentjudge is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside.Our restraining order is made permanent.


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G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968

HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila et. Alvs.REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as PresidingJudge of Branch 23, CFI of Manila

This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari , withpreliminary injunction filed by Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police ofManila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis,Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and Martin Alagao, apatrolman of the Manila Police Department, againstRemediosMago and Hon. HilarionJarencio, Presiding Judge ofBranch 23 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for theannulment of the order issued by respondent Judge in Civil CaseNo. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date ofMarch 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond ofcertain goods which were seized and held by petitioners inconnection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code,but which were claimed by respondent RemediosMago, and toprohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in anymanner whatsoever in said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending thedetermination of this case this Court issued a writ of preliminaryinjunction restraining the respondent Judge from executing,enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order in Civil

Case No. 67496 and from proceeding with said case.

Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligenceunit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliableinformation received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that acertain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared andundervalued, would be released the following day from thecustoms zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, andupon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manilaand a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conductedsurveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucksleft gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4,1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after thetrucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila.The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, andthe two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police.Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods andshowed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of DutiesCollected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureauof Customs in the name of a certain BienvenidoNaguit.

Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure anddetention of the two trucks and their cargo, RemediosMago andValentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manilaa petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminaryinjunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging, amongothers, that RemediosMago was the owner of the goods seized,having purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in SanFernando, Pampanga; that she hired the trucks owned byValentinLanopa to transport, the goods from said place to herresidence at 1657 LaonLaan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goodswere seized by members of the Manila Police Departmentwithout search warrant issued by a competent court; that anilaChief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel forRemediosMago that the bales be not opened and the goodscontained therein be not examined; that then CustomsCommissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers toexamine the goods because the goods were no longer under thecontrol and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that thegoods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and,undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 ofthe Tariff and Customs Code because RemediosMago had bought

them from another person without knowledge that they wereimported illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened,although Chief of Police Papa had arranged with theCommissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods,and that unless restrained their constitutional rights would beviolated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence,RemediosMago and ValentinLanopa prayed for the issuance of arestraining order, ex parte , enjoining the above-named police andcustoms authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales andexamining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return ofthe goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moraland exemplary damages in their favor.

On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge HilarionJarencioissued an order ex parte restraining the respondents in Civil CaseNo. 67496 now petitioners in the instant case before this Court from opening the nine bales in question, and at the same timeset the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction onNovember 16, 1966. However, when the restraining order wasreceived by herein petitioners, some bales had already beenopened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in thepresence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistantcity fiscal and a representative of herein respondentRemediosMago.

Under date of November 15, 1966, RemediosMago filed anamended petition in Civil Case No. 67496, including as partydefendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manilaand Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. Hereinpetitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24, 1966,their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ ofPreliminary Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of theseizure and detention of the goods and the trucks and of theirother actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, towit: that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdictionto try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdictionof the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court hadjurisdiction over the case, the petition stated no cause of action inview of the failure of RemediosMago to exhaust theadministrative remedies provided for in the Tariff and CustomsCode; that the Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction overthe goods because the full duties and charges thereon had notbeen paid; that the members of the Manila Police Department hadthe power to make the seizure; that the seizure was notunreasonable; and the persons deputized under Section 2203 (c)of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search, seizures andarrests in inland places in connection with the enforcement of thesaid Code. In opposing the issuance of the writ of preliminaryinjunction, herein petitioners averred in the court below that thewrit could not be granted for the reason that RemediosMago wasnot entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for; that the release ofthe goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under theTariff and Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of Customs of

the authority to forfeit them; and that RemediosMago andValentinLanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. Hereinpetitioners prayed the court below for the lifting of therestraining order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ ofpreliminary injunction, and for the dismissal of the case.

At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, withthe conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of thegoods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of therepresentatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau ofCustoms, and the Anti-Smuggling Center of the Manila PoliceDepartment. On December 13, 1966, the above-named personsfiled a "Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.


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Herein respondent RemediosMago, on December 23, 1966,filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that sincethe inventory of the goods seized did not show any article ofprohibited importation, the same should be released as peragreement of the patties upon her posting of the appropriatebond that may be determined by the court. Herein petitionersfiled their opposition to the motion, alleging that the court had nojurisdiction to order the release of the goods in view of the factthat the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that most ofthe goods, as shown in the inventory, were not declared andwere, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A supplemental oppositionwas filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging thaton January 12, 1967 seizure proceedings against the goods hadbeen instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila,and the determination of all questions affecting the disposal ofproperty proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture proceedingsshould thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On January 30,1967, herein petitioners filed a manifestation that the estimatedduties, taxes and other charges due on the goods amounted toP95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein respondentRemediosMago filed an urgent manifestation and reiteration ofthe motion for the release under bond of the goods.

On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an orderreleasing the goods to herein respondent RemediosMago uponher filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March13, 1967, said respondent filed the corresponding bond.

On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on hisown behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of thecourt releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that theManila Police Department had been directed by the Collector ofCustoms of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pendingtermination of the seizure proceedings.

Without waiting for the court's action on the motion forreconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, hereinpetitioners filed the present action for prohibitionand certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. Intheir petition petitioners alleged, among others, that therespondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in ordering therelease to respondent RemediosMago of the disputed goods, forthe following reasons: (1) the Court of First Instance of Manila,presided by respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over the case;(2) respondent RemediosMago had no cause of action in CivilCase No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila due to herfailure to exhaust all administrative remedies before invokingjudicial intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped bythe negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not collecting thecorrect taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for therelease of the goods was grossly insufficient.

In due time, the respondents filed their answer to thepetition for prohibition and certiorari in this case. In theiranswer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was withinthe jurisdiction of the lower court presided by respondent Judgeto hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue thequestioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No.67496 was instituted long before seizure, and identificationproceedings against the nine bales of goods in question wereinstituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners couldno longer go after the goods in question after the correspondingduties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left thecustoms premises and were no longer within the control of theBureau of Customs; (3) that respondent RemediosMago was

purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that thosegoods can not be the subject of seizure and forfeitureproceedings; (4) that the seizure of the goods was affected bymembers of the Manila Police Department at a place outsidecontrol of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and affectedwithout any search warrant or a warrant of seizure anddetention; (5) that the warrant of seizure and detentionsubsequently issued by the Collector of Customs is illegal andunconstitutional, it not being issued by a judge; (6) that theseizing officers have no authority to seize the goods in questionbecause they are not articles of prohibited importation; (7) thatpetitioners are estopped to institute the present action becausethey had agreed before the respondent Judge that they would notinterpose any objection to the release of the goods under bond toanswer for whatever duties and taxes the said goods may still beliable; and (8) that the bond for the release of the goods wassufficient.

The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, therespondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in issuing the orderof March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.

The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers andjurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect all lawful

revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges,fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws;(2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon thecustoms; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goodsin question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on InformalEntry". 2 As long as the importation has not been terminated theimported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau ofcustoms. Importation is deemed terminated only upon thepayment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles,or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit forwithdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties,taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4

The record shows, by comparing the articles and dutiesstated in the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts of DutiesCollected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Officeof the Solicitor General 5 wherein it is stated that the estimatedduties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this caseamounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of theappraiser of the Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes andother charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, acomparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, asshown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected onInformal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles foundin the bales upon examination and inventory, 6 shows that thequantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoidthe payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (thestatement and receipts of duties collected) states that there were

40 pieces of ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventorycontained in the "compliance") states that in bale No. 1 alonethere were 42 dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assortedcolors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were assessed,but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5 piecesof men's metal watch bands (white) and 120 dozens of men'smetal watch band (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens ofmen's metal watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens onlyof men's handkerchief were declared, but in Annex H it appearsthat there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens in baleNo. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articlescontained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subjectto forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and


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(5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court has held thatmerchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary tolaw, is subject to forfeiture, 7 and that goods released contrary tolaw are subject to seizure and forfeiture. 8

Even if it be granted, arguendo , that after the goods inquestion had been brought out of the customs area the Bureau ofCustoms had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, whensaid goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting

under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, whohad been formally deputized by the Commissioner ofCustoms, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction andcustody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and CustomsCode imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to holdpossession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, andother charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and todispose of the same according to law. The goods in question,therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of theBureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus ,docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of FirstInstance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of FirstInstance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction oversaid goods even if the warrant of seizure and detention of thegoods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedingshad not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.

The ruling in the case of " Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon.Gregorio Lantin , et al.," G.R. No. L-24037, decided by this Court onApril 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De Joya case, it appears that Francindy Commercial of Manila boughtfrom Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of assortedtextiles and rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had beenimported and entered thru the port of Cebu. ErneroseCommercial shipped the goods to Manila on board an inter-islandvessel. When the goods where about to leave the customspremises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the customs authoritiesheld them for further verification, and upon examination thegoods were found to be different from the declaration in thecargo manifest of the carrying vessel. Francindy Commercialsubsequently demanded from the customs authorities the releaseof the goods, asserting that it is a purchaser in good faith of thosegoods; that a local purchaser was involved so the Bureau ofCustoms had no right to examine the goods; and that the goodscame from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964, FrancindyCommercial filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila apetition for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs andthe Collector of Customs of the port of Manila to compel saidcustoms authorities to release the goods.

Francindy Commercial alleged in its petitionfor mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had no jurisdictionover the goods because the same were not imported to the port

of Manila; that it was not liable for duties and taxes because thetransaction was not an original importation; that the goods werenot in the hands of the importer nor subject to importer's control,nor were the goods imported contrary to law with its (FrancindyCommercial's) knowledge; and that the importation had beenterminated. On November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs ofManila issued a warrant of seizure and identification against thegoods. On December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs andthe Collector of Customs, as respondents in the mandamus case,filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack ofjurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pendingseizure and forfeiture proceedings. The Court of First Instanceheld resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pendingdecision on the merits. On December 14, 1964, the Court of First

Instance of Manila issued a preventive and mandatory injunction,on prayer by Francindy Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00.The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customssought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction,and the resolution of their motion to dismiss. The Court of FirstInstance of Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered themto comply with the preliminary and mandatory injunction, uponthe filing by Francindy Commercial of an additional bond ofP50,000.00. Said customs authorities thereupon filed with thisCourt, on January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari andprohibition with preliminary injunction. In resolving the questionraised in that case, this Court held:

This petition raises two related issues: first, hasthe Customs bureau jurisdiction to seize the goods andinstitute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2)has the Court of First Instance jurisdiction to entertainthe petition for mandamus to compel the Customsauthorities to release the goods?

Francindy Commercial contends that since thepetition in the Court of first Instance was filed (onOctober 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customswarrant of seizure and forfeiture (on November 12,

1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdictionof the said court.

The record shows, however, that the goods inquestion were actually seized on October 6, 1964, i.ebefore Francindy Commercial sued in court. Thepurpose of the seizure by the Customs bureau was toverify whether or not Custom duties and taxes werepaid for their importation. Hence, on December 23,1964, Customs released 22 bales thereof, for the samewere found to have been released regularly from theCebu Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to goods importedillegally or released irregularly from Customs custody,these are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. ofthe Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).

The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power,among others to collect revenues from importedarticles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling andother frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff andcustoms laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).

The goods in question are imported articlesentered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found tohave been released irregularly from Customs custody inCebu City, they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, theproceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction ofthe Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.

Said proceeding should be followed; the owner ofthe goods may set up defenses therein (Pacis v. Averia,L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of theCommissioner of Customs appeal lies to the Court ofTax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To permitrecourse to the Court of First Instance in cases ofseizure of imported goods would in effect renderineffective the power of the Customs authorities underthe Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court ofTax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellatejurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v.Averia, supra , Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest


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jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedingsexclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Courtof Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature, whilethe Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts ofFirst Instance is a general legislation, not to mentionthat the former are later enactments, the Court of FirstInstance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customsauthorities.

It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs

acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for thepurposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the momentthe goods are actually in its possession or control, even if nowarrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued bythe Collector of Customs in connection with seizure andforfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau ofCustoms actually seized the goods in question on November 4,1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquiredjurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcementof the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regularcourts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manilahave jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector ofCustoms had issued the warrant of seizure and detention onJanuary 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondentscontend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt todivest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge didnot acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when thepetition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was noneed of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquiredjurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of FirstInstance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questionedorder of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.

Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, anofficer of the Manila Police Department, could not seize the goodsin question without a search warrant. This contention cannot besustained. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G.Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner ofCustoms, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of thecustoms and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, andarrests, 11 and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, ofany cargo, articles or other movable property when the samemay be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed undercustoms and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and examineany box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever foundwhen he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein ofdutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law;and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast orperson reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such articleas aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitionerRicardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect thesearch and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and

Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any policeofficer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has thelegal duty to render said assistance. 14 This was what happenedprecisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, madethe search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the ninebales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was givenauthority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of thecargo. 15

Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen hadauthority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issuedby a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does notrequire said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizespersons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff

and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land,inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwellinghouse; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel oraircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person onboard, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast orperson suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable orprohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,without mentioning the need of a search warrant in saidcases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code providesthat said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only uponwarrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is ourconsidered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search ofa dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under thecustoms law may effect search and seizure without a searchwarrant in the enforcement of customs laws.

Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. UnitedStates, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein the court, considering a legalprovision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff andCustoms Code, said as follows:

Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the4th Amendment, we find in the first Congress, and in thefollowing second and fourth Congresses, a difference

made as to the necessity for a search warrant betweengoods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in adwelling house of similar place, and like goods in courseof transportation and concealed in a movable vessel,where readily they could be put out of reach of a searchwarrant. . . .

Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3,1815 (3 Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it was madelawful for customs officers not only to board and searchvessels within their own and adjoining districts, but alsoto stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or personon which or whom they should suspect there wasmerchandise which was subject to duty, or had beenintroduced into the United States in any mannercontrary to law, whether by the person in charge of thevehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should findany goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which theyhad probably cause to believe had been so unlawfullybrought into the country, to seize and secure the same,and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture.This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315,chap. 100), for a year and expired. The Act of February28, 1865, revived 2 of the Act of 1815, abovedescribed, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The substance ofthis section was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Actof July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L. 178, and wasthereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as 3061,Comp. Stat. 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1161.

Neither 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts hasever been attacked as unconstitutional. Indeed, thatsection was referred to and treated as operative by thiscourt in Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 219, 27L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .

In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagaoand his companion policemen did not have to make any searchbefore they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their originalpetition, and amended petition, in the court belowRemediosMago and ValentinLanopa did not even allege thatthere was a search. 18 All that they complained of was,


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That while the trucks were on their way, theywere intercepted without any search warrant near theAgrifina Circle and taken to the Manila PoliceDepartment, where they were detained.

But even if there was a search, there is still authority to theeffect that no search warrant would be needed under thecircumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has beenheld that:

The guaranty of freedom from unreasonablesearches and seizures is construed as recognizing anecessary difference between a search of a dwellinghouse or other structure in respect of which a searchwarrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship,motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods,where it is not practicable to secure a warrant becausethe vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality orjurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. (47Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v. United States, 267U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790;People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R.,686.)

In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389,27 A.L.R., 686), the question raised by defendant's counsel waswhether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searchedwithout search warrant or other process and the goods thereinseized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of theprohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended thenegative, urging the constitutional provision forbiddingunreasonable searches and seizures. The Court said:

. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitutiondirectly prohibits search and seizure without a warrant,as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" searchand seizure is forbidden. . . .

. . . The question whether a seizure or a search isunreasonable in the language of the Constitution is ajudicial and not a legislative question; but indetermining whether a seizure is or is notunreasonable, all of the circumstances under which it ismade must be looked to.

The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle ofrecent development, which has multiplied by quantityproduction and taken possession of our highways inbattalions until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, withtheir easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed ascovered vehicles to standard form in immensequantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling

express trains, they furnish for successful commissionof crime a disguising means of silent approach and swiftescape unknown in the history of the world before theiradvent. The question of their police control andreasonable search on highways or other public places isa serious question far deeper and broader than theiruse in so-called "bootleging" or "rum running," which isitself is no small matter. While a possession in the senseof private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructedfor travel and transportation on highways. Their activeuse is not in homes or on private premises, the privacyof which the law especially guards from search andseizure without process. The baffling extent to whichthey are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of

crime of all degrees, from those against morality,chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, andmurder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon thatproblem a condition, and not a theory, confronts properadministration of our criminal laws. Whether search ofand seizure from an automobile upon a highway orother public place without a search warrant isunreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined asa judicial question in view of all the circumstancesunder which it is made.

Having declared that the seizure by the members of theManila Police Department of the goods in question was inaccordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customshad acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of theenforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion ofthe Court of First Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved theprincipal and decisive issue in the present case. We do notconsider it necessary, for the purposes of this decision, to discussthe incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for

by petitioners;

(b) Declaring n

search & seizure cases

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