TRUST  THY  NEIGHBOR?  TRUSTWORTHY  MULTI-­‐TENANCY  FOR  THE  

MODERN  APPLICATION  ECOSYSTEM  

2   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

ABOUT  TRUSTONIC  JON  GEATER,  CHIEF  TECHNICAL  OFFICER  

The  changing  landscape  

4   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

THE  RISE  OF  MOBILE  AND  THE  CONNECTED  SOCIETY  

0  

100  

200  

300  

400  

500  

600  

700  

2005   2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   2011   2012   2013E  

Desktop  

Laptop  

Smartphone  

Source  data:  Morgan  Stanley  Research  

5   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

THE  RISE  OF  MOBILE  AND  THE  CONNECTED  SOCIETY  

0  

100  

200  

300  

400  

500  

600  

700  

2005   2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   2011   2012   2013E  

All  PC  

Smartphone  

Source  data:  Morgan  Stanley  Research  

6   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

THE  RISE  OF  MOBILE  AFFECTS  THE  ENTIRE  CHAIN  

!  So  why  are  we  talking  about  Smartphones  at  an  AMD  conference?    

!  What  is  a  mobile  device?  

7   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

JUST  A  FEW  YEARS  AGO…  MOBILE  SECURITY  

!  I  was  working  for  an  Enterprise  Security  company  making  encryp^on  and  key  management  products  

!  We  were  asked  by  a  major  US  bank  to  help  them  with  the  problem  they  had  with  informa^on  security  on  mobile  devices  

!  2  primary  device  types:  

‒  Laptops      This  one’s  fairly  obvious.    But  this  was  easier  because  of  established  security  vendors  and  no  real  no^on  of  BYOD  for  laptops  

‒ Tape  drives  (!)  They  are  very  mobile…  But  compara^vely  simple  security  problem  .  

8   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

THE  RISE  OF  MOBILE  AFFECTS  THE  ENTIRE  CHAIN  

!  We  now  (try  to)  do  everything  on  the  mobile  internet  that  we  used  to  do  by  PC,  ordinary  phone  and  post  

!  That  blurs  the  lines  between  device  types:  phones,  tablets,  laptops  –  truly  heterogeneous!  

!  It  forces  applica^ons  on-­‐line,  so  the  whole  informa^on  system  from  chip  to  cloud  needs  consistent  security  

!  It  also  leads  to  a  significant  rise  in  the  number  of  types  of  informa^on  processed  on  mobile  devices  

!  …and  a  consequent  rise  in  the  value  of  that  informa^on  

9   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

THE  RISE  OF  MOBILE  AFFECTS  THE  ENTIRE  CHAIN  

!  We  now  (try  to)  do  everything  on  the  mobile  internet  that  we  used  to  do  by  PC,  ordinary  phone  and  post  

!  That  blurs  the  lines  between  device  types:  phones,  tablets,  laptops  

!  It  forces  applica^ons  on-­‐line,  so  the  whole  informa^on  system  from  chip  to  cloud  needs  consistent  security  

!  It  also  leads  to  a  significant  rise  in  the  number  of  types  of  informa^on  processed  on  mobile  devices  

!  …and  a  consequent  rise  in  the  value  of  that  informa^on  

Sensi^ve    Informa^on  

Security  and  trust  

11   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

WHAT  IS  RISK?  

Risk  =  probability  x  severity  

12   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

WHAT  IS  RISK?  

Risk  =  ^me  x  remedia^on  

13   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

WHAT  IS  RISK?  

Risk  =  likelihood  x  cost  

14   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

WHAT  IS  RISK?  

Risk  =  likelihood  x  cost  

How  much  should  I  care  about  this?    When  will  it  happen?    What’s  the  impact  if  it  does?  

15   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

WHAT  IS  SECURITY?  

A  Venn  diagram  

SECURE NOT SECURE

16   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

WHAT  IS  SECURITY?  

A  Venn  diagram  

SECURE?  

17   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

WHAT  IS  SECURITY?  

Security    Is  

Contextual  

18   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

THE  RISE  OF  MOBILE  AFFECTS  THE  ENTIRE  CHAIN  

!  Things  are  much  more  complicated  now    

!  The  different  use  cases  present  a  set  of  conflic^ng  use  cases  that  a  single  extant  planorm  has  to  sa^sfy  

!  And  that’s  before  the  user  gets  involved  

!  Mul^-­‐tenancy  on  a  consumer  device  lacks  some  of  the  more  powerful  approaches  available  to  server  applica^ons  

!  There  are  also  more  threats  now  ‒ Professionalized  malware  ‒ Threats  always  follow  the  money  

Privacy

please

OPEN! CLOSED!

MY CONTROL! NO, MINE!

Start  Trusted,  Stay  Trusted  

20   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

START  TRUSTED  

!  So  how  does  security  enable  trust?  !  We  typically  define  fundamental  security  building  

blocks  as  “Roots  of  Trust”  

!  To  be  effec^ve  the  RoT  has  to  be  rooted  in  hardware  ‒ Otherwise  there  are  too  many  ways  to  remove  it,  and  nothing  to  check  back  against  

‒  “Trust,  but  verify”  !  Not  just  a  key:  includes  the  mechanisms,  code  etc  

‒ NIST  guidelines  !  Secure  boot  mechanisms  (including  UEFI)  are  based  

on  roots  of  trust  

!  Scaling  problem  –  not  everyone  can  own  a  direct  root!    So  the  planorm  has  to  provide  the  main  one  

HARDWARE  ROOTS  OF  TRUST  

RoT  for    Storage  

RoT  for    Verifica-on  

RoT  for  Measurement  

RoT  for    Repor-ng  

RoT  for  Integrity  

Protected  Storage  

Isola:on   Device  Integrity  

Opera^ng  System  

App  

App

App   App  

Picture:  Andrew  Regenshield:  NIST/Computer  Security  Division    

21   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

STAY  TRUSTED  

!  Boot  security  is  necessary  but  not  sufficient  ‒ Doesn’t  account  for  run-­‐^me  exploits  ‒ Good  for  system  FW  but  doesn’t  scale  to  applica^ons    

!  Security  is  a  dynamic  affair.    We  need  to  be  able  to  react  as  quickly  as  the  threats/market  

!  Planorm  use  cases  shouldn’t  be  fixed  when  the  chip  leaves  the  factory  ‒ Need  to  be  able  to  add  trusted  func^onality  later  on  

!  Security  context  is  best  known  to  the  service  providers  but  they  do  not  make  hardware.  ‒ How  to  anchor  their  trust  chains  in  hardware  at  scale?  ‒ How  to  encode  their  use  case  into  general  purpose  HW?  ‒ Can  you  do  a  whole  FW  update  each  ^me  a  single  app  changes?    No!  

SECURITY  DOESN’T  STAY  STILL  

TrustZone®  and  TEE  

23   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

TRUSTZONE®    HARDWARE  BACKED  SECURITY  FROM  ARM  

!  Separa^on  technology  built  into  ARM  Cortex-­‐A  processors  

!  Enables  2  independent  process  stacks  to  execute  on  a  single  SoC:  Normal  mode  and  Secure  mode  

!  Memory  and  peripherals  can  be  par^^oned  into  secure-­‐only  or  shared  

!  Mode  separa^on  is  enforced  by  the  processor  and  fabric  –  stronger  than  MMU    

!  Sovware  in  Normal  World  (including  awacks!)  can’t  read  memory  or  peripherals  that  are  reserved  for  Secure  World  

!  It  is  not  magic!    Designed  to  defeat  sovware  awacks,  not  na^onal  governments  and  laserbeams  

!  Doesn’t  have  any  sovware  

TZ  only  Switchable  

Normal  

24   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

TRUSTED  EXECUTION  ENVIRONMENT    PRACTICAL  SECURITY  FOR    MOBILE  APPLICATIONS  

Image:  GlobalPlanorm  

Hardware Platform

Rich OS Application Environment

Rich OS

GlobalPlatformTEE Client API

Trusted Execution Environment

Trusted CoreEnvironment

GlobalPlatformTEEInternalAPI

TrustedFunctions

Payment Corporate

GlobalPlatformTEE Functional API

GlobalPlatformTEE Functional API

Client Applications

GlobalPlatform TEE Client API

TrustedApplication

DRM

TrustedApplication

Payment

TrustedApplicationCorporate

HW Keys, SecureStorage,Trusted UI (Keypad, Screen),

Crypto accelerators,NFC controller,

Secure Element, etc.

HW SecureResources

EnvironmentTrusted Core Trusted

Functions

GlobalPlatformTEE Internal

TEE Kernel

API

Primary  device  environment    

runs  as  normal,  including  other  

security  mechanisms  

 

 Security  cri:cal  code  and  resources  protected  by  TEE  applica:ons    

 TEE  provides  the  constant  security  founda:on  independent  of  OS  choice      

Integrity  and  trust  underpinned  by    SoC  hardware    

GlobalPlaIorm  APIs  ensure  portability  across  handsets/plaIorms    

Control  of  secure  resources    

25   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

TRUSTED  EXECUTION  ENVIRONMENT      PRACTICAL  SECURITY  FOR    MOBILE  APPLICATIONS  

!  TEE  combines  the  planorm  hardware  with  sovware  to  provide  an  open  environment  in  which  to  run  security  sensi^ve  code  for  normal  applica^ons  

!  Highly  flexible  system  enables  applica^on  stakeholders  to  protect  their  own  func^onality  ‒ Correct  context  is  used  

!  GlobalPlanorm  is  not  the  only  model  ‒ But  a  standard  helps  with  a  scalable  ecosystem  

!  Provides  simple  APIs  for  cryptography,  secure  storage  etc  

!  Working  towards  advanced  APIs  for  things  like  Trusted  User  Interface  (where  applicable)  

 

26   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

BACKEND  TRUST  AND  ENROLMENT  COMPLETING  THE  CHAIN  OF  TRUST  

!  A  well-­‐built  TEE  provides  strong  separa^on  of  processes  on  the  device  

!  But  as  we’ve  seen,  systems  and  trust  are  bigger  than  the  device  

!  A  remote  loading  system  connected  to  the  Roots  Of  Trust  is  essen^al  in  order  to  sustain  a  chain  of  trust  from  Chip  to  Cloud  

!  Making  it  essen^al  to  the  crea^on  of  an  ecosystem  

!  This  is  not  yet  standardized  but  Trustonic  operates  a  backend  system  connected  to  an  on-­‐chip  Root  of  Trust  

27   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

Trusted  app  

Trusted  app  

Secure  Kernel  

Trusted  app  

!  ‘Secure boot’ from SoC ROM assures integrity of TEE and sensitive data assets

!  TEE is given control of secure peripherals, memory regions and trusted apps

!  Trusted apps are verified before they can run and access sensitive assets – contextual security

 

!  Normal World can only access trusted apps through published APIs – transaction integrity

!  Manufacturing and Backend systems maintain the chain of trust between chip, apps and relying parties  

 

START  TRUSTED,  STAY  TRUSTED  LIFECYCLE  SUPPORT  DESIGNED-­‐IN  

28   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

!  TPM 2.0 is an interface specification  

!  Can co-exist with TEE, or run as an application inside it ‒ Or even be a hardware one, if money, space and

power allow. Compatible with all models

!  Extensive work in the TCG on Firmware TPMs (PCClient group) and Mobile TPMs (Mobile Platforms group) to enable this kind of architecture

 

 

WHAT  ABOUT  TPM?  TPM  2.0  protocol  can  be  supported  too  

TEE  entry  

Rich  App  

Mobile  OS  

REE  

Rich  App  

Trusted  OS  

TA  TPM  

TEE  

Smartphone  hardware    

TEE  Client  API  

TPM  Client  API  

TEE  Internal  API    +    TEE  trusted  UI  ++  

TA  

Client  to  Cloud  Examples  

30   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

CHIP  TO  CLOUD  TRUST  EXAMPLE  USE  CASE:  SIMPLER  LOGIN  

ARM TrustZone® enabled SoC

Client API

Open Environment Trusted Execution Environment

OTP TA Secure OTP generation

Secure OTP key storage OTP Launcher

APIs

Trusted User Interface

Secure cryptography

Secure Mass Storage

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LOGO

LOGO IN BLACK

LOGO COLOR VERSIONS

LOGO ON BLACK

Rich OS

Cloud  service  can  have  more  confidence  in  the  ID  claim  they  receive    

User  has  the  convenience  of  using  their  preferred  device,  

and  fewer  clicks  

31   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

CHIP  TO  CLOUD  TRUST  OTHER  USE  CASES  

!  Flexible  iden^ty  &  access  use  cases  ‒ Convert  passwords  to  stronger  on-­‐the-­‐wire  creden^als  ‒ Also  biometrics  

!  Transac^on  verifica^on  and  protec^on  ‒  Simpler  payments  ‒ Confiden^ality  ‒ binding  integrity  

!  Content  ‒ DRM  processing,  innova^ve  delivery  models  

!  Enterprise  ‒ On  board  creden^als  for  VPN  etc  ‒ BYOD  trust  anchors  ‒ Virtual  HSM  

!  Improve  user  experience  

!  Provide  more  innova^ve  services  

32   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

CHIP  TO  CLOUD  TRUST  BENEFITS  

!  Chip  to  cloud  works  both  ways  ‒ The  client  is  increasingly  the  primary  device.    Remote  service  should  have  to  prove  itself  before  the  device  gives  up  any  sensi^ve  informa^on  

‒ The  flexible  architecture  of  TEE  enables  these  islands  of  trust  to  work  both  ways  

!  Ability  to  verify  root  of  trust  separately  enables  greater  confidence  and  unlocks  poten^al  for  enhanced  services  and  user  experience  

!  Privacy  impacts  can  be  limited  by  separa^ng  the  key  actors  in  the  system:  something  that  can  happen  naturally  

AMD  and  Trustonic  

34   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

AMD  AND  TRUSTONIC  THE  PLATFORM  SECURITY  PROCESSOR  

AMD64  

PSP  

TEE  

APU  

(Not  to  scale!)  

!  The  Planorm  Security  Processor  (PSP)  is  a  dedicated  ARM  co-­‐processor  within  the  APU  dedicated  to  providing  security  func^ons  

!  Has  its  own  secure  RAM  and  NV  storage  

!  Can  access  system  memory  

!  Crypto  func^onality,  including  TRNG  

!  Last  month  AMD  and  Trustonic  announced  a  partnership:  AMD  has  licensed  the  Trustonic  TEE  to  run  as  the  security  kernel  in  the  PSP  

!  Talk  to  AMD  for  the  PSP  roadmap  and  access  for  3rd  party  security  extensions  

Wrap  up  

36   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

WRAPPING  UP  

The  mobility  trend  affects  ALL  areas  of  compu^ng      1  

Security  is  DYNAMIC.    Need  to  keep  up.      2  

HARDWARE  trust  is  needed  to  defeat  SOFTWARE  threats      3  

A  collabora^ve  ECOSYSTEM  approach  is  essen^al      4  

AMD  and  Trustonic  are  working  together  to  enable  this      5  

37   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

Thank  you  

39   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

DISCLAIMER  &  ATTRIBUTION  

The  informa^on  presented  in  this  document  is  for  informa^onal  purposes  only  and  may  contain  technical  inaccuracies,  omissions  and  typographical  errors.    

The  informa^on  contained  herein  is  subject  to  change  and  may  be  rendered  inaccurate  for  many  reasons,  including  but  not  limited  to  product  and  roadmap  changes,  component  and  motherboard  version  changes,  new  model  and/or  product  releases,  product  differences  between  differing  manufacturers,  sovware  changes,  BIOS  flashes,  firmware  upgrades,  or  the  like.  Trustonic  assumes  no  obliga^on  to  update  or  otherwise  correct  or  revise  this  informa^on.  However,  Trustonic  reserves  the  right  to  revise  this  informa^on  and  to  make  changes  from  ^me  to  ^me  to  the  content  hereof  without  obliga^on  of  AMD  to  no^fy  any  person  of  such  revisions  or  changes.    

TRUSTONIC  MAKES  NO  REPRESENTATIONS  OR  WARRANTIES  WITH  RESPECT  TO  THE  CONTENTS  HEREOF  AND  ASSUMES  NO  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  ANY  INACCURACIES,  ERRORS  OR  OMISSIONS  THAT  MAY  APPEAR  IN  THIS  INFORMATION.    

TRUSTONIC  SPECIFICALLY  DISCLAIMS  ANY  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF  MERCHANTABILITY  OR  FITNESS  FOR  ANY  PARTICULAR  PURPOSE.  IN  NO  EVENT  WILL  TRUSTONIC  BE  LIABLE  TO  ANY  PERSON  FOR  ANY  DIRECT,  INDIRECT,  SPECIAL  OR  OTHER  CONSEQUENTIAL  DAMAGES  ARISING  FROM  THE  USE  OF  ANY  INFORMATION  CONTAINED  HEREIN,  EVEN  IF  TRUSTONIC  IS  EXPRESSLY  ADVISED  OF  THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  SUCH  DAMAGES.  

 

ATTRIBUTION  

©  2013  Trustonic  Ltd.  All  rights  reserved.  Trustonic,  the  graphical  <t  logo  and  combina^ons  thereof  are  trademarks  of  Trustonic  Ltd.  in  Europe,  the  United  States  and/or  other  jurisdic^ons.    AMD  is  a  trademark  of  Advanced  Micro  Devices,  Inc.    ARM  and  TrustZone  are  trademarks  of  ARM,  Ltd.Other  names  are  for  informa^onal  purposes  only  and  may  be  trademarks  of  their  respec^ve  owners.  

40   |      TRUST  THEY  NEIGHBOR?      |      JON  GEATER,  TRUSTONIC      |      NOVEMBER  12TH,  2013      |      CONFIDENTIAL  

SESSION  ABSTRACT  

!  TITLE:  Trust  thy  neighbour?    Trustworthy  mul^-­‐tenancy  for  the  modern  applica^on  ecosystem  

!  SHORT  ABSTRACT:  With  tales  of  leaks,  hacks  and  malware  on  the  rise,  trust  in  mobile  systems  is  in  short  supply  these  days.    In  other  areas  an  almost  opposite  but  equally  troubling  problem  exists  where  walled  gardens  or  security  agents  seek  to  keep  out  the  bad  guys,  but  also  s^fle  innova^on  and  invite  ques^ons  of  trust  in  the  mo^va^on  and  interest  of  the  gardeners.    

!  This  talk  looks  at  recent  developments  in  client-­‐to-­‐cloud  trust  technology  in  the  ARM  mobile  device  ecosystem  and  presents  a  model  for  both  security  and  control  that  allows  mul^-­‐tenancy  with  confidence.    It  also  covers  how  AMD  have  adopted  and  adapted  some  of  this  technology  to  create  a  world-­‐leading  SoC  planorm  with  trust  built  into  the  very  heart  of  the  chip.