sculpting god - the logic of dionysian negative theology

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Harvard Divinity School

Sculpting God: The Logic of Dionysian Negative TheologyAuthor(s): John N. JonesSource: The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 89, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 355-371Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Harvard Divinity SchoolStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1509922

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Sculpting God: The Logic of DionysianNegative Theology*

John N. JonesYale University

n recent decades, the theology of Dionysius the Areopagitel (pseudo-Dionysius) has recaptured the attention of a number of scholars. These

scholars address Dionysius's importance for the history of philosophy,2 forChristian aesthetics3 and

liturgicaland biblical symbols,4 and for

postmodern

*I thank Michael Foat, Jeff Fisher, Dan Grau, Antony Dugdale, David Kangas, and NancyGratton for their patient and helpful responses to this work, with special thanks to RowanGreer and Cyril O'Regan.

'All citations of the Dionysian corpus are numbered according to J. P. Migne, Patrologiaecursus completus (Athens: Typographeiou Georgiou Karyophylle, 1879) 3.1, from which allGreek quotations are taken. Except where otherwise noted, all English quotations are from theinvaluable Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works (trans. Colm Luibheid; notes and addi-tional trans. Paul Rorem; New York: Paulist Press, 1987).

2Stephen Gersh, From lamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory andEvolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1978).

3Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol. 2: Studiesin Theological Style: Clerical Styles (trans. Andrew Louth, Francis McDonagh, and BrianMcNeil; San Francisco: Ignatius; New York: Crossroads, 1984) 144-210.

4Paul Rorem, Biblical and Liturgical Symbols within the Pseudo-Dionysian Synthesis (Toronto:Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984). Although Rorem's most recent monograph(Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence [Ox-ford: Oxford University Press, 1993]) is an important contribution to English-language schol-arship in the field, with respect to negative theology it rehearses quite precisely Rorem'scomments in Symbols and especially in the footnotes of Complete Works. When discussingRorem, therefore, I will refer to these earlier volumes.

HTR 89:4 (1996) 355-71



356 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

theology.5 Much of this attention focuses on the brief and historically in-fluential The Mystical Theology, written ca. 500 CE. For scholars, however,this text, like the God of which it speaks, seems to embody contradictions.Is there a consistent logic in the text, or is it deliberately inconsistent? Inthis essay, I shall analyze passages throughout the Dionysian corpus inorder to interpret the sometimes dense expressions of Mystical Theologyand uncover the logical structure of Dionysius's negative theology.6 I shallsuggest that Dionysius's primary task is to deny that God is a particularbeing.7 By identifying the patterns of language used to speak of beings,Dionysius can identify both affirmative and negative language that avoidssuch

patternsand hence is

appropriatefor

speechabout God. This

interpre-tation demands close attention to the distinction between particular asser-tions or denials and the assertion or denial of all beings. By focusing onthis distinction and on the higher status of negative over affirmative theol-ogy, I shall show, against the dominant trend in Dionysian scholarship, thatthis negative theology logically coheres; it is neither self-negating nor logi-

5Jacques Derrida, "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials," in Harold Coward and Toby Foshay,eds., Derrida and Negative Theology (Albany: SUNY, 1992) 73-142.

6There are several a priori presumptions against even the possibility of finding a logicalstructure in Dionysian negative theology. First, Dionysius claims, humans cannot know Godas God knows himself (Divine Names 1.588b; for a discussion of the difficulty in Neoplatonismof imputing knowledge to the undivided God, see Gersh, lamblichus, 267-68). The fact thathuman epistemology is limited, however, does not mean that there is no discernable structureto the highest kind of knowledge.

Second, Dionysius sometimes writes humbly about the ability of his words to describedivine matters (Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 7.568d; Celestial Hierarchy 15.340b; Divine Names13.98 lc-84a). Even if one takes these expressions of humility at face value, it does not followthat what Dionysius manages to say is not clearly structured. (For the view that Dionysius'sexpressions of humility should not be given too much importance, see Ronald F. Hathaway,Hierarchy and the Definition of Order in the Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius [Hague: Nijhoff,1969] xvii).

Third, several scholars imply that since Dionysius understands theology as a prayer, a

hymn of praise, and a form of direct address, it should not be externally analyzed as an abstractdiscussion of philosophical language. See Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mys-tical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981) 164-66; and Rorem, Sym-bols, 51. This merely shows, however, that identifying a coherent logical structure in Dionysiannegation is not equivalent to grasping the religious meaning of the contemplative practicesthat manifest such a structure. For an example of postmodern anxiety about this question asit applies to Dionysius, however, see Derrida, "Denials," 79, 91, 98, 111.

7For the sake of analyzing Dionysian negative theology, it suffices to say that the denialof all beings will deny individual existents, being itself, and the totality of all existents. Fora study of the kinds of being in Dionysius, see Bernhard Brons, Gott und die Seienden:Untersuchungen zum Verhaltnis von neuplatonischer Metaphysik und christlicher Traditionbei Dionysius Areopagita (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976) esp. chap. 1: "DieSeienden: Ontologie und menschliche Hierarchie," lemma 1: "Die Ontologie" (pp. 29-52).



JOHN N. JONES 357

cally contradictory. Against Rorem and von Balthasar, it does not negatecertain statements about God only to negate the negations; against Gersh,

it employs logical contradiction only in a highly qualified way. The posi-tivity of this negative theology, that is, the presence of language that

Dionysius does not wish to negate, shows the appropriateness of Dionysius'smetaphor of sculpture for theology. In the conclusion, I use the precedingdiscussion to reinterpret Mystical Theology and suggest how logic andaesthetics merge as Dionysius "sculpts" God.8

E The Problem: nappropriate Ways of Speaking about GodIn large part, Dionysian theology is a critical theology, addressed po-

lemically against what Dionysius sees as erroneous ways of speaking aboutGod.9 For Dionysius, the fundamental error in certain speech about God isto confuse God with beings, that is, with things or concepts.'0 In MysticalTheology, he writes:

But see to it that none of this comes to the hearing of the uninformed,that, s to say, to those caught up with the things of the world, whoimagine that there s nothing beyond nstances of individual being andwho think that by their own intellectual resources they can have adirect

knowledgeof him who has made the shadows his

hiding place.And if initiation nto the divine is beyond such people, what is to besaid of those others, still more uninformed, who describe he transcen-dent Cause of all things in terms derived from the lowest orders ofbeing, and who claim that it is in no way superior to the godless,multiformed hapes hey themselves have made?"

According to Dionysius, idolaters confuse God with things. The other "un-informed" ones, perhaps Middle Platonist philosophers, confuse God with

concepts."2 In another text, Dionysius anticipates how this latter group might

8Dionysius draws the metaphor of sculpting from Plotinus (Enn. 1.6.9). Aphairesis (daXaipeoTc,"clearing aside," "removal") includes both a sculptor's carving and a logician's denial, the"subtraction" of attributes from a subject.

9Some scholars, particularly von Balthasar, downplay or even deny this polemic tone.

Citing Letters 7.1077c-80a, von Balthasar writes (Glory, 149): "Nothing is more character-istic of Denys than his rejection of apologetic: why engage in controversy? To do so is onlyto descend to the level of one's attacker." Elsewhere, von Balthasar implies that Dionysiuswishes to "adopt an irenical position" (p. 162). This is a generous interpretation of Dionysianmotives, but it is not supported by the corpus.

'0For Dionysius, both things and concepts "exist"; see Mystical Theology l.lOOO1a-b.

"Ibid.'2Regarding such Dionysian passages, Derrida remarks "one is not far from the innuendo

that ontology itself is a subtle or perverse idolatry" ("Denials," 90). In Dionysius, this is not

merely innuendo but an explicit, definitive statement of his entire theological project.




criticize the biblical use of material images for God, preferring to likenGod to concepts.13

It could be argued hat if the [scripture writers] wanted o give corpo-real form to what is purely incorporeal, hey. .. should have begunwith what we would hold to be noblest, immaterial nd transcendentbeings [for instance, Word and Mind].14

Now these sacred hapes certainly how more reverence nd seem vastlysuperior o the making of images drawn rom the world. Yet they areactually no less defective than this latter, for the Deity is far beyondevery manifestation f being and of life. . every reason or intelli-

gence falls short of similarity o [the Deity].15

Dionysius accepts the philosophers' view that material images cannot reachGod. The philosophers' own solution, that is, to regard concepts as moreadequate for representing God, however, fails as well. Concepts and mate-rial images both fall short of Dionysius's God, and for the same reason:God is beyond being. Thus he writes: "In the scriptures the Deity hasbenevolently taught us that understanding and direct contemplation of itselfis inaccessible to beings, since it actually surpasses being."16

ForDionysius, knowing

that God isbeyond being (U'Oepootooc) givesstructure to theological speech. Any way of attributing being to God is

mistaken. Moreover, Dionysius suggests, such attribution follows a clearlydefined pattern. As a preface to Dionysius's discussion of this pattern, Ishall first briefly consider how things or concepts are spoken about inordinary language. If someone says that a thing x is white, the listenerunderstands as well that it is not red. To assert a characteristic of any x isalso to deny some other characteristic(s) of it. The converse is also true. Ifsomeone says that x is not red, the listener assumes that it is some other

characteristic-perhaps white, or transparent,or invisible but audible. That

is, she understands that there is some assertion to be made about x, eventhough she may not know what that assertion is. To be a thing x is to havecertain characteristics and not to have others.

'3Dionysius's discussion of biblical names in chapter 2 of Celestial Hierarchy begins withthe issue of names for angels. As Rorem notes (Symbols, 86), however, it is clear that thediscussion is also about the use of names for God.

4Celestial Hierarchy 2.137b-c.15Ibid., 140c-d. Among other interpreters of Dionysius, Aquinas was uncomfortable with

the apparent sense of this passage. Appealing to common sense, Aquinas denied that Dionysius

regarded all affirmations concerning God as equally defective. For example, Aquinas empha-sized (S.th. la.13.2) how much better it is to say that "God is good" than to say "God is a

body."16Divine Names 1.588c.



JOHN N. JONES 359

In The Divine Names, Dionysius writes, "It is not that [the Cause of all]exists here and not there. He does not possess this kind of existence andnot that.""7 Thus, Dionysius characterizes the way that assertion and denialare ordinarily juxtaposed when speaking about things, and rejects this jux-taposition in the case of the Cause of all.18 Later in the same chapter,Dionysius adds that the Cause of all "is not any one thing"; therefore thelanguage one uses only for a particular being-"it is this and not that"-is not appropriate for the Cause.19 Although Dionysius rejects the juxtapo-sition of assertion and denial for speech about the Cause of all, he doespermit some kind of role for multiple assertions or multiple denials.

E The Corrective: Appropriate Ways of Speaking about GodIn the same Divine Names passage, Dionysius writes:

He is all things since he is the Cause of all things. .. But he is alsosuperior o them all because he precedes hem and is transcendentallyabove them. Therefore every attribute may be predicated of him, andyet he is not any thing.20

'7Ibid., 5.824a-b.'8Particularly on the basis of Mystical Theology 4-5, almost all interpreters agree that

denials occur when Greek nouns, and adjectives of both positive and negative form (such as"in motion" and "motionless"), are said not to apply to a subject. Thus, in Mystical Theology5.1048a, Dionysius writes that God is not "in motion," not "motionless," and neither error nortruth.

19In other words, for Dionysius any of the "names" for God, such as "mind" or "life" or"lifeless," are privative, since they refer to particular being and therefore imply a lack of

perfection.Letters 6 may also address the juxtaposition of assertion and denial. Dionysius writes

(Letters 6.1077a) that "what is not red does not have to be white. What is not a horse is not

necessarily a human." Although this letter does not discuss denial or assertion explicitly, thereare three reasons for linking this passage with Divine Names 5.824a-b. First, both discuss thatfalse conclusions are drawn from incorrect assumptions about the relation between negativeand positive claims. Second, the letter's overall message, that the addressee has merely tradedone mistake for another, correlates well with the Dionysian view of ambiguous denials. Third,according to Hathaway (Hierarchy, 71), Letters 6 contains terms that "one would normallyassociate with a treatise on logic." If Letters 6 addresses denial, then Hathaway's provocativesuggestion about the relation between the numbering of the Parmenidean hypotheses in

neoplatonism and the numbering of the Dionysian letters would find support. He writes (Hi-erarchy, 80), "the sixth hypothesis represents (the absurdity of) relative not-being, and theSixth Letter connects the problem of falsehood and appearance with relative not-being (no one

should attack a particular religious belief or practice as not being good, since not-being-Xnever necessarily implies being-Y, i.e., it is the being, the positive nature of a thing, whichmust be known or recognized)."

20Divine Names 5.824b.




For speech about God, assertions belong together and denials belong to-gether, thus forming distinct ways to name God. Because they functiondifferently, however, one should not combine assertions and denials. Theformer articulate God as Cause of all; the latter articulate God as transcen-dent. Combining the two yields language that may apply equally to Godand to things, thus failing to show that God is unique and separate frombeings.

Assertion (Oicnc): In order to avoid using language that does not reflectGod's uniqueness, one hastens to qualify any assertion about God in a waythat implies no denial. For example, one juxtaposes several assertions thatcannot in ordinary language apply to any one thing. The multiplicity ofnames for God in Divine Names, such as "power itself' and "truth," ypifythis kind of speech.21 Since these names, in combination, clearly do notrefer to any particular being, the way of assertions, or what Dionysius callsaffirmative theology, adequately distinguishes God from beings. As a re-sult, the "is" of an expression such as "God is power itself' takes on ametaphorical sense; any asserted name both is God and is not God, depend-ing upon the sense in which it is used. This double sense, identity anddifference, follows from the role of assertions in articulating God's causal-ity: for Dionysius as for Greek Neoplatonists, a cause is both immanent toits effect and distinct from it. The "not" of "is and is not" is part of howaffirmative theology articulates divine causality. Discussing the sense ofbiblical names in Dionysius, Rorem correctly calls attention to the negativeelement, the "not," of names understood in a metaphorical sense.22 I donot, however, agree with his claim that this kind of negativity emerges onlywhen negative theology corrects affirmative theology. Affirmative theologyhas a kind of negativity proper to itself; for Dionysius, affirmative theologyin its own right is metaphorical discourse distinguishing God from all beings.

Individual Denials and the Denialof

AllBeings:

The case of denials,which articulate God's transcendence, is more complicated logically thanthe case of assertions. If one says that God is both power and truth, oneavoids any confusion between God and thing or concept, since no thing orconcept that exists in a particular way is both power and truth. If one saysthat God is neither power nor truth, however, one has not excluded much:

21"Power": bid., 11.953c; "truth": bid., 7.872c-73a.22Rorem, Symbols, 89. Although the "symbols" in the title of Rorem's monograph suggest

material images for God, such as those discussed in chapter 2 of Celestial Hierarchy, Rorem'sanalysis applies equally to non-material, conceptual names, such as those in Divine Names.Hence I prefer to speak of "metaphors."



JOHN N. JONES 361

God could still be a "lion," a "drunkard," r several other things.23 One canuse denial (dctaipeotc) adequately to distinguish God from beings by makingcontradictory denials about God, denials that cannot both be true of anybeing. Thus, as Dionysius writes in the conclusion of Mystical Theology,God neither "lives" nor is "lifeless," neither "possesses speech" nor is"speechless."24 This way of speaking is unusual, imparting to MysticalTheology its paradoxical character. It does not, however, imply that one hasabandoned all rules for speech about God. It is only the case that God isboth y and not-y because other statements about God are true without beingnegated in any way; the equivalence of y and not-y does not hold for ally.

One can also deny all possible names of God simultaneously. In the firstchapter of Divine Names, Dionysius writes that:

since the union of divinized minds with the Light beyond all deityoccurs in the cessation of all intelligent activity, the godlike unifiedminds who imitate hese angels as far as possible praise t most appro-priately hrough he denial of all beings. Truly and supernaturally n-lightened after this blessed union, they discover that although t is thecause of everything, t is not a thing since it transcends ll things in amanner beyond being.25

This passage is central to Dionysian negative theology. It shows that thehighest articulation of God that humans can achieve is through "the denialof all beings" (8td tr c av 6vcovT3v d0tpOVO pc<o). There is noth-ing higher.26 This high regard for the denial of all beings has a closeparallel in the following passage from Mystical Theology:

I pray we could come to this darkness o far above light! If only welacked sight and knowledge so as to see, so as to know, unseeing andunknowing, hat which lies beyond all vision and knowledge. For this

would be really to see and to know: to praise the Transcendent One ina transcending way, namely through he denial of all beings (t&a TijcmdvTcoV COv vTov doatlpoecOX). We would be like sculptors who

set out to carve a statue. They remove every obstacle to the pure viewof the hidden image, and simply by this act of clearing aside(d(XaitpEoet) they show up the beauty which is hidden.27

23"Lion": Celestial Hierarchy 2.144d; "drunkard": Mystical Theology 3.1033b, c.24Mystical Theology 4-5.1040d; 1045d.25Divine Names 1.593b-c.

26Unlike Mystical Theology 5.1048b below, the translation for i;v does not affect themeaning of Divine Names 1.593b-c; to deny each being is to deny all beings.

27Mystical Theology 2.1025a-b.




As Divine Names 1.593b-c indicates, this transcendent knowing is not merelyto be hoped for: some humans do achieve it.28 In both of these passages,the transcendent God is articulated through "the denial of all beings."29

If the denial of all beings articulates the highest God, however, whydoes Dionysius write, in one of the concluding phrases of Mystical Theol-ogy, that the Cause of all is "beyond every denial" ()KTE?p niooavd(aip?elv)?30 This passage suggests that one cannot reach God by anykind of denial at all. For this reason, interpreters such as Rorem, vonBalthasar, and Vanneste suggest that in Mystical Theology, even denial isultimately denied as adequate for speech about God. Dionysian negativetheology involves, as Roques calls it, "negations doubles," or self-nega-tion.31 This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the previous pas-

28Divine Names 1.596a suggests that scripture writers are among the "unified minds." AsRorem emphasizes throughout Symbols (for example, 18), "theologian" for Dionysius meansscripture writer (as in Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 3.432b). Chapter 2 of Mystical Theologymakes clear that Moses is among the unified minds as well.

29For example, Paul knew the inscrutable and unsearchable God by knowing that God wasbeyond mind (Letters 5.1073a). In Letters 1 as well, knowledge as "unknowing" is a reference

point for discussing the highest God: "And this quite positively complete unknowing is knowledgeof him who is above everything that is known" (1065a-b).

30Mystical Theology 5.1048b.31Rene Roques, Structures theologiques de la Gnose d Richard de Saint Victor: Essais et

analyses critiques (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962) 143. Treating negations anddenials as synonymous, Rorem (Complete Works, 140 n.17) writes that Mystical Theologyconcludes by negating negation, by "abandoning all speech and thought, even negations." On

p. 136 n. 6, he also writes of Mystical Theology 1.1000b: "Here at the outset and again at itsconclusion (MT 5.1048b 16-21), the treatise refutes the impression that negations can capturethe transcendent Cause of all." Similarly, von Balthasar (Glory, 206) interprets the conclusionof Mystical Theology as saying that "God is not only beyond all affirmations but beyond allnegations too." Mystical Theology does not, however, abandon all forms of negative language;since the denial of all being is appropriate to the transcendent God, individual denials are

abandoned.Jan Vanneste also understands the denial that falls short of God in chapter 5 of Mystical

Theology as including even the denial of all being (Le Mystere de Dieu: Essai sur la structurerationelle de la doctrine mystique du pseudo-Denys I'Areopagite [Brussels: Declde de Brouwer,1959] 48-51, 119-20, 154-55, 165). Apparently, Vanneste notices the difficulty of harmoniz-ing this reading of Mystical Theology 5 with passages such as Divine Names 1. He suggests,therefore, in part on the basis of Dionysius's discussion of Moses' ascent of Mount Sinai inMystical Theology 3, that no kind of denial reaches God; the moment of aphairesis is surpassedby unknowing (dyvo/oia), which in turn is surpassed by union (evootc). Vanneste's

groundbreaking exegesis of Mystical Theology, however, is inaccurate on this point. In Mys-tical Theology 3, Moses does not leave aphairesis behind in favor of agnosia. "He pushes aheadto the summit of the divine ascents. And yet he does not meet God himself, but contemplates,not Him who is invisible, but where he dwells." Clearly the summit of divine ascents isequivalent to "the holiest and highest of the things perceived with the eye of the body or themind," that is, things and concepts, or beings. Moses is united with God at the very moment hebreaks free of "all that the mind may conceive, wrapped. . . in the invisible." That is, the



JOHN N. JONES 363

sages and is exegetically unnecessary. The problem is the translation ofTCav. As the previous passages show, Dionysius holds that there is nothingbeyond the God who is reached through the denial of all beings. Thispassage, therefore, does not mean that the highest God is beyond denialsconsidered as a whole. Here iCav does not mean "all together" but "each":the highest God exceeds what any individual denial expresses. Although thedenial of all beings adequately and unambiguously expresses that God isnot a being, individual denials do not do so. This is the first main point ofthis study: there is a difference between individual denial(s) and the denialof all beings at once; this difference is central to Dionysian theology.

This difference underscores the ambiguity of individual denials and theimportance of using them correctly. Dionysius elsewhere implies that deni-als have both an ordinary sense and a sense appropriate to God as transcen-dent.32 Individual assertions and denials, therefore, are inadequate for theGod spoken of in terms of "the assertion of all things, the denial of allthings, that which is beyond each assertion and denial."33 Divine Names2.641a may illuminate another phrase in the conclusion of Mystical Theol-ogy: "[The Cause of all] is beyond assertion and denial. We make asser-tions and denials of what is next to it, but never of it."34 If consistent withthe previous passages, this phrase does not mean that one does not employassertion, and neither does one employ denial, since one must deny allbeings of the highest God. The phrase means that God exceeds what canbe expressed by each individual assertion and each denial.35

The Subordinate Role of the Assertion of All Beings: For Dionysius,the highest God is correctly known or sculpted through the denial of allbeings, through multiple denials not conjoined with assertions.36 On purelylogical grounds, Dionysius might have given the assertion of all beings thesame status, since assertions together suffice to distinguish God from par-

aphairesis of all beings, agnosia, and henosis are not successive moments. They are simulta-neous.

Although Vanneste rejects the idea of temporal succession (Mystere, 49), his discussionof logical succession still introduces a division not found in the text.

32Divine Names 2.640b.33Ibid., 2.641a. Here, Luibheid and Rorem translate inv as "every."34Mystical Theology 5.1048b.35This reading shows other apparently contradictory phrases in the corpus to have a straight-

forward meaning. For instance, in Mystical Theology 3.1033c, Dionysius discusses how to"deny that which is beyond each denial" (Complete Works: "every denial"). Despite its para-doxical appearance, this phrase means simply that Dionysius will show how to employ somekind of aphairesis to articulate the transcendent God, "that which is beyond every denial."This is done through the denial of all beings.

36This denial applies to the three persons of the Trinity as well (for example, MysticalTheology 5.1048a).




ticular beings. Indeed, Dionysius's frequent juxtaposition of assertion anddenial, and even of the assertion of all things and the denial of all

things,37shows how closely the two are related. Although both suffice to separateGod from beings, however, the two ways do not have equal status. InDivine Names, Dionysius writes:

This is the sort of language we must use about God, for he is praisedfrom all things according o their proportion o him as their Cause. Butagain, the most divine knowledge of God, that which comes throughunknowing, s achieved n a union far beyond mind, when mind turnsaway from all things, even from itself, and when it is made one withthe

dazzling rays, beingthen and there

enlightened bythe inscrutable

depth of Wisdom.38

In a passage preceding this one,39 transcendence/the denial of all things isjuxtaposed with the cause of all things; both are ways to approach God. Inthis passage, the denial of all beings, which as we saw earlier correlateswith union and unknowing, is made superior to assertion. Dionysius re-affirms this superiority in passages pertaining to negation which I shallexamine below.40

Before discussing negation, however, I shall briefly examine the impli-

cations of the hierarchical relationship between two ways of articulatingGod. Following Corsini, Gersh suggests that Dionysius and other ChristianNeoplatonists represent a decisive moment in Western philosophical his-tory. This moment is characterized by a move to logical self-contradiction,wherein the first two Parmenidean hypotheses, which correlate to somedegree to what I call denials and assertions, are both attributed to God.Thus, it is true both that God is "at rest" and "moving" and that God is notat rest and not moving.41 The characterization "self-contradiction" misrep-resents Dionysian theology, however, and exaggerates its departure from its

sources. First, self-contradiction often implies incoherence or ambiguity ina logical structure; Dionysius's structure, that is, his ways for speaking

37Divine Names 2.641a.38Ibid., 7.872a-b. Mystical Theology 2 also discusses the relation between unknowing,

union, and denial.39Divine Names 7.869d-72a.40Celestial Hierarchy 2.140d-41 a; Mystical Theology 2.1000a-b.41Gersh, amblichus, 11, 155-56; Eugenio Corsini, II trattato 'De divinis nominibus' dello

Pseudo-Dionigi e i commenti neoplatonici al Parmenide (Turin: Giappichelli, 1962) esp. 42,115-22.

Andrew Louth (Denys the Areopagite [Wilton, CT: Morehouse Barlow, 1989] 87), implic-itly following Gersh and Corsini, suggests that Dionysius rejects the Proclean framework,which clearly distinguishes negative and affirmative theologies. According to Louth, Dionysiusbrings the two together "in stark paradox." Louth undermines the force of this claim, however,by writing that denials are truer than affirmations (ibid., 88).



JOHN N. JONES 365

about God, is quite coherent. Second, even if one finds "self-contradiction"a useful expression for coherent language, assertions and denials do not

have equal status in Dionysius. The kind of contradiction Gersh mentionsrequires that the same thing x be in the same respect both y and not-y. Ofcourse, one may read Dionysius as saying that even though the two waysof speaking refer to different aspects of God, nonetheless they both some-how refer to the same God. Third, even if this were true, the problem ofkinds of predication arises. As noted earlier, at least some forms of Dionysiantheological language are metaphorical anguage, not ordinary anguage. SinceDionysius uses "is" in a particular way, therefore, one cannot reject thelogical coherence of his statements such as "God is at rest and not at rest"

unless one can show their metaphorical sense to be contradictory.Fourth and most importantly, even if one wishes to analyze metaphorical

language as literal predication, the peculiarity of Dionysian logic does notarise only when he applies assertions and denials to God. He already vio-lates ordinary logic within the way of assertions, wherein he applies non-identical names, such as "power" and "truth," to God;42 moreover, thisaspect of Dionysian negative theology is unremarkable in Neoplatonistthought.

However one chooses to characterize the relation between assertions

and denials in Dionysian theology, the denial of all beings remains appro-priate to God in a way that individual assertions, individual denials, and theassertion of all beings do not. Negations clarify and indeed exemplify thisdistinction.

Negations and the Way of Negation (cda6dao}c): Few have studied theprecise relation between denial and negation. Although Vanneste long agoobserved that the two appear to function differently, scholars often regardthem as synonymous.43 Properly understood, however, negations help illus-trate the difference between kinds of denial, because they are distinct fromindividual denials and correlative to the denial of all beings.

In Mystical Theology 1.1000la-b, Dionysius writes:

But see to it that none of this comes to the hearing of the uninformed,that is to say, to those caught up with the things of the world, whoimagine that there s nothing beyond nstances of individual being and

420r, to choose examples from the Parmenidean hypotheses, God is both at rest and moving(Divine Names 9.916b-d).

43Vanneste, Mystere, 58. Louth (Origins, 167, 174), translates docaip?ol as "negation,"

but in his discussion of related passages refers to denial. An early French translation of thecorpus (Maurice de Gandillac, trans., (Evres Completes du Pseudo-Denys L'Areopagite [Paris:Aubier, 1943]) sometimes renders doatip?oti as "depouillement," but also renders both d(oaipeotiand danoaotlc as "negation." Rorem and Roques consistently refer to both d)atipe?ct anddcoir6aots as negation (negation).




who think that by their own intellectual resources they can have adirect knowledge of him who has made the shadows his hiding place.And if initiation nto the divine is beyond such people, what is to besaid of those others, still more uninformed, who describe he transcen-dent Cause of all things in terms derived from the lowest orders ofbeing, and who claim that it is in no way superior o the godless,multiformed hapes they themselves have made? What has actually tobe said about the Cause of everything s this. Since it is the Cause ofall beings, we should posit and ascribe to it all the affirmations wemake in regard o beings, and, more appropriately, e should negateall these affirmations, ince it surpasses all being. Now we should notconclude hat he negations are simply he opposites of the affirmations,but rather hat the cause of all is considerably prior to this, beyondprivations, beyond each denial, beyond each assertion.44

This passage clarifies the meaning and relation of assertion, denial, affir-mation, and negation. Dionysius relates all affirmations to God as Cause,and he subordinates all affirmations to negation. I have already shown thatdivine causality relates to the assertion of all beings and that this is sub-ordinate to transcendence and the denial of all beings. This raises the pos-sibility that the denial of all being correlates with what Dionysius calls

negation.Chapter two of The Celestial Hierarchy supports this suggestion.

Dionysius insists that concepts are as deficient as material images in rep-resenting God.45 After saying this, Dionysius proceeds to contrast such

ways of representing God, that is, affirmations, with negation, another kindof scriptural device.46 He states that the way of negation "seems to [him]much more appropriate" than affirmation, "more suitable to the realm ofthe divine." This is similar to the preference he showed earlier for thedenial of all beings over the assertion of all beings. Similar too is his

reasoning: "God is in no way like the things that have being and we haveno knowledge at all of his incomprehensible and ineffable transcendenceand invisibility."47 This strengthens the case that for Dionysius, negationand the denial of all beings are synonymous. As I noted earlier, however,the denial of all beings functions very differently than an individual denial.Thus negations, too, would function differently than individual denials.

To explain this difference, I shall examine two unusual features of this

passage. First, in this chapter, Dionysius discusses not merely affirmation

44Luibheid and Rorem render diav in the final phrase as "every." Throughout the corpus,Dionysius explicitly relates being and knowability. One can know only what has being; whatis beyond being is by definition unknowable.

45Celestial Hierarchy 2.140c-d.46Ibid., 2.140d-41a.47Ibid., 2.140d-41a.



JOHN N. JONES 367

in general but specific examples of biblical representations of God, such as"Word" and "life." Few have noted that, similarly, when Dionysius dis-cusses negation, he does not merely describe a general way of speaking butspecific examples of such speech. Indeed, this passage is the only one inthe Dionysian corpus where particular words are explicitly and unambigu-ously identified as examples of negations.48 According to Dionysius, "[thedeity] is described as invisible, infinite, ungraspable."49 This sentence sug-gests that the following passage in Divine Names discusses negation proper,and not merely negative language in general:50

it is customary or theologians to apply negative terms to God, but

contrary o the usual sense of a deprivation. Scripture, or example,calls the all-apparent ight "invisible." t says regarding he One ofmany praises and many names that he is ineffable and nameless. Itsays of the One who is present n all things and who may be discov-ered from all things that he is ungraspable nd "inscrutable."

Similar clusters of such words appear elsewhere in Divine Names5l (invis-ible, incomprehensible, "unsearchable and inscrutable") and in Letters52(invisible, inscrutable, unsearchable, inexpressible).

These words share certain features. Dionysius describes each of them as

biblical representations; he does not describe all denials in this way. More-over, each negation is not only alpha-privative in form, a feature sharedwith Greek words such as "at rest" and "lifeless," but also denotative of thedenial of what is characteristic of all beings.53 This explains the continu-ation of the Celestial Hierarchy passage: "[The deity] is described as invis-ible, infinite, ungraspable, and other things which show not what he is but

48Rorem (Symbols, 86) suggests that tropos in this passage does not convey any technicalsense; it means simply "manner" or "mode" of speaking. Whatever its meaning here, however,note that Dionysius provides specific examples of negations, not simply negative language ingeneral.

49Celestial Hierarchy 2.140d.50Divine Names 7.865b-c.51Ibid., 1.588c.52Letters 5.1073a-76a.53The word "negation" always articulates transcendence. Yet, although most words that

can function as negations logically denoting God's transcendence (for example, "unknow-able," "ungraspable"), two do not: infinite and invisible. For this reason, Dionysius can attimes apply these words to beings. Why then does he use them as negations at all? There aretwo possibilities. First, these words derive from the same scriptural passages as other nega-tions, so the words may connote transcendence. Second, the words may denote transcendencein a modified way. Whenever Dionysius uses "light" as a metaphor for the conceptual, the"invisible" indicates what is beyond both thought and perception. Also, if Dionysius, likeother Neoplatonist writers, is undecided whether the realm of being has an infinity of its own,"infinite" may at times negate all being.




what in fact he is not."54 As we saw in chapter seven of Divine Names, thiskind of negativity does not imply the privation and particular being impliedby individual denials. Indeed, if negations were simply like individualdenials, the rhetorical structure of chapter two of Celestial Hierarchy wouldmake little sense. Dionysius has just finished describing words that seem tohonor God but in fact fail to do so because they do not adequately distin-guish God from beings. Why then offer as a corrective other inadequatewords?

Negations are in fact not inadequate for speech about the transcendentGod. Indeed, whenever Dionysius mentions them, he identifies them as thejustification for saying that God is beyond being. One sees the method-ological importance of negations in the second remarkable feature of thisCelestial Hierarchy passage. Dionysius writes:

this second way of talking about him seems to me much more appro-priate, for, as the secret and sacred radition has instructed, God is inno way like the things that have being and we have no knowledge atall of his incomprehensible nd ineffable transcendence nd invisibil-ity.55

Regarding negation, this passage is tautological: one says that God is

"ungraspable" because one cannot grasp God's ungraspability. The wordand the justification for using it are identical. This negation, like others, isnot one biblical representation among many; it is a representation thatgoverns the use of other representations. A negation repristinates transcen-dence, providing a summary of Dionysian negative theological method;individual denials are logical operations that follow from a negation.56 Thisis the second main point of this study: a negation and a denial are notsynonymous. Unlike an individual denial, a negation relates to the(im)possibility of knowing and saying anything about God. It is, so to

speak, a second-order rule for the employment of first-order names.57 As aresult, Dionysius never rejects negations for speech about God; becauseDionysius's God surpasses individual assertions and denials, one negateswhen speaking theologically.58

54Celestial Hierarchy 2.140d.55Ibid., 2.140d-41 a.56Rorem (Symbols, 6, 25, 49, 63, etc.) persuasively argues that Dionysian theology, both

affirmative and negative, is a method for interpreting the concrete representations in scriptureand liturgy. Rorem may not give sufficient attention, however, to what kind of method the

theologyis.

Negations,which are

ultimately true,show that all other

biblical representationsfall short of the transcendent God.57Mystical Theology 5.1048a.58This reading implies that there are negations as well as denials in Mystical Theology 5.

In his helpful discussion, Roques (L'univers dionysien: Structure hierarchique du monde



JOHN N. JONES 369

E Implications of this InterpretationI have argued that in Dionysian theology there is a strong distinction

between two kinds of denial, the denial of particular being and the denialof all beings, and that negation correlates with the latter. I have also arguedthat, properly understood, Dionysian negative theology is neither self-negating nor self-contradictory. Without debating the philosophical or theo-logical merits of this theology, I consider it important to note briefly whyits logical structure, even when properly understood, lends itself so easilyto such readings. I summarize Dionysian negative theology roughly asfollows: "God is not a being and so cannot be known or spoken of asbeings are known or spoken of." Is this statement itself a kind of assertionabout God? Many modern and most postmodern readers would answer inthe affirmative, regarding any sentence about a subject as a kind ofpredicative act, a kind of knowledge and speech. This view makes even thedenial of all beings an assertion, because it is considered impossible toavoid saying something about "what God is" when speaking, even whenspeaking of what is beyond being.59 For instance, Derrida interpretsDionysius as struggling to utter God's inutterability but always saying toomuch, bringing God into the realm of word and being by the very act ofspeaking.60 Dionysius never says, however, that he

regardsall

speechabout

God, including negative theology, as speech about being. Moreover, hissystematic distinction between negation and the language of privation, towhich he assigns distinct functions, shows that he does not regard both aslanguages of particular being. In light of this distinction, current construc-tive theologies should be conscious of the difference between how Dionysiantheology may be retrieved and how it is to be interpreted in its own right.

E Sculpting God: a Reinterpretation f The Mystical Theology

In light of the previous discussion, I shall attempt a summary of Mys-tical Theology. This short treatise opens with Dionysius's address to the

selon le pseudo-Denys [Paris: Aubier, Montaigne, 1954] 206-7) understands the negations ofCelestial Hierarchy 2 as quite similar to "monstrous," dissimilar images for God from scrip-ture, such as eagle or drunkard. Both fall short of God, but at least both leave the intelligenceunsatisfied, so that the mind knows not to dwell on them as adequate representations of God.In my reading, Dionysius juxtaposes negations and monstrous images not because they havethe same status but because negations are the rationale for the value of dissimilar images.Dionysius's God is indeed "ungraspable." If one must use images, therefore, it is better to useimages that are less likely to appear adequate for depicting God.

59In other words, as Celestial Hierarchy 2.141a in particular shows, Dionysian negativetheology requires that some predicates are not conceptual.

60According to Derrida, Dionysius wishes to gesture to a hyperessentiality beyond predi-cation, negation, and conceptualization ("Denials," 74, 77). I would respond that, for Dionysius,negations proper are so stripped of conceptuality that they do not risk delimiting God.




Trinity beyond being, asking it to lead Christians to the "highest peak ofmystic scripture," a place characterized by paradox. Then, beginning hisaddress to Timothy, Dionysius urges him to leave behind "everything per-ceptible and understandable," that is, as I have said above, things andconcepts. He urges Timothy to say nothing of this ascent to those whothink that God is a material object or a concept. It is appropriate to likenGod to particular beings, "since it is the Cause of all beings," and moreappropriate to negate, since "it surpasses all being." Using language similarto that of Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius interprets Moses' ascent of MountSinai as the mind's ascent to the place of unknowing.61 In chapter two,Dionysius introduces the metaphor of the statue: sculptors "remove everyobstacle to the pure view of the hidden image, and simply by this act ofclearing aside (dCoaipeotc) they show up the beauty which is hidden."62Dionysius carries out this carving in the following chapters. In chapterthree, he gives examples of beings that form the material for carving:descriptions of God according to "forms, figures, and instruments" such as"sleeping," "drunk," and "hungover." As such perceptible images are carvedaway, only concepts remain.63 The higher the mind's ascent, the less thatremains to be carved away. Language ultimately "falters" where the finalobstacles have been removed, the final beings denied. The statue is carved;language is "at one with him who is indescribable."64

Despite their more paradoxical appearance, chapters four and five merelyrehearse these same ideas in greater detail. Chapter four says that God isnot anything that might characterize material objects: having shape, form,quality, quantity, and weight; perceptible; changing; divisible. Chapter fiveremoves concepts from God, but nonetheless continues to say a great dealabout the ungraspable God, for example, that God cannot be named orknown.65 It is only the presence of such unnegated speech that makes

sculpture,and the concreteness and specificity it implies, an appropriate

metaphor for Dionysian negative theology; as Rolt observes, a theology ofpure negativity would seek not to carve a block of marble but to destroy

61Louth (Origins, 175) discusses Dionysius's relation to Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysianecstasy; Louth's further discussion of the difference between the human and angelic hierar-chies and the hierarchies of names for God (Origins, 176-78 and Denys, 105) is unequalledin its clarity.

62Mystical Theology 2.1025a-b.63Ibid., 3.1033b.

64Ibid., 1033c.65I hope, in a later study, to examine the relation between negations proper and phrases that

appear to be roughly synonymous with them, such as "free of every limitation" (MysticalTheology 1048b).



JOHN N. JONES 371

it.66 The conclusion of Mystical Theology, that God is beyond each indi-vidual assertion and denial, serves an aesthetic and a logical function. It

shows that in Dionysius's view no more carving (denial) is necessary.Moreover, by repeating the language of chapter one, it shows that theproject of (non-)predication announced in chapter one is completed.

Nonetheless, the work of sculpting this statue may not be as finished asDionysius believes. To some, the stone remaining on the pedestal appearsindistinguishable from the stone pieces carved away. Artists taking Dionysiusas their master may both appreciate the beauty of his creation and wonderif it must be sculpted still further, and what form, if any, would representits consummation.

66C. E. Rolt, trans., Dionysius the Areopagite: "The Divine Names" and "The MysticalTheology" (8th ed.; London: SPCK, 1977) 195 n.1.

sculpting god - the logic of dionysian negative theology

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