science and history: a reply to turner

The Sociological Quarterly

47

(2006) 465–470 © 2006 Midwest Sociological Society

465

The Sociological Quarterly ISSN 0038-0253

Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Oxford, UK and Malden, USATSQThe Sociological Quarterly0038-02532006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.2006473465470MARXISM, POSITIVISM, AND HISTORICISM: AN EXCHANGE

A Reply to TurnerRichard York

and Brett Clark

*Direct all correspondence to Richard York, Department of Sociology, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR

97403-1291; e-mail: [email protected]

SCIENCE AND HISTORY: A Reply to Turner

Richard York*

University of Oregon

Brett Clark

University of Oregon

We are honored that a scholar of Jonathan Turner’s stature has found our article worthyof extended commentary, and we are grateful for this opportunity to engage in a dialoguewith him. We find Turner’s comment interesting and thought provoking. However, itdemonstrates a misunderstanding of the central purpose of our article, which was topresent the connections between Marxism and positivism by demonstrating the scientificnature of the Marxist enterprise, not to critique positivism. Apparently, because of hisinaccurate perception that we were mounting an assault on positivism, or science moregenerally, his comment takes on a defensive tone, struggling to deflect an attack that wenever made. Since Turner is off the mark from the start, his comment becomes increas-ingly confused as it unfolds. We must therefore focus our reply on correcting this elabo-rate distortion of our work and of scientific traditions in sociology more generally.

We find it telling that throughout his long comment, in which he systematically mis-represents our argument, he

never once

quotes our article. He appears committed to pro-viding a rather tired defense of his position against his narrow conception of critiques ofit, regardless of whether such critiques were actually made. As we read it, underlying thetangential remarks and digressions, Turner’s critique of our article is based on four asser-tions, each of which demonstrates his confusion.

First, despite our clear statement in the introduction (as well as at numerous otherpoints) that the purpose of our article is to show that “there are substantial connectionsbetween the Marxist and positivist traditions with regard to scientific analysis of the social(and natural) world” (York and Clark 2006:425; see also the start of the conclusion onpage 442) and that “much of the tension between these two great methodological-theo-retical traditions stems from a failure of each to appreciate the central concerns of theother” (York and Clark 2006:426), Turner characterizes our argument as a critique of pos-itivism throughout his comment. We are clear throughout our article that we are notattempting to devastate positivism (as Turner suggests [2006:455]) or deliver it a “fatalblow” (Turner 2006:460), but rather are trying to reveal connections between it andMarxism. For example, we make it clear that we are in part attempting to “expressimportant Marxist critiques of mainstream empirical work in the terminology of

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Richard York and Brett Clark

thinkers of a more positivistic persuasion” (York and Clark 2006:426) in order “to showthat a positivist program can address empirical conjectures based on Marxist theory”(York and Clark 2006:442). How Turner has managed to interpret our work as an unre-lenting attack on positivism is quite beyond us. Where we offer critiques, we are clear thatthey are of

specific practices or conceptualizations

, and when we generalize critiques to thepositivist tradition, we are careful to note that we apply these critiques only to its “cruderforms” (York and Clark 2006:428), not its more sophisticated versions—just as we arecareful to differentiate more sophisticated strains of Marxism from crude, nonmaterialisttraditions of Marxism.

Second, Turner (2006) attempts to define the positivist tradition strictly in the man-ner that he wants it to be, rather than to acknowledge the diversity of positions containedwithin it. As we noted, positivism (like Marxism) is a diverse tradition (York and Clark2006:427), and more than a few sociologists whom Turner (2006) apparently would notadmit into the fold identify themselves as doing work that is positivistic in nature. This isone reason we focused our comments on specific issues and did not offer a critique of thewhole positivist program. We also frequently indicate that we are viewing positivism in abroader sense, such as by referring to those with “positivist leanings” (York and Clark2006:426), rather than in the narrow sense of Turner’s (2006) orthodoxy.

Third, Turner (2006) appears to believe that positivism is synonymous with science,using the terms nearly interchangeably (Turner 2006), failing to recognize that positivismis but one of many approaches in the scientific enterprise. This is in part because heapparently considers work scientific only if it accepts an ontological assertion—that thereare fundamental laws that directly govern any phenomena of interest, in this case those ofthe social world. Turner defines the positivist goal as an effort “to formulate laws aboutthe underlying dynamics of, and fundamental relationships among, forces driving thesocial universe,” (Turner 2006:452) “to denote universal and generic properties of thesocial world,” (Turner 2006:452) and “to formulate and then to test laws that apply to

all

societies in

all

places and at

all

times” (Turner 2006:453). Underlying this position is anassumption that “there are timeless and invariant processes in the social universe, muchas there are in the physical and biological realms” (Turner 1985:25).

Although we are “in full agreement with positivism about the importance of ontolog-ical realism” (York and Clark 2006:428) and firmly accept that science must focus onmaterialist explanations, we consider the key characteristics of scientific work to beepistemological—wherein theory is developed on the basis of rational analysis andempirical evidence—and argue that whether fundamental laws directly govern any par-ticular set of phenomena is a scientific

question

, the answer to which should not beassumed

a priori

.We fully accept the existence of natural laws, such as those in physics and chemistry,

and we do not question that all human societies at all points in time are constrained bythese. For example, all societies must produce food, and food production is dependent onthe characteristics of the biophysical environment and the physical and chemical lawsthat govern it. However, we consider the existence of fundamental

social

laws that gobeyond the strictures of physics and chemistry to be an open question. As we wrote,


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Our concern is to show the potential for engagement between Marxists and positivistson the question about the nature of social “laws.” The materialist Marxist traditiongenerally is highly skeptical of the claim that most observed social phenomena can beexplained by spatiotemporally invariant social laws, although it does not a priorireject the possibility of such laws. . . . [O]ur argument is that the conflicting claims ofMarxists and positivists regarding the existence of invariant social laws can be adjudi-cated in a scientific research program and that one aspect of scientific sociology, be itpositivist or Marxist, should be aimed at establishing the distinction between forcesthat are historically particular and those that are truly ahistorical. (York and Clark2006:429)

We find it worth noting that although Turner (2006) speaks about the existence of sociallaws, he does not offer a social law that is the equivalent of the law of gravity in its charac-ter and determination. While general laws of production and of power have been pro-posed, they are far from being firmly established. Nevertheless, as the previously quotedpassage from our article demonstrates, we do not deny that such laws may exist nor are weopposed to the search for them. We simply believe that there is more to scientific sociol-ogy than looking for such laws, and we are concerned that historically emergent lawlikeregularities (“social gravity”) that only operate in a specific era will easily be misidentifiedas spatiotemporally invariant if we uncritically “assume that the forces driving the forma-tion” of social systems, or modes of production, “

are the same

” (Turner 2006:456) in allplaces at all points in time. This is why we develop and explain the concept of social grav-ity in such detail and note that regularities may appear lawlike and invariant when they,in fact, only characterize a specific context.

Turner (2006) is outright wrong about the nature of laws in the natural sciences. Hestates that “[w]hat York and Clark seem to conflate is that laws are not about interactioneffects; rather, they are about generic forces per se” (Turner 2006:458). Turner’s assertionthat laws are not about interaction effects is simply not true as a generality. For example,the gas laws in physics describe regularities that emerge from the interaction of molecules.They are not “fundamental” themselves, since they are “(widely conjectured to be) tautol-ogous consequences of quantum mechanics” (Cohen and Stewart 1994:263). However,they are highly useful because they describe the dynamics of gases more concisely thancould be done by building up from quantum mechanics. Furthermore, Turner appearsunaware of the fact that there is debate within biology as to whether or not fundamentallaws can be formulated in the biological sciences (Gould 1970; McIntyre 1997; Mayr1982). Like human societies, biological systems are undoubtedly constrained by physicallaws, but their regularities and tendencies emerge from interactions of a diversity of parts(Lewontin 2000; Gould 2002; Mayr 1982). No doubt, in some sense, these emergent ten-dencies are reducible to the laws of physics. However, it would be absurd to argue thatmost biological (or sociological) processes can be

meaningfully or usefully

explained inquantum mechanics. This observation does not make biology unscientific, since, likeother sciences, it is based on rational and empirical epistemological foundations, but itdoes point to the particularities of biological systems that need to be understood in theirown terms. Likewise, the regularities of social systems are most likely due to emergent

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tendencies from the interaction of many underlying components. When propertiesemerge from complex interactions of components that are not readily understandablebased on studying each component in isolation, we need to study and understand theseproperties in their own terms, not ignore them because they do not fall within the narrowdomain of what Turner (2006) finds interesting. To ignore these emergent properties andinteractions (in both the natural and social world) is to strip the scientific enterprise ofmuch of its content and scope and to limit its ability to comprehend the development ofa dynamic world.

It is also worth noting that if sociological “laws” along the lines Turner (2006) is pro-posing do in fact exist, they are, despite his unwillingness to acknowledge it, historicallyemergent and context specific—unless, of course, Turner is proposing a strict physicaldeterminism (which we are quite sure he is not). After all, humans are products of history,having emerged from the process of biological evolution. If there are “laws” particular tohuman societies, they assumedly apply specifically to modern humans, not our ancestorsof several million years ago (unless Turner is arguing for extremely crude sociobiological-type laws that subsume sociological theory in its entirety under biological theory). Weassume Turner agrees with us that the unique properties of humans are not due to anyvitalistic or supernatural forces, but rather merely emerge from complex interactions ofentirely material processes. It logically follows that any laws particular to all human soci-eties are historically emergent (i.e., they came about as a result of the particular arrange-ment of matter and forces unique to humans, and beyond some point in the past, they didnot apply to our ancestors). We therefore do not see why emergent properties of societiesparticular to a specific historical era (social gravity) should be placed beyond the realm ofscientific inquiry, since they simply apply at a different level of generality (a specificsocial-historical context of the human species) than Turner’s proposed “timeless” socio-logical “laws” (which apply to the specific context of all human societies, but not all livingcreatures).

In short, we have a broader view of scientific sociology than Turner (2006) and areinterested in the full diversity of processes that influence the social world. We admitwithin the realm of scientific sociology explanations based on physical laws, biologicalprocesses, processes unique to human societies, and processes unique to particular typesof human societies (and, of course, we recognize the hyperparticularities that character-ize any specific historical event, although these are not our primary concern). The ques-tion for sociologists is where the most meaningful or useful explanation for any particularset of phenomena lies and how we can distinguish among the causal forces invoked by dif-ferent types of explanations. The materialist Marxist tradition argues that most phenom-ena of interest to social scientists are probably best explained by forces unique to ahistorical era, whereas sociological positivists prefer explanations based on processescommon to human societies in general. We argue that one type of explanation should notbe privileged a priori (and, once again, we also consider physical and biological explana-tions acceptable where appropriate) and that scientific sociology should attempt to iden-tify, understand, and distinguish among each type of explanation. One of the key pointsof our article was a methodological one: it is easy to confuse “laws” particular to a specific


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historical era with “laws” particular to humans in general, a point Turner seems reluctantto recognize. It is through engaging this particular concern that we can improve our abil-ity to differentiate between the two and enhance our understanding of human society andhistory.

Fourth, Turner creates a false dichotomy between science and history—positivismand historicism in his terminology—derisively suggesting that we are “fence sitting”(Turner 2006:462). In part, Turner’s dichotomy stems from reducing science to positiv-ism in general. Part of our intention in our article was to show that there is no fundamen-tal divide between science and history—in fact, we believe that historical analyses shouldbe done scientifically. Many of the natural sciences are

historical

sciences (e.g., geology,biology) and are in large part concerned with understanding not only the general forcesthat shape natural phenomena but also explaining how and why history actually unfoldedas it did. In our view then, sociology should be both historical

and

scientific, recognizingthat there are different levels of generality: from the physical forces that influence allmaterial phenomena; through the biological processes common to all life, the sociologi-cal forces common to all human societies, and the forces common to particular socialorganizations (social gravity); to the particularities of any given event. Strictly partition-ing science from history, as Turner does, only impoverishes both.

Recognizing these four assertions that are embedded in Turner’s (2006) comment,and the confusions they reflect, lays bare how Turner has mischaracterized our work. Thisleaves us only with the task of quickly clearing up some of his more particular charges.First, we are not against quantification or statistical analyses, as Turner seems to think,but quite to the contrary, we find quantitative analysis an important part of sociology. Infact, we use the concepts of statistics in our article because we find them particularly ame-nable for clarifying scientific issues. We were merely suggesting the limitations of statisti-cal methods (there are limitations particular to each and every method), not denigratingtheir utility.

Second, we believe that scientific inquiry should be an interplay of induction anddeduction. In practice, science has always been done in this fashion, although variousschools of thought have elevated one approach or the other to primacy at various times.Turner’s (2006) comments on this issue do not address our arguments.

Third, we are not against reductionism and recognize that it has led to many scientificdiscoveries. However, we are concerned that an

exclusive

focus on reductionism blinds usto the interaction of forces and the emergence of regularities that cannot be understoodin terms of constituent parts in isolation. We are therefore only critical of “

narrow

reduc-tionism” (York and Clark 2006:426, emphasis added)—the singular focus on reduction-ism to the neglect of dialectical considerations—not reductionism in general. Onceagain, Turner’s (2006) comments do not address our arguments.

Fourth, we did not propose that “social gravity,” “intersections of historical andempirical events,” “indigenous transformation,” “nonlinearity,” or “ideology” obviate sci-ence as Turner (2006) suggests in the headings for sections in the second half of his com-ment. The suggestion that we did is purely a creation of Turner’s imagination. We clearlypresented all of our arguments as

scientific

in nature. In fact, we make use of concepts and

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examples from the biological sciences to illustrate how sociology can embrace both his-torical and scientific approaches. Nowhere did we suggest that our arguments underminescientific inquiry and that we should throw up our hands in defeat, given the complexityof the universe. Counter to Turner’s misrepresentation, at the heart of our article is theassertion that scientific sociology

can

address the issues that we raised. In fact, we contendthat “[s]cientific sociology is not well served by having separate research traditions thatoperate largely in isolation, without cross-fertilization,” and that positivism and Marxism“can inform” each other (York and Clark 2006:425–6). We propose, in the conclusion,that

A scientific perspective that avoids overly reductionistic, mechanistic, and teleologi-cal positions and incorporates the concepts of plasticity, historicity, social gravity, andcoevolution can provide the foundation for critical research that is not epistemologi-cally naïve, while remaining grounded in materialism and realism. In this, the scien-tific enterprise, whether Marxist or positivist, can grapple with the dynamic world inwhich we are immersed. (York and Clark 2006:442)

Finally, Turner (2006) inserts an odd section on ideology (the final “obviate science” sec-tion), in which he offers his opinion about whether Marxists or positivists are more ideo-logically driven. This is tangential to our article, since we only briefly mention ideology.All we can do is restate our position “that scientific questions should ultimately bedecided based on logic of argument and validity of evidence, not ideology” (York andClark 2006:428–9). Certainly, Turner would agree.

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Cohen, Jack and Ian Stewart. 1994.

The Collapse of Chaos: Discovering Simplicity in a Complex

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Gould, Stephen Jay. 1970. “Dollo on Dollo’s Law: Irreversibility and the Status of Evolutionary

Laws.”

Journal of the History of Biology

3:189–212.

——. 2002.

The Structure of Evolutionary Theory

. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, Harvard University.

Lewontin; Richard. 2000.

The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and Environment

. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press.

Mayr, Ernst. 1982.

The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution and Inheritance

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bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

McIntyre, Lee. 1997. “Gould on Laws in Biological Science.”

Biology and Philosophy

12:357–67.

Turner, Jonathan H. 1985. “In Defense of Positivism.”

Sociological Theory

3(2):24–30.

Turner, Jonathan H. 2006. “Explaining the Social World: Historicism versus Positivism.”

The Socio-

logical Quarterly

47:451–64.

York, Richard and Brett Clark. 2006. “Marxism, Positivism, and Scientific Sociology: Social Gravity

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