scepticism bibliography

PART EIGHT

Skepticism Bibliography, 1989-1991

JOSE R. MAlA NETO

INTRODUCTION

The Foundation for Intellectual History has entrusted me to prepare a bibliography on skepticism outlining the scope and nature of the present-day interest in this subject. Starting with philosophical journals and books published in North America and Western Europe I have tried-within the limits of the available bibliographical information-to expand the search to other scholarly fields in the humanities as well as to publications from other parts of the world. Because of this geographical and disciplinary expansion, however, the years of publication was limited to 1989-91 trusting that three years would provide a reasonably representative sample. Before indicating the main features of the current scholarly interest in skepticism some remarks on the design of the bibliography and its main limitations are in order.

1. The bibliography comprises books, articles, and essay reviews. The main sources were The Philosopher's Index, the French catalogue FRANCIS, the Humanities and Social Sciences indices, the Library of Congress catalogue, the MLA bibliography, and current philosophical bibliographies printed in Paris and Louvain. I also directly examined the main philosophical journals for this period and checked each article or book referred to in the sources that did not provide an abstract. Whenever available, I reproduced the author's own abstract or the abstract given by one of the bibliographies I used. In other cases I edited some central part of the text in which the author summarizes his or her goals and/or principal results. When no source is indicated, the abstract is mine.

2. Skepticism is such a crucial issue in epistemology that almost no publication in the field can fail to deal with it. In order to keep the bibliography to a manageable size I decided to include only those publications in which skepticism is the main topic. Since this is not always easy to tell from the title, I am aware that some publications may have been left out.

3. Although I tried to be as inclusive as possible, some books and journals were either not available in the libraries consulted or not indexed in the bibliographies used. This is particularly true of publications written in languages other than English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese.

4. My criterion for classification by subject was the following. If a publication deals predominantly with a person, the latter's name is indicated as the subject. In all other cases I classified the publication under intellectual disciplines. Many items

387

J. van der Zande and R.H. Popkin (eds.), The Skeptical Tradition around 1800, 387-391. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

388 Skepticism Bibliography

could be classified under more than one heading. For example, contemporary epistemologists often deal extensively with the skeptical arguments of Descartes and Hume. If the purpose of these epistemologists was not a textual examination their publications were classified under the heading "epistemology." There is, of course, an element of arbitrariness involved because it is not always clear whether an author discusses, for instance, primarily Davidson'S argument against skepticism or skepticism in general. Moreover, scholarly disciplines are not clearly distinguished from one another and skepticism often cuts across different fields (epistemology, literature, ethics, history of philosophy, and so on). The abstracts provide some clarification. The subject classification is meant only to provide a preliminary, panoramic view of the main themes and topics related to skepticism.

The items compiled in this bibliography can be roughly divided into three main fields: i) ancient skepticism; ii) contemporary epistemology and ethics; and iii) the modern skeptical tradition.

i) The large number of publications (41 items) on ancient skepticism in just three years attests to the tremendous development of this field since the 1970s. Of the two ancient skeptical schools, Pyrrhonism has received much more attention than Academic skepticism, although the revival of interest in ancient skepticism also includes a quantitative and qualitative increase of studies on Academic skepticism. Most studies consist of technical, exegetical analysis of the works of Sextus Empiricus, the only surviving works by an ancient skeptical author.

Ancient skepticism, in particular Pyrrhonism, was not merely, or even mainly, according to many scholars, an epistemological position, but a way of life. Most contemporary scholars therefore discuss the nature of the ancient skeptics' practical goal of ataraxia (peace of mind), how it can be achieved and how it affects the life of the skeptic. Is a Pyrrhonian life at all possible? If it is, how does it differ from the life of the dogmatist and of the non-philosopher? Furthermore, the discovery of the practical thrust of ancient skepticism has led to inquiries concerning the scope of the ancient skeptic's epoche or suspension of judgment. Is it restricted to philosophical beliefs? What kind of assent is withdrawn? What is the nature of the assent to appearances that the Pyrrhonian philosopher accepts as his main practical rule? Practical aspects of ancient skepticism are also the focus of attention in another theme explored by modern scholars, namely, the philosophical value of the skeptical modes (arguments) and the nature of the skeptic's zetesis (investigation). How good and effective are the arguments of the skeptics? Are the skeptics committed to the arguments they use against the dogmatists?

Finally, a major topic of interest is the comparison of ancient with modern kinds of skepticism, in particular Cartesian and Humean skepticism. Is the problem of the external world also a problem for the ancient skeptics? Does the criterion of following appearances commit the skeptics to anti-realism? Can the modern skeptic legitimately break with the ancient skeptical tradition and isolate his skepticism from practical life? Were the ancient skeptics anti-realists? And historically, how did skepticism evolve from a kind of mental therapy to a kind of epistemological

Skepticism Bibliography 389

disease? There is much more controversy than consensus about these topics but the

various debates have no doubt contributed to the quality of the investigation. Of particular importance are Myles Burnyeat's articles "Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism" (Doubt and Dogmatism, ed. M. Schofield, M.F. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes [Oxford, 1980], reprinted in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. M.F. Burnyeat [Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1983]), and "The Skeptic in His Place and Time" (Philosophy in History, ed. R. Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner [Cambridge, 1984]). Important too is Jonathan Barnes' work on these topics and his philosophical analysis of the Pyrrhonian modes. Barnes' and Julia Annas' The Modes of Skepticism (Cambridge, 1985) is another major reference in contemporary scholarly works on ancient skepticism. With respect to the origins of Pyrrhonism, new perspectives on Pyrrho have been opened by Fernanda Declava Caizzi's research.

ii) Skepticism is a major polemical topic among contemporary epistemologists. Of the roughly seventy articles and books in this field, about 65 percent rejects and 35 percent upholds a skeptical position. The defenders of skepticism usually employ an arsenal of sophisticated philosophical analyses to strengthen and reconstruct Descartes' and Hume's doubts about the existence of the external world and Hume's doubt about causation. Barry Stroud's defense of the cogency of the Cartesian dream argument (among others) in his The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism (Oxford, 1984) has been a major challenge to contemporary epistemologists. The skeptical arguments are also updated. Whereas there are almost no references to Descartes' evil demon in the literature there are plenty to a brain kept in a vat hooked up to a computer powerful enough to supply this brain with all the experiences we ordinarily have.

The bibliography shows that the majority of epistemologists reject skepticism, although this usually does not translate into actual refutations. The foundational Cartesian type of response to skepticism is definitely out of fashion. Among the principle arguments against skepticism are that the skeptical position involves a performative contradiction, usually of a linguistic kind; that the skeptic's standards of knowledge and certainty are beyond scientific and ordinary practice; and that the skeptical alternative-for instance, the possibility that one may be dreaming-is not relevant in most cognitive situations. These responses to skepticism strike more at practical dimensions of the skeptical position than at the skeptical arguments themselves. One basic practical presupposition of skepticism is directly challenged by some anti-skeptical philosophers who, often influenced by William James, contest the skeptic's strict commitment to intellectual integrity. Shall we give our assent only to those propositions whose evidence is demonstrative? These present-day antiskeptics unwittingly take issue with the basic principle of Academic skepticism according to Cicero's interpretation of Arcesilaus. Finally, a note must also be added to the original interpretation of skepticism by Stanley Cavell. The skeptical quest for certainty about the existence of an external world and other minds is interpreted by Cavell as a lack of acknowledgment of the world and others. Cavell's views on skepticism have influenced some literary critics.


In summary, the current responses to skepticism show, first, a recognition that skepticism must be dealt with in relation to or even exorcised from epistemology and, second, a wide-spread view among epistemologists that skepticism is, as Bertrand Russell once said, irrefutable from a strict epistemological point of view even if practically untenable or condemnable. This is especially true for ethics where skepticism appears as even more threatening than in other fields.

iii) The third large group of items concerning what I call the "modem skeptical tradition" can be further classified in four subgroups.

1. A number of publications contain detailed philosophical analysis of Hume's and Descartes' skeptical arguments. (It is ironical that Descartes' arguments in favor of skepticism are much more influential today than his arguments against skepticism). The previously mentioned tendency in contemporary epistemology of not confronting the skeptical challenge in a foundationalist manner is reflected in Cartesian scholarship. The large majority of Cartesian scholars who published in 1989-91 mitigate in one way or another the force of Descartes' skeptical arguments. Some say that rather than a skeptical argument the evil demon is a purgative device to eliminate false beliefs. Others recognize the argument, but argue that it is valid only within a foundationalist perspective which is not necessarily that of Descartes. Still others claim that the demon argument is not so extreme as it usually is taken to be. As to the dream argument, it is argued that it does not call into question the existence of matter and that, after all, Descartes does not seek absolute certainty.

With respect to Hume, the main topics discussed are whether Hume is really a skeptic, whether his naturalism is compatible with his skepticism, and, on causality, whether Hume really denies that there are necessary connections or whether he admits that there might be, arguing only that we cannot know them. Hume's views on belief and the relevance of his epistemological skepticism to his political, moral, and religious views have also been discussed by scholars. Finally, there is a remarkable effort to relate Hume to the skeptical tradition. There are studies both on Hume's ancient and modem sources of Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism and on his relation to modem philosophers such as Descartes who introduced new elements into the skeptical tradition.

2. The bibliography also contains a considerable number of historical studies on modem philosophers who have dealt intensively with the skeptical tradition. These are either skeptics such as Hume, Montaigne, Sanchez, La Mothe Le Vayer, Huet, Bayle, Schulze, Feyerabend, and Wittgenstein (accepting Kripke's view that Wittgenstein's notion of following a rule is skeptical), or philosophers who, although not skeptics themselves, considered skepticism a most important subject: Descartes, Pascal, Kant, Hegel, and Moore.

3. Other studies reveal the importance of skepticism to philosophers traditionally viewed as unrelated to-or unconcerned with-skepticism: Vives, Condorcet, Maimon, Fichte, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husser!, and Peirce.

4. Finally, there are critical studies showing that a host of great literary authors were quite concerned with skeptical issues. The skepticism in their works is often related to philosophers in the modem skeptical tradition: Calderon (Erasmus and the


Jesuits); Milton (Descartes and Glanvill); Johnson (Mersenne, Gassendi, Locke, and Bayle); Byron and Eliot (Montaigne); Machado de Assis (Montaigne and Pascal).

The bibliography shows that today skepticism is a major philosophical theme. This comes as no surprise given the centrality of epistemology in philosophy. What is new is the amazing number of studies which demonstrate the historical vitality of the skeptical tradition. There are reasons to expect that in the near future skepticism will change from a mere abstract epistemological position to a dynamic and influential tradition in Western-and even perhaps in Eastern-philosophy, running almost without interruption from ancient times to the present. First, some contemporary epistemologists realize that the skeptical questions they deal with have a long history, the knowledge of which can help them in the understanding of and finding solutions to contemporary philosophical problems. Second, present-day scholarship on ancient skepticism is carried out by scholars who are well trained in analytical philosophy. They interpret ancient skepticism not only in its historical context but also bring to light its philosophical value and relevance to current epistemological debates. Third, some studies have shown that skepticism was also a presence in medieval philosophy. Augustine began his philosophical career writing about the Academic skeptics. Skepticism was an issue in the later medieval period in particular. Other studies show that the voluntarist and nominalist views of Ockham and some of his students can bring about interesting and unique skeptical problems. These studies tend to spread to other medieval authors and periods. Finally, the skeptical arguments of Descartes and Hume are no longer seen as unrelated to skeptical views in the early modem period, nor is modem skepticism reduced to Cartesian and Humean skepticism. On the contrary, Descartes and Hume are beginning to be seen as original contributors to a strong skeptical tradition comprising many other figures. Among them were philosophers, writers, and theologians who reconstructed ancient skepticism in a variety of ways that we are only now beginning to be acquainted with. Two scholars have contributed considerably to the opening of this new research: Charles B. Schmitt and Richard H. Popkin. Their work has been tremendously important for the present-day recognition of ancient skepticism as a major force in modem philosophy.

SKEPTICISM BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1989-91

1. ADLER, JONATIIAN. "Epistemic Universalizability: From Scepticism to Infallibilism," Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed. M.D. Roth and G. Ross (Dordrecht, 1990),83-98. Epistemology.

"Epistemic justification is universalizable. If someone is justified in a belief then anyone else, in relevantly similar circumstances, is also justified in that belief. Given universalizability, together with some assumptions, a sceptical argument is generated. In part I, I defend this sceptical argument against objections to an earlier version. Part II asks what happens when we do not assume that, in almost all cases, no matter how good one's epistemic position, there is someone in a position at least as good, whose justification was actually defeated. In that case the above sceptical argument becomes an argument for infallibilism. "

2. ALAI, M. "Putnam: Scetticismo, Realismo e Teoria del Riferimento, " Lingua e Stile: Revista di Linguistica e CriticaLitteraria, 24 (1989),435-55. Putnam.

"Hilary Putnam has argued that scepticism (in the form of the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat) is inconsistent. This fact, he claims, disconfirms metaphysical realism, which is committed to the consistency of scepticism. Putnam's argument is based on the premise that casual links are a necessary condition for reference. I point out that such a premise is questionable, and that metaphysical realism is not necessarily committed to it. I also examine various possible formulations of Putnam's argument (one of which is due to Massimo Dell' Utri), and argue that none of them is valid. Finally, I notice that in holding the consistency of scepticism metaphysical realism agrees with our best account of human knowledge and of its limits."

3. ALLEN, BARRY. "Gruesome Arithmetic: Kripke's Sceptic Replies," Dialogue, 28 (1989), 257-84. Kripke.

"Kripke's solution [to scepticism] and the position it concedes to the sceptic are deeply allied. Here I shall demonstrate their common assumption, and on that basis argue that Kripke's solution begs the sceptic's question. Furthermore, I believe we can live with the sceptic. The sceptical argument can be turned into a reasonable contribution to a kind of nominalism in the philosophy of meaning and truth. "

4. ALLEN, JAMES. "The Scepticism of Sextus Empiricus," Au/stieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt, ed. W. Haase and H. Temporini, Part II: Principate, vol. 36/4: Philosophie (Berlin and New York, 1990),2582-607. Ancient Scepticism.

The article contains: 1) a general introduction to Sextus' life and writings; 2) a discussion of the Academic sceptics, who are divided into "radical" (Arcesilaus and Cicero), who hold the Stoic view that assent ought to be given only to what is demonstrative and "moderate" (Cameades and Philo), who

393


reject this view of wisdom; and 3) a discussion of Sextus' scepticism. Sextus' scepticism is compared to Academic scepticism and the Empirical school of medicine. The author focuses on the nature and scope of Pyrrhonian belief. There is an analysis of the meaning of "phenomenon" and the "nonevident" in Sextus, which are shown to be different from what the Dogmatists mean by these terms. The Pyrrhonian position on belief is compared to the ordinary man's. Although they largely overlap, they do not coincide. The scope of Pyrrhonian epoche is not determined by subject matter but by "the character of endorsement," which is short of absolute certainty.

5. ANNAS, JULIA. "Platon Ie Sceptique," Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 95 (1990), 287-92. Ancient Scepticism.

"The article discusses the sceptical New Academy's interpretation of Plato as a sceptic. The first part discusses Arcesilaus' reintroduction of Socratic method, and the reading of the Socratic dialogues and the Theaetetus implied by this. The second part discusses arguments probably used by the later, more moderate Academy for a reading of Plato's more dogmatic dialogues in a way consistent with scepticism. "

6. ARRINGTON, ROBERT L. "Sign-Post Scepticism," Meaning Scepticism, ed. Klaus Puhl (Berlin and New York, 1991), 13-33. Wittgenstein.

The author argues that paragraph 65 of the Philosophical Investigations "provides . . . a repudiation of the argument often used to generate rulefollowing scepticism, the argument that claims that there is no fact of the matter about what a rule requires because of the possibility of multiple interpretations of it." The passage "alerts us to the fact that there are different senses to the notion of multiple interpretations of a rule. By assessing the significance of each of these senses for the sceptical argument, we are able to dismiss what I shall call shallow rule-scepticism [viz. "there is no way to know what a rule tells us to do at a particular time or in a particular context because the rule is susceptible of multiple interpretations, each of which indicates a different action to be taken and no one of which is more favored by the evidence than the others"]. Atld this puts us in a position to deal effectively with a more radical deep rule-scepticism [viz. insofar as there is no way for anyone, even God, to determine what the rule requires or means, or what we mean by it, it follows that there is no such thing as the rule telling us what to do, and no such thing as our attaching a meaning to the rule that dictates a particular application of it]."

7. ARROYO, JULIAN. "EI Escepticismo Critico en el Diccionario de Bayle," Pensamiento, 47 (1991), 239-48. Bayle.

"The article is one chapter of the unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Critical Scepticism as Method in Bayle's Work (Complutense University, Madrid, 1989). The Dictionary is the literary platform to expose his ideas that will review the mental situation of the age. Bayle revindicates the historical facts and values them critically. The latter is the most personal part of Bayle's Dictionary and makes the difference between this work and other dictionaries. This informs and interprets at a more sceptical than doctrinal level, stimulates


the reflection (positive scepticism). History was simple narration without punctual facts. These facts will now be the point of departure toward the truth (critical scepticism). The irrational elements of error from the historical manifestation will question his (in)sufficient critical model of rationality, which requires him to overcome fideism and scepticism. "

8. AUDI, ROBERT. "Causalist Internalism," American Philosophical Quarterly, 28 (1989), 309-20. Epistemology.

"Internalist theories of justification take it to be based on grounds that are in some sense accessible to the subject. Causalist theories of justification hold that a ground justifies belief only if the belief is causally sustained or produced by it. Many philosophers have thought that since we do not have internal access to causal connections, a causalist theory of justification cannot be internalist. This paper sets out an internalist account of justification, sharpens the problem of reconciling it with a causal condition on justification, and argues that given a proper understanding of internalism and a balanced appraisal of scepticism, the prospects for reconciliation are good. "

9. AUNE, BRUCE. Knowledge of the External World (New York, 1991). Epistemology .

"This book is concerned with our knowledge of the external world. The first half is devoted to the views of major historical figures-specifically, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and 1.S. Mill. The second part has both a destructive and a constructive part. The destructive part is focused on the attempts of Wittgenstein and others to dispose of the problem as an illusion or nest of confusions; it is argued that these attempts fail. The constructive part provides a reconstruction of the problem and a solution based on probability theory and the aim of rational inquiry. "

10. AUSLAND, H.P. "On the Moral Origin of the Pyrrhonian Philosophy," Elenchos, 10 (1989), 359-434. Ancient Scepticism.

"Today's understanding of the place occupied by scepticism within a history of philosophy is strongly conditioned by the epistemological orientation specific to modem philosophy since the times of its origins, as modified under the influence of German idealism. Leaving such construction aside, we find that ancient scepticism, at least, comes first into view as a philosophy that takes its beginning, not from a challenge to account for our cognitive access to an external world, but rather from the problem of human happiness. The Pyrrhonian way to the good life relates a human disposition productive of undisturbed calm directly to an undecidabilty inherent in practical affairs. But the critique of our senses, opinions, and reason that it includes for the sake of demonstrating this relation is not pursued in a fashion suitable to the intention of exposing any comparative or general unreliability of our several faculties in relation to external things, but is instead practiced with a view to showing it wrong for us to exercise a preference between competing claims on our choice that are similar in dignity. Viewed from this new (really old) perspective, Pyrrho's scepticism stands revealed as integral, and not incidental, to his moral philosophy, and can moreover be restored its proper


historical role as developed expression of the prudence found per excellence in the person of Socrates."

11. BAIER, ANNETTE. A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's "Treatise." (Cambridge, Mass., 1991). Hume.

"Hume's Treatise explores a succession of versions of human reason, and in his third book endorses a social and 'lively' reason. The anti-rationalist arguments are directed against a limited intellectualist version of reason, and prepare the ground for Hume's constructive account of reason and morality. " (Phil. Index)

12. BAILEY, ALAN. "Rediscovering Scepticism," Eidos, 6 (1989), 153-76. Ancient Scepticism.

"Most present -day epistemologists assume that the protagonist of Descartes' First Meditation is a paradigm instance of someone who uses sceptical arguments to arrive at a sceptical conclusion about the extent of our knowledge of the world. This paper examines the differences between this so-called Cartesian scepticism and the Pyrrhonian scepticism described by Sextus Empiricus, and attempts to show that Pyrrhonian scepticism is by far the more philosophically interesting of the two positions."

13. BAILEY, ALAN. "Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Self-Refutation," Philosophical Quarterly, 40 (1990), 27-44. Ancient Scepticism.

Starting with an analysis of Agrippa's five modes, the author argues that Pyrrhonian arguments are-like Feyerabend's-ad hominem. The dogmatist's canons of rationality are reduced ad absurdum. At the beginning of his inquiry, the Pyrrhonist believes in these canons. But in the process of arguing, he finds out that "these principles fail to meet the standards that they themselves lay down. Thus the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment on the objective cogency of these principles."

14. BALDWIN, THOMAS. "Moore and Philosophical Scepticism," The Analytic Tradition, ed. D. Bell and C. Neil (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 117-36. Moore.

The author presents a discussion of Moore's reply to scepticism that brings to light the tensions between his common sense response and another line of argumentation (that renders the common sense response problematic) based on Moore's foundationalist conception of knowledge.

15. BAR-ON, DORIT. "Justifying Beliefs: The Dream Hypothesis and Gratuitous Entities," Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed. M.D. Roth and G. Ross (Dordrecht, 1990), 141-46. Stroud and Moser.

"In Part I of the paper I clarify the dispute between Paul Moser, a defender of common sense realism, and Barry Stroud, who develops a sceptical argument. In part II I argue that Moser's defense of the realist hypothesis as the best explanation of the contents of our experiences requires much more elaboration and explication before its superiority over its sceptical competitors can be established. "

16. BAR-ON, DORIT. "Scepticism: the External World and Meaning," Philosophical Studies, 40 1990), 207-31. Quine.


Quine's argument against scepticism about the external world-his naturalized epistemology-can be used with even better results against Quine's scepticism about meaning (the problem of radical translation).

17. BARCALOW, EMME'IT. "Moral Scepticism and Moral Education," Journal of Thought, 24 (1989), 35-54. Ethics.

18. BARNES, JONATHAN. "La [,WUPWVLCJi pyrrhonienne," Cahiers de la Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, 15 (1990), 87-106. Ancient Scepticism.

The author presents a detailed analysis of Agrippa's first mode (diaphonia). The logical elements of the mode, its psychological implications, its conditions and validity in bringing about epoche are examined. The conclusion is that the mode does lead to suspension of judgment but that, contrary to Agrippa, it does not have a universal scope.

19. BARNES, JONATHAN. "Scepticism and Relativity," Philosophical Studies, 32 (1988-90), 100-31. Ancient Scepticism.

"I discuss 1) the connections between scepticism and relativism in the works of Sextus Empiricus, arguing that these two very different notions are occasionally confounded; and 2) Sextus' criticisms of certain dogmatic theories about relatives, arguing that most of these criticisms hit their targets."

20. BARNES, JONATHAN. The Toils of Scepticism (Cambridge, UK, 1990). Ancient Scepticism

The author examines "the general form which Agrippan argumentation characteristically takes and the general structures which Agrippan scepticism characteristically erects" in five chapters: "Disagreement," "Infinite regression," "Reciprocity," "Hypotheses," and "The sceptic's net. "

21. BARNES, JONATHAN. "Pyrrhonism, Belief and Causation: Observations on the Scepticism of Sextus Empiricus," Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt, ed. W. Haase and H. Temporini, Part II: Principate, vol. 36/4: Philosophie (Berlin and New York, 1990), 2608-95. Ancient Scepticism.

The author discusses the scope of Pyrrhonian epoche in Sextus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Sextus' arguments against causality. The latter are shown to be wrong because they are based on a view of causality as a factual event, whereas it is something rational. On the scope of Pyrrhonian epoche, the author examines the tensions between a radical position that conflicts with ordinary beliefs and a more moderate that confines epoche to scientific and philosophical matters. In the conclusion the author argues that an uniform Pyrrhonian position on the scope of epoche is neither necessary nor adequate given the Pyrrhonian end of tranquility. Only the issues that cause intranquility in the inquirer need be subjected to the investigation that leads to epoche.

22. BAYLE, PIERRE. Historical and Critical Dictionnaire, tr. Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis, 1991). Bayle.

A second edition of a selection of articles of the Dictionnaire translated into English. In his introduction, the editor introduces the reader to the life and thought of Bayle, underlining his place in the history of modem scepticism.

23. BEHERA, SATRUGHNA. "Rule-Scepticism: Kripkean Understanding in Witt-


genstein's Perspective," Indian Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1991), 17-30. Kripke.

"This paper is an attempt to give a critical account of Saul Kripke's (1982) sceptical interpretation of 'following a rule' in the later philosophy of Wittgenstein. According to Kripke, 'rule-scepticism' follows from the fact that in following a rule any rule could be followed since there is no objective ground of knowing which is the correct rule to be followed. He maintains that Wittgenstein gives a 'sceptical solution' to this sceptical problem by committing himself to a communitarian view of language and rules. This brings Wittgenstein closer to the Humean tradition which leads our concept of rules and rulefollowing to a virtual collapse. I come to the conclusion that the foundation for language proposed by Kripke to get over the rule-scepticism is agreement in responses, that is, the mere fact that we agree in our responses in following a rule is sufficient to make language possible. "

24. BELL, M. and MAGINN, M. "Naturalism and Scepticism," Philosophy, 65 (1990), 399-418. Hume and Wittgenstein.

"Humean naturalism is commonly taken to argue from the inevitability of our ordinary belief to the emptiness of philosophical scepticism. Hume is seen as replacing the task of answering scepticism with an empirical investigation into the origins of our beliefs. The authors argue that this is a misconception. Hume's conception of the naturalistic task is to provide, from within our ordinary outlook, a philosophical account of our ordinary beliefs that shows them to be entirely legitimate, even though they are not rationally grounded. Hume is prevented from completing this task by his commitment to an empiricist conception of experience that is inherently sceptical. It is argued that Wittgensteinrejects Hume's empiricist assumptions and returns wholeheartedly to the naturalistic outlook, he is able to achieve the non-sceptical understanding of our common sense convictions that eluded Hume. "

25. BELL, RICHARD H. "On Trusting One's Own Heart: Scepticism in Jonathan Edwards and SOren Kierkegaard," History o/European Ideas, 12 (1990), 105-18. Kierkegaard and Edwards.

The author addresses the problem of the criterion of verification of the believer's communication with God.

26. BELSHAW, CHRISTOPHER. "Scepticism and Madness, n Australasian Journal 0/ Philosophy, 67 (1989), 447-51. Epistemology.

The author argues that once the implications of the sceptical position that all matters of fact are contingent and all beliefs about the unobserved rationally unjustified are fully examined, it "results in a paradox more violent than any to which Hume expressly drew our attention. "

27. BENITEZ, LAURA. "Los Argumentos Escepticos Cartesianos," Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia, 15 (1989), 85-96. Descartes.

"Barry Loewer's logical reconstruction of Cartesian sceptical arguments is discussed in this paper. His interpretation of knowledge and indubitability is assumed and his reconstruction of the deceiver God argument is used to elucidate the dream argument. Different levels of Cartesian scepticism thus


become clear. Finally, contributions and limitations of Loewer's reconstruction are examined, and the notion of adequate idea is introduced to enliven discussion. "

28. BERNASCONI, ROBERT. "Scepticism in the Face of Philosophy," Re-reading Levinas, ed. R. Bernasconi and S. Critchley (Bloomington, 1991), 148-61. Levinas and Derrida.

"When in Otherwise than Being Levinas observes that the refutation of scepticism has failed to prevent scepticism's return, it is to suggest that scepticism's disdain for and reliance on the logos provides a model for Levinas' own thematizing of the unthematizable. 'Scepticism in the Face of Philosophy' suggests that Levinas appeals to scepticism as part of his response to Derrida's objection in 'Violence and Metaphysics.' When Derrida subsequently returned to Levinas in 'At this very moment' he seemed oblivious of Levinas' response. An analysis of that essay helps articulate what governs the similarities and differences between the two thinkers." (Phil. Index)

29. BETT, RICHARD. "Cameades' Distinction Between Assent and Approval, "The Monist, 73 (1990), 3-20. Ancient Scepticism.

Can the Academic sceptic live his scepticism? The author examines Cameades' attempt to justify his affirmative answer to this question by denying assent but approving appearances (Academica, 11.104). The author claims that Cameades' success depends on the question of whether action requires assent to-and not mere approval of-appearances, i.e., commitment to their being true.

30. BEUCHOT, MAURICIO. "Escepticismo en Ia Edad Media: el caso de Nicolas de Autrecourt," Revista Latinoamericana de Filosojia, 15 (1989), 307-18. Autrecourt.

The author examines Autrecourt's scepticism: denial of substance and of causality as a necessary connection. His scepticism is compared to different varieties of nominalism. According to Autrecourt, non-contradiction is the only principle of certainty (knowledge). Historical and natural sciences, which cannot be reduced to non-contradiction, are dubious.

31. BLACK, ROBERT. "Moral Scepticism and Inductive Scepticism," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 90 (1990), 65-82. Ethics.

"Viewing moral scepticism as the rejection of objective desirabilities, inductive scepticism may be seen as the rejection of objective believabilities. Moral scepticism leads naturally to amoralism rather than subjectivism, and inductive scepticism undermines not our practices of induction but only a view about justification. The two scepticisms together amount to the adoption of a defensibly narrow, formal view of research." (Phil. Index)

32. BLACKBURN, SIMON. "Hume and Trick Connexions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50 (1990), 237-50. Hume.

"Recently there has been a pronounced shift in the interpretation of Hume on causation. The previous weight of opinion took him to be a Positivist, but the new view is that he is a Sceptical Realist. [The author refers primarily, but not exclusively, to J. Wright's The Sceptical Realism of David Hume


(Manchester, 1983)]. I hold no brief for the Positivist view. But I believe it needs replacing by something slightly different and that at best it shows an error of taste to make Sceptical Realism a fundamental factor in the interpretation of Mume. "

33. BOGHOSSIAN, PAUL A. "The Rule-Following Considerations," Mind, 98 (1989), 507-49. Kripke.

"The paper consists of an extended critique of Kripke's discussion of 'rulefollowing' and of the extensive secondary literature of which it has given rise. Among the issues discussed are the reality of meaning, the privacy of meaning, the reducibility of meaning, the relation between meaning and community. The paper argues for a robust realism about meaning: a realist, non-reductionist and judgment-independent conception, one which sustains no obvious animus against private language. "

34. BOLZANI FILHO, ROBERTO. "Ceticismo e Empirismo," Discurso, 16 (1990), 37-67. Ancient Scepticism.

"Analysis of empeiria, phainomenon, and tekhne in Sextus Empiricus shows that Pyrrhonian scepticism has a positive dimension that supports its approximation to the scientific model developed by British empiricism. Some common features of the philosophies of Berkeley and Hume are compared with the results of the analysis of Sextus' scepticism." (Phil. Index)

35. BONICALZI, FRANCESCA. L' ordine della cenezza: Scientificitil e persuasione in Descanes. (Genova, 1990). Descartes.

36. BONJOUR, LAURENCE. "Reply to Steup's 'The Regress of Metajustification, '" Philosophical Studies, 55 (1989), 57-63. Epistemology.

The author answers Steup's criticism that the author's requirement of metajustification leads his coherentist theory of truth and anti-foundationalism to scepticism insofar as it generates infmite regress.

37. BORGHERO, CARLO. ·Voltaire, Bayle e il pirronismo storico,· Studi Settecenteschi, 12 (1989), 141-64. Bayle and Voltaire.

Analysis of Bayle's 'historical pyrrhonism' shows that it is not plain epistemological scepticism about historical knowledge but a critical methodological approach to history that challenges the role that traditional sacred history ascribes to historical authority, thereby making a case against superstition and intolerance. Once Bayle's 'historical pyrrhonism' is adequately understood, Voltaire's indebtedness to Bayle (in particular in Voltaire's Pyrrhonism de 1 'histoire) becomes non-problematic.

38. BOTIANI, LIVID. "Noia, acedia ed epoche," Sapienza, 44 (1991), 113-91. Ethics.

"Acedia, ennui, boredom, melancholia, but also despair, distress have always represented and represent signs of negativity which are generically banished from the official culture. On the contrary, I have tried to show that those signs can be thought positively: as modalities of possibilities of suspension of assent, of withdrawal of consent; i.e., such as epoche as basis of a good ethics of dissidence."

39. BOTWINICK, A. "Nietzsche, Foucault and the Prospects of Postmodem Politi-


cal Philosophy," Manuscrito, 17 (1989),117-54. Nietzsche and Foucault. "A defense of the consistency of scepticism and relativism from Niet

zsche's standpoint. Criticism of Deleuze's postmodem interpretation of Nietzsche. The author presents a 'conservative' interpretation of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge and ethics, which is related to Polany's theory of 'tacit knowledge' and his interpretation of Plato. The problem of power, the question of 'reflexivity.' The author brings to light the tensions in Foucault's thought that subvert the tenability of his postmodemism. Criticism of postmodemism in general." (Francis)

40. BOURETZ, P. and MONGIN, O. "Le Conflict des Valeurs," Esprit, 146 (1989), 127-34. Ethics.

"The crisis of values. The conditions for acting. The values of contemporary scepticism. The competence of action (Ricoeur, Levinas). Values and hierarchy." (Francis)

41. BOURITSAS, L. "More, and Deeper, Dogmas of Empiricism: Towards a Holism without Scepticism," Filosofia, 18 (1989-90), 410-23. Quine and Dretske.

The author argues that Quine's holism leads to scepticism. Both his holism and scepticism identify truth with some aspect of the cognizing subject. Scepticism can be avoided through commitment to a representational view of language.

42. BRANSEN, JAN. The Antinomy of Thought: Maimon's Scepticism and the Relation Between Thought and Objects (Dordrecht, 1991). Maimon.

Judging involves (a) locating the object of thought in a conceptual framework, and (b) attributing or discovering qualities of the object. The author argues that (a) and (b) are both necessary in the act of judging and mutually inconsistent. "Hence the intrinsically aporetic character of any account of thinking." "In Part One I criticize a number of leading American philosophers [Rosemberg, Rorty, and Nagel], arguing that ... they all run into difficulties because of their common underestimation of the tensions between [(a) and (b)] ... In Part Two I present a detailed reconstruction of the Antinomy of Thought, which is a central theme in the philosophy of Salomon Maimon (1752-1800) . .. [who] provides the material for a powerful argument in favor of the claim that the tension between [(a) and (b)] ... reflects the intrinsically aporetic character of the structure of our articulations of the relation between thoughts and objects. This argument leads to the conclusion that an account of thinking should not be an attempt to solve the tension ... but, more modestly, an attempt to understand it."

43. BRAUNLEDER, MARGOT. Selbstbestimmung, Varantwortung und die Frage nach dem sittlich Guten (Wiirzburg, 1990). Ethics.

On scepticism about ethics in Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and members of the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer, Adorno, Habermas, and others).

44. BREAZEALE, DANIEL. "Fichte on Scepticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 28 (1991), 425-53. Fichte.


"Though it is widely believed that Fichte was unconcerned with epistemological issues in general and with sceptical objections to philosophy in particular, his writings contain frequent discussions of scepticism. However, there is a manifest tension between what appears to be Fichte's praise of scepticism for its indispensable contribution to philosophy, his criticism of it as internally self-contradictory, and the 'denouncement' of scepticism's allegedly harmful practical consequences. This essay shows how, for Fichte, 'critical scepticism' represents a crucial step beyond the 'ordinary standpoint' and toward an adequate philosophical standpoint. Finally, it is argued that the tenability of Fichte's critique of scepticism ultimately depends upon the tenability of his own version of transcendental idealism, the Wissenschajtslehre."

45. BROWN, MICHAEL A. "Scepticism, Religious Belief, and the Extent of Doxastic Reliability," Logos, 12 (1991), 138-52. Alston.

"Two forms of doxastic reliabilism are distinguished, practical and theoretical, both of which are responses to scepticism. W. Alston's version of theoretical reliabilism is considered in terms of the ideals of internal coherence, dialectical adequacy, and usefulness for determining how far reliability extends among religious practices. The conclusion is that Alston's theory cannot be used to make the determination and at the same time satisfy the other two ideals. Accordingly, there is no reason to prefer Alston's reliabilism over its practical counterparts." (Phil. Index)

46. BRUECKNER, ANTIIONY. "Unfair to Nozick," Analysis, 51 (1991), 61-64. Nozick.

"This is a defense of Nozick against the charge that his response to scepticism begs the question in virtue of its alleged assumption that the actual world is a normal, non-vat-world. It is argued that Nozick is not committed to that assumption. "

47. BRUECKNER, ANTIIONY. "Another Failed Transcendental Argument," Nous, 23 (1989), 525-30. Stroud.

An attack on Lipson's ("Objective Experience," Nous, 1984) criticism of Stroud's ("Transcendental Arguments," Journal of Philosophy, 1968) objections to the use of transcendental arguments to refute scepticism.

48. BRUECKNER, ANTIIONY. "The Omniscient Interpreter Rides Again, " Analysis, 51 (1991), 199-205. Davidson.

"Davidson argues that since radical interpretation is constrained by the principle of charity, massive error in one's belief system is not possible. Foley and Fumerton ("Davidson's Theism?" Philosophical Studies, 1985) criticize this anti-sceptical argument, holding that Davidson's use of the notion of an omniscient interpreter either commits him to theism or begs the question against the sceptic. I save Davidson's argument from this attack by conceiving the omniscient interpreter as possessing perfect modal knowledge." (Phil. Index)

49. BRUECKNER, ANTIIONY. "Scepticism About Knowledge of Content," Mind, 99 (1990), 447-51. Epistemology.

The author criticizes John Heil's defense of externalism (the view that the


contents of one's mind are determined by physical and social events external to the mind and body) and his denial of privileged access to one's own mental states. The author argues that the solution to the problem of scepticism about mental contents involves a solution to the problem of scepticism about the external world.

50. BRUECKNER, ANTHONY. "The Anti-Sceptical Epistemology of the Refutation of Idealism," Philosophical Topics, 18 (1991), 31-45. Kant.

The author argues that Guyer's reconstruction (in his book Kant and the Claims of Knowledge) of Kant's argument from the self-knowledge of the temporal ordering of one's own representations to the existence of enduring external objects is an inadequate reply to scepticism.

5l. BRUNS, GERALD L. "Dialogue and the Truth of Scepticism," Religion and Literature, 22 (1990), 85-91. Cavell and Levinas.

The author relates Levinas' philosophy to Cavell's treatment of scepticism, arguing that their views converge on the point "that the truth or moral of scepticism is that our relation to the world is not one of knowing."

52. BRUNSCHWIG, JACQUES. "La formule (TOP E'trL Ttl AO,¥OW chez Sextus Empiricus," Cahiers de la Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, 15 (1990), 107-21. Ancient Scepticism.

Through a syntactic and semantic examination of Sextus' formula, in particular in PH 1.20, the author addresses the problem of the scope of the sceptic's epoche. The conclusion is that PH 1.20 "cannot justify an 'urban' interpretation of Sextus' scepticism [Le., an interpretation that limits the scope of epoche to philosophical assertions]: the ... restriction does not aim at protecting ordinary assertions provided that they have no pretention to rational or theoretical truth. But this passage cannot authorize an interpretation globally 'rustic,' without any limitation; for its main point is that no sceptical conclusion can be detached from the specific corpus of utterances and arguments in reference to which, case by case, the conclusion appears justified. "

53. BUDICK, EMILY. "James' Portrait of Female Scepticism," The Henry James Review, 12 (1991), 154-58. James.

The author applies Cavell's treatment of literary scepticism to James' Portrait of a Lady. Starting with doubt concerning paternity, James' female character develops a full-fledged sceptical philosophical stance. This stance is related to the male's desire to obtain certain knowledge about woman, which reveals James' patriarchal society.

54. BURKEY, JOHN. "Descartes, Scepticism, and Husserl's Hermeneutic Practice," Husserl Studies, 7 (1990). Descartes and Husseri.

On Husserl's use and criticism of Descartes' method of doubt. According to Husserl, "Descartes missed the opportunity to deepen the task defmed by scepticism precisely because he fell prey to the sceptical formulation of what it means to know. The task which Descartes thus took up and defined out of the sceptical reduction was the challenge of evidence for something beyond the merely subjective. n


55. BUTCHVAROV, PANAYOT. Scepticism in Ethics (Bloomington, 1989). Ethics. The author argues that ethical scepticism with respect to the reality of

ethical facts can be rejected but not the scepticism that challenges our ability to discriminate right from wrong actions.

56. CABANCHIK, SAMUEL. "Wittgenstein Esceptico?" Cuadernos de Filosojia, 21 (1990), 31-41. Wittgenstein.

"The main object of this paper is to propose a sceptical interpretation of Wittgenstein's thought. In order to attain this end, I develop, in the first place, a criticism of Moore's notion of certainty. My point of view is, against Moore's, that 'certainty' and knowledge are, probably, incompatible notions, and that the possibility of a sceptical doubt about the assumed certainty is a necessary condition to distinguish between belief and knowledge, and to construe any kind of knowledge. On the other hand, I deal with what Kripke called 'the sceptical paradox' in relation to the determination of linguistic meaning. Both the ideal of certainty and the presumption in favor of the objectivity of meaning are assumed in this paper as a symptom of the kind of philosophical thought which must be overcome. "

57. CABANCHIK, SAMUEL. "Certeza, Duda Esceptica y Saber," Critica, 21 (1989), 67-89. Epistemology.

"This work purports to show that 'certainty' and 'knowledge' are not solidary notions although perhaps incompatible, and suggests that the possibility of doubt about the alleged certainty is a necessary condition to distinguish belief from knowledge and, through this distinction, to the construction of some knowledge. "

58. CAPPELLETII, ANGELl. "EI Escepticismo de leniades de Corinto, " Methexis, 2 (1989), 51-56. leniades of Corinth.

On the Greek sophist influenced by the Eleatic philosophers, whose only fragment is preserved by Sextus and Plutarch. The author reconstructs his scepticism as follows: "1) There is no being, because if there were it would have to be one, immutable, and eternal; but the senses-our only source of knowledge-do not present an object with such properties. 2) There is no non-being, whose existence would be contradictory. 3) There is no becoming nor things that come to be for they require a mixture of being and non-being, which do not exist. But everything that exists in the world changes and comes to be. Therefore, things do not possess a real being but are mere appearances of which no real science may exist, but only opinion. But every opinion is fallible, given that it is opposed to science or knowledge in the same way that appearances are opposed to true being. "

59. CAPPELLETII, VICENZO. "Meditazione Cartesiana," II Veltro, 33 (1989), 81-90. Descartes.

"The author sees Cartesian philosophy as the real beginning of the theory of reason in its modem meaning. And he indicates the unity of anthropology and philosophy as the most original step in the development of Descartes' thought. What links the two is doubt. ... Doubt, the author observes, subtracts itself from itself: doubting doubt is doubting again. In doubt, in


which reason attempts to deny itself, it is indeed forced to acknowledge itself running. The dubitative situation is however transcended with the discovery of a principle, that of identity, to which doubt is obliged to yield. In the dubitative situation anthropology and philosophy merge. But Descartes does not keep faith with his fruitful discovery. He moves beyond doubt to assert what the author of this article calls 'the equivocal universals:' thought, being, extension .... In Descartes, the author concludes, there are two paths: one original and constructive, the other traditional [Eleatic monism] and verbalistic. "

60. CARDY, MICHAEL. "Pyrrhonism and the Concept of a Common Human Nature in Eighteenth-Century Thought," The Question of Humanism, ed. D. Goicoechea, T. Madigan and J. Luik (Buffalo, NY, 1990), 223-34. Aesthetics.

The author examines Crousaz' Traite du Beau (1715), Hutcheson's An Inquiry into the origin of our ideas of beauty and virtue (1725), Father Andre's Essai sur Ie beau (1741) and Diderot's article "Beau" in the Encydopedie. "The thinkers in question [are] ... considered in groups of two in chronological order. Given the dangers implicit in the Pyrrhonist argument as set out by Montaigne, the crucial questions these thinkers had to face were: (i) Has beauty an objective, absolute existence or is its existence dependent on the subjective perception of a sentient being? (ii) If the latter, how can relativity of judgment be avoided in aesthetics and, by extension, in ethics too?"

61. CARLIN, DAVID R. "Take a Stand, or Several," Commonweal, 118 (1989), 457-58. Ethics.

"Tolerant believers hold strong convictions but are will1ng to put up with views that appear mistaken or even dangerous. Tolerant sceptics, on the other hand, fmd it easy to accept a diversity of opinions because they have no beliefs. For them, all views are a matter of personal preference and are thus equally invalid. The writer discusses the danger that tolerant scepticism poses to society. "

62. CASSIN, BARBARA. "L' Histoire chez Sextus Empiricus," Cahiers de la Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, 15 (1990), 123-38. Ancient Scepticism.

The author analyzes the meaning of "history" in Sextus, reconciling Sextus' claim in Hypotyposes that he reports the Pyrrhonian position as a historian with his devastating criticism of the discipline of history in AM I. 248-69. The conclusion is that from the sceptic's criticism of the dogmatic notion of history, Sextus derives the non-dogmatic modality of his own account of scepticism and of the dogmatic philosophies.

63. CASTLE, TERRY. "Contagious Folly: An Adventure and Its Sceptics," Critical Inquiry, 17 (1991), 741-72. Psychology.

"Psychology has so far been unable to provide an adequate explanation of the so-called 'collective hallucination,' or delusion shared by two or more persons. The sceptical response to An Adventure (1911)-in which two Oxford lady dons claimed to have seen the ghost of Marie Antoinette at Ver-


sailles and printed voluminous 'proofs' for their claims-illustrates the problem well. No contemporary sceptical theory, including the psychological concept of the 'folie a deux,' seems to explain properly the uncanny nature of their belief or the bizarre reactions it provoked. "

64. CASTRO MENDEZ, SILVIA. "EI Problema del Conocimiento en Pascal," Revista de Filosofia de /a Universidad de Costa Rica, 27 (1989), 429-37. Pascal.

"This article is a·chronological review of Pascal's works following along the thread of the gnoseological and methodological problems therein enclosed. The author proposes that the apparent scepticism of the Thoughts is only a rhetorical resource to show how reason is not sufficient to arrive at certainty by itself, and how the possibility of knowledge stands for a cognitive instance different from reason to which it must be submitted. "

65. CAUJOLLE-ZASLAWSKY, FRANCOISE. "L' OppositiontoLOP/Kmpop chez Sextus Empiricus," Cahiers de la Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, 15 (1990), 139-49. Ancient Scepticism.

An examination of the "general" /"particular II opposition in Sextus indicates three relationships: (i) neutral opposition, (ii) valuation of the "particular" but neutrality toward the II general," and (iii) valuation of the "general" at the expense of the "particular." The author suggests that (ii) was characteristic of ancient Pyrrhonism and that (iii) was introduced by Aenesidemus who was influenced by Heraclitus' elevation of universal reason as opposed to particular perceptions.

66. CAVAILLE, JEAN-PIERRE. "Les Sens trompeurs: usage cartesien d'un motif sceptique," Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger, 181 (1991), 3-31. Descartes.

The author shows the relevance of sense deception in Descartes' philosophy: its rhetorical aspects, its contrast to ancient scepticism and its relation to the hyperbolic doubt as presented in the demon argument. The author also compares Descartes' with other seventeenth-century philosophical and literary treatments of sense deception.

67. CHALMERS, ALAN. "How to Defend Science from Scepticism," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 40 (1989), 249-53. Philosophy of Science.

A reply to Barry Gower's criticism of the author's view that there are no universal methods in science. The author argues that, contrary to Gower, adoption of universal methods lead to scepticism because such methods cannot be justified. Furthermore, they contradict the history of science. The author argues that his position does not lead to "relativistic scepticism" because it is grounded on the "aims of science" which are not relative to the dispositions of particular individuals but to society in general.

68. CHAMPEAU, S. Borges et /a meta physique (Paris, 1990). Borges. "Analysis of the work of the Argentine poet Borges, making explicit the

meaning he gives to the terms 'metaphysics' and 'scepticism,' indicating the relationship between philosophy and poetry, and clarifying by comparison the


concepts employed by Borges. To what extent does his literary work depend on philosophy? Borges' perspective transcends the alternative of either fascination with or rejection of metaphysics and in this respect it has to do with philosophy." (Francis)

69. CHATALIAN, GERGE. Epistemology and Scepticism: An Enquiry into the Nature of Epistemology (Carbondale, Ill., 1991). Epistemology.

"The author seeks to restore the classical tradition in epistemology in part by assembling data about philosophical scepticism throughout the history of philosophy. He outlines the central theses in the epistemology of Quine, Russell and Wittgenstein, examining the implicit claims made by such theses about ancient sceptics, Sophists and Plato. The author argues against analytic epistemology and favors a classical approach." (Phil. Index)

70. CHATTOPADHYAYA, D.P. Induction, Probability, and Scepticism (Albany, NY 1991). Epistemology.

71. CHIESA, CURZIO. "Sextus semiologue: Ie probleme des signes commemoratifs," Cahiers de la Revue de TMologie et de Philosophie, 15 (1990), 151-66. Ancient Scepticism.

Sextus divides the signs between commemorative and indicative, accepting the former and rejecting the latter. But his arguments against the indicative signs seem to undermine also the commemorative ones. Analysis of Sextus' implicit semiotic theory shows that if his arguments against signs in general "do not lead to the destruction of commemorative signs, that's because they do not eliminate the signs tout court."

72. CHRISTIE, D. "Contemporary 'Foundationalism' and the Death of Epistemology," Metaphilosophy, 20 (1989), 114-26. Epistemology.

"Analytic epistemology cannot oppose anti-foundational ism, particularly descriptive anti-foundationalism, to the extent that the latter is committed to the description of our inductive practices. The foundationalists can, therefore, equally be pragmatists." (Francis)

73. COBURN, ROBERT C. "Evolution and Scepticism," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 71 (1990), 1-13. Nagel.

Criticism of Nagel's view that our objective capacity to knowledge is not vindicated by evolutionary theory. Related sceptical problems concerning evolutionary theory are also discussed.

74. COHEN, STEWART. "Scepticism and Everyday Knowledge Attributions," Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed. M.D. Roth and G. Ross (Dordrecht, 1990), 161-69. Stroud and Austin.

Can one refute scepticism by appealing to the grounds of everyday knowledge attributions? The author examines the linguistic (Austin's) reply that the sceptic's strict standards of justification are not appropriate to the circumstances in which we ordinarily make knowledge claims and Stroud's criticism of this response. The conclusion is that neither common sense refutes scepticism nor does scepticism show that common sense knowledge claims are mistaken. But the burden of proof should lie with the sceptic due to the extravagance of his position vis-a.-vis common sense.


75. COHEN, STEWART. "Scepticism, Relevance, and Relativity," Dretske and His Critics, ed. B.P. McLaughlin (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 17-37. Dretske.

The author explores the anti-sceptical thrust of Dretske's "relevant alternatives" reply to scepticism, viz., that knowledge does not require elimination of all possible alternative accounts such as dreaming and "brain in a vat" but only those relevant to a certain standard. He denies the validity of the "closure principle" (if S knows p and that p entails non-q then S knows non-q) that excludes the elimination of "non-relevant" alternatives and addresses the problems of contextual ism and that of defining criteria of relevance (the author claims that such criteria cannot be precisely specified, for intuition determines what qualifies as relevant alternatives in each context).

76. COLEMAN, DOROTHY P. "Interpreting Hume's Dialogues," Religious Studies, 25 (1989), 179-90. Hume.

The author claims that Hume holds Philo's position in the Dialogues. The main passages cited by scholars against this identification are explained by Hume's view that religious beliefs lack rational and empirical grounds. One of the passages cited against the identification of Philo's with Hume's position is Philo's assent to the argument from design at the end of the Dialogues. But this assent is motivated by an instinctive feeling unlike Cleanthes' previous causal argumentation. Philo's apparent support of fideism is again consistent with Hume's scepticism about cause. Philo's "veneration for true religion" is consistent with his "abhorrence of vulgar superstitions" which is precisely the denial of "any specific content to the idea of an ultimate cause."

77. COMPAROT, A. "Montaigne et Sanchez ou les exigences de la pensee scientifique," Montaigne et la Grece: 1588-1988, ed. K. Christodoulou (Paris, 1990), 206-16. Montaigne and Sanchez.

According to the author, Montaigne's and Sanchez's doubt is methodic. It is used to attack Aristotelian science in order to vindicate the PlatonicAugustinian doctrine of illumination and a conception of scientific inquiry based on experience. Doubt also has a moral utility. It provides selfknowledge and instills humiliation. Both are propadeutic to the reception of the light and to the acceptance of experience.

78. COPE, KEVIN L. Criteria of Certainty: Truth and Judgment in the English Enlightenment (Lexington, KY, 1990). British Philosophy.

79 COPP, DAVID. "Moral Scepticism," Philosophical Studies, 62 (1991), 203-33. Ethics.

"'Moral scepticism' is the thesis that no moral code or standard is or could be objectively justified. It constitutes as important a challenge to anti-sceptical moral theory as does scepticism about God to theistic philosophies. It expresses intuitive doubts, but it also entails the falsity of a variety of philosophical theories. It entails a denial of moral knowledge and truth, but one could reject it without holding that there is such knowledge or truth. An anti-sceptical theory could be a familiar 'epistemic theory,' but it could also be a 'practical theory,' according to which some moral code has an appropriate justification in practical reason."


80. CORTASSA, GUIDO. "II Programa dello scettico: struttura e forma di argomentazione del Primo Libro delle HP," Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt, ed. W. Haase and H. Temporini, Part II: Principate, vol. 36/4: Philosophie (Berlin and New York, 1990), 2696-718. Ancient Scepticism.

The author underlines Sextus' effort at clarification, precision, and selfassurance in his exposition of Pyrrhonism, which show Sextus' concern with the identity of Pyrrhonism vis-a-vis the other philosophies. This is examined in Sextus' presentation of the sceptic's attitude, the general structure of the tropoi leading to epoche, in his distinction of Pyrrhonism from other schools of philosophy, and in the presentation of the end of Pyrrhonism: epoche and ataraxia.

81. COSTA, MICHAEL J. "Hume and Belief in the Existence of an External World," Philosophical Studies, 32 (1990), 99-112. Hume.

"The author addresses for Hume the question What is the nature of the psychological state that constitutes belief in the existence of an external world? The interpretation developed describes this belief as a disposition (1) to produce vivid ideas of appropriate types filling in gaps between constant and coherent impressions and (2) use the resulting product as the base on which to develop and justify causal inferences. It is argued that this account best explains the various relevant things that Hume has to say, including especially Hume's claim that belief in body cannot be justified, yet is presupposed in all our reasonings." (Phil. Index)

82. COULOUBARITSIS, LAMBROS. "La Probll!matique sceptique d'un impense: 7J (JKHLS," Cahiers de la Revue de TMologie et de Philosophie, 15 (1990), 9-26. Ancient Scepticism.

Semantic analysis of the Greek word skepsis shows that although largely used by Plato, the term was first conceived by the ancient sceptics. The analysis shows the particular kind of inquiry pursued by the ancient sceptics: skepsis is in the realm of theoretic inquiry analogous to deliberation in the realm of practice.

83. COULOUBARITSIS, LAMBROS. "Reflexions de Sextus Empiricus sur les dieux (Adversus Mathematicos IX-X), Kernos, 2 (1989), 37-52. Ancient Scepticism.

Sextus argues both against those who deny the existence of Gods and against those who claim their existence. He thus establishes equipollence and claims acceptance of his ancestral tradition of religious practice. The author sees in Sextus' procedure evidence that in antiquity theology was a part of philosophy (Sextus discusses logical arguments for the existence or non existence of Gods, whose reality is mainly a subject of physics) without relation to religion (there is no reference to revelation or religious faith).

84. CRAIG, EDWARD. "Nozick and the Sceptic: the Thumbnail Version," Analysis, 49 (1989), 161-62. Nozick and Dretske.

The author claims that the Nozick-Dretske analysis of knowledge does not defeat the sceptic.

85. CRAIG, EDWARD. "Davidson and the Sceptic: The Thumbnail Version," Ana-


lysis, 50 (1990). Davidson. "[E]stablishing," as Davidson does, "merely that our beliefs are mostly

true, by a method which simply transmutes any doubt there may be about their truth into a doubt about what their content is, throws away the baby without even managing to get rid of the bath water. "

86. DANFORD, JOHN W. David Hume and the Problem of Reason (New Haven, 1990). Hume.

"Hume's reflections on the power and limits of reason led him to see a defect in the most widely accepted accounts of the epistemology of modem science itself. Science does not produce clear and certain knowledge, on a level quite distinct from 'prudence' or judgments from experience, as has been claimed. Hume showed instead that except in mathematics we are always limited, in our search for knowledge, to what experience teaches. Genuine knowledge of the principles of morals is not less accessible than is knowledge of the principles of physics. Indeed the abstract sciences, i.e., physics, because of their distance from what Hume called "common life," are more vulnerable to the distortions which commonly plague systems of any kind. Hume's investigations led him to see that genuine political science consists in the careful and balanced study of history, where the principles of morals and indeed human nature can be explored in all their variety and complexity. Hume's Essays, the History of England, and the Dialogues should be viewed as the center of his philosophy; they constitute his attempt to discern the outlines of the moral universe, the human world as a whole." (Phil. Index)

87. DAVID, MARIAN. "Neither Mentioning 'Brains in a Vat' nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove that We Are Not," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51 (1991), 891-96. Putnam.

"The paper considers some reconstructions of Putnam's anti-sceptical arguments to the effect that we are not brains in a vat. The standard reconstructions of the argument are rejected because they employ a metalinguistic premise concerning the meaning of the sentence 'I am a brain in a vat' which makes them susceptible to scepticism about meaning. An invitingly simple object-language version of the argument is suggested. It, too, is rejected because the premise that we can think that we have brains in a vat remains open to sceptical doubt." (Phil. Index)

88. DAVIS, WILLIAM H. "In My Opinion, That's Your Opinion: Is Rorty a Foundationalist?" Reason Papers, 14 (1989), 137-41. Rorty.

"This reply to an article by Steven Yates argues that Rorty' s denial of the possibility of objective truth is not essentially self-referentially incoherent. I argue that a sceptic has no burden of proof, is free to suppose things for the sake of argument, and may hope for a personally satisfactory view of the world, all without refuting himself in the process. "

89. DECLAVA CAIZZI, FERNANDA. "Timmoni e i filosofi: Protagora (fr. 5 Diels)," Cahiers de la Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, 15 (1990), 41-53. Ancient Scepticism.

Examination of Timon's fragment on Protagoras indicates Timon's


sceptical (ironical) position vis-a.-vis Protagoras and suggests that the view that relates Protagoras to the sceptical tradition is alien to ancient Pyrrhonism.

90. DE DUN, HERMAN. "De Waarheid over het scepticisme," Wijsgerig Perspectief op Maatschappij en Wetenschap, 30 (1989-90), 97-102. Wittgenstein.

The author argues that Wittgenstein solves the problem of Hume's scepticism.

91. DE MARTELAERE, PATRICIA. "Normen van redelijkheid," Wijsgerig Perspectief op Maatschappij en Wetenschap, 30 (1989-90), 114-18. Epistemology.

On Hume's scepticism and contemporary alternatives to it (Popper, Moore, and Wittgenstein).

92. DE PIERRlS, G. "Essay Review of Stroud's The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism," Nous, 23 (1989), 531-43. Stroud.

"The distinction of two levels in which one can address the problem of scepticism with respect to our possibility of knowing the external world-the transcendental or philosophical level and the internal or empirical level-are crucial for reading Descartes, Moore, Kant, and Carnap." (Francis)

93. DE VRIES, WILLEM. "Burgeoning Scepticism," Erkenntnis, 33 (1990), 141-64. Psychology.

"This paper shows that the resources mobilized by recent arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind also suffice to construct a good argument against a Humean-style scepticism about our knowledge of extramental reality. The argument constructed, however, will not suffice to lay to rest the attacks of a truly global sceptic who rejects the idea that we usually know what our occurrent mental states are."

94. DELL' UTRI, MASSIMO. "Choosing Conceptions of Realism: the Case of Brains in a Vat," Mind, 99 (1990), 79-90. Epistemology.

The author presents a linguistic refutation of scepticism inspired in Putnam's view that every meaningful discourse presupposes the knowability of reference. "If the sceptic understands the language he listens to and makes the others understand his own, then also the terms 'brain' and 'vat,' like the rest of his language, do have a 'reference-in-the-image,' and this is enough to show he is not a [brain in a vat]. "

95. DELL, KATHARINE J. The Book of Job as Sceptical Literature (Berlin, 1991). History of Religion.

The author rejects the classification of the book of Job under "wisdom" literature and proposes "sceptical" instead. "[A] sceptical tradition as a context for [the author of Job's] activity may be sought both in a broader intellectual milieu which lies outside the main wisdom tradition ... and in a narrower philosophical group which can be likened to the milieu of the Greek sceptics. The scepticism conveyed by the author of Job resembles the 'suspension of belief' practiced by the early Greek sceptics."

96. DENYER, NICHOLAS. "Symbolic Scepticism," Phronesis, 36 (1991),313-18. Barnes.

"The review article complains about the abuse of symbolic logic in Jonathan Barnes, The Toils of Scepticism (Cambridge, 1990)." (Phil. Index)


97. DEREOffiUS, A. "Pascal, Bayle, Voltaire: Bayle e Voltaire interpreti di Pascal," Studi Francesi (1990), 13-42. Pascal, Bayle, and Voltaire.

98. DESBORDES, FRANCOISE. "Le scepticisme et les 'arts liberaux:' une etude de Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. I-VI," Cahiers de la Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, 15 (1990), 167-79. Ancient Scepticism.

In Adversus Mathematicos Sextus condemns grammar, astrology, and rhetoric instead of establishing equipollence as he usually does. He does that because these are liberal arts (distinct from the philosophical disciplines) that must be preserved: suspension of judgment with respect to them would jeopardize life. But this commits Sextus to "scientific" procedures that are normally rejected when he examines the philosophical disciplines.

99. DORE, CLEMENT. Moral Scepticism (London, 1991). Ethics. "In roughly the first half of this book, I shall address myself to scepticism

regarding our ability to know that some moral judgments are true and some are false. And in Chapters 6-9 I shall deal with the kind of professional moralist's scepticism about morality which [Bernard] Williams voices [Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass., 1986]. I shall assume throughout the book that there is a (Reidian-Moorean-Chisholmian) prima facie case against scepticism of any sort. My chief aim is to defend against criticism the thesis that in fact non-sceptical moral theories are available. "

100. DRETSKE, FRED. "The Epistemology of Belief," Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed. M.D. Roth and G. Ross (Dordrecht, 1990), 183-94. Epistemology.

"By examining the general conditions in which a structure could come to represent another state of affairs, it is argued that beliefs, a special class of representations, have their contents limited by the sort of information the system in which they occur can pick up and process. If a system-measuring instrument, animal or human being-cannot process information to the effect that something is Q, it cannot represent something as Q. From this it follows (for simple, ostensively acquired concepts at least) that if an organism that has the information-processing capabilities for knowing that something is Q it can represent something as Q. "

101. DRIVER, JULIA. "The Virtues of Ignorance," The Journal of Philosophy, 78 (1989), 373-84. Ethics.

Building on the case of modesty, the author criticizes the traditional view in ethics that no virtue is constituted by, or based on, ignorance.

102. DUMONT, JEAN-PAUL. "OVOfP /UXAAOP chez Platon," Cahiers de la Revue de Theoiogie et de Philosophie, 15 (1990), 29-40. Ancient Scepticism.

The author indicates the original Platonic and Heraclitean meaning of the formula "this no more than that." The ancient sceptics' use of the formula to cause suspension of judgment is a radical break from the traditional philosophical use of the expression.

103. DURRANT, MICHAEL. "Scepticism: Three Recently Presented Arguments Examined," Philosophical Investigations, 14 (1991), 252-66. Dancy.

"I consider three sceptical arguments advanced by Jonathan Dancy, 1) you


don't know that you are not a brain sustained in a vat of liquid in a laboratory and wired to a computer which is feeding you your current experiences under the control of some ingenious scientist; 2) the sceptical argument from the possibility of error; 3) the sceptical argument concerning the lack of justification of arguments from experience. In all three types of cases it is argued that the sceptic of necessity has to presuppose what he implicitly denies in order for him to intelligibly advocate his own position. Such forms of scepticism are thus radically unjustified. "

104. ERES, GLORIA H. "Hume's Philosophical Schizophrenia," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 71 (1990), 14-22. Hume.

The author argues that there is no problematic conflict in Hume between philosophical reflection and ordinary life but among "conflicting intuitions at the philosophical level." The return to ordinary belief is not a satisfactory outcome for Hume because Hume thinks that the sceptical stance should be adopted in ordinary life. His realization that he holds unjustifiable beliefs is a philosophical issue that throws light on the nature of belief.

105. EVERSON, STEPHEN. "The Objective Appearance of Pyrrhonism," Psychology: Companions to Ancient Thought, vol. 2, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge, UK, 1991), 121-47. Ancient scepticism.

On the differences between Ancient (Pyrrhonian) and Modem (Cartesian) scepticism. There is no scepticism about the external world in Ancient scepticism nor does it assign any privileged status to mental states.

106. FALZER, PAUL R. "On Behalf of Sceptical Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 24 (1991), 238-54. Rhetoric.

"The essay proposes that rhetoric should remain in the sceptical tradition. It suggests that the age of technology has altered rhetoric's mandate: instead of establishing a relationship between knowledge and praxis, rhetorical practice now broaches the relationship, renders it transparent, and thereby serves as the principle means of restraining humankind's compulsion to act. The conception advanced in this essay maintains that rhetoric is an insufficiently justified practice occupying the region between individual and culture. Moreover, it is proposed that this conception brings rhetoric's dependence on philosophy to an end. "

107. FELDMAN, RICHARD. "Klein on Certainty and Canonical Beliefs, " Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed. M.D. Roth and G. Ross (Dordrecht, 1990), 121-26. Klein

"In 'Epistemic Compatibilism and Canonical Beliefs' Peter Klein argues that we can know that the preponderance of our common sense beliefs about the external world are true, although we cannot know with respect to any particular belief about the world that it is true. Klein argues that we fail to know each particular proposition because there is a doubt-maker for it, whereas there is no doubt-maker for the general proposition about the preponderance of our beliefs. I argue that, given Klein's account of what makes a proposition doubtful, the general proposition about our beliefs is doubtful and thus not known. "


108. FERNANDEZ SANTAMARIA, JOSE A. Juan Luis Vives: Escepticismo y Prudencia en el Renacimiento (Salamanca, 1990). Vives.

Vives' thought is related to sceptical views that unfold during the Renaissance. It is grounded on three skeptical positions: "(1) Man is unable to know the first cause having only reason as guide, (2) reason is unable to warrant a clear, certain and indubitable knowledge of first causes and principles that reveal the essence of nature, (3) man can attain only opinions through reason." In the first chapter, "the sceptical positions most remarkable in the period" are delineated. In the second, the author examines Vives' view of the human condition, justifying the author's view that Vives is a sceptic. In the third, the analysis of Vives' scepticism is continued and its relation to fideism brought to light. "In the fourth [chapter], given that all 'scientific' methodology is excluded by the second premise, we focus on the artistic methodology-the only possible alternative to the scientific one-that can be developed according to premise number 3. Finally, the last chapter shows what the artistic methodology can generate: prudentia."

109. FERRETTI, SILVIA. "n Giudizio di Santagostino sulla Nuova Accademia tra scetticismo ed esoterismo," Filosojia, 41 (1990), 155-83. Augustine.

The author presents an analysis of Augustine's Contra Academicos. A Platonic background of Augustine's refutation of scepticism is indicated: a metaphysical view of the truth is presupposed, according to Augustine, in the Academic attack on the Stoic naturalistic criterion of truth.

110. FIESER, JAMES. "Hume's Pyrrhonism: a Developmental Interpretation," Hume Studies, 15 (1989), 93-119. Hume.

The author argues that "Hume is a sceptic in the Pyrrhonian tradition in his belief that fundamental aspects of the human understanding are wrought with contradictions." He claims that Hume, from the Treatise to the Enquiry, expands the realm of Pyrrhonism. In the former the contradictions are identified in external objects and causality, whereas in the Appendix to the Treatise and in the Enquiry they are also identified in the mental and moral realms.

111. FIESER, JAMES. "Is Hume a Moral Sceptic?" Philosophy and Phenomenology Research, 50 (1989), 89-105. Hume.

Hume is not a sceptic as far as normative ethics is concerned, for he holds a consequentialist theory of action. But he is "a weak meta-ethical sceptic insofar he denies that morality is independent of the existence and character of human beings. He is not a thorough or strong meta-ethical sceptic [because] he advances a moral theory which is firmly grounded in human instinct. "

112. FISHER, MICHAEL. Stanley Cavell and Literary Scepticism (Chicago, 1989). Cavell.

"This book applies S. Cavell's analysis of scepticism to the controversies surrounding poststructuralist literary theory, particularly works by J. Derrida, J.H. Miller, Paul de Man, and Stanley Fish. The book argues that there are significant affinities between deconstruction and the sceptical questioning


discussed by Cavell. Cavell's work on external-world and other-minds scepticism permits a fresh view of deconstruction and shows why some attacks against deconstruction (most notably those of M.H. Abrams and Charles Altiere) have failed." (Phil. Index)

113. FISHER, MICHAEL. "Stanley Cavell and Contemporary Literary Theory," Bucknell Review, 32 (1989), 116-31. Cavell.

An application of Cavell's views on scepticism to contemporary literary theories.

114. FOLEY, RICHARD. "Scepticism and Rationality," Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed. M.D. Roth and G. Ross (Dordrecht, 1990), 69-81. Epistemology .

"Sceptical hypotheses convince no one, and yet they have an enormous influence in epistemology. They provoke some epistemologists into endorsing metaphysical and linguistic positions that antecedently would have seemed to have had little appeal, and they push others into an overly defensive posture from which it can seem that the test of an epistemology is how well it would fare in a hostile environment. There must be a third way. The author describes a different way of reacting to sceptical hypotheses-one that is neither dismissive of them nor submissive to them. "

115. FORSTER, MICHAEL N. Hegel and Scepticism (Cambridge, Mass., 1989). Hegel.

The author shows Hegel's relation to the sceptical tradition under three aspects. 1) Hegel argues that ancient scepticism, unlike modem scepticism, a) is methodic, i.e., it is an universal procedure, unlimited by the content of beliefs; b) does not reduce the scope of epoche; and c) has a practical purpose. 2) Ancient scepticism is a basic moment in Hegel's philosophy of history: it has a crucial role in the transition from the "harmonious culture of the Greek polis ... to the cultural conditions of Roman and subsequent JudeoChristian history, in which men are intellectually alienated both from God and from their natural and social environment." Christian theology is a response to sceptical attacks on Greek theology and culture. 3) Crucial concepts in Hegel's philosophy such as "dialectics" involve an epistemology enacted to defend his system from sceptical objections.

116. FOUGEYROLLAS, P. "Actualite du Scepticisme," Societes, 25 (1989),47-52. Philosophy of Science.

"Given the plurality of perspectives on history and the incapacity of the social and human sciences to thoroughly explain this plurality, there is a general crisis at this end of the century. In this situation, one must avoid the double danger of dogmatism and of nihilism by adopting a lucid scepticism. " (Francis)

117. FOUKE, DANIEL. "Argument in Pascal's Pensees," History of Philosophy Quanerly, 6 (1989), 57-68. Pascal.

The author objects to Popkin's and Penelhum's view that Pascal is an epistemological sceptic and a fideist by analyzing the structure of Pascal's arguments.


118. FRANKLIN, JAMES. "Healthy Scepticism," Philosophy, 66 (1991), 305-24. Epistemology.

"The central argument for scepticism about the external world is the symmetry argument: that there is no reason to prefer the realist hypothesis to, say, the deceitful demon hypothesis. This argument is defended against the various standard objections, such as that the demon hypothesis is only a bare possibility, does not lead to pragmatic success, lacks coherence or simplicity, is ad hoc or parasitic, makes impossible demands for certainty, or contravenes some basic standards for a conceptual or linguistic scheme. Since the conclusion of the sceptical argument is not true, it is concluded that one can only escape the force of the argument through some large premise, such as an aptitude of the intellect for truth, if necessary divinely supported. "

119. FRENCH, S. "A Peircean Response to the Realist-Empiricist Debate," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 25 (1989), 293-307. Peirce.

"On how Peirce's views on scepticism, truth, and belief can shed light on the realist-empiricist debate in contemporary science." (Francis)

120. FUCHS, W. W. "Post-Modernism is not Scepticism," Man and World, 22 (1989), 393-402. Nietzsche and Derrida.

The author rejects the association of postmodernism with scepticism. Nietzsche and Derrida's views are distinguished from Sextus Empiricus "in terms of starting point, methods, self-evaluation, and aspirations." The main difference is that "Post-Modernism ... has approached the secret heart of truth. "

121. FUMERTON, RICHARD. "Metaepistemology and Scepticism," Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed. M.D. Roth and G. Ross (Dordrecht, 1990), 57-68. Epistemology.

"I explore the implications of the internalismlexternalism controversy for the possibility of refuting traditional forms of scepticism. In particular I argue that philosophically interesting responses to scepticism may presuppose a version of internalism I call inferential internal ism but that the possibility of refuting scepticism within that framework may depend on the plausibility of a highly controversial concept of probability as an internal relation between propositions." (Phil. Index)

122. FUNKENSTEIN, AMos. "Descartes and the Method of Annihilation, " Sceptics, Millenarians and Jews, ed. J. Israel and D. Katz (Leiden, 1990), 70-75. Descartes.

A scholastic (in particular Nominalist) critical tradition of "thought experiments of that which is possible in view of God's absolute power" is present in Descartes' epistemology along with the Renaissance tradition of sceptical fideism. Descartes' solution to scepticism (avoidance of the 'Arnauld Circle,' the cogito and the proof of a non-deceiver God) can be clarified by reference to this scholastic tradition.

123. GABAUDE, JEAN-MARC. "Paradoxale assurance pratique: synthese montaignienne des sagesses sceptique, epicurienne et stoique," Montaigne et la Grece: 1588-1986, ed. K. Christodoulou (Paris, 1990),97-101. Montaigne.


The author argues that despite Sextus Empiricus' influence, Montaigne did not adopt a "doctrinal n scepticism. The Essais contain elements of an "ethical axiology" of happiness and enjoyment that bring together Epicurean and Stoic elements.

124. GARCIA NORRO, JUAN JosE. "EI Cuadruplo Problema de la Induccion: Critica de La Solucion Popperiana," Revista de Filosojia, 3 (1990), 5-21. Popper.

"Induction poses four different problems. The main one is the problem pointed out by Hume-the metaphysical problem of induction. It is argued that Popper misunderstands the nature of this question. Hence he has not been able to solve it as he claims. Hume's challenge persists." (Phil. Index)

125. GARCIA-BARCE, MIGUEL. "Ideal Objects and Scepticism. A polemical point in Logical Investigations, n Annals Husserlians, 29 (1990), 73-90. Husseri.

126. GARFIELD, JAY L. "Epoche and Sunyata: Scepticism East and West," Philosophy East and West, 40 (1990), 285-307. Eastern Philosophy.

Eastern (Buddhist) forms of scepticism shed light on undeveloped issues of Western scepticism such as the therapeutic nature of scepticism, the nature of epoche, the relationship between scepticism and ordinary life, etc. Buddhist scepticism shows that the sceptical position lies between the reificationist's and the nihilist's positions. This sheds light on contemporary discussions in cognitive science (Fodor on individualism and causation).

127. GEMES, KEN. "A Refutation of Popperian Inductive Scepticism," British Journal/or the Philosophy 0/ Science, 40 (1989), 163-84. Popper.

"Formal argument against Popper's inductive scepticism." (Francis) 128. GIAMMUSO, SALVATORE. "Individuo, tradizione e pluralismo dei valore: per

un' interpetrazione critica dello scetticismo morale contemporaneo, " Archivio di Storia della Cultura, 2 (1989), 251-302. Ethics.

129. GIGANTE, MARCELLO. "Quelques precisions sur Ie scepticisme et l'epicurisme," Cahiers de la Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, 15 (1990), 69-83. Ancient Scepticism.

A reply to some critical reviews of the author's book Scetticismo e epicureismo (Naples, 1981). The main point is that, contrary to Isnardi Parente, Epicurus' main opponents-in particular in the Capital Maxims XXIIIXXIV-are Pyrrho and his disciples and not Democritus and Metodorus.

130. GILLET, GRANT. "An Anti-Sceptical Fugue," Philosophical Investigations, 13 (1990), 304-21. Wittgenstein

The author claims that Wittgenstein criticizes scepticism about the external world through an articulation of the following themes: use of "know;" the relation between truth and meaning; "the importance of acting in thought;" "the need of certain things to be fixed;" and "the coherence of our thought as a system. "

131. GruSTA, M. "Antioco di Ascalona e Cameade nellibro V del De jinibus bonarum et malorum di Cicerone," Elenchos, (1990), 29-49. Ancient Scepticism.

The author examines Han Joachim Mette's edition of the fragments by


Antiochos (Lustrum, 28-29 [1986-87], 9-63) and compares it with the edition by George Luck (Der Akademiker Antiochos [Bern and Stuttgart, 1953], 73-94), checking them against Book V of Cicero's De jinibus bonarum.

132. GLIDDEN, DAVID K. "From Pyrrhonism to Post-Modernism," Ancient Philosophy, 10 (1990), 263-67. Ancient Scepticism.

Criticism of David Hilley's Philosophy in Question: Essays on a Pyrrhonian Theme (1988). The author denies that there are significant similarities between ancient Pyrrhonism and postmodernism and discusses the history of philosophy.

133. GLOCK, HANS-JOHANN. "Stroud's Defense of Cartesian Scepticism-A 'Linguistic' Response," Philosophical Investigations, 13 (1990), 44-64. Stroud, Austin and Wittgenstein.

Although a linguistic response to scepticism based on Austin may be insufficient, Wittgenstein's views on grammar show that scepticism makes no sense.

134. GOLDMAN, ALAN H. "Scepticism About Goodness and Rightness," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29 (1990), 167-83. Ethics.

The author objects to contravening scepticism about goodness by conceiving it as an objectively perceivable or generic property, and proposes another solution: conceiving goodness as the object of rational desire. As to scepticism about rightness, the realist solution is rejected. The author proposes an alternative solution based on a coherentist theory of truth.

135. GRICE, PAUL. "Common Sense and Scepticism," Studies in the Way of Words, ed. P. Grice (Cambridge., Mass., 1989), 147-53. Malcolm.

Malcolm says that because sceptical doubts about empirical propositions do not depend on the accumulation of evidence they are a priori. The sceptic

1s thus committed to the view that empirical propositions of the form "I know that such and such is the case" are self-contradictory. But these propositions are ordinarily used to describe states of affairs. The sceptic's position is thus contradictory because self-contradictory expressions can never be used to describe situations. Grice shows that Malcolm's objection can be questioned, for one can construe a linguistic situation in which the ordinary use of the proposition "I know p" may be interpreted as wrong.

136. GRJASNOV, A. F. "'Le 'Paradoxe sceptique' et les moyens de Ie depasser" (in Russian), Voprosy Filosojii, 12 (1989), 140-50. Wittgenstein and Kripke

137. GROARKE, LEO. Greek Scepticism: Anti-Realist Theory in Ancient Thought (Montreal, 1990). Ancient Scepticism.

"This book offers an account of Greek scepticism through its various stages of development in classical times, and also a discussion of its relationship to modem and contemporary philosophy. The author argues that the Greek sceptics anticipated problems central to modem epistemology and in fact provided an analogue of the anti-realist trends normally thought to be uniquely modem. The separation of the mind from the external world generally attributed to Descartes is an integral part of ancient scepticism, and the problems that it generates were dealt by classical sceptics at a deeper and

Skeptidsm Bibliography 419

more significant level than they are today." (Bibliographie de la philosophie) 138. GROARKE, LEO and SOLOMON, GRAHAM. "Some Sources for Hume's

Account of Cause," Journal of the History of Ideas, 52 (1991), 645-63. Hume.

"We show that four central aspects of Hume's account of cause were contained and available to him in the translation of Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism contained in Thomas Stanley's 1687 History of Philosophy." (Phil. Index)

139. GROSS, KENNETH. "Slander and Scepticism in Othelo," English Literary History, 56 (1989), 819-52. Cavell.

The author criticizes Cavell's interpretation of Othelo. According to Cavell, Othelo presents a criticism of the quest for certainty. The play shows that this quest leads to the destruction of life. The author argues that Othelo's inhumane quest for certainty pointed out by Cavell must be counterbalanced by Desdemona's "form of love that strangely mirrors the blind narcissistic prizing or misprizing of her which makes Othelo so susceptible to Iago's slanders."

140. GROSSMANN, REINHARDT. The Fourth Way: A Theory of Knowledge (Bloomington, 1990). Epistemology.

"The author argues that a realistic ontology in regard to perceptual, physical, and mathematical objects can be combined with an empiricistic theory of knowledge. In the first part of the book he shows that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities leads to idealism, while Descartes' 'way of ideas' leads to scepticism. In order to avoid these twin scourges of modem philosophy, the author argues for the existence of ordinary perceptual objects and explains how we know these things through acts of perception. The second part of the book deals with our knowledge of our minds. In the third and longest part, the author argues that logic and arithmetic concern matters of fact and that we discover these facts empirically." (Phil. Index)

141. HALLO, WILLAM W. "The Limits of Scepticism," Journal of the American Oriental Sodety, 110 (1989), 187-99. Archeology.

"Faced with limited evidence, students of the ancient Near East must choose between two alternatives: to limit the inferences they draw from it, or to treat it as a precious resource to be critically sifted as they reconstruct a total picture of antiquity. This paper attempts to weigh these alternatives dispassionately in light of specific examples."

142. HAMILTON, ANDY. "Anscombian and Cartesian Scepticism," Philosophical Quarterly, 41 (1991), 39-54. Anscombe.

"Anscombe's 'Sensory Deprivation Argument' (in his book titled The First Person) presents a subject in a tank, totally sensorially deprived and amnesiac, yet still apparently guaranteed to self-refer using 'I.' Since the subject has no conception of itself as embodied, she argued, 'I' must refer to a Cartesian Ego or (Anscombe's conclusion) to nothing at all. However, this argument depends on an empty phenomenon of 'no unnoticed substitution' of


the referential 'I' or (a sceptical variant of the argument) a modal fallacy. One can reconstruct Anscombe's argument avoiding these fallacies, but paradoxically a Cartesian conclusion results. The way 'I' continues to refer in the absence of a Fregean conception, together with Anscombe's important claims about the circularity of the self-reference principle, does however suggest that the concept of a person is irrelevant to self-reference-a claim not easy to counter. "

143. HANKINSON, R.I. "A Purely Verbal Dispute? Galen on Stoic and Academic Epistemology," Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 45 (1991), 267-300. Ancient Scepticism.

The author argues for the correctness of Galen's view that Stoic (Chrysippus') and Academic (Cameades') epistemologies are pragmatically identical although they are ontologically different.

144. HANKINSON, R.I. "Saying the Phenomena," Phronesis, 35 (1990), 194-215. Essay review of von Staden's Herophilus: The Art of Medicine in Early Alexandria (Cambridge, UK, 1989). Ancient Scepticism.

The reviewer discusses von Staden's interpretation of Herophilus' tripartite classification of medicine, his view. on causality (which the reviewer, contrary to von Staden, relates to Pyrrhonism), and Herophilus' position on the supremacy of phenomena. [T]he 'body-cause-sign' tripartition ... is extremely well suited to Herophilus' epistemological and methodological position ... The place of 'body' needs no justification; the 'signs' are the [phenomena] from which medical theory takes its start; and the 'causes' are the hidden entities, the deep internal conditions to which the theorist infers on their basis. Such inferences, and this is Herophilus' great innovation, are inherently and irremediably fragile-they are always, of their very nature, open to refutation and revision in the light of further experience .... [T]hat does not, of course, make him in any sense (apart from a methodological one) a sceptic. It does, however, make him a great scientist and theorist of science. "

145. HARMAN, GILBERT. Scepticism and the Definition of Knowledge (New York and London, 1990). Epistemology.

"The book argues that (1) scepticism is an intelligible view and (2) the issue scepticism raises is whether or not certain sceptical hypotheses are as plausible as the ordinary views we normally accept. Along the way, there are discussions of the nature of psychological concepts, the definition of knowledge, how belief is based on inference, and, most importantly, how inference leads to the best explanation. "

146. HARRISON, BERNARD. "Wittgenstein and Scepticism," Meaning Scepticism, ed. Klaus Puhl (Berlin and New York, 1991). 34-69. Wittgenstein.

The certainty one has about someone else's pain is "beyond doubt" not in virtue of some criterion that secures the internal relation between external behavior and mental states, "but simply the fact that the limited resources of non-vacuous doubt in the actual situation confronting me have run out!"

147. HARWOOD, STERLING. "Taking Scepticism Seriously and in Context,"


Philosophical Investigations, 12 (1989), 223-33. Moore. Against Moore's refutation of scepticism. Moore does not have "complete

certainty," which is the certainty "that logically cannot be more certain" nor does he have "absolute certainty, " which is unconditional. The author claims that "a consistent sceptic can speak: normally and without absurdity." The sceptic "need not to deny ordinary propositions; he merely thinks they are not completely certain. "

148. HATHERlNGTON, STEPHEN C. "Kripke and McGinn on Wittgensteinian Rulefollowing," Philosophia, 21 (1991), 89-100. Wittgenstein.

"Colin McGinn thinks that Wittgenstein uses (what Kripke characterizes as) his rule-sceptical argument as a reductio. I think that, if McGinn is right, then philosophical considerations suggest that the argument is best construed as a reductio of rule-sceptical thinking itself." (Phil. Index)

149. HAYS, STEVE. "On the Sceptical Influence of Gorgias' On Non Being," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 28 (1990), 327-37. Gorgias.

On the influence of Gorgias' work at Plato's time. The two main conclusions are: 1) "that [it] was very well known by name among educated Athenians ... and that at least one of its skeptical arguments was sufficiently current at the popular level to form the basis of Aristophanic caricature; and 2) that Plato recognized in Gorgias' arguments a challenge to his own philosophical views to which Plato or others would have to respond. "

150. HElL, JOHN. "Doubts About Scepticism," Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed. M.D. Roth and G. Ross (Dordrecht, 1990), 147-59. Stroud.

Criticism of Stroud's Cartesian scepticism about the external world. Two 'epistemologial projects' must be distinguished: "(i) the specification of the conditions of empirical knowledge; and (ii) the determination of conditions under which it would be reasonable-or true-to believe or to say that those conditions are satisfied. The sceptical arguments to which Stroud alludes in the first two chapters of The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism seem to me to apply straightforwardly to the second of these projects; the conclusions drawn, however, purport to raise questions about the first. That is, the sceptic's contention is not that we can never establish that we have knowledge of ordinary states of affair-that would be compatible with our 'having' it-but that we 'do not and could not have' such knowledge."

151. HENDERSON, GREIG. "In Search of the Ordinary: Leading Words Home," University of Toronto Quarterly, 59 (1990), 442-48. Cavell.

Essay Review of M. Fischer's Stanley Cavell and Literary Scepticism (1989) and S. Cavell's Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein (1989).

152. HERZOG, DON. "David Hume: Crusading Empiricist, Sceptical Liberal," Knowledge and Politics, ed. M. Dascal and O. Gruengard (Boulder and London, 1989),69-82. Hume.

"I mean to argue that there are ties between Hume's epistemology and his political theory. But they are not so strong as some have suggested; nor are


they where scholars have looked. Briefly, Hume's commitment to rmding fundamental laws of human nature does not yield any ideological identification of England's middle classes with the essence of humanity. And Hume is in fact quite sensitive to the decisive effects of shifting social context. Hume's habits of the mind, though, do playa role in his political theory. More important, Hume's insistence on bowing to experience has much to do with the tenor of his political thought. "

153. HINTON,1.M. "Scepticism - Philosophical and Everyday," Philosophy, 64 (1989), 219-43. Philosophy of Language.

The author evaluates and distinguishes from its ordinary meaning a variety of philosophical meanings of "scepticism."

154. HOAGWOOD, TERENCE A. "Historicity and Scepticism in the Lake Geneva Summer," The Byron Journal, 19 (1991), 90-103. Byron.

The author relates Byron to ancient scepticism (Sextus Empiricus) with whom he was acquainted through Montaigne, in particular the Apology for Raymond Sebond "which was ... impressive to Byron," and T. Stanley's History of Philosophy. "Historicity entails ... more in Child Harold III than current events; it entails the relativity, multiplicity, and mutability of systems of thought and their related systems of political and cultural life. Scepticism, however, entails more in Child Harold III than merely intellectual doubts about merely abstract issues: for Byron as for Shelley, scepticism entails the recognition that tyranny has its own thought-systems, and that (veiled in times of repression) revolution involves ideological transformations no less than political acts. Thus history and scepticism, like Byron and Shelley, came together with important results in the Lake Geneva summer. "

155. HOLCOMB III, HARMON R. "Cognitive Dissonance and Scepticism," Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 19 (1989), 411-31. Psychology.

"The basic idea of the argument is to apply the 'classical' theory of cognitive dissonance ... to uncover basic experimental-logical flaws in discussions of scepticism. [Sceptics and dogmatists] utilize self-deceptive strategies for reducing cognitive dissonance as a result of viewing knowledge as true belief plus some special relation to evidence. ... This postulate generates a critical perspective on epistemology of great potential scope and significance. Debates over scepticism by such diverse thinkers as Descartes, Hume, Malcom, Austin, Popper and recent philosophers of science are permeated by fallacies logically similar to self-deceptive fallacies about waiting. "

156. HOLYER, ROBERT. "Scepticism, Evidentialism and the Parity Argument: A Pascalian Perspective," Religious Studies, 25 (1989), 191-208. Philosophy of Religion.

Sceptical arguments are usually considered as having positive validity in religion only for the fideist. The author applies the constructive role of sceptical arguments in experimental science to religion, claiming that "sceptical arguments lead not to abandonment of claims of justified belief but to a revision and contextualization of our epistemic standards." Pascal's


apology is used as a model. 157. HOOKWAY, CHRISTOPHER. Scepticism (London, 1990). Epistemology.

The author examines the main sceptical arguments in Sextus, Descartes, Hume and some contemporary philosophers as well as the common sense/pragmatic kind of reply to scepticism (from Reid to Wittgenstein and Quine) which he favors.

158. HOOKWAY, CHRISTOPHER. "Scepticism and Autonomy," Proceedings o/the Aristotelian Society, 90 (1989-90), 103-18. Ethics.

"The problem of scepticism is viewed as a particular case of the problem of the free will, of rational and autonomous self-control." (Francis)

159. HOOKWAY, CHRISTOPHER. "Russell et la possibilite du scepticisme, " Hermes, 7 (1990), 103-18. Russell.

"In an often cited page from Human Knowledge, Russell claims that radical scepticism in epistemology is a position both 'logically impeccable' and 'psychologically impossible.' According to the author, Russell's statement leads to a 'sophistic' form of scepticism. Close examination of Russell's treatment of induction shows that if the theory of knowledge of the second Russell indicates, from certain aspects, the naturalization of epistemology (in the Quinean sense), it continues, from other aspects, largely trapped in traditional empirism." (Francis)

160. HOOKWAY, CHRISTOPHER. "Critical Common-sensism and Rational Selfcontrol," Nous, 24 (1990), 397-412. Peirce.

On the nature of Peirce's "critical common-sensism" response to scepticism: its differences from Reid's common sense, its criticism of Kant and its role in Peirce's pragmatism.

161. HOOKWAY, CHRISTOPHER. "The Epicurean Argument: Determinism and Scepticism," Inquiry, 32 (1989), 79-94. Ethics.

"The author examines Honderich's attempt to make sense of the widespread view that acceptance of determinism undermines reason and knowledge. After introducing the issue and stating Honderich's version of the argument from determinism to scepticism, I present an alternative which is closer to traditional patterns of sceptical arguments and the anti-determinist assumptions about agency and the self which each employs: scepticism results from determinism against the background of a conception of rationality and justification which supports a Cartesian approach to epistemology and an internalist theory of justification. "

162. HUDAC, MICHAEL C. "Merleau-Ponty in the Cartesian Dubito: A Critical Analysis," History 0/ Philosophy Quarterly, 8 (1991), 207-19. MerleauPonty and Descartes.

The author replies to Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of Descartes' dubito, viz., that absolute doubt is not feasible, that the ontological distinction between an external object (which can be doubted) and its perception (which is certain) is untenable, and that the cogito is prereflective. The author argues that, contrary to Merleau-Ponty, Descartes' doubt supports a phenomenological interpretation. Descartes' doubt is similar to Husserl's


epoche. 163 HULL, ROBERT. "Scepticism, Enigma and Integrity: Horizons of Affirmation

in Nietzsche's Philosophy," Man and World, 23 (1990), 375-91. Nietzsche. The author argues that Nietzsche presents a criticism of philosophy

"reminiscent of the sceptical modes of Sextus Empiricus or of the essenceless language games of the later Wittgenstein." Basically, in Nietzsche this is what the author calls a "moral-psychological critique of epistemology." The philosopher's search for truth is motivated-and its results shaped-by fear of insecurity and other non-epistemic factors.

164. HUMBER, JAMES M. "Descartes' Dream Argument and Doubt of the Material World," Modern Schoolman, 69 (1991), 17-32. Descartes.

"Whether or not one believes that Descartes' Dream Argument (DA) casts doubt upon the existence of the material world is determined, in part at least, by how he/she interprets DA's conclusion. In my essay, I argu~ that a close examination of relevant Cartesian texts show: (a) that DA does not call matter's existence into question; (b) that Stuart's interpretation of DA's conclusion is wrong; and (c) that it is wholly unimportant whether we accept Frankfurt's interpretation of DA's conclusion or the traditionalist's view, for nothing of consequence hinges on the matter." (Phil. Index)

165. HUMBER, JAMES M. "On Dreaming and Being Awake: A Defense of Descartes," History of Philosophy Quarterly, 6 (1989), 3-26. Descartes.

The author defends Descartes' refutation of the dream argument (DA). "(1) if a non-deceiving God exists, Descartes can counter all major criticisms of his attempt to overcome DA doubt; (2) to be assured of success in attacking Descartes' escape from DA doubt, one must reject Descartes' belief in the existence of a veracious God; and (3) if Descartes' attack upon the DA scepticism fails because God does not exist, Descartes' thesis can be modified so that it makes no reference to God, and yet provides an escape from DA doubt. "

166. HUNYADI, M. "Vne Morale post-metaphysique: introduction a la theorie morale de Jiirgen Habermas," Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, 122 (1990), 467-83. Habermas.

Habermas develops the notion of communicative reason to avoid scepticism about values. This kind of scepticism is necessitated by instrumental reason, which is not universal.

167. HURLEY, S.L. Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity (New York and Oxford, 1989). Ethics.

Part IV of the book is about scepticism. It "[contains] chapters on Scepticism and on Autonomy and Democracy, [it] is about knowledge of what should be done and the relationship of personal autonomy and democracy to such knowledge. A discussion of realism and a critique of the error theory about values lead to a consideration of epistemological scepticism and a defense of the possibility of 'tracking the truth' about what should be done. The sceptic tries to debunk evaluative beliefs; that is, he or she tries to explain evaluative beliefs in a way that shows that if they were not true they


would still be held. The understanding of the modal structure of deliberation and the role of supervenience achieved in Part III is brought to bear in resisting the sceptic's insufficiently discriminating efforts to debunk. "

168. HURTADO, GUILLERMO. "Ward on Davidson's Refutation of Scepticism," Critica, 21 (1989), 75-81. Davidson.

The author objects to Ward's reconstruction of Davidson's anti-sceptical argument.

169. HYMERS, MICHAEL. "The Role of Kant's Refutation of Idealism," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29 (1991), 51-67. Kant.

"I shall argue that [Kant's] Refutation [of Idealism] is a clear development of a line of thought expressed in the Transcendental Deduction and the Fourth Paralogism of the Critique'S 1781 edition. This general line of thought is that the possibility that we are systematically deluded about the nature of the empirical world is ruled out, in part, by the fact that illusion presupposes a background of veridical perception."

170. ILDEFONSE, FREDERIQUE. "L'Expression du scepticisme dans les Dialogues faits a 1 'imitation des anciens," Corpus,' Revue de Philosophie, 10 (1989), 23-39. La Mothe Le Yayer.

The author presents an analysis of La Mothe Le Yayer's scepticism, arguing that at the level of his discourse La Mothe Le Yayer articulates a rupture from bivalent logic, which is characteristic of dogmatic discourse. "[La Mothe Le Yayer's] Dialogues do not search for principles, they rather display them, reporting them as examples. They do not aim at the essential but understand the arbitrary and the omission as proper to discourse. "

171. INDURKHYA, BIPIN. "Some Remarks on the Rationality of Induction," Synthese, 85 (1990), 95-114. Stove.

"This paper begins with a rigorous critique of David Stove's recent book The Rationality of Induction. In it, Stove produced four different proofs to refute Hume's sceptical thesis about induction. I show that Stove's attempts to vindicate induction are unsuccessful. Three of his proofs refute theses that are not the sceptical thesis about induction at all. Stove's fourth proof, which uses the sampling principle to justify one particular inductive inference, makes crucial use of an unstated assumption regarding randomness. Once the assumption is made explicit, Hume's thesis once more survives." (Phil. Index)

172. IOPPOLO, ANA M. "Stoici e Accademeci sur molo dell'assenso (A proposito della pubblicazione di The Hellenistic Philosophers)," Elenchos, 10 (1989), 231-46. Ancient Scepticism.

On the nature of Stoic representation, the role of assent in the distinction between opinion and science, and Arcesilaus' criteria of action.

173. JACKSON, TIMOTHY P. "The Possibilities of Scepticism: Philosophy and Theology without Apology, "Metaphilosophy, 21 (1990),303-21. Epistemology.

"Some philosophers judge scepticism to be meaningful but demonstrably false; others judge it to be meaningful and probably true; still others judge it


to be meaningless and thus neither true nor false. How are we to clarify and/or adjudicate such disputes? I address this question by providing a taxonomy of scepticisms. This allows me to point out the strengths and weaknesses of several modem epistemological projects, as well as to locate them in a larger philosophical and theological context. I argue that rationality in any area of inquiry can be distinguished from both foundational ism and nihilism, and I support this by defending a form of meta-scepticism. "

174. JACOBSON, ANNE JAAP. "Inductive Scepticism and Experimental Reasoning in Moral Subjects in Hume's Philosophy,· Hume Studies, 15 (1989), 325-85. Hume.

The author notes that Hume's goal in the Treatise is-as he says in the subtitle-"to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects." To attribute unrestrained scepticism about this method to Hume is to charge him with inconsistency. The author examines the sceptical features of Hume's treatment of causality and beliefs about the unobserved to conclude "suggesting how to avoid viewing Hume in this area as simply lamentably inconsistent," although "Hume's use of the experimental method does remain problematic, as, I suggest, Hume himself thought. "

175. JOHNSEN, BREDO C. "Relevant Alternatives and Demon Scepticism," Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed. M.D. Roth and G. Ross (Dordrecht, 199O} , 29-37. Epistemology.

The author examines a number of attempts at refuting scepticism by means of the "relevant alternatives argument" (basically, the possibility of alternative accounts of some experience that challenge our claim to know it is either irrelevant or inappropriate in the context in which the knowledge is claimed) and indicates what is the main insight in the argument: "I take for granted both that we mutually take for granted that we continuously share this vast range of things taken for granted, and that we have devised a way of speaking which is consonant with this situation: we attribute knowledge to each other and to ourselves provided that we can see that those alternatives to our beliefs which are relevant, given what we mutually take for granted can be ruled out. "

176. JOHNSEN, BREDO C. "Nozick and Scepticism: II," Philosophia, 19 (1989), 61-62. Nozick.

The author argues that Nozick does not show that "the sceptic is wrong to think that we lack knowledge of typical contingent propositions, " but only "how knowledge of typical contingent truths is possible in light of the fact that we cannot rule out the possibility that we are the victims of an evil demon. A consistent sceptic does not deny the latter but relative to Nozickean ... accounts of knowledge, the sceptic should rest content with pointing out that, even though knowledge is possible on such accounts, we have no reason whatever to believe that it is ever actual."

177. JOHNSTONE, ALBERT A. Rationalized Epistemology: Taking Solipsism Seriously (Albany, NY, 1991). Epistemology.

"This book pursues rational solutions to sceptical doubts entertained by


Descartes, Berkeley, and Hume concerning the continued existence of unperceived objects, the reality of perceived ones, and the existence of an external world. It first shows in detail why currently popular coherentist solutions, whether pragmatic, linguistic, or neo-Kantian, must fail. Then in the foundationalist tradition of Russell and Husserl, it proceeds to unearth the rational, pan-cultural grounds we have for rejecting solipsistic scenarios. In the process, it sketches a solipsistic semantics, and probes the crucial role played in cognition by nonlinguistic thinking, the tactile-kinesthetic body, and free will." (Phil. Index)

178. JOHNSTONE, ALBERT A. "The Need for Warrant," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51 (1991),541-56. Epistemology.

The author discusses some "common sense" replies to scepticism, most of which are inspired by Moore's approach to the sceptical problem. (For example, that sceptical hypotheses are irrelevant in ordinary situations). He thinks the crucial issue is not "whether the evidence is sufficient to claim absolute certainty" but "whether the evidence provides any warrant whatever for the common sense claim." He concludes that the common sense and the sceptical position are "on equal footing, each apparently devoid of evidential support. "

179. KADVANY, JOHN. "Reflections on the Legacy of Kurt Godel: Mathematics, Scepticism, Postmodernism," The Philosophical Forum, 20 (1989), 161-81. Godel.

The author argues that there is an analogy between Godel' s mathematical scepticism on the one hand and Pyrrhonism, Humean scepticism, and contemporary postmodernism on the other.

180. KARLSSON, MIKAEL M. "Epistemic Leaks and Epistemic Meltdowns: A Response to W. Morris on Scepticism with regard to Reason," Hume Studies, 16 (1990), 121-30. Hume.

A criticism of Hume's argument that due to the fallibility of our faculties the possibility of error increases each time we go through the proofs in attempting to make sure of an argument. This iteration may result in the strengthening of confidence in the argument.

181. KING, JAMES. "The Virtue of Political Scepticism," Reason Papers, 15 (1990), 24-46. Hume.

182. KISER, LISA J. Truth and Textuality in Chaucer's Poetry (Hanover, N.H., 1991). Chaucer.

The author argues that Chaucer's works exhibit a scepticism with respect to the possibility of truthful historical accounts. "Through his narratorhistorians, Chaucer very nearly advances the radical thesis that there is no such thing as history or experience prior to its textualization in some rhetorically organized and socially determined fictional form. "

183. KLEIMAN, LoWELL. "Morality as the Best Explanation," American Philosophical Quarterly, 26 (1989), 161-67. Ethics.

The author argues that "[m]oral explanation can be objective, universal and consistent with the rest of science. "


184. KLEIN, PETER. "Epistemic Compatibilism and Canonical Beliefs, " Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed. M.D. Roth and G. Ross (Dordrecht, 1990),99-117. Epistemology.

"The paper argues two points: (i) absolute indubitability is a plausible rendering of what sceptics have required and (ii) a very important belief can be absolutely indubitable. That belief is a meta-proposition, namely, that the preponderance of my canonical beliefs (those that I typically take for granted) is true. That meta-proposition can be certain although no canonical belief is certain. I formulate a very strict account of absolute indubitability and argue against Descartes' claim that if there are grounds for doubting each proposition in a set of propositions, there are grounds for doubting them all. "

185. KOHL, MARVIN. "Humanism and the Justification of Belief," Free Inquiry, 12 (1992), 56-57. Epistemology.

"A reply to Brian Zamulinski's defense of scepticism. Essentially, I claim the evidentialism of W.K. Clifford is self-refuting and defend a Jamesian view of belief." (Phil. Index)

186. ~ KOHL, MARVIN. "Scepticism and Happiness," Free Inquiry, 10 (1990), 40-42. Epistemology.

The author challenges the view that happiness demands, aside from foundational beliefs, "that we only believe something to be true when the claim is supported by reliable evidence and that ... we should doubt what is doubtful [and] ... disbelieve what is false."

187. LAURSEN, JOHN C. "Scepticism and Intellectual Freedom: The Philosophical Foundations of Kant's Politics of Publicity, " History of Political Thought, 10 (1989), 439-55. Kant.

The author argues that "Kant's politics of publicity and its foundation [is] a response-and partial acceptance of-scepticism." Although "Kant anchored the transcendental principle of publicity in law and thus indirectly in ethics, ... the point still stands that the many treatments of scepticism and censorship ... were the occasions on which he expanded on the importance of publicity. "

188. LAURSEN, JOHN C. "Michel de Montaigne and the Politics of Scepticism," Historical Reflections, 16 (1989), 99-133. Montaigne.

"Montaigne's politics is best characterized as a politics of human fallibility, of movement and process, of custom, and of good judgement. If other labels must be used, they should always be prefixed by the word 'sceptical. '"

189. LAURSEN, JOHN C. "David Hume y el Vocabulario Politico del Escepticismo," Anuario de Filosofia del Derecho, 7 (1990), 411-30. Hume.

The author relates Hume's political vocabulary ("politeness and manners" and "opinion and belief") to the ancient sceptics' practical rule of following tradition.

190. LEVY, CARLOS. "Plato, Arcesilas, Carneades: Response to J. Annas, " Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 95 (1990), 293-306. Ancient Scepticism.

Against Annas, the author argues that the testimonies concerning the New Academy suggest that Arcesilaus and Carneades, "instead of confining Plato


within the limits of scepticism, have accepted-in their own way-the whole Platonic legacy. "

191. LINVILLE, KENT. "Dialogue and Doubt in Descartes' First Meditation," Philosophical Investigations, 14 (1991), 115-30. Descartes.

"Given the genre of Descartes' First Meditation, its author should also be its sole actor. But this study shows that two roles are played there by distinct identities: Descartes the author, and a companion literary creation, Descartes the meditator. Unmasking these two separate identities reveals an implicit dialogue structure disguising a pervasive equivocation on the meaning of 'believes' (and derivatively, 'doubt') at the heart of the Meditation. That ambiguity, once removed, enables us to show that although Hume is correct in opposing Descartes' voluntarism, he is wrong in claiming that the passivity of belief results from our nature. "

192. LIPSON, MORRIS. "Psychological Doubt and the Cartesian Circle," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19 (1989), 225-46. Descartes.

The author argues against Arnauld's circle and claims that Descartes does not seek absolute certainty.

193. LIPSON, MORRIS. "Dreams, Scepticism, and Features of the World," Philosophical Studies, 55 (1989), 223-28. Stroud.

The author criticizes Heil's attack on Stroud's reconstruction of the Cartesian dream argument. (Heil's view is that the dream argument is contradictory) .

194. LIVINGSTON, DONALD. "A Sellarsian Hume?" Journal of the History of Philosophy, 29 (1991), 281-90. Hume.

A reply to F. Wilson's ("Is Hume a Sceptic with Regard to the Senses?" JHP, 27 [1989], 49-73) criticism of the author's and R. Popkin's view that Hume is a sceptic.

195. LoPTSON, PETER. "Phenomenological Scepticism in Hume," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 28, (1990), 367-88. Hume.

The author claims that "phenomenological scepticism" is the most relevant kind of scepticism for Hume. It is "reached as a result of reflection on the felt character of a subject's experiences of a supposed reality, exterior to that subject, together with knowledge (scientific or empirical knowledge) about the objective nature, including the machinery or structure, of mind. It will be (a form ot) scepticism in the sense of implying that a subject will have no basis or reason for supposing that there is an external world, from anything identifiable in the subject's experience; together with the fact that Hume is candidly agnostic about any need to suppose that there must be an external world in order for a subject to seem to experience one. "

196. LUNTLEY, MICHAEL. "The Transcendental Grounds of Meaning and the Place of Silence," Meaning Scepticism, ed. Klaus Puhl (Berlin, 1991), 170-88. Wittgenstein.

"Wittgenstein does not offer a sceptical problem about the objectivity of meaning, let alone a sceptical solution to this problem; rather he offers a reductio ad absurdum of a familiar line of approach to understanding the


phenomenon of meaning. [This] idea ... is becoming something of a consensus. What is not so clear is the exact nature of the inadequate conceptual set which induces scepticism and the constraints this scepticism places upon retooling [changing the conceptual set that leads to scepticism]. In this paper I want to try to clarify these two points. "

197. LUPER-Foy, STEVEN. "Arbitrary Reasons," Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed. M.D. Roth and G. Ross (Dordrecht, 1990), 39-55. Epistemology.

"Practical scepticism says that because we ultimately have no reason to do one thing rather than another, we should do nothing. Theoretical scepticism says that since ultimately we have no reason to believe anything about the way things are, our views should all be dropped. Foundationalism and coherentism are both ways of trying to show that since our beliefs need not be arbitrary, the sceptic has no grounds for saying we should abandon them. Neither questions the sceptic's fundamental assumption that we ought to avoid all arbitrary beliefs and acts. Precisely this assumption is my target. Once it is rejected, we can say that even if our beliefs and acts are arbitrary, the sceptic cannot conclude that we should stop believing and acting. The sceptic's position no longer will be a threat to knowledge claims."

198. MAIA NETO, JOSE R. "Duvida Antiga e Duvida Modema Segundo Kierkegaard," Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia, 17 (1991), 243-57. Kierkegaard.

"Kierkegaard's discovery of the ancient sceptics (probably during his stay in Berlin in the Winter of 1841) was fundamental for the beginning of his pseudonymous authorship. Ancient scepticism plays a double sequential role in Kierkegaard: it informs his criticism of the modem (Philosophical, Cartesian-Hegelian) concept of a methodic doubt, and helps him clarify Christian faith by contrasting it with genuine practical doubt." (Phil. Index)

199. MAIA NETO, JOSE R. "Feyerabend's Scepticism," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 22 (1991), 543-55. Feyerabend.

"Feyerabend's view on 'incommensurability,' his defense of pluralism in science, and his argumentative strategy are clarified by comparison with Greek scepticism. Feyerabend's attitude toward philosophy and his use of sceptical views are clarified by comparison with Kierkegaard (one of his favorite philosophers)." (Phil. Index)

200. MAIA NETO, JosE R. "Hume and Pascal: Pyrrhonism versus Nature," Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 41-49. Pascal and Hume.

"For both Hume and Pascal, philosophical reasoning would lead to destructive Pyrrhonism were it not for the intervention of nature, which sets constraints on philosophical doubt. The philosopher thus faces what Hume calls 'the dangerous dilemma:' either a dangerous life of reasoning, philosophy and doubt, or a safer, but open to 'errors, absurdities, and obscurities,' non-philosophical life. Because Hume was aware that the dilemma could favor a transition to religious faith, he, contrary to Pascal, attempted to mitigate the dilemma by depriving it of normative content. But that such content


cannot be avoided follows from Hume's own philosophy." (Phil. Index) 201. MAlA NETO, JOSE R. "Machado de Assis: Scepticism and Literature," Latin

American Literary Review, 18 (1990), 26-35. Machado de Assis. The author shows how scepticism about values, scepticism about factual

statements, and scepticism about the external world are constructed in literary form in the main novels of the Brazilian writer Machado de Assis.

202. MALBREIL, GERMAIN. "Descartes Censure par Huet, " Revue Philosophique de la France et de I' Etranger, 181 (1991), 311-28. Huet

The author examines Huet's many critical books and manuscripts on Descartes and the Cartesians. Huet's ambiguous and passionate relation to Descartes (fascination and fierce opposition) is centered on the foundational role of doubt in philosophy. Is Descartes' doubt genuine or feint? Is it radical or just a methodical device to introduce a dogmatic philosophy? Huet's ambiguous relation to Descartes ultimately derives from the ambiguity of Descartes' own position on doubt while his criticism of the Cartesians (Regius) derives from the latter's view that Descartes' doubt is not serious. The author concludes by locating Huet's criticism in the later development of anti-Cartesianism (Vico).

203. MALIANDI, RICARDO. "EI Discreto Encanto del Escepticismo Etico," Cuademos de Etica, 6 (1989), 7-28. Ethics.

"The paper differentiates two kinds of ethical scepticism: that which denies the effectiveness and that which denies the validity of moral principles. Both kinds are related, but do not necessarily entail each other. The concept of ethical scepticism is studied in its relations with amoralism, nihilism, pessimism, and subjectivism. Finally, we try to elucidate in which sense and to which extent we can apply to the ethical scepticism the classical argument-that of self-contradiction-against the theoretical or epistemological scepticism." (Phil. Index)

204. MANADES MILLET, J. "Los Limites del Escepticismo: Wittgenstein y la Refutation del Cartesianismo," Pensamiento, 45 (1989), 183-205. Wittgenstein.

"Wittgenstein establishes a new epistemological paradigm, characterized by scepticism with respect to foundation, holism, and pragmatism. The article analyses an aspect of Wittgenstein's critique of modem epistemology, showing the impossibility of appealing to hyperbolic doubt as a method for the foundation of theory of knowledge. "

205. MANNER, MARTIN. "Samuel Johnson, Scepticism, and Biography," Biography, 12 (1989), 302-19. Johnson.

"Johnson's sceptical approach to biography is a dialectic by which Johnson engages the reader in testing the limits of biographical inference. This biographical scepticism derives from the scientific epistemologies of Locke and Bacon, the writings of Pierre Bayle, and the 'constructive scepticism' of the seventeenth-century Christian apologists."

206. MARQUARD, ODO and WALLACE, ROBERT M. In Defense of the Accidental: Philosophical Studies (New York, 1991). Ethics.


"A collection of essays written between 1982 and 1986 which advocate the philosophy of a sceptic. All the essays aim at the thesis that what we human beings are is always more our accident than our choice." (Phil. Index)

207. MAZOUE, JAMES G. "Self-Synthesis, Self-Knowledge, and Scepticism," Logos, 11 (1990), 111-25. Nozick.

"In Philosophical Explanations Robert Nozick proposes an explanation of reflexive self-knowledge in terms of a self synthesizing itself through time in accordance with what he calls the 'closest continuer schema.' Sceptical possibilities remain, however, that undermine his proposal unless his account is supplemented with an Insulation Condition (IC): For any given act of reflexive self-reference r, no act of reflexive self-reference synthesizes itself around r other than the closest reflexive continuer or r's closest reflexive predecessor. Although the addition of IC provides a partial vindication of Nozick's account, other sceptical questions about the referent of 'I' would remain unanswered. "

208. McDONALD, HENRY. "Crossroads of Scepticism: Wittgenstein, Derrida, and Ostensive Defmition," Philosophical Forum, 21 (1989-90), 261-76. Wittgenstein and Derrida.

The author criticizes two sceptical interpretations of Wittgenstein. One 'analytic,' another 'continental.' The former is Kripke's rule-following scepticism, which has roots in Hume's treatment of scepticism. The latter is Staten's 'Derridaen' (deconstructivist) scepticism. According to the author, Wittgenstein's scepticism lies not in the problem of relating rule and application (against Kripke) nor in deconstructing classical conceptual dualities such as essence/accident (against Staten). His scepticism "was about the ability of the philosopher ... to dispel illusions generated by metaphysical dualism, not a scepticism or doubt that such dualism was in fact illusory. It was a scepticism about the usefulness of philosophy, not about what philosophy is about. "

209. McDONOUGH, RICHARD M. "Wittgenstein's Refutation of Meaning-Scepticism," Meaning Scepticism, ed. Klaus Puhl (Berlin, 1991), 70-92. Wittgenstein.

Against Kripke's view that Wittgenstein formulates a strong argument for meaning scepticism in the Philosophical Investigations. He argues this is the case of the Tractatus, for "the Investigations proposes a (roughly) Kantian strategy for 'refuting' this meaning scepticism. There is a 'scepticism' in the Investigations, but it is about the one thing which Kripke ... shows no inclination to doubt, namely that the natural sciences are capable of providing an autonomous account of the world .... Meaning scepticism is just a natural consequence of the current exaggerated faith in the independence and scope of the natural sciences, the very faith that is 'under attack' in the Investigations. "

210. MCGINN, MARIE. Sense and Cenainty: A Dissolution of Scepticism (Oxford, 1989). Epistemology.

"This book is concerned with the question of whether there is a satisfact-


ory rebuttal of external world scepticism. It argues that the justification the sceptic requires cannot be given, but that his conclusion is both beyond belief and in conflict to common sense. This makes both scepticism and the dogmatic assumption of common sense unsatisfactory. It attempts to construct a nondogmatic defense of common sense, by giving an account of the nature of the judgments that form the framework of our practice, which shows why the absence of justification is not a lack. Philosophers discussed include Wittgenstein, Moore, Austin, Cavell, and Stroud." (Phil. Index)

211. MCGRAY, J.W. "Universal Prescriptivismand Practical Scepticism," Philosophical Papers, 19 (1990), 37-51. Hare.

"On R.M. Hare's view that universal rational prescriptions are equivalent to a kind of Utilitarianism." (Francis)

212. McKINNON, CHRISTINE. "From What Can't be Said to What Isn't Known," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29 (1991), 87-107. Wittgenstein.

The usual view that Wittgenstein diffuses-instead of refutes-scepticism and that he adopts conventionalism in On Certainty can be revised by interpreting the work from the point of view of the transcendental idealism of the Tractatus.

213. McLEAN, G.R. "Pollock's Reply to the Sceptic," Philosophical Papers, 20 (1991), 155-72. Pollock.

"In a number of places, John Pollock attempts to dismiss scepticism concerning the justification of our ordinary perceptual judgements by showing that the grounds upon which we make these judgements are themselves constitutive of the concepts in terms of which the judgements are framed, and therefore that, given that we understand the judgements, we must be able to recognize the conditions under which they are justified. I argue that it is false that the ability to recognize the justification conditions of these judgments is a necessary condition of the grasp of their meanings, and therefore that Pollock's cause fails." (Phil. Index)

214. MCPHERRAN, MARK L. "Pyrrhonian's Arguments Against Value," Philosophical Studies, 60 (1990), 127-42. Ancient Scepticism.

Against Julia Annas, the author denies that the Pyrrhonians confuse scepticism about values with moral relativism. The author also argues that the modern insulation of scepticism about values from practical life is unjustifiable because, contrary to Hume, moral beliefs are intimately related to motivational emotions.

215. MESSERI, MARCO. "11 'Circulo' e Ie ragioni di Cartesio," Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana, 70 (1991), 195-230. Descartes.

On the "Arnauld Circle" (fourth set of objections to the Meditations raised by A. Arnauld). The author denies that there is circularity in Descartes' appeal to the true idea of God as guarantee of the veracity of the clear and distinct ideas.

216. METCALFE, JOHN F. "Moral Scepticism and the Dangerous Maybe: Reconsidering Mackie's Ethics," Eidos, 6 (1989),217-33. Ethics.

"Nothing new here: I rehearse the main arguments for moral scepticism


and point out their weakness. I conclude that the garden-variety scepticism rooted in British Empiricism is neither as compelling nor as radical as that inspired by Nietzsche." (Phil. Index)

217. METSCHL, ULRICH. "Eine ldeine Uberraschung fiir Gehirne im Tank," ZeitschriftfUr Philosophische Forschung, 43 (1989),519-27. Epistemology.

'On the sceptical argument from the experience of the brain-in-a-vat." (Francis)

218. MILLAR, ALAN. Reasons and Experience (New York, 1991). Epistemology. "The book provides an exploration of problems on the borderlands

between philosophy of mind and epistemology, focusing on the role of sensory experiences in knowledge-acquisition. A key issue is whether, and if so how, such experiences contribute to the justification of beliefs. It is argued that they do with the help of the notion that justified belief is better which is competently acquired or retained. Competence here is conceptual competence. In line of this there is much discussion of the nature of concepts and their mastery. Other topics include reasons and evidence, groundless beliefs and scepticism.' (Phil. Index)

219. MILLER, DAVID. "A Restauration of Popperian Inductive Scepticism," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 41 (1990), 137-39. Popper.

"It is shown that the argument of Kin Gemes, 'A Refutation of Popperian Inductive Scepticism,' British J. Phil. Sci., 40/2 (1989), 183f, involves division by zero, and that the principles that Gemes claims to be inconsistent are mutually consistent." (Phil. Index)

220. MONFASANI, J. "Lorenzo Valla and Rudolph Agricola," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 28 (1990), 181-200. Valla and Agricola.

In the second part of the paper, the author argues-against Lisa Jardine -that Valla is not an Academic sceptic (he rather refutes scepticism) and that the evidence for Agricola's Academic scepticism is not conclusive.

221. MORGAN, VANCE G. "Ockham and Scepticism: the Intuitive Cognition of Non-Existents," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 84 (1990), 355-72. Ockham.

The author attacks Gilson's and Pegis' view that Ockham's doctrine of intuitive cognition of non-existents leads to scepticism. He argues that Ockham's doctrine is "purposely designed to avoid the kind of scepticism Ockham is being charged with. The fmal section of the paper, however, will show that even if Ockham avoids the charge of scepticism as presented, other unanswered questions arise from his theory which open the door to scepticism in a different way. "

222. MORRIS, WILLIAM E. "Hume's Scepticism About Reason," Hume Studies, 15 (1989), 39-60. Hume.

The author claims that Hume's scepticism in book I, part IV of the Treatise is a "reductio ad absurdum" of an "intellectualist" position which overemphasizes the rational pattern in human thought. Hume rejects both this dogmatic position and extreme scepticism, for although "contrary in their operation and tendency," they are of the same kind, that is, not consistent


with human nature. 223. MORRISON, DONALD. "The Ancient Sceptic's Way of Life," Metaphilo

sophy, 21 (1990), 204-22. Ancient Scepticism. A "reconstruction" of the ancient sceptics' way of life that emphasizes the

sceptics' moderation and tolerance. The author replies to the criticism that the sceptic's way of life is deprived of moral content and contrasts ancient with modem scepticism, which rather than a way of life, "works on the principle of a single, fully general Master Argument: Hume's indictment of causality; Descartes' evil demon; the contemporary brain in a vat."

224. MOSER, PAUL. "Two Roads to Scepticism," Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed. M.D. Roth and G. Ross (Dordrecht, 1990), 127-39. Epistemology

There is a "low" and a "high" road to scepticism. The first-more commonly pursued (cf. Descartes, Hume, Peter Unger and Barry Stroud)-consists in "redefining what knowledge is, specifically, ... raising the standards for knowledge beyond plausibility. This strategy amounts to a low victory by high redefinition-really no victory at all. And it suffers from all the disadvantages of the fallacy of 'ignoratio elenchi' by defmition." The "high road" "is not guilty of a fallacy. On this approach, the sceptic accepts the non-sceptic's notion of knowledge, but argues that on this very notion we cannot, or at least do not, have knowledge of the external world." There are not many sceptics who pursue this road because from "the empirical evidence most of us have" we do not arrive at scepticism.

225. MOUTSOPOULOS, EVANGHELOS A. "La Dimension morale du pyrrhonisme chez Montaigne," Montaigne et La Grece: 1588-1988, ed. K. Christodoulou (Paris, 1990), 123-28. Montaigne.

"Pyrrhonian morals were [in antiquity] an exasperated and somehow affected result of epistemological theses. With Montaigne, it acquires an agreeable mobility, impregnated with a taste characteristic of a Renaissance mind that announces modem times."

226. MUDRY, PHILIPPE. "Le Scepticisme des medecins empiriques dans Ie traite De la Medicine de Celse: modeles et modalites," Cahiers de la Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, 15 (1990), 85-96. Ancient Scepticism.

"The empirical physicians' doctrine presented by Celso-at least in the section where the dogmatic theory of knowledge is refuted-seems related to Arcesilaus' Academy. ... We add that, due to the virulent nature of the polemics, Celso's presentation may well refer to-or even constitute a part of-a model historically close to Arcesilaus' dispute with the Stoics."

227. MUJICA, BARBARA. "The Sceptical Premises of Calderon's En esta Vida todo es Verdad y todo es Metira," Texto y EspectacuLo, ed. Barbara Mujica (Lanham, Md., 1989), 117-26. Calderon.

The author shows that Calderon's work is structured by traditional sceptical arguments and positions. Calderon's scepticism is related to the revival of scepticism in the Renaissance and its presence in Spain above all through Erasmus and the Jesuits.


228. MURPHY, RICHARD T. "HusserI and Hume: Overcrowding Scepticism?" Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology, 22 (1991), 30-44. HusserI and Hume.

"This article explores how HusserI utilized Hume's insight into the difference between reasoning concerning 'relations of ideas' and that concerning 'matters of fact' to overcome Hume's psychologism and scepticism and thereby to establish philosophy as rigorous science. It remains within the context of HusserI's own interpretation of Hume and relies on some of HusserI's explicit allusions to Hume. These admittedly sketchy investigations do show that HusserI rejected Kantianism to embrace Hume's radically subjectivist approach. That Husserl has overcome logical and transcendental psychologism more successfully than Hume is problematic."

229 . MUSGRAVE, ALAN. "Saving Science from Scepticism," Freedom and Rationality (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 117. Dordrecht, 1990), 297-323. Popper and Watkins.

"On Watkins and Popper. Hume's scepticism and irrationalism. Certain truth, probable truth and possible truth. Criticism of rationalism. The pragmatic problem of induction." (Francis)

230. NATHAN, DANIEL O. "Scepticism and Legal Interpretation," Erkenntnis, 33 (1990), 165-89. Philosophy of Law.

"I have tried to argue that the dismissal of so-called external sceptical views [viz., "doubts about the existence of interpretations and values independent of mind"] is problematic in several respects. In response to at least certain manifestations of external scepticism, it falsely denies the significance of an important external challenge to the framework of legal interpretation, and in such a denial it also undermines the chances of elevating rational interpretation to a level immune to changes of narrow relativism. "

231. NEVES, J.e. DAS. "A Determina<;ao Heideggeriana do Fen6meno em Sein und Zeit Como Superacao do Ceticismo Metodico," Revista Portuguesa de Filosofta, 45 (1989), 379-402. Heidegger.

"With Heidegger's text to determine the phenomenality of the phenomenon in Sein und Zeit, one recognizes that it is philosophy's most fundamental problem that is being rethought but not in terms of 'foundations of the science(s), ' 'certitudes,' 'apoditic evidence' -as much of the philosophy in modem times has sought to do. Edmund Hussed's thought is paradigmatic of this attitude, attributing to philosophy the work of founding through 'methodological scepticism.' However, Husserl approaches the matter of the phenomenality of the phenomenon within the context of phenomenological reduction. The seventh paragraph of Sein und Zeit determines the concept of phenomenon as that which 'shows-itself-in-itself' and does so by establishing reciprocal relations between the phenomenon and other deficient forms of donation-appearance (Schein) and 'manifestation' (Erscheinung)! In this way, the question of donation, i.e., the question of truth (Aletheialrevelation) takes up again its first place in the context of phenomenological thought, relegating the methodological question concerning certitude to a derived


status. " 232. NIELSEN, KAL. God, Scepticism and Modernity (Boulder, Col., 1989).

Philosophy of Religion. A collection of earlier published essays dealing with fideism, religious

scepticism and justification. 233. NUSSBAUM, MARTHA. "Sceptic Purgatives: Therapeutic Arguments in

Ancient Scepticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 29 (1991),521-57. Ancient Scepticism.

"The aim of this paper is to investigate the therapeutic strategies of Greek scepticism, comparing these with 'medical' practices in the other schools. This project requires a detailed imagination of the life of a pupil in the course of sceptical therapy." The author concludes that a sceptical life is livable "provided that [the pupil] allows herself the principle of noncontradiction to organize her thoughts, and provided that she allows herself a commitment to ataraxia sufficient to organize her involvement with sceptical procedures." However, the author finds such life morally questionable and at odds with human nature.

234. ODEGARD, DOUGLAS. "Scepticism: the Current Debate," Eidos, 8 (1989), 177 -208. Epistemology.

"Some recent positions on sceptical issues are considered by seeing how well a briefly sketched conception of justified certainty can survive the debate. According to the conception, we are sometimes justified in believing something without having any ground for doubt, although we do have a ground for thinking that there may be a ground for doubt. The conception is defended against three kinds of opponents: 1) those who, like Moore and Wittgenstein, think that some common sense positions are bedrock; 2) those who, like Dretske and Nozick, think that we can know ordinary things with certainty even though the things we know have doubtful implications; and 3) those who, like Stroud, Unger, Klein, Moser, and Bonjour, think that very few matters, or at any rate very few empirical matters, are certain."

235. OLASO, EZEQUIEL DE. "Scepticism and the Infinite," L' Infinito in Leibniz, ed. Antonio Lamarra (Roma, 1990),95-118. Leibniz.

"To take into account the infinite is ... one of the characteristics of modem philosophy. At the same time, the supposition that infmity is beyond the reach of human understanding has been forcefully sustained either by philosophers and scientists prone to scepticism or by sceptics themselves. The defense of the rights of reason, but within the realm of the infmite, was one of Leibniz' predominant preoccupations, and is one of his best claims upon our gratitude."

236. OLASO, EZEQUIEL DE. "Why Pericles' Slave Fell Into the Fourth Mode," Elenchos, 12 (1991), 91-94. Ancient Scepticism.

The author provides interpretations for two illustrations of Aenesidemus' fourth mode based on sleeping and waking conditions given by Diogenes Laertius that were left unexplained by Annas and Barnes (The Modes of Scepticism, Cambridge, 1985).


237. OLSHEWSKY, THOMAS M. "The Classical Roots of Hume's Scepticism," Journal of the History of Ideas, 52 (1991), 269-87. Hume.

"The contrast made by Sextus and Hume between Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism are notoriously incommensurate. Hume does not attribute to the former, as Sextus does, that doubting involves denial; Hume attributes to neither the probability claims Sextus attributes to the former; they come closest to a match in attributing inclination to credence to the Academiceans; their contrast of principle and nature so basic to Hume is absent from Sextus; and Hume's notion of mitigation finds no place in Sextus' account at all. There are good grounds for supposing that Hume modeled his account of Academic scepticism on Cicero's in the Academica, for whom no contrast such as those of Hume and Sextus existed. Hume's model for Pyrrhonism is his own Treatise, from which he tried to take rhetorical distance in varying ways, settling on the contrast of the Enquiries as one kind of engagement rather than difference in doctrine."

238. PAGANINI, GIANNI. Scepsi Moderna: Interpretazioni dello Scetticismo da Charron a Hume (Cosenza, 1991). History of Philosophy.

The book contains basic texts by the main modem philosophers who dealt extensively with scepticism, namely, Charron, Sanchez, La Mothe Le Vayer, Gassendi, Huet, Mersenne, Glanvill, Bayle, Foucher, Crousaz and Hume. The first part of the book contains an introductory commentary of the texts, showing the different types of scepticism involved, the relation of scepticism with basic intellectual movements in early modem philosophy (libertinism, the new science, Cartesianism), and the peculiarities of these modem forms of scepticism vis-a-vis the ancient sceptical tradition.

239. PAGE, CARL. "Demoniac Credulity and the Universalization of Cartesian Doubt," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 27 (1989), 399-426. Descartes.

"The author analyzes the hypothesis of the deceiver demon and the different interpretations of the hyperbolic doubt in Descartes' First Meditation and concludes that, although mathematics is subjected to doubt, the hypothesis of the deceiver demon is less extreme than it is usually considered." (Francis)

240. PAPPAS, NICKOLAS. "Knowing and Saying that I Know, n Philosophy, 66 (1991), 487-502. Stroud and Austin.

On Austin's ordinary language reply to scepticism. The author argues that "the distinction between assertibility and truth either cannot be drawn, or has no effect on scepticism when it is drawn." The author reconstructs Austin's argument in order to show-against Stroud who claims that Austin's argument shows only when one is entitled to say that one knows something, leaving untouched the sceptical problem of whether one does know this something-that it does provide a satisfactory reply to scepticism.

241. PAPRZYCKA, KATARZYNA. "Is the Sceptical Attitude the Attitude of a Sceptic?" Auslegung, 17 (1991), 119-23. Epistemology.

" A genuine sceptic opens our minds to the possibility of deception. From this one ought not to draw the conclusion that we cannot know anything, as


does the dogmatic sceptic (in effect identifying our actual world with the possible world of complete deception). Rather, one should take this claim as an invitation to consider the whole range of possibilities-worlds where we are deceived in various degrees. It is argued that the same strategy is exhibited by some scientific procedures (reduction, for instance). Thus, if the sceptic succeeds at all he merely effects a switch in the level of inquiry. "

242. PAVKOVIC, A. "Is the Evil Demon Argument a Sceptical Argument?" (in Serbo-Croatian), FilozoJ Istraz, 28 (1989), 285-97. Descartes and Nozick.

"In the first part of the paper I argue that Descartes' argument from the Evil Demon is not intended to offer any reasons for doubt, as the sceptical arguments do. Descartes' hypothesis of the Evil Demon is more of a therapeutical device which should keep out of the inquirer's mind all those old beliefs which the inquirer has already assumed to be false. In this interpretation of the argument, Nozick seems to assume that the first premise concerns the knowledge of conceptual truths. In the second part I argue that this is not so, and that Nozick in effect imputes to the sceptic either bad faith or simple-mindedness. In conclusion, I point out that there is no reason to attribute to the sceptic the requirement that in a case of knowledge, any possibility of error should be ruled out." (Phil. Index)

243. PELEGRINI, MARIA A. Falchi. "11 Montaigne di Horkheimer," II Pensiero Politico, 22 (1989), 248-63. Horkheimer.

Horkheimer's interest in Montaigne's scepticism is due to the role of scepticism as an intermediary in the transformation of critical reason into instrumental reason that occurs in the modem world. "Horkheimer's theory shares with scepticism the impossibility to rationally affirm the validity of absolute values but it rejects the surrender of reason's critical function [given that] it holds that when negative thought becomes positive, once dialectical, it becomes formal; once critical, it becomes instrumental, no longer opposing the economic, social, political and cultural systems of domination, becoming instead functional to these systems, a factor not of change but of conformism and conservatism. "

244. PENTZOPOULOU-VALALAS, THERESE. "L' 'Apriori Existentiel' comme fondement du scepticisme grec," Cahiers de la Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, 15 (1990), 195-206. Ancient Scepticism.

The author takes the sceptic's acceptation of appearances as the primacy of phenomenical existential reality. This shows the sceptic's awareness of the primacy of existence over essence and makes possible an overall interpretation of ancient scepticism. It justifies, in particular, the exclusion of appearances and the rules of life from sceptical doubt: they cannot be objects of philosophical inquiry because they constitute its transcendental foundation.

245. PERL, JEFFREY M. Scepticism and Modem Enmity (Baltimore and London, 1989). Eliot.

The author examines Eliot's philosophical views (from his youth as a student at Harvard to his late views) in which scepticism appears central. For example, "[h]e explained his own Christian faith (in the only sermon he ever


gave) as the result of 'pursuing scepticism to the utmost limit. '" Eliot "saw in retrospect Montaigne as the catalyst to his Christianity. "

246. PERRY, KATHLEEN ANNE. Another Reality: Metamorphosis and the Imagination in the Poetry of Ovid, Petrarch, and Ronsard (New York, 1989). Petrarch, Ovid, and Ronsard.

The theme of metamorphosis in poetry is related to scepticism in philosophy. In the "sceptical practice" of epoche, "two opposing opinions may be maintained simultaneously, just as two contrasting forms coincide in the phenomenon of metamorphosis. According to Sextus Empiricus, distinctions such as self and other, alike and different, subject and object, and true and false are not considered valid or workable. Sceptics do not put their trust in human perceptions or in empirical methods of gathering information; just so, metamorphosis denies congruence between outward from and inward existence ... Sceptics deny rational methods as well, just as Ovid denies his readers any reason for the movements of the universe." "Metamorphosis in the works of these three poets ... is linked to some of the central issues of poetic theory and of philosophy in general. Because of their unreal, irrational nature, Ovidian transformations in particular echo some tenets of sceptical philosophy. The unusual combinations created by such transformations are reminiscent of the buildfng blocks of poetry, figures of rhetoric such as metaphor, metonymy, and paradox. But most of all, the irrational quality of metamorphosis, untrammeled by philosophical rationalism and aided by literary figures, allows these poets to explore the vagaries of the human imagination, and perhaps to explain better the nature of poetry itself."

247. PIERRES, GRACIELA. "Essay Review of Barry Stroud's The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism," Nous, 23 (1989), 531-43. Stroud.

The reviewer manifests general agreement with Stroud, except for the latter's treatment of Kant and of the distinction of the transcendental from the empirical.

248. POHLENZ, GERD. "Die erkenntniskritische Wendung Descartes' als Konsequenz geschichtlicher Entwicklung des Leib-Seele-Dualismus, " Conceptus, 24 (1990), 73-97. Descartes.

"The radical sceptical and epistemological turn in the philosophy of modem times (Descartes) is based on the micro-physiological reformulation of mind-body dualism and-perhaps more important-on an explicit sensibility for the peculiar nature of 'qualia,' which appears 'revolutionary.' This context (including a special relation to Kant's theory) is analyzed and reconstructed both systematically and historically. The sceptical reformulation of dualism in the Meditations does not at all presuppose any dualistic concept of the mental. The sceptical argumentation (as it is reconstructed in this paper) indeed has, in contrast to its modem epistemological reformulations, consequences for our fundamental concept of ourselves and of nature. Critical remarks are meant to offer some possible means for coming to grips with the so far analyzed problem situation (e.g., method of philosophical mind-body differentiation; reductio ad absurdum of the dream argument;


repudiation of sense-data theory)." (Phil. Index) 249. PoPKIN, RICHARD H. "Condorcet's Epistemology and His Politics," Knowl

edge and Politics, ed. M. Dascal and O. Gruengard (Boulder and London, 1989), 83-110. Condorcet.

The author addresses the following: 1. Condorcet's epistemology: scepticism with respect to absolute certain knowledge but belief in highly probable knowledge of physical nature, human beings and society. 2. Condorcet holds a very optimistic view with respect to the possibility of knowledge to improve human life and society. 3. Condorcet's position against slavery illustrates the relationship between his epistemology and politics. 4. Comparison with Hume sheds light on their contrary evaluations of the possibility of science to improve humankind.

250. POPKIN, RICHARD H. "Jewish-Christian Arguments in the Rise of Scepticism," New Perspectives on Renaissance Thought, ed. J. Henry and S. Hutton (London, 1990), 1-12. Jewish Philosophy.

Scepticism was associated to (supportive of) religion when it revived in the Renaissance. How did it tum against religion in the Enlightenment? The author explores one avenue: the role and dissemination of Jewish antiChristian manuscripts in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

251. POPKIN, RICHARD H. "Bishop Pierre-Daniel Huet's Remarks on Malebranche," Nicolas Malebranche, ed. S. Brown (Assen, 1991), 1-21. Huet.

The author analyzes Huet's marginalia on Malebranche's De la Recherche de la verite, showing its sceptical and anti-Cartesian thrust, later developed by Huet in works such as Censura Philosophiae Cartesianae and Traite Philosophique de lafaiblesse de l'esprit humain.

252. PORCHAT PEREIRA, OSWALDO. "Sobre 0 que Aparece," Revista Latinoamericana de Filosojia, 17 (1991), 195-229. Ancient Scepticism.

"The paper argues for a neo-Pyrrhonian philosophical proposal, understood as entirely adequate to the philosophical needs of contemporary man. The text is directly inspired by the doctrine of Sextus Empiricus and follows most of the time very closely some passages of his writings. One tries to investigate, under several relevant aspects, the rich potentialities of the Pyrrhonian notion of phenomenon, once it is restored to its original meaning in Sextus' doctrine. And it is suggested how a whole sceptical view of the world can be built upon such a notion, which could be made entirely compatible with modem empirical science." (Phil. Index)

253. PORCHAT PEREIRA, OSWALDO. "Escepticismo y Mundo Exterior," Cuademos de Filosojia y Letras, 17 (1989). Ancient Scepticism.

On the ancient sceptical roots (both Pyrrhonian and Academic) of Cartesian scepticism about the external world.

254. Pozzo, GIANNI M. "Pirronismo e antitradizionalismo nell' acribia storica di Pierre Bayle," Verijiche, 19 (1990), 283-306. Bayle.

Bayle anticipates Voltaire, Turgot and Condorcet in 1) his plea for an objective history free from the passions, prejudices and religious commitments; 2) his plea for toleration; and 3) his criticism of superstition. But


unlike the 'philosophes' of the Enlightenment, he remained pessimistic with respect to human history and reason, which he saw as a destructive critical tool. Although his views were not inconsistent with the Enlightenment belief in historical progress, he remained a sceptic (even closer to Pyrrhonism) both in his method and practical stance.

255. QUINNEY, LAURA. "Scepticism and Grimness in Shelley," Colloquium Helveticum, 12 (1990), 169-82. Shelley.

Shelley's scepticism fits the pattern of what Wittgenstein calls the desire for a "perspicuous representation:" "perspicuous representation ... tends by some inner weight toward grim revelation. Scepticism exposes the putative grounds of reality as a veil or screen of illusion. "

256. RADRIZZANI,IvES. "Le Scepticisme a l'epoque kantienne: Maimon contre Schulze," Archives de Philosophie, 54 (1991), 553-70. Schulze and Maimon.

"The questions, what is scepticism and how far is it compatible with transcendental thought are examined in light of the discussions between Schulze and Maimon, between an ontology of the phenomenon, Aenesidemus and Hume and a radical criticism (Kant) toward a reasonable scepticism."

257. REHG, WILLIAM R. "Lonergan's Performative Transcendental Argument Against Scepticism," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 63 (1990), 257-68. Stroud.

"This article draws on Bernard Lonergan's Insight for a reply to Barry Stroud's critique of anti-sceptical transcendental arguments. Because Lonergan focuses on the performances (rather than on the conceptual frameworks) involved in Cartesian sceptical arguments, he avoids the dilemma posed by Stroud. These performances commit the sceptic to a notion of objectivity that undermines-at least at a meta-level-the content of sceptical doubt."

258. REIN, ANDREW. "Stroud and Williams on Dreaming and Scepticism," Ratio, 3 (1990), 40-77. Stroud and Williams.

"The article concerns a particular argument advanced by Stroud in his book The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Stroud's argument is that if we accept Descartes' requirement that in order to know that p (for suitable p) we must know that we are not dreaming that p, then we can never know that p because the acceptance of Descartes' requirement precludes our ever knowing that we are not dreaming that p. An argument advanced by Bernard Williams in an appendix to his book on Descartes is then discussed and applied to Stroud's problem. The conclusion reached is that the acceptance of Descartes' requirement is consistent with our being able to know, while awake, that we are not dreaming and hence that we can accept Descartes'

. requirement without thereby surrendering to the sceptic. " 259. RENSI, GIUSEPPE. La Scetticismo Estetico del Leopardi (Ferrara, 1990).

Leopardi. The author shows Leopardi's rejection of the Platonic idea of the beauty

as unique, eternal and immutable. 260. ROGERS, KATHERIN A. "Hume on Necessary Causal Connections," Philo

sophy, 66 (1991), 517-21. Hume.


"There are three main interpretations of Hume's theory of causation: He holds that (1) we cannot know causal connections or, (2) we have no philosophical justification, but are 'naturally' determined to believe in them or, (3) there are causal connections, but we cannot comprehend them. On the first Hume's causal explanation for our belief in necessary connections is obviously contradictory. On the second it is plainly false. The most dedicated Humean does not claim to be determined to accept it. On the third it is impossible to verify. We cannot simultaneously believe in necessary connections and observe the mind producing the belief." (Phil. Index)

261. ROSSETTI, LMO. "Sulla differenza tra il fenomenismo di Protagora e il fenomenismo scettico," Cahiers de la Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, 15 (1990), 55-68. Ancient Scepticism.

The distinction between Protagoras' and Sextus' phenomenalism is evaluated in terms of a) certainty; b) reply to opponents; and c) their "guiding idea." Sextus' certainty is negative-he is basically negative judgmental on dogmatic discourse. Protagoras is neutral with respect to the truth value of dogmatic assertions. Sextus replies to the accusation of lack of consistency by attacking the distinction between true and false knowledge. Protagoras takes the criticism as proof of his man's measure doctrine. Finally (c), from his negative certainty, Sextus criticizes all presumed positive certainty whereas Protagoras "contents himself to produce an indefinite series of separable useful opinions." These differences have an emotional correlate: from the verification of diaphonia Protagoras moves to a pragmatic position in social life whereas Sextus takes a cautious and withdrawn position.

262. RUSHDY, ASHRAF H.A. "In 'Dubious Battle:' Scepticism and Fideism in Paradise Regained," Huntington Library Quarterly, 53 (1990), 95-118. Milton.

The author argues that there are three kinds of scepticism in Milton's Paradise Regained. "The first represents the lapsed human condition unable to comprehend the majesty of divinity." "The second type of scepticism is that wherein doubt is used to dispel dogma ... Milton belonged to that age in which doubt was a tool useful for dismantling dogmatism, whether of natural, religious, or divine history" (Bacon, Descartes, and Glanvill). "And finally there is the doubt of desperation, the scepticism Jesus criticizes in rejecting Athenian philosophy, that which doubts every thing though 'plain sense.'" "Like a Pyrrhonist, Satan is sceptical about appearances and resolutely unwilling to affirm anything about essences. While Satan articulates his doubt about appearances ... even as he alters his visage, Jesus articulates his knowledge of essences while retaining the same appearance; moreover, by referring to his own interior demeanor he demonstrates that Satan's doubts are unfounded. It is 'plain sense' that Jesus is the Son of God."

263. SARTORELLI, JOSEPH. "McGinn on Concept Scepticism and Kripke's Sceptical Argument," Analysis, 51 (1991), 79-84. Kripke and McGinn.

"In Wittgenstein on Meaning, Colin McGinn argues that the sceptical argument that Kripke distills from Wittgenstein's rule-following consider-


ations generates. at most what might be called meaning scepticism (the nonfactuality view of concepts). If correct, this would mean the sceptical reasoning is far·less significant than Kripke thinks. Others have seemed to agree with McGinn. I argue that McGinn is wrong here-that, in fact, Kripke's sceptical reasoning has a straightforward extension to concepts. Whether the reasoning succeeds,however, is another matter, which I do not address here. "

264. SARTWELL, erusPIN. "Doubt and Faith: Santayana and Kierkegaard on Fundamental,. Belief, " Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 27 (1991), 179-~5. Kierkegaard:and Santayana.

"This paper.argues that Kierkegaard and Santayana converged on a critique of Cartesian epistemology and universal doubt, a critique based on the notion of faith. It further argues that this critique remains cogent. "

265. SCARRE, GEOFFREY. "Demons, Demonologists, and Descartes," Heythrop Journal, 31 (1990), 3-22. Descartes.

The author argues that the deceiver argument is valid only within a foundationalist view of knowledge. This view must be rejected. Descartes himself conceived his argument not primarily as a sceptical argument but as a device against prejudice.

266. SCHNEEWlND, J.B. "Natural Law, Scepticism, and Methods of Ethics," Journal of the History of Ideas, 52 (1991), 289-308. Ethics.

"The assumption that everyone is equally able to think appropriately about morality was not generally accepted in the seventeenth century. Naturallaw theorists rejected it, but some, moved by the religious belief that God would not hold us accountable unless we could know what we oUght to do, altered the position. Montaigne's sceptical view that each can find within the self a ruling pattern for testing intentions provided a model for moral thinking developed in different ways by later thinkers, such as Hume and Kant."

267. SCHRECK, P.A. "Cartesian Scepticism and Relevant Alternatives," Eidos, 8 (1989), 125-37. Epistemology.

"In recent years many philosophers, such as Dretske, Goldman, and Stine, have attempted to refute scepticism by arguing that the sceptic makes unnecessary demands on the cognizer. These philosophers argue that the hypothetical situations upon Which sceptical arguments are based need not be considered and that only relevant alternatives to knowledge need be taken into account. This essay seeks to refute these arguments by demonstrating that they all ultimately beg the question against the sceptic. "

268. SCHRENK, LAWRENCE P. "Augustine's De Trinitate in Byzantine Scepticism," Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 30 (1989), 451-56. Medieval Philosophy.

The author examines a refutation of Academic scepticism based on Augustine'S De Trinitate, belonging to an anonymous Byzantine compilation of philosophical texts.' The author estimates that the refutation was written after the fourteenth century. The piece indicates Augustine's influence in Greek medieval thought. It is the only known philosophical refutation of


scepticism in the period. 269. SCHUELER, G.F. "Anti-Realism and Scepticism in Ethicsj" Iyyun, 40 (1991),

3-18. Ethics. "This paper examines a feature of the project of replacing the 'philoso

phical picture' which distinguishes descriptive concepts from concepts which we merely project onto reality (Le., the picture that makes anti-realism in ethics plausible) with some form of 'internal realism' which denies this distinction. It is argued that such a change would have no effect at all on ethical scepticism. Genuine ethical sceptics suspect that only one's own interests and concerns give one any reason to act and that ethical considerations, just by themselves, do not. This suspicion is not allayed by making 'cause' as much a projection as 'fair.'"

270. SHAIDA, S.A. "Moral Scepticism," Indian Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1989), 269-81. Ethics.

"The paper seeks to explain and briefly criticize some apparently cogent and popular grounds of moral scepticism which are (a) moral relativism in two forms which I characterize as the general theory and the specific theory of moral relativity; (b) subjectivism of different variety; (c) lack of a rational decision-making procedure in ethics; and (d) unanswerableness of the questions concerning ultimate values/obligations. It is emphasized that none of these convincingly support moral scepticism. It is concluded that its theoretical assumptions are morally damaging."

271. SHIRLEY, EDWARD S. "Why the Problem of the External World is a PseudoProblem: Santayana and Danto," The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 14 (1990), 298-309. Santayana and Danto.

The author discusses the nature of representation and applies Santayana's critique of Danto's answer to Cartesian scepticism to the problem of the existence of the external world.

272. SHIRLEY, EDWARD S. "The Right to Believe and Scepticism: James versus Unger," Southwestern Philosophical Review, 5 (1989), 87-95. Unger and James.

"Peter Unger's version of scepticism, which includes scepticism about the possibility of being reasonable in any of our actions, contradicts James' doctrine of the right to believe in propositions on inconclusive evidence. James is not only cbrrect in rejecting (by implication) Unger's claim that we must have a specific reason for adopting any belief, but his argument applies mutatis mutandis to Unger's argument that to know some proposition we must be entitled to be absolutely certain of it. Hence, James' argument not only undermines Unger's sceptiCism about rationality but the basic scepticism about knowledge upon which it rests."

273. SKORUPSKI, JOHN. "The Intelligibility of Scepticism," The Analytical Tradition, ed. D. Bell and C. Neil (Cambridge, 1990), 1-29. Epistemology.

Analysis of what the author calls the "modernist strategy" of responding to scepticism, which he claims was first developed by analytic philosophy and is one of the characteristic features of the analytic movement. Basically, "the


modernist strategy seeks to show that the sceptic fails to ask the question he intends to ask-where he thought there was a question there is none. "

274. SMrm, PLINIO JUNQUElRA. "More in the Manner, But Also in the Matter" (in Portuguese), Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia, 15 (1989), 19-43. Hume.

"Hume thought that the principles contained in the Treatise and the first Enquiry did not differ amongst themselves. For him, the difference was 'more in the manner, than the matter.' This is also the interpretation usually held by scholars. Our purpose is to study whether this interpretation can stand a detailed analysis of the texts. We compare Hume's considerations about scepticism in both works: scepticism with regard to reason and to the senses and his conclusions. Our analysis shows that there are some important modifications in his arguments, though his conclusions are the same. From Hume's revolutionary point of view the differences are but small. From a historical and a philosophical point of view, however, these differences cannot be neglected. So we allowed ourselves to correct Hume's famous phrase: 'more in the manner, but also in the matter. '" (Phil. Index)

275. SMrm, PLINIO JUNQUEIRA. "0 Ceticismo Naturalista de David Hume," Manuscrito, 13 (1990), 69-86. Hume.

"The interpretations usually held about Hume divide his works into two parts, one negative, one positive. The first would constitute his scepticism and the second, his naturalism. The only question that would remain to us is to examine how far he succeeded in reconciling these two parts. Our purpose is to show that this distinction between scepticism and naturalism is not present in the works of Hume. These have an argumentative unity, at the same time negative and positive. His solution to the problem of causality, the instinct of habit, is a sceptical and naturalist solution; and his moderate scepticism combines the radical, sceptical arguments with the argument derived from the force of nature and avoids both sorts of dogmatism. To these stable, unitary doctrine we gave the name of 'naturalistic scepticism. '" (Phil. Index)

276. SOSA, ERNEST. "Knowledge in Context, Scepticism in Doubt: The Virtue of Our Faculties," Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed. M.D. Roth and G. Ross (Dordrecht, 1990), 171-82. Epistemology.

"Concerning the relevant alternatives response to the sceptic, I have emphasized the large element of adhocness that remains even if I grant that knowledge is contextual in ways other than the way required by the response . ... [T]he main problem has been not the contextuality of relevant alternatives, but rather the obscurity of the concept (except when 'defmed' as alternatives that need to be ruled out), and the implausibility or adhocness or incompleteness of any explication so far offered .... [The paper also discusses] whether knowledge is indeed contextual in the way proposed or whether the reasons adduced for considering it to be contextual cannot be taken into account with comparable overall success by the view that knowledge can vary in 'content' from context to context. [The paper then addresses] intellectual virtue: the


concept, its realization in humans, and its relation thereby to cognitive justification and human knowledge. Finally [we consider] the relativity of knowledge to epistemic communities, and offer a tentative sketch of an explanation for such relativity, whether viewed as contextual or contentual, in terms of a certain conception of intellectual virtue."

277. SOUZA FILHO, DANILO MARCONDES. "Questoes Internas e Questoes Externas," Re!lexiio, 51 (1991),48-59. Epistemology.

"The aim of this paper is to consider different possibilities of analysis of the status of philosophical questions in relation to their subject matter. Should they be considered external to the field they examine or as arising from this very field itself? What are the boundaries between philosophical and nonphilosophical discourse, and how can philosophical discourse be characterized in itself? The way these questions are dealt with in Camap, transcendental philosophy and ordinary language philosophy is then briefly examined and discussed."

278. STRAWSON, GALEN. The Secret Conne:xion: Causation, Realism, andDavid Rume (New York, 1989). Hume.

"David Hume has been misunderstood. He does not hold that there is no such thing as causal power or causal necessity. He does not hold a regularity theory of causation. He firmly believes (without claiming to know for sure) that there is such a thing as causal power. He merely insists that we cannot know its nature. His point is merely epistemological; he is not making the ontological claim that there is definitely no such thing as causal power. Such a claim is a dogmatic metaphysical claim of just the sort he abhors; it is ruled out by his sceptical principles."

279. STRIKER, GISELA. "Ataraxia: Happiness as Tranquility," The Monist, 73 (1990), 97-110. Ancient Scepticism.

The author criticizes the Pyrrhonian conception of happiness on the grounds that, unlike most Greek ethical views, ataraxia is a purely hedonistic conception of happiness unrelated to virtue.

280. STROLL, AVRUM. "Max on Moore," Dialectica, 44 (1990), 153-63. Moore. "Moore claims that he knows certain propositions to be true with

certainty, but refuses to say how he knows, i.e., refuses to give supporting reasons for his claims. Many philosophers, including Max Black, have argued that Moore's approach simply begs the philosophical issues at stake. In contrast, the author argues that Moore's assessment of scepticism shows that it cannot be defeated by rational argumentation and therefore must be met by a rebuttive technique that does not allow the sceptical regress to begin. The outcome is at least a stalemate and in certain sense may represent a defeat for the sceptic."

281. STROLL, AVRUM. "Scepticism and the Problem of the Criterion," Sceptics, Millenarians and Jews, ed. J. Israel and D. Katz (Leiden, 1990), 1-14. Moore.

The author proposes a refutation of scepticism inspired in Moore. Seeing, hearing, etc. are good criteria of knowledge with which the sceptic is


implicitly committed when he advances his sceptical arguments (illusion, dreaming, etc.).

282. STROUD, BARRY. "Hume's Scepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical Reflection," Philosophical Topics, 19 (1991), 271-91. Hume.

The author shows that Hume's trajectory from (1) philosophical reasoning leading to excessive Pyrrhonism to (2) nature-the imagination-determining beliefs independently of justifiability has an important philosophical value, namely, to show the force of nature. Hume holds that the best philosophy (in the sense of the most adequate to human life) continuously goes from (1) to (2) and leads to Academic or mitigated scepticism which has two main advantages: a) it teaches modesty and tolerance, and b) it restricts inquiry to ordinary matters. The author relates the disposition of the mind provided by Hume's mitigated scepticism to the ancient sceptics' ataraxia.

283. SUPERSON, ANITA M. "The Self-Interest Based Contractarian Response to the Why-Be-Moral Sceptic," Southern Journal o/Philosophy, 28 (1990), 427-47. Ethics.

"Is every instance of acting morally an instance of acting rationally? Philosophers have offered many answers to meet the sceptic's challenge. I shall examine one kind of answer to the sceptic, namely, that offered by selfinterest based contractarians." The author concludes that this answer is not satisfactory because it leads to a position vulnerable "to the serious charge that it is never rational to act morally. "

284. TEMKIN, JACK. "Wittgenstein on Criteria and Other Minds," Southern Journal 0/ Philosophy, 28 (1989), 561-93. Wittgenstein.

The author denies that Wittgenstein's treatment of criteria refutes scepticism about other minds (against Norman Malcolm and others). However, Wittgenstein's notions of criteria and grammar "do playa crucial role in Wittgenstein's response to the problem of other minds."

285. THIRIART, P. "Ou Scepticisme au behaviorisme," Philosopher, 7 (1989), 87-98. Psychology.

"On the gap between our behavior and our conscient justification of it. The behavioristic, the psychoanalytic, and the existentialist points of views. It is necessary to put forth a mystification of the self and of the others against the rationalization of the self-justification." (Francis)

286. THORSLEY, PETER L., JR. "Byron and Bayle: Biblical Scepticism and Romantic Irony," Byron, the Bible, and Religion, ed. WolfZ. Hirst (London, 1991), 58-76. Bayle and Byron.

Bayle's rejection of rationalizations of religion, his love of facts, his pledge for tolerance and his sceptical method are present in Byron's works (Byron knew and possessed Bayle's Dictionnaire)." In drawing out .. , not so much the influences as the parallels and affmities between Bayle and Byron, I do not mean to deny their differences. Byron is still and in so many ways a poet of the Romantic Age. Yet there are two grave dangers inherent in the Romantic 'Weltanschauung' ... : the oppressive and sinister collectivism and authoritarianism which go with organic theories of race and history;


and the quite opposite danger of the estheticization of all of experience, which, as Kierkegaard warned, can lead to sterility and ennui. If Byron is spared of both of these diseases, it is surely in part because he was inoculated early on with that spirit of enlightened and ironic scepticism so well represented by Pierre Bayle."

287. TIENSON, JOHN L. "A Conception of Metaphysics," American Philosophical Quarterly, 26 (1989), 63-71. Strawson.

The author defends Descartes' and Hume's scepticism against Strawson's criticism in his book Individuals.

288. TODESCO, FABIO. "L' Europa scettica delle Nove Zeitung di Lipsia," Rivista di Filosofia, 81 (1990),399-428. Italian Philosophy.

The author examines the impact of scepticism in eighteenth century Italy. "[T]he interest in scepticism in Italy was quite alive. Thanks to Sextus; to Bayle, and to the periodics, the sceptical argumentation was recasted, discussed, and adapted to a cultural environment particularly intense. "

289. TODESCO, FABIO. "Scettici, idealisti e dogmatici nella recezione tedesca di Wolff," Rivista di Filosofia, 80 (1989), 215-39. Italian Philosophy.

The author examines the reception ofWolffs and-through Wolff-Leibniz' philosophy in Italy.

290. TRIENES, RUDIE. "Bemerkungen zu Hegels Interpretation des platonischen Parmenides in seinem Jeaner Skeptizismus-Aufsatz," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 97 (1990), 118-25. Hegel.

On Hegel's interpretation of the scepticism exhibited in Plato's Parmenides.

291. TYMOCZKO, THOMAS. "Brains Don't Lie: They Don't Even Make Many Mistakes," Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed. M.D. Roth and G. Ross (Dordrecht, 1990), 195-213. Epistemology.

A development of Hilary Putnam's argument against the "brains in a vat" sceptical argument. "[T]he key insight is that brains in a vat don't make many false statements-not any more than we do. Such brains are not making false statements about our environment, they're making true statement about theirs. If this point be granted, the sceptic's problem by and large disappears. Next we'll consider the objection that this way of looking at things just shifts the sceptic's problem about the external world to a sceptical problem about language. . .. I'll argue that the attempt to retreat to linguistic scepticism cannot be carried through, in part by showing that the analogous move in case of mathematical scepticism is transparently incoherent. Finally, I'll try to assuage psychological doubts about this anti-sceptical maneuver. Can we really distinguish our world from the phenomenally indistinguishable world of brains in vat? Yes, if we use a logical argument and not an empirical discovery. Can we rely on an argument for which a brain in a vat could give a formally equivalent analogue? Yes, this is an essential feature of any transcendental anti-sceptical argument. "

292. TYMOCZKO, THOMAS. "Mathematical Scepticism: Are We Brains in a Countable Vat?" Philosophica, 43 (1989). Philosophy of Mathematics.


The author develops a philosophy of mathematics that treats mathematical objects as empirical objects. The problem of scepticism about the external world thus becomes applicable to mathematics. The author's conclusion is that while "Putnam's form of internal realism can save us from Skolem scepticism, the realism that emerges does not justify a quasi -scientific attitude in set theory. "

293. UMPHREY, STEWART. Zetetic Scepticism (Wakefield, N.H., 1990). Ancient Scepticism.

"This is an essay about inquiry. It begins with a discussion of the passage in Plato's Meno in which Socrates confronts a sceptical challenge to the presumption that inquiry or 'zetesis' is possible. With this zetetic scepticism Socrates must somehow deal, yet the way he chooses is not wholly adequate or so I argue (Chapter I). There follows a provisional account of inquiry (Chapter II), then several attempts to overcome zetetic scepticism (Chapters III-VI). The essay ends with some comments on Socrates as both sceptical and zetetic (Chapter VII)."

294. VAN WOUDENBERG, R. "Scepticism, Certain Grounds and the Method of Reflexivity" (in Dutch), Tijdschrijt voor Filosojie, 52 (1989), 251-75. Apel.

"Some statements are called reflexive. For example, the statement 'this sentence consists of six words.' The reflexivity lies in the fact that the statement refers to itself. Reflexivity in the sense of self-reference can be used systematically as a philosophical method. Usually the use of this method ... leads to some form or other of scepticism. But in addition, and this is the point of the article, this method can be used as a means of fmding certain grounds (foundations). This is argued in sections II-IV by means of an analysis of the transcendental pragmatics of Karl-Otto Ape!." (Phil. Index)

295. VANDERMEERSCH, PATRICK. "Scepticisme als vorm van geloof," Wijsgerig Perspectiej op Maatschappij en Wetenschap, 30 (1989-90), 102-08. Montaigne.

On the relation of scepticism to religion in Montaigne. 296 VERSCHAFFEL, BART. "Scepsis en kritiek," Wijsgerig Perspectiej op Maat

schappij en Wetenschap, 30 (1989-90), 108-13. Bayle and Descartes. On Bayle's historical Pyrrhonism against the background of Cartesian

philosophy. 297 VEZZALI, MARIANO. "Le Due vie della ragione in Dostoevskij," Vita e

Pensiero, (1989), 112-23. Dostoyevsky. "Dostoyevsky offers a demonstration ad adbsurdum of the necessity of

faith from the inconsistency rationally proved of life without faith. " 298. VOELKE, ANDRE-JEAN. "Soigner par Ie logos: la therapeutique de Sextus

Empiricus," Cahiers de la Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, 15 (1990), 181-94. Ancient Scepticism.

An examination of Sextus' therapeutics (its goal, technics, motivation, etc.) in contradistinction to that of other philosophers, Epicurus in particular.

299. VOGEL, JONATHAN. "Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?" Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, ed M.D. Roth and G.


Ross (Dordrecht, 1990), 13-27. Epistemology. "Arguments for scepticism seem to depend upon the Closure Principle:

roughly, if you know p and you know that p entails q, you know q. Fred Dretske's Zebra Case has been taken to show that the Closure Principle is invalid, but this is not so. One can, however, devise other apparent counterexamples to the principle ("Car Theft Cases") which are closely related to the Lottery Paradox. But these examples a) provide no comfort from scepticism in any case; b) may mislead us because of anomalies in our thinking about probabilities; c) really do not count against the Closure Principle after all. The problem cases do, th(lugh, raise difficulties for some relevant-alternatives theories. "

300. VOGEL, JONATHAN. "Cartesian Scepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation," The Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1990), 658-68. Epistemology.

The author argues that the common sense hypothesis that there is an external world should be preferred over the sceptical hypothesis because the sceptical explanation of our experience of an external world is weaker than "even a scientifically unsophisticated common sense view of the world."

301. W AERDT, PAUL A. V. "Colotes and the Epicurean Refutation of Scepticism, " Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 30 (1989), 225-67. Ancient Scepticism.

Colotes attacked ancient scepticism by arguing that the sceptic cannot live his scepticism. He adapted the earlier Stoic version of the objection to Epicurean epistemology. His anti-sceptic argument was incorporated in Epicurean doctrine to such an extent that its Stoic origin was forgotten.

302. WAN-CHUAN FANG. [in Chinese] Bulletin of the College of Liberal Arts, 37 (1989),453-76. Epistemology.

303. WARD, ANDREW. "Coherence and Warranted Theistic Belief," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 28 (1990), 35-45. Davidson.

"In a number of papers, Donald Davidson appeals to the intelligibility of an Omniscient Interpreter in order to undercut the sceptical contention that it is intelligible that human beings have a coherent system of beliefs, most of whose members are false. The purpose of this paper is to take Davidson's argument and use it to provide a defense for belief in the existence of God. "

304. WARD, ANDREW. "Scepticism and Davidson's Omniscient Interpreter Argument," Critica, 21 (1989), 127-43. Davidson.

Against Bennett's criticism of Davidson's anti-sceptical argument. "[I]f the sceptic grants both the genuine intelligibility of a language user having all and only true beliefs (an omniscient interpreter) and Davidson's method of (radical) interpretation, then the sceptical contention that human beings may, have a coherent system of beliefs that are comprehensively false about the actual world is undermined."

305. WEDGWOOD, RALPH. "Scepticism and Rational Belief," The Philosophical Quarterly, 40 (1990), 45-64. Epistemology.

The author attempts "to provide at the same time a way of breaking free of self-refuting Pyrrhonian scepticism and of providing a satisfactory non-


circular definition of rational or justified belief. " 306. WILLIAMS, MEREDITH. "Blind Obedience: Rules, Community and the

Individual," Meaning Scepticism, ed. Klaus Puhl (Berlin, 1991), 93-125. Wittgenstein.

"In this paper. I shall show both that ... Wittgenstein does hold a community view of rules, the view that the objectivity of rule-following is essentially social, and that that view is quite plausible .... I shall argue that it is only through a community view of rule-following that space can be made for the basic normative distinction between correct and incorrect action and for the power of rules to constrain the individual's behavior." This view does not engender scepticism which is meaningful only in the "classical view"-which is not Wittgenstein's-"that applications of a rule must be guided and justified by something. n

307. WILSMORE, S. J. "Answering Scepticism in Art," International Philosophical Quarterly, 29 (1989), 191-203. Aesthetics.

"In this paper I begin with an account of the way in which works of art exists. I then try to show that this is just the kind of account of the independent existence of works of art which has been lacking in aesthetics. I end by arguing that such an understanding of art has repercussions for our understanding of the nature of aesthetic experience, whether of art or of nature. "

308. WILSON, FRED. "Is Hume a Sceptic With Regard to the Senses?" Journal of the History of Philosophy, 27 (1989), 49-73. Hume.

The author criticizes Popkin's interpretation of Hume as a Pyrrhonian. He agrees that Hume does claim in the Treatise that the two principles that generate beliefs (imagination and causation) are contradictory since the former leads to belief whereas the latter leads to doubt. Yet the principle of causation can be rationally justified.

309. WINBLAD, DOUGLAS G. "Scepticism and Naturalized Epistemology," Philosophia, 19 (1989),99-113. Quine and Goodman.

On Quine's and Goodman's answers to scepticism about the external world.

310. WISDO, DAVID. "Simone Weil on Scepticism, Objectivity, and Epistemic Life," Cahiers Simone Weil, 14 (1991), 255-67. Weil.

"S. Weil inquires about the way of life that allows human beings to satisfy their desire for truth. According to her the need of truth implies the denial of any form of voluntarism to the extent that voluntarism is always related to subjectivism (the will of truth or the will to believe). Respect toward reality is related to scepticism about beliefs." (Francis)

311. WOLLAEGER, MARK A. Joseph Conrad and the Fictions of Scepticism (Stanford, 1990). Conrad.

"It is not new ... to think of Conrad as a sceptic, but scepticism itself has become a new subject in recent years. By returning to Conrad with a more rigorous understanding of scepticism as a genuine philosophical issue, I claim to shed new light on familiar matters as well as to open new lines of inquiry . Too often the word scepticism when applied to Conrad and other early


modernists slides into a diffuse sense of social detachment and a reluctance to believe in the existence of ascertainable truths. Such usage implies the practical scepticism of Montaigne rather than the philosophical scepticism of Descartes. More interested in the Cartesian tradition, I invoke scepticism as a many-faceted concept whose significance expands as it is used to explore the varied formal and intellectual intricacies of Conrad's fiction. Among the issues freshly argued here in the context of authorial scepticism are Conrad's thematics of coercion, isolation, and betrayal; the complicated relations among author, narrator, and character; and the logic of Conradian romance, comedy, and tragedy. Specific formal characteristics are also understood in relation to the articulation of Conrad's scepticism. The distinctive features of his chronological dislocations and his presentation of character, for instance, both express and resist the pull toward a more radical scepticism."

BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX (Numbers refer to entrees)

Aesthetics 60, 307 Agricola, Rudolphus 220 Alston, W. 45 Aenesidemus, see Schulze Anscombe, G.E.M. 142 Apel, Karl-Otto 294 Archeology 141 Augustine 109 Austin, John 74, 133, 240 Autrecourt, Nicolas de 30

Barnes, Jonathan 96 Bayle, Pierre 7, 22, 37, 97, 254, 286,

296 Borges, Luis 68 Byron, George Gordon, Lord 154, 286

Calderon, Pedro 227 Cavell, Stanley 51, 112, 113, 139, 151 Chaucer, Geoffrey 182 Condorcet, Marie-Jean-Antoine Nicolet

de Caritat 249 Conrad, Joseph 311

Dancy, Jonathan 103 Danto, Arthur 271 Davidson, Donald 48,85, 168,303,304 Derrida, Jacques 28, 120, 208 Descartes, Rene 27, 35, 54, 59, 66,

122, 162, 164, 165, 191, 192, 215, 239,242,248,265,296

Dostoyevsky, Fedor 297 Dretske, Fred 41,75, 84

Edwards, Jonathan 25 Eliot, Thomas S. 245

Feyerabend,Paul 199 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 44 Foucault, Michel 39 Godel, Kurt 179 Goodman, Nelson 309 Gorgias 149

455

Habermas, JUrgen 166 Hare, R.M. 211 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 115,

290 Heidegger, Martin 231 History of Philosophy 238 History of Religion 95 Horkheimer, Max 243 Huet, Pierre-Daniel 202, 251 Hume, David 11, 24, 32, 76, 81, 86,

104, 110, 111, 138, 152, 174, 180, 181, 189, 194, 195, 200, 222, 228, 237,260,274,275,278,282,308

Husserl, Edmund 54, 125, 228

James, Henry 53, 272 Jeniades of Corinth 58 Johnson, Samuel 205

Kant, Immanuel 50, 169, 187 Kierkegaard, Smen 25, 198,264 Klein, Peter 107 Kripke, Saul 3, 23, 33, 136, 263

La Mothe Le Vayer, Francois de 170 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 235 Leopardi, Giacomo 259 Levinas, Emanuel 28, 51

Machado de Assis 201 Maimon, Salomon 42, 256 Malcolm, Norman 135 McGinn, Colin 263 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 162 Milton, John 262 Montaigne, Michel de 77, 123, 188,

225,295 Moore, George Edward 14, 147, 280,

281 Moser, Paul 15

Nagel, Ernest 73 Nietzsche, Friedrich 39, 120, 163


Nozick, Robert 46, 84, 176,207,242

Ockham, William 221 Ovid 246

Pascal, Blaise 64, 97, 117, 200 Peirce, Charles S. 119, 160 Petrarch 246 Philosophy

Ancient Skepticism 4, 5, 10, 12, 13, 18-21,29,34,52,62,65,71,80, 82, 83, 89, 98, 102, 105, 129, 131, 132, 137, 143, 144, 172, 190, 214, 223, 226, 233, 236, 244, 252, 253, 261, 279, 293, 298, 301

British Philosophy 78 Eastern Philosophy 126 Epistemology 1, 8, 9, 26, 36, 49,

57,69,70,72,91,94, 100, 114, 118, 121, 140, 145, 157, 173, 175, 177, 178, 184-86,197,210, 217, 218, 224, 234, 241, 267, 273, 276, 277, 291, 299, 300, 302,305

Ethics 17, 31, 38,40,43, 55, 61, 79,99,101,128,134,158,161, 167, 183, 203, 206, 216, 266, 269,270,283

History of Philosophy 238 Italian Philosophy 288, 289 Jewish Philosophy 250 Medieval Philosophy 268 Philosophy of Language 153 Philosophy of Law 230 Philosophy of Mathematics 292

Philosophy of Religion 156, 232 Philosophy of Science 67, 116

Pollock, John 213 Popper, Karl 124, 127,219,229 Psychology 63, 93, 155, 285 Putnam, Hilary 2, 87

Quine, Willard V. 16,41,309

Rhetoric 106 Ronsard, Pierre de 246 Rorty, Richard 88 Russell, Bertrand 159

Sanchez, Francisco 77 Santayana, George 264,271 Schulze, Johann Gottlieb (Aenesidemus-

Schulze) 256 Shelley, Percy B. 255 Stove, David 171 Strawson, Galen 287 Stroud, Barry 15, 47, 74, 92, 133, 150,

193,240,247,257,258

Unger, Peter 272

Valla, Lorenzo 220 Vives, Juan Luis 108 Voltaire 37,97

Watkins, John 229 Weil, Simone 310 Williams, Bernhard 258 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 6, 24, 56, 90,

130, 133, 136, 146, 148, 196, 204, 208,209,212,284,306

INDEX OF NAMES

Abbt, Thomas 73, 77 Abel, Niels Henrik 45 Abicht, Johann Heinrich 160, 169 Acosta, Uriel 355 Adam, Jean 188-193 Adelung, Johann Christoph 380 Aenesidemus 133, 153, 157, 159,349 Aenesidemus-Schulze, see: Schulze Agrippa von Nettesheim 48,359,371 Alembert, Jean Ie Rond d' 31, 188-

200, 203, 206, 214-216, 284, 288 Ancillon, Jean-Pierre-Frederic 26 Ancillon, Louis-Frederic 26 Andre, Yves 197, 199 Andrewes, Lancelot 254 Antiochus 369 Arcesilaus 152-157, 232, 353, 368 Arendt, Hannah 278 Aristo 156, 157 Aristotle 26, 54, 79, 83, 342, 348,

357,358,360 Arnauld, Antoine 65 Arnobius 373 Arriaga, Rodrigo de 355 Ast, Friedrich 380 Augustine 354, 359, 373 Ayer, A.J. 57

Bacon, Francis 22, 24-26, 175-181, 184-186,209,214,216,217,271, 349, 351, 365

Balfour, J. 232 Balguy, John 248, 249 Barbeyrac, Jean 265,365,366 Barkhausen, Viktor 319,320 Batteux, Charles 196 Bayle, Pierre 57,62,81,87,104,231,

232,265,340,342,344,345,347, 350, 352, 355, 361, 373, 380, 382

Beattie, James 93 Beccaria, Cesare 298,299,316,319,

320,322,324,335 Beck, J.S. 134 Beck, Lewis W.A. 96 Beiser, Frederick C. 111

457

Bergier, Nicolas-Sylvestre, abbe 19-21, 64

Berkeley, George 16,21,24,27,32, 33,45, 62, 93, 112,222,231,331

Bermudez, Jose Luis 112 Bernstein, Richard 69 Bezout, Etienne 189 Bischof, KJ. 306,308 Bloch, Olivier Rene 350 Block, Georg Wilhelm 305 Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich 207,

210,216 Bochner, Salomon 47 Bode, Johann Joachim Christoph 345 Boerhaave, Herman 332 Bolingbroke, Henry St. John 250,255,

259 Bolten, Johann Friedrich 295 Bolzano, Bernhard 45 Bond, John 3 Bongie, Laurence 187 Bossuet, Jacques Benigne 360 Boullier, David-Renaud 197, 199 Bouterwek, Friedrich 159, 380 Bouwsma, William 69 Brinkmann, Carl Gustav von 184 Brissot de Warville, Jacques-Pierre 18,

31-35, 38, 62 Browne, Peter 243, 244, 256 Brucker, Johann Jakob 27, 339, 342-

362,367,381-383 Brues, Guy de 48 Brutus, Marcus Junius 330 Buddeus, Carl 349 Buddeus, Johann Franz 349,355,365 Buffon, George-Louis Leclerc, Comte

191,192,203-205,209,210,215 Buhle, Johann Gottlieb 350, 360 Burke, Edmund 235, 236, 244, 247-

250, 252, 254-259 Burke, Peter 326 Burlamaqui, Jean-Jacques 265 Burnyeat, Myles F. 12, 224, 329, 336 Buscher,I.G. 293 Butler, Joseph 250-252

458 Index

Caesar, Gaius Julius 252 Camus, Albert 69 Cantor, Georg 58 Carneades 72, 93, 104,368,369 Carpzow, Benedikt 333 Cassius, Gaius 330 Cato, Marcus Porcius 330,333 Cauchy, Augustin-Louis 45 Cavaille, J.P. 351 Charles V (Emperor) 326 Charron, Pierre 360 Chillingworth, William 251 Chladenius, Johann Martin 77 Chrysippus 93 Chubb, Thomas 244,245,255 Cicero, Marcus Tullius 26,74, 79,

153,344,352,354,358,359,369, 370, 380

Clarke, Samuel 198 Clarke, Thomas 224-227, 229, 233 Clavius, Christopher 53 Clerc, Jean Ie 344 Clevesahl, Erich Christian 365 Cluver, Detlev C. 53 Collins, Anthony 355 Comte, August 187,200,215,217 Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de 19,22,

24-26', 32, 95, 367 Condorcet, Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas

Caritat, Marquis de 21,22, 31, 35-38, 62, 63, 175, 188, 194, 195, 196, 206, 215, 216

Constantini, Friedrich Gerhard 294 Coste, Pierre 345 Cramer, Johann Andreas 287 Crell, Lorenz von 291 Crousaz, Jean-Pierre 339, 340, 344,

355, 366 Crusius, Christian August 306, 307,

377

Dacosta, Uriel, see: Acosta Danton, Georges-Jacques 22 Davis, Philip 1. 41 Davy, Humphry 175 Democritus 348, 353-356 Descartes, Rene 26,27, 33,46, 47,

65, 70, 102, 112, 135, 182, 198, 199,214,224,229,242,271,272,

348,351,352,355,357,359-362 Destutt de Tracy, Antoine-Louis-

Claude, Comte 24 Diderot, Denis 16-18, 32, 344 Diodorus 156, 157 Diogenes Laertius 344,352,370 Dirichlet, Peter Gustav Lejeune 45 Dodwell, Henry 246-248 Dumas, Jean 304 Duns Scotus 354

Eberhard, Johann August 75, 358 Edgecumb, James 244,245 Einstein, Albert 58 Engel, Johann Jakob 181 Epicurus 43, 83 Erasmus, Desiderius 74 Erhard, Johann Benjamin 143, 145-

158, 165-168 Eschenbach, Johann Christian 331 Euclid 46, 47, 50-53 Euler, Leonhard 46 Evans, Richard 1. 336

Fabricius, J.A. 344, 355 Faust, Bernhard Christian 289 Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich 77,79,

85,91,92,94,99, 111,209,325-327

Ferguson, Adam 203 Fermat, Pierre de 46 Fevre, J. Ie 26 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 72-74,111,

120, 131-134, 145, 151-153, 155, 159, 306, 316, 367

Flew, Anthony 4 Fontenelle, Bernard Ie Bovier de 190 Forberg, Friedrich Karl 150, 154-157 Formey, Jean-Henri-Samuel 330,339,

344, 366, 367, 380 Forster, Georg 180-184 Foucault, Michel 216, 218 Foucher, Simon 54, 62 Frederick IT (prussian king) 17, 18,

181, 300 Fiilleborn, Georg Gustav 74, 344

Gadamer, Hans-Georg 109 Gadbled, Christophe 188-190, 192, 197

Galileo, Galilei 23, 65 Garat, Dominique-Joseph 22-24 Garve, Christian 75-77,79, 114,306 Gassendi, Pierre 107,348,351,352,

359-362 Gaukroger, Stephen 351 Gauss, Karl Friedrich 47 Gawlick, Giinter 84, 85, 88, 114 Gebauer. Georg Christian 365 Gerando, Joseph-Marie de 26,27 Gibbon, Edward 336 Girtanner, Christian 180 Glanvill, Joseph 239, 251, 351, 355,

360, 361 Globig, Hans Ernst von 300 Gmelin, Christian Gottlieb 301 Gobineau, Arthur de 269, 279 Godel, Kurt 58 Godet 23 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang 71, 175,

210,216,297,311,312,334 Goeze, Johann Melchior 334 Gottignies, Gilles-Francois 53 Gravenhorst, Christop Julius 289 Gravenhorst, Johann Heinrich 289 's-Gravesande, Willem Jacob 89 Green, Thomas Hill 4 Gregory, Tullio 350 Grimm, Friedrich Melchior von 15, 16 Gross, C.F. 345 Grotius, Hugo 114,265,366 Gurlitt, Johann Gottfried 35

Haller, Albrecht von 332, 339, 366 Hamann, Johann Georg 86, 87, 114,

115,330 Hammacher, Klaus 72 Hammond, Henry 9 Heath, Sir Thomas Little 47 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 74,

111,120,130,132,159,213,217, 341,367,384

Heiberg, Johan Ludvig 47 Heller, Heinrich Wilhelm 301 Helvetius, Claude Adrien 15, 16, 25,

27 Heraclitus 353 Herbert, Franz de Paula von 153-155,

157

Index 459

Herder, Johann Gottfried 73, 210, 216, 334

Herschel, William 23 Hersh, Reuben 41 Hervet, Gentian 360 Herz, Marcus 210 Hilbert, David 58 Hippel, Theodor von 87 Hobbes, Thomas 242,248,249,335,

349 Holbach, Paul Henri Dietrich, Baron d'

15, 17, 19 Homer 352 Hommel, Karl Ferdinand 316,330,

335, 336 Hont, Istvan 106, 114, 115, 373, 377 Hooker, Richard 254 Huet, Pierre-Daniel 54, 62, 340, 342,

345, 352, 355, 361, 373 Humboldt, Alexander von 175-181,

183-186,216,217 Humboldt, Wilhelm von 181-186, 209,

216,217 Hume, David 3-8, 10-13, 15-24, 26-

29, 33, 34, 36-38, 54, 56, 57, 61-65,70,71,73, 81-100, 103, 104, 109, 114, 115, 119, 126, 128, 130, 135, 151, 159, 163, 164, 168- 170, 176,181, 182, 187, 188,200,203-206,214,215,221-224,226,227, 229-233,237,250,251,252- 254, 298,300,306,309,329-331, 333, 342,344,350,353,356,361,362, 367,375,377

Huster, Johann Georg 300

Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich 69, 71, 72, 74,87,181-183,331

Jakob, Ludwig Heinrich 356 Jenner, Edward 284 Jerusalem, Karl Wilhelm 334 Joseph II (Emperor) 321 Jurieu, Pierre 34, 62, 265

Kahle, Ludwig Martin 345 Kant, Immanuel 16, 24-27, 29, 57, 69-

72,74,77,78,81-87, 100-109, 111-115, 119, 129-131, 133, 134, 136-138, 141, 143, 147, 148, 155-

460 Index

160, 163, 181-183, 187,203,224, 227,295,298,306-309,312,316, 317,328,329,331,333,340-342, 346,347,350,353,356,357,361, 362, 367, 373-377

Keith, George 18 Kemp Smith, Nonnan 222,223 Kepler, Johannes 58 Keranflech, Charles Hercule 197, 199 Kergorlay, Louis de 273 Kielmeyer, Carl Friedrich 209 Kierkegaard, SHren 20, 21 King, William 243 Kinker, Johannes 26 Klein, Ernst Ferdinand 181 Kreimendahl, Lothar 84, 85, 88 Kronecker, Leopold 58 Krug, Wilhelm Traugott 370 Kriinitz, Johann Georg 334

La Mothe Le Vayer, Franr,:ois de 342, 344,345,349,355,361,373

Lacretelle, Jean-Charles-Dominique de 19

Lacretelle, Pierre-Louis de 19 Lactantius 359, 373 Lacydes 231 Laird, John 6 Lakatos, hnre 41,42 Lallemandet, Jean 355 Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste-Pierre-Antoine

de Monet, Chevalier de 175,217 Lambert, Johann Heinrich 91 Lancelin, P.F. 25 Laplace, Pierre-Simon de 25, 187-190,

192-200,206,214-217,279 Lavater, Johann Kaspar 183 Lavoisier, Antoine-Laurent 25, 180 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von 26, 46,

53, 54, 71, 75, 81-83, 90, 91, 111, 112, 128, 130, 163, 170, 197, 198, 199, 330, 350, 361, 362

Leland, John 252, 253 LeB, Gottfried 305 Leslie, Charles 253 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 72, 90,

203, 334, 361 Lev~que, Pierre 190 Lichtenberg, Georg Christoph 310

Lichtenstein, Anton August Heinrich 295 Locke, John 17-19,22-26, 32, 36, 62,

82, 83, 90, 92, 95, 128, 130, 170, 190,222,237,241-245,250,251, 257, 347-350, 361, 362

Lossius, Christian 85,93,94,99, 111, 345

Lotze, Rudolf Hermann 55 Louis XVI (French king) 22 Lueder, August Ferdinand 292,295

Maimon, Salomon 111,131,134,139, 150, 159, 167, 168, 170,303,331, 354

Maimonides 354 Malebranche, Nicolas de 23, 32, 33,

62, 90, 197-199, 355, 360 Mandeville, Bernard 114 Marat, Jean-Paul 18, 64 Marc Antony 330 Marguerie, Jean-Jacques de 192 Marquard, Odo 112, 115 Martini, Johann Bernhard 290 Matthiii, Carl Christian 289 Maupertuis, Pierre-Louis-Moreau de

16, 198 Meiners, Christoph 76,91,92, 94,

358, 365, 380 Mendelssohn, Moses 72, 73, 75, 85,

88-91,209,306,308 Merian, Jean-Bernard 15, 16, 26, 330 Mersenne, Marin 106,355 Michaelis, Johann David 305,317 Middleton, Conyers 359 Mill, John Stuart 55 Mirabeau, Victor Riquetti, Marquis de

298 Molyneux, William 243 Monnier, Pierre Ie 189 Montagu, Mary Wortley 284 Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de 23, 69,

74,87,228,229,330,342,345, 353-355, 360, 373

Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat 22, 298, 300, 306, 309, 316, 323, 326

Montucla, Jean-Etienne 42-48, 54-57, 59,64,65

Moore, Brian 3

Moore, George E. 225,226 Morellet, Andre 28 Morgan, Thomas 255 Morhof, Daniel Georg 351 Moritz, Karl Philipp 303 Morton, Nathaniel 265 Moser, Justus 301,302 Mosheim, Johann Lorenz von 304 Muratori, Ludovico Antonio 345 Musil, Robert 57

Naigeon, Jacques-Andre 18,20 Napoleon Bonaparte 25 Newton, Isaac 6, 46, 98, 193, 194,

198,208,214,241,242,251,256 Nicolai, Friedrich 169,311,334 Nicole, Pierre 65 Niethammer, Friedrich Immanuel 147,

151, 152, 154, 157 Nietzsche, Friedrich 341 Nieuwentijt, Bernard 53 Nollet, Jean-Antoine, abbe 189

Oken (Ockenfuss), Lorenz 175 Olaso, Ezequiel de 33, 112 Osiander, Friedrich Wilhelm 296

Parmenides 356 Pascal, Blaise 18, 20, 36, 62-65, 197,

198,231,249,262,263,273,279 Passmore, John A. 3 Peano, Giuseppe 59 Petrarch, Francesco 74 Philo of Larissa 369 Photius 349 Pico della Mirandola, Gianfrancesco

47,359 Pistorius, Hermann Andreas 168 Platner, Ernst 93, 111, 131, 159, 170,

203,331,362,367,375 Plato 23,26,47,58,79, 83, 156, 157,

163,274,348,353-355,357,368 Ploucquet, Gottfried 344 Poincare, Henri 51, 54 Pope, Alexander 242 Popkin, Richard H. 20,28,69, 106,

187, 298, 343, 350 Prades, abbe L.M. 191 Price, Henry H. 4

Prichard, Harold A. 4 Proclus 57, 58

Index 461

Pufendorf, Samuel 335,366 Pyrrho 163, 164, 228, 339, 344, 349,

350, 352, 354, 358-360, 369, 370, 372,377

Pythagoras 353, 356

Rathlef, Ernst 300 Reichenbach, Hans 57 Reid, Thomas 93,222 Reinhold, Carl (Karl) Leonhard 74, 82-

84, 119-131, 133, 143, 145-148, 150-153, 155, 159, 163, 165, 167-172, 362, 375

Riemann, Georg Friedrich Bernhard 53 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 25, 33, 34, 62,

71,79,232,298,306,320,333, 340, 345, 361

Russell, Bertrand 4,47,58 Rust, George 238

Sade, Donatien Alphonse Francois de 341

Sailer, Johann Michael 305 Sanchez, Francisco 48, 53, 355 Sargent, John 239 Savile, Sir Henry 52-54 Schar, Markus 333 Scheffner, Johann George 87 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph

111,175,341 Schiller, Friedrich 155, 180, 182, 183,

210 Schlegel, Friedrich 74 Schleiermacher, Friedrich Ernst Daniel

213,380 Schlettwein, Johann August 317,318 Schlick, Moritz 38 SchlOzer, August Ludwig 284, 301 Schmitt, Charles 343 Schneewind, J.B. 307,373,377 Schulze, Gottlob Ernst (Aenesidemus-

Schulze) 111,131,133-141,143, 145-153, 157, 159, 160-165, 167-169, 331, 356, 367, 375

Schwab, Johann Christoph 26 Schwager,JohannMoritz 317,318 Scipio Aquilianus 353

462 Index

Selle, Christian Gottlieb 26 Sextus Empiricus 43,44,47-58, 71,

104, 105, 112, 126, 152, 154, 156, 157,163,228,229,329,331,340, 344, 345, 350, 354, 356, 359, 360, 369, 370, 374, 378, 380

Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl 248, 249, 377

Sherlock, Thomas 249,251,252 Silhon, Jean de 373 Sintenis, Christian Friedrich 305 Smith, Adam 114 Socrates 104, 274, 330, 352-354, 357 Soemmering, Samuel Thomas 180 Sonnenfels, Joseph von 316 South, Robert 239 Spinoza, Baruch 72, 77, 204 Staudlin, Carl Friedrich 27, 69-73,

107,151,152,155,157,297,310-312,315,331,339-350,353,354, 355-362, 365-384

Stephani, Heinrich 133 Stillingfleet, Edward 237-239,241,

253,254 Strawson, Peter 261 Stroud, Barry 4 Sulzer, Johann Georg 29, 73-76, 79,

89, 330 Swift, Jonathan 5, 9

Talbert, abbe Francois-Xavier 345 Taylor, Alfred E. 12 Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb 119,

168, 169, 346, 350, 365, 368, 370, 380-383

Tertullian 359 Tetens, Johann Nikolaus 79, 85, 94-

100, 111,362,375 Thales 348, 356 Thomasius, Christian 330, 335, 365 Tiedemann, Dietrich 380 Tillotson, John 239,240,249,251,

254 Timon of Phlius 369 Tindal, Matthew 248, 255 Tocqueville, Alexis de 261-279

Toland, John 242,243, 246, 254, 355 Tonelli, Giorgio 32, 112, 113, 299,

309 Turgot, Anne-Robert-Jacques 21,22,

28,35,36

Varignon, Pierre 53 Varro, Marcus Terentius 360 Vierhaus, Rudolf 310 Viete, Francois 46 Villemandy, Pierre de 355 Villers, Charles de 24-26 Visbeck, Johann Carl 160, 169 Vives, Juan Luis 359 Vogel, Samuel Gottlieb 292 Volney, Constantin Francois de Chasse

boeuf 23 Volta, Alessandro 176, 177 Voltaire (Francois Marie Arouet) 16,

17,25, 32, 104,290,296,298, 299,306,326

Vossius, Gerhard Johannes 47

Wachter, Carl Georg 333 Walker, Ralph 81 Washington, George 25 Weierstrass, Karl Theodor Wilhelm 45,

59 Weishaupt, Adam 362 Weyl, Hermann 58 Whaley , Joachim 113 Whitehead, Alfred North 47 Wieland, Christoph Martin 78, 300 Wilkins, John 251 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 225-229,233 Wizenmann, Thomas 111 Wolff, Christian 71, 74, 75, 83, 306,

330,335,345,347,350,356,361 Wollaston, William 250, 251 Wollner, Johann Christoph 182 Wright, John P. 4 Wundt, Wilhelm 55

Xenophon 79

Zeno of Elea 26, 348, 356, 357

ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIRE DES IDEES

* INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

43. P. Dibon: Inventaire de la correspondance (1595-1650) d' Andre Rivet (1572-1651). 1971 ISBN 90-247-5112-8

44. K.A. Kottman: Law and Apocalypse. The Moral Thought of Luis de Leon (1527?-1591).1972 ISBN 90-247-1183-5

45. F.G. Nauen: Revolution, Idealism and Human Freedom. Schelling, Holderlin and Hegel, and the Crisis of Early Gennan Idealism. 1971 ISBN 90-247-5117-9

46. H. Jensen: Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson's [1694-1746] Ethical Theory. 1971 ISBN 90-247-1187-8

47. A. Rosenberg: [Simon] Tyssot de Patot and His Work (1655-1738). 1972 ISBN 90-247-1199-1

48. C. Walton: De la recherche du bien. A study of [Nicolas de] Malebranche's [1638-1715] Science of Ethics. 1972

ISBN 90-247-1205-X 49. P.J.S. Whitmore (ed.): A 17th-Century Exposure of Superstition. Select Text of

Claude Pithoys (1587-1676). 1972 ISBN 90-247-1298-X 50. A. Sauvy: Livres saisis ii Paris entre 1678 et 1701. D'apn!s une etude pre liminaire

de Motoko Ninomiya. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1347-1 51. W.R. Redmond: Bibliography of the Philosophy in the Iberian Colonies of America.

1972 ISBN 90-247-1190-8 52. C.B. Schmitt: Cicero Scepticus. A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the

Renaissance. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1299-8 53. J. Hoyles: The Edges of Augustanism. The Aesthetics of Spirituality in Thomas Ken,

John Byrom and William Law. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1317-X 54. I. Bruggeman and A.J. van de Ven (eds.): Inventaire des pieces d' Archives fran~aises

se rapportant a l' Abbaye de Port-Royal des Champs et son cercle et a la Resistance contre la Bulle Unigenitus et a l'Appel. 1972 ISBN 90-247-5122-5

55. J.W. Montgomery: Cross and Crucible. Johann Valentin Andreae (1586-1654), Phoenix of the Theologians. Volume I: Andreae's Life, World-View, and Relations with Rosicrucianism and Alchemy; Volume II: The Chymische Hochzeit with Notes and Commentary. 1973 Set ISBN 90-247-5054-7

56. o. Lutaud: Des revolutions d' Angleterre ii la Revolution fran~aise. Le tyrannicide & Killing No Murder (Cromwell, Athalie, Bonaparte). 1973 ISBN 90-247-1509-1

57. F. Duchesneau: L'Empirisme de Locke. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1349-8 58. R. Simon (ed.): Henry de Boulainviller - <Euvres Philosophiques, Tome I. 1973

ISBN 90-247-1332-3 For <Evres Philosophiques, Tome II see below under Volume 70.

59. E.E. Harris: Salvation from Despair. A Reappraisal of Spinoza's Philosophy. 1973 ISBN 90-247-5158-6

60. I.-F. Battail: L'Avocat philosophe Geraud de Cordemoy (1626-1684). 1973 ISBN 90-247-1542-3

61. T. Liu: Discord in Zion. The Puritan Divines and the Puritan Revolution (1640-1660). 1973 ISBN 90-247-5156-X

62. A. Strugnell: Diderot's Politics. A Study of the Evolution of Diderot's Political Thought after the Encyclopedie. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1540-7



63. G. Defaux: Pantagruel et les Sophistes. Contribution a l'histoire de l'humanisme chretien au 16e siecle. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1566-0

64. G. Planty-Bonjour: Hegel et la pensee philosophique en Russie (1830-1917). 1974 ISBN 90-247-1576-8

65. R.I. Brook: [George] Berkeley's Philosophy of Science. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1555-5 66. T.E. Jessop: A Bibliography of George Berkeley. With: Inventory of Berkeley's

Manuscript Remains by A.A. Luce. 2nd revised and enlarged ed. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1577-6

67. E.I. Perry: From Theology to History. French Religious Controversy and the Revo-cation of the Edict of Nantes. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1578-4

68. P. Dibbon, H. Bots et E. Bots-Estourgie: Inventaire de la correspontiance (1631-1671) de Johannes Fredericus Gronovius [1611-1671]. 1974

ISBN 90-247-1600-4 69. A.B. Collins: The Secular is Sacred. Platonism and Thomism in Marsilio Fieino's

Platonic Theology. 1974 ISBN 90-247-1588-1 70. R. Simon (ed.): Henry de Boulainviller. (Euvres Philosophiques, Tome 11.1975

ISBN 90-247-1633-0 For (Evres Philosophiques, Tome I see under Volume 58.

71. J.A.G. Tans et H. Schmitz du Moulin: Pasquier Quesnel devant la Congregation de l'lndex. Correspondance avec Francesco Barberini et memoires sur la mise a l'Index de son edition des (Euvres de Saint Leon, publies avec introduction et annotations. 1974 ISBN 90-247-1661-6

72. J.W. Carven: Napoleon and the Lazarists (1804-1809). 1974 ISBN 90-247-1667-5 73. G. Symcox: The Crisis of French Sea Power (1688-1697). From the Guerre

d'Escadre to the Guerre de Course. 1974 ISBN 90-247-1645-4 74. R. MacGillivray: Restoration Historians and the English Civil War. 1974

ISBN 90-247-1678-0 75. A. Soman (ed.): The Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Reappraisals and Documents.

1974 ISBN 90-247-1652-7 76. R.E. Wanner: Claude Fleury (1640-1723) as an Educational Historiographer and

Thinker. With an Introduction by W.W. Brickman. 1975 ISBN 90-247-1684-5 77. R.T. Carroll: The Common-Sense Philosophy of Religion of Bishop Edward Stil-

lingfleet (1635-1699).1975 ISBN 90-247-1647-0 78. J. Macary: Masque et lumieres au 1se [siecle). Andre-Fran¥ois Deslandes, Citoyen et

philosophe (1689-1757).1975 ISBN 90-247-1698-5 79. S.M. Mason: Montesquieu's Idea of Justice. 1975 ISBN 90-247-1670-5 80. DJ.H. van Elden: Esprits fins et esprits geometriques dans les portraits de Saint

Simon. Contributions a l'etude du vocabulaire et du style. 1975 ISBN 90-247-1726-4 81. I. Primer (ed.): Mandeville Studies. New Explorations in the Art and Thought of Dr

Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733). 1975 ISBN 90-247-1686-1 82. C.G. Norefia: Studies in Spanish Renaissance Thought. 1975 ISBN 90-247-1727-2 83. G. Wilson: A Medievalist in the 18th Century. Le Grand d' Aussy and the Fabliaux ou

Contes.1975 ISBN 90-247-1782-5 84. J.-R. Armogathe: Theologia Cartesiana. L'explication physique de I'Eucharistie chez

Descartes et Dom Robert Desgabets. 1977 ISBN 90-247-1869-4



85. Berault Stuart, Seigneur d'Aubigny: Traite sur l'art de la guerre. Introduction et edition par Elie de Comminges. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1871-6

86. S.L. Kaplan: Bread, Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV. 2 vols., 1976 Set ISBN 90-247-1873-2

87. M. Lienhard (ed.): The Origins and Characteristics of Anabaptism / Les debuts et les caracteristiques de l'Anabaptisme. With an Extensive Bibliography / Avec une bibliographie detaillee. 1977 ISBN 90-247-1896-1

88. R. Descartes: Regles utiles et claires pour la direction de l' esprit en la recherche de la verite. Traduction selon Ie lexique cartesien, et annotation conceptuelle par l.-L. Marion. Avec des notes mathematiques de P. Costabel. 1977 ISBN 90-247-1907-0

89. K. Hardesty: The 'Supplement' to the 'Encyclopedie'. [Diderot et d'Alembert]. 1977 ISBN 90-247-1965-8

90. H.B. White: Antiquity Forgot. Essays on Shakespeare, [Francis] Bacon, and Rem-brandt. 1978 ISBN 90-247-1971-2

91. P.B.M. Blaas: Continuity and Anachronism. Parliamentary and Constitutional Development in Whig Historiography and in the Anti-Whig Reaction between 1890 and 1930. 1978 ISBN 90-247-2063-X

92. S.L. Kaplan (ed.): La Bagarre. Ferdinando Galiani's (1728-1787) 'Lost' Parody. With an Introduction by the Editor. 1979 ISBN 90-247-2125-3

93. E. McNiven Hine: A Critical Study of [Etienne Bonnot de] Condillac's [1714-1780]

'Traite des Systemes'. 1979 ISBN 90-247-2120-2 94. M.R.G. Spiller: Concerning Natural Experimental Philosphy. Meric Casaubon [1599-

1671] and the Royal Society. 1980 ISBN 90-247-2414-7 95. F. Duchesneau: La physiologie des Lumieres. Empirisme, modeles et theories. 1982

ISBN 90-247-2500-3 96. M. Heyd: Between Orthodoxy and the Enlightenment. lean-Robert Chouet [1642-

1731] and the Introduction of Cartesian Science in the Academy of Geneva. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2508-9

97. lames O'Higgins: Yves de Vallone [166617-1705]: The Making of an Esprit Fort. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2520-8

98. M.L. Kuntz: Guillaume Postel [1510-1581]. Prophet of the Restitution of All Things. His Life and Thought. 1981 ISBN 90-247-2523-2

99. A. Rosenberg: Nicolas Gueudeville and His Work (1652-1727).1982 ISBN 90-247-2533-X

100. S.L. laki: Uneasy Genius: The Life and Work of Pierre Duhem [1861-1916]. 1984 ISBN 90-247-2897-5; Pb (1987) 90-247-3532-7

101. Anne Conway [1631-1679]: The Principles of the Most Ancient Modern Philosophy. Edited and with an Introduction by P. Loptson. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2671-9

102. E.C. Patterson: [Mrs.) Mary [Fairfax Greig] Sommerville [1780-1872] and the Cultivation of Science (J 815-1840). 1983 ISBN 90-247-2823-1

103. C.1. Berry: Hume, Hegel and Human Nature. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2682-4 104. C.l. Betts: Early Deism in France. From the so-called 'deistes' of Lyon (1564) to

Voltaire's 'Lettres philosophiques' (1734). 1984 ISBN 90-247-2923-8



105. R. Gascoigne: Religion, Rationality and Community. Sacred and Secular in the Thought of Hegel and His Critics. 1985 ISBN 90-247-2992-0

106. S. Tweyman: Scepticism and Belief in Hume's 'Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion'. 1986 ISBN 90-247-3090-2

107. G. Cerny: Theology, Politics and Letters at the Crossroads of European Civilization. Jacques Basnage [1653-1723] and the Baylean Huguenot Refugees in the Dutch Republic. 1987 ISBN 90-247-3150-X

108. Spinoza's Algebraic Calculation of the Rainbow & Calculation of Changes. Edited and Translated from Dutch, with an Introduction, Explanatory Notes and an Appendix by M.1. Petry. 1985 ISBN 90-247-3149-6

109. R.G. McRae: Philosophy and the Absolute. The Modes of Hegel's Speculation. 1985 ISBN 90-247-3151-8

110. J.D. North and J.1. Roche (eds.): The Light of Nature. Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science presented to A.C. Crombie. 1985 ISBN 90-247-3165-8

111. C. Walton and P.J. Johnson (eds.): (Thomas] Hobbes's 'Science of Natural Justice'. 1987 ISBN 90-247-3226-3

112. B.W. Head: Ideology and Social Science. Destutt de Tracy and French Liberalism. 1985 ISBN 90-247-3228-X

113. A.Th. Peperzak:: Philosophy and Politics. A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel's Philosophy of Right. 1987 ISBN Hb 90-247-3337-5; Pb ISBN 90-247-3338-3

114. S. Pines and Y. Yovel (eds.): Maimonides [1135-1204) and Philosophy. Papers Presented at the 6th Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter (May 1985). 1986

ISBN 90-247-3439-8 115. T.J. Saxby: The Questfor the New Jerusalem, Jean de Labadie [1610-1674) and the

Labadists (1610-1744). 1987 ISBN 90-247-3485-1 116. C.E. Harline: Pamphlets, Printing, and Political Culture in the Early Dutch Republic.

1987 ISBN 90-247-3511-4 117. R.A. Watson and J.E. Force (eds.): The Sceptical Mode in Modern Philosophy. Essays

in Honor of Richard H. Popkin. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3584-X 118. R.T. Bienvenu and M. Feingold (eds.): In the Presence of the Past. Essays in Honor of

Frank Manuel. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1008-X 119. J. van den Berg and E.G.E. van der Wall (eds.): Jewish-Christian Relations in the

17th Century. Studies and Documents. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3617-X 120. N. Waszek: The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Account of 'Civil Society'. 1988

ISBN 90-247-3596-3 121. J. Walker (ed.): Thought and Faith in the Philosophy of Hegel. 1991

ISBN 0-7923-1234-1 122. Henry More [1614-1687]: The Immortality of the Soul. Edited with Introduction and

Notes by A. Jacob. 1987 ISBN 90-247-3512-2 123. P.B. Scheurer and G. Debrock (eds.): Newton's Scientific and Philosophical Legacy.

1988 ISBN 90-247-3723-0 124. D.R. Kelley and R.H. Popkin (eds.): The Shapes of Knowledge from the Renaissance

to the Enlightenment. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1259-7



125. R.M. Golden (ed.): The Huguenot Connection. The Edict of Nantes, Its Revocation, and Early French Migration to South Carolina. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3645-5

126. S. Lindroth: Les chemins du savoir en Suede. De la fondation de I'Universite d'Upsal a Jacob Berzelius. Etudes et Portraits. Traduit du suedois, presente et annote par J.-F. Battail. Avec une introduction sur Sten Lindroth par G. Eriksson. 1988

ISBN 90-247-3579-3 127. S. Hutton (ed.): Henry More (1614-1687). Tercentenary Studies. With a Biography

and Bibliography by R. Crocker. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0095-5 128. Y. Yovel (ed.): Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered. Papers Presented at the 7th

Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter (December 1986). 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0405-5 129. J.E. Force and R.H. Popkin: Essays on the Context, Nature, and Influence of Isaac

Newton's Theology. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0583-3 130. N. Capaldi and D.W. Livingston (eds.): Liberty in Hume's 'History of England'. 1990

ISBN 0-7923-0650-3 131. W. Brand: Hume's Theory ofMoralludgment. A Study in the Unity of A Treatise of

Human Nature. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1415-8 132. C.E. Harline (ed.): The Rhyme and Reason of Politics in Early Modern Europe.

Collected Essays of Herbert H. Rowen. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1527-8 133. N. Malebranche: Treatise on Ethics (1684). Translated and edited by C. Walton. 1993

ISBN 0-7923-1763-7 134. B.C. Southgate: 'Covetous of Truth'. The Life and Work of Thomas White

(1593-1676).1993 ISBN 0-7923-1926-5 135. G. Santinello, C.W.T. Blackwell and Ph. Weller (eds.): Models of the History of

Philosophy. Vol. 1: From its Origins in the Renaissance to the 'Historia Philosphica'. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-2200-2

136. M.J. Petry (ed.): Hegel and Newtonianism. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-2202-9 137. Otto von Guericke: The New (so-called Magdeburg) Experiments [Experimenta Nova,

Amsterdam 1672]. Translated and edited by M.G.Foley Ames. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2399-8

138. R.H. Popkin and G.M"Weiner (eds.): Jewish Christians and Cristian Jews. From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2452-8

139. J.E. Force and R.H. Popkin (eds.): The Books of Nature and Scripture. Recent Essays on Natural Philosophy, Theology, and Biblical Criticism in the Netherlands of Spinoza's Time and the British Isles of Newton's Time. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2467-6

140. P. Rattansi and A. Clericuzio (eds.): Alchemy and Chemistry in the 16th and 17th Centuries. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2573-7

141. S. Jayne: Plato in Renaissance England. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3060-9 142. A.P. Coudert: Leibniz and the Kabbalah. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3114-1 143. M.H. Hoftbeimer: Eduard Gans and the Hegelian Philosophy of Law. 1995

ISBN 0-7923-3114-1 144. J.R.M. Neto: The Christianization of Pyrrhonism. Scepticism and Faith in Pascal,

Kierkegaard, and Shestov. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3381-0 145. R.H. Popkin (ed.): Scepticism in the History of Philosophy. A Pan-American

Dialogue. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3769-7



146. M. de Baar, M. LOwensteyn, M. Monteiro and A.A. Sneller (eds.): Choosing the Better Part. Anna Maria van Schurman (1607-1678).1995 ISBN 0-7923-3799-9

147. M. Degenaar: Molyneux's Problem. Three Centuries of Discussion on the Perception of Forms. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3934-7

148. S. Berti, F. Charles-Daubert and R.H. Popkin (eds.): Heterodoxy, Spinozism, and Free Thought in Early-Eighteenth-Century Europe. Studies on the Traite des trois imposteurs.1996 ISBN 0-7923-4192-9

149. G.K. Browning (ed.): Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Reappraisal. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4480-4

150. G.A.J. Rogers, J.M. Vienne and Y.C. Zarka (eds.): The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context. Politics, Metaphysics and Religion. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4530-4

151. R.L. Williams: The Letters of Dominique Chau, Botanist-Cure. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4615-7

152. R.H. Popkin, E. de Olaso and G. Tonelli (eds.): Scepticism in the Enlightenment. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4643-2

153. L. de la Forge. Translated and edited by D.M. Clarke: Treatise on the Human Mind (1664). 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4778-1

154. S.P. Foster: Melancholy Duty. The Hume-Gibbon Attack on Christianity. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4785-4

155. P. Ferretti: A Russian Advocate of Peace: Vasilii Malinovskii (1765-1814). 1998 ISBN 0-7923-4848-6

156. J. van der Zande and R.H. Popkins (ed8.): The Skeptical Tradition around 1800. Skepticism in Philosophy, Science, and Society. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-4846-X

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBUSHERS - OORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON