sarkozy, the mediterranean and the arab spring

This article was downloaded by: [University of Limerick]On: 12 May 2013, At: 21:05Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

Contemporary French andFrancophone StudiesPublication details, including instructions for authorsand subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gsit20

Sarkozy, the Mediterranean andthe Arab SpringJean-Robert HenryPublished online: 11 Apr 2012.

To cite this article: Jean-Robert Henry (2012): Sarkozy, the Mediterranean and the ArabSpring, Contemporary French and Francophone Studies, 16:3, 405-415

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17409292.2012.675664

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expresslyforbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make anyrepresentation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up todate. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should beindependently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liablefor any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damageswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connectionwith or arising out of the use of this material.

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gsit20

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17409292.2012.675664

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Contemporary French and Francophone StudiesVol. 16, No. 3, June 2012, 405–415

SARKOZY, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND

THE ARAB SPRING

Jean-Robert Henry

ABSTRACT For Nicolas Sarkozy, the relationship between France and the Mediterraneanhas been a dominant diplomatic and personal concern. Nevertheless, there is no obviouslink between the early Mediterranean initiative which he announced in 2007, leading in2008 to the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean, and official French reactionsin 2011 to the unfolding events of the Arab Spring as the president was entering the finalyear of his term of office. During the intervening years, French projects lost momentumand Euro-Mediterranean relations were reduced to their simplest form. Despite theseemingly different rationales for these two contrasting sets of actions, it is still possible toidentify common features that can inform our understanding of the constants and variablesaffecting French Mediterranean policy and, with it, that of Europe.

Keywords: Sarkozy; France; Mediterranean; Arab Spring; Barcelona Process; Maghreb.

For Nicolas Sarkozy, the relationship between France and the Mediterraneanhas been such a dominant diplomatic and personal concern that we cangenuinely suggest that there is such a thing as Sarkozy’s Mediterranean policy.Nevertheless, in reviewing this policy, there is no obvious link between the earlyMediterranean initiative of 2007 which in 2008 led to the creation of the Unionfor the Mediterranean and official French reactions in 2011 to the unfoldingevents of the Arab Spring as the president was entering the final year of his termof office. During the intervening years, French projects lost momentum andEuro-Mediterranean relations were reduced to their simplest form. Despite the

ISSN 1740-9292 (print)/ISSN 1740-9306 (online)/12/030405–11 � 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17409292.2012.675664

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

imer

ick]

at 2

1:05

12

May

201

3

seemingly different rationales for these two contrasting sets of actions, it is stillpossible to identify common features that can inform our understanding of theconstants and variables affecting French Mediterranean policy and, with it, thatof Europe.

The 2007 Mediterranean initiative

On 7 February 2007 in Toulon, with his presidential campaign in full swing,Nicolas Sarkozy outlined his project for a Mediterranean Union to an audienceof rapatries (former settlers from the French North African colonies). The Unionwould, he said, be the major French diplomatic initiative of his presidency.Its official aim was to breathe fresh life into relations between Europe and itssouthern neighbors while enhancing France’s own Mediterranean policy.

Although Sarkozy’s campaign foregrounded the concept of a rupture (breakwith the past), the Toulon speech was only the most recent in a series ofattempts to revive the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or Barcelona Process,begun in 1995. Its gradual loss of momentum had been highlighted by the failureof the 2005 summit marking the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration.Europe’s Mediterranean policy makers—particularly those in France—had losthope that the process could be revived and had begun to look elsewhere for away past the dysfunctions of this partnership. Since 2001, the five Europeancoastal states of the Western Mediterranean had revived the ‘‘5þ 5 Dialogue,’’partnering with the five countries of the Maghreb, emphasizing the sharedeconomic and cultural interests of a sub-region that had been spared the conflictsof the Middle East (Chevalier and Pastre 2003). Careful not to enter into directcompetition with the Barcelona Process, they took some pride in havingcontrived to hold a summit of heads of state and government in Tunis inDecember 2003 and on having improved cooperation in areas such as defensewhere Barcelona had not been able to gain a foothold.

Other French attempts to compensate for Barcelona’s failings had beenmade towards the end of Jacques Chirac’s presidency. In particular, a fruitless‘‘re-launch’’ of the Euro-Arab Dialogue in April 20061 was followed by a short-lived push to strengthen the Franco-Maghrebi partnership in March 2007.Despite the lack of coordination, such moves are evidence of the abiding interestin the Mediterranean that characterizes French foreign policy. This interestfeatured more prominently in the right’s presidential campaign than that of theleft, with the socialist candidate Segolene Royal observing a prudent silenceon the subject, despite Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s open support for an extensionof Europe’s southern borders.

From Sarkozy’s Toulon speech onwards, the proposed ‘‘MediterraneanUnion’’ dominated the debate. The promotional materials put together by HenriGuaino, the president’s special adviser, and a former head of France’s long-term

406 C O N T E M P O R A R Y F R E N C H A N D F R A N C O P H O N E S T U D I E S

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

imer

ick]

at 2

1:05

12

May

201

3

economic strategy unit, drew on the writings of Braudel, Valery, and Camus.Taking the view that ‘‘the future of Europe will be played out in theMediterranean,’’ he developed a vision of a Mediterranean Union constructedalong the same lines as the European Union. But it quickly became obvious thatone major motive for the proposal lay in the need to provide Turkey, whosepossible membership of the European Union was opposed by Sarkozy, with aplace in the region’s power structures. Equally, its apparent generosity becamemore nuanced once its objectives emerged. The Mediterranean Union wasto have four priorities: to control and manage immigration, to protect theenvironment, to promote co-development, and to fight against corruption,organized crime, and terrorism. Overall, security concerns appeared to be thedriving force.

In both its objectives and ambiguities, the idea of a Mediterranean Unionresembled the ‘‘Mediterranean community’’ advocated by advisers on the leftwho proposed a benevolent and peaceful form of sub-regionalism on Europe’ssouthern marches that would complement the European project but would havemore limited powers and would not compete with it. Meanwhile, the need toconstruct ‘‘a zone of peace, security and prosperity shared by the peoples of theMediterranean’’ had also been expressed on the right in May 2005 by MichelBarnier, Minister of Foreign Affairs and a close associate of Chirac (Barnier2005). At the time there was thus a degree of political consensus in France onthis matter. Moreover, the concept of a Mediterranean Union appeared to drawand expand on previous more modest attempts to organize relations betweenthe northern and southern coastal states of the Mediterranean, such as the 5þ 5Dialogue and the eleven-member Mediterranean Forum, also known as theFranco-Egyptian Forum (Hayete 2000). There was talk of bringing the twogroups together in a ‘‘6þ 6’’ that would include Greece and Egypt. Presentingno challenge to European rules, this ‘‘strengthened cooperation’’ on Europe’sfrontiers would probably have been endorsed without question had Sarkozy’sMediterranean initiative been conducted in a less ostentatious way.

Instead, the new president used his election-night speech in May 2007 tosend out a formal call to countries on the other side of the Mediterraneanto support his plan for a Mediterranean Union. He presented it as both the‘‘new face of France’s policy towards the Arab world’’ and an innovative visionfor the organization of the Mediterranean. By July 2007, he was in the Maghrebto promote his project. However, his reception there was disappointing andequivocal. In Europe, Italy and Spain expressed polite interest in the project,but the irritation of other European partners, including Germany, soon madeitself felt. These reservations explain the series of revisions to the initiative madein the president’s speech to the Paris ambassadors on 27 August, in his speechin Tangiers in November 2007 and during the Rome talks with his Italian andSpanish counterparts at the end of December, before a final Franco-Germancompromise was approved by the Council of Europe in March 2008.

S A R K O Z Y , T H E M E D I T E R R A N E A N A N D T H E A R A B S P R I N G 4 0 7

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

imer

ick]

at 2

1:05

12

May

201

3

In his speech to the ambassadors, Sarkozy slightly shifted his position onTurkey’s membership of Europe. While stopping short of outright rejection,he nevertheless made approval subject to the findings of a European working-party on the limits of Europe. He also introduced a new element to his plan for a‘‘dialogue of cultures.’’ To meet the ‘‘challenge’’ of the ‘‘confrontation betweenIslam and the West,’’ he not only offered the Union as a means to create a closerrelationship but also proposed aid to ‘‘Muslim countries’’ for the developmentof nuclear domestic power, obviously with France’s help. At the same time, herestated his commitment to Israel’s security. These changes were not enoughto dispel the reservations of his European partners. Angela Merkel publiclyexpressed her regret at the emergence of a project which competed with thatof Europe, and refused to accept any reduction in Germany’s involvement in theMediterranean. Meanwhile, Madrid was calling for a ‘‘Barcelona plus.’’

Sarkozy took some account of these objections in his Tangiers speech on23 October. He now focused on the ‘‘pragmatic’’ aspects of the plan, which wasconceived as a flexibly constructed ‘‘union of projects’’ decided on the basis ofco-development. He agreed that the European Commission should be fullyassociated with the Mediterranean Union, but proposed that non-coastal statesshould only have observer status.

On 20 December 2007, a few days after Gaddafi’s lavish state visit to Paris,a summit in Rome brought the leaders of France, Italy and Spain together tofind a way to reconcile the French plan with European objections. The ‘‘RomeDeclaration’’ was agreed, stating that the Union for the Mediterranean ‘‘wouldhave the remit of reuniting Europe and Africa around the countries borderingthe Mediterranean’’ (Ambassade de France). Proposed by the Spanish, theambiguous formulation of a ‘‘Union for the Mediterranean’’ (UfM) wouldeventually be unanimously endorsed at the European Council meeting of 13and 14 March 2008 and placed under the umbrella of the Barcelona Processin the official communique (European Commission ‘‘Barcelona’’). The idea of aMediterranean Union had had its day, reabsorbed into the Euro-Mediterraneanprocess. The only surviving political feature of Sarkozy’s project was the jointpresidency of the new union, shared by one northern and one southern coastalstate.

But Sarkozy’s diplomatic efforts were not over. He planned to use theFrench presidency of Europe to impose his own interpretation on the stillsketchy structure of the Union for the Mediterranean and to ensure that Frenchinterests were upheld. The Parisian summit on the Mediterranean held on13 July 2008, the eve of Bastille Day, involved a display that was national, notEuropean, in character. The controversial invitation of the Syrian presidentto these celebrations was perceived as the expression of a desire to shake offEuropean expectations and values. This French voluntarism was confirmed a fewmonths later in Marseille at the Euro-Mediterranean conference of foreignministers on 3 and 4 November 2008. The French worked hard to find a way for


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

imer

ick]

at 2

1:05

12

May

201

3

Arab and Israeli representatives to share membership of the UfM and to bringthe Arab League back into the Euro-Mediterranean process. France won theco-presidency of the UfM with Egypt but lost out in its bid to provide a homefor the general secretariat, which went to Spain. But France’s greatest failurelay in its inability to avert the Gaza crisis which would, a few weeks later, leavethe new organization in a deep coma before it had even taken its first steps.All the evidence suggests that the French president had been informed of theimminence of the military offensive by the Israeli foreign minister in Paris inDecember 2008. He was therefore justly suspected, along with other Europeanofficials, of behaving duplicitously on Israel’s behalf. This in turn may be seen asa symptom of Europe’s inability to face up to the Israeli-Palestinian problem.

At home, too, the results of the first phase of Sarkozy’s Mediterraneanpolicy, from 2007 to 2008, were negative if not disastrous. His great‘‘Mediterranean ambition’’ had ended in a global ‘‘freeze’’ on partnershipprojects. Even the scaled-down political scheme of ‘‘concrete’’ projects (water,transport, energy, education) was not altogether successful and its executionwas certainly deserving of the criticisms leveled at it. A lack of coherence andtoo much improvisation and spin discredited the initiative, damaged Francein the eyes of the world and aroused the opposition of the French diplomaticservice (such as the members of the Marly group), which had been kept at arm’slength by the Elysee. French policy makers, including first and foremost thepresident, were the prisoners of a hastily-conceived proposal in which nothought had been given to its contradictions. First, it created an oppositionalrelationship between the Mediterranean and Europe when the intention hadbeen, on the contrary, to find a way to increase common ground between them.Surprise was also felt that the French should claim membership of both Europeand the Mediterranean while denying Turkey similar status. Likewise, thedistribution of power between the two unions had not been properlyconsidered, while a further contradiction resulted from the gap between theidealism of the language used and the modesty or even cynicism of the actualproposals. In practice, the rhetoric on the Mediterranean served nationalsecurity objectives. The project of the Mediterranean Union drew on theEuropean model but ignored its human side; the intention was never to turn theMediterranean into a shared social space along European lines. On the contrary,the Pact on Immigration and Asylum adopted under the French presidency inthe second semester of 2008 was highly restrictive.

A final criticism directed at the rhetoric of the Mediterranean has been thatit was designed to conceal a pro-Atlantic bias in French policy, sacrificing deGaulle’s work in this region for an illusory special relationship with the UnitedStates.2 From the earliest months of Sarkozy’s presidency, we see a number ofsigns of this shift. For example, the repeated specific condemnations of theIranian nuclear threat were a departure from France’s traditional stance in favorof a total ‘‘denuclearization’’ of the Middle East. Meanwhile, no reference was


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

imer

ick]

at 2

1:05

12

May

201

3

made to Israel’s nuclear capacity; there were merely renewed expressionsof support for the latter’s security, barely tempered by criticism of Israelisettlements in the occupied territories. Later, France would distance itself to acertain extent from George Bush’s foreign policy, and would use its presidencyof the European Union, the G8 and the G20 to restore some prominence andluster to its international strategy. But a fundamentally pro-Western opticremains one of the hallmarks of Sarkozy’s presidency.

The freeze in Euro-Mediterranean relations and the challengeof the Arab Spring

The difficulties encountered in setting up the UfM and uncertainty as to howit fitted with the Barcelona Process led in 2009 and 2010 to a general paralysisin Euro-Mediterranean relations. Neither the old structure of the Partnershipnor the new UfM system really worked. Each of the European presidenciesin turn found it impossible to arrange a conference of Euro-Mediterraneanforeign ministers. Hopes had been riding on the Spanish and Belgian presidenciesin 2010 to find a way out of the stalemate. But all they achieved was to arrangea few meetings on technical matters. The UfM secretariat was successfully set upin Barcelona and a Jordanian secretary general was appointed (against the wishesof the French). He would resign in January 2011 after taking stock of his lackof power. This paralysis of Euro-Mediterranean relations was all the morenoticeable for the contrast it presented with the goodwill extended to Muslimcountries and peoples by president Obama in his speech of 4 June 2009 at CairoUniversity. Sadly, this indication of change in American policy would also failto live up to its promise.

Even in Paris, the Mediterranean ceased to be a focus of activity at this time,as is demonstrated by the minimal attention paid to it in the president’s speechesto the ambassadors of 26 August 2009 and 25 August 2010, each simply makinga commitment to a summit of the Union for the Mediterranean in the nearfuture. Like the June 2010 Barcelona summit during the Spanish presidency ofEurope, these summits did not materialize. It is true that, in November 2008,the Elysee did appoint Henri Guaino to lead an Inter-Ministerial Mission for theMediterranean with the support of a small team of specialists. Other than this,French Mediterranean policy confined itself during this period to maintainingbilateral relationships. Like all its European partners, Sarkozy’s France would betaken by surprise by the Arab Spring.

The revolutions and hopes that animated Arab societies from December2010 onwards intensified the crisis in Euro-Mediterranean relations. Two yearsafter the UfM was put on ice, the Arab Spring seems to have dealt thePartnership its final blow, as the Union found itself unable to generateany assistance from Europe for the transformations occurring on its borders.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

imer

ick]

at 2

1:05

12

May

201

3

Euro-Mediterranean institutions had become so insignificant that the resigna-tions of successive secretary generals of the UfM in January and December 2011went unnoticed. Only a few French officials still dared to claim, against theevidence, that the UfM provided Europe with the right vehicle to meet thechallenges arising from the turmoil in the South. Sarkozy would again do soin his speech to the ambassadors of 31 August 2011. But, in practice, hisapproach was more national than European.

The European Commission attempted to provide a more focused response.In a preparatory document published three days before the emergency Europeansummit on Libya of 11 March 2011, it recognized that ‘‘the radically changingpolitical landscape’’ of the region required a ‘‘qualitative step forward’’ inEurope’s relationship with its southern neighbors. It called for a new approachbased on shared values, describing this as a ‘‘partnership for democracy andshared prosperity’’ (European Commission ‘‘A Partnership’’ 1–2). Its immediateobjectives were to support democratic reforms and strengthen cooperation withthe people of the region, including an increase in the mobility of individuals.But the practical proposals were modest in scope.

A change of strategy was all the more necessary because the uprisings haddeprived Europe of its usual interlocutors in the region. Links with the newauthorities had to be gradually forged and a shared language and commonobjectives had to be identified. The promises of aid made by the G8 to Tunisiaand Egypt in June 2011 at Sarkozy’s instigation also remain to be finalized.

Moreover, the way in which member states seemingly echoed the EuropeanCommission’s analyses and recommendations leaves one wondering who wouldlend much credence to the noble sentiments of such messages. Populist speechesagainst immigration or Islam had never been so strong in most Europeancountries, to the point where greater stress was placed on the (relatively minor)threat of a wave of immigration across Europe than on the need to re-think thefuture of the region in the light of changes in the south.

The French response to the Arab Spring has not been easy to follow.It began very badly with Tunisia, despite the fact that it is France’s most obviouspolitical and cultural ally in the region and is the country most likely to promoteunderstanding of the new expectations of its people. It was after all in Frenchthat the latter chose to tell its rulers (whose corruption and aberrantsecurity measures were widely known in France): ‘‘Degage’’ (clear off). But theFrench government was not up to the challenge. The attitude of ForeignMinister Michelle Alliot-Marie was scandalous both politically (offering French‘‘policing expertise’’ in support of the embattled regime) and personally(taking time to deal with a family investment on her visit to Tunis in December2010). The many deals struck with the old Tunisian regime continue to workagainst a rapprochement between the two countries, despite the Tunisianpassion for things French and the minister’s resignation. With Egypt, theFrench government’s failure was less spectacular. It largely took the form of a


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

imer

ick]

at 2

1:05

12

May

201

3

wait-and-see approach to the instability caused by the removal of presidentMubarak who, as co-president of the UfM, was one of the main supporters ofSarkozy’s Mediterranean project.

Sarkozy aimed to compensate for the inadequacies of his foreign policy inTunisia and Egypt with strong action in Libya. On the advice of the philosopherBernard-Henri Levy, he was the first to receive and recognize Gaddafi’sopponents. Having failed to secure European support, he obtained that of theArab League and this was followed by the Security Council resolution(negotiated by Alain Juppe) to establish a no-fly zone over Libya to ‘‘protect thecivilian population’’ threatened by forces loyal to Gaddafi. The intervention,launched as Benghazi was about to fall and placed under the control of NATO,lasted from March to October 2011, ending with the death of Colonel Gaddafi.Whatever our views on the latter’s death, we may find French involvement in itsomewhat surprising given his extravagant reception in Paris just three yearsearlier. Shortly thereafter, Sarkozy was welcomed in Tripoli.

Although the intervention in Libya might appear to have been aMediterranean success for France, the most high-profile of this presidency,it was not entirely without its problems. Because the limited objectives set bythe Security Council were ignored—to the point of interference in internalaffairs—many countries (not only Russia and China but also a number of Arabcountries such as Algeria) greeted it with reservations or mistrust. Moreover,there is no certainty that France will reap all its hoped-for economic rewards;contracts for reconstruction have been won by countries that distancedthemselves from the military operation. Last, there were frictions over theconduct of French foreign policy between Sarkozy and his more or less privateadvisers, and the new foreign minister, Alain Juppe, who had accepted the poston condition that he would be fully involved in policy. He had even set newguidelines for French diplomacy, inviting it to ‘‘change its view of the Arabworld’’ and to abandon its complicity with corrupt and authoritarian rulers,entering instead into an expanded dialogue with civil society that would include‘‘Islamic traditions of thought’’ (Le Monde).

This was the spirit in which the foreign minister approached the questionof Syria, bringing French diplomatic support to the demands of those opposed tothe regime of Bachar al-Assad. He also worked for Palestine’s acceptance as afull member of the UN, perhaps as a counter-balance to Sarkozy’s generallypro-Israeli policies. But he was unable to avert bad blood with Turkey over theadoption (with the Elysee’s encouragement) in January 2012 of a law punishingthe denial of the Armenian genocide. He instead merely expressed regret at thelaw’s poor timing and the ill-tempered polemics it had aroused in France andTurkey. Here again we see France’s continued difficulties under this presidency inestablishing a comfortable relationship with Turkey. The latter is nevertheless arising regional power and France, as another regional power, would greatly gainfrom a collaborative relationship such as existed in the past. But rivalry appears to


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

imer

ick]

at 2

1:05

12

May

201

3

have prevailed: Sarkozy’s France does not hide its suspicion of Islam and its fear ofimmigration, while Turkey now exports its moderate Islamic political model tothe new regimes in the Arab world. The struggle between the two for influence isplain in Tunisia, and Turkey is currently gaining the upper hand.

Conclusion

This rapid overview of the twists and turns of Sarkozy’s Mediterranean policyshows it to be disappointing in every respect, largely as a consequence of hismodus operandi, which has remained unchanged throughout:

1. President Sarkozy apparently has no personal vision of trans-Mediterraneanrelationships; he relies on the analysis and opinions of official or informaladvisers whose public discussions of Mediterranean relations have occupieda prominent place in the media. Furthermore, his experience of the Arabworld is limited, although he has established strong personal ties with theEmir of Qatar who is today the chief supporter of his policies in this region.

2. He nevertheless takes an authoritarian view of his role and, like de Gaulle,considers international relations to be the president’s private preserve.More than in any other presidency, and without de Gaulle’s close contactswith his foreign ministry, decisions on foreign policy have been taken at theElysee (in consultation with its secretary general, a diplomatic adviser and aspecial adviser). This should guarantee cohesion, but tends to leaveresponsibility for mistakes and shifts in policy with the president. ThusSarkozy comes across as an inconsistent authoritarian.

3. The appropriation of international policy in general and Mediterraneanpolicy in particular by the Elysee has been to the detriment of the foreignminister, whose role was reduced to naught during the first four years of thepresidency (under Kouchner and Alliot-Marie) before Alain Juppe took upthe post at the beginning of 2011. But he too has found it hard to establishhis authority.

4. Sarkozy likes to grasp tactical opportunities to promote his policies and,above all, his international profile on which the image he cultivates at homeand his ability to retain power partly depend. He reacts quickly and is fondof coups (bold strokes) (as in Libya) and bullying tactics. But his proactiveapproach to foreign affairs sometimes comes close to aimless freneticism.And the foreign-policy media show can have adverse effects: it intensifiesmisunderstandings between states and is unable to exploit diplomaticresources and protocols to reduce tensions and differences.

5. A disturbing aspect of the new French Mediterranean policy is the excessiveimpact of internal political issues and their consequences on internationalrelations. Sarkozy’s populist vote-winning speeches against immigration and


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

imer

ick]

at 2

1:05

12

May

201

3

Islam have introduced an ideological turn to this policy. His description ofthe ‘‘confrontation between Islam and the West’’ as the ‘‘major challenge’’ ofcurrent international politics is a new departure in French presidentialdiscourse. His predecessors have always been careful to remain aloof fromconflicts in the Mediterranean and to avoid the trap of cultural determinism.They have sought to preserve an alternative voice for France on theseconflicts which has been appreciated by their southern partners. In contrastto 2003, the new French Mediterranean policy runs the risk of consolidatinganti-Western feeling among Arab peoples who have recently undergone achange of regime.

Faced with the misadventures of Sarkozy’s Mediterranean policies, it is highlytempting to point to the improvisations, voluntarism, media excesses andexhibitionism of their prime mover. But such failings are only those of Europe’sMediterranean policy writ large, a caricature of the impossibility of realistic,lucid, and generous long-term thinking on its relationship with the south.Moreover, Europe’s pusillanimity in the face of the Middle-Eastern conflict isself-defeating and has produced paralysis in Euro-Mediterranean relations.

A final European lesson is that the disappointments of French policy inthe Mediterranean illustrate the impossibility of conducting a nationalMediterranean policy from within Europe. Nevertheless, a way needs to befound to build complementary national policies. How can the various resourcesand approaches relating to the Mediterranean that are available among memberstates and other European bodies be brought to serve the common interest?How can we harness the diversity of individual Mediterranean relationshipsbetween north and south to create a shared policy? This challenge to Europeangovernments has yet to be answered.

Translated by Teresa Bridgeman

Notes

1 First set up in 1974, the Euro-Arab Dialogue was a system of consultationsbetween the EU and the Arab League intended to explore possibilities forpartnership.

2 Hubert Vedrine had warned against this tendency (Vedrine 2007).

Works Cited

Ambassade de France en Italie. ‘‘Appel de Rome pour l’Union pour la Mediterraneede Nicolas Sarkozy.’’ 5http://www.ambafrance-it.org/spip.php?article27214. Consulted 18 February 2012.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

imer

ick]

at 2

1:05

12

May

201

3

Barnier, Michel. Interview in El Watan. 8 May 2005.Cherigui, Hayete. ‘‘La politique mediterraneenne de la France : un instrument de

leadership dans l’espace regional.’’ Politiques mediterraneennes entre logiquesetatiques et espace civil. Ed. J. R. Henry and G. Groc. Paris: Karthala, 2000.143–175.

Chevalier, Jean-Marie and Olivier Pastre, eds. ‘‘5þ 5’’: L’ambition d’une associationrenforcee. Les Cahiers du Cercle des economistes. 4. December 2003. With PatrickArtus, Jean-Paul Betbeze, Elie Cohen, Christian de Boissieu, Michel Didier,Pierre Jacquet, Jean-Herve Lorenzi, Charles-Albert Michalet, and DanielVitry.

European Commission. ‘‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperitywith the Southern Mediterranean.’’ Joint communication to the EuropeanParliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee andthe Committee of the Regions. 8 March 2011. http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/fule/headlines/news/2011/03/20110308_1_en.htm.Consulted 18 February 2012.

—. ‘‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.’’ Communication fromthe Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. 20 May2008. http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com08_319_en.pdf. Consulted18 February 2012.

Natalie Nougayrede, "Paris veut dialoguer avec les ‘courants islamiques’.’’ Le Monde,19 April 2011.

Vedrine, Hubert. Rapport pour le president de la Republique sur la France etla mondialisation. 4 September 2007. 5http://www.hubertvedrine.net/publication/rapport.pdf4. Consulted 18 February 2012.

John-Robert Henry is Emeritus Director of Research at the Institut d’Etudes sur le

Monde Arabe et Musulman (IREMAM/CNRS), Aix-en-Provence. He is a specialist on

Mediterranean, Euro-Arab and Franco-Algerian studies. His publications include

Politiques mediterraneennes entre logiques etatiques et espace civil (co-edited with

Gerard Groc, 2000), La France et l’Algerie: destins et imaginaires croises (2003),

L’espace euro-maghrebin, L’Annee du Maghreb 2004 (2006), Le debat juridique au

Maghreb, Etudes reunies en l’honneur de Ahmed Mahiou (co-edited with Yadh Ben

Achour and Rostane Mehdi, 2009), and Mediterranean Policies from Above and Below

(co-edited with Isabel Schafer, 2009).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

imer

ick]

at 2

1:05

12

May

201

3

sarkozy, the mediterranean and the arab spring

Documents