SALYUT: Soviet Steps Toward PermanentHuman Presence in Space

December 1983

NTIS order #PB84-181437

Recommended Citation:SALYUT: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space–A Technical Mere-orandum (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-TM-STI-14, December 1983).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 83-600624

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

Foreword

As the other major spacefaring nation, the Soviet Union is a subject of interest tothe American people and Congress in their deliberations concerning the future of U.S.space activities. In the course of an assessment of Civilian Space Stations, the Officeof Technology Assessment (OTA) has undertaken a study of the presence of Sovietsin space and their Salyut space stations, in order to provide Congress with an informedview of Soviet capabilities and intentions.

The major element in this technical memorandum was a workshop held at OTAin December 1982: it was the first occasion when a significant number of experts inthis area of Soviet space activities had met for extended unclassified discussion. As aresult of the workshop, OTA prepared this technical memorandum, “Salyut: SovietSteps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space. ” It has been reviewed extensivelyby workshop participants and others familiar with Soviet space activities.

Also in December 1982, OTA wrote to the U. S. S. R.’s Ambassador to the UnitedStates Anatoliy Dobrynin, requesting any information concerning present and futureSoviet space activities that the Soviet Union judged could be of value to the OTA assess-ment of civilian space stations. The result of this request is appendix A of this technicalmemorandum: “The Soviet Salyut Space Program: Space Station, Spacecraft, Support,and Training Facilities” is an official summary of Salyut space station activities, pro-vided to OTA by Dr. Balayan, Vice-Chairman of the Intercosmos Council of theU. S. S. R. ’s Academy of Sciences. OTA appreciates the cooperation of AmbassadorDobrynin and the Soviet Academy in providing this information. This appendix is ofparticular interest in that such information is seldom provided to American agenciesthrough official Soviet channels.

Appendix B is a paper prepared for OTA by Geoffrey E. Perry, head of the Ketter-ing Group in England. This paper, “Soviet Space Stations: Achievements, Trends, andOutlook, ” provides an independent view of Soviet accomplishments in this area; it isbased, in part, on the Kettering Group’s long-term monitoring of audio communica-tions between the Salyuts and Soviet ground stations.

Those individuals acknowledged in appendix C provided information during thecourse of the study and/or reviewed the draft report.

Director

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OTA Staff for Salyut: Soviet Steps Toward PermanentHuman

William

Presence in Space

John Andelin,Science, Information,

Assistant Director, OTAand Natural Resources Division

Nancy Naismith, Science, Transportation, and Innovation Program Manager

Mills, Science, Transportation, and Innovation Program Manager (until Oct. 1, 1983)

Thomas F. Rogers, Project Director, Civilian Space Stations Assessment

Philip P. Chandler, II, Deputy Project Director, Civilian Space Stations Assessment

Contractors

Leonard David Courtland S. Lewis

Al Peabody Peter Ognibene

Administrative Staff

Marsha Fenn R. Bryan Harrison

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

John Bergling Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joe Henson

Glenda Lawing Linda A. Leahy Cheryl J. Manning

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EARLY SOVIET MANNED SPACEFLIGHT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .PRE-SALYUT SOYUZ SPACE FLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .SALYUT SPACE STATION CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . . .SALYUT ACI’IVITIES, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .FUTURE DIRECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IMPACT ON FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . .CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .POSTSCRIPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .GENERAL REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .APPENDIX A: THE SOVIET SALYUT SPACE

. . . . . . . . . . . .,..,. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .PROGRAM:

SPACECRAFT, SUPPORTAND TRAINING FACILITIES

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .SPACE STATION,. . . . . . . . . . . . . .?...., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX B: SOVIET SPACE STATIONS: ACHIEVEMENTS, TRENDS,AND OUTLOOK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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. . . . . . . .APPENDIX C: OTA WORKSHOP ON SOVIET SPACE STATION ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Photo cradit: Tass

Orbiting complex Salyut 7–Soyuz T-5 (photo taken from Soyuz T-6 on July 2, 1982, from a distance of about 120 m)

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Introduction

A number of citizens of the Soviet Union, andtheir guests from other countries, have visited theEarth’s lower space regime; the Soviet in-orbitspace infrastructure, primarily the Salyut spacestations (or, as the Soviets say, “orbital stations”),has housed and supplied them there, more or lesscontinuously, for over a dozen years. During thisperiod the total number of hours that Soviet cos-monauts have spent in space has overtaken andis now much greater than the corresponding totalfor U.S. astronauts. By all accounts, the Sovietsare more knowledgeable than the United Statesin space biology and medicine; in a number oftechnical areas, notably in the use of automateddocking systems, they routinely use techniquesthat the United States has never demonstrated.It is true, on the other hand, that the Space Shut-tle now gives the United States significantcapabilities that the Soviets do not have, but itis widely believed on the basis of photographicevidence available from unclassified sources thatthe Soviet Union is developing both a small spaceplane and a heavy-lift shuttle expected to be ca-pable of propelling more massive payloads intolow-Earth orbit than can its U.S. counterpart.

The Soviet space station program is the corner-stone of an official policy which looks not onlytoward a permanent Soviet human presence inlow-Earth orbit but also toward permanent Sovietsettlement of their people on the Moon and Mars.The Soviets take quite seriously the possibilitythat large numbers of their citizens will one daylive in space. Although the Soviets do not oftendirectly communicate detailed results of what hasbeen learned by and from the cosmonauts aboardSalyuts, enough information is available to con-clude that they are accomplishing much more thanrudimentary scientific investigations: they are pro-viding the data, information, and experience re-quired to design habitats and equipment whichwill allow individuals to reside for the long-termin space.

The Soviet approach to the development ofspace capabilities differs significantly from theAmerican. Whereas the United States tends to ad-vance from one space capability to the next byquantum leaps, the Soviet Union tends to modifyand adapt technology that is already in hand,

thereby increasing its capability in a seemingly

more evolutionary or progressive fashion. By thusrelying on systems flight-proved in earlier spaceprograms, the Soviets may have been able to re-strain costs and minimize the time spent in de-velopment and construction. The Soviet spaceprogram and the U.S. satellite communicationsindustry are similar in that both allow for theestablishment of gradually evolving spacecraft de-sign, and it may be advisable for the UnitedStates, in other selected areas of space applica-tions, for example, to adopt some form of the So-viet strategy. Already, NASA’s Solar System Ex-ploration Committee (SSEC), emphasizing the im-portance of system heritability, has advocated asimilar approach for planetary science.

The relative merits of automated and humancapabilities for performing work in space or, moreprecisely, the criteria for establishing the optimalmix of the automation and the human presencefor particular tasks, are the subjects of consider-able debate in the United States. Although theamount of time in space that American astronautshave amassed is nontrivial, there is a certain de-gree of unreality about this debate because it can-not yet be grounded in extensive experience. TheSoviet Union, on the other hand, can draw ona much greater fund of experience as they imple-ment plans for integrating human and machinecapabilities for work on future space stations.

Perhaps the most important point to be madehere is that the United States and the Soviet Unionhave cast the issue of humans versus machines indifferent terms. U.S. space policy is to explore andstudy space and to use it for general human ben-efit—and, where appropriate, to involve humanbeings in actual spaceflight. In addition, both theUnited States and the Soviet Union use theirspaceflight programs involving people to enhancetheir national images. Soviet space poIicy, how-ever, goes further; it includes the goal of learn-ing how human beings may reside permanentlyin space, both as an end in itself and as a meansof serving their national purposes. To date, theUnited States has not committed itself to perma-nent human occupancy of space as a nationalgoal.

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Executive Summary

The launching of Sputnik 1 initiated a spacerace that led to the landing of astronauts on theMoon; today the United States and the SovietUnion are well aware of their relative strengthsand weaknesses in space activity. In most areasof space science and space applications—best ex-emplified, respectively, by the Voyager missionsto Jupiter and Saturn, and the burgeoning satellitecommunications industry-the United States,through steady, long-term effort, seems to havegained a substantial lead over the Soviet Union.

In human spaceflight, the picture is less clearbecause the countries have taken quite differentapproaches. In some respects, the activities of thetwo countries in this arena have resembled therace between the tortoise and the hare: while theSoviet effort has featured apparently steady, in-cremental progression along well-defined lines ofdevelopment, the United States has typicallyplayed catchup, using its strong technologicalcapacity to produce space achievements of star-tling virtuosity. Continuing development on bothsides has been fueled by a combination of politi-cal, economic, and military motives, in differentorder of importance at different times.

The divergent approaches of the two countrieshave led to two very different types of currenthuman spaceflight capability. The Soviet Unionhas, since 1971, pursued a more-or-less continuousprogram of development of space stations in low-Earth orbit (LEO). with the sixth Operationalmodel of the Salyut series now flying, Soviet cos-monauts have logged over three times the U.S.total of crew-hours in space, and accumulated ex-tensive experience in the conduct of flight opera-tions, experimentation, and Earth observation intrips that last for months. However, they are cur-rently restricted to the use of relatively small, ex-pendable launch vehicles for crew transportationand resupply. The United States, on the otherhand, has an operational space Shuttle which per-mits the routine ferrying of crews and large pay-loads into orbit for over a week, currently at therate of some 5-6 flights per year. The Shuttle isreusable, its staytime in orbit could be increased,and the planned fleet of four Orbiters could pro-vide staytime on the order of months per year.

But an individual unmodified Orbiter does notprovide a habitation combining large volume,high power, and long duration needed for manyof the in-orbit research and development activi-ties of interest, particularly to the life sciences andsome in the private sector.

The National Aeronautics and Space Admin-istration is now considering “the next logical step”for its space program: the establishment of a po-tentially permanent human presence as part of anactually permanent LEO infrastructure, i.e., whatNASA describes as a civilian space station. If theadministration formally proposes to begin workon such infrastructure, then Congress may findthat a detailed examination of the Soviet humanpresence in space, the Salyut space stations, andtheir associated space vehicles, can provide a use-ful frame of reference.

Early in this century, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky,a Russian scientist and engineer, provided thetheoretical underpinnings for the Soviet space pro-gram with his visionary writings about the useof orbiting stations as a springboard for explor-ing the cosmos. One can still find the influenceof his theories in the statements of modern-daySoviet leaders.

But Soviet scientists and technicians have foundthat the road to realizing their dream is a long anddifficult one. After initial successes with Sputnikand the early orbital flights of cosmonauts in theone-seat Vostok capsule, the Soviet space pro-gram began to feel the limitations of its tech-nology. The 6-metric-ton (tonne; one tonne =2205 lbs) Voskhod flew only twice, Voskhod 1with three crewmembers, Vockhod 2 with two.Two years later, in 1967, a new space vehicledebuted with Soyuz 1. Despite the death of thefirst Soyuz pilot in a crash landing, the Soyuz-class ship eventually became the principal meansof putting cosmonauts into space. After 12 yearsof Soyuz operations, a new design, Soyuz T,made its inaugural flight in 1979.

In the late 1960’s, the Soviets appeared to beintent on sending cosmonauts to the Moon, but,in view of the success of the U.S. effort to do so,they eventually settled for landing automated

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probes on the lunar surface. Subsequently, thefocus of the Soviet manned space program shiftedexclusively to the establishment of a strongcapability for near-Earth orbital operations, i.e.,the development of space stations and associatedspace vehicles. When Soyuz 4 docked with its sis-ter ship Soyuz 5 in January 1969, the Sovietscalled the resulting complex “the world’s firstspace station, ” although the two craft had no con-necting passageway between them. Salyut 1,which provided one continuous volume capableof supporting human habitation for time-periodsof the order of months, went into orbit in 1971;the most recent of the series, Salyut 7, waslaunched in 1982 and remains operational today.

Some of the Salyut stations were apparentlymilitary in function; others seem to have beenprimarily civil. With Salyut 6 and 7, the distinc-tion became blurred; it may be that the militaryno longer has a separate Salyut program. TheSoviets have maintained total secrecy in militaryoperations, but they have gradually become moreopen with their civilian programs, broadening themakeup of their crews to include members fromEastern Europe and other Soviet-bloc countries,France, and, soon, India. Although any jointU.S.-Soviet effort (e.g., the symbolic joining ofthe Apollo and Soyuz in orbit in 1975) currentlyseems unlikely, future Soviet missions will prob-ably continue to be international to some degree.

The fact that the Soviet technological baseremains relatively narrow seems to be closelycoupled with the infrequency with which rapidinnovation is achieved, both in Soviet industrygenerally and in the Soviet space program in par-ticular. Although Soviet spacecraft designers relyheavily on automated control with cosmonautsas backups, crewmembers have, in many in-stances, assumed broader duties to make up forfailures in automation. In any case, Salyut hasafforded its crews of engineers and cosmonauts

extensive experience in conducting operations inspace. Precisely how this experience will be putto use in future operations is unclear,

Salyut may be the penultimate step leading toa permanent, large-scale human presence in space.Before that can be accomplished, the Soviets mayhave to achieve success in developing a heavy-lift launcher, similar to the U.S. Saturn V, whichwould allow for the construction of a second-gen-eration station out of much larger modules, Avehicle along the lines of the U.S. space shuttleto provide routine access to a near-Earth stationwould also be desirable, and indeed Westernsources believe that the Soviets may be develop-ing a heavy-lift, reusable shuttle that could carrytwice the payload of the American craft. In ad-dition, the Soviets have already conducted testsfor a l-tonne prototype of a 10- to 20-tonne spaceplane.

With such spacecraft in their fleet, the Sovietswould possess both a “space truck” and a light-duty ferry vehicle to provide routine service toan expandable infrastructure in space. With thisinfrastructure as a hub of operations, extensionof human activity to geostationary orbit, theMoon, and even Mars becomes technically feasi-ble—indeed Soviet planners have frequently men-tioned each of these as an objective. That previousU.S.S.R. efforts to reach Mars have met with fail-ure may, in the near term, have militated againsttheir initiating programs to send vehicles to theouter planets and deep space. But it is unlikely

that the Soviets see these failures as anything morethan temporary setbacks, especially in view ofU.S. success in planetary exploration generallyand their own success in the very difficult taskof returning data from the surface of Venus—afeat that the United States has yet to match. In-deed, a Salyut space station may provide the coreelement of a future base necessary to ensure su-ccess of future trips to Mars.

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Early Soviet Manned Space flight

Historical Background

A central element in the Soviet Union’s explora-tion and exploitation of space has been its relianceon Salyut-class orbital stations occupied by cos-monauts. Seven of these stations have been offi-cially announced by the U.S.S.R. as of Decem-ber 1983. These facilities have begun to realize thepossibilities envisioned by Konstantin Tsiolkov-sky, the Russian scientist/engineer who is consid-ered the founder of Soviet astronautics. Early inthe century, he described how orbital stationsmight be built, noting that they represented thevery heart of a program of space conquest.

Typical of his observations is this 1923 descrip-tion of the construction of a system of Earth-orbiting stations:

We take off in a space ship . . . and stay at adistance of 2000-3000 versts [each verst equaling0.6629 mile] from Earth, as its Moon. Little bylittle appear colonies with implements, materials,machines, and structures brought from Earth.Gradually, independent production, though lim-ited at first, will develop. *

Reinforcing the conviction of Tsiolkovsky, thelate Leonid Brezhnev, then President of the SovietUnion, remarked in 1978:

Mankind will not forever remain on Earth, butin the pursuit of light and space will first timidlyemerge from the bounds of the atmosphere, andthen advance until he has conquered the wholeof circumsolar space. We believe that permanent-ly manned space stations with interchangeablecrews will be mankind’s pathway into the uni-verse.2

As the launch of Sputnik l—the Earth’s firstartificial satellite, on October 4, 1957—opened thepath toward realization of Tsiolkovsky’s visions,so the Soviet Union’s increasing ability to trans-port people into space in the 1960’s, 1970’s, and1980’s has added substance to Brezhnev’s declara-tion. At least since the early 1970’s, the SovietUnion seems to have taken a slow, more-or-less

‘K. E. Tsiolkovsky, CoJkcted Works, vol. 2, Moscow, Izdatel’stvoAN U. S. S. R., 1954.

‘Kenneth Gatland, chief author, The Illustrated Encyclopedia of’Space ~echnology (London: Salamander Books, Ltd., 1981), p. 214,

steady approach toward fulfilling the aspirationsof its engineers and political leaders. *

Vostok

Vostok (meaning “East”), a one-seater space-craft, was the first Soviet vehicle to carry acosmonaut into orbit. * * Six Vostoks werelaunched between April 1961 and June 1963; theyremained in orbit for periods ranging from 108minutes to nearly 5 days. Weighing 4.7 metrictons (tonnes) and simple in design, the vehicleconsisted of two modules: an almost sphericalcapsule which carried the cosmonaut, and anequipment package containing fuel, life-supportgear, batteries, attitude-control thrusters, and aretrorocket to slow the vehicle for reentry intothe Earth’s atmosphere.

Vostok’s pilot was little more than a passenger.With no orbital maneuvering capability designedinto the system, the pilot had few responsibilitiesfor control of the spacecraft.

On two occasions, pairs of Vostoks flew con-currently. Two A-1 vehicles launched Vostoks 3and 4 from the same cosmodrome within 24hours; *** Vostoks 5 and 6 were similarly launchedwithin 48 hours. In the second case, the Sovietsshowed they could launch at precise times. In 1962and 1963, the U.S. manned spaceflight programcould not match this achievement, the Mercuryprogram being plagued by a series of “holds” andpostponements.

*Many informed Western observers, as well as official Soviethistorians and publicists, would extend this characterization to theearl y years of the Soviet program. Others, however, disagree, argu-ing that, especially in these early years, the appearance of an evolu-tionary course disguises a number of false starts, midcourse correc-tions, and radical changes of plan.

* ‘In preparation for the first manned flight, the Soviets, in 1960

and 1961, launched at least four Sputniks with animals aboard inorder to determine how they were affected by the operation ofvarious spacecraft subsystems. These included the launch s~’stem,onboard life support and environmental control, and the reentry

and recovery system.***The designations “A,” “D, “ “G, ” etc., are based on an

alphanumeric classification system devised by the late CharlesSheldon of the Library of Congress. Another system designates thelaunch vehicle with an “SL” and a number. Thus, the “A-2” vehicleis the same as the “SL-4. ”

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(a) LUNA 1-3

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Cred/t L C P Vick, 1982

Luna 1-3 (a); Vostok 1-6 (b) —standard launch vehicle with the first type of added upper stage A-1 (a) as used to launchthe first three Luna spacecraft; (b) as used to launch the six Vostok manned spacecraft

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Vostok Booster

These simultaneous flights not only served astests of ground control and launch turnaroundcapability, but also, as precursors of futurerendezvous and docking missions, allowed a de-termination of how closely spacecraft could bepositioned in orbit without specific orbital ma-neuvers. The orbital injections were so accuratethat the first pair coorbited and the second passed

within 5 miles of each other in noncoplanar or-bits. * With these Vostok missions, the Soviets alsodemonstrated the capability to handle communi-cations with two spacecraft simultaneously.

Another highlight of the Vostok program tookplace in June 1963 when Valentina Tereshkova be-came the first woman in space. Flying in Vostok6 for 48 orbits around the Earth, she tallied moreflight time than all the male astronauts in the U.S.Mercury program. Although relatively untrainedand rumored to have been ill throughout herflight, Tereshkova at least achieved substantialpublicity.

Voskhod

In October 1964 and March 1965, the SovietUnion launched the 6-tonne Voskhod (“Sunrise”),a modified Vostok capable of carrying two orthree cosmonauts on daylong flights. Because theVoskhod was used only for these two flights, someWestern experts believe it was intended primari-ly to preempt the U.S. Gemini program, whichwould put two astronauts in one vehicle, one ofwhom would “walk” in space. Voskhod had ap-proximately the same pressurized volume as didVostok, but more volume was made available forhabitable crew space because the ejection seat andrails were removed and because the crew woreoveralls instead of bulky pressurized space suits.

Voskhod 1, weighing 5.3 tonnes, had a three-person crew. In Voskhod 2, which weighed 5.7tonnes, one of the crew couches was replaced withan inflatable airlock and associated hatches toallow for extravehicular activity (EVA), or “space-walking. ” During the flight one of the crew ac-complished the first spacewalk of some 10 minutesduration. * * The Voskhod program included thefirst flight of a physician to conduct in situ obser-vations; it also tested new TV and audio commu-nications equipment, evaluated techniques forspacecraft orientation, and employed a new solid-rocket, soft-landing system. It did not, however,

*The orbits of Vostok 5 and 6 were in fact separated by almost29” at their point of nearest approach, with the result that their rel-ative velocity was approximately 12,000 feet per second. This hardlycould be counted as a rendezvous.

* *The cosmonaut spent a total of some 22 minutes under spaceconditions—12 minutes outside the spacecraft, and the preceding10 minutes in a depressurized, inflatable airlock.

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Credit C P V/ck, 1982

Voskhod-2 (a); Soyuz T (b) —standard launch vehicle with the improved upper stage A-2 (a) as .Jsed to launch the twoVoskhod manned spacecraft; (b) as used to launch the Soyuz T manned spacecraft

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include a launch escape system. As the first of aseries of individually small but cumulatively sig-nificant advances in Soviet space capabilities, theVoskhod program brought the Soviet Union’stotal person-hours in orbit to some 507; by con-trast, U.S. astronauts had accumulated 53 hoursthrough Project Mercury.

By the end of the Voskhod program, the SovietUnion was dedicating its engineering expertise tothe creation of a more capable spacecraft—theSoyuz (“Union”). During the 2-year hiatus be-tween the flight of Voskhod 2 and Soyuz 1, theU.S. Gemini program of 10 flights accomplishedmany outstanding first-time achievements; Amer-ican crewmembers also overtook their Sovietcounterparts in flight time, a lead they main-tained, through the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project(ASTP) in 1975, until the flight of Soyuz 29 inJune 1978. The Salyut 6 missions subsequentlyreestablished the Soviet lead, more than doublethe U.S. total.

Soyuz

Building on the technical foundation laid byVostok and Voskhod, the Soviet Union developedthe Soyuz space vehicle. First flown with a pilotaboard in 1967, * Soyuz, the first of the Soviets’truly operational spacecraft rated to carry crew,remains, with evolutionary modifications, thestandard vehicle for transporting crewmembersto Salyut (“Salute”) space stations. The currentdesign, called Soyuz T, was introduced in 1979.Many Western observers believe that Soyuz wasinitially developed to serve as part of an ambitiousprogram to send a cosmonaut to the Moon. How-ever, it experienced a number of technical prob-lems, including the inability of the A-2 boosterto launch a fully fueled and instrumented space-craft, launch failures of the medium-lift Protontype D-l-e and the heavy-lift G-class boosters, * *and troubles with control systems aboard auto-mated lunar spacecraft. These problems made itimpossible to use Soyuz for a manned lunar mis-sion during the late 1960’s, when beating theUnited States to the Moon was, presumably, of

—- —● The first flight of the Soyuz in 1967, ended with the death of

the pilot In a crash landing; this kind of craft was not flown againuntil October 1968,

* *The G-series booster IS comparable to the U.S. Saturn V vehicle,

high priority. As a result, the Soviets appear tohave postponed any such lunar missions indef-initely.

Why were such technical problems not over-come? The conventional explanation hoIds thatthe American lunar landings undermined the So-viets’ incentive for, and interest in, putting acosmonaut on the Moon. A fuller appraisal holdsthat, after Apollo 11, the planned Soviet programwould have seemed second rate. The Soviets orig-inally envisioned sending (only) one cosmonautin a Zond spacecraft to 1oop once around theMoon (not to make multiple orbits) and probablyrequired an Earth-orbit rendezvous. But the suc-cess of Apollo 8 at Christmas 1968 and subsequentnear-perfect flights of Apollos 9, 10, and 11, ap-parently convinced the Soviets to concentrate onother activities. As alternatives that could beachieved, near-Earth, orbiting stations capable ofhuman habitation, and automated probes forlunar sample return (via the Luna series space-craft) and surface exploration (via Lunokhod 1and 2) became the new foci of Soviet activities.

Carrying crews of one to three persons, Soyuzhas been used to conduct a wide variety of mili-tary and scientific experiments. These vehicles arecapable of orbital maneuvering, rendezvous anddocking, and solo flights with crew aboard forup to 30 days. *

Soyuz is 7 meters in length, 2.7 meters in di-ameter, and up to 6,8 tonnes in weight, andcontains three connected elements that are interde-pendent for power, thermal control, and propul-sion:

. Command Module. —Serves as the ascentand descent compartment in which cosmo-nauts are ferried to and from orbit, as wellas the module in which they are stationedduring orbital maneuvers. It also containssystem function indicators and control panelsthrough which the cosmonauts interact withvarious automatic systems. The CommandModule and the Orbital Work Module to-

*Although 18 days is the longest demonstrated flight of a Soyuzcraft with crew aboard, the Sowets have repeatedly stated this timecould be extended to 30 days. Without crew aboard, Soyuz vehiclesarc capable ot much longer duration In orbit: Soyuz T-1 recordeda fllght ot 100 days while docked with Salyut b, Cosmos 613, un-d e c k e d rerna]ned In orbit tor 60 da}rs.

25-291 0 - 83 - 2 : QL 3

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Cred/t C P V/ck, 1983

Soyuz 4: The original Soyuz spacecraft. Average mass: 6,500 to 6,625 kg. Overall length frclm booster interface to thedocking interface: 7.5 m. Body diameter: 2.2 m. Base diameter: 2,72 m. Descent module mass: 2,900 kg. The Soyuz1-9 spacecraft were never launched fully fueled and fully instrumented. A full weight spacecraft would have weighed

approximately 9,000 kg, exceeding the 7,500-kg payload capacity of the Soy Jz A-2 booster

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gether provide a total habitable volume ofnearly 9 cubic meters (one cubic meter = 35cubic feet), roughly twice that of Vostok; inSoyuz T the habitable volume has been in-creased to about 10 cubic meters. The slight-ly bell-shaped Command Module is a “liftingbody;” its aerodynamic properties, similar tothose of Apollo, are substantially better thanthose of Vostok, lessening reentry decelera-tion forces on its crew and enhancing landingzone targeting.Orbital Work Module. —Nearly spherical inshape, it allows cosmonauts to work, think,eat, relax, and sleep in surroundings that arespacious in comparison with those of theCommand Module. The Orbital Work Mod-ule is also used as an airlock through whichthe crew may transfer to other spacecraft orembark on spacewalks; an airtight hatch islocated at the interface that secures it to theCommand Module.

● Instrument and Systems Module. —Containsa series of propulsion, maneuvering, and at-titude control engines; associated fuel tanks;and a pressurized forward section holdingmajor portions of the electronics for majoroperating systems (environmental, attitudecontrol, communications, electrical, and pro-pulsion). In some versions of Soyuz, solar cellarrays protrude, winglike, from oppositesides of this module, and provide charge andrecharge of a set of internal chemical batter-ies. Use of solar panels ceased after Soyuz11 but was resumed with the Soviet Union’scomponent of the joint U.S.-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, Soyuz ASTP,3 and re-tained in the Soyuz T.

. —‘For a detailed account of this mission, see, Edward and Linda

Ezell, The Partnership—A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Pro-ject, in the NASA History Series, 5JASA SP-420Qr Washington,D. C,, 1978.

—

Pre-Salyut Soyuz Space Flights

As the core vehicle for Soviet-manned space ac-tivities since 1967, the Soyuz has accomplisheddiversified objectives, many of them directly re-lated to the growth of the Salyut space station pro-gram. Capable of flying with or without crews,Soyuz has served as a test bed to observe the phys-iological effects of long- and short-term spaceflighton human beings (as well as animals and plants),to evaluate rendezvous and docking techniques,and to appraise Earth remote-sensing equipmentand new spacecraft systems. *

In early Soyuz flights, cosmonauts exercisedskills later to be integrated into operations of theSalyut space stations. Specifically, the space com-plex resulting from the docking of Soyuz 4 and5 in January 1969 was described by the Sovietsas “the world’s first space station’’4—a somewhatpuzzling description, as there was no connectinghatch. During the few hours when the two craftwere linked in power, control, and communica-tions, two cosmonauts from Soyuz 5 donned self-contained life-support systems, left their craftthrough a hatch in the Orbital Work Module and,using handrails, transferred into the docked Soyuz4. This orbiting complex provided a total work-ing volume of 632 cubic feet, the largest attainedto that date.

Although most observers contend that a truespace station should allow its occupants to movefrom one part of the facility to another withouthaving to resort to spacewalking, the experiencegained in the Soyuz 4 and 5 complex was valu-able in the design and development of larger spacestation configurations.

In October 1969, the Soviets launched Soyuz6, 7, and 8. In spite of their apparent failure to

● Unfortunately, in demonstrating this latitude of functions, fourcosmonauts lost their lives in two separate accidents, one in SoyuzI and three in Soyuz II.

‘This phrase was first used in a question by the Tass correspondentat the Cosmonauts’ press conference in Moscow, Jan. 24, 1969. (Sum-mary World Broadcasts, Su/2984/c/4). This same claim could havebeen made earlier, when two pairs of unmanned Soyuz prototypespreviously achieved successful rendezvous and docking—except, ofcourse, that some third vehicle would have been required to ferry

a crew to staff them,

dock two of the vehicles, they succeeded in fly-ing the three spacecraft with their seven cosmo-nauts in coordinated, close formation. At thetime, the Soviets commented that the joint exer-cise evaluated autonomous navigation devices foruse in close-formation flying and achieved a “ra-tional distribution” of control between man andmachine.

Acting on the assumption that the constructionof future space stations would require a mastery

of in-space welding techniques, the Soviets in-cluded a test unit on Soyuz 6. The device wasoperated remotely in vacuo and manually withinthe pressurized Orbital Workshop Module. Threewelding techniques were tried in vacuo: 1) low-pressure compressed arc, 2) electron beam, and3) arc with consumable electrode. Only the sec-ond was reported to be a complete success. Morerecently, the Soviets claimed those experimentscan now be “seen as an impetus to the practicaldevelopment of space technology. ”5

From its first use in April 1967 to the landingof Soyuz 9 in June 1970, and the initiation of spacestation operations, Soyuz spacecraft flew 15 per-sons on eight missions for a total of nearly 44 daysof operations in space. At the close of this period,Soviet personnel—on Vostok, Voskhod, and Soy-uz spacecraft—had accumulated a total of some2,550 hours in space. By comparison, the totalat this juncture for U.S. Mercury, Gemini, andApollo spaceflight was far greater, being slightlyover 6,260 personnel hours.

An apparent objective of the Soyuz programwas to provide a multipurpose spacecraft to beused in connection with an orbital space station.Among its many roles, Soyuz was to be a tem-porary base for checking out the station, a sup-ply and transport shuttle, and a vehicle for con-ducting additional independent studies. Given thegrowing proficiency the Soviets had shown withSoyuz, there remained no major technologicalbarriers to their Salyut space station program.

‘V. Kubashov, Pravda, Moscow, Apr. 26, 1980, p. 3.

13

Salyut Space Station Characteristics

Because each new U.S. spacecraft system is de-signed “from scratch, ” American designers tendto emphasize quantum leaps in capability. By con-trast, the Soviets reuse subsystems on differentspacecraft whenever possible. For instance, thesame propulsion, power, and thermal-control sys-tems may be used on many vehicles. By relyingon systems flight-proved in earlier space pro-grams, * the Soviets may have been able to reducecosts and shorten the time spent in developmentand construction. Still, most of these elements re-quire modification. b

The Soviets are believed to have begun workdirectly related to the development of Salyut spacestations in the late 1960’s. The first in this seriesof stations, Salyut 1, was launched in April 1971.To date, the Soviet Union has officially acknowl-edged that seven of these facilities have beenlaunched, one of which (Salyut 2) broke up in or-bit. Cosmos 557, which failed in orbit, is generallythought to have been a Salyut, although the So-viets have not confirmed this inference.7 * * Onlyone other spacecraft, Cosmos 382, may have beena Salyut, but the evidence for this view is meager.8

Though the Soviets experienced numerous failuresearly in the Salyut program, their strategy of usingflight-proved subsystems in new programs to savetime and costs was less at fault than was theirweakness in the quality control of these subsys-tems.

-— ——.— —.- .——— -‘For example, the Soyuz and Salyut (1 and 4) propulsion systems

were identical. Salyut I also used Soyuz solar panels. The propul-sion unit of Molniya spacecraft was the same as that used on earlylunar and interplanetary vehicles.

‘K. P. Feoktistov and M. M. Markov, “Evolution of ‘Salyut’ Or-bital Stations, ” Zern)ya i VseIennya, September-October 1981, pp.10-17,

‘Nicholas L. Johnson, Handbook of Soviet Manned Space Flight,vol. 48, Science and Technology Series, American Astronautical So-ciety, San Diego, Calif., 1980, p. 209, (Note that this book was pub-lished before the orbiting of Salyut 7.)

* *As a rule, Soviet practice is to give a spacecraft a name appro-priate to its class only if it achieves the purpose for which it wasintended; craft which miscarry or are aborted receive either no name(as was the case for two that exploded in 1966) or the general ap-pellation Cosmos. The failed Salyut 2 is the exception to this rule.

8Johnson, op. cit. Cosmos 382 was probably not a Salyut; it ap-pears to have been considerably lighter and more maneuverable.Its altitude (5, ooO km apogee), plane-change capability (51.6 - to.55.9 ), and perigee increase (from 320 km to 2,577 km) link it moreprobably to Cosmos 379.

Salyut-class space stations utilize several distinctmajor components:

●

●

●

Salyut. —An orbital laboratory, 13 meters(m; one m = 3.3 ft. ) in length, 4.2 m at max-imum diameter and weighing approximate-ly 19 tonnes; it provides over 100 m 3 o fusable space for up to five crewmembers. Theorbits of civil Salyuts (4, 6, and 7) lie between362 and 338 kilometers (km; 1 km = 0.62statute mile) above the Earth’s surface; thoseof military Salyuts (3 and 5), between 274and 241 km; that of Salyut 1, thought to becivil, between 277 and 251 km; all have aninclination of approximately 52 0 . Two ofthe sections— a transfer/docking compart-ment and a working/living compartment—are habitable; the third is an unpressurizedinstrument/propulsion section. Solar arraysprovide power. Salyuts 1 through 5 had onedocking port; Salyuts 6 and 7, two ports.With a Soyuz transport craft docked at oneend and a Progress resupply ship at theother, the total length of the complex is 29m. Onboard laboratory equipment has in-cluded a multispectral camera, materialsprocessing furnaces, and devices for scien-tific, medical, and technological tests. *Soyuz. —An early model of this class oftransport that was retired from Salyut opera-tions after Soyuz 40 in 1981. This spacecraft,flown with and without cosmonauts on-board, provided a transport link for two- orthree-person crews and supplies betweenEarth and the Salyut vehicles, or, in the caseof Soyuz 22, a solo flight.**Soyuz T.–Unveiled in December 1979. Thesuccessor to Soyuz,9 and similar to it in ex-ternal shape and dimensions, Soyuz T can

*For a more detailed description of Salyut, see Appendix A: TheSoviet Salyut Space Program.

* *Soyuz carried three cosmonauts on four flights. Soyuz 4 waslaunched with one cosmonaut, but returned carrying twocosmonauts from Soyuz 5; Soyuz 5 was launched with three andreturned with one. After three crewmen on Soyuz 11 died fromdepressurization during reentry on June 6, 1971, cosmonauts wererequired to wear pressurized suits, and crew size was limited to two.

‘Craig Covault, “Extensive Design Changes Mark Soyuz T,” Avia-tion 14’eeA & Space ~echnology Jan. 14, 1980, p. 57.

15

16

I

—

! II I

I II

- 4I

Ir

I I

I II II

; - - ; “ - - ;, ,.

11

L-- - - -

4.15 31

Cred/t C P V/ck, 1982

Salyut launch vehicle: The Proton D-1 Launch Vehicle used to launch the Salyut Spacecraft Laboratory.It is a three-stage launch vehicle

17

Soyuz 11 docked to Salyut 1

Soyuz 17/Salyut 4 represents a further development in the civilian Salyut Program. Major revisions are the absenceof solar panels on the Soyuz ferry and the change to three large, steerable solar panels on the station

18

Soyuz T Spaceship

*

$

Principal Characteristics

CrewWeightWeight of descent moduleLength of the bodyMaximum diameterSpan of extended solar

battery panelsType of booster rocket

2-3 persons6,850kg3,000kg

6,98m2.72m

10.6mSoyuz

Cfed/t Drawing from “Mlsslon S:lentlflque”Franco-SovietiqueSaliout-7France-USSR Scientlflc Mlsslon“Salyut-7 (F)ress Kit) for Soyuz T-6, 1982

. . . .

19

●

transport as many as three people wearingpressure suits (or two people and a cargopod) to the Salyuts. ’ Operating with solarpanels, the craft sports advanced electronicsand computers; it is more maneuverable thanits predecessor, providing an automatic nav-igation control system that can be overrid-den for manual control, if desired, The or-bital module of the vehicle, once its cargo hasbeen undoaded into the station, can act as acontainer to hold used equipment and trashfor subsequent destructive reentry.** Thecommand module of Soyuz T is used to re-turn the crew to Earth.Progress. —An unmanned transport of slight-ly over 7 tonnes, based on Soyuz design andusing internal batteries rather than powerderived from solar cells, it links to Salyutautomatically, delivering equipment, parts,fuel, and other consumables.’” The cargo ca-pacity of Progress is about 2.3 tonnes offood, water, mail, film, equipment, and pro-pellants. Oxygen regenerators for Salyut’slife-support system are resupplied, along withgaseous nitrogen, if needed. 11 Salyut cosmo-nauts transfer much of this cargo into the sta-tion manually, but propellant for the stationis pumped automatically. Using residual pro-

*Soyuz T-3, T-6, T-7, and T-8 had crews of three.* ● The orbital module has not been left attached to Salyut. Without

propulsion and flight control, its disposal would be difficult.‘oK, P. Feoktistov, Scientific Orbital Complex, Monograph re-

produced in English in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS),USSR Report: Space, June 17, 1980.

‘lTass in English, 0753 GMT, Jan. 24, 1978.

pellant, Progress spacecraft also double asspace tugs, capable of pushing Salyuts intohigher orbit. The last service which Progresscan render to Salyut is to accept its refuse.Because it is not designed for recovery, Pro-gress is jettisoned and destroyed upon reen-try into the atmosphere.Cosmos 929-C]ass Module. ‘z—Designed todouble the habitable volume of Salyut, thismodule is flown without crew to the stationand docked automatically. Carrying its ownpropulsion, guidance, and life-support sys-tems, it is designed with several docking portsand an ejectable “sub-module” which is largeenough to return the station’s crew and/orheavy equipment to Earth. The first suchmodule, Cosmos 929, was orbited July 17,1977, and tested as a freeflyer. The next inthe series, designated Cosmos 1267, dockedwith Salyut 6 in 1981, forming an orbitalcomplex that flew, uninhabited, for 13months while a variety of automated systemcheckouts and flight-stability experimentswere carried out. The latest module of thistype, Cosmos 1443 (which may weigh asmuch as 20 tonnes), docked with Salyut 7 inMarch 1983.1

3 *-—

‘z’’ Soviets Show Assembly of Space Station Units, ” A W’&ST, Iune2 9 , 1981, p. 21.

1“’Soviets Launch Module to Enlarge Salvut 7,” AU’& ST, Mar.7, 1983, p. IQ.

*The long hiatus between the flights of Cosmos 1267 and 1443can be attributed to the fact that the Cosmos 1267 test program wasnot terminated until the summer of 1982, at which point the SoyuzT-5 mission was already in progress.

Photo cred(t TASS

Link-up in Orbit: On June 28, 1983, the spaceship Soyuz T-9 linked up with the orbital complex Salyut T-7—’’Cosmos-1443”

20

Progress Cargo Spaceship

Doc

P r i n c i p a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s

WeightWeight of cargo dellveredto the station

includlng:-In the cargo compartment-In the compartment for fuel

componentsMaximum lengthMaximum diameter of pressurizedcompartmentsType of booster rocketDuration of flight:

Independentwhen dockedwith the orbital station

Orbit parameters:heightIncllnatlonrotation period

7,020kg

about 2,300kg

Up to 1,300kg

Up to 1,000kg7.94m

2.2mSoyuz

up to 3 days

up to 30 days

200 to 350 km51,6 degrees

about 89 minutes

Cred/t.’ Drawing from “MI sslon Sclent Iflque”Franco-SovietiqueSaliout-7France-USSR Sclentlflc Mlsslon“Salyut-7 (Fress Kit) for Soyuz T-6, 1982

Salyut Activities

Launch dates of Salyut space stations an-nounced by the Soviets: 14

Salyut I ., . . .Apr. 19, 1971Salyut 2. . . . . .Apr. 3, 1973 (failed)Salyut 3.... . .. June 25,1974Salyut4 . .Dec. 26,1974Salyut 5.... . . . . ..June 22, 1976Salyut6 ... ..Sept. 29, 1977Salyut 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ..Apr. 19, 1982

Salyut 1

The first in the Salyut series carried an OrionI telescope for obtaining spectrograms of stars inthe 2,OOO to 3,OOO angstrom region of the elec-tromagnetic spectrum; a gamma-ray telescope,called Anna III, provided observations unattain-able from Earth. Several optical and multispec-tralcameras were used for astronomical and Earthphotography. Photo sessions of geological andmeteorological phenomena were coordinated withaircraft flights and orbiting weather satellites.Making use of a hydroponic farm, biological ex-periments centered on the effects of weightlessnesson plant growth and nutrition. Long-term impli-cations of the effects of microgravity on thehuman organism were also studied.

A first attempt to board the station by a three-man crew on Soyuz 10 was thwarted by faultydocking equipment on the Soyuz. A second at-tempt by Soyuz 11 cosmonauts was successful;this three-man crew became the world’s first oc-cupants of what some would describe as a true“space station”-i .e . , long-term in-space in-frastructure that accommodates human beings—residing in Salyut for 23 days. This initial success,however, was followed by an unhappy ending.A valve, intended for equalizing internal and ex-ternal pressures as the spacecraft descendedthrough the atmosphere during recovery, jerkedopen at the instant of the explosive separation ofthe command and orbital modules, permitting the

cabin’s atmosphere to escape. The cosmonauts,wearing no spacesuits, perished. * From then un-til the launch of Soyuz T-3 in 1980, Soyuz vehicleswere redesigned to allow the crew to wear space-suits. Crew size was reduced to two to providesufficient room for the suits and related equip-ment. Salyut 1 was intentionally removed fromorbit 175 days after launch.

Salyut 2

This vehicle did not achieve stability in orbit,began to tumble, and broke up before crews couldoccupy it.

Salyut 3

Unlike Salyut 1, which had two sets of fixedsolar panels fore and aft, Salyut 3 carried twolarger panels attached just aft of the centerbody,on the rear transfer module .15 These panels couldbe rotated so the craft could continue to receivesolar power whenever it was in sunlight, whateverits orientation. Salyut 3 was also modified so thatits docking port was aft .16 Other noteworthy mod-ifications included higher efficiency power andlife-support systems and more convenient interiordesign.

Cosmonauts aboard Salyut 3 conducted some400 scientific and technical experiments, includ-ing high-resolution photo reconnaissance and/orEarth resources observation, spectrographic studyof aerosol particles in the Earth’s atmosphere, theculturing of bacteria, and the recycling of water.

The crew of Soyuz 14 resided aboard Salyut3 for 14 days, but a follow-on Soyuz 15 crewproved unable to effect docking. Overall, the sta-tion remained operational for twice its design life-time. Some 2 months after Salyut 3’s final crewdeparted, a data capsule was ejected and recov-ered on Earth. That only a few photographs,

ldco~mos 557, launched May 11, 1973, has been identified inWestern circles as a successfully orbited Salyut, although the sta-tion suffered a propulsion or command-sequencer failure, render-ing it useless for human occupation. The vehicle rapidly decayedin orbital altitude, reentering the atmosphere on May 22, 1973. See,

“Reception of Radio Signals From Cosmos 557, ” The KetteringGroup, Space flight, vol. 16, 1974, pp. 39-40.

● The cause of death was embolism, i.e., the formation of bub-bles in the bloodstream.

“Although all subsequent Salyuts retained this midship mount-ing of solar panels, they were placed farther aft on Salyuts 3 and5 than on Salyuts 4, 6, and 7. See, for example, AlV&ST, Dec. 4,

1978, p. 17.

‘*Ibid,

21

22.-

6.98 m

6,700 Kg.

o

/

t

Credit C P V/ck, 1983

Soyuz 1 l/SaIyut 1. Total volume: 100.3 m3. Total weight: 25,600 kg. Total solar panel surface area: 42m2

showing noncritical interior equipment aboardSalyut 3, have been released encourages specula-tion that its primary mission was probably mili-tary.

Salyut 4

The design of this station, seemingly primari-ly civilian in character, allowed the crew moreready access for repair and replacement purposes.Two navigation systems for the station’s automat-ic control were evaluated, as was a new teletypesystem. Onboard scientific equipment, weighing

about 2.5 tonnes, was of much greater variety andcapability than that carried on previous stations.The cosmonauts’ time was devoted each day toa specific area of investigation-astronomical,Earth resources, or biomedical. X-ray, solar, andinfrared spectrometric telescopes were among thehost of instruments employed. Making repeatedobservations of agricultural patterns, forests, andmaritime areas, the crew collected a large bodyof data on Earth resources. They also studiedmicro-organisms, higher plants, and the humancardiovascular system, measuring the tone ofblood vessels and the circulation of blood to the

——.——

23

6.98 m

I ‘1

14.42 m

I

16 m

2 I .4 m< <,#23 m

1

I< *

Credtt ~ C P V/ck, 1 9 8 3

Soyuz 18/Salyut 4: Total volume: 100,3 m’. Total weight: 25,600 kg. Total solar panel surface area: 60 m’Solar panel span: 17 m

brain, The cosmonauts also evaluated the effec-tiveness of various exercise and diet regimes forcounteracting the reconditioning effects of micro-gravity,

The first crew to board Salyut 4 arrived onSoyuz 17; they remained for 29 days. The mis-sion of their scheduled successors, the crew ofSoyuz 18A,17 was aborted during ascent, Next

1-18A is the U.S. designation. The Soviets refer to this event asthe April .S anomaly,

aboard were the Soyuz 18B team; they remainedon the station for 62 days. Soyuz 20, a vehiclewithout crew, carried biological specimens; itdocked and remained at the station for 89 daysbefore returning to Earth. Part of its mission wasto determine whether Soyuz could remain withoutpower for a relatively long time before restartingits power supply without mishap—an importantconsideration in planning for one crew to remainaboard a Salyut for a lengthy mission. Salyut 4was purposely taken out of orbit after 770 daysof flight.

24

Salyut 5

Salyut 5, the second station thought by Westernanalysts to be primarily military, was the last inthe Salyut series to carry only one docking port,a design characteristic which effectively preventsa resupply vehicle from docking when a crew ofcosmonauts is already aboard. * Salyut 5 demon-strated a high-resolution camera, similar to that

on Salyut 3, that was used to study mineral de-posits, seismic areas, environmental damagecaused by mud streams and railway constructionpaths. A device for smelting certain metals—bis-muth, tin, lead, and cadmium-and a crystalgrowth experiment were evaluated in the station’smicrogravity environment. As in previous Sal-yuts, biological experiments on fish, plants, andfruit flies were also conducted; algae and higherorder plants were cultivated to examine the ef-

*It is technically possible, but too risky, to back off one spacecraft fects o~ t h e spaceflight e n v i r o n m e n t o n t h e i r de-

and then dock another while the crew is on board the station. v e l o p m e n t a n d g r o w t h .

. 2 ?

I

14.4 m ?

21.38 m ?

6 ,800 1 ($

I22 .38 m ?

Cred/t. ~ C . P VIck, 1983

“Military” Salyut Conceptional Design: Total volume: 99 m3. Total mass: 25,300 kg. Total solar panel surface area(estimated): over 50 m2. Total mass: over 25,000 to 25,300 kg. Only a few written descriptions, a few movie film segments,and a few photographs of the internal and external design layout of the Miiitaw Salyut 3 and 5 vehicles have been released

25

Over the course of Salyut 5’s stay in orbit, Cosmonauts routinely worked as in-orbit re-Soyuz 21 brought a two-man crew, who remained pairmen, enabling the station’s design life of 18on the station for 49 days; the crew of Soyuz 23 months to be greatly surpassed. Because of thefailed to dock; and the crew of Soyuz 24 remained longevity of Salyut 6, perhaps to the surprise evenaboard for 16 days. of the Soviets themselves, its crews registered an

Like Salyut 3, this station ejected a recoverable impressive list of accomplishments. Space applica-tions and Earth observations each accounted forpod to Earth after its last crew departed, and, as

with Salyut 3, the Soviets have released only in- about one-third of the cosmonauts’ work sched-

ternal photographs of limited interest. The sta- ule; the final third was split between biomedical

tion remained in orbit for 412 days before it was studies and astrophysics.

commanded to reenter. The two docking ports permitted 33 successfuldockings using vehicles with and without cosmo-nauts. At least two crews tried but failed to dockwith the station. Five long-duration cosmonaut

Salyut 6

By far the most productive of Soviet space sta-tions, this “second generation” Salyut includedtwo docking ports, fore and aft; the station wasfashioned to support a new propulsion systemcapable of being refueled in orbit. A water-regeneration device became a standard feature ofthe life-support system, supplying crewmemberswith wash water; fresh drinking water was stored.Many of the experimental systems tested on earlierstations became operational on Salyut 6. A newmultispectral camera (which had been flight-testedon Soyuz 22) and astronomical telescopes wereflown. During its mission, cosmonauts assembledand deployed from Salyut’s aft end a dish anten-na used in mapping radio emissions from the Sunand the Milky Way, although the ultimate suc-cess of this experiment is in doubt. 18 Severalmaterials processing furnaces were appraised, andinfrared-sensitive semiconductors were produced.Other experiments produced superconductors, eu-tectics, alloys, pure metals, glass, ionic crystals,and metal oxides. Salyut 6 cosmonauts alsotested newly designed extravehicular spacesuits.

‘HCraig Covau]t, “Radio Telescope Erected cm Salyut 6,” AW&ST,Aug. 13, 1979, pp. 54-55 See also “Soviets Ready Salyut 6 CrewReturn, ” AW&ST, Aug. 13, 1979, p. 21.

“lames C. Brown, Materials processing on the Soviet Sa/yut 6

Space Station Memorandum SWN481-1OO4I , Centra l In te l l igence

Agency, Natlona] Foreign Assessment Center, Apr. 1, 1981. Sovietresearch In the materials processing-in-space arena appears exten-wve. According to MIT protessor Harry Catos, before a House spacesubcommittee review of space processing, a large new Soviet researchinst } t u te empl(~ys several hundred full-time sclent ists worh ing onspace material~ processing. Other countries involved in this instituteInclude Poland, Hungarv, Czechoslovakia, and France, SeeAstronautics and Aeronautics, September 1979, p. 9.

crews and 11 visiting crews accumulated a totalof 676 days of operation. New duration recordsfor human spaceflight were successively estab-lished: 96, 140, 175, and 185 days. During Salyut6’s lifetime, eight cosmonauts from the Soviet blocresided in Salyut for short periods; Soyuz 33, car-rying a non-Soviet crewmember, along with a So-viet pilot, failed to dock. * Salyut 6 operations in-troduced the use of Soyuz T and Progress vehic-les, multiple-crew dockings, refueling in orbit, andthe Cosmos 1267 module. * *

Cosmos 1267 docked with Salyut 6 in June 1981for a long series of what were described as check-outs of automated systems and “dynamic tests”of the overall response of the structure to maneu-vers while docked with another vehicle. Accord-ing to Soviet space planners, Cosmos 1267 rep-resented a “prototype space module, ” built toexpand the operations of future stations; suchmodules could be dedicated to materials process-ing and astronomical or other scientific pursuits,or they could be outfitted as living quarters. Theycould also be undecked from Salyut, flown along-side the station and reconnected. This configura-tion would be particularly useful for the conductof experiments in materials processing, becauseit could avoid perturbations caused by the sta-tion’s reactions to movements of the cosmo-nauts .20

The Soviets apparently were undecided aboutusing their long-lived Salyut 6 for future missions,——

‘Soyuz 25 with two Soviet crew also failed to dock with Salyut 6.* *There was no crew aboard either Cosmos 1267 and Salyut 6

during their docking of 40 days, after which both were deorbited.‘“From Sputnik to Sa@t: 25 Years of the Space Age, !Novosti

Press Agency Publishing House, 1982, passim.

25-291 0 - El 3 - 3 : QL 3

26——.— —.— -— -. —

6 9 8 m

6,800 K g.

I I I

18,900 K g .

13.050 m

PROGRESS7,020 Kg.

29 m

Credit - C P Vick, 1983

Salyut 6 and attached transport vehicles Soyuz and Progress in various combinations; diagram shows, left to right,Soyuz, Salyut and Progress: Total mass with two Soyuz: 32,500 to 32,600 kg. Total mass with one Soyuz and one Progress:32,720 to 32,770 kg. Total mass with one Soyuz: 25,700 to 25,750 kg. Total volume with two Soyuz: 110.6 m3. Total volumewith one Soyuz and one Progress: 106.9 m3. Total volume with one Soyuz: 100.3 m3. Total solar panel surface area: 60 mz.

Solar panel span: 17 m

27— —— — — .

and twice had Cosmos 1267 boost the complexinto a higher orbit. After Salyut 7 was launched,Cosmos 1267 propelled Salyut 6 into a destruc-tive reentry on July 29, 1982. The stay of Salyut6 in orbit lasted 4 years and 10 months.21 2 2

Salyut 7

Currently, the Soviet Union is maintaining Sal-yut 7 in orbit. Soviet space officials indicate it issimilar in size and shape to its predecessor .23 24Two docking ports are again provided, one ofwhich has been modified to handle larger space-craft. The standard station control system on.——. ..———

“Peter Smolders, “Saluting Saiyut’s Space Recordr ” ,Vem Scien-tiSt, Oct. 11, 1979, PP. 118-121.

“’’TASS Reports Termination of Flight c~f Salyut 6 Station, ” I+av-

da, July 30, 1982, p. 1

“B. Konovalov, “A Trip Through the ‘Salyut 7,’ “ lz~’est~jra, hlay18, 1982, p, 3

-“’The N’em’ Salyut 7’ 1~ a \lt~dernl~vd Statl~, n, ‘ A]r and (’oimo,”

N() Q!O, ]une 5 1Q82, p 43

Salyut 7—the result of experiments conducted onother stations—allows its crews to operate thefacility in more automatic modes.25 Recommen-dations from cosmonauts who had lived aboardSalyut 6 led to an interior “modernization pro-gram” to make Salyut 7 more livable. Designershave taken special care to protect certain obser-vation windows, shielding both inside and out-side panels with removable covers, because con-taminants from propulsion unit firings, as well asimpacts from micrometeorites, degraded the win-dows on Salyut 6. The color scheme was changedto improve the residential and working environ-ment, and a refrigerator was installed.

Salyut 6 carried a submillimeter wavelength in-frared telescope; Salyut 7 contains a complex ofX-ray equipment, The first long-duration crew

““Salyut 7 Incorporates State-o[-Art Upgrades, ‘ A il’&.ST, ]uly26, 1982, pp 26-27,

.

Crewmen on Station Aboard Salyut 7

28

used a new computer-controlled 300-lb materials-processing furnace to produce several pounds ofsemiconductor monocrystals. This furnace oper-ates automatically when the station is unoccupied.New systems for medical examination and diag-nosis have improved the range of biomedicalparameters that can be monitored, either onboardby the cosmonauts or remotely from the ground.For example, a thorough electrocardiogram canbe obtained automatically. Measurements ofblood circulation in the cerebral cortex, an im-portant parameter in near-weightless conditions,are receiving particular attention.

Performing about 300 experiments, the station’sfirst long-term crew worked to meet orders from500 national economic and scientific centers. So-viet officials stated that, for the first time, a Salyutspace station undertook “direct research produc-tion tasks. ”26 Some 20,000 photographs of theEarth’s surface were reportedly taken during thefirst phase of this operation.

Initial operations of Salyut 7 relied on Progressvehicles for resupply and refueling .27 The SoyuzT-5 transported a crew of two to the Salyut inMay 1982. Subsequently, a Soyuz T-6 with threeaboard, including a French spationaut, and aSoyuz T-7 with three, including the world’s sec-ond woman cosmonaut, visited the primary crewon separate occasions. The primary crew set a newworld endurance record for spaceflight: 211 days.

On March 2, 1983, “a modular transport ship, ”Cosmos 1443 (a Cosmos 929-class module), waslaunched, and docked with Salyut 7 on March 10in a configuration similar to the Salyut-6/Cos-mos-1267 complex.

28 Although a Soyuz craft with

—————1“’Kuznetsov Presents Awards to Salyut 7 Cosmonauts, ” Moscow

Domestic Service, LD291458, Dec. 29, 1982.“In the early phase of Salyut 7, two small “subsatellites” were

launched from the station by its first long-duration crew. These sat-ellites, Iskra 2 and Iskra 3, were constructed by students of a MoscowAviation Institute and served as communications satellites foramateur radio enthusiasts, The two satellites were “launched” fromthe station’s airlock. For a detailed account of early work on Salyut7, see: “Salyut Mission Report, ” by Neville Kidger, Spaceflight, Jan-uary 1983, pp. 28-29.

‘“’’Soviets Launch Module to Enlarge Salyut 7,” AW&ST, Mar.7, 1983, p, 19.

Phofo crertlt. Novos/I

Members of the Soyuz-9 space mission

a crew of three aboard failed to dock with thecomplex in April 1983, 29 a two-person crewboarded the station on June 28, 1983, and remainaboard as of this writing.

The Salyut-7/Cosmos-1443 orbital complexwas thought capable of housing as many as sixcrewmembers. * Stationing of that many peopleaboard the complex would have born out earlierSoviet pronouncements that this configurationwas a prototype for future larger scale space sta-tions. On August 14, 1983, Cosmos 1443, alongwith its descent module (with a capacity for re-turning one-half tonne of cargo, but not a crewmember) was undecked from Salyut 7.** Thenon September 19, 1983, Cosmos 1443 was inten-

-—.——.“’’Soviet Docking in Space Falls; Mission Aborted, ” Washington

Post, Apr. 24, 1983, pp. A-1, A-12.*It is not clear that docking arrangements allow more than one

Soyuz T to dock with a Salyut 7/Cosmos 1443-type combinationat a time; such a provision wo ~ld be expected in the future.

‘•A rather complex sequence of events occurred during August1983. Cosmos 1443 undecked on August 14. Then on August 16,Soyuz T-9 undecked, the Salyut was rotated through 180 , and the

29...——

The crew of the Soyuz T-7 spaceship (from left to right) –crew commander Leon id Popov, Pilot-Cosmonaut of the U. S. S. R.;researcher engineer Svetlana Savitskaya; and flight engineer Novosti

tionally deorbited, perhaps because of a seriousmalfunction affecting its operation .30 More recent-ly, Salyut 7 itself has experienced a serious pro-pellant leak, leaving it with two of its three ox-idizer tanks empty and 16 of its 32 attitude con-trol thrusters unusable. Because of the difficultyof making repairs, it is less likely that Salyut 7will become a major component of a large mod-ular station.

Military Utility of Salyut

Salyut space stations serve both military andcivilian needs.

31 Through the mid-1970’s, each sta-tion could be distinguished as military or civilian— . —

Soyuz was redocked at the “front” end of the station. On August17, Progress 17, bringing additional fuel, air, and water was dockedto the “back” end of the station. On August 19, the descent modulefrom Cosmos 1443 landed in Kazakhstan, U.S.S.R. Since the un-docking of Cosmos 1443 and Salyut 7, the two spacecraft went outof and (through firing of the motor of the Progress attached to Salyut )came back into orbital phase, but apparently no attempt was madeto redock prior to the intentional deorbiting of Cosmos 1443.

~oA “jatjon ~ee~ & space Technology’, Oct. 10, 1983, P 25

“Johnson, op. cit., pp. 213-217

by its design, communications frequencies, orbits,onboard equipment, and crew composition. Suchdistinctions are virtually impossible to draw forthe Salyut 6 and 7 stations. Indeed, now that 6years have passed since the last Salyut clearlyidentifiable as military was used, a separatemilitary Salyut program may no longer exist.

Civilian Salyuts (1 and 4) were flown in higherorbits, increasing their value for astronomicalobservations. Telemetry was typical of Sovietnonmilitary spacecraft, and the crew commander,although usually from the Soviet military, wasaccompanied by a civilian flight engineer.

In contrast, military Salyuts (3 and 5) wereflown in lower orbits, presumably to get the mostout of the capabilities of onboard photo recon-naissance assets and activities which replaced theastronomical activities of civilian flights. * Flightsof these Salyuts, typically using radio frequencies

*In order to maintain such a low orbit tor very long, large quan-tities of propellant must be expended.

30— ———

.

\

L

.

.

3> 003

-b.3

3

vLn3

1

\

4 + - 2 . 2 . $\

$Cred/t - C P V/ck, 1983

Cosmos 1443/Salyut 7/Soyuz T: Total mass: about 47,000 kg, Total solar panel surface area: ‘[00 mz. Total power output:7 kW. Total volume: 150.3 m3. Solar panel span: 16-17 m

associated with other Soviet military space mis-sions, were conducted by all-military crews. Theyremained in orbit for shorter periods than theircivilian counterparts and ejected capsules for re-covery on Earth.

Of course, there must be some military interestin scientific programs. For instance, astronomicalinvestigations completed by Salyut crews main-tained the orientation of certain equipment to anaccuracy of a few arc-seconds, a capability relatedto what might be needed to aim directed-energyweaponry. The materials processed in microgravi-ty could range from electronic components to newpharmaceuticals,

Many activities aboard Salyut might be de-scribed, in the United States, as civil, but othersmight well have military implications. Whethermilitary activities aboard these stations pose aserious, near-term threat to the United States can-not be determined from the open literature. Cer-tain military operations may have been turnedover to automated spacecraft: Soviet advance-ments in satellite photo reconnaissance may havereduced the need for crewmembers to gather thesedata.

Comparisons with the U.S. program are alsocomplicated by the fact that no operational re-quirements for U.S. military missions aboard aspace station, particularly those requiring crew-members, have been formally stated. 32 However,in view of President Reagan’s speech in March,1983, on the subject of defense against ballisticmissiles, this assessment may be changing. 33 In

“At the Space Station Symposium held in Washington, D.C ,in luly 1983, R i c h a r d DeLauer, Undersecretary of Defense forResearch and Engineering, reiterated this position. For an earlierdiscussion, see: Joel Levy, et al,, “Potential Military Applicationsof Space Platforms and Space Stat ions,” Eascon 82, 15th AnnualElectronics and Aerospace Systems Conference, IEEE Conference

Record 82 CH1828-3, Sept. 20-22, 1982, pp. 269-276. This p a p e rstates: “It is apparent that, at this time, the DOD has not definedany firm requirements for space platforms or space stations. ” Themilitary utility of a manned space station, say for photo recon-naissance, requires detailed tradeoff studies, “ . in order toevaluate whether the increase in system performance due to man’spresence warrants the increase of approximately an order ofmagnitude in the cost of the program. Any increase in system per-formance achieved by such means would be measured by some, asyet undefined, weighing of factors such as cost, risk, survivability,reliability, threat recognition and the time to respond. ”

““President Seeks Futuristic Defense Against Missiles, ” Washing-ton Post, Mar, 24, 1983, pp. A-1, A-13. See also, “Reagan PlansNew ABM Effort, ” Science, vol. 220, Apr. 8, 1983. More recently,

3 1. —

any case, the military value of the Soviet spacestation remains open to question.

Capability Base for Salyut Program

The Soviet technology base must inevitably af-fect its space program. A thorough appraisal ofthis base cannot be obtained because the Sovietstightly control what information about the pro-gram is made public. Observers, however, havenoted these characteristics: 34

Simplicity. —Compared with similar Westernsystems, Soviet components are, in general,relatively less complicated.Commonality. —Once a basic system or sub-system is developed, it is used as much aspossible thereafter. With this approach, a rel-atively narrow technological base can servemuch broader needs.Gradual Change. —This principle derivesfrom the other two. Because each system isclosely related to its predecessor, the risks at-tendant on innovation are reduced.

In sum, the Soviets prefer to use a single, reli-able basic design over a relatively long time inorder to provide several generations of systemsfor similar or related uses.

Professional surveys of industrial technologyin the U.S.S.R. suggest that the Soviets are gen-erally unwilling or unable to undertake rapid in-novation. In some cases, however, a few criticalsuppliers and supporting industries have been ableto set priorities that led to rapid change.

the Defensive Technologies Study Team, headed by former NASAAdministrator James C. Fletcher, has been reported as concluding

that “a space-based [ballistic missile defense] system may also re-quire a continuous manned space presence Both cost and ef-

fectiveness may justify manned systems . Development of a repairand refurbishment system may be fie key to operational andeconomic viability of space-based ballistic missile defense. ” A W’&ST,Oct. 24, 1983, p. 50.

“Herbert P. Ely, “Impact of the Technology Base on SovietWeapon Development ,“ Army Research, Development & Acquisi-

tion Magazine, May-June 1982, pp. 12-13. For a broader look atconditions of Soviet technology see: Industrial lrrnovat~on in theSoviet Union, Ronald Amann and Julian Cooper (New Haven,Corm.: Yale University Press, 1Q82). The authors discuss Sovietmilitar y technologies in detail, and conclude that they do not havethe quality and level of sophistication that those of the United Stateshave. In general, although Soviet industry is slow to respond to newR&D initiatives, the technology lag is smallest in the defense andspace sectors.

Hampered by a lack of precise instrumentationand sophisticated engineering techniques, Sovietspace designers frequently take a “brute-force” ap-proach to problem-solving .35 Although this ap-proach has obvious drawbacks, it does tend toimpose—in contrast to the U.S. system of single-unit production—an economy of operationthrough the exploitation of continuing productionof less complex hardware. Lastly, there is a con-sensus that an uneven research and developmentbase, poor quality control, and poor qualityassurance has impeded Soviet space developmenton many fronts.3b

Evidence for these evaluations is provided bythe mixed results from lunar probes and interplan-etary exploration. Crossing the relatively shortdistance to Earth’s neighboring Moon, Sovietvehicles were generally successful in achieving softlandings, trekking across the lunar terrain, andreturning samples of the Moon’s surface directlyback to Earth, Four-month dashes to the planetVenus resulted in significant Soviet success inlanding vehicles and-operating their sensors forbrief periods on the surface of that extraordinarilyinhospitable world.

By contrast, 9-month journeys to Mars havemet with repeated failure, and no attempts havebeen made to probe Mercury, Jupiter, and Saturn.The outer planets in particular, the subject of in-tense scrutiny by U.S. space vehicles, have so farremained beyond the reach of Soviet probes. Therather limited time during which important sys-tems aboard Soviet spacecraft remain operationalis still a major limitation. This weakness also ap-pears in spaceflights with Soviet crews, who havebeen able to keep Salyuts operational by under-taking unscheduled maintenance and repair.

As these operations of Soviet spacecraft are re-viewed, certain limitations become apparent:

.“Ursula M. Kruse-Vaucienne and John M. Logsdon, Science and

Technology in the Soviet Union–A Profile (Washington, D. C.:Graduate Program in Science, Technology and Public Policy, TheGeorge Washington University, 1979), pp. 3-7,

‘bEven though impediments exist, can they be circumnavigatedby a concentrated scientific thrust? See, for example: John W. Kiser,111, “Technology: We Can Learn a Lot From the Soviets, ” The Wash-ington I’ost, Aug. 14, 1983, pp. Cl, C4. See also: Malcom W.Browne, “Soviet Science Assessed as Flawed But Power ful, ” TheNew York Times, May 20, 1980, p. C-3, which describes the buildupof the Soviet science work force and its potential for scientific\urprise.

Salyut.—Although Salyut is smaller than cur-rently proposed U.S. concepts, it has accommo-dated Soviet crews for as long as 211 days. At-tachment of a Cosmos 929-type module shouldmarkedly improve living conditions.

Salyut cannot communicate via line-of-sight cir-cuits directly with Ear-t h stations (in the SovietUnion) during every ore of its 15 or 16 daily or-bits. On those orbits when communication is notpossible, the cosmonauts sleep, and telemetry,communicated via shortwave circuits, issometimes used to monitor basic onboard sys-tems. Even during the in-contact orbits, the crewcan communicate with Earth stations on Sovietterritory for only 25 minutes out of every 90.

Compared with scientific equipment proposedfor any future U.S. “stations,” Soviet scientificequipment is low in weight and used sporadical-ly; just a small portion of it is replaceable. Thestation itself can generate 4 kW of power, Cosmos1443 contributed 3 kW from its own solar panelswhile it was attached to Salyut, and additionalmodules may be expected to do likewise. The lowreturn-weight of equipment transported back toEarth via Soyuz T is one constraining factor; be-cause of the delay in returning photographic filmto Earth, its use, rather than reliance on advancedelectronics, for remote sensing of the Earth isanother (although the installation of live televi-sion transmission equipment aboard the latest Sal-yut has partially overcome this limitation). * Thelife-support system requires regular deliveries ofdrinking water and supplies for purifying thecabin atmosphere. * * The current configurationrequires that Salyut be refueled through its aftdocking port.37

Soyuz T.—This vehicle, like the original Soyuz,is a reliable, though relatively unsophisticated,spacecraft. Its onboard computer has no backup.The latest mission of cosmonauts aboard Salyut7 demonstrated an operational lifetime of SoyuzT, while attached to the station, of 150 days. Be-

‘App. A.* *Some water is recycled abo,ird Salyut, a capability that U.S.

spacecraft do not possess.ITFor a discussion of rendezvo~ls and docking techniques involv-

ing Soyuz T and the Salyut stations, see: A viatsiya i Kosmonautika,1979, pp. 36-39, translated in JPRS 74805 Space No. 1, Dec. 20, 1979,

3 3

cause the Soviets are reluctant to land Soyuz Tin the water or at night, they impose strict con-straints on the duration and scheduling of itsflights. Yet, they have repeatedly demonstratedthe ability to deviate from these conditions whennecessary. No spacecraft, of course, can landwithout restrictions. Indeed, the U.S. Space Shut-tle Orbiter operates with even greater restrictionsthan Soyuz. Major modifications of the U.S. craftwould be required if its staytime in orbit were toapproach that of Soyuz T.

General

In order to minimize one of these deficiencies,the Soviet Union, according to a plan lodged withthe International Frequency Registration Board in1981, intends to operate a system called theEastern Satellite Data Relay Network (ESDRN),which will employ radiofrequencies similar to theU.S. Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System(TDRSS). The Soviet system would allow reliable,nearl y continuous communication with Salyutstations and other spacecraft in low-Earth orbit,commencing perhaps as early as December 1985.

Despite the fact that the Soviet technology baseadvances more slowly and still remains, in mostinstances, less sophisticated than that of theUnited States, it is not suggested that these fac-tors seriously inhibit what appears to be a con-tinuing and expanding set of objectives for pro-ductive operations in space, made possible, inpart, by people aboard Salyut-class facilities, anddetermined by what the Soviets consider valuable.Resupply, repair, and service functions, for ex-ample, are often performed by cosmonauts, whowere a key factor in the longevity of Salyut 6. TheSoviets regard the adaptability of human beingsas a form of insurance that permits continuousand variegated space station operations .38

Whereas the U.S. program from its inceptionwas heavily influenced by the high visibility ofthe Apollo program and the continuing presenceof test pilots, who insisted that astronauts be “inthe loop” whenever possible, the Soviet programat the outset was heavily influenced by the Insti-

‘“G, T Beregovt]y, et a] , EvperImentd] p~jrcho]oglcd] Research

{n A ~r]at~on and Cosmond utlc-s ( ?vIoscow Navka Press, 1 Q78 ~.

tute for Automatic Control, which obviously hada different orientation. However, the same unre-liability of automated equipment that has plaguedthe Soviets’ long-duration planetary probes hasmade the human presence an essential element inthe Salyut program. As a result, the Soviets havegone far in discovering how the attributes peculiarto human beings may be put to effective use inconducting unforeseen as well as planned activitiesin the course of maintaining and operating a spacestation. 39 Their growing fund of experience sup-ports and in turn is supported by two related re-quirements of their ideology and their judgmentof their national security interests: that they begin“the inevitable socialist expansion into space, ” andthat they maintain and enhance their nationalprestige. These factors have resulted in whatshould be appreciated as the cultivation of thehuman presence in space.

The Soviets have claimed that people stationedin space can improve the effectiveness of Earthobservations. After a period of adjustment of afew weeks, cosmonauts report both improved vis-ual acuity and enhanced perception and differen-tiation of color, making it possible for them toidentify land features and ocean phenomena (e. g.,the presence of schools of fish) that were not ex-pected to be visible from low-Earth orbit. Thesefindings have been pursued in real-time aboardSalyut space stations.40 41

In support of the human presence, the Salyutstations have served as medical laboratories inwhich the occupants have completed comprehen-sive programs of biomedical and life-science re-search. Much of this data-gathering is dedicatedto answering the following questions: Do longspaceflights result in unacceptable psychologicaleffects and produce harmful physiological altera-tions of the human body? If so, can these effectsbe countered? In search of answers, the Soviets

—.- ——“G, T . Beregovoy et a l , ‘ Res, arch in Space Psychology, ”

l’sikhologicheski,v Zhurnai, .?(4 ), Jul\F-August 1082, pp 1(30-167 (InE n g l i s h , J P R S Space, No\T 19, 1Q82 pp. 17-so, )

““Jerry Grey, B e a c h h e a d s In Space A B]ueprlnt for the F“uture,

N e w Y o r k , 1983, p, 42.

“Personal communication from Chr I> Dodgy, Science POIICy

Research Division, Congressional Researc h $ervice, \4’ashingt(~n,DC., re U, S,-U, S,S. R. \lrorklng Group on ~pace B]t>logy and \led-ic ine, meet i ng of Ntl\’ember 1981, L“n ltc~rmed Ser\rices L’n I vers] t }’of the Health Sc]ences (USUHS 1, Bethesda, hld

34

are planning in-flight missions that would entailstays up to 1 year for cosmonauts.

Special exercise and diet regimes are being em-ployed to counter changes in cardiovascular toneand muscle systems during flight and to facilitatethe subsequent readaptation to gravity. Somechanges such as the loss of red blood cells havebeen found to be self-limiting and subsequentlyreversible. Others, although decreasing in rateover time, may not entirely level off. In particular,osteoporosis, the loss of calcium from bone, maypose a formidable problem in the context of flightdurations of a year or more in the absence of grav-it y. 4243 Extensive ground-based studies employ-ing simulations of weightlessness (including bedrest and water immersion) are augmenting inflightresearch. 44

Medical studies of the cosmonauts, supple-mented by onboard diagnostic equipment to mon-itor their overall health on long flights, continue

A2Arnauld E. N ic o g os s ia n a n d J a m e s F . P a r k e r , Jr., SPaCe

Physiology and Medicine, Biotechnology Inc., NASA Headquarterscontract NASW-3469, Washington, DC., September 1982, pp.20-24.

tsThe Soviets themw]v~ seem undecided about whether very long-term weightlessness will be a general problem. Cosmonaut GeorgiGretchko is quoted (in “Soviets Unveil Space Station Plans, ” by PeterSmolders, New Scientist, June 301983, p. 944) as saying of a possi-ble trip to Mars: ‘Your heart and entire organism would have becomeso accustomed to living in space that you would never be able tostand life on Earth again. ” On the other hand, see Grey, op. cit.,PP . 41-42: “One of the cosmonauts, Valery Ryumin, spent a fullyear in space (he served on the 175-day and 185-day flights aboardSalyut 6), and was in excellent physical condition after both flights.He walked comfortably only one day after returning to the oppres-sive [sic] gravity of Earth, and was jogging happily on the third day.After exhaustive studies of the returned cosmonauts, the Soviets’bioastronautics mentor Oleg Gazenko concluded, ‘I believe thathumankind can be as happy in space as on Earth. ’ “

AAArnauld E. Nicogossion and Courtland S. Lewis, A Critical Re-view of the U.S. and International Research on Effects of Bedreston Major Body Systems, Biotechnology, Inc., NASA Headquarterscontract No. NASW-3223, Washington, D. C., January 1982.

to be given a high priority aboard Salyut. Cer-tain countermeasures have been designed to main-tain good health and high performance duringprolonged spaceflight. The most demanding ofthese is exercise, which consumes an average of2.5 hours during each day in space and involvesthe use of specialized gear as well as conventionalexercise devices.

The Soviets have devised a comprehensivepsychological support program, including thetransport of letters and news to Salyut crews andfrequent two-way video communication withfamilies and research counterparts on the ground.These measures have been instituted to counterthe cosmonauts’ isolation and heavy workload.

One challenging goal is a closed life-supportsystem aboard Salyut that would generate waterand air and produce food, independent of exter-nal supply .45 46 A complete growing cycle of high-er order plants has been evaluated aboard Salyut,as has control of plant diseases and use of vege-tables and herbs as food for human consump-tion. ’ Creation of partially closed ecological sys-tems may conceivably lead to completely closedsystems, suitable for flights of 2 years or more.Designed in accordance with biomedical informa-tion derived from past Salyut flights, these closedsystems could be implemented for eventual flightto the Moon and neighboring planets; such sys-tems might also lead to substantial cost reductionsin Earth orbit operations.

’51. I. Gitelson, et al., Cfosed Ecosystems as the Means for theOuter Space Exploration by Mer! (Experimental Results, Perspec-tives), IAF-81-164, presented in Rome, Italy, Sept. 6-12, 1981.

46Y. Y. Shepelev, “Biological life-Support Systems, ” ch. 10 ofFoundations of Space Biology and Medicine, vol. 111: Space Medicineand Biotechnology, M. Calvin ar[d O. G. Gazenko (eds. ), NASA,1975. NASA Sp-374, pp. 224-308.

*Borage was grown from seedlings to leaf stage, and spring onionsfrom bulbs to maturity.

Future Directions

The Soviet Union’s Salyut space stations haveformed the backbone of an ambitious and expan-sive program involving human beings in space.The ideological underpinning of Salyut is the de-sire to project and maintain an image of scien-tific, technological, and industrial world leader-ship in space. Overall, the Soviet approach to-ward implementing these goals has been one ofcautious advance—a step-by-step evolution con-sistent with an often-stated, long-term goal ofspreading Soviet influence into near-Earth spaceand beyond. As was the case for the U.S. Apolloprogram, the Soviet effort does not appear to bepredicated on near-term economic benefits.

The last 5 years have witnessed a growing ma-turity and confidence in Soviet spaceflight plan-ning and conduct, Present Soviet activities withSalyut are approaching the establishment of a per-manent human presence in low-Earth orbit .47

Whether or not continuous human occupancy isestablished soon, the Soviet Union can be ex-pected at least to maintain and probably to ex-pand human activities in space. The Salyut spacestation is anticipated to remain the central elementfor space operations involving peopIe, althoughseveral new programs may augment the station’suse and enhance the range of future Soviet op-tions.

Three New Initiatives

Soviet planners appear to be looking at threenew initiatives: modular space stations, heavy-lift expendable boosters, and reusable launchvehicles. President Brezhnev was apparently astrong supporter of space expenditures; PresidentAndropov’s views are not fully known .48 Al-though appraisals of Soviet spending are diffi-cult, 49 one estimate puts the overall cost of the—. —

47Rolf Engel, “Soyuz and Salyut: Stepping-stones to a PermanentSoviet Space Station?” Znteravia, February 1982, pp. 173-177.

~ HAccording to one Western source, no major change in the Sovietdetermination to expand in space is to be expected. See: Theo Pirard,“Russia’s Future in Space, ” Space Press, June 1983, pp. 16-17.

“See, for example: “Estimating Soviet Military Spending-An Ar-cane Art M’ith Political Overt ones,” by Michael R. Gordon, IVa-tional ]ournal, June 26, 1982, pp. 1140-1141, Gordon discusses the

Soyuz/Salyut program during the 1970’s at near-l y$40 billion (in 1980-adjusted dollars). That is ap-proximately the cost of the entire U.S. MoonLanding program—from the first Mercury sub-orbital flight to the final Apollo 17 Moon land-ing and return. 50 Moreover, the cost to develop,launch, and maintain Salyut 6 during its nearly5-year tour-of-duty probably exceeded $9 billion(in 1980-adjusted dollars).” As in the UnitedStates, the economic climate in the Soviet Unionmight well dictate the scope, scale, and timing ofany new Soviet space initiative.

Modular Space Stations

A modular station could be composed of fiveto eight units, separately launched and assembledin orbit. These plans are well within current Sovietcapabilities. Indeed, Soviet sources have identifiedCosmos 929-class modules as prototypes:

of the kind that will be linked together toform a multi-purpose orbital station. One of themodules will be a fitted-out laboratory, otherswill perform purely technological duties. Therewill also be observatory modules and wholeplants for manufacturing products in zero-g.Lounge modules will be living quarters for cos-monauts to take a rest after the heavy workloadthey will handle in space. . . . Each station caneasily be modified by changing modules to fitchanging needs of the mission . . .52

Within a constellation of such modules, Sovietcosmonauts could begin to live in orbit more com-fortably and more productively. A modular spacestation could be the beginning of a usefully per-manent human presence in space. Among otherpossibilities, the crew of a large, well-equippedstation would no longer have to be limited tobroadly trained cosmonauts. Technicians withparticular specialties could be included in the sta-tion’s complement. In any case, a large modular

controversy surrounding U.S. estimates of Soviet military spendingwhich are used to justify increased American military budgetrequests,

50 Enge], Op, cit,, p. 175. These estimated costs for the Soviet Pro -

gram include expenditures for investment, infrastructure, anddevelopment.

“Saunders Kramer, “Salyut Mission, ” in Letters to the Editor,AW&ST, oct. 27, 1980, p. 76.

sZDr. Feoktistov, quoted i n DST-14005-022082.

3 5

36

station would allow human beings to achieve amore normal, leisured, and productive life inspace than has hitherto been possible.

Heavy-Lift Expendable Boosters

Currently, Salyut operations are carried outusing two types of launch vehicles. The “A” seriesbooster, which provides over 400 tonnes of thrustat liftoff, is the workhorse of the Soviet launcherfamily .53 Variants of this booster are used to loftSoyuz, Soyuz T, Progress, and other vehicles.This standard launch vehicle, minus its upperstage, was used to orbit Sputnik 1 into space in1957—an indication of its reliability and longev-it y. 54 “D” series boosters, called “Protons,” havelaunched Salyut space stations and Cosmos 929-class modules without cosmonauts onboard. TheProton’s thrust at liftoff equals about 1,000tonnes. There are also “C” and “F” series boosterswhich meet other requirements, but those of the“B” series have been phased out.

Under development, according to reports reach-ing the West, is a new booster in the “G” seriescapable of producing up to 5,000 tonnes of thrustat liftoff. Previous boosters in this series were ap-parently destroyed in three inaugural attempts(1969, 1971, and 1972): one exploded on thelaunch pad and two exploded in flight. Similarto the U.S. Saturn V, the redesigned G booster,possibly carrying cryogenic upper stages, isseveral years away from operational status,though test flights could occur between 1984 and1986. A Pentagon analysis claims the booster willbe capable of putting very heavy payloads intoorbit (180 to 210 tonnes)—six to seven times thepayload weight of the U.S. space Shuttle.55

Some believe the new “G” series booster willlead to the long-awaited Soviet attempt to putcosmonauts on the Moon. Others believe it willbe used to orbit very large electromagnetic weap-ons. The new booster could also propel a 90-tonnestation into orbit, to be occupied by a dozen or——

‘Appendix A describes this booster in more detail. See also(jlu~hkc}, Valentin, Petrovich, “Development of Missile Construc-tlc~n ~nd C{wmonautics ]n the U. S. S. R.,” )Mashinc)stra.venive(Nl[)wt)w Machine [ncfustry Publishin g House, 1982), p. 66.

“James Oberg, “Beyond Sputnik’s Booster, ” Omni, October 1982,

pp. 22, 189.

“Soviet Military Power (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department ofDefense, 1981 ), pp. 79-80.

more crewmembers by the end of the decade.Such facilities might, in some respects, be moreattractive than space stations built from smallermodules. With relatively small-sized modules,such as the Cosmos 929-class, for example, theremay be as much as 30 percent redundancy ofhardware for rendezvous, docking, propulsion,electrical power, structural support, and the like.In a larger station, the weight of this otherwiseemployed hardware could be used instead for ad-ditional instrumentation, living quarters, manu-facturing facilities, and other productive equip-ment, All of these uses could be fulfilled by sucha launcher. As an alternative to developing sucha “G” series launcher, the Proton booster mightbe upgraded to carry cosmonauts. This choicewould allow some modest improvements andavoid the risks inherent in developing a newlauncher.

Reusable Vehicles

The Reusable Space Plane.—Speculation con-cerning a Soviet version of the LT. S. Dyna-Soarhas been fueled by two Cosmos flight tests, eachapparently designed to evaluate the aerodynamicand reentry characteristics of a winged spaceplane, weighing about a tonne. These missions—Cosmos 1374 on June 3, 1982, and Cosmos 1445on March 15, 1983—flew identical trajectories;each was sent into space for a 2-hour test fromthe Kapustin Yar launch site near Volgograd, or-bited the Earth, and landed in the Indian Ocean.A seven-ship Soviet task force supported bothretrieval operations. Photographs of the Sovietrecovery of Cosmos 1445, released by the RoyalAustralian Air Force, indicate the craft is of alifting-body/blended-wing design .5’ Some West-ern experts contend that the recovered vehiclesare prototypes designed to provide reentry datafor a larger 10-to 20-tonne version which wouldcarry a crew. (By contrast, the U.S. space Shut-tle weighs approximate] y 100 tonnes. ) The Soviettests have been likened to the U.S. Asset programof the early 1960’s, which made use of several—-

“See the following: Craig Covault, “Soviets Orbit Shuttle Vehi-cle, ” A W&ST, June 14, 1982, pp. 79-80; “Soviets Launch WingedSpacecraft, ” AW&ST, Mar. 21, 1983, p. 18; “Soviets RecoverSpaceplane in Indian Ocean, ” A W&ST, Mar. 28, 1983, p. 15; and“Soviets Recover Spaceplane, ” 4 W&ST, Apr. 4, 1983, p, 16. See

also: U.S. Department of Defer se, Soviet Military Power, March1983, pp. 66-68.

—— —— .—

37

m

~ -.7 -———.+ 4

f“-

38

Photo credlf Austra//a Department of Defence

Recovery of Cosmos-1445 by the SSVRS 201 YAMAL is believed to be a quarter-scale testbed versionof the Soviet space plane

gliders on suborbital flights into the Atlantic, togather heating and structural load information onwinged space vehicle designs.

Some Western observers believe this programmay have begun as early as 1976. Drop tests ofthe Soviet space plane from aircraft, akin to thosecarried out in the U.S. space Shuttle program,have been reported.

The Soviet space plane is expected to be capableof ferrying three persons between the ground andthe Salyut station or other platforms in low-Earthorbit. It should be able to provide a means ofrapid evacuation from the station and sufficientcross-range to allow landing at any major airport.However, its design may make little, if any, cargospace available, thus affording no solution to theSoviets’ inability to return heavy payloads fromspace stations to Earth. Although less versatile

than the U.S. Shuttle, its greater simplicity mightbe well-adapted to quick launch and turnaroundas well as rapid response to occasional reconnais-sance requirements. Operation of the vehicle maybegin within 2 to 3 years.

The Reusable Heavy-Lift Shuttle .—Accordingto an assessment by the Department of Defense,the Soviet Union is apparently building a “heavy-lift” space shuttle similar in design to the U.S.Shuttle but capable of lofting twice as much pay-load into orbit. As detailed in a 1983 report onSoviet military power,57 58 the heavy shuttle, likethe U.S. Shuttle, will be a delta-winged orbitermounted on an external tank with strap-on

57sov;ef ~j]j~av power, M ed. (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Depart-

ment of Defense, March 1983), pp. 64-69.58 Craig Covault, “Soviets Buildlng Heavy Shuttle, ” AlW&ST, Mar.

14, 1983, pp. 255-259.

—39

— -——. —

boosters. However, its ratio of payload weightto total vehicle weight is judged to be higher thanthat of the U.S. vehicle, and the specific impulseof its liquid-fuel strap-on boosters could be higherthan the Shuttle’s solid-fuel engines. In addition,the U.S. Shuttle carries 40,000 lbs of main enginesand propulsion equipment on the Orbiter itself,whereas the Soviet shuttle would carry them onits main tank. This general configuration, where-by the Soviet shuttle would not have to recoverits high-energy main engines, would result in alarge payload bonus, though this advantagewould have to be weighed against the cost of re-placing the (unrecovered) engines. Overall,although its precise configuration and propellantsare not known, the Soviet shuttle, with liquidstrap-on boosters, could provide a payload capa-bility of perhaps twice that of the 65,000 lbs ofthe U.S. Shuttle .59

Although the smaller space plane has been un-dergoing tests for several years, the heavy-liftshuttle design is relatively new and would require,perhaps, a decade of development and testing be-fore it would be ready for regular use. Advancedversions of the vehicle could evolve into a two-stage, fully reusable system. bo 6

1 At the Tyuratamspaceport near the Aral Sea, where Soviet cos-monauts are often launched, a large runway hasbeen built and could be used to support opera-tions for either type of reusable spacecraft. bz

——. .- ———‘+ See Picard, op. cit. It should be noted, however, that previous

Soviet practice has been to rely on space structures that, relativetc~ comparable U.S. structures, are heavy. If this practice is con-tinued in the heavy-lift shuttle, and if this vehicle does indeed relyexclusively on I iquid propellants, then a payload capacity doublethat of the U.S. Shuttle would imply a thrust at lift-off of some 3,000

to 4,000 tonnes.

‘“Craig Covau]t, “Soviets Developlrrg Fly Back Launcher, ”AJ4’&ST, No\T. 6, 1978, pp. I Q - 2 0 .

“For further views on a Soviet space shuttle system, see: “A SovietSpace Shuttle?” b y K e n n e t h Gatland, Spacef/ight, September-Octc>ber, 1978, pp. 325-326. Also, ‘The Soviet Space Shuttle Pro-gram, ” b} Lt Carl A. Forbrich, Air UrrI\, Review. May-June 1980,PP. 55-62, and ‘The Soviet Space Shuttle: Sifting Fact From Rumor,”by James Oberg, reprinted in Insight, the newsletter of the NationalSpace Institute, June-July 1980, pp. 4, Q.

“’Pictures ot the runaway have r-tow appeared In A W&ST, Mar.21, 1983, pp 20-21.

General Considerations

Although both types of Soviet reusable space-craft may be realized in the relatively near future,Western experts disagree on the roles these vehi-cles might play with cosmonauts aboard. Somehave suggested that the space plane could servethe Soviet military as a “space fighter. 63 Othersthink that the Soviets plan to use it as a replace-ment for Soyuz T vehicles. The heavy-lift shut-tle, on the other hand, could well have an impor-tant role in boosting a new and larger generationof space-station modules into orbit.

The Soviets have bitterly criticized the U.S.space Shuttle as evidence of the “militarization ofspace” despite the official U.S. position that thecraft is not a weapon. Soviet criticism may arisefrom a genuine fear of its use for military opera-tions, or it may be a smoke screen to be main-tained only until the Soviet Union can unveil asimilar vehicle. 64 Soviet protests against U.S.military reconnaissance satellites, for instance,subsided once the U.S.S.R. had launched com-parable spacecraft.

“’’Soviet Militarization ot Space, ” Air Force i’blagazine, hlarch1982, p. 42,

“Soviet sensitivities as to the military usefulness ot the U.S. SpaceShuttle and its potential for sparking Sowet ‘technological inferiori-ty” are evidenced in: .%viet Elites— Jfrorld \ ‘iet~’ and l’ercept]ons

of the U. S., by G. Guroff and Steven Grant, Oftlce of Research r

International Communications Agency, R-18-81, Sept, 2Q, 1Q81,p. 17. Report observes:

The U S space shuttle, in particular, \eems to h~vt, lett $t)\lets, ln -c Iudlng some at the highest levels, alm{)st >pcec h less \f’hen they wwon telev islon ( private showings) what the [ I S had dt)ne ]t was clearto many that their erstwhile “lead ‘ In the manned space race had dlwp-peared, and that their own program was year, bt,htnd that ,)t the LI SG]ven the wide publlclty of Soviet space ett{)rts man> Soviets telt untilthen that the U S had all but abandoned space t{) the S[)vlet Llnlon

Many belleve that they are Incapable ot doing t% hat the [‘ S ha. dt)newith the shuttle Thts teeljng translates tc)r mtl+t Sc)v Iets )nt[) the turt herbellet that It the U S wants to, It can change the mllltar}, bdlan( r )nIts favor almost overnight that it can pull some w capon rabbit out otIts technological hat at an~r moment and Iea\,e the S[)\let [ ‘nl[)n tar InehlndIn the arms race

Soviet concern regarding U.S. intentions to develop a space weaponscapability could be ampl]~ fueled by such documents as High Fron -

tier—A New National Strategy, a Project of the Heritage Founda-tion, Washington, D,C. 1982, which calls for, among other element~,a military “high performance spaceplane” for inspecting or retrle~r~lof “suspect” space objects.

American perceptions of the Soviet milltar>’ presence )n \pace IStypified by: “Twenty-five Years After Sputnik— The New’ Sc)vletArms Buildu p in Space, ” The New York Time .!lagaz]ne (let 3,1W32, pp. 30-34, 89, 92-Q3, Q8, 100.

Impact on Foreign Policy

The Soviet Union’s space program is intendedto demonstrate, inter alia, what can be achievedunder its form of government. To this end, theSoviets have made political capital out of theirguest cosmonaut program: a number of cosmo-nauts from Soviet-bloc countries—Czechoslovak-ia, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary,Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia, and Romania65—wereferried to Salyut 6 for short-duration workingvisits. A French spationaut was transported to andfrom Salyut 7. Preparations are underway to in-clude a crewmember from India in early 1984, andother countries may be invited to participatein future missions. How valuable is the guest pro-gram? At a minimum, it supports Soviet propa-ganda aims, and the scientific exchange, particu-larly with the French, may be of significant value.In any case, the Soviets clearly believe that theprogram is worth the relatively small investmentrequired.

These international activities suggest the Sovietshave decided to make their space program some-what more open. Recently, they have also begunto announce some launch dates and to allow out-siders to observe payload processing, to viewlaunches, and to access scientific data morequickly,

In contrast to the United States, the SovietUnion, in the view of some, is much more aggres-sive in deploying its space program as an impor-tant element in its foreign policy. Increasing open-ness may be the forerunner of greater cooperativeefforts, particularly in the use of more instrumen-tation from Eastern European sources. The coop-erative Soviet-French venture to probe Venus andHalley’s Comet, for example, will incorporatemore sophisticated technology than the Soviets

bsThe last six are in Cyrillic alphabetical order. See J. Oberg, RedStar in Orbit.

have previously used, thus increasing its chanceof success. ”

Whereas the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP)came to fruition as a product of detente, similarjoint U.S.-Soviet ventures involving space stationsare viewed by many as out of step with currentpolitical realities. Others suggest that such ven-tures are technically logical and diplomaticallyfeasible.” There is also a possibility that cooper-ative space ventures could become polarized: theSoviet Union might increase its working relation-ships with Eastern European countries and, per-haps, France, while the United States works withJapan, Canada, and Western Europe.68 Future Sal-yuts could incorporate “internationalized” mod-ules dedicated to specific scientific research orcommercial application.

The impact of an evolving Soviet space stationprogram on U.S. space policy is unclear. Manyobservers agree that a U.S.S.R, pronouncementthat a “permanent presence in space” had beenachieved would do little to reshape U.S. civilianspace objectives. Even bolder announcements ofSoviet intentions to send human beings to theMoon or to traverse interplanetary distances toestablish a human presence on Mars, might havelittle influence on U.S. pursuits. Creation of asignificant and obvious military installation in or-bit, however, might well dictate an American re-sponse in kind.

In the end, a U.S. response to any new Sovietspace project would be heavily influenced by pub-lic opinion and the circumstances of that moment.It is impossible to predict with much assurancejust what Soviet activities might trigger an impor-tant American reaction.

“’’French, Soviets Weigh Venus Mission, ” AW&ST, Nov. 22,1982, pp. 79-80.

‘7See, for example, “Hitch Up With a Red Star, ” James Oberg,OMN1, March 1982, p. 20.

“’’NASA Mulls International Effort on Space Station, ” A W&STMar. 1, 1982, pp. 20-21.

41

25-291 0 - 83 - 4 : QL 3

Conclusion

In any characterization of the future of the So-viet space program, caution is the rule. Westernforecasters during the past 5 years expected a moredynamic effort than the Soviets actually put forth.Still, the Soviets have shown considerable perse-verance, and their predictions about even biggerspace stations—capable of housing “large collec-tives” rather than small crews—should be takenseriously. Modularized space facilities—carryingequipment for astronomical, physical, and chemi-cal experiments, and for technology developmentpurposes, adapted for multidisciplinary programsfor both civilian and military purposes—can beexpected. 69 It is possible that useful and market-able products and services could be provided.Such stations, situated in various orbits, wouldbe a straightforward extension of demonstratedSoviet capabilities. Eventually, these same facili-ties could involve international teams.

With a sufficient commitment of resources, theSoviets may be able to maintain a continued hu-man presence in space through the use of heavy-lift launchers and/or expanded use of currentlyavailable boosters. A shuttle-type vehicle wouldpermit routine access to platforms in near-Earthorbit. A large Salyut complex could serve as aspace transportation node or base camp.

As recently as late November 1983, the Sovietnewspaper Pravda asserted that the main thrustof Soviet cosmonautics is “the creation of [sophis-

b~comments of Anatoly Skripko, Science and TechnoloW Attacheto the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., at a luncheon of theAmerican Astronautical Society, Feb. 12, 1982. See also “SovietsInitiating Program on Modular Space Station, ” by Craig Covault,AlW&ST, July 20, 1981, p. 22; and “Soviets Move Toward SpaceOperations Center, ” James Oberg, Aeronautics and Astronautics,May 1982.

ticated] orbital manned complexes, which can beimproved during lengthy use and be reconstructeddepending on the nature of the tasks being tack-led. 70 The next step in the Soviet space programwill aparently be “the transition from long-termorbital stations regularly visited by replacementcrews to a multi-team, permanently manned or-bital complex. ”

From a permanent foothold in near-Earth or-bit, the next step might bean extension to geosta-tionary orbit. Soviet scientists have argued thata series of orbital stations might one day stretchfor hundreds of miles in a given orbit.72

Salyut operations are one step in the Sovietdrive toward mastery of space. It is quite con-ceivable that, by the end of the century, theycound put cosmonauts on the Moon. 73

‘“Quotation from Pravda, Nov. 25, 1983, appearing in AerospaceDaily, Dec. 1, 1983, p. 155.

7’Pravda, Nov. 28, 1983, quoted in Aerospace Daily, Dec. 1, 1983,p, 155. The article continued as follows: “Pravda said the size ofsuch a complex ‘will be impressive even by the standards of construc-tion on Earth. For instance, the parabolic antenna alone should havean effective aperture . . . [o]n the order of 300-350 meters. In ad-dition, it must be geared to a long period of operation—15-20 years

as a minimum. ’“Pravda said that ‘[t ]oday, this complex is conceived as a unified

system of large-scale installations in orbit at an altitude of 200-400kilometers, linked to Earth by freight and passenger transportspacecraft. The complex will include specialized scientific researchlaboratories, comfortable housing modules, powerful energy installa-tions, a refueling station, repair workshops, and even constructionsites for producing and installing standardized construction com-ponents. The real potential of orbital flight for the ad hoc solutionof urgent national economic tasks will also be expanded many timesover. ’ “

72Yuri Zaitsev, “Orbital Stations—The Present and Future, ”Moscow News, #45 (2825), Nov. 19-26, 1978, p. 11.

73’ The Soviets think that in about 20 years a journey to Mars maybe possible. By this time, spaceships may incorporate centrifugesthat simulate the conditions of living under gravity. ” Smolders, op.cit., p. 944.

4 3

Postscript

According to accounts published in U.S. news-papers on october 12, 1983,74 the Soviets an-nounced a nearly disastrous setback when an A-2rocket, bearing a Soyuz T and two cosmonauts,exploded on a launch pad at the Tyuratam cos-modrome. Apparently, just prior to scheduled lift-off, a fire was detected at the base of the launchvehicle, and the launch escape system was trig-gered, either by automatic failure detection cir-cuitry, the blockhouse crew, or the cosmonautsthemselves. The launch escape tower rocketejected the Soyuz orbital module and the descentmodule carrying the cosmonauts moments beforethe booster exploded beneath them. Subsequent-ly, the descent module was separated from the or-bital module and parachuted to Earth. The escaperocket subjected the cosmonauts to a high veloci-ty, high G, escape trajectory, and the landing im-pact velocity was substantially higher than thenormal 3.3 feet per second. Both may have sus-tained some injuries. This two-man crew was tohave made a week-long resupply visit to the twocosmonauts who have been aboard Salyut 7 sinceJune 28, 1983.75

This accident did not seem to have placed thecrew aboard the Salyut in any great danger be-

— . . —T~ wd~fiington post, Oct, 12, 1983, p. A-9; New York Times, Oct.

12, 1983, p, A-7.75 For a thorough discussion both of the accident and of the failure

aboard Salyut 7, see the article “Explosion, Leak Cripple Salyut 7Effort, ” AW&ST, Oct. 10, 1983, pp. 23-26.

because they were resupplied by Progress 17 inmid-August and Progress 18 in October and be-cause they were resupplied by Progress 17 in mid-August and Progress 18 in October and becausetheir Soyuz T-9 was still capable of returning themto Earth, In addition, the Soviets have at leastthree other (undamaged) launch pads at Tyur- ‘atam, and almost certainly have another SoyuzT and an A-2 booster which could have been in-tegrated and readied for launch on short notice.The degraded condition of Salyut 7, however,adds additional uncertainty for future missions.The Soviets have announced that the most recentcrew of cosmonauts returned to Earth on Novem-ber 23, 1983, after a mission of 150 days.

Coincidentally, NASA has had to postpone thefirst flight of Spacelab aboard the Shuttle because“a liner that protects the lowest part of one of the[reusable] solid-rocket engines from heat” wasalmost burned through during the previous Shut-tle flight.7b If the flame had burned through partof the engine in flight, the Shuttle would havebecome aerodynamically unstable some 2 minutesafter launch; the result could have been acatastrophe.

The U.S.S.R. accident and the U.S. near-acci-dent indisputably show that space operations arestill hazardous, even with systems that have beenflight-proved time after time,

“The Washington Post, Oct. 13, 1983, p. A-15.

45

General References

Baker, David, The History of Manned Space Flight(New york: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1982).

Gatland, Kenneth, chief author, The J))ustrated Ency-clopedia of Space Technology (London: SalamanderBooks, Ltd., 1981).

Johnson, Nicholas L., Handbook of Soviet MannedSpace Flight, vol. 48, Science and Technology Series(San Diego, Calif.: American Astronautical Socie-ty, 1980).

Soviet Space Programs, 1966-1970: Goals and Pur-poses, Organization, Resources, Facilities and Hard-ware, Manned and Unmanned Flight Programs, Bio-astronautics, Civii and Military Applications, Pro-jections of Future Plans, Attitudes Toward interna-

tional Cooperation and Space Law, Committee onAeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate,Washington, D. C., 1971.

Soviet Space Programs, 1971-75: Overview, Facilitiesand Hardware, Manned and Unmanned Flight Pro-grams, Bioastronautics, Civil and Military Applica-tions, Projections of Future P)ans, Committee onAeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, vol.1, Washington D. C., 1976.

Space Activities of the United States, Soviet Union,and Other Launching Countries/Organizations:2957-1981, Committee on Science and Technology,U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., Zd sess.,Serial Y, Washington D. C., June 1982.

47

Appendixes

Appendix A:

The Soviet Salyut Space Program:Space Station, Spacecraft, Support

and Training Facilities

Material provided to OTA by Dr. Balayan, Vice Chairman of the IntercosmosCouncil of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.

The Salyut Orbital Scientific Station

The creation of the Salyut orbital stations is an im-portant stage in the development of Soviet cosmonau-tics, intended to increase the length of both mannedand unmanned flights.

The total mass of the orbiting scientific complex, in-cluding two transport ships, is 32,500 kilograms (kg);the mass of the space station in orbit is 18,900 kg, themass of the transport ship in orbit is 6,800 kg. * Thedimensions are as follows: 1) total length docked withtwo transport ships 29 meters (m), 2) station length15 m, 3) maximum station diameter 4.15 m, and 4)maximum transverse station dimension with solar pan-els open 17 m.

More than 20 portholes are provided for the con-duct of scientific experiments, visual observation, andstill and motion picture photography from the com-partments of the station.

Hatches in the docking units are used to aIlow thecrew to move between the transport ship and the sta-tion. After docking, the crew can work and rest bothin the compartments of the station and in the transportships, moving through these hatches.

Terrestrial conditions are maintained in the sectionsof the station in orbit—the same gas composition, at-mospheric temperature and pressure, providing thenecessary conditions for the cosmonauts’ activities.

Composition and Arrangement of Orbital Station

The station consists of five compartments: transit,operations, scientific apparatus, intermediate, andequipment compartments.

During powered flight the external elements of thetransit section and parts of the small-diameter opera-tions section are protected from aerodynamic forcesby fairings which are later jettisoned.

‘These masses appear to be related to Salyut IJ and Soyuz craft

The scientific equipment installed in the scientific ap-paratus section is protected during powered flight bya scientific apparatus cover which is also jettisonedafter orbital insertion.

The transit section is bounded by conical and cylin-drical (2 m diameter) sealed envelopes.

The passive portion of the docking unit—the “cone”—is installed at the conical end of the section (the ac-tive “rod” docking unit is installed on the spacecraft),while the cylindrical portion of the section adjoins theoperations section of the orbital unit.

There is a hatch in the conical envelope of the tran-sit section to allow servicing of the station on Earthand to allow the crew to exit into space. The outer sur-face of the transit section carries:

antenna of the approach and docking unit;optical lamps for orientation during manual dock-ing of spacecraft;external television cameras;panels with temperature regulation units;gas storage cylinders of the life-support systemcontaining air;ionic and solar sensors of the station’s orientationsystem;handles and restrainers for cosmonauts in space-suits performing space walks; andpanels for the study of micrometeorites, contam-

The

ination of optical surfaces, and properties of rub-ber and biologic polymers.outside of the transit section and the apparatus

installed on it are covered with a vacuum-shield ther-mal insulation to maintain the required temperatureconditions.

Within the transit section, which is used as a lock,are spacesuits, panels, equipment and attachment de-vices to support space walks.

There are seven portholes in the transit section.Some carry instruments for astro-orientation of thestation. These instruments, together with the corres-ponding control panels and knobs which control theorientation of the station, form two control posts (postNos. 5 and 6).

51

52

The transit section connects to the operations sec-tion of the station through a sealed airtight hatch. Theoperations sections consists of two cylindrical shells(2.9 m diameter and 3.5 m length, and 4.1 m diameterand 2.7 m length) connected by a conical section (1.2m in length).

The cylindrical shells have spherical ends. The pos-terior end has a hatch which connects the operationssections with the intermediate chamber.

In the operations section, equipment is arrangedalong the section forming a common passageway be-side the equipment, with instruments and equipmentlocated to the left and right. The instruments andequipment are installed on standard racks which formthe frame of the interior,

Most of the monitoring and control systems andscientific apparatus of the station are in the operationssection. The apparatus with which the station crewworks directly is grouped by functional purpose in fivecontrol posts (there are two additional control postsin the transit section, as was mentioned earlier).

Post No. 1 is the central control post of the station,where control of the main station systems is concen-trated. It is located in the lower portion of the opera-tions section (in the small diameter area). This posthas two working locations equipped with chairs (forrestraint), communications equipment, control panels,a lever to control the angular position of the stationin space, optical sites of the orientation system, andportholes with no equipment.

To the left and right of the control panel are the re-generator cartridges of the station’s gas-mixture sup-port system, as well as the refrigeration and dryingunits of the temperature control system. Near the for-ward end of the operations section beyond controlpanel No. 1 are the gyroscopic instruments of theorientation and motion control system, mounted ona rigid frame.

Post No. 2 (the astropost) is also in the lower, smalldiameter portion of the operations section, closer toits conical portion. This post is used for astro-orien-tation and astro-navigation of the station. The postis equipped with communications equipment, an orien-tation control panel, and astro-instruments (installedon two portholes).

Between post Nos. 1 and 2 in the small diameter endof the operations section is the area where the creweat and rest. In this area is a table with special devicesfor heating food. A drinking water container is at-tached to the table. Along the right side in this areais the system which regenerates water from at-mospheric moisture condensate, The cosmonauts ob-tain hot and cold water from this system. Behind theinterior panels on the left side is the onboard computerapparatus. The cosmonauts can perform minor pre-

ventive repair of equipment on the table in this area,for which they have a special onboard toolkit avail-able.

Post No. 3 is intended to control the apparatus lo-cated in the scientific equipment section. This post islocated in the large diameter portion of the operationssection in its lower part near the rear end. Controlpanels, communications equipment, and retainers areinstalled here,

The instrument zone comtains the onboard radio sys-tem, radio telemetry system, and power supply systemcontrol apparatus. Near the aft end of the operationssection on the left and right sides are the crew’s bunks,and in the instrument arc a there are food storage con-tainers.

In the upper portion Of: the operations section (nearthe aft end) are two locks for jettisoning the crew’swastes into space. Wastes are collected in special con-tainers and, after they are ejected from the lock cham-ber, burn up in the atmosphere.

On the aft end of the operations section is the head.It is separated from the remaining portion of the opera-tions section and has forced ventilation. Beside it isa vacuum cleaner, dust filters, storage for water, lin-ens, and other life-support system consumables.

In the forward, larger-diameter portion of the opera-tions section is a system allowing the crew to showerperiodically.

Post No. 4 is in the lower central portion of the oper-ations section near the conical shell. Here is the equip-ment used for most of the medical experiments, stilland motion picture cameras, and the scientific appa-ratus control panel. This post has cosmonaut re-strainers and communications equipment.

Near post No. 4 is the system used to prevent ill ef-fects of weightlessness on the cosmonauts. It includes:

● a treadmill and other devices for physical exercise;● a bicycle ergometer;● a pneumatic vacuum suit to create low pressure

on the lower portion of the body; and● a muscle tissue stimulation apparatus,One of the two portholes at post No. 4 carries an

MKF-6M multiple-zone survey camera manufacturedby Karl Zeis Jena of East Germany with electronicsand control panel.

On the left and right sides near post No. 4 are therefrigeration and drying units of the temperature con-trol system, the onboarc radio apparatus, electronicunits of the orientation system, and station movementcontrol system.

Post No. 7 works in cooperation with the scientificequipment control post and water regeneration systemcontrol, This post is located in the central portion ofthe small diameter operations section.

Control panels are mounted on the interior to the

53

left and right; the cosmonaut who works here is re-strained in a reinforced seat.

All control panels and cosmonaut working locationsare equipped with internal loudspeaker communica-tions devices and daylight lamps. Other lamps are usedto create general illumination in the living space. Dur-ing still and motion picture photography and televi-sion reports, the cosmonauts turn on additional lightsto provide the necessary illumination for the cameras.

Most of the outer surface of the small diameter oper-ations section is covered with the temperature controlsystem’s radiator. On the left and right sides and inthe upper portions of the section are three solar bat-tery panels. Special drives rotate the panels toward theSun at all times. In the forward portion of the opera-tions section are the solar battery orientation systemsensors, which determine the position of the Sun inthe forward hemisphere as the station moves. Outsidethe lower portion of the small diameter operations sec-tion are the automatic station orientation instruments(an infrared vertical, solar sensor, television orienta-tion device, etc.), Outside the conical portion of theoperations section is a special repeating action coverwith electric drive to maintain the temperature of theporthole through which the MKF-6M camera operates.

On the outside of the large diameter operations sec-tion are the onboard radio system and telemetry sys-tem antennas.

To maintain the proper temperature the body of theoperations section is covered on the outside with matsof vacuum shield heat insulation, while the large di-ameter portion of the section is also covered with afiberglas cover for protection from aerodynamic heat-ing during powered flight. On the sides of the stationare panels with sensors to study the flux of microme-teorites.

The unsealed cylindrical equipment section (4.15 mdiameter, 2.2 m length) contains:

● the combined motor installation, including cor-recting motors and a system of low thrust motorswhich creates controlled torque to orient the sta-tion in space; and

tanks of fuel.On the outer surface of the equipment section are:● the approach and docking radio antennas;● optical lamps for orientation during manual dock-

ing of spacecraft with the station;● the solar battery orientation system sensors,

which determine the position of the Sun in the afthemisphere (with respect to station flight);

● the onboard radio system antennas; and● a television camera to monitor docking of trans-

port spacecraft.The equipment section is thermostatted in flight and

has external heat insulation similar to the insulation

of the operations section. The equipment section isconnected to the end of the operations section; its aftend is connected to the booster rocket.

The scientific apparatus section is in the large di-ameter cylindrical portion of the operations section.It is a combination of conical and cylindrical shells(maximum 2.2 m diameter). The end of the section isoriented toward outer space and is equipped with acover.

The intermediate chamber of the station is a sealedsection consisting of cylindrical and conical shells 2m in diameter with a total length 1.3 m. The seconddocking unit of the orbital station is mounted throughthe conical section on the intermediate chamber.

The intermediate chamber is used to carry equip-ment delivered by the transport spacecraft. An air lineis laid through it to supply air from the operations sec-tion to the transport ship to create a common atmos-phere. The intermediate section has two portholes usedfor visual observation, still and motion picture pho-tography and television reporting.

Systems of the Orbital Station, Their Purpose,and

10

The●

●

●

Main Operating Modes

Onboard Equipment Control System (SUBK).–SUBK controls the onboard systems:automatically (by a programed timer);on radioed command from the Earth; andon command of the cosmonauts at the controlpanels.

The SUBK switches the electric power supply sys-tem and protects the power supplies from short cir-cuits, controls the pyrotechnic cartridges which openand deploy external elements of the structure, etc., andoutputs information on the results of operations to thecosmonauts’ panels and to Earth.

2. Orientation and Motion Control System (SOLD).—The SOUD is intended to orient and control the mo-tion of the space station in automatic and manualmodes.

The SOUD includes:● a sensor apparatus (sensing elements);

— solar sensor;— infrared vertical device (IKV);— gyroscopic angular motion sensors;— an ionic sensor;— free three-way gyroscope; and— velocity increment integrator.

● manual instruments:— a wide-angle orienting site;— optical orientors;— an electronic-optical converter; and— an astro-orientor.

54

. the “Kaskad” apparatus to maintain long-term or-bital and inertial orientation;

● the approach electronic apparatus;. lamps and targets for manual approach and dock-

ing; and● automatic equipment and electronic units.3. Combined Motor Installation (ODU).–The ODU

is intended to create controlled torque around thecenter of mass of the station by means of low-thrustmotors, and to generate power to move the station bymeans of the high-thrust motors.

The combined motor installation includes:● correcting motors (two); and● orientation motors.The motors are supplied with fuel from two groups

of collectors, each of which supplies the motorsthrough three station control panels—pitch, yaw androll.

4. Command Radio Link.—The system is intendedto transmit control commands and settings from theEarth to orbit, trajectory measurements, two-way tel-ephone communications between Earth and the sta-tion, and television and telemetry information fromthe station to Earth.

The system includes receivers, transmitters, anten-na-feeder device, a programed timer (PVU), decoder,and other electronics and automation equipment.

5. Television Communications System.—The televi-sion system is used to transmit color and monochromeimages from the onboard television cameras to Earthand to the onboard television screen (VKU).

The system includes:● external stationary television cameras (mono-

chrome images);● the reporting television camera (color);● the reserve reporting camera (monochrome);. video monitors (VKU);● the antenna-feeder devices;● special lamps; and● automation and electronic equipment.6. Telephone Communications System.—The “Zar-

ya” radiotelephone communications system is intendedto provide two-way Earth-station and station-space-craft communications in the ultra-short wave (USW)and short wave (SW) bands. The system includes USWreceivers and transmitters, SW receivers and transmit-ters, and antenna-feeder devices.

To provide loudspeaker communications within thesealed station sections, there are loudspeakers,microphones, and amplifiers at the control posts andworking locations.

The transmission of text (alphanumeric) informa-tion from Earth to the station utilizes an apparatuswith a printer.

7. Radiotelemetry Communications system(RTS). –The radiotelemetry system is designed to col-lect information and transmit it from the spacecraftto Earth. The station carries two RTS systems; one sys-tem is used for service information, the other for in-formation from the scientific and experimental appa-ratus.

Independent magnetic recorders (MIR) with mag-netic tape cassettes are used to record scientificmeasurements with high sampling frequency. Themagnetic tapes are returned to Earth on transportspacecraft.

8. Orbital Control Radio System, Which PerformsTrajectory Measurements.

9. Power Supply System.—The power supply sys-tem (SEP) provides electric power for all onboard sys-tems of the station, and also charges the buffer batter-ies (BB) and supplies power to transport spacecraftdocked to the orbital unit.

The system includes:● solar batteries (SB); three solar battery panels are

installed on three planes of the station; the main buffer battery (BB);● the reserve buffer battery; and● the power supply test unit (BKIP).The SB panels are oriented toward the Sun by means

of the solar battery orientation system (SOSB). Whena minimal voltage is reached, all consumers are auto-matically disconnected except for the duty systems,and a switch is made to the reserve BBO. After space-craft dock, the orbital unit SEP charges the BB andsupplies the transport spacecraft as long as they re-main docked.

10. Life-support system (SOZh).—The SOZh is in-tended to provide conditions which will support thelife of the crew; proper pressure and gas compositionof the atmosphere, food and water, sanitary-hygienicconditions, and space-walk support.

The gas composition support system (SOGS) is in-tended to liberate oxygen (Oz) and absorb carbon diox-ide (COZ) and other impurities.

The system includes:● chemical O2 regenerators; chemical C0 2 absorbers :● gas analyzers;● harmful impurity filters (FVPS);● dust filters (PFs); and● gas stored in cylinders.Additional regenerators, absorbers, FVPs, and gas

are delivered by transport and cargo ships to replenishthe supplies and allow continued operations of the sys-tem.

The system can maintain the parameters of the at-mosphere within assigned limits (C02 =0.9 mm mer-

.

55

cury (Hg) Oz = 160-280 mmHg, total gas pressure 760-960 mmHg) by manual connection and disconnectionof regenerators and absorbers according to the read-ings of the gas analyzers.

The crew is supplied with water by regeneration ofwater from atmospheric moisture condensate and byreserves of stored water.

The water is stored in special containers.Food is stored onboard the station as daily pacs in

boxes. The food supply is supplemented by deliver-ing it on transport and cargo spacecraft.

Sanitary-hygienic conditions are maintained on-board the spacecraft by means of a sanitary installa-tion (ASU) [head —Tr. ], shower, sets of linen, personalhygiene washcloths, and two lock chambers (ShK)with containers for waste ejection. Liquid wastes arecollected in the sanitary device and ejected through thelocks. Solid wastes (ASU, food, etc. ) are collected inpackets, then placed in special rigid containers de-signed for ejection through the locks.

Two spacesuits are used to allow two cosmonautsto perform space walks simultaneously. The transitsection is used as a lock for this purpose.

11. Medical Monitoring and Prophylaxis Equip-ment. —This equipment is designed to allow regularmedical monitoring of the cosmonaut~ health and pre-vent harmful effects of spaceflight factors.

The system includes medical testing apparatus, an“Aelita” combined medical examination apparatus, atreadmill, bicycle ergometer, pneumatic vacuum suit,units for testing and indicating parameters of the crew’scondition upon orbital insertion, and a pharmacy.

These devices are used for:● regular medical testing, the information from

which is transmitted to Earth through the telem-etry channels;

● periodic medical examination with the “Aelita”apparatus, the data from which are recorded on-board the spacecraft and transmitted to Earth; and

● regular crew training (with a treadmill, bicycleergometer, and pneumatic vacuum suit).

12. Temperature Regulation System (STR).—TheSTR is intended to support the proper temperature ofstructures, units, and apparatus of the orbital stationand docked transport spacecraft, and to create com-fortable temperature conditions within the habitationsections.

13. Docking and Internal Transfer System (SSVP).—The SSVP is intended to perform mechani-cal, electrical, and hydraulic docking of the orbital sta-tion with transport and cargo spacecraft, and to sup-port internal transfer of cosmonauts from spacecraftinto the station without passage through open space.

The docking unit is based on the rod (active por-tion) and cone (passive portion) principle.

The Soyuz T Transport Spacecraft

The Soyuz T spacecraft is an improved mannedtransport spacecraft for the delivery of the crew toSalyut orbital stations and return of the crew to Earth,as well as transportation of cargo.

The experience gained in the development of flightsof Soviet spacecraft and stations was used extensive-ly in designing the Soyuz T spacecraft.

The Soyuz T spacecraft is placed in orbit by a Soyuzbooster rocket, which determined the size and massof the new spacecraft. The well-proved Soyuz space-craft, including the descent module, orbital (habita-tion) section, and instrument-equipment section, wasused as the basis for arrangement of the new space-craft.

However, the Soyuz T spacecraft differs in a numberof details from the earlier craft, has improvedcharacteristics and, particularly, increased effec-tiveness as a transportation vehicle for orbital spacestations, plus improved reliability and crew safety.

The spacecraft is designed to carry up to three crewmembers in space suits. In addition to the special on-board systems, the spacesuits protect the crew in caseof a loss of seal in the living spaces. If necessary, de-pending on the mission of each specific flight, thespacecraft crew may be reduced in number with nochanges in spacecraft design. The free spaces are thenused to carry special cargo containers, allowing, incombination with Progress spacecraft, the problem ofdelivering cargo to the station and returning cargofrom the station to be solved.

Most of the onboard systems of the spacecraft weredesigned anew or modernized using systems designprinciples, new elements, and new production andtesting technologies.

A new motion control system has been developedfor the spacecraft, using an onboard digital computer.The system calculates motion parameters and auto-matically controls the spacecraft in the optimal modewith minimum fuel consumption, performs self-test-ing, and automatically switches if necessary to reserveprograms and hardware, while outputting informationto the crew via the onboard display.

The decisions implemented in the system assurehigher accuracy, reliability, and flexibility of spacecraftcontrol in both orbital flight and descent.

The crew can control the spacecraft manually notonly in orbit but also during descent in the atmosphere.

The approach and correcting motor and dockingand orientation micromotors operate with the samefuel components and have a common fuel storage andsupply system, allowing more effective utilization ofonboard fuel reserves. During flight the consumptionof fuel is monitored by a special measurement system.

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In order to improve reliability, the landing equip-ment system has been modernized, and the emergen-cy crew rescue system, used as the spacecraft is placedin orbit, has been improved.

The radio systems of the spacecraft—such as thecommand-program radio link and radiometry and tel-evision systems—have been improved, and solar bat-teries have been included in the power supply system,

The design of the spacecraft provides for duplica-tion of important mechanisms, sealing devices, sepa-rator units, etc.

The total volume of the living spaces aboard theSoyuz T is about 10 m3.

The Progress Automatic TransportSpacecraft

The automatic transport spacecraft is intended fordelivery of the following items to the Salyut pilotedorbital station:

scientific apparatus, photographic materials, crewlife-support supplies, instruments, and units inneed of replacement; and

● fuel components to recharge the combined motorinstallation of the orbital station.

In addition, it provides for the removal of wastes andunits which have completed their operating life fromthe space station.

The automatic cargo transport spacecraft has alaunch mass of 7 tonnes and consists of three mainstructural units:

● the cargo section (GO) with docking unit;● the fuel component section (OKD); and● the instrument and equipment section (PAO),

consisting of the transit, instrument, and equip-ment sections.

The docking unit of the spacecraft is based on thedocking unit of the Soyuz manned spacecraft and isdesigned for mechanical docking of the spacecraft withthe station, to assure an airtight seal, and also to con-nect electrical lines and automatically connect and sealthe main fuel supply lines. The crew passes throughthe docking unit into the cargo section of the space-craft.

The cargo section of the spacecraft is intended tocarry instruments, scientific apparatus, photographicmaterials, food, water, and life-support system equip-ment, including regeneration installations, all mountedon special frames and in containers. Throughout theflight, with the docking unit hatch sealed, conditionsare maintained in the cargo section as required topreserve all of the instruments and food products be-ing delivered to the space station. The volume of thecargo section is 6.6 m3. The cargo section has an or-

dinary air atmosphere (7612 mmHg). The temperaturein the section is maintained between + 3° and + 30° C,

The cargo section is connected to the refueling com-ponent section. On the outer surface of the section arethree antennas of the electronic approach system, twoexternal television cameras (one aimed forward, theother toward the Earth), 103 light indices (used by thecrew to monitor correct placement of the spacecraftduring automatic approach and docking). Outside thesection are the main lines which feed fuel componentsfrom the refueling section to the connections on thedocking unit. The cargo section of the spacecraft cancarry up to 1,300 kg of cargo to the orbital station.

The refueling component section structurally con-sists of two truncated conical shells. The section con-nects at one end to the cargo section, at the other endto the transit section and instrument and equipmentsection. At the outside of the section are two light in-dices which supplement the light index on the cargosection. This section is intended to carry tanks of fuelcomponents for delivery to the orbital station, gascylinders, and the equipment of the refueling system.The gas in the cylinders (nitrogen or air) is used todrive the fuel components during the refueling and alsoto fill the habitation compartments of the station ifnecessary.

The refueling system includes a system which teststhe seal of the fuel lines, a blowing system, and sen-sors to monitor the temperature and pressure of thecomponents and gas in the process of storage and re-fueling. During refueling, up to 1 tonne of fuel com-ponents can be transferred to the tanks of the com-bined motor installation of: the station.

The refueling system is controlled by the crew ofthe orbital station, with radio signals from Earth con-trolling the cargo spacecraft end.

The instrument and equipment section is designedto carry all of the main service systems of the space-craft supporting independent flight, approach anddocking, flight as a part of the orbital station, andundocking.

The transit section of the instrument-equipment sec-tion is a framework which carries the fuel tanks, spher-ical containers, and fittings of the approach and orien-tation system motors. Outside the section are 10 ap-proach and orientation motors of the system and thecommand radio link antenna.

The instrument and equipment sections are similarto the instrument and equipment sections of the Soyuztransport spacecraft in their design, purpose and ap-paratus, and equipment carried.

A Soyuz booster rocket is; used to insert the trans-port cargo spacecraft into orbit.

After the cargo spacecraft separates from the boosterrocket, structural elements carrying the antennas of

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the electronic approach system and radiotelemetrysystem, as well as the panel carrying the light indices,are deployed from the spacecraft.

Basic Information on the SoyuzBooster Rocket

The Soyuz booster rocket has three stages.Stage I consists of four lateral units, each of which

is 19 m long, 3 m in diameter; its motor has four cham-bers, two of which are steering chambers, developinga total thrust in a vacuum of 102 tonnes.

Stage II is the central unit, about 28 m in length,maximum 2.95 m in diameter, its motor has fourchambers, all of which are steering chambers, develop-ing a total thrust in a vacuum of 96 tonnes.

Stage III is a unit with a length of 8 m and a diameterof 2.6 m; its motor has four chambers (with steeringnozzles), developing 30 tonnes of thrust in vacuum.The launch mass of the booster rocket with a SoyuzT spacecraft aboard is over 300 tonnes.

When the booster rocket is launched, the motors ofthe first and second stages are ignited simultaneous-ly. The second stage continues to operate after the fourlateral units [of the first stage] are jettisoned. The thirdstage is ignited after the second stage motor has com-pleted operation. The booster rocket uses kerosene-ox-ygen fuel in all stages. The total length of the boosterrocket with a Soyuz T spacecraft is 49 m. The maxi-mum diameter at the stabilizers is 10.3 m.

Controlling the Flight of the SalyutOrbital Scientific Station

Organization of Flight Control

Flight control of the Salyut orbital scientific station,transport and cargo spacecraft is provided by:

● the flight control center near Moscow;● a network of tracking stations;● a system of modeling devices including a mathe-

matical model of the station and a physical modelof the spacecraft; and

● a communications system with Earth and satellite-information transmission channels.

Flight Control Center

The flight control center performs the followingtasks:

● operational administration and coordination ofthe operation of the entire system;

● collection, processing, and display of telemetry,trajectory, and television information arriving

●

from the station and from transport and cargospacecraft; andinteraction with the launch and search and rescuesystems, trainers and modeling equipment, andvarious organizations participating in flight sup-port.

The flight leader and flight control personnel arelocated at the center. The flight control center isequipped with a computer system; devices for collec-tion, processing, and display of information; internalcommunications and television; remote-command out-put; communications with the crew; and transmissionof telegraph messages to the Salyut station. The con-trol center is in communications with the Moscow tele-vision technical center at Ostankino.

The flight control center has been significantly im-proved. It now has a second control room to controlthe flight of the transport and cargo spacecraft and amodernized computer system which now allows theproblem of controlling several spacecraft simultane-ously to be solved. At the same time the number ofcommunications channels between the center andtracking stations has been increased to support simul-taneous transmission of telephone, telemetry, and tele-vision information to the center from three spacecraftover surface channels and through Molniya commu-nications satellites.

The modernized computer system of the center andthe improved communications system allow transmis-sion, processing, and display of information from alltelemetry sensors of the Salyut station and from Soyuzspacecraft simultaneously for the control personnel.

The flight control personnel operating with theSalyut and Soyuz spacecraft systems are a carefullyselected trained team consisting of specialists of variousprofiles. They include specialists on the flight programand flight control organization specialists, onboardsystems developers, designers of the station and trans-port spacecraft, scientists, ballisticians, physicians,communications specialists, as well as specialists onthe control and maintenance of the tracking stations,flight control central hardware, communications sys-tem hardware, plus representatives of scientific orga-nizations of our country and other socialist countries.

Most of the control personnel are located at theflight control center–this is the chief operational flightcontrol group. Some of the personnel are located attracking stations and on ships of the U.S.S.R. Acad-emy of Sciences, the Priroda state scientific researchand production center, and the center for medical andbiological research. The total number of personnel isabout 100. Successful performance of the flight mis-sion and completion of scientific research and crewsafety depend on precise operations by every man.

25-291 0 - 83 - 5 , QL 3

58—..

The organizational structure of the flight controlcenter personnel was developed by specialists with ex-perience in the organization of manned spacecraft andstation flight control, is recorded in special organiza-tional documentation, and has been repeatedly testedin training exercises and in controlling the flights ofprevious stations and manned spacecraft.

The flight leader heads the control personnel.Flight control is performed from two rooms: the

main station flight control room and the transport andcargo spacecraft control room.

The personnel in the rooms work under the controlof shift flight leaders.

Each room contains: the shift flight leader; specialistsresponsible for the main onboard systems; personsresponsible for the operation of tracking stations; per-sons responsible for planning the flight program andfor complete analysis of the operation of onboard sys-tems; a cosmonaut operator in communication withthe crew; representatives of the organizations whichdevelop the station and spacecraft; a ballistics expert;a physician responsible for medical monitoring of thecrew; the shift center leader; and specialists responsi-ble for the main system at the center (communications,computer system, display systems, etc. ).

All specialists work at positions with individual dis-play and communications equipment.

The personnel work in four shifts. Shift changesoccur during flight with no delay in flight operations.

Since the flight control center, tracking stations, andcommunications equipment are all the same for the sta-tion and the transport spacecraft, priority had to beassigned for their use. During orbital insertion, ap-proach, and docking of the transport spacecraft withthe station, the transport spacecraft control room haspriority for use of equipment.

After docking and movement of the crew into thestation, priority is transferred to the main controlroom. Priority transfer occurs at the moment the trans-fer hatches between the spacecraft and station areopened.

Organization of Work in Control Room

Control of the station or transport spacecraft istransferred to the control center from the launch com-plex immediately after separation of the last boosterrocket stage.

Up to this point the personnel in the control roomsmonitor the operation of onboard systems by tele-metry, observe the crew by television, and listen tothe conversations between the crew and the launchteam.

A central screen shows the course of the boosterrocket’s flight over the entire insertion trajectory. Afterseparation of the spacecraft from the booster the per-sonnel in the control room monitor the opening of theantennas by telemetry, make contact with the crew,and begin testing onboard systems.

Work in the room is organized as follows: Whenthe spacecraft enters the zone of visibility of groundtracking stations (the movement of the spacecraft isdisplayed on the central screen in the main hall) com-mands are transmitted to the spacecraft in accordancewith the flight program. The personnel in the roommonitor the transmission of commands and their re-ception by the spacecraft. The necessary onboard sys-tems are switched on by commands from Earth or bythe crew. The tracking stations begin to receive andtransmit to the control center the telemetry, trajectoryinformation, and television images received from thespacecraft. As the telemetry and trajectory data arereceived they are automatically processed by the con-trol center’s computers and transmitted to the display

devices in the control room.

Telemetry information is analyzed in detail by sys-tems specialists who generate conclusions concerning

the status and operation of each onboard system forthe responsible personnel.

Those responsible for individual systems are in com-munications with the support personnel outside thecontrol center and can, if necessary, consult with themor obtain additional information on the operation ofthe systems.

In case of abnormal operation of spacecraft systems,the specialist responsible for overall analysis deter-mines the effect of any system failures on the opera-tion of individual systems, prepares suggestions forelimination of defects and correction of onboard sys-tem-operating modes, ard then reports these sug-gestions to the shift flight leader.

The physician responsible for medical monitoringperforms detailed analysis of biotelemetry data, esti-mating the condition of the crew and reporting it tothe shift flight leader.

As trajectory information is processed and orbitalparameters are determined, the ballistic data areautomaticall y transmitted to the control room dis-plays.

The communications operator carries on plannedradio conversations with the crew. The person respon-sible for the tracking stations monitors their operationand, if there is any deviation from the planned pro-gram, informs the shift flight leader and takes stepsto eliminate deviations.

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The onboard computer specialist monitors opera-tion of the computer and, if necessary, prepareschanges to the computer program which are thentransmitted to the spacecraft.

The center shift leader monitors the operation of allservices at the center and, if there are deviations in anyoperations, informs the shift flight leader and takessteps to eliminate them.

The shift flight leader, considering all the informa-tion which he receives, makes decisions concerning thefuture flight program. If there are no deviations in theoperation of onboard and ground-based systems, per-mission is given to perform operations in accordancewith the planned program.

If it is necessary to correct the program, the correc-tion is made by the person responsible for planningthe program. Correcting actions may be undertakenduring a session or in subsequent sessions. If necessaryin order to identify failures and test correcting actions,a mathematical model of the station or the combinedspacecraft physical model may be used. Decisions areimplemented by transmitting instructions by radiofrom the flight control center to onboard systems orby verbal transmission of instructions to the crew.

Control Room Operation Support

In addition to the major specialists in the controlroom, there are also support groups at the center. Thespecialists in these groups are located in separate roomsequipped with positions similar to those in the con-trol rooms, The main tasks of these personnel are toprovide:

support to personnel in the control room withcalculations and information which can be usedto make decisions concerning the flight program;consultation with control room specialists andassistance to them in analyzing the operation ofonboard systems;assurance of implementation of decisions madeby the shift flight leader;support for the operation of the technical equip-ment at the center; andprospective flight planning.

The personnel include the following specialists:●

●

●

●

specialists in onboard systems preparing andtransmitting to the display devices the necessaryadditional information to control room special-ists;specialists in operational planning of the flightprogram, to prepare, if necessary, changes to theflight program;specialists in advanced planning of the flight pro-gram (1 week);specialists in coordination of tracking station op-era tions;

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

specialists in communications which support com-munications of the center with the spacecraft andtracking stations;specialists in ballistics, included in the main bal-listic center staff and performing the necessaryballistic calculations to determine the orbit, zonesof visibility, entry and exit of the spacecraft fromthe shadow, maneuvers, as well as data necessaryfor scientific experiments;onboard computer specialists;representatives of the search and rescue system,constantly ready to go to work in case of an emer-gency return of the spacecraft;the medical monitoring group, which regularlyanalyzes biotelemetry and maintains communica-tions with the flight medical support center;a group which plans the program for the crew’sday off, prepares music transmissions for thecrew, radio conversations between the crew andtheir families, and cultural and scientific activities;andto provide consultations to the flight leaders dur-ing experiments sponsored by representatives ofanother Socialist nation, the flight control centerincludes a consultation group of specialists rep-resenting the sponsoring nation.

Training of Control Personnel

Before starting to work at the center, control per-sonnel undergo a training cycle. Training is performedusing the mathematical model of the Salyut space sta-tion, the physical model of transport spacecraft, andtraining machines. Actual tracking stations and com-munications devices are used in these training exer-cises. The crew of the Soyuz T spacecraft participatein the training as well.

Training exercises are performed under conditionsas close to those of real flight as possible. The flightprogram is developed in real time with interactionsamong individual groups of control personnel, theflight control center, and the tracking stations. Non-standard situations which may develop on board andon ground are simulated. The most difficult flightstages are run through repeatedly.

The Baykonur Kosmodrom

The Baykonur Kosmodrom is a complex organiza-tion with many branches, a combination of uniquedevices, automatic systems, and engineering structuresserviced by specialists of many sorts.

The Baykonur Kosmodrom is located in the KazakhSSR in a semidesert area with a continental climate

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(hot, dry summer and cold, dry, windy winter). It wasfounded in 1955.

The reasons for selecting the location of the Kos-modrom were that it is remote from large populatedareas, thus allowing safe rocket launches to be assuredand separation zones (i. e., areas for the landing ofreturning spacecraft) to be set aside, and that manydays in this area are cloudless.

Launches are performed from the Baykonur Kosmo-drom in accordance with the national space researchand utilization program of the U. S. S. R., in coopera-tion with other socialist nations in the “Interkosmos”program, and also in accordance with agreements forjoint operations concluded with the United States,France, and other nations.

The world’s first artificial Earth satellite waslaunched from the Baykonur Kosmodrom, the firstcosmonaut Yu. A. Gagarin, and the first woman V.V, Tereshkova started from Baykonur; the Luna,Venera, Mars, and Zond automatic interplanetary sta-tions were launched here, as were space stations andartificial Earth satellites of various types (Kosmos,Elektron, Polet), and the Molniya series of satellitesused to relay television programs and to provide long-distance telephone and telegraph communications.

Manned Soyuz T spacecraft and Salyut orbital sta-tions are regularly launched from the Baykonur Kos-modrom.

The Kosmodrom is used for assembly, testing, andlaunching of booster rockets with spacecraft, as wellas for final prelaunch preparation of the cosmonauts.

The main component parts of the Kosmodrom are:● the booster rocket assembly and testing building;● the spacecraft assembly and testing building;● the launch areas; and. observation, command, and telemetry points.The residential area of the Kosmodrom is located

some tens of kilometers from the launch area and tech-nical buildings, Here we find the cosmonaut trainingcomplex (classrooms for technical and scientific train-ing of crews, the sports complex with swimming pool,laboratories to prepare the cosmonauts for flight, andthe medical complex), as well as the institute, technicalschool, schools, club, stadium, television center, etc.

The Kosmodrom is connected to other points in thenation by air, highway, and rail. The territory of theKosmodrom also has a well-developed network ofhighways and railroads.

The operations of assembly, testing, and joining ofbooster rockets and spacecraft are performed at thetechnical positions in the installation and testingbuildings of the Kosmodrom, which are equipped withthe necessary testing and measurement equipment andtools.

A number of launch and technical positions havebeen constructed at the Kosmodrom. One of the mostimportant is the position from which three-stage boost-er rockets carrying the Vostok, Voskhod, Soyuz, andnow Soyuz T spacecraft are launched,

The launch structure for this booster rocket includesa launch system with releasable supporting beams. Therocket is “suspended” in the launch system by the sup-porting units. The rocket system is delivered to thelaunch position from the assembly and testing buildingof this technical position, where it is assembled in thehorizontal position.

The launch complex of the system, equipment, andengineering structures used to transport the rocketsystem to the launch position, set it in the launch struc-ture, and perform prelaunch testing includes:

the transporter and erector;the launch structures;the launch system (supporting frames and re-straining devices; cables, hoses, and cable towers);the servicing devices (servicing frames and cabin);andthe fuel and oxidizer supply systems.

The launch and other structures also contain: sys-tems for filling and thermostatting fuel; a compressorstation; compressed-gas receiver; fuel storage tank; asystem to control both the preparation of the rocketfor launch and the actual launch; the command pointbunker, connected by communications lines to alloperational services of the Kosmodrom; observationand command-measurement points; and the flight con-trol center.

Preparation of the booster rocket for launch beginswith transportation of its stages and sections of thespacecraft in special railroad cars from the manufac-turing plants. The individual stages of the boosterrocket are delivered to the spacecraft assembly build-ing, where they are automatically tested, assembled,and prepared to be joined with the spacecraft. Thespacecraft is assembled and tested in the spacecraftassembly building.

The ship is filled with fuel components and com-pressed gases at the filling station of the Kosmodrom,to which the spacecraft is delivered in a special railroadcar. After it is filled and final operations are per-formed, the transit section and nose fairing areattached to the spacecraft. The assembled forward unitis then attached to the booster rocket, and the entirerocket-spacecraft system is tested.

This completes the work at the technical position,and the space system is delivered to the launch posi-tion on its transporter.

To install the rocket on the supporting beams of thelaunch system, the transporter raises the rocket to the

61

vertical position by means of hydraulic jacks. Duringthis time the supporting beams are shifted from an in-clined position to their operating position and acceptthe weight of the rocket in its central (supporting) belt.The rocket is thus suspended over the gas-deflectingtrough. Its tail portion is several meters below groundlevel. This helps to protect equipment on the groundfrom the powerful high-temperature jet of the motors.

The transporter, after placing the rocket on the sup-porting beams, lowers its boom to the horizontal posi-tion and rolls away the launch system. The servicingbooms, cable, and hose towers are brought up to therocket. As soon as they are in their operating positionthe process of azimuthal guidance of the rocket andplacement of the rocket in the strictly vertical posi-tion is begun. All of these operations are performedby mechanisms on command of the remote control sys-tem. The air system which controls the temperatureof the spacecraft is then started up. The essence of thisoperation is feeding of air beneath the fairing of thebooster rocket at a rate such that the apparatus andfuel components remain within a defined temperaturerange. The air thermostatting system continues oper-ating almost up to the moment of launch.

After the various lines are connected (fuel, drainage,pneumatic, electrical) to the rocket and spacecraft, thenext operation begins—pressure-testing, i.e., checkingthe tightness of seal of all connection points with com-pressed air. Any pressure drop indicates a leak.

The testing and launch apparatus then begins pre-launch testing of the onboard systems and units of therocket. All onboard systems are tested to determineif they are functioning properly and their initial con-ditions are correctly set; individual onboard andground-based instruments are checked (without start-ing the standard programs or turning on the actuatingorgans); the television, communications, command ra-dio link, onboard power supply, and other systemsare tested. The results of prelaunch testing are dis-played on all video-monitoring devices and recordedby the telemetry systems and multichannel recordingmachines. If all onboard system and unit parametersare normal, permission is given to begin fueling thebooster and filling its compressed-air tanks.

The transfer of liquid oxygen into the booster is aspecial operation. The lines and tanks are first cooled;i.e., their temperature is artificially reduced to preventthe liquid oxygen from boiling off and to reduce thepressure in the booster’s tanks and lines. For this pur-pose a small quantity of liquid oxygen is fed in fromthe storage container. As it evaporates, it cools the

tanks and lines then passes through the safety anddrainage valves in the gaseous state. After the tanksand lines are cooled, the pumps begin to operate. Thelevel-monitoring system (SKU) assures precise meas-urement of fuel components.

Control of the filling process and monitoring of thetransmission of instructions are performed remotelyfrom the launch-pad command point.

At the same time as the booster rocket and the space-craft are fueled, their systems, instruments, and unitsundergo final testing, adjustment, and simulated oper-ation, and commands are transmitted to the memoryunit of the onboard control system—it is set up to per-form a definite program of orbital insertion.

Since liquid oxygen evaporates it must be toppedoff; i.e., additional liquid oxygen is pumped in to fillthe tanks to the required level. The fuel componentsare then drained from the filling lines, after which thefilling, drainage, and pneumatic lines are disconnected,and the correct vertical position and azimuthal guid-ance of the rocket are tested.

Two hours and thirty minutes before the launch thecosmonauts take their places in the spacecraft. Thefinal prelaunch and launch operation program isstarted. The automatic system assures a launch at theprecise time with an accuracy of a few hundredths-of-a-second. Final monitoring of all rocket systembefore the launch is performed by telemetry.

At minus 1 minute, when it becomes clear that allsystems and units of the booster rocket and spacecraftare operating properly and the cosmonauts are readyfor the launch, the operator places a switch in the“launch” position. The automatic final launch-operation program is started. Operations performedare displayed on the control panel. The fuel-andoxidizer-tank drainage lines are closed at this time. Thecable and hose towers swing away from the rocket.The turbine pumps begin operating. The ignition isturned on. The pyrotechnic ignition devices createflames in the chambers of the first- and second-stagemotors. The motors develop thrust, operating in thepreliminary, intermediate, and then main operatingmodes. When the motor thrust exceeds the weight ofthe booster rocket it begins to rise and is freed fromthe clamps of the launch system support beams. Atthis instant a contact closes and the “launch” lightbegins to shine on the control panel. Information onthe prelaunch preparation and insertion of the space-craft into orbit is sent to the flight control center, whereit is processed and displayed on the common and in-dividual screens in the control rooms. Control of the

62—. —

spacecraft is transferred from the launch complex tothe flight control center immediately after separationof the third stage of the booster rocket.

Command, Measurement, and Searchand Rescue Systems

The flight of the Soyuz T spacecraft is controlledthrough the U.S.S.R. command and measurementcomplex, based on seven tracking stations in the SovietUnion—Dzhusaly, Yevpatoriya, Ussurisk, Ulan-Ude,Kolpashevo, Tbilisi, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy,U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences research vessels in theAtlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the USSR Academyof Sciences computer centers, These ground-based andocean tracking stations are located so as to providecommunications with the station and transport space-craft in all orbits of the flight.

The longest continuous communications with thecrew are provided for those orbits when the spacecraftdock, the crew move out for a space walk, or thespacecraft begins its return from orbit.

Command program information is transmitted fromthe control center to the tracking stations throughautomated telephone communications lines and is re-layed from there to the orbital station. Telemetry andtelevision information can also be recorded at thetracking stations for subsequent transmission to theflight control center.

The ground-based complex is a component part ofthe Salyut space station and Soyuz T spacecraft flightcontrol loop. The control loop includes: the flight con-trol center, ground-based and shipboard tracking sta-tions, the ground and satellite communications system,and ballistic centers.

As it controls the flight, the ground-based controlcomplex performs the following tasks:

● exchange of all types of information between thespacecraft and the flight control center;

provision of two-way telephone and” telegraphcommunications between the control center andthe spacecraft crew;

● measurement of the parameters of the spacecraft’smotion;

● organization of communications between ele-ments of the ground-based control system and theflight control center; and

● operational administration and coordination ofoperation of tracking stations and other elementsof the ground-based system.

The tracking stations in the process of a flight meas-ure the parameters of the spacecraft’s motion and re-ceive telemetry and television information from the

implemented through the tracking stations by conduct-ing conversations with the crew and transmitting radiocommands to the spacecraft,

There are about 20 telephone and telegraph com-munications channels between the center and a typicaltracking station. Most tracking stations have widebandcommunications channels with the center, The track-ing station is equipped with a computer which can per-form about 50,000 operations per second. Eliminationof telemetry redundancy from the flow of telemetryinformation is performed by specialized apparatus.The throughput capacity of the data transmission ap-paratus used over the telephone channels is 2,400 bps.

Shipboard command and measurement points re-ceive and transmit to the center the complete flow oftelemetry information from the spacecraft. Molniyacommunications satellites ar-e used in the satellite com-munications system.

The tasks of the search and rescue complex include:. search for and location of the returning spacecraft

and cosmonauts,● determination of the coordinates of their landing,● evacuation of the cosmonauts and provision of

medical aid,● technical servicing of the spacecraft, and its removal from the landing area to its assigned

point.The men and equipment of the search and rescue

complex are placed where the returning spacecraft willland. Helicopters and aircralt, observing the spacecraftvisually and by radio, converge on their assigned loca-tions along the landing track, using radio directionfinding to approach the spacecraft and accompany itas it comes in for a landing, and maintain two-waycommunications with the crew.

The returning spacecraft land in a selected area ofthe Soviet Union. The descent apparatus is designedto land on dry land; the apparatus has special systemsassuring safety of the cosmonauts should it land inwater.

In the landing area the cosmonauts are met by aspecially trained search group. This group includestechnical specialists and physicians. The search groupis provided with everything necessary to reach thelanding point rapidly and to provide any needed assist-ance to the cosmonauts.

The search aircraft carry parachute personnel in-cluding physicians and rescue specialists who if nec-essary parachute to the spacecraft after it lands. Searchand rescue equipment includes aircraft and helicopters,ships and all-terrain vehicles. The technical specialistsand physicians included in the search group are well-trained parachute jumpers and scuba divers. The phys-icians of the group have available the necessary med-ical equipment and medications, adapted for use under. .

spacecraft. All decisions related to flight control are any weather conditions.

63—. — .

After landing, the cosmonauts open the hatches ofthe spacecraft and prepare containers of scientific ap-paratus and photographic film for transportation. Ifnecessary they can use the reserve stores onboard thespacecraft, including warm clothing, swimsuits, signal-ing and radio communications devices, extra water,and other necessary products. After landing and leav-ing the spacecraft, the cosmonauts take off their space-suits and put on flight clothing. The containers ofscientific apparatus and film are turned over to thespecialists in the search group. The cosmonauts under-go post-flight physical examination at the landingpoint.

If the spacecraft lands in water, the cosmonauts re-move their spacesuits, don special equipment, prepareto use their flotation devices, and maintain contact byradio with the search service. The search group whicharrives at the landing zone helps the cosmonauts toleave the spacecraft.

The search process, location of the spacecraft, andevacuation of the cosmonauts from the spacecraft andfrom the landing zone are all reported from the areain which the search and rescue complex operates tothe flight control center.

The Yuriy Gagarin CosmonautTraining Center

The Yuriy Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center(TSPK) was created in 1960 and is located outsid e

Moscow, in Zvezdnyy Gorodok [Star Village].The cosmonaut training center is an institution pro-

vided with modern equipment and manned by quali-fied specialists, capable of training crews for space andexpeditions in accordance with the increasing demandsof the time.

The specialists at the Center have accumulated greatexperience in educational, scientific, and indoctrina-tion work. They take part in studies of the prospectsof using manned spacecraft, and contribute to the im-provement of spacecraft and their equipment and tothe planning of future flights.

The structure of the TSPK, the mission of its mainsubunits, and [the composition of its] professional staffof specialists are determined by the tasks which it per-forms in preparing and supporting space flight.

In 1968 the Center was named in honor of Yuriy Ga-garin.

In 1971, for its great services in the preparation ofcrews for spaceflight, its participation in the masteryof space, and in connection with the l0th anniversaryof the world’s first manned space flight, the center wasawarded the Order of Lenin.

During the operation of the TSPK (up to June 1 ,1982) 49 manned spacecraft crews were trained, includ-ing: 6 for the Vostok spacecraft, 2 for the Voskhodspacecraft, 37 for the Soyuz spacecraft, 4 for the SoyuzT spacecraft. Sixty cosmonauts had been in space, includ-ing 10 three times (Vladimir Shatalov, Aleksey Yeli-seyev, Valeriy Bykovskiy, Petr Klimuk, Nikolay Ruk-avikhnikov, Valeriy Kubasov, Valeriy Ryumin, ViktorGorbatko, Oleg Makarov, Vladimir Kovalenok), and15 twice, as well as 9 cosmonauts who were citizensof other Socialist nations: Vladimir Remek (CSSR),Miroslav Germashevskiy (Poland), Zigmund Jen(GDR), Georgiy Ivanov (Bulgaria), Vertalan Farkash(Hungary), Fam Tuan (Viet Nam), A. Tamayo Mendes(Cuba), Zhugderdemidiyn Gurragcha (Mongolia), andDumitru Prunariu (Roumania).

In 1980 the cosmonaut training center celebrated its20th anniversary.

Appendix B

Soviet Space Stations:Achievements, Trends, and Outlook

Geoffrey E. Perry, MBENovember 1982

My mathematical conclusions, based on scientific dataverified many times over, show that with such devices itis possible to ascend into the expanse of the heavens, andperhaps to found a settlement beyond the limits of theEarth’s atmosphere. . . . People will take advantage of thisto resettle not only all over the face of the Earth but allover the face of the Universe. . . .

–K. E. Tsiolkovsky 1903

It is a widely held belief that the Soviet space pro-gram deliberately follows the paths described in theearly years of the century by Konstantin Tsiolkovsky. 1

Be that as it may, it is certainly possible to find closeparallels between Tsiolkovsky’s writing and the courseof events, but more likely these parallels result becausemodern engineers have arrived at similar solutions tothe same problems rather than because of slavish obe-dience or preconceived notions.

Smolders z holds that the concept of space stationsforms the nucleus of Tsiolkovsky’s vision of spacetravel, Tsiolkovsky considered the construction of apermanent base in space to be the first important steptowards a landing on the Moon and exploration of theplanets. A space station concept attributed to Tsiol-kovsky depicting a closed ecological system and gar-den, laboratories, living quarters, and a docking portwith an airlock has been reproduced in official Sovietpublications. Illustrations of other space stations ap-pearing on commemorative stamps owe more to thedesigns of Shternfel’d and others which are to be foundin a handbook produced by the staff of the BattelleMemorial Institute. ’ A 1964 Soviet Defense Ministrybook on Manned Space Stations listed the building ofa larger manned space station, with a crew of 30 to50, in the 1972-75 period, as the third of five furtherstages in space conquest. 4 To date, the maximum num-ber to man a complex at any one time has been five

) V Rich, Nature 250 (London July 19, 1974), p 177‘PL, “Soviets in Space” (Gulldford Lutterworth Press, 1973), p 34‘(, E \$’ukelIc (ed } }{JndbmA of S(JL,Iet Space-Scwnce Rf5edrch, Gordon

,ind Breach New York 1968 pp 4 7 3 - 4 8 641 N Bubnov and L N Kamlnln, “Manned Space StatIons,” Voyenrmye

Izdatel stvo M/nJsterstva CXmrorry SSSR (Moscow 1964) and quoted inM Stoiko, “Soviet Rocketry, ‘ p 209

for the Apollo-Soyuz mission and two visits to Salyut7 .5

After the “troika” mission of Soyuz 6, 7, and 8 in1969, Leonid Brezhnev said, “Soviet science views or-bital stations with interchangeable crews as man’s ma-jor highway into space. . . . Major scientific labora-tories will appear for conducting research in spacetechnology and biology, medicine and geophysics,astronomy and astrophysics. ”6

According to Feoktistov and Markov, direct workon Salyut space stations began in 1969.7 To reduce costand to shorten the construction time as many units andseparate systems as possible were used from Soyuz,Zond, and other tried and tested designs. Most of theseneeded modification as they did not provide the re-quired service-life, and basic systems, such as the heatsupply, were built from scratch. The intention of usingthe manned mode opened up the possibility of in-orbitrepair and replacement of defective subsystems, there-by increasing the reliability and life of the station.

A study of Soviet space station philosophy demandsconsideration of Salyut, Soyuz, and Progress space-craft as components of an orbital complex. The Soyuzacts as a manned transport craft between Earth andthe orbiting space station, remaining docked with thestation whilst the crew is on board, in the same man-ner as the Apollo was used for three missions to Skylaband, presumably, the Shuttle orbiters will be used withany future National Aeror autics and Space Adminis-tration (NASA) space station. Progress, a Soyuz de-rivative, has an unmanned role as an expendable cargovehicle.———

‘Apollo, Thomas Stafford, Donahl Slayton, and Vance Brand. Soyuz,Aleksey Leonov and Valeriy Kubaso\ Docked 1309 Z, July 17, 1975, Firstundocking 1203 Z, July 19.37 min. urldocked. Second docking 1240 Z, July19 Final undocking 1526 Z, July 19, S3 hr 17 min. total, 49 hr. 40 min. net,Soyuz-T .5, Anatolly Berezovoi and Valentin Lebedev. Soyuz-T 6, VladimirDzhanibekov, Aleksandr Ivanchenkov, and Jean-Loup Chretien, Docked 1746Z, June 25, 1982. Undecked 1101 Z, July 2, 161 hr 15 min. total, Soyuz-T7, Leonld Popov, Aleksandr Serebrov, and Svetlana Savitskaya, Docked1832, Aug. 20, 1983. Undecked 1145 Z, Aug 27, 161 hr. 13 min. total,

‘Brezhnev’s statement quoted by A. !i, Yeliseyev at press conference foHow-Lng end of manned phase of the Salyut 6 mission, reported in Izvestiya, July14, 1981, p. 2, reproduced in JPRS 70319, Space #13, Oct. 28, 1981, p 4

‘K. P Feoktistov and M. M, Mark{\v, “Evolutlon of ‘Salyut’ Orbital Sta-tions, ” Zem]ya I Vselbnnya, 5, September-October 1981, pp. 10-17, repro-duced in JPRS 80424, Space No. 15, Mar 29, 1982, p. 1

64

———— -.—

65

Although certain events in the history of the Sovietspace program have been spectacular at the time, itmust be realized that they are not instant technologicalbreakthroughs but rather are the results of carefulplanning and cautious steps towards the desired goals,The docking of the Soyuz 4 and 5 spacecraft in 1969,claimed as establishing “the world’s first orbital spacestation,”8 should be seen as the first docking of twomanned Soviet spacecraft following two successfulautomatic dockings of unmanned satellites in theCosmos series. 9 The clue to the intended function ofthe Soyuz was to be found in the name “Union,” al-though a characteristic element of ambiguity was alsopresent. The EVA transfer of cosmonauts between thetwo spacecraft demonstrates the step-by-step approachand unsophisticated design philosophy.10 Internal crewtransfer was not accomplished until Soyuz 11 dockedwith Salyut 1 more than 2 years later.

The Soyuz T (T = transport) currently in use withthe Salyut 7 space station has evolved through severalvariants. Tested unmanned in the Cosmos series,Soyuz 1 malfunctioned and killed cosmonaut Koma-rov during the return to Earth when the parachutefailed to deploy correctly. ” This resulted in an18-month period of redesign before testing recom-menced with the unmanned rendezvous and dockingof Cosmos 186 and 188. As in Voskhod, crews flewwithout spacesuits and a three-man capacity was dem-onstrated with Soyuz 5 although, for the Soyuz 9recordbreaking 18-day flight, the crew was reduced totwo to permit sufficient consumables to be carried. Theloss of the crew of Soyuz 11 returning from the 24-daymission to Salyut 1 necessitated a further period ofredesign. 12 TO accommodate a life-support system anda spacesuited crew, one of the seats was removed andSoyuz flew as a two-man spacecraft for the remainderof its life, ending with Soyuz 40 in 1981.13

Prior to this, unmanned flights in the Cosmos series,having characteristics similar to those of manned mis-sions, pointed to the development of a new mannedspacecraft. 14 It was mildly disappointing when, on its— . —

‘Phrase used In a question by the Tass correspondent at Cosmonauts’ pressconference In Moscow, Jan 24, 1969, reported in SU ‘ 2984 ‘C ‘4

‘Cosmos 186 launched Oct. 28, 1967 Cosmos 188 launched oct. 30 Firstorbit rendezvous and clocklng at 0920 Z, Oct 30. Undecked at 1250 Z, 3hr 30 mln total time docked Cosmos 212 launched Apr 14, 1968. Cosmos

213 launched Apr. 15 First orbit rendezvous and docking at 1021 Z, Apr15 Undecked at 14] I Z, 3 hr 50 m]n total time docked.

IJSovuz 4, Vladlmlr shata]ov, launched Jan. 14, 1969. .$oYuz 5, Boris

Volyn;v, Yeugenly Khrunov, and Aleksey Yellseyev, launched Jan 15, 18thorbit rendezvous and docking at 0820 Z, Jan. 16, Undecked at 1255 Z; 4 hr35 mln total time docked

‘‘Soyuz 1 with Vladlmlr Komarov crashed Apr 24, 1967.‘ISoyuz 11 landed on June 29, 1971, Its th ree c rewmen, Ceorgiy

Dobrovolsk]y, Vladislav Volkov, and Vlktor Patsayev, perished1‘Sojruz 40 landed May 22, 1981“Cosmos 1001 launched Apr 4, 1978, recovered after 11 days, Cosmos

1074 launched Jan 31, 197~, recovered after 60 clays

first flight to the Salyut 6 space station at the end of1979, it was named Soyuz T and then shown in photo-graphs to have the same external shape and dimen-sions of the old Soyuz.

15 Internal redesign has restoredthe three-man capacity,

16 whilst permitting the use ofspacesuits at critical phases of the mission, and an on-board computer has enhanced its performance. Where-as the early Soyuz spacecraft were stated to have a30-day capability, Soyuz T 5 functioned in orbit for106 days, during which it was docked with Salyut 7for 103 days.17

A major disadvantage of using the Soyuz appearsto be the tight constraint imposed by lighting condi-tions during recovery, Information released at the timeof the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) revealed thatlandings should occur at least 1 hour before local sun-set and that a minimum of 8 minutes should elapse be-tween eclipse-exit and retrofire. Graphical analyses byChristy’ s and Clark19 show that the 31 revolutionsrepeating pattern of ground tracks employed for theSalyuts 6 and 7 lead to landing “windows” at inter-vals of approximately 2 months. Moreover, the dura-tion of these windows varies from only 7 to 10 daysdepending on the time of year. These windows, inturn, impose constraints on mission durations. The 8-day Intercosmos missions, for example, were launchedimmediately prior to the opening of a landing windowso that, if the need to abort prematurely should arise,as with the Bulgarian mission, the constraints couldbe obeyed on the third day.zo To date, Soyuz T space-craft have also obeyed these constraints and have yetto demonstrate the capability to make normal landingsat any time of the day or night. If this practice is fol-lowed for Berezovoi and Lebedev, then the next win-dow opening around the end of the year would pro-long their mission to something in excess of 230 days.z’The constraints could be obeyed in an emergency atother times of the year by moving the recovery zonefrom the Kazakhstan region. Cosmonauts have beendepicted training for recovery from landings in watershould such landings prove to be necessary .22

Up to a few years ago, the orbital module remainedattached to the command module until after retrofire.

,,50YUZ. T ]aunched D e c . lb, 197916SOYUZ-T 3, Le o n l d Kiz im, Oleg Makarov, a n d Gennadly Strekalov

launched Nov 27, 1980I’Soyuz-T 5 landed Aug. 27, 1982‘8R. D Christy, “Safety Practices for Soyuz Recoveries, SPacefljght 23,

1981, pp. 321-322,l~p s C]ark “SOYUZ Missions to Salyut Stat Ions, .$pacefl~ght 21. 1979.

Pp 259-263.

‘oSoyuz 33, Nikolay Rukavishnikov and Ceorg,Y, Ivanov, Apr. IO-12 1979“SOJ,UZ-T 7 landed in poor conditions at night, Dec 10, 1982, 21 I days

9 hr 5 rr,in record duration2’Spacef7ight 20, 1Q78, p 305 shows Aleksey Gubarev and Vladlmlr Remeh

practicing for SOyuz 28

66

Latterly, it has been jettisoned prior to retrofire.23 Theorbital module, filled with bulky, used equipment,burns in the atmosphere on reentry and provides ameans for disposing of unwanted material as an alter-native to the regular use of the airlocks. The unloadedProgress performs a similar function but is deorbitedover the Pacific rather than being left to decay natural-ly. The crew capacity of the Soyuz T is limited to threeby the use of the A-2 vehicle for its launch. Thisbooster, using the same first stage as that used tolaunch the first Sputnik 25 years ago, is the only Sovietbooster to be man-rated to date. The larger D vehiclenow appears to be totally reliable and could possiblybe man-rated at some future date for launching space-craft with larger crew complements, and some Westernobservers speculate that the mysterious dual payloadlaunches at 51.6° inclination were reentry tests ofreusable winged spacecraft .24 The Cosmos 1374 mis-sion of summer 1982 has been claimed to have beena reentry test of a scale model winged spacecraft,launched by the intermediate capacity C vehicle; theRoyal Australian Air Force released pictures of thefollow-on Cosmos 1445 spacecraft being recoveredfrom the Indian Ocean. zs Nevertheless it is not un-reasonable to suppose that research and developmentwork leading to a reusable manned spacecraft to serv-ice a permanently manned space station is in hand.

The unmanned Progress craft is something morethan an interim measure to provide space-station crewswith fresh supplies. The Soviets have mastered thetechnique for resupplying their Salyut stations withpropellant and potable water, a feat unmatched in theSkylab missions and, as yet, unnecessary for the spaceShuttle. Moreover, the residual propellant of theProgress engine has been used to maneuver the Soyuz-Salyut-Progress orbital complex in the manner of aprimitive space tug.26

The altitudes selected for the Salyut missions belowthe Van Allen radiation belts27 are not the most eco-nomical in terms of propellant usage, The relativelyhigh air-drag, particularly in the case of the “military”Salyuts 3 and 5,28 made great demands on stored pro-pellants to maintain the orbit throughout the duration

~Qrbital module 0[ first SoyUz-T discarded 25 March 1980, cataloged

by RAE as 79-lo3D but as 77-97BR by NORAD.l~co~mos ggl-gz, Dec. 15 1976; Cosmos 997-998, Mar. 29, 1978; cosmos

1101101, May 22, 1979; and T. Williams, “Soviet Re-entry Tests: A WingedVehicle?” Space flight 22, 1980, pp. 213-214.

‘sAviation Week & Space Technology 116, June 14, 1982, p, 18; andCosmos 2374, June 3, 1982, (Pictures of the 1983 flight of Cosmos 1445, asimilar spacecraft, taken by the Royal Australian Air Force have been pub-lished by the world’s media, )

26, ’ . . during the joint flight the engines of Progress 15 had been usedto make two adjustments of the trajectory of the orbital complex, ” ( Tass inRussian for abroad, 1436 GMT, Oct. 14, 1982, reported in SU/7163/D/3,

ZTExp]orer I discovered radiation belt at 950 km.2aSalyut 3256-292 km, Salyut 5214-257 km.

of the missions. Choice of a greater altitude to mini-mize propellant consumption exacts a penalty in termsof surface resolution for Earth observation programs.As space stations increase in physical size and complex-ity the drag problem will attain an even greater sig-nificance.

The small interior volume of the Salyut stations,which have an effective floor-area of 16 squaremeterszg in the Working compartment, must lead tocramped conditions, especially at times when thecosmonauts are joined by’ visiting crews. A first steptowards increasing the interior volume came with thedocking of Cosmos 1267, a “prototype space mod-ule, ”30 with Salyut 6. Although this docked complexwas never manned, it was claimed21 that future sta-tions could be enlarged by docking with modules dedi-cated to different disciplines including crew rest andrelaxation. The Cosmos l267 engine was used to main-tain the Salyut 6 orbit32 and eventually to deorbit thedocked complex at the close of the joint mission .33Cosmos 1267 and its preclecessor, Cosmos 929, wereboth reported to have returned part of their structureto Earth after a period of some 30 days.34 Salyuts 3and 5 also returned capsules during the unmannedphases of their missions, and thus an unmanned returncapability already can be seen to exist .35

Another disadvantage of the current Salyut programis the lack of near-continuous communication withground stations. For long periods in each orbit the crewis out of touch with ground control. In the initial stageof Soviet manned spaceflight this disadvantage waspartially overcome by the use of shortwave frequen-cies for voice communication as well as the long-rangehousekeeping telemetry still in use today. Later, mer-chant ships were converted to provide communicationlinks through Molniya satellites,3b and purpose-builtvessels have since moderrized the space support fleetmaintained by the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences .37

~gYu Semenov and L. Gorshkov, “ ‘Salyut 6’ Orbital StatIon: Home, Lab-oratory, Vehicle, ” Nauka i Zhizn’, April 1981, pp. 43-53, 125, reproducedin JPRS 78779, Space #12, Aug. 19, 1981, p. 7.

‘°Cosmos 1267 docked with Salyut 6 at 0752 GMT, June 19, 1981. MoscowHome Service, 0930 GMT, June 19, 1981, reported in SU/6755/D,’l.

JIIntewiew with Konstantin Feoktistov, UPI, 1248 GMT, June 24, 1981:and interview with Konstantin Feoktistov, Tass, Russian for abroad, 0508GMT, June 24, 1981, reported in SIJ/6770/Dll.

‘ * MOSCOW Home Service, 1400 GMT, July 1, 1981, reported inSU /6770/D/l.

33 Tass, Russian for abroad, 1057 GMT, July 29, 1982, reported inSUI 7095/D/1.

“’’Part of New Soviet Space Statitm Deorbited and Recovered, ” DefenseDaily, May 29, 1981, p. 153, (Cosmcs 1267 capsule returned May 24, 1981. )

jssalyut 3 returned capsule on Sept, 23, 1974. Tass, Russian for abroad,1405 GMT, Sept. 26, 1974, reported in SU’4715/C ‘1 and Salyut 5 returnedcapsule on Feb. 26, 1977. Tass in Rus:ian, 1502 GMT, Mar. 2, 1977, reportedin SU, 5458/C/l.

3’Tass in English, 0900 GMT, OCI. 18, 1969, reported in SU ‘3207 C 2,“G, Bezborodov and A. M. Zhako<, “Suda Kosmicheskoy Sluzhby, ” 1zda-

te~’stvo “Sudostroyeniye,” (Leningrad: 1980), reproduced In JPRS L 9862,Space FOUO 381, pp. 1-21.

67

Details of an Eastern Satellite Data Relay Network(ESDRN) lodged with the International Frequency Reg-istration Board in 1981 38 show that the Soviet Unionintends to operate a system employing frequencies i nthe Ku-band39 similar to the American TDRSS forcommunicating with Salyut stations and other space-craft in low-Earth orbit, commencing no sooner thanDecember 1985.

Following the end of the manned phase of the Salyut6 mission in 1980, articles appeared in the daily andtechnical press detailing the achievements and out-lining future needs.’” Isvestiya stressed that thoseachievements were not only in the great reliability andlongevity in space of the onboard systems and equip-ment but also in the vast amount of experimental workaimed at finding solutions for fundamental scientificproblems and practical requirements on Earth today.The requirements of 22 of the Ministries and Depart-ments of the U.S.S.R. were considered.

More than 1,600 experiments were said to have beenperformed involving some 150 items, many of whichwere repeated at least once .4

1 Of these, 60 were astro-physical, 200 on the production of materials of excep-tionally high purity, and 900 in medicine and biology.Many of the latter were in cooperation with othercountries as part of the Intercosmos program. Thesuperpure materials ranged from the homogeneousalloys and semiconductor materials, produced in theKristall, Splav, and Isparitel furnaces and ovens, ” tovaccines produced by elect rophoresis.43 Much timewas devoted to the observation of the Earth fromspace. Some 13,000 photographs were obtained usingthe Kate-140 topographical and MKF-6M multispectralcameras. 44 As a result, a supply of freshwater waslocated in the Kyzyl-Kum desert and large-scale geo-logical features coinciding with mineral deposits andpossible oil-bearing regions were identified .45 It wasstated that photographs of an area covering 1 millionkm z could be recorded on film in 10 minutes, equiv-alent to the result of several years’ aerial photogra-phy.” (Salyut 4 was reported to have returned pho-tographs of 4.5 million km2 of the U.S.S.R. )47 1n ad-

——.“Special SectIon No SPA-AA 343 1484 annexed to IFRB Circular No.

1484, Sept 1, 1981‘“1O 82, 1 I 32, 137 and 1352 GH7 downllnk, 1462 and 1505 CHZ upllnh““Feoktlstov and Markov, Idem , and Semenov and C,or+,kov, idem and

‘Looking to Orbit\ ~~f the Future, ls~wst]}’a July 14 i981, p 2, reproducedIn JPRS 79319, Space ~ 13, Oct 28, 1981, pp 3-6, and K Feoktlstov, “TOFuture Orbits, ” 1’ravda, June Q 1Q81, p 3, reproduced In JPRS 7931Q, Space# 13, Ocl 28, 1981, pp 45-46

“Ib]d p 46‘ 2 Semenov and Gorshkov, ldem. p Q‘ ‘Feokt ls tov and klarkov Idem p 11.~~Fe<lktl~t[)v, ldem , P 4 6J$ Fec)kt IStov and Marko\., ldem , P 4“A P Aleksancirov, [svesfya July 14, 1981, p 2, reproduced in JPRS

7931~, Space #13, oct 28, 1~81, p 3“Feoktlstov and Markov, idem , p 4

dition to radioastronomy, experiments with the KRT-10 in 1979,48 astronomical observations of active areasof the Sun’s surface and other X-ray sources were madeand infrared radiation from the planets and stars wasrecorded using the cryogenically cooled 1.5-meter di-ameter BST-lM telescope .49 For these observations anorientation accuracy of a few arc seconds was main-tained, so and some Western commentators have seenmilitary implications related to the pointing ofdirected-energy weapons in this context .5’ Undoubted-ly, there is a large area in which military and scien-tific experimental programs overlap each other.

Experience has shown that it is possible for crewsto work in space for long periods at a time so Iongas they follow a regular exercise regimesz to counteractthe effects of prolonged weightlessness. Equally impor-tant is sustaining the psychological well-being of thecrew. T. this end consideration has been given tothe interior decoration of the station .54 It was foundthat working to a normal Earth time schedule was ben-eficial both to the cosmonauts and the ground-supportteams, Regular rest days at weekends are used forhousekeeping and relaxation. The introduction of atwo-way television link” enabling the cosmonauts tosee their families whilst talking to them at the week-ends was a great morale-booster as were the visits fromshort-term crews. However, the strain began to tell onthe Salyut 7 cosmonauts who set the record of 211 daysin space, and their working day was reduced from 16to 12 hours.5b

And what of the future? Steps must be taken toovercome the disadvantages of the current programmentioned above. More efficient transport crafts areneeded. A Soyuz can deliver only 50 kg of suppliesin addition to its crew, and Progress is limited to 2,300kg. ” Although Progress transports delivered morethan 20 tonnes of supplies to Salyut 6 in 12 visits, thegreater part of the cargo comprised life-support systemsupplies and units, fuel and replacements for onboardsystems .58 A man requires more than 10 kg of replace-ment life-support system elements every day, 59 and

4BN s Kardashev, A. 1, savln, M. B. Zakson, A G Sokolov, and KP Feoktistov, “The First Radio Telescope in Space, ” Zem/,va I t’selenna,va,No 4, July-August IWO, pp 2-9, reproduced In ]PRS 76578, Space //7, Oct8, 1980, pp 1-15

t~Feoktistov and Markov, idem. , p 650 Feoktistov, idem , p. 4 6 .““Washington Round Up, ” Aviation WeeL & Space Technolog~, 117, NO

17, Oct. 25, 1982, p, 15~~ Semenov and Gorshkov, idem , P 155 ‘N. Novlkov, ‘An Extended Expedrtlon, ” SovetsL.~} L’oln No 8, 1981,

pp 29-29, reproduced in JPRS 78779 Space ~12, Aug IQ, 1~81 pp 26-29“Ibid , p. 8.“ldem,, p, 28,~~l~f{l~c(~w, P%ror/d Serv]ce in Engllsh, 1000 GMT, Oct 27, 1982, reported

In SU 7182 D 1“Novikcw, idem , p. 27.“Feoktlstov and Markov, ldem , p. 10.‘“Ibid p 9

68

there is an obvious need to change over to a new life-support system operating on a closed cycle, therebyeliminating the need to deliver water and atmosphericpurification supplies. (A water-regeneration system didnot produce in excess of 500 liters of potable water onSalyut 6.60 A reduction in the amount of fuel neces-sary for station orientation could be effected by theadoption of an electromechanical orientation system. 61

(Trials of this type of system were conducted on Salyut3 and must be presumed to have been less than satisfac-tory since this principle has yet to be adopted opera-tionally. )

The introduction of a new onboard computer systemfor Salyut 7 has relieved the crew of much routinework connected with the operation of the station. 62

This is markedly noticeable in communication sessionswith ground control. On previous missions much timewas spent in calling “Zaria,” the ground control, inorder to confirm that two-way contact had been estab-lished. Today, the computer switches on the trans-mitter when the stations rises above the radio hori-zon of the ground station, and the cosmonauts speakfrom wherever they chance to be in the station at the

‘°Feoktistov and Markov, idem,, pp 10-11.b’Idem., p. 11.“ MOSCOW Home Service, 1800 C; MT, May 21, 1982, reported in

SU/7034/D/2; and Moscow Home Service, 0200 GMT, May 23, 1982,reported in SU j 7048/D ‘2; and [svestiya, July 16, 1982, reported inSU17122/D/3.

time. Feoktistov, commenting on the introduction ofcomputer and microprocessor technology, has cau-tioned that enthusiasm for automation can lead to ex-traordinary complexity and, consequently, a reduc-tion of equipment reliability. ’3

The elimination of the need to mothball the stationbetween periods of occupancy by long-term crewswould be a logical step in the steady evolution ofSalyut operations. A further improvement would bethe provision of facilities for receiving water and pro-pellant from Progress transports at either of the twodocking ports. This would eliminate the transportationand redocking which has hitherto been necessary torelocate the Soyuz at the forward docking port in orderto accommodate a Progress at the aft port. Such re-design may also encompass provision of nonaxialdocking ports although destruction of axial symmetrycould introduce problems In maneuvering and altitudecontrol.

In the distant future one might expect the Sovietsto take steps to establish a permanent space stationin geosynchronous orbit’< for the collection of solarenergy, its conversion to electrical energy, and trans-mission to Earth by microwaves, but these possibilitiesintroduce difficulties several orders of magnitude great-er than those solved to date.

‘ 3 Feoktistov and Markov, idem., p 10.b41dem., p. 11.

Appendix C

OTA Workshop onSoviet Space Station Activities

List of Outside Participants

Craig CovaultAviation Week & Space Technology

Leonard DavidNational Space Institute

Merton DaviesThe Rand Corp.

Ed EzellSmithsonian Institution

John R. HilliardAir Force Systems Command

Nicholas JohnsonTeledyne Brown Engineering

Saunders KramerDepartment of Energy

Courtland S. LewisBiotechnology, Inc.

James ObergMcDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company

Geoffrey PerryThe Kettering GroupNorthants, England

Paul RambautNASA Headquarters

P. Diane RauschNASA Headquarters

Marcia S. SmithCongressional Research Service

Additional Reviewers

Hubert BortzmeyerChristopher H. DodgeRussell DrewPaul HanleThomas KarasCharles KellyGordon LawJohn LogsdonGeorge MuellerJoseph RoweCarl SaganCharles P. VickRay A, WilliamsonSimon P. Worden

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