safety issues and trends and iaea activities on research

Safety Issues and Trends and IAEA activities on Research Reactor Safety

A M Shokr

Research Reactor Safety Section Division of Nuclear Installation Safety

August 2016

Contents

bull Introduction Overview of research reactors

bull Research reactor safety issues and trends

bull IAEA activities on research reactor safety

bull Feedback from the IAEA Survey on safety reassessments following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP

bull Concluding remarks (future focus)

Built to date about 700 Operational 234 Temp shutdown 13 Shutdown 142 Decommissioned 298 Under constructionplanned

Argentina Azerbaijan Bolivia Brazil Ethiopia France Indonesia Jordan Korea Mongolia Netherlands Saudi Arabia Sudan Tanzania Tunisia USA Vietnam

Introduction Overview of Research Reactors (RRDB)

Number ~234 operational

Region Operational Research Reactors

Africa 10

Americas 66

AsiaPacific 52

Europe 106

Safety Issues and Trends - Updating the IAEA activities on research reactor safety

4

Safety issues and trends are identified and programme and activities are updated accordingly Feedback from Code of Conduct meetings IRSRR and safety reviews


bull The feedback shows attention need to be paid to the

ndash Regulatory effectiveness

ndash Ageing management and continued safe operation

ndash Ability to perform safety assessment

ndash Operational radiation protection emergency preparedness and decommissioning plans

ndash Infrastructure for establishment of the first research reactor

ndash Interface between safety and security

RRSS activities ndash Supporting application of the Code of Conduct

bull Regional meetings focusing on areas of common concern

bull Triennial International Meetings ndash Self assessments -

identification of areas needing improvements

6

RRSS activities ndash Safety Standards and supporting documents

bull Development of safety standards and supporting documents and assist Member Sates in their application

bull During the past few years Revised safety requirements 11 Safety Guides 11 TECDOCs and Safety Reports

Safety Standards httpwww- nsiaeaorgstandardsdocumentsdefaultasps=11ampl=90ampsub=20ampvw=9sf

TECDOCs httpwww-pubiaeaorgbooksIAEABooksSeries34Technical-Documents

Safety Reports httpwww-pubiaeaorgbooksIAEABooksSeries73Safety-Reports-Series

7

RRSS activities ndash Safety reviews and advisory services

bull Conducting INSARR review services - 15 INSARRExpert Missions on average per year

8

RRSS activities ndash Dissemination of operating experience

bull Operating the IRSRR and

organizing regular meetings for exchange of operating experience

bull The IRSRR currently joined by

57 Member States (more than 95 of the facilities are covered)

bull Operating experience from the events reported to IRSRR was published in 2015

RRSS activities ndash Enhancing safety of Research Reactors under Project and Supply Agreements

bull 27 research reactors in 23

countries are under Project and Supply Agreements with the IAEA

bull Collecting analysing and disseminating the results of Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs)

bull Regular meetings on the safety of the research reactors under agreements and review of the safety performance indicators of these facilities

10

RRSS activities ndash Capacity building ndash EampT

bull Training workshops and technical meetings ndash more than 40 since 2010

bull Group Fellowship Training Course (NA NE NS and TC)

bull Online video presentations on safety standards and key technical areas for research reactors

bull Training material

bull Coordinated Research Projects

11

RRSS activities - Infrastructure for firstnew research reactor programmes (with NE NA and TC)

bull Publications

bull Conduct of advisory services and expert missions

bull Training workshops and meetings

12

RRSS activities ndash Support TC programme and information networks

bull Supporting the implementation of more than 25 nationalregional technical cooperation projects

bull Supporting the functioning of regional Advisory Safety Committees for Research Reactors in Europe Africa and the Asia and the Pacific regions

bull Supporting the functioning of information networks (ANSN FNRBA ANNuR etc)

13

Feedback from the Survey on the safety reassessment from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP (November 2015)

14

Feedback from the survey on safety reassessment of research reactors in light of the accident at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant

bull 60 of originally communicated MSs

bull 30 responses (2 from regulatory bodies)

bull 21 reassessments bull 14 following IAEA SRS No 80 bull Many safety enhancements

15

Feedback from the Survey General

Feedback from the Survey Modifications of the Facility

Did the reassessment include analysis of loss of electrical power supply combinations of events and consequential events

17

0

5

10

15

20

25

Yes No

Yes

No

bull Almost all responses indicated reassessment of design basis accidents and consideration of additional single external internal events with emphasis on the loss of electrical power supply

bull Many reassessments included consequential events (eg earthquake with LOCA loss of power supply)

bull Some considered combined earthquake and flooding events and implemented related modifications (eg improvements on site accessibility and emergency preparedness arrangements)


Has the reassessment verified that the existing design provisions ensure that the basic safety functions will be fulfilled in the case of extreme external events

18

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

a b c d

Num

ber

of

responses

C h a r t T it le

a Protection amp shutdown system b Cooling systemc Confinementcontainment system d Additional systems

a Implementation of seismic monitoring and automatic protective actions as well as increased protection of control rod drives

b Modifications to strengthen protection against LOCA with loss of offsite electrical power

c Enhanced seismic resistance of the reactor building and some facilities installed emergency ventilation systems

d Implementation of additional measures to

protect existing electric power supplies (spare cabling redundant and separate external source lines seismic resistance of UPS) and added mobileportable generators

Chart1

Number of responses
Chart Title
13
13
10
18

Sheet1

Sheet1

Feedback from the Survey Safety Organization

Has the reassessment resulted in changes in the reactor organizational aspects (eg reactor organizational chart human factors etc) andor relevant regulatory practices (eg licensing conditions inspection programmes etc)

19

bull The majority of facilities did not change organizational aspects

bull Some facilities increased technical support and training for emergency response and strengthened the functioning of the reactor safety committee

bull Regulatory bodies reported that guidance on safety reassessments was developed consistent with SRS No 80

Chart1

10
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2

Feedback from the Survey- Emergency Preparedness

Have the existing emergency arrangements and procedures been reviewed to particularly for an accident initiated by an extreme external event affecting several facilities simultaneously

Most facilities reported that the existing arrangements were generally adequate but many made enhancements such as

bull Improving communication systems increasing response forces and increasing emphasis on training of responders

bull Redesigning off-site access points and routes and upgrading roads within the facility site

bull Installing additional fire protection equipment and relocation of equipment into seismically qualified buildings

bull Performing exercises of beyond design basis accident response incorporating human factors training and increasing the frequency of emergency response exercises that include offsite organizations

20

Feedback from the Survey Safety Documentation

Has the reassessment resulted in changes in the safety analysis and conclusions presented in the SAR

Has the reassessment resulted in changes in the operating programme including operating maintenance and periodic testing procedures

21

bull About half of the facilities did not identify a need to update the SAR based on the reassessment

bull The SAR for most other facilities is currently under regulatory review and assessment

bull Changes made to bull Cover new emergency response equipment

(mostly reported)

bull Increase the frequency of preventive maintenance

bull Establish procedures for abnormal conditions

Chart1

9
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2

Chart1

12
8

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2

Feedback from the Survey ndash Summary

bull Most organizations responded to the survey have performed reassessments following the guidance in SRS No 80 or a similar national process

bull The majority have implemented modifications to SSCs procedures and emergency plans to strengthen the basic safety functions and robustness of the facility

bull Efforts are still needed by many organization to complete the assessment or to implement the results

22

Concluding remarks- Future focus (2016-2017)

bull Maintaining and expanding worldwide application of the Code of Conduct and the IAEA safety standards

bull Maintaining adequate levels of ageing research reactors

bull Regulatory effectiveness including infrastructure for first research reactor projects

bull Dissemination of the relevant lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant

bull Improving managing the interface between safety and security

bull Improving exchange of operating experience and networking

22

Research Reactor Safety Section (RRSSNSNI)

To support Member States in achieving and maintaining a high level of safety of research reactors using peer reviews and advisory services based on IAEA safety standards


Contents




















questionparticpants Canada Usa Egypt Ukrain Austria Germany Nigeria USA Texas US Nuclear Regulatory Commision Romania Italy Ukrain Kiev Institute Bangladesh Nuclear Institute Brasil CNEN Germany Hungary Russia - MIR Russia - RBT-6 Russia - RBT-102 Brazil- TRIGA Greece Vietnam Mexican- TRIGA India Argentina- RA-10 Germany- FRM II Australia-OPAL Japan Ghana

GENERAL

Has your organization performed a safety reassessment of research reactors following the feedback from the Fukushima-Daiichi accidentIf ldquoNordquo explanation of the reasons

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

No No No No No No No No No

Comment Safety Analysis Report already considers these accident scenarios (flooding or severe weather phenomena) For Inshass site (ETRR-1) Site characterization has no occurrence probabilities for tsunami or earthquakes as itrsquos far away from Mediterranean sea about 240 Km and the maximum earthquake magnitude is 65 no need for a low power reactor with inherent safe fuel The safety reassessment of TRIGA14MW RR is planned for the period 2015-2016A large effort is planned for site re-evaluation following the new Romania regulation in this area issued between 2012-2015 Partially reassessed and implemented Safety reassessment was peformed for the threee larger (gt50 KW) research reactor facility in operation in Germany FRMZ TRIGA Mark II at the Mainz University BER-II the experimental reactor operated at the Helmholtz Zentrum in Berlin FRM II the Hienz Maier Leibnitz research reactor in Garching (near Munich) the four smaller reactors (lt2W) were not included in the safety reassessment We were already performing a safety reassessment due to our license renewal process and also due to concerns related to 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup Physical protection aspects were addressed as well The Reactor is in Extended Shutdown since July 2004 A complete safety reassessment based on the IAEA Safety Reports Series No 80 for the Dalat Nuclear Research Reactor (DNRR) has not been conducted yet Though in the annual safety review for the DNRR operation the Dalat Nuclear Research Institute (DNRI) takes into account the international good practices and lessons learnt from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident We are making a reassessment related with the cooling system Related with the training for emergency situations we had a program with practical exercises We are improving the fire protection program and emergency situations The physical security program has been improved A structural analysis for the installation was made and it was observed that is not necessary to make provisions to avoid the flooding of the installation Additional to this activities we have a reactor modernization program including the control ventilation and cooling system (this program is financed by the IAEA) however in December 2011 the SAR was reviewed and updated postulated initiating events were re-evaluated

Was the analysis performed based on the IAEA Safety Reports Series No 80If ldquoNordquo what requirementsguidance the reassessment was based on

Yes NA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

No No No No No No No No No No No No No

Comment NRU staff are currently completing a Severe Accident Management review with Westinghouse and a contractor Based on Power Reactor Severe Accident processes Planned No assessment performed The safety analysis was performed immediately after the accident before the IAEA Report was published Initial assessment did not show any basis for further consideration The NRC staff did contribute to the development and review of the IAEA Safety Report Series No 80 document and was aware of its content during the performance of the NRCrsquos post-Fukushima safety assessment of NRC-licensed research and test reactors The NRCrsquos Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) provided specific guidance to the NRC staff for the assessment facilities other than power reactors in March of 2013 preceding the publication of the final version of IAEA Safety Report Series 80 The NRCrsquos internally developed guidance was compared to IAEArsquos Safety Report Series No 80 following publication and was found to be generally consistent Section 6 graded approachA graded approach was applied considering the peculiar features of TRIGA14MW RR -Fuel design-Incoloy cladding high temperature melting point of cladding and fuel pellets -Inherent safety feature provided by design including large prompt negative coefficient of reactivity due to temperature -The fission product inventory and peculiarity of source term -Siting in a low populated area -Structural concept conservative by design below ground level Partially based on the IAEA safety series no 80 Since 2009 the reactor has initiated process improvement in plant safety through experience observed in other reactor in the world Satisfy effectively the local emergency plan The safety reassessment in Germany was already performed in 2012 the IAEA Safety Report Series No 80 was not available at that time Therefore a catalogue of requirements was developed by the Working Group ldquoResearch Reactorsrdquo of the Reactor Safety Commission (RSK) an advisory board of the Federal Ministry for the Environment Nature Conservation Building and Nuclear Safety The catalogue of requirements for research reactors based on the safety reassessment for the nuclear power plant After that Germany provided input to the drafting and the review process of the Safety Report Series No 80 The safety reassessment of German research reactors is basically consistent with the guidance of the Safety Report Series No 80 The analysis was based on the WANO recommendations and request from ROSATOM State Corporation The analysis was based on the WANO recommendations and request from ROSATOM State Corporation The analysis was based on the WANO recommendations and request from ROSATOM State Corporation IAEA Safety Reports Series No 80 was not the main focus of the process However as this is a work in progress it may eventually come to the foreground The safety reassessment for the DNRR was mainly based on guidance requirements and instructions of the supplier operating experience and recommendations of the DNRIrsquos safety committee and VARANS as well as good practices obtained through participating in the international workshops and meetings The analysis was based on the main points contained in the IAEA Safety Report but mainly based on requirements set by the German authorities but deterministic approach was used Eg in the loss of reactor coolant accident analysis the lowest position of the purification system inlet pipe is still 05 m higher than the elevation of the top of the core thus at least 05 m thick of shielding water above the core would not be lost and the core would not be uncovered

MODIFICATIONS OF THE FACILITY

Did the reassessment include analysis of loss of electrical power supply combinations of events (eg earthquake with flooding earthquake with fire etc) and consequential events (eg earthquake and loss of coolant loss of electrical power supply etc)If ldquoYesrdquothe analysed events

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

No No No No No No No

Comment One part of the assessment includes loss of power and as such NRU purchased three portable diesel generators and have engineered tie-in points to support critical loads In addition to major seismic upgrades installed a number of years ago a number of equipment purchases support beyond design basis events These include earthquakes dam breaks loss of process cooling major primary coolant loss etc In the case of fire NRU has significantly upgraded its firewater distribution system in NRU including Siamese connections for fire pumper direct connection The reassessment includes the combination of possible external events (earthquake tornado) with loss of power that results in the regular emergency cooling system fail Earthquakes and flooding can be excluded in Berlin Applicable events noted are1 Loss of electrical power supply2 Fire3 Flooding We have an open pool TRIGA reactor and we are in a region with very minimal seismic threat 1 The first reassessment included bull natural events ( focus on seismic and flooding events) bull extended loss electrical power (station blackout) bull loss of and inadequate decay heat removal core bull loss of and inadequate decay heat removal for irradiated and spent fuel bull combustible gas generation and control bull loss of reactor containmentconfinement 2 A second reassessment included bull flooding bull seismic eventsbull high velocity wind tornados and resulting missile hazardsbull lightningbull snow and ice loading of structuresbull drought and temperature extremesbull firebull extended loss of the electrical gridbull loss of the ultimate heat sink The new safety report will have the content following the guidance from SSG-20 Loss of external electrical power for more than 2 hours was analysed In order to prevent the loss of control of installation and to ensure the safety of installation and site sustaining vital functions a new diesel generator was installed outside the reactor building Reassessment included an assessment of the tsunami risk tornadoes flooding and is under evaluation earthquakes Combination of the Loss of coolant event together with tsunami risk tornadoes flooding Is under evaluation Loss of coolant and earthquakes All listed events Loss of electrical power supply flood fire and loss of coolant The robustness of German research reactors was reviewed with regard to natural hazards (such as earthquake flooding other natural hazards sespecially weather conditions and their combination with another relevant hazard) expanded postulated events (station blackouts and emergency power failure) precautionary measures accident management man-madew hazards (such as blast wave combustible gases toxic gases airplane crach) loss of inner and outer electrical power supply loss of secondary coolant accident can be occurred in spent fuel storage Analyzed events full loss of power supply with primary pipeline rupture caused by external events earthquake tornado sow storms flooding fire) Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE) accompanied by tornado on the adjacent area Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE) accompanied by fire on the adjacent area Fire on the adjacent area accompanied by tornado followed by actuation of a stand-alone power system after 24 hours The considered events included as follows blackout accompanied by primary circuit pipeline break caused by extreme weather events (earthquake tornado snow load flooding fire on the adjacent area) Due to our facility small power (100kW TRIGA Mark I) and peculiar characteristics (eg underground pool) the main postulated accidents ndash loss of power fire rupture of a fuel element loss of coolingshielding water flooding for instance ndash were considered as already covering a broad enough set of conditions that may even happen simultaneously The reassessment was made previous to the Fukushima accident For the DNRR the events of loss of coolant from the reactor pool and reactivity insertion are considered as the most potential events Taking account the extreme external events such as earthquake and loss of electrical power supply the combination of events has been analysed as follows - Earthquake with excessive loss of reactor pool water- Earthquake with loss of electrical power supply- Earthquake with removal of control rods 1 Special internal events (sabotage fire suddenly lost of the pool water- radiological emergency) 2 External events-Earthquakes-Explosions in the natural gas duct near to the reactor site ( about 600 m) 3 Combinations of events -Earthquake with fire the reassessment was for conditions more severe that design basis The combination which can result due to single common cause have been accounted for most sever condition was for power failure with flooding due to storm surge mainly loss of electric supply (ldquostation black outrdquo) earthquake flooding widely spread fires loss of coolant due to leaks in the reactor or storage pool loss of coolant due to blockage of cooling channels in fuel element internal flooding reactivity accidents due to manipulation errors airplane crash explosion burnable gases toxic gases A fault scheduale was prepared that identified design basis and beyond design basis initiaton event applicable to OPAL The safety reassessment involved revisiting the 82 beyond design basis events effectively reassessing them as design basis events and determining whether the critical safety functions were met in all cases initiating events were considered one external hazard may be reasonably assumed to occur in conjunction with each other one external hazard may be a consequence of another one external hazard may occur coincidentally This analysis identified that combinations of events had been considered implicitly in the original SAR but not explicitly and a recommendation was made that the SAR be prevised to address such combinations explicitly a The events related to the loss of the shutdown function b The events related to the loss of coolant function c The events related to the loss of containment function a loss of electrical power supplyb floodingc loss of coolant

Has the reassessment verified that the existing design and organizational provisions ensure that the basic safety functions (reactivity control heat removal and confinement of radioactive materials) including for spent fuel storage will be fulfilled in the case of extreme external eventsIf ldquoYesrdquoModifications implemented (or planned) as a result of the reassessment considering the following

Yes Yes (Yes) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

No (No) (No) (No)

a Reactor protection and shutdown systems No changes Our protectionemergency systems are sufficient per our Safety Analysis Report which already considers a tsunami accident scenario No Changes No assessment performed We had to evaluate our emergency plans and create a special manual for severe emergencies Installation of independent power supply systems (Diesel generator and Inverter) Yes No Changes Reactor protection and shutdown systems was subject of modernization project accomplished in 2010 An earthquake warning system was installed at TRIGA14MW reactor This system receive a signal provided by national monitoring system from earthquake epicentre This system are continuously operated by National Institute for Earth with 20 seconds before reaching the wave in the reactor site and actuate the reactor scram system in order to put the reactor in a safe shutdown state Installation of seismic switch is under development Seismic switch incorporated in reactor shutdown system and control rods drive changed by new one Equipment modernization No need to improve Industrial anti-seismic protection was put into pilot operation to provide an emergency shutdown of the reactor in cease of earthquake as well as to automatically record seismic effects Industrial anti-seismic protection system was installed and put into operation Industrial anti-seismic protection system was put into operation to ensure emergency reactor shutdown in the case of an earthquake and automatic record of seismic impact on reactor facilities Due to its design principles and small size our facility is rather safe shutdown is achieved by passive means (control rods fall by gravity if current to the electromagnets that raise them is interrupted) TRIGA fuel has a negative temperature coefficient that limits power excursions and we do not need cooling after shutdown Our reactor building is made of reinforced concrete and provides reasonable containment to eventual leakages Reinforcement of the Reactor building to meet the requirements of the more recent anti-seismic regulations (modification implemented) Reinforcement of plastic cover to protect the control rod driven motors from falling objects Installation of a steel structure to support the control rod driven motor platform in case of strong earthquake The new control system takes into account all the measures to have reactivity control and shut down the reactor in emergency situations (No) The original RA-10 concept design included a second shutdown system The reassessment indicated this provision to be adequate to cope with very low frequency events which include the failure of the first shutdown system Modifications to improve the management of such events were identified including for example the provision of a standard fire water hose coupling in place of a blank flange on an existing external water supply point and the modification of three electrical junction boards to facilitate the connection of an external mobile diesel generator No Changes but no modification identified

b Reactor cooling systems Reactor cooling systems include 4 separate supplies including a seismically qualified water system integral to NRU In addition NRU has purchased firewater pumps to allow water to be drawn directly from the river and distributed to NRU The water can be tied into various sources or it can be pumped directly into the core if required No Changes Connection of system with chiller to serve as emergency core cooling system Yes installed facility equipment or portable external sources to avoid early loss of reactor cooling Complete instrumentation refurbishment with intelligent transducersconverters connected to data acquisition system and external scram from all events related to cooling system as pool level LOCA LOFA Installed better pipe supports to minimize vibration and to reduce consequence of earthquake Excahnge of secondary pumps and new cooling tower No need to improve Coolant can be returned using motor pump and quick-detachable hoses A possibility is provided for coolant return with the use of a motor pump and quick-detachable hoses Design of a double flapper to isolate the reactor pool and assure - in case of failure of the first flapper - the establishment of natural circulation for the pool water cooling the fuel assemblies (modification planned) Refurbishment of cooling tower and two water reservoir pools (250 m3 volume) and water tower (21 m3 height and 25 m3 volume) Improvement of the stainless steel pipeline and valve system the emergency core cooling system Improvement of watertight plugs for neutron beam tubes to prevent the excessive loss of water from the reactor pool The new cooling system are planned to have the capacity to cool the reactor core in any conditions 1) The original RA-10 concept design included an Emergency Water Injection System After the reassessment a modification on this system was made to allow water injection from outside the facility for instance from a fire truck 2) Long term pools cooling system was modified to allow power supply from diesel generator system so the system can keep reactor pool coolant temperature within acceptable values for 7 days No Changes

c Confinementcontainment systems A confinement boundary system was installed a number of years ago In this phase we have issued Enabling Instructions that identify procedures to use equipment in non conventional ways to ensure habitability of the facility is maintained so the staff can work to re-establish core cooling This includes use of building ventilation fans and ducting to provide a negative pressure on the structure if the reactor ventilation system fails for whatever reason No Changes Negative pressure system for the Reactor Hall upgraded to include filters and detectors Yes No Changes Confinement system- emergency ventilation of confinement was ensured by initial design using one of two fans to control the differential pressure filtration of air and releases The modification consist into power supply diagram were one of the fans is ensured by the diesel generator in case of blackout planned for improvement design of new racks for spent fuel storage element More measuring data were displayed in the control room concerning the direction of the air flow New design of the primary cooling system so as the whole system (primary piping delay tank pumps heat exchangers) will be confined (modification planned) Reinforcement of reactor building by adding steel pillars and replacement of rubber seals for shipping door The confinement of the reactor is going to be improved with the modernization of the reactor ventilation system No The original RA-10 concept design included a confinement designed to mitigate the consequences of a severe accident involving core damage Installing weir preventing spend fuel pool water from flowing out of radiation controlled area

d Any additional system supporting the above mentioned safety functions (eg mobile diesel generator emergency cooling systems etc) heavy equipment (loaders) has been purchased to allow transport of the pumps and diesel generator sets -Specific equipment has been installed to monitor core cooling conditions in either a boiling mode or a loss of level event The equipment including header vessel differential pressure radiation levels and core temperature can be used to identify when the event changes from an Emergency Operating Procedure event to a Severe Accident Management event improving the security and physical protection system because ETRR-1 in extended shutdown state and the fuel transferred to the spent fuel storage The additional gasoline pumps for emergency cooling system have been installed The additional power cables from the diesel generators to IampC system have been purchased and stored in the special places (without installation to prevent them from brake in case of extreme event) We are planning to purchase the mobile diesel generator No Changes Yes For decay heat removal systems portable external sources can be initiated to make up for evaporation and boil-off No Mobile pump has been added to the emergency cooling system Installed mobile generator solar power supply system and modification of ECCS Already bought the new control console for the reactor some modifications according to accident management and emergency preparedness werewill be implemented Water resistance of the refilling electrical motors of pumps was increased A contract has been established with the Hungarian Disaster Management in case black-out a diesel generator is transferred immediately to the site Backup diesel stations are used for power supply of safety-important systems Fire detection and alarm system was put into operation Uninterruptible power supply system accumulators were replaced with anti-seismic accumulators Backup diesel electrical power stations (two) were additionally equipped with a stand-alone automatic aerosol fire suppression system A motor pump was procured with quick-detachable fire hoses to supply water from a remote tank Electrical power is supplied for the safety important systems with the use of backup diesel power stations Automatic fire detection and alarm system was put into operation Replacement of an old diesel generator by new one with higher reliability and with an automatic-restart system included (faster response time) and additional supply of mobile diesel generator for fire protection Installation of a pump system near by sump in the reactor hall to move water from the sump to the reactor pool in case of failure of the emergency core cooling system Installation of an additional emergency ventilation system including HEPA and charcoal filters Establishment of an emergency control room in order to shutdown the reactor when emergency situation occurred We have a program for the maintenance and surveillance of the diesel generator modifications have been carried out proposed for power supply system viz Providing DG sets at higher elevation arrangement has been made for mobile DG set supplementary control room hook-up points in decay heat removal system reactor trip has been proposed for ground motion beyond 80 of OBE value etc Terrain fill level raised to take into account extreme flooding conditions considered beyond the design basis An additional grid connection has been realized other measures like a mobile diesel generator or supplementary refilling systems for the reactor pool in case of pool leakage are under investigation No Changes

ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS

Has the reassessment resulted in changes in the reactor organizational aspects (eg reactor organizational chart human factors etc) andor relevant regulatory practices (eg licensing conditions inspection programmes etc)If ldquoYesrdquoThe most significant changes (implementedplanned)

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No

Comment A Technical Support Group has been established for the Emergency Operating Event This staff is trained in the various Enabling Instructions and are available to support the Operations Team in a Severe Accident Condition Training has been provided to all staff on how to manage Severe Accident Conditions This concept is different than design basis events The reactor emergency procedures have been modified The human factor has been taking into consideration (as an example the new signs on the walls showing what to do in case of emergency have been installed) No assessment performed The reassessment considered this aspect but concluded no changes were necessary at this time It should be noted that the continuation of assessment work related to the three largest research and test reactors could yet require actions The recent regulation issued by CNCAN the Romanian regulatory Authority concerning periodic safety review of nuclear power plant and research reactors among others call for a distinct person or group in operation organization structure to ensure independent safety review This will be implemented in 2016 for approval of annual organizational chart 1 Change of reactor organizational chart Included the following new divisions in the Center for research Reactor organizationNuclear Safety Division and Documentation Planning and Training Division and IampC Division 2 Reforms the reactor safety committes Control access to area inspection and periodic testin programs Fire training is done twice a year All regulatory practices based on our quality system The safety reassessment that was performed following the feedback from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident did not point out the necessity for changes in safety organization The safety organisation is commonly reviewed within the continuous regulatory supervision and within this framework deficits if any are addressed Additional programmes were elaborated for post-accident training of personnel and maintenance of new equipments The analysis resulted in the development of the action plan supervised by Rostehnadzor during inspection The analysis resulted in the development of the action plan supervised by Rostechnadzor during inspections Additional programmes were elaborated for post-accident training of personnel and maintenance of new equipmentThe analysis resulted in the development of the action plan supervised by Rostechnadzor during inspections The documentation was outdated in several aspects and thoroughly reviewed But the process is not finished yet Related with the new reactor license the Regulatory Body request additional information for the fire protection system the maintenance program for the diesel generator and a wide study to analyse the effect of one explosion in the gas duct In the re-license process the Regulatory Body issues 257 Additional Information Requirements (RIA in Spanish) that has been solved by the reactor personnel Up to date the re-licensing process is in the final stage there are 5 RIAacutes in Regulatory Body evaluation The RA-10 Reactor is at the detailed design stage This issue will be evaluated in a future stage

Have the existing emergency plan and associated emergency arrangements and procedures been reviewed to ensure that they are adequate and that their implementation is possible particularly for an accident initiated by an extreme external event affecting several facilities simultaneously Descriptions of any actions taken or planned regard

a Response capability of on-site and off-site emergency personnel Emergency Operating Centre now includes a Technical Support Group The EOC has established a communication system to interface with NRU an information data centre including drawings procedures Enabling Instructions SMART boards computers etc (No) All of these items are reviewed by our staff every year We have an annual surveillance item that requires a review of our Emergency Response Plan as well as an annual emergency and evacuation drill We also interact with off-site organizations regularly and schedule annual training with these organizations (police fire and hospital groups) The emergency plan is sufficient and we do periodic drills No changes No No change Off-site capabilities improved Yes but no changes made Yesthe reassessment considered this aspect but concluded no changes were necessary at this time It should be noted that the continuation of assessment work related to the three largest research and test reactors could yet require actions On institute site there are only one nuclear installation the other installations are radiological one with low impact on reactor installation The response capability is provided in emergency plan and is continuously ensured by the on-site staff dealing with services concerning the firefighting power supply water supply radiation protection and communication No Yes Deploying more response force and installing alarm sensors at the different points of the reactor facility We are giving emphasis to training together with university and fire stations in the region In case of emergency situation sufficient number of skilled emergency personnel (see also 6d) will be available Members of the emergency response organisation are in the on-call service and will be notified by the shift supervisor on duty Exact structure and competences of the emergency response organisation are described in the accident management manuals of the individual facilities Yes But We do not need to take more action in this regard because the emergency preparedness was reviewed by the authority and it was approved in any aspects Alterations were introduced into the current procedures to commission new systems The personnel were trained to maintain and operate the above systems Beyond-the design accident procedure guidelines were revised and amended Response capability of on-site and off-site emergency personnel is supported with a high-capacity motor pump with hoses to supply river water and a mobile diesel generator to supply power to affected facilities Beyond-the-design basis accident procedure guidelines were revised and amended Response capability of on-site and off-site emergency personnel is supported with a high-capacity motor pump with quick-detachable hoses to supply river water and a mobile diesel generator to supply power to affected facilities Beyond-the-design basis accident procedure guidelines were revised and amended Alterations were introduced into the current procedures to commission new systems The personnel were trained to maintain and operate the above systems Response capability of on-site and off-site emergency personnel is supported with a high-capacity motor pump with quick-detachable hoses to supply river water and a mobile diesel generator to supply power to affected facilities Our Emergency Response Procedures have been reviewed The same personnel responsible for operation are also the first in line to deal with emergency Immediate risks posed to the facility out of operation hours can be dealt with by security staff who are able to handle the situation until arrival of the technical personnel In order to enhance the Emergency preparedness capabilities of Greece to Radiological and Nuclear (RN) incidents in densely populated urban areas the National Centre for Scientific Research ldquoDEMOKRITOSrdquo in collaboration with the Greek Atomic Energy Commission have been implementing a project aiming at advancing the existing public protection mechanism while investigating the degree to which RN risks are appropriately taken into consideration in national plans and regulations These activities prepare the implementation of actions RN23 H29 and H30 of the EU Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Action Plan Training drill and exercise programmes for on-site emergency personnel With appropriate EOP in place giving detailed plan of action and necessary provisions made the onsite personnel will be capable of handling the event No The RA-10 Reactor is at the detailed design stage This issue will be evaluated in a future stage No Changes Under Consideration Not yet done for extreme external events affecting facilities simultaneously

b Accessibility of the affected facilities by off-site organizations NRU is located next to a military base In the event access issues existed beyond what teh site could handle additional support can be secured Yes the facility design has sufficient accessibility for intervention of off-site organizations No changes No change Off-site access redesigned Yesthe reassessment considered this aspect but concluded no changes were necessary at this time It should be noted that the continuation of assessment work related to the three largest research and test reactors could yet require actions There are written legal binding agreements with intervention organizations for which the access is granted to the affected facilities Yes Developing the communication systems It is part of our training with the team of firemen from the nearby region The off-site organisations (eg fire brigade) take regularly part on the emergency exercises and they are familiar with the research reactor facility and its site In case of emergency situation they will be ordered by the emergency response organisation The accessibility of the affected facilities in case of severe accident is included in the disaster control plans Affected facilities are accessible by off-site organizations namely Federal Rescue Service specialists Affected facilities are accessible by off-site organizations namely Federal Rescue Service specialists Affected facilities are accessible by off-site organizations namely Federal Rescue Service specialists Our emergency procedures include provisions regarding when to call for help from external organizations such as the Fire Department and how to provide them access to the facility The accessibility of the DNRIrsquos facilities are regularly reviewed by the off-site emergency organizations (such as the Dalat Cityrsquos Fire Service and VARANS) In 2013 the DNRI upgraded its internal routes that improves the accessibility of all facilities The recent review has showed that the accessibility of the affected facilities was fairly easy and fast the access to affected facilities are taken into account in the institutional Emergency Plan Reactor site can be accessed from outside with two independent motor able routes At least one of them is expected to remain available even during extreme emergency No Alternative access roads have been identified during the site evaluation Their suitability for access during extreme external will be evaluated in a future stage No Changes Dissemination of satellite phone numbers as neither the on-site EPR procedures or the off-site emergency plans actually identified such numbers that are already available Under Consideration Not yet done for extreme external events affecting facilities simultaneously

c Availability of emergency equipment and its suitability for the conditions that may be created by extreme events Additional loaders fire equipment etc purchased to support SAM In addition the site has a well equipped fire department including specialty fire ladder trucks to access the roof of NRU Partially sufficient Availability of emergency equipment has been improved The emergency equipment storage areas equipped with emergency flash lights Now there is a regular check once a year of the availability of the emergency equipment Equipment gadgets and personnel made available Yesthe reassessment considered this aspect but concluded no changes were necessary at this time It should be noted that the continuation of assessment work related to the three largest research and test reactors could yet require actions The institute continuously operate his own firefighting station with permanent staff fire truck tools and materials Radiation protection laboratory has shift staff all along the year in order to survey the operation of fixed and mobile installations and instruments available in the case of emergency Yes Have a plan to develop We have adequate equipment and installation The emergency equipment is at each research reactor facility in sufficient quantity available Some accident management measures andor equipment were implemented after the safety reassessment following the feedback from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident This includes eg electrical connections for the emergency power diesel aggregates that are intended especially for the accident management equipment and the pumps for the coolant injection into the reactor pool feeding of boric acid as an alternative in case of malfunction of control rods Furthermore all accident management procedures were systematically described in the accident management manuals The facility is equipped with up-to-date fire alarm the facility conditions are controlled from the centralized control station of the fire and salvage unit The facility is equipped with up-to-date fire alarm the facility conditions are controlled from the centralized control station of the fire and salvage unit The facility is equipped with up-to-date fire alarm the facility conditions are controlled from the centralized control station of the fire and salvage unit Basic emergency equipment is available both at the facility and nearby The testingmaintenance of emergency equipments for the extreme conditions are periodically performed by the DNRI staff according the specific procedures and its suitability is always annually reviewed by the DNRIrsquos safety committee and off-site emergency organizations The necessary equipment for a proper response to an emergency is available on the site (radiation survey meters electronic dosimeters Respiratory Protection Equipment Anti-contamination clothing) Additional support are provide by a Radiological Protection (RP) organization and Industrial Safety Appropriate surveillance is maintained to ensure availability of emergency equipment All the emergency equipment are capable of performing under the circumstances considered during the extreme event No The RA-10 Reactor is at the detailed design stage This issue will be evaluated in a future stage No Changes Some caches of on-site emergency equipment are to be relocated from their current location in existing non-seismically qualified locations to seismically qualified buildings Under Consideration Not sure of adequate emergency equipment for such an extreme external events affecting facilities simultaneously

d Training programme of operating personnel with respect to emergency situations NRU has performed simulated training with all Operating Supervisory staff A validation exercise was recently completed with outside Human Factors and Peer observers A full simulation exercise with additional oversight is planned for October Yes Personnel training programmes have been modified taking into account new emergency equipment The training programme is expanded to more severe accidents 1 Emergency seminars conducted regularly to educate staff and emergency personnel on conduct and attitude during emergency 2 Emergency drills conducted to verify level of understanding and compliance Yesthe reassessment considered this aspect but concluded no changes were necessary at this time It should be noted that the continuation of assessment work related to the three largest research and test reactors could yet require actions The training manual for reactor operation and training for emergency was reviewed in 2014 The annual training program was revised accordingly for all category of staff and approved by Regulatory Body Yes Different training programmes are conducted by the Training Institute We are giving emphasis to training radiological emergency and fire situation together with university and team of firemen from the nearby region Part of training stuff attends lectures of nuclear power plants Emergency trainings for operating personal takes place regularly usually once a year At these exercises also the off-site organizations and the disaster response organisation of the supervisory authority participate Programs to train personnel with respect to emergency situation have been elaborated Emergency prevention trainings are performed Programs to train personnel with respect to emergency situation have been elaborated Emergency prevention trainings are performed Programs to train personnel with respect to emergency situation have been elaborated Emergency prevention trainings are performed Emergency preparedness is part of our periodic Training and Re-training Program The training of operating personnel with respect to emergency situations is introduced in the initial training and continuing training programmes for the operating personnel The drills on the anticipated emergencies that might occur at the site are performed every two years and emergency exercises is performed at suitable intervals but the emergency drills and exercises for the extreme conditions with the involvement of off-site emergency organizations have not conducted yet Training drill and exercise programmes for on-site emergency personnel Firefighting Training (planned) Interactive sessions have been held with the operating staff regarding various actions to be taken as mentioned in the EOP and its rationale All the provisions made are adequately elucidated to the operating staff Surveillance programs are carried out for ensuring performance of safety equipment and familiarisation of the operating staff No The RA-10 Reactor is at the detailed design stage This issue will be evaluated in a future stage No Changes More realistic an extensive emergency exercises are planned and have been implemented included a complete site evacuation exercise performed this month BDBA response training such as response to station blackout and water-supply training in case of loss of coolant accident was conducted Other programmes are under consideration This is done annually for PIEs

SAFETY DOCUMENTATION

Has the reassessment resulted in changes in the safety analysis and conclusions presented in the SAR If ldquoYesrdquoThe current status of the SAR any planned revisions and any related interactions with the regulatory body No changes in the SAR SAR recently updated by a third party contractor

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No

Comment No changes in the SAR SAR recently updated by a third party contractor In progress The combination of the events listed in the safety analysis has been included in the SAR No assessment performed There exist a planned revision in 2017 No changes however it should be noted that the continuation of assessment work related to the three largest research and test reactors could yet require actions The reactor SAR was reviewed updated and submitted to the Romanian Regulatory Body in 2013 After Regulatory Body evaluation a series of requirements and recommendations were formulated Those recommendations will be considered in the new SAR which is in progress The revied SAR has been sent to the regulatory body Have a plan to update the SAR based on the reassessment results 1 Full interaction with the regulatory body 2SAR is evaluated every two years It is not yet known The SAR for FRM II and BER II reactors are expected to be completed in 2016 and for the FRMZ facility it will be in 2020 Our updated Safety Analysis Report is currently under review by the regulator The SAR for the DNRR was updated and reviewed by VARANS in 2012 after fulfillment of full core conversion from HEU to LEU fuels and the license for operation and utilization of the reactor with the validation of the 10-year duration was granted in February 2013 The results of safety reassessment were mainly presented in chapters 16 (Safety Analysis) and 20 (Emergency Planning and Preparedness) For the purpose of application of license renewal in 2023 Periodic Safety Review for the DNRR will be planned to conduct in the period of 2018 ndash 2022 See Ans 5 As per the new regulatory requirements plant is subjected to Periodic Safety Review (PSR) once in ten years PSR for Dhruva was concluded in 2014 Review of plant safety against reassessed DBEs is part of the PSR no major changes are expected in this and BDBEs are part of Sever Accident Management Guide Certain changes are proposed in the plant to manage BDBEs and improve margins against DBEs The national regulation requires very low frequency events to be included in the analysis Therefore extreme events were already taken into account in the analysis reported in the PSAR multiple changes have been identified and are being implemented to the SAR in conjunction with other changes identified during the course of the PSR This includes the explicit consideration of combinations of external events (as previously discussed under Question 3) as well as additional analysis of certain beyond design basis events Note that the safety analysis in SAR Chapter 16 is being extensively rewritten to adopt the Fault Schedule approach to the deterministic safety assessment and that many of the changes arising from the safety reassessment are being incorporated into that rewrite (It have some possibility of change depend on the result of review by NRA (Nuclear Regulation Authority)) SAR was reviewed and updated in December 2011 The next update will be December 2016

Has the reassessment resulted in changes in the operating programme including operating maintenance and periodic testing procedures If ldquoYesrdquochanges in the operating programme including operating maintenance and periodic testing procedures (established or planned)

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No

Comment No changes to existing testing programs or procedures New procedures developed and tested to support new equipment purchased (eg diesel testing) and on line load testing Enabling Instructions issued to address abnormal operating configuration modes The intent is to have procedures that have been thought out ahead of time to ensure issues efficiencies and equipment details have been thought through instead of having to work a problem from first principles during the event A total of 30 Enabling instructions have been identified They include jumpering interlocks to allow abnormal equipment operating configurations supplying portable air to critical dampers and valves use of newly installed injection points use of firewater pumps storage block cooling facilities rod storage bays make-up supplies etc The new emergency equipment has been included in the maintenance and periodic testing procedures No assessment performed weekly maintenance checks now includes electrical and mechanical systems that hitherto viewed not so important to safety such as sample irradiation system No changes however it should be noted that the continuation of assessment work related to the three largest research and test reactors could yet require actions Some procedures concerning response to an emergency were updated Maintenance and periodic testing of the mobile pump has been added Since 2002 with the impelementation of the quality system alla these items are periodically performed and reviewed The safety reassessment that was performed following the feedback from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident did not point out the necessity for changes in operating programme and procedures The operation programme and procedures are commonly reviewed within the continuous regulatory supervision and within this framework deficits if any are addressed Maintenance and periodical check-up procedures for new equipment have been developed Maintenance and periodical check-up procedures for new equipment have been developed Maintenance and periodical check-up procedures for new equipment have been developed Our Operation Manual and Emergency Procedures were updated as well and are under review The changes in the operating programme are mainly related to maintenance and periodic testing procedures in which the information and instructions were prepared more in detail and frequency of the maintenance and periodic testing was increased depending on the systemrsquos safety functions a The new control system takes into account all the measures to have reactivity control and shut down the reactor in emergency situationsb The new cooling system are planned to have the capacity to cool the reactor core in any conditionsc The confinement of the reactor is going to be improved with the modernization of the reactor ventilation systemd Any additional system supporting the above mentioned safety functions (eg mobile diesel generator emergency cooling systems etc)e We have a program for the maintenance and surveillance of the diesel generator new surveillance programs have been introduced following the incident for ensuring emergency preparedness The RA-10 Reactor is at the detailed design stage This issue will be evaluated in a future stage The response to extended loss of electrical power supplies is being reviewed and revised as a result of not only the safety reassessment but also lessons learned from a demonstration emergency exercise that involved initiating a deliberate station blackout for approximately 20 minutes and assessing the plant response Note that the use of a symptoms-based approach to emergency operating instructions means that they are more readily able to cope with beyond design basis initiating events as well as design basis initiation events

1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 19

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)

Partially 5 (comment)

Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 8

Total 29

Yes

No

questionparticpants Canada Usa Egypt Ukrain Austria Germany Nigeria USA Texas US Nuclear Regulatory Commision Romania Bangladesh Italy Ukrain Kiev Institute Bangladesh Nuclear Institute Brasil CNEN Germany Hungary Russia - MIR Russia - RBT-6 Russia - RBT-102 Brazil- TRIGA Greece Vietnam Mexican- TRIGA India Argentina- RA-10 Germany- FRM II Australia-OPAL

GENERAL



No No No No No No No No

Comment Safety Analysis Report already considers these accident scenarios (flooding or severe weather phenomena) For Inshass site (ETRR-1) Site characterization has no occurrence probabilities for tsunami or earthquakes as itrsquos far away from Mediterranean sea about 240 Km and the maximum earthquake magnitude is 65 no need for a low power reactor with inherent safe fuel The safety reassessment of TRIGA14MW RR is planned for the period 2015-2016A large effort is planned for site re-evaluation following the new Romania regulation in this area issued between 2012-2015 Partially reassessed and implemented Partially reassessed and implemented Safety reassessment was peformed for the threee larger (gt50 KW) research reactor facility in operation in Germany FRMZ TRIGA Mark II at the Mainz University BER-II the experimental reactor operated at the Helmholtz Zentrum in Berlin FRM II the Hienz Maier Leibnitz research reactor in Garching (near Munich) the four smaller reactors (lt2W) were not included in the safety reassessment We were already performing a safety reassessment due to our license renewal process and also due to concerns related to 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup Physical protection aspects were addressed as well The Reactor is in Extended Shutdown since July 2004 A complete safety reassessment based on the IAEA Safety Reports Series No 80 for the Dalat Nuclear Research Reactor (DNRR) has not been conducted yet Though in the annual safety review for the DNRR operation the Dalat Nuclear Research Institute (DNRI) takes into account the international good practices and lessons learnt from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident We are making a reassessment related with the cooling system Related with the training for emergency situations we had a program with practical exercises We are improving the fire protection program and emergency situations The physical security program has been improved A structural analysis for the installation was made and it was observed that is not necessary to make provisions to avoid the flooding of the installation Additional to this activities we have a reactor modernization program including the control ventilation and cooling system (this program is financed by the IAEA)

Was the analysis performed based on the IAEA Safety Reports Series No 80If ldquoNordquo what requirementsguidance the reassessment was based on NA

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

No No No No No No No No No No No No

Comment NRU staff are currently completing a Severe Accident Management review with Westinghouse and a contractor Based on Power Reactor Severe Accident processes Planned No assessment performed The safety analysis was performed immediately after the accident before the IAEA Report was published Initial assessment did not show any basis for further consideration The NRC staff did contribute to the development and review of the IAEA Safety Report Series No 80 document and was aware of its content during the performance of the NRCrsquos post-Fukushima safety assessment of NRC-licensed research and test reactors The NRCrsquos Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) provided specific guidance to the NRC staff for the assessment facilities other than power reactors in March of 2013 preceding the publication of the final version of IAEA Safety Report Series 80 The NRCrsquos internally developed guidance was compared to IAEArsquos Safety Report Series No 80 following publication and was found to be generally consistent Section 6 graded approachA graded approach was applied considering the peculiar features of TRIGA14MW RR -Fuel design-Incoloy cladding high temperature melting point of cladding and fuel pellets -Inherent safety feature provided by design including large prompt negative coefficient of reactivity due to temperature -The fission product inventory and peculiarity of source term -Siting in a low populated area -Structural concept conservative by design below ground level partially based on the IAEA safety series no 80 Partially based on the IAEA safety series no 80 Since 2009 the reactor has initiated process improvement in plant safety through experience observed in other reactor in the world Satisfy effectively the local emergency plan The safety reassessment in Germany was already performed in 2012 the IAEA Safety Report Series No 80 was not available at that time Therefore a catalogue of requirements was developed by the Working Group ldquoResearch Reactorsrdquo of the Reactor Safety Commission (RSK) an advisory board of the Federal Ministry for the Environment Nature Conservation Building and Nuclear Safety The catalogue of requirements for research reactors based on the safety reassessment for the nuclear power plant After that Germany provided input to the drafting and the review process of the Safety Report Series No 80 The safety reassessment of German research reactors is basically consistent with the guidance of the Safety Report Series No 80 The analysis was based on the WANO recommendations and request from ROSATOM State Corporation The analysis was based on the WANO recommendations and request from ROSATOM State Corporation The analysis was based on the WANO recommendations and request from ROSATOM State Corporation IAEA Safety Reports Series No 80 was not the main focus of the process However as this is a work in progress it may eventually come to the foreground The safety reassessment for the DNRR was mainly based on guidance requirements and instructions of the supplier operating experience and recommendations of the DNRIrsquos safety committee and VARANS as well as good practices obtained through participating in the international workshops and meetings The analysis was based on the main points contained in the IAEA Safety Report but mainly based on requirements set by the German authorities



Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes


Comment One part of the assessment includes loss of power and as such NRU purchased three portable diesel generators and have engineered tie-in points to support critical loads In addition to major seismic upgrades installed a number of years ago a number of equipment purchases support beyond design basis events These include earthquakes dam breaks loss of process cooling major primary coolant loss etc In the case of fire NRU has significantly upgraded its firewater distribution system in NRU including Siamese connections for fire pumper direct connection The reassessment includes the combination of possible external events (earthquake tornado) with loss of power that results in the regular emergency cooling system fail Earthquakes and flooding can be excluded in Berlin Applicable events noted are1 Loss of electrical power supply2 Fire3 Flooding We have an open pool TRIGA reactor and we are in a region with very minimal seismic threat 1 The first reassessment included bull natural events ( focus on seismic and flooding events) bull extended loss electrical power (station blackout) bull loss of and inadequate decay heat removal core bull loss of and inadequate decay heat removal for irradiated and spent fuel bull combustible gas generation and control bull loss of reactor containmentconfinement 2 A second reassessment included bull flooding bull seismic eventsbull high velocity wind tornados and resulting missile hazardsbull lightningbull snow and ice loading of structuresbull drought and temperature extremesbull firebull extended loss of the electrical gridbull loss of the ultimate heat sink The new safety report will have the content following the guidance from SSG-20 Loss of external electrical power for more than 2 hours was analysed In order to prevent the loss of control of installation and to ensure the safety of installation and site sustaining vital functions a new diesel generator was installed outside the reactor building Loss of electrical power supply flood fire and loss of coolant Reassessment included an assessment of the tsunami risk tornadoes flooding and is under evaluation earthquakes Combination of the Loss of coolant event together with tsunami risk tornadoes flooding Is under evaluation Loss of coolant and earthquakes All listed events Loss of electrical power supply flood fire and loss of coolant The robustness of German research reactors was reviewed with regard to natural hazards (such as earthquake flooding other natural hazards sespecially weather conditions and their combination with another relevant hazard) expanded postulated events (station blackouts and emergency power failure) precautionary measures accident management man-madew hazards (such as blast wave combustible gases toxic gases airplane crach) loss of inner and outer electrical power supply loss of secondary coolant accident can be occurred in spent fuel storage Analyzed events full loss of power supply with primary pipeline rupture caused by external events earthquake tornado sow storms flooding fire) Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE) accompanied by tornado on the adjacent area Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE) accompanied by fire on the adjacent area Fire on the adjacent area accompanied by tornado followed by actuation of a stand-alone power system after 24 hours The considered events included as follows blackout accompanied by primary circuit pipeline break caused by extreme weather events (earthquake tornado snow load flooding fire on the adjacent area) Due to our facility small power (100kW TRIGA Mark I) and peculiar characteristics (eg underground pool) the main postulated accidents ndash loss of power fire rupture of a fuel element loss of coolingshielding water flooding for instance ndash were considered as already covering a broad enough set of conditions that may even happen simultaneously The reassessment was made previous to the Fukushima accident For the DNRR the events of loss of coolant from the reactor pool and reactivity insertion are considered as the most potential events Taking account the extreme external events such as earthquake and loss of electrical power supply the combination of events has been analysed as follows - Earthquake with excessive loss of reactor pool water- Earthquake with loss of electrical power supply- Earthquake with removal of control rods 1 Special internal events (sabotage fire suddenly lost of the pool water- radiological emergency) 2 External events-Earthquakes-Explosions in the natural gas duct near to the reactor site ( about 600 m) 3 Combinations of events -Earthquake with fire the reassessment was for conditions more severe that design basis The combination which can result due to single common cause have been accounted for most sever condition was for power failure with flooding due to storm surge mainly loss of electric supply (ldquostation black outrdquo) earthquake flooding widely spread fires loss of coolant due to leaks in the reactor or storage pool loss of coolant due to blockage of cooling channels in fuel element internal flooding reactivity accidents due to manipulation errors airplane crash explosion burnable gases toxic gases A fault scheduale was prepared that identified design basis and beyond design basis initiaton event applicable to OPAL The safety reassessment involved revisiting the 82 beyond design basis events effectively reassessing them as design basis events and determining whether the critical safety functions were met in all cases initiating events were considered one external hazard may be reasonably assumed to occur in conjunction with each other one external hazard may be a consequence of another one external hazard may occur coincidentally This analysis identified that combinations of events had been considered implicitly in the original SAR but not explicitly and a recommendation was made that the SAR be prevised to address such combinations explicitly


Yes Yes (Yes) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

No (No) (No) (No) No

a Reactor protection and shutdown systems No additional changes are proposed over the installation of a secondary shutdown system installed in the 1990s Our protectionemergency systems are sufficient per our Safety Analysis Report which already considers a tsunami accident scenario improving the security and physical protection system because ETRR-1 in extended shutdown state and the fuel transferred to the spent fuel storage No assessment performed We had to evaluate our emergency plans and create a special manual for severe emergencies Installation of independent power supply systems (Diesel generator and Inverter) Yes Reactor protection and shutdown systems was subject of modernization project accomplished in 2010 An earthquake warning system was installed at TRIGA14MW reactor This system receive a signal provided by national monitoring system from earthquake epicentre This system are continuously operated by National Institute for Earth with 20 seconds before reaching the wave in the reactor site and actuate the reactor scram system in order to put the reactor in a safe shutdown state Seismic switch incorporated in reactor shutdown system and control rods drive changed by new one Installation of seismic switch is under development Seismic switch incorporated in reactor shutdown system and control rods drive changed by new one Equipment modernization The existing design and organizational provisions ensure the fulfilment of the basic safety functions Nevertheless some modifications according to accident management and emergency preparedness werewill be implemented For more information see 6 Emergency preparedness No need to improve Industrial anti-seismic protection was put into pilot operation to provide an emergency shutdown of the reactor in cease of earthquake as well as to automatically record seismic effects Industrial anti-seismic protection system was installed and put into operation Industrial anti-seismic protection system was put into operation to ensure emergency reactor shutdown in the case of an earthquake and automatic record of seismic impact on reactor facilities Due to its design principles and small size our facility is rather safe shutdown is achieved by passive means (control rods fall by gravity if current to the electromagnets that raise them is interrupted) TRIGA fuel has a negative temperature coefficient that limits power excursions and we do not need cooling after shutdown Our reactor building is made of reinforced concrete and provides reasonable containment to eventual leakages Reinforcement of the Reactor building to meet the requirements of the more recent anti-seismic regulations (modification implemented) Reinforcement of plastic cover to protect the control rod driven motors from falling objects Installation of a steel structure to support the control rod driven motor platform in case of strong earthquake The new control system takes into account all the measures to have reactivity control and shut down the reactor in emergency situations modifications have been carried out proposed for power supply system viz Providing DG sets at higher elevation arrangement has been made for mobile DG set supplementary control room hook-up points in decay heat removal system reactor trip has been proposed for ground motion beyond 80 of OBE value etc The original RA-10 concept design included a second shutdown system The reassessment indicated this provision to be adequate to cope with very low frequency events which include the failure of the first shutdown system Modifications to improve the management of such events were identified including for example the provision of a standard fire water hose coupling in place of a blank flange on an existing external water supply point and the modification of three electrical junction boards to facilitate the connection of an external mobile diesel generator

b Reactor cooling systems Reactor cooling systems include 4 separate supplies including a seismically qualified water system integral to NRU In addition NRU has purchased firewater pumps to allow water to be drawn directly from the river and distributed to NRU The water can be tied into various sources or it can be pumped directly into the core if required Connection of system with chiller to serve as emergency core cooling system Yes installed facility equipment or portable external sources to avoid early loss of reactor cooling Complete instrumentation refurbishment with intelligent transducersconverters connected to data acquisition system and external scram from all events related to cooling system as pool level LOCA LOFA Installed better pipe supports to minimize vibration and to reduce consequence of earthquake Installed better pipe supports to minimize vibration and to reduce consequence of earthquake Excahnge of secondary pumps and new cooling tower No need to improve Coolant can be returned using motor pump and quick-detachable hoses A possibility is provided for coolant return with the use of a motor pump and quick-detachable hoses Design of a double flapper to isolate the reactor pool and assure - in case of failure of the first flapper - the establishment of natural circulation for the pool water cooling the fuel assemblies (modification planned) Refurbishment of cooling tower and two water reservoir pools (250 m3 volume) and water tower (21 m3 height and 25 m3 volume) Improvement of the stainless steel pipeline and valve system the emergency core cooling system Improvement of watertight plugs for neutron beam tubes to prevent the excessive loss of water from the reactor pool The new cooling system are planned to have the capacity to cool the reactor core in any conditions a Yes 1) The original RA-10 concept design included an Emergency Water Injection System After the reassessment a modification on this system was made to allow water injection from outside the facility for instance from a fire truck 2) Long term pools cooling system was modified to allow power supply from diesel generator system so the system can keep reactor pool coolant temperature within acceptable values for 7 days

c Confinementcontainment systems A confinement boundary system was installed a number of years ago In this phase we have issued Enabling Instructions that identify procedures to use equipment in non conventional ways to ensure habitability of the facility is maintained so the staff can work to re-establish core cooling This includes use of building ventilation fans and ducting to provide a negative pressure on the structure if the reactor ventilation system fails for whatever reason Negative pressure system for the Reactor Hall upgraded to include filters and detectors Yes Confinement system- emergency ventilation of confinement was ensured by initial design using one of two fans to control the differential pressure filtration of air and releases The modification consist into power supply diagram were one of the fans is ensured by the diesel generator in case of blackout planned for improvement planned for improvement design of new racks for spent fuel storage element More measuring data were displayed in the control room concerning the direction of the air flow New design of the primary cooling system so as the whole system (primary piping delay tank pumps heat exchangers) will be confined (modification planned) Reinforcement of reactor building by adding steel pillars and replacement of rubber seals for shipping door The confinement of the reactor is going to be improved with the modernization of the reactor ventilation system No The original RA-10 concept design included a confinement designed to mitigate the consequences of a severe accident involving core damage

d Any additional system supporting the above mentioned safety functions (eg mobile diesel generator emergency cooling systems etc) heavy equipment (loaders) has been purchased to allow transport of the pumps and diesel generator sets -Specific equipment has been installed to monitor core cooling conditions in either a boiling mode or a loss of level event The equipment including header vessel differential pressure radiation levels and core temperature can be used to identify when the event changes from an Emergency Operating Procedure event to a Severe Accident Management event The additional gasoline pumps for emergency cooling system have been installed The additional power cables from the diesel generators to IampC system have been purchased and stored in the special places (without installation to prevent them from brake in case of extreme event) We are planning to purchase the mobile diesel generator Yes For decay heat removal systems portable external sources can be initiated to make up for evaporation and boil-off No installed mobile generator solar power supply system and modification of ECCS Mobile pump has been added to the emergency cooling system Installed mobile generator solar power supply system and modification of ECCS Already bought the new control console for the reactor Water resistance of the refilling electrical motors of pumps was increased A contract has been established with the Hungarian Disaster Management in case black-out a diesel generator is transferred immediately to the site Backup diesel stations are used for power supply of safety-important systems Fire detection and alarm system was put into operation Uninterruptible power supply system accumulators were replaced with anti-seismic accumulators Backup diesel electrical power stations (two) were additionally equipped with a stand-alone automatic aerosol fire suppression system A motor pump was procured with quick-detachable fire hoses to supply water from a remote tank Electrical power is supplied for the safety important systems with the use of backup diesel power stations Automatic fire detection and alarm system was put into operation Replacement of an old diesel generator by new one with higher reliability and with an automatic-restart system included (faster response time) and additional supply of mobile diesel generator for fire protection Installation of a pump system near by sump in the reactor hall to move water from the sump to the reactor pool in case of failure of the emergency core cooling system Installation of an additional emergency ventilation system including HEPA and charcoal filters Establishment of an emergency control room in order to shutdown the reactor when emergency situation occurred We have a program for the maintenance and surveillance of the diesel generator Terrain fill level raised to take into account extreme flooding conditions considered beyond the design basis An additional grid connection has been realized other measures like a mobile diesel generator or supplementary refilling systems for the reactor pool in case of pool leakage are under investigation



Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes


Comment A Technical Support Group has been established for the Emergency Operating Event This staff is trained in the various Enabling Instructions and are available to support the Operations Team in a Severe Accident Condition Training has been provided to all staff on how to manage Severe Accident Conditions This concept is different than design basis events The reactor emergency procedures have been modified The human factor has been taking into consideration (as an example the new signs on the walls showing what to do in case of emergency have been installed) No assessment performed The reassessment considered this aspect but concluded no changes were necessary at this time It should be noted that the continuation of assessment work related to the three largest research and test reactors could yet require actions The recent regulation issued by CNCAN the Romanian regulatory Authority concerning periodic safety review of nuclear power plant and research reactors among others call for a distinct person or group in operation organization structure to ensure independent safety review This will be implemented in 2016 for approval of annual organizational chart 1 Change of reactor organizational chartIncluded the following new divisions in the Center for Research Reactor organization Nuclear Safety Division and Documentation Planning and Training Division and IampC Division 2 Reforms the reactor safety committees 1 Change of reactor organizational chart Included the following new divisions in the Center for research Reactor organizationNuclear Safety Division and Documentation Planning and Training Division and IampC Division 2 Reforms the reactor safety committes Control access to area inspection and periodic testin programs Fire training is done twice a year All regulatory practices based on our quality system The safety reassessment that was performed following the feedback from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident did not point out the necessity for changes in safety organization The safety organisation is commonly reviewed within the continuous regulatory supervision and within this framework deficits if any are addressed Additional programmes were elaborated for post-accident training of personnel and maintenance of new equipments The analysis resulted in the development of the action plan supervised by Rostehnadzor during inspection The analysis resulted in the development of the action plan supervised by Rostechnadzor during inspections Additional programmes were elaborated for post-accident training of personnel and maintenance of new equipmentThe analysis resulted in the development of the action plan supervised by Rostechnadzor during inspections The documentation was outdated in several aspects and thoroughly reviewed But the process is not finished yet Related with the new reactor license the Regulatory Body request additional information for the fire protection system the maintenance program for the diesel generator and a wide study to analyse the effect of one explosion in the gas duct In the re-license process the Regulatory Body issues 257 Additional Information Requirements (RIA in Spanish) that has been solved by the reactor personnel Up to date the re-licensing process is in the final stage there are 5 RIAacutes in Regulatory Body evaluation The RA-10 Reactor is at the detailed design stage This issue will be evaluated in a future stage


a Response capability of on-site and off-site emergency personnel Emergency Operating Centre now includes a Technical Support Group The EOC has established a communication system to interface with NRU an information data centre including drawings procedures Enabling Instructions SMART boards computers etc (No) All of these items are reviewed by our staff every year We have an annual surveillance item that requires a review of our Emergency Response Plan as well as an annual emergency and evacuation drill We also interact with off-site organizations regularly and schedule annual training with these organizations (police fire and hospital groups) The emergency plan is sufficient and we do periodic drills No changes No No change Off-site capabilities improved Yes but no changes made Yesthe reassessment considered this aspect but concluded no changes were necessary at this time It should be noted that the continuation of assessment work related to the three largest research and test reactors could yet require actions On institute site there are only one nuclear installation the other installations are radiological one with low impact on reactor installation The response capability is provided in emergency plan and is continuously ensured by the on-site staff dealing with services concerning the firefighting power supply water supply radiation protection and communication Response capability of on-site has been improved by deploying more response force and installing alarm sensors at different points of the reactor facility No Yes Deploying more response force and installing alarm sensors at the different points of the reactor facility We are giving emphasis to training together with university and fire stations in the region In case of emergency situation sufficient number of skilled emergency personnel (see also 6d) will be available Members of the emergency response organisation are in the on-call service and will be notified by the shift supervisor on duty Exact structure and competences of the emergency response organisation are described in the accident management manuals of the individual facilities Yes But We do not need to take more action in this regard because the emergency preparedness was reviewed by the authority and it was approved in any aspects Alterations were introduced into the current procedures to commission new systems The personnel were trained to maintain and operate the above systems Beyond-the design accident procedure guidelines were revised and amended Response capability of on-site and off-site emergency personnel is supported with a high-capacity motor pump with hoses to supply river water and a mobile diesel generator to supply power to affected facilities Beyond-the-design basis accident procedure guidelines were revised and amended Response capability of on-site and off-site emergency personnel is supported with a high-capacity motor pump with quick-detachable hoses to supply river water and a mobile diesel generator to supply power to affected facilities Beyond-the-design basis accident procedure guidelines were revised and amended Alterations were introduced into the current procedures to commission new systems The personnel were trained to maintain and operate the above systems Response capability of on-site and off-site emergency personnel is supported with a high-capacity motor pump with quick-detachable hoses to supply river water and a mobile diesel generator to supply power to affected facilities Our Emergency Response Procedures have been reviewed The same personnel responsible for operation are also the first in line to deal with emergency Immediate risks posed to the facility out of operation hours can be dealt with by security staff who are able to handle the situation until arrival of the technical personnel In order to enhance the Emergency preparedness capabilities of Greece to Radiological and Nuclear (RN) incidents in densely populated urban areas the National Centre for Scientific Research ldquoDEMOKRITOSrdquo in collaboration with the Greek Atomic Energy Commission have been implementing a project aiming at advancing the existing public protection mechanism while investigating the degree to which RN risks are appropriately taken into consideration in national plans and regulations These activities prepare the implementation of actions RN23 H29 and H30 of the EU Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Action Plan Training drill and exercise programmes for on-site emergency personnel With appropriate EOP in place giving detailed plan of action and necessary provisions made the onsite personnel will be capable of handling the event No The RA-10 Reactor is at the detailed design stage This issue will be evaluated in a future stage No Changes

b Accessibility of the affected facilities by off-site organizations NRU is located next to a military base In the event access issues existed beyond what teh site could handle additional support can be secured Yes the facility design has sufficient accessibility for intervention of off-site organizations No changes No change Off-site access redesigned Yesthe reassessment considered this aspect but concluded no changes were necessary at this time It should be noted that the continuation of assessment work related to the three largest research and test reactors could yet require actions There are written legal binding agreements with intervention organizations for which the access is granted to the affected facilities Accessibility has been improved by developing the communication systems Yes Developing the communication systems It is part of our training with the team of firemen from the nearby region The off-site organisations (eg fire brigade) take regularly part on the emergency exercises and they are familiar with the research reactor facility and its site In case of emergency situation they will be ordered by the emergency response organisation The accessibility of the affected facilities in case of severe accident is included in the disaster control plans Affected facilities are accessible by off-site organizations namely Federal Rescue Service specialists Affected facilities are accessible by off-site organizations namely Federal Rescue Service specialists Affected facilities are accessible by off-site organizations namely Federal Rescue Service specialists Our emergency procedures include provisions regarding when to call for help from external organizations such as the Fire Department and how to provide them access to the facility The accessibility of the DNRIrsquos facilities are regularly reviewed by the off-site emergency organizations (such as the Dalat Cityrsquos Fire Service and VARANS) In 2013 the DNRI upgraded its internal routes that improves the accessibility of all facilities The recent review has showed that the accessibility of the affected facilities was fairly easy and fast the access to affected facilities are taken into account in the institutional Emergency Plan Reactor site can be accessed from outside with two independent motor able routes At least one of them is expected to remain available even during extreme emergency No Alternative access roads have been identified during the site evaluation Their suitability for access during extreme external will be evaluated in a future stage No Changes Dissemination of satellite phone numbers as neither the on-site EPR procedures or the off-site emergency plans actually identified such numbers that are already available

c Availability of emergency equipment and its suitability for the conditions that may be created by extreme events Additional loaders fire equipment etc purchased to support SAM In addition the site has a well equipped fire department including specialty fire ladder trucks to access the roof of NRU Partially sufficient Availability of emergency equipment has been improved The emergency equipment storage areas equipped with emergency flash lights Now there is a regular check once a year of the availability of the emergency equipment Equipment gadgets and personnel made available Yesthe reassessment considered this aspect but concluded no changes were necessary at this time It should be noted that the continuation of assessment work related to the three largest research and test reactors could yet require actions The institute continuously operate his own firefighting station with permanent staff fire truck tools and materials Radiation protection laboratory has shift staff all along the year in order to survey the operation of fixed and mobile installations and instruments available in the case of emergency Have plan to develop Yes Have a plan to develop We have adequate equipment and installation The emergency equipment is at each research reactor facility in sufficient quantity available Some accident management measures andor equipment were implemented after the safety reassessment following the feedback from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident This includes eg electrical connections for the emergency power diesel aggregates that are intended especially for the accident management equipment and the pumps for the coolant injection into the reactor pool feeding of boric acid as an alternative in case of malfunction of control rods Furthermore all accident management procedures were systematically described in the accident management manuals The facility is equipped with up-to-date fire alarm the facility conditions are controlled from the centralized control station of the fire and salvage unit The facility is equipped with up-to-date fire alarm the facility conditions are controlled from the centralized control station of the fire and salvage unit The facility is equipped with up-to-date fire alarm the facility conditions are controlled from the centralized control station of the fire and salvage unit Basic emergency equipment is available both at the facility and nearby The testingmaintenance of emergency equipments for the extreme conditions are periodically performed by the DNRI staff according the specific procedures and its suitability is always annually reviewed by the DNRIrsquos safety committee and off-site emergency organizations The necessary equipment for a proper response to an emergency is available on the site (radiation survey meters electronic dosimeters Respiratory Protection Equipment Anti-contamination clothing) Additional support are provide by a Radiological Protection (RP) organization and Industrial Safety Appropriate surveillance is maintained to ensure availability of emergency equipment All the emergency equipment are capable of performing under the circumstances considered during the extreme event No The RA-10 Reactor is at the detailed design stage This issue will be evaluated in a future stage No Changes Some caches of on-site emergency equipment are to be relocated from their current location in existing non-seismically qualified locations to seismically qualified buildings

d Training programme of operating personnel with respect to emergency situations NRU has performed simulated training with all Operating Supervisory staff A validation exercise was recently completed with outside Human Factors and Peer observers A full simulation exercise with additional oversight is planned for October Yes Personnel training programmes have been modified taking into account ne ew emergency equipment The training programme is expanded to more severe accidents 1 Emergency seminars conducted regularly to educate staff and emergency personnel on conduct and attitude during emergency 2 Emergency drills conducted to verify level of understanding and compliance Yesthe reassessment considered this aspect but concluded no changes were necessary at this time It should be noted that the continuation of assessment work related to the three largest research and test reactors could yet require actions The training manual for reactor operation and training for emergency was reviewed in 2014 The annual training program was revised accordingly for all category of staff and approved by Regulatory Body Different training programmes are conducted by the Training Institute Yes Different training programmes are conducted by the Training Institute We are giving emphasis to training radiological emergency and fire situation together with university and team of firemen from the nearby region Part of training stuff attends lectures of nuclear power plants Emergency trainings for operating personal takes place regularly usually once a year At these exercises also the off-site organizations and the disaster response organisation of the supervisory authority participate Programs to train personnel with respect to emergency situation have been elaborated Emergency prevention trainings are performed Programs to train personnel with respect to emergency situation have been elaborated Emergency prevention trainings are performed Programs to train personnel with respect to emergency situation have been elaborated Emergency prevention trainings are performed Emergency preparedness is part of our periodic Training and Re-training Program The training of operating personnel with respect to emergency situations is introduced in the initial training and continuing training programmes for the operating personnel The drills on the anticipated emergencies that might occur at the site are performed every two years and emergency exercises is performed at suitable intervals but the emergency drills and exercises for the extreme conditions with the involvement of off-site emergency organizations have not conducted yet Training drill and exercise programmes for on-site emergency personnel Firefighting Training (planned) Interactive sessions have been held with the operating staff regarding various actions to be taken as mentioned in the EOP and its rationale All the provisions made are adequately elucidated to the operating staff Surveillance programs are carried out for ensuring performance of safety equipment and familiarisation of the operating staff No The RA-10 Reactor is at the detailed design stage This issue will be evaluated in a future stage No Changes More realistic an extensive emergency exercises are planned and have been implemented included a complete site evacuation exercise performed this month





Comment No changes in the SAR SAR recently updated by a third party contractor In progress The combination of the events listed in the safety analysis has been included in the SAR No assessment performed There exist a planned revision in 2017 No changes however it should be noted that the continuation of assessment work related to the three largest research and test reactors could yet require actions The reactor SAR was reviewed updated and submitted to the Romanian Regulatory Body in 2013 After Regulatory Body evaluation a series of requirements and recommendations were formulated Those recommendations will be considered in the new SAR which is in progress Have planned to update the SAR based on the reassessment results The revied SAR has been sent to the regulatory body Have a plan to update the SAR based on the reassessment results 1 Full interaction with the regulatory body 2SAR is evaluated every two years It is not yet known The SAR for FRM II and BER II reactors are expected to be completed in 2016 and for the FRMZ facility it will be in 2020 Our updated Safety Analysis Report is currently under review by the regulator The SAR for the DNRR was updated and reviewed by VARANS in 2012 after fulfillment of full core conversion from HEU to LEU fuels and the license for operation and utilization of the reactor with the validation of the 10-year duration was granted in February 2013 The results of safety reassessment were mainly presented in chapters 16 (Safety Analysis) and 20 (Emergency Planning and Preparedness) For the purpose of application of license renewal in 2023 Periodic Safety Review for the DNRR will be planned to conduct in the period of 2018 ndash 2022 See Ans 5 As per the new regulatory requirements plant is subjected to Periodic Safety Review (PSR) once in ten years PSR for Dhruva was concluded in 2014 Review of plant safety against reassessed DBEs is part of the PSR no major changes are expected in this and BDBEs are part of Sever Accident Management Guide Certain changes are proposed in the plant to manage BDBEs and improve margins against DBEs The national regulation requires very low frequency events to be included in the analysis Therefore extreme events were already taken into account in the analysis reported in the PSAR multiple changes have been identified and are being implemented to the SAR in conjunction with other changes identified during the course of the PSR This includes the explicit consideration of combinations of external events (as previously discussed under Question 3) as well as additional analysis of certain beyond design basis events Note that the safety analysis in SAR Chapter 16 is being extensively rewritten to adopt the Fault Schedule approach to the deterministic safety assessment and that many of the changes arising from the safety reassessment are being incorporated into that rewrite



No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No


1st Question

Yes 21

No 7 (comment)

Total 28

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 27

3rd Question

Yes 20 (comment)

No 8

Total 28

4th Question

YES 24 (comment)

No 4

Total 28

5th Question

Yes 12

No 16

Total 28

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 10

Total 28

8th Question

Yes 4 (comment)

No 11

Total 15

Yes

No


GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 10

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 17

Total 29

Yes

No

a 13

b 13

c 10

d 18

a

b

c

d

Contents

bull Introduction Overview of research reactors

bull Research reactor safety issues and trends

bull IAEA activities on research reactor safety

bull Feedback from the IAEA Survey on safety reassessments following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP

bull Concluding remarks (future focus)






Africa 10

Americas 66

AsiaPacific 52

Europe 106


4














6







7



8












10







11


bull Publications



12





13


14





15




17

0

5

10

15

20

25

Yes No

Yes

No






18

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

a b c d

Num

ber

of

responses

C h a r t T it le







Chart1

Number of responses
Chart Title
13
13
10
18

Sheet1

Sheet1



19




Chart1

10
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2








20




21




(mostly reported)



Chart1

9
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2

Chart1

12
8

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2





22








22




Contents





















GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 19

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 8

Total 29

Yes

No


GENERAL








































1st Question

Yes 21

No 7 (comment)

Total 28

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 27

3rd Question

Yes 20 (comment)

No 8

Total 28

4th Question

YES 24 (comment)

No 4

Total 28

5th Question

Yes 12

No 16

Total 28

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 10

Total 28

8th Question

Yes 4 (comment)

No 11

Total 15

Yes

No


GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 10

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 17

Total 29

Yes

No

a 13

b 13

c 10

d 18

a

b

c

d






Africa 10

Americas 66

AsiaPacific 52

Europe 106


4














6







7



8












10







11


bull Publications



12





13


14





15




17

0

5

10

15

20

25

Yes No

Yes

No






18

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

a b c d

Num

ber

of

responses

C h a r t T it le







Chart1

Number of responses
Chart Title
13
13
10
18

Sheet1

Sheet1



19




Chart1

10
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2








20




21




(mostly reported)



Chart1

9
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2

Chart1

12
8

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2





22








22




Contents





















GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 19

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 8

Total 29

Yes

No


GENERAL








































1st Question

Yes 21

No 7 (comment)

Total 28

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 27

3rd Question

Yes 20 (comment)

No 8

Total 28

4th Question

YES 24 (comment)

No 4

Total 28

5th Question

Yes 12

No 16

Total 28

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 10

Total 28

8th Question

Yes 4 (comment)

No 11

Total 15

Yes

No


GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 10

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 17

Total 29

Yes

No

a 13

b 13

c 10

d 18

a

b

c

d


4














6







7



8












10







11


bull Publications



12





13


14





15




17

0

5

10

15

20

25

Yes No

Yes

No






18

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

a b c d

Num

ber

of

responses

C h a r t T it le







Chart1

Number of responses
Chart Title
13
13
10
18

Sheet1

Sheet1



19




Chart1

10
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2








20




21




(mostly reported)



Chart1

9
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2

Chart1

12
8

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2





22








22




Contents





















GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 19

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 8

Total 29

Yes

No


GENERAL








































1st Question

Yes 21

No 7 (comment)

Total 28

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 27

3rd Question

Yes 20 (comment)

No 8

Total 28

4th Question

YES 24 (comment)

No 4

Total 28

5th Question

Yes 12

No 16

Total 28

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 10

Total 28

8th Question

Yes 4 (comment)

No 11

Total 15

Yes

No


GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 10

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 17

Total 29

Yes

No

a 13

b 13

c 10

d 18

a

b

c

d













6







7



8












10







11


bull Publications



12





13


14





15




17

0

5

10

15

20

25

Yes No

Yes

No






18

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

a b c d

Num

ber

of

responses

C h a r t T it le







Chart1

Number of responses
Chart Title
13
13
10
18

Sheet1

Sheet1



19




Chart1

10
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2








20




21




(mostly reported)



Chart1

9
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2

Chart1

12
8

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2





22








22




Contents





















GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 19

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 8

Total 29

Yes

No


GENERAL








































1st Question

Yes 21

No 7 (comment)

Total 28

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 27

3rd Question

Yes 20 (comment)

No 8

Total 28

4th Question

YES 24 (comment)

No 4

Total 28

5th Question

Yes 12

No 16

Total 28

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 10

Total 28

8th Question

Yes 4 (comment)

No 11

Total 15

Yes

No


GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 10

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 17

Total 29

Yes

No

a 13

b 13

c 10

d 18

a

b

c

d







7



8












10







11


bull Publications



12





13


14





15




17

0

5

10

15

20

25

Yes No

Yes

No






18

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

a b c d

Num

ber

of

responses

C h a r t T it le







Chart1

Number of responses
Chart Title
13
13
10
18

Sheet1

Sheet1



19




Chart1

10
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2








20




21




(mostly reported)



Chart1

9
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2

Chart1

12
8

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2





22








22




Contents





















GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 19

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 8

Total 29

Yes

No


GENERAL








































1st Question

Yes 21

No 7 (comment)

Total 28

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 27

3rd Question

Yes 20 (comment)

No 8

Total 28

4th Question

YES 24 (comment)

No 4

Total 28

5th Question

Yes 12

No 16

Total 28

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 10

Total 28

8th Question

Yes 4 (comment)

No 11

Total 15

Yes

No


GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 10

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 17

Total 29

Yes

No

a 13

b 13

c 10

d 18

a

b

c

d



8












10







11


bull Publications



12





13


14





15




17

0

5

10

15

20

25

Yes No

Yes

No






18

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

a b c d

Num

ber

of

responses

C h a r t T it le







Chart1

Number of responses
Chart Title
13
13
10
18

Sheet1

Sheet1



19




Chart1

10
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2








20




21




(mostly reported)



Chart1

9
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2

Chart1

12
8

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2





22








22




Contents





















GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 19

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 8

Total 29

Yes

No


GENERAL








































1st Question

Yes 21

No 7 (comment)

Total 28

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 27

3rd Question

Yes 20 (comment)

No 8

Total 28

4th Question

YES 24 (comment)

No 4

Total 28

5th Question

Yes 12

No 16

Total 28

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 10

Total 28

8th Question

Yes 4 (comment)

No 11

Total 15

Yes

No


GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 10

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 17

Total 29

Yes

No

a 13

b 13

c 10

d 18

a

b

c

d












10







11


bull Publications



12





13


14





15




17

0

5

10

15

20

25

Yes No

Yes

No






18

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

a b c d

Num

ber

of

responses

C h a r t T it le







Chart1

Number of responses
Chart Title
13
13
10
18

Sheet1

Sheet1



19




Chart1

10
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2








20




21




(mostly reported)



Chart1

9
10

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2

Chart1

12
8

Sheet1

Sheet1

Sheet2





22








22




Contents





















GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 19

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 8

Total 29

Yes

No


GENERAL








































1st Question

Yes 21

No 7 (comment)

Total 28

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 27

3rd Question

Yes 20 (comment)

No 8

Total 28

4th Question

YES 24 (comment)

No 4

Total 28

5th Question

Yes 12

No 16

Total 28

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 10

Total 28

8th Question

Yes 4 (comment)

No 11

Total 15

Yes

No


GENERAL
















No (No) (No) (No)
























1st Question

Yes 21

No 8 (comment)

Total 29

2nd Question

Yes 15

No 12 (comment)

Total 29

3rd Question

Yes 23 (comment)

No 6

Total 29

4th Question

YES 26 (comment)

No 3

Total 29

5th Question

Yes 10

No 10

Total 29

6th Question

Fully 8 (comment)


Not 5

7th Queston

Yes 9 (comment)

No 20

Total 29

8th Question

Yes 12 (comment)

No 17

Total 29

Yes

No

a 13

b 13

c 10

d 18

a

b

c

d



1st Question

Yes	21

No	8	(comment)

Total	29

2nd Question

Yes	15

No	12	(comment)

Total	29

3rd Question

Yes	23	(comment)

No	6

Total	29

4th Question

YES	26	(comment)

No	3

Total	29

5th Question

Yes	10

No	19

Total	29

6th Question

Fully	8	(comment)

Partially	5	(comment)

Not	5

7th Queston

Yes	9	(comment)

No	20

Total	29

8th Question

Yes	12	(comment)

No	8

Total	29