safety commitee

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Date: May. 3, 2011

安全/质量会议2011年5月3日

Safety/Quality Committee Meeting May. 3, 2011


Monthly Safety/Quality Committee Meeting Agenda – April.

Time Scheduled

No. Business Item (Responsible Member) Materials Action Required

5 Minutes 1.0 Opening comments (CEO) None Information Sharing

5 Minutes 2.0 Review attendance – Safety Director Roster Evaluate attendance of members

3.0 Key Q&S Events Level 1&2 Items (Quality Manager)

Non conform, Safety & Customer item list

Status by prime responsible manager

3.1 Items requiring special attention (Prime responsible manager)

List of Late, missing items

Responsible manager to provide explanation and recovery plan“

35 Minutes


List of 90days old items


5 Minutes 3.3 MET user Matrix QS Director

10 Minutes 4.0 Surveillance – (QS Manager) Surveillance Metrics Evaluate trend, initiate actions for bad trends

10 Minutes 5.0 Audit Activities (Q&S Audit Leader) Standard Audit Reports

Evaluate trends, identify areas for emphasis, (Review repeat items, closures, re-openings)

6.0 EHS Metrics Review (Mike Zhang)15 Minutes

6.1 EHS Statistics/Emergency Preparedness Injuries, waste, energy and water, Drill

Review trends and determine if unfavorable trends exist and if emphasis needed

5 Minutes 7.0 Violations and Disciplinary Action (HR Director)

Discipline Report Determine if quality and safety related disciplinary actions in accord with Just Culture

20 Minutes 8.0 Wrap up

5 Minutes 8.1 Action Status Review

10 Minutes 8.2 Status Review of Emphasis Programs SMS Development

5 Minutes 8.3 Open Discussion/Emergent Issues Picture on site


Safety Committee Attendance RecordCommittee Member

Role Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Bernard CEO A A A

Wang Xioadong

VCEO A D A

John CFO A X A

Elizabeth Planning A A A

Lily Quality N/A A A

Daniel Ni Ops A A D

Rebecca HR X A A

Guo Lin Supply Chain

A D A

Roger Commercial X D A

Fred Eng & Training

A A D

A – In attendance (Green)

D – Sent delegate (Yellow)

X – Absent (Red)



Time Scheduled










35 Minutes




5 Minutes 3.3 MET user Matrix (QS Manager) QS Director













CAS GSMS Item List

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Audit - Internal

101134 Failure to Action Inboard Trailing Edge Flap Drive Torque Tube Job Cards on Aeroflot Arcraft VP-BAV and VP-BAX.(9)(0)

145-1 Non Compliance

O(4) Cerda, A R

04-25-2011

05-10-2011

Li, Eric Li, E; Chen, J; He, X

05-02-2011

CAPA Finding: On N768DA 767-200 during routine surveillance/audit of completed job cards it was discovered that job card 57-582-00 had been stamped as work scope complete, this raised question due to work instructions content, and noted required tools/and altnerate methods of working job card had not been observed in area of aircraft during routine maintenance. This action raised the question had this work scope been completed on Aeroflot Aircraft VP-BAV and VP-BAX. The Job cards in question are No. 57-582-00 and 57-740-00 (Inboard Trailing Edge Flap Torque Tube) in work package PP015642 and PP015625 respectively. It has been validated that the work scope per job cards has not been preformed on above aircraft per customer job cards, copies of AD, SB and Job Cards are attachted.

CAPA Remedial Action:

TO ALL PLEASE NOTE THIS REMEDIAL ACTION IS FOR N768DA ONLY 1.Perform all required work as instructed on job cards, all work to be controlled by NRCs. Supplementary working sheet was raised for both flaps/torque tube removal/installation, completed removal and detailed inspection, waiting for power on for flaps adjustment. 2.Rework of drive torque tubes require cleaning, inspection and lubrication per AMM 27-51-41. NRC N101 was raised for drive torque tubes cleaning; inspection and lubrication, job has been completed on 28Apr11. 3.In an effort to ensure on the above that we follow the required work scope instructions; it will be required that the quality surveillance team perform validation of work instruction content, and concurrence of work preformed. QA are informed for validation. ******************************* AT THIS TIME REMEDIAL ACTION FOR Aeroflot Aircraft VP-BAV and VP-BAX IS TBD; SEQUENCE TO OUTCOME OF CUSTOMER NOTIFICATION.

CAPA Plan:

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CAS GSMS Item List

CAPA Root Cause: 1. Maintenance crews mis-understood the job card description. 2. Maintenance crew need more detailed instructions in the task card to avoid misleading.

Last Status Desc: This Met item will still require more investigation and detail in the root cause. Remedial is still in work at this time.


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CAS GSMS Item List




New Search Page: Page 1 of 2 Total Items: 24 Preferences

Source

Item No (View/Edit)


Review ID Category

Status (History)

ID by Person

Created On

CAPA Plan Due Date

CAPA Impl Due Date

CAPA Impl Cmpl Date

Prime Resp Person

Resp Person

Last Status Dt

Observation/Other

101080 The tow bar broken during the A/C VP-BAX towing(8)(0)

145-2 Safety - Incident Product

O(10) Chen, S

03-16-2011

03-23-2011

04-07-2011

Chen, Junrong

Chen, J; Xin, W; He, X

05-02-2011

CAPA Finding: During the A/C VP-BAX towing from ramp into hangar bay 3,the tow bar disconnected from aircraft caused by the lock pin of tow bar broken.


1.Inform managment of the event. - Manager (JR) was informed of this incident on 3/11/2011. Action completed. 2. Attached the un-serviceable tag on 767 towbar and transfered to facility department for repair on 14 MAR11. Action completed.

CAPA Plan: 1.Briefed with all HM staff the maintenance tips for aircraft towing and towbar installation between A/C and tow truck,and coordinated with purchase department to require that towbar manufactory should assign engineer to perform the new type towbay training for all HM staff. meanwhile, training record or certification is neccessry for QA approvement. action completed at 22MAR11. 2. Required all HM staff to acknowledge the HM checklist regarding aircraft towing without power in hangar , which mentioned the pressure of brake accumulator as AMM requirement. action completed at 07APR11. 3. required all HM staff to perform the towbar OJT.towbar OJT program will be done at around 28APR11 during the N768DA C check while A/C out of hangar for operation. and OJT instructor is wen shen xin(employee number 363). action open

CAPA Root Cause: 1.HM mechanics did not perform the towbar training. 2.insufficient training regarding aircraft towing without power in hangar.

Last Status Desc: This MET is subject to the validation of some facts submitted into the MET system ECD 13May11

Audit - Internal

101085 Some calibration tools have no calibration labels.(1)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(3) Xue, C 03-22-2011

04-21-2011

Olson, Gary

Olson, G

04-27-2011

CAPA Finding: PRO-10-M07R3 3.B: Each piece of measuring/test T/E must be attached with an appropriate label indicating its current status. Users are required to operate per the status identified in the labels. Audit found some calibration tools and equipment have no calibration label. For example: rulers BSAS0301SM656 and BSAS0301SM612 in SM workshop have no calibration label. Engine wash machine BSAS02030043 in bay 3 has no calibration label. Radom moisture meter in composite workshop has no calibration label.


The engine wash machine BSAS020300043 without OEM's Certificate should be stopped using and will be put into use after the result of calibration is in tolerance Stick to the serviceable label on the radome moisture meter and then put into use.

































CAS GSMS Item List

CAPA Plan: The newly-purchased T/E will be labeled on according to the calibration requirements raised by back shop. The new-purchased T/E should be kept in the receiving area until it is stick to calibration label All newly-purchased T/E should be received and inspected by tool/equipment receiving personnel. For the tools that are evaluated to be calibrated by tool engineer, tool engineer should notify calibration administrator to stick to the calibration label on them and the receiving & inspection sheet should be filed Calibration administrator should get a report from SAP of all new tooling to check for possible missed items every two weeks.

CAPA Root Cause: (1) Those tapes & rulers without calibration labels are newly purchased and received on Mar. 9th, 2011. The user department of back shop should put forward the calibration requirements of tools to the person who is assigned to take charge of calibration. The person who is assigned to take charge of calibration feedback the calibration requirements to calibration administrator and the tools will be controlled. But calibration administrator has not received any calibration requirement from back shop. During these days the person who is assigned to take charge of calibration is on leave and back shop is busy with production task, so it leads to the result that the user department didn't put forward the calibration requirements to calibration administrator in time and didn't keep these tools without calibration labels in the quarantine area. Calibration administrator received the evaluation report of measuring/test T/E without calibration required of the newly-purchased tools on Mar. 23th, 2011. (2)SAP SYS. Show that the engine wash machine BSAS020300043 was received on May.3rd,2010. But Calibration administrator didn't known about the calibration requirement of the equipment after it was inspected and put into use. Now there is no receiving & inspection sheet and manufacture's certificate found except for the operation manual. (3) The radome moisture meter BSAS0305CO01 in composite workshop was shipped to Boeing Shanghai on Nov. 9th,2009. The equipment was found out-of-tolerance during the receiving and returned to manufacture for repair. It was recalibrated after modification on May. 4th 2010 and was put into use without control by calibration administrator. (4) Now all the newly-purchased T/E of the tool rooms including back shop, facility, HM/LM, NDT& training center aren't assigned appropriate personnel for receiving and inspection. It leads that some calibration T/E without control was entered to tool room and was used for production

Last Status Desc: Attached an updated QSACAR which includes PRO revision with an Estimate completion of May 15, 2011. And a start week for the bi-weekly report to audit for any exceptions.

Audit - Internal

101086 The calibration administrator can not monitor the loaned/leased tools calibration condition.(1)(0)


O(3) Xue, C 03-22-2011

04-21-2011

Olson, Gary

Olson, G

04-27-2011

CAPA Finding: PRO-10-M07R3 4.I.ii: Calibration Administrator is responsible for control of these T/E during the loan/ lease time period so as to ensure these equipments are under control within Boeing Shanghai facility. Files will not be established; these equipments will not be coded and labeled per Boeing Shanghai procedure. This is to ensure that equipment due for calibration during the loan term, are removed from work sites. Audit found, the calibration administrator can not monitor the loaned/leased tools calibration condition.


CAPA Plan: 1. Sent email to support chain manager & operation support manager to the requirement that calibration administrator should be advised of an calibration tool loaned/leased before used PRO-10-M07 4.I.i on 18 April 2011. This should ensure that above procedure is followed.

CAPA Root Cause: Now Supply Chain department don't offer calibration administrator the information about the measuring/test T/E that is loaned/leased from outside sources according to PRO-10-M07R3 4.I.i.

Last Status Desc: Attached an updated QSACAR and copy of email traffic.














CAS GSMS Item List

Audit - Internal

101087 The process of SOOT evaluation is not executable.(1)(0)


O(3) Xue, C 03-22-2011

04-21-2011

Olson, Gary

Olson, G

04-27-2011

CAPA Finding: PRO-10-M07R3 4.F.ii.c is out of tolerance calibration tools procedure. Audit found the process of SOOT evaluation is not executable. For example, the calibration tools used records can not tracked to specified maintenance practice, so the engineering can not evaluate the impact on aircraft. After the evaluation, the follow-up process is not specified.


Back Shop and NDT Shop could trace the used records of calibration tool/equipment by manual system.

CAPA Plan: 1. Back Shop and NDT Shop could trace the used records of calibration tool/equipment by manual system. 2. The PRO-12-M57 has procedure that states job card is traced Refer to the Form PRO-12-M57C by operation support department. 3. Xu Haiqiang, the leader of operation support department will ask IT for help to modify the SAP system to control tooling to task card level. 4. Revise PRO 10-M07 include procedure for QA to return completed PRO 10M07l form for filing. Clarify some other verbiage ie Description or Evaluation, Departmental Title changes. Estimate revision of procedure to be available for approve by April 28, 2011

CAPA Root Cause: Now in main stores the computer program outside of SAP only trace the used records that when and which plane out-of-tolerance T/E is used for and can't trace which task of work card it was used for. So are back shop and NDT shop. It leads to the result that engineering department can't have an evaluation of the impact on the product and QA department can't take further action according to the evaluation.

Last Status Desc: Waiting for reply from QA department on clear instruction for the actions for SOOT after Engineering evaluation. The estimated PRO revision date adjusted to allow for this data to make it into this revision.

Audit - Internal

101088 Some load test tools are not controlled.(1)(0)


O(3) Xue, C 03-22-2011

04-21-2011

Olson, Gary

Olson, G

04-27-2011

CAPA Finding: Audit found some hoist equipments were controlled as calibration tools, but some are not. For example, BSAS020200139 fishpole hoist and BSAS020200276 MLG R&I equipment were not controlled by calibration.


Remedial action is that operation support department to ensure that all tools/equipments needing proof test, load test, etc are currently controlled.

CAPA Plan: 1. Draft procedure to control the tooling and equipment needing the proof load test or magnetic force inspection inside of the Tooling Calibration system. Estimate October 2011. 2. Operation support department supplies a 100% complete listing of all tooling and equipment from the SAP system to calibration administrator and tool engineer so that all BSAS items could be traced. Tool engineer categorizes all tooling and equipment in different groups that which needs the proof load test or magnetic force inspection. Estimate June 2011. 3. Calibration administrator picks up a list of tools/equipments needing the proof load test or magnetic force inspection according to the result of categorization. Estimate Budgetary changes and get LT agreement. Estimate October 2011. 4. Remedial action is that operation support department to ensure that all tools/equipments needing proof test, load test, etc are currently controlled.

CAPA Root Cause: The MLG R&L Equipment BSAS020200276 Gage has been controlled since it was received. Please check the certificate of calibration on the web \\10.1.0.220\bsdms\Quality\Calibration\calibration certificate report\HM\BSAS020200276. The fish pole hoist BSAS020200139 wasn¡¯t controlled as calibration equipment because it was evaluated as the equipment that isn¡¯t required for calibration during the receiving and inspection. Now, calibration administrator only controls the measuring tool/equipment, not including the equipment that needs the proof load test or magnetic force inspection. The some hoist equipments were controlled as calibration equipments, because they were evaluated as calibration equipments during the receiving and inspection. So Calibration administrator put them into the list of calibration tool/equipment and controlled as schedule.

Last Status Desc: Attached an updated QSACAR which include the requirement of the PRO to be completed by May 15, 2011.
















CAS GSMS Item List

Audit - Regulator

101097 The CRS sampled in base maintenance did not refer to the latest version of the Operator's work scope.(0)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

06-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Sun, X

CAPA Finding: The Certificate of Release to Service sampled in base maintenance did not refer to the latest version of the Operator's work scope for the maintenance check so as to demonstrate that all maintenance ordered has been properly carried out by the organisation.


CAPA Plan: The QA Manager will work together with the QA Engineer to amend the Certificate of Release to Service procedure to require to refer to the latest version of the Operator's work scope for the maintenance check. ECD: Jun-30-2011.

CAPA Root Cause: The Certificate of Release to Service procedure did not define the requirement to refer to the latest version of the Operator's work scope for the maintenance check so as to demonstrate that all maintenance ordered has been properly carried out by the organisation.

Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101098 MOE Section 2.16 "Release to Service Procedure" is not adequated.(0)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: MOE Section 2.16 "Release to Service Procedure" does not adequately describe the procedure to be followed for the release to service of an aircraft from base maintenance.


CAPA Plan: The QA Manager will work together with the QA Engineer to amend the MOE to clarify. ECD: Jun-30-2011.

CAPA Root Cause: Boeing Shanghai's understanding to the MOE development user guide provided by EASA was different from the current requirement. As a result, the MOE used and reviewed during the audit did not meet the expectation.

Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101099 MOE section 2.20 does not describe the sub-contract control procedure required by AMC145.A. 75(b).(0)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: MOE section 2.20 does not describe the sub-contract control procedure required by AMC145.A. 75(b).




Last Status Desc:



































CAS GSMS Item List

Audit - Regulator

101100 Some lower order procedures are not approved or controlled via the MOE(0)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: The fundamental principles and limitations of all Part 145 compliance are not set out in the MOE procedures. In several areas lower order procedures, which are not approved or controlled via the MOE, are referred to for compliance purposes, e.g. MOE section 3.4.4 refers directly to a lower order procedure for certifying staff authorisations. All MOE procedures need to be reviewed in this regard.




Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101101 The list of certifying staff is not contained in MOE section 1.6.(0)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: The list of certifying staff is not contained in MOE section 1.6, and there is no MOE procedure permitting the delegation of approval for the list of certifying staff to the organisation.




Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101102 The responsible level three NDT person is not identified in the MOE.(0)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: The responsible level three NDT person is not identified in the MOE.




Last Status Desc:






























CAS GSMS Item List

Audit - Regulator

101103 MOE Section 1.9 does not include the NDT methods used in the course of maintenance under the organisation's A1 rating.(0)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: MOE Section 1.9 does not include the NDT methods used in the course of maintenance under the organisation's A1 rating.




Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101104 MOE Section 3.4 does not clearly identify the privileges of the Category A, B1, B2 and C certifying staff.(0)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: MOE Section 3.4 does not clearly identify the privileges of the Category A, B1, B2 and C certifying staff. In addition the restriction for Cat A staff to only release tasks for which they have performed themselves is not detailed.




Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101105 MOE section 3.4 does not include Part 145 Appendix IV requirements for the authorisation of certifying staff not qualified to 145.A.30(i) 1 and 2(0)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X











































CAS GSMS Item List

CAPA Finding: MOE section 3.4 does not include Part 145 Appendix IV requirements for the authorisation of certifying staff not qualified to 145.A.30(i) 1 and 2. EASA User Guide CAO 00006-001 Section 7 should be used for compliance.




Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101106 The Certification authorisation document (PAC) does not identify the holder as a B1, B2 or C certifying staff member.(0)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

07-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Zhang, Q; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: The Certification authorisation document (PAC) does not identify the holder as a B1, B2 or C certifying staff member.


CAPA Plan: B1, B2 and C certifying staff will be defined in the authorization procedure PRO-10-M19. Estimated completion date: 30-Jul-2011

CAPA Root Cause: B1, B2 and C certifying staff members are not defined in the authorization procedure.

Last Status Desc:





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CAS GSMS Item List





Source

Item No (View/Edit)


Review ID Category

Status (History)

ID by Person

Created On

CAPA Plan Due Date

CAPA Impl Due Date

CAPA Impl Cmpl Date

Prime Resp Person

Resp Person

Last Status Dt

Audit - Regulator

101107 The Quality plan does not demonstrate that all aspects of Part 145 compliance are audited on an annual basis.(1)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

04-30-2011

04-25-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Xue, C; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: The Quality plan does not demonstrate that all aspects of Part 145 compliance are audited on an annual basis.


CAPA Plan: The audit plan is amended to show all aspects of Part 145 compliance are audited every 12 months on April 25, 2011.

CAPA Root Cause: At the time of the audit, the annual audit was planned is such a way to show the functions to be audited instead of showing the aspects of Part 145 compliance.

Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101108 Extension of authorisations to cover EASA part145 depended upon a brief training module on 145 procedures without further assessment.(0)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

07-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Zhang, Q; Sun, X













































CAS GSMS Item List

CAPA Finding: The sampled authorisation assessment procedure interview records for certifying Staff indicated that competence assessment on company procedures predated the existence of EASA part 145 procedures. Extension of authorisations to cover EASA part145 depended upon a brief training module on '145 procedures without further assessment.


CAPA Plan: The related competent authority regulation requirement will be added into the authorization interview form for inspector and certifying staff. Estimated completion date: 30-Jul-2011

CAPA Root Cause: The competent authority regulation is not required in the authorization assessment procedure.

Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101109 MOE section 2.2 Acceptance of Parts does not specify the certification required to accompany parts for use under the Part 145 approval.(0)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: MOE section 2.2 Acceptance of Parts does not specify the certification required to accompany parts for use under the Part 145 approval.



CAPA Root Cause: Boeing Shanghai's understanding to the MOE development user guide provided by EASA was different from the current requirement. As a result, the MOE used and reviewed during the audit did not met the expectation.

Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101110 MOE section 1.8.2 does not accurately reflect the layout of the line station facility.(0)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: MOE section 1.8.2 does not accurately reflect the layout of the line station facility.



CAPA Root Cause: The layout in the MOE for Line Maintenance Office was presented in such a way that may easily mislead

Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101111 Line station personnel have not been issued with appropriate B1 and B2 authorisations.(0)(0)


O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

07-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Zhang, Q; Sun, X




































CAS GSMS Item List

CAPA Finding: Line station personnel have not been issued with appropriate B1 and B2 authorisations.


CAPA Plan: Assess line station personnel and issue appropriate B1 and B2 authorizations. Estimated completion date: 30-Jul-2011

CAPA Root Cause: As Boeing Shanghai has not been excising the EASA Part 145 privilidges under its line maintenance rating

Last Status Desc:

Audit - Internal

101132 Material planner didn't run MRP in SAP system periodically.(0)(0)


O(0) Xue, C 04-25-2011

05-24-2011

Guo, Lynne

Guo, L; Huang, Y

CAPA Finding: PRO-15-M07R2 4.B: Material planner runs MRP in SAP system periodically. When the current inventory levels lower than total material request, MRP will produce a supplement proposal spreadsheet of inventory levels. The spreadsheet includes: part numbers, inventory levels, reorder levels and requested delivery date. Audit found there was no evidence to show material planner run MRP in SAP system periodically.


CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

Safety - Incident

101093 Presure gauge missed during Line maintain(1)(0)

2 O(1) Chen, S

03-28-2011

04-10-2011

04-30-2011

Song, Chengzhe

Song, C; Zhang, F

04-29-2011

CAPA Finding: Incident Report: 23 Mar, Around 21:00 at ramp 301, The LM performed pre-flight check on ship N451PA,during PDC,got NLG strut service request form customer's representative due NLG strut low. After discussed with customer's MGR. Agreed to cancel the SVC job to make the flight on time. After A/C taxi away, The LM mechanics walked back from A/C side and forgot to take back the guage which was put on the N2 Bottle cart and cause missed.


1. went to SIA to look for the lost tool, but did not find. 2. interviewed on duty staffs Wu Xiaochun, Kang ZP and Yang JX on 04/24; confirmed tools were not lost on aircraft. 3. debreifed with team on tool keeping during working on ramp.

CAPA Plan: 1. interview duty staff; 2. debrief with team about good tool keeping while working on ramp. 3. warning letter will be issued to duty staff

CAPA Root Cause: duty staff complecency of good tool keeping while working on ramp.

Last Status Desc: Sunxh corrected a typing error in the Remedial Action tab. Originally it reads: 2. interviewed on dutu staffs Wu Xiaochun, Kang ZP and Yang JX on 04/24; confirmed tools were not lost on aircraft.

101095 Missing one walkie talkie in course of line maintenance.(1)(0)

2 Safety - Incident Product

O(3) Chen, S

03-30-2011

04-11-2011

04-30-2011

Song, Chengzhe

Song, C

04-29-2011
























CAS GSMS Item List

CAPA Finding: Incident Report: LM reported Missing 1 walkie talkie on N1 shift 29Mar 11 after departure the A/C 497, and A/C 409. The concerned mechanics checked the lift truck and Ramp where they worked, including the road they were driving (could be falling from truck) but cannot find the walkie talkie.


1. interviewed duty staff James Wang on 30 Mar; 2. confirmed that the walkie talkie was not lost on a/c;

CAPA Plan: 1. interview duty staff before 01 Apr; 2. debrief with team for how to keep tools safety while drive high lift with tools putting on platform by 30 Apr

CAPA Root Cause: duty staff did not reliaze that he will lose tools while put walkie talkie on platform with a long distance driving on high lift because of really bad road situation.

Last Status Desc: Sunxh corrected some wording. The original entry reads: The concerns mechanics checked the lift truck and Ramp where they even worked area , even the way they driving ( could be falling from truck) but cannot find the walkie talkie.

Safety - Incident

101124 Mobile Boom Crane Tipped on Side (see attachment/s)(4)(0)

Level 2 Safety - Incident Personal/EHS

O(3) Cerda, A R

04-02-2011

05-20-2011

Li, Eric Li, E; Chen, J; He, X

05-02-2011

CAPA Finding: Note: This incident should require team concurrence to determine if this incident is a reportable or non-reportable incident. Since the crane usage was non aircraft related; it is currently entered in MET as a Level 2 and not a 145-2. Update on 07Apr11 Stephen Yan, Xianghua Sun and Tony Cerda meet and agreed that this MET item should remain Level 2 and NOT a 145-2, but that this item be addressed as "Major issue, requiring immediate attention¡±. ******************************** On 03Apr11 at approximately 0920hrs we encountered an incident involving the operation of the mobile crane in bay 4,it was attempting to remove the wing cradle saddle from A/C shoring stand. The Crane's out riggers were not extended, hydraulic down locks had been extended, mobile crane tipped on its side please refer to enclosed attachment/s. Boeing Shanghai Security has been notified to make hangar security video footage available for review on 04Apr11; there are two hangar cameras in direct line of sight of incident area this should aid in an in depth investigation report.


1.Informed the managment of event-heavy maint manager JR and facility manager Mike Zhang were informed at 03APR2011, action completed. 2. Removed the mobile crane outside of hangar for repair at 04 APR2011, action completed. 3. Involved person go to hospital for injury check at 03 APR2011, action completed. 4. Mobile crane driver Xu Bin (employee number 563) was temporary terminate the vehicle operation authority from 03 APR2011 to 04 JUL2011.action completed.

CAPA Plan: 1. Set up training program by training department for GSE operation. 2. Reinforce the authorization review process by QA.

CAPA Root Cause: 1. Operator violated the basic safety rule to extend Crane's out riggers. 2. Crane operator didn't receive enough hands-on training, equipment operation authorization assesment will need improvement.

Last Status Desc: This MET Item subject to Leadership Team's review for training approval, Final Investigation report, and approval of CAPPA Plan & Root Cause.






























CAS GSMS Item List

Time: 0.5000




Time Scheduled










35 Minutes

















CAS GSMS Item List



Search: Designator like BSH* and Items are Past Due and (Problem Type = CA) and Review ID like *2 Sort: CAPA_REVIEW_NO Asc


Source

Item No (View/Edit)


Review ID Category

Status (History)

ID by Person

Created On

CAPA Plan Due Date

CAPA Impl Due Date

CAPA Impl Cmpl Date

Prime Resp Person

Resp Person

Last Status Dt

Audit - Special Investigation

100775 Taskcards completion error rate is trending above set standards (2.0)(5)(0)


O(13) Olson, G

08-19-2010

11-30-2010

03-31-2011

Ni, Daniel Ni, D; Chen, J; He, X

05-02-2011

CAPA Finding: Based on the Boeing Shanghai Maintenance Issue Matrix the quality of Jobcards properly/timely completed/stamped has been trending over the treshhold of 2.0. Currently the average severity is 3.2. The current error rate on taskcards on first review is average 30+%, last aircraft far exceeds at near 50%.


1. Made correction when mistake were found.

CAPA Plan: Set paper work improvement project to follow up the problems. 1. Create a taskcard sign-off procedure to specify the process, responsibility, training time requirement (for 1st aircraft, one week before the aircraft gets in), training courseware, exams, recurring training requirement and emergent training plan. 2. Create a discipline policy for repeated mistakes, (Internal management, recurring training & exam, withdraw of the authorization, etc.) 3. Review the procedure and include the specific requirements on: What kind of material or service tags need to be attched? Which level of reference documents are required to attach? What/How to N/A? 4. Publish the CPM and keep updating it. 5. Check the missing items and record the total numbers of defects according to each team at the first sign-off time. Detail please refer to the project.

CAPA Root Cause: Project team is locating the root cause, will find a effective action plan for improvement. 1. Lack of in-time effective communication/training/briefing 2. Working Attitude 3. Poor English 4. QC standard Detail please refer to Paper-work improvment project

Last Status Desc: At this time there is no supporting data for closure that reflects trending below 5%.

Operator/Customer Input

100994 Complaints after C-Ch VP-BVH(3)(0)

145-2 Safety - Hazard/Risk Product

O(3) Chen, S

02-16-2011

02-25-2011

Chen, Junrong

Chen, J; He, X

05-02-2011

































CAS GSMS Item List

CAPA Finding: The customer complains three failure of defect item which has been fixed in PVG were recurring again after C-Check.


1.Inform managment of the event. -HM Manager (JR) was informed of this enent on 2/24/2011. Action completed 2. Forwarded the investigation report to customer regarding customer concern by project manager Eric on 28FEB11. detail as attachment. Action completed 3. waiting the customer feedback for above issues and action follow based on customer requirement.Action open.

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc: We are currently awaiting response from customer for pertinent details to complete this MET item two e-mails

have been sent to sales personnel (Stewart) for assistance. First response insufficient information supplied.

Safety - Incident

101093 Presure gauge missed during Line maintain(1)(0)

2 O(1) Chen, S

03-28-2011

04-10-2011

04-30-2011

Song, Chengzhe

Song, C; Zhang, F

04-29-2011

CAPA Finding: Incident Report: 23 Mar, Around 21:00 at ramp 301, The LM performed pre-flight check on ship N451PA,during PDC,got NLG strut service request form customer's representative due NLG strut low. After discussed with customer's MGR. Agreed to cancel the SVC job to make the flight on time. After A/C taxi away, The LM mechanics walked back from A/C side and forgot to take back the guage which was put on the N2 Bottle cart and cause missed.


1. went to SIA to look for the lost tool, but did not find. 2. interviewed on duty staffs Wu Xiaochun, Kang ZP and Yang JX on 04/24; confirmed tools were not lost on aircraft. 3. debreifed with team on tool keeping during working on ramp.

CAPA Plan: 1. interview duty staff; 2. debrief with team about good tool keeping while working on ramp. 3. warning letter will be issued to duty staff

CAPA Root Cause: duty staff complecency of good tool keeping while working on ramp.

Last Status Desc: Sunxh corrected a typing error in the Remedial Action tab. Originally it reads: 2. interviewed on dutu staffs Wu Xiaochun, Kang ZP and Yang JX on 04/24; confirmed tools were not lost on aircraft.

101095 Missing one walkie talkie in course of line maintenance.(1)(0)

2 Safety - Incident Product

O(3) Chen, S

03-30-2011

04-11-2011

04-30-2011

Song, Chengzhe

Song, C

04-29-2011

CAPA Finding: Incident Report: LM reported Missing 1 walkie talkie on N1 shift 29Mar 11 after departure the A/C 497, and A/C 409. The concerned mechanics checked the lift truck and Ramp where they worked, including the road they were driving (could be falling from truck) but cannot find the walkie talkie.


1. interviewed duty staff James Wang on 30 Mar; 2. confirmed that the walkie talkie was not lost on a/c;

CAPA Plan: 1. interview duty staff before 01 Apr; 2. debrief with team for how to keep tools safety while drive high lift with tools putting on platform by 30 Apr

CAPA Root Cause: duty staff did not reliaze that he will lose tools while put walkie talkie on platform with a long distance driving on high lift because of really bad road situation.

Last Status Desc: Sunxh corrected some wording. The original entry reads: The concerns mechanics checked the lift truck and Ramp where they even worked area , even the way they driving ( could be falling from truck) but cannot find the walkie talkie.


















CAS GSMS Item List





Time: 0.5703





















Time Scheduled










35 Minutes




5 Minutes 3.3 MET user Matrix (QS Manager) MET user Monitoring QS Director













CAS GSMS Item List





Source

Item No (View/Edit)


Review ID Category

Status (History)

ID by Person

Created On

CAPA Plan Due Date

CAPA Impl Due Date

CAPA Impl Cmpl Date

Prime Resp Person

Resp Person

Last Status Dt

Audit - Special Investigation

100775 Taskcards completion error rate is trending above set standards (2.0)(5)(0)


O(13) Olson, G

08-19-2010

11-30-2010

03-31-2011

Ni, Daniel

Ni, D; Chen, J; He, X

05-02-2011

CAPA Finding: Based on the Boeing Shanghai Maintenance Issue Matrix the quality of Jobcards properly/timely completed/stamped has been trending over the treshhold of 2.0. Currently the average severity is 3.2. The current error rate on taskcards on first review is average 30+%, last aircraft far exceeds at near 50%.


1. Made correction when mistake were found.

CAPA Plan: Set paper work improvement project to follow up the problems. 1. Create a taskcard sign-off procedure to specify the process, responsibility, training time requirement (for 1st aircraft, one week before the aircraft gets in), training courseware, exams, recurring training requirement and emergent training plan. 2. Create a discipline policy for repeated mistakes, (Internal management, recurring training & exam, withdraw of the authorization, etc.) 3. Review the procedure and include the specific requirements on: What kind of material or service tags need to be attched? Which level of reference documents are required to attach? What/How to N/A? 4. Publish the CPM and keep updating it. 5. Check the missing items and record the total numbers of defects according to each team at the first sign-off time. Detail please refer to the project.

CAPA Root Cause: Project team is locating the root cause, will find a effective action plan for improvement. 1. Lack of in-time effective communication/training/briefing 2. Working Attitude 3. Poor English 4. QC standard Detail please refer to Paper-work improvment project

Last Status Desc: At this time there is no supporting data for closure that reflects trending below 5%.

Audit - Internal

100817 Job Card Buy-Off Without Work Being Performed Properly(1)(0)


O(11) Olson, G

09-21-2010

11-30-2010

05-31-2011

Chen, Junrong

Ni, D; Chen, J; He, X

04-18-2011





































CAS GSMS Item List

CAPA Finding: During walk-around on Evergreen RD773 (N488EV)it was discovered that incorrect grease applied to #3 and #6 Trailing Edge Flap Ball screw gimbals and yokes. Found Aeroshell 7 (light tan) and JC 3125002, and 3126002 requires Aeroshell 33 (Kelly Green).


Relubricate the #3 and #6 TE flap gimbal and yokes with Aeroshell 33, purging all Aeroshell 7 from the joint. This work was performed on Sep 20-21. relubricated the total 10 points of LUB spot which were missed on L/R BLG and TE flaps for WOA 747 A4 check

CAPA Plan: 1. Investigate the issue with involved person. (Engineer admitted that he miss-read the AMM, and gave wrong instruction to his crew.) 2. Assigned 2 HM engineers for 100% buy back, will evaluate the result after 5 aircraft. (The first 100% buy back was done on Jeju ¡°C¡± check, quality is improving) 3. Inventory greasing pump and gun, and request for additional items to support operation. New grease pump and guns are available for HM maint from 10JAN11. 4.Assigned LUB team to accumulate the LUB experience for 747 and enhance 100% buy back.( we have a significantly improvrment for LUB service during the next N499MC A check)

CAPA Root Cause: Related engineer lack of responsibility for reading the AMM step by step carefully so as to give incorrect instruction to mechanics. Total 10 LUB spots missed during A check. Both L/H and R/H BLG missed one same LUB spot due to mechanic have not catched this LUB spot ref job card. and F/C LUB team missed 8 LUB spots for L/R inboard TE flap which Removed&Reinstalled for EO accomplish during WOA A4 check and F/C LUB team performed the LUB service for L/R TE FLAP after compelted inboard flap Reinstallation which was only 3 hours ahead of A check released.

Last Status Desc: sequence to 5 A/C zero defects on lube job cards

Operator/Customer Input

100953 World Airways N740WA reported that aircraft had damage on Horiz Stab(3)(0)

145-2 Safety - Hazard/Risk Product

O(1) Olson, G

01-21-2011

02-11-2011

Ni, Daniel

Ni, D 01-21-2011

CAPA Finding: After aircraft towed to Cargo ramp World Line Mx found dent on leading edge of Horizontal Stabilizer.


BSAS staff dispatched to evaluate and repair the damage. Repair was carried out and aircraft dispatched.

CAPA Plan: 1. Brief to all backshop and HM staff that everyone should report the accident immediately 2. Re-check the video for the evidence 3. Enhance Cherry picker handling policy - observer must be arranged during operation around aircraft.

CAPA Root Cause: 1. Accident report not on time 2. Cherry Picker handling without observer, no clear handling policy for it

Last Status Desc: Met item raised with no determination of root cause. Could not determine if damaged by Cleaning staff, Production staff, or missed on inspection. It was agreed to enter item without this determination to document the event.


































CAS GSMS Item List

Time: 0.7813




Time Scheduled










35 Minutes


















BSH Open MET Item Metrics

0

5

10

15

20

25

Current 0 0 1 9 22 0 6 2

Late 0 2 0 6 0 0 0 0

Missing Date 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0

Total 0 2 1 17 22 0 6 2

BSH Operations Eng & Plng Production Quality Training Facilities SM&P

As of 4-18-2011


2

4

4

17

64

57

18

3

17

13

6

2

23

9

1

2

3

5

11

1

1

1

1

1

4

11

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

(O)

BSHVCOFAC (C)

BSHVCO (C)

(O)

BSHSMP (C)

BSHOPSTTD (C)

(O)

BSHOPSQAD (C)

(O)

BSHOPSPRO (C)

BSHOPSPLNG (C)

(O)

BSHOPSENG (C)

(O)

BSHOPS (C)

BSH (C)

ClosedOnTimeCurrentLE3WKPastDueGT3LE8WkPastDueGT8WkPastDue

As of: 4/18/2011

Bus. Ops C

Planning C

Production O

Production C

Quality C

Quality O

Tech Training C

Engineering C

Org C

Boeing Shanghai MET Usage MetricCorrective Action Items

Apr 2010-Apr 2011

Facilities C

Vice CEO C

Engineering O

Suppl Mgmt O

Facilities O

Bus. Ops O

Suppl Mgmt C


Boeing Shanghai MET CA Items Closure StatusPast 6 Months

As of 4/18/2011

19.9%

67.9%

1.3%

12.9%

70.0%

8.4% 9.9%

61.9%

6.2%11.9%

19.2%

11.5%6.9%8.9%

14.5%

69.8%

8.4%13.6%

65.2%

9.3%12.4%

9.6%12.7%

67.7%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Perc

enta

ge

Nov 61.9% 19.9% 11.9% 6.2%

Dec 67.9% 19.2% 11.5% 1.3%

Jan-11 69.8% 14.5% 8.9% 6.9%

Feb-11 65.2% 13.6% 8.4% 12.9%

Mar-11 70.0% 12.4% 9.3% 8.4%

Apr-11 67.7% 12.7% 9.6% 9.9%

CA Impl On Time Late Missing Date Open


Monthly MET Item Status Review

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Created this period 72 18 41 17 16 24 21 19 24 16 31 35 45 3

Closed & Suspended 38 70 33 27 31 15 7 27 34 20 23 12 43 7

Open & Pending 90 38 46 36 21 30 44 37 26 22 30 53 55 51

Current Past Due * 39 16 14 3 6 7 5 15 5 3 2 21 10 8

Current Past ECD * 2 9 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0

Candidate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

3/31/10 4/30/10 5/31/10 6/30/10 7/31/10 8/31/10 9/30/10 10/31/10 11/30/10 12/31/10 1/31/11 2/28/11 3/31/11 Today

As of:

CAS Global Safety Management System4/20/2011 12:09:00

* Candidate items are not included in Current Past Due and Current Past ECD counts



Time Scheduled










35 Minutes

















VP-VVF Best Practices during drilling Repair Backshop 4Small fire in LDG Wheelwell from hot drill bit or swarf on protective plastic

VP-VVF Aircraft shoring Jacking/Shoring PM 4 Aircraft being shored in the incorrect configuration

VP-VVF Aircraft shoring Jacking/Shoring PM 4Shoring not mechanically locked after set per SB, was being adjusted every morning

VP-VVF Aft Cargo door 3 of 6 rollers LUBE FUS 33 roller seized but lubricated roller outer surface, card says bolt

VP-VVFMobile Crane tipped over (NOT DIRECT Support) Crane HM 4

Out-riggers when no extended during 90 degree operation of crane.

VP-VVF Inspection of flight control cable on CWT Insp FLT CTL 4 Signed card without gaining access

VP-VVFInspection of flight control cable in ceiling of bulk cargo Insp FLT CTL 4 Signed card without gaining access

VP-VVFVP-VVF

VP-VVF Error Rate for the Project not including Planning 60 922 6.51%VP-VVF Total Error rate for the Project 60 922 6.51%

UR-DNM #1 Engine Fuel& HYD lines disconnect protection Removal ENGINE 3

#1 Engine Fuel& HYD lines collectively covered, no protective caps and HYD fluid lines above fuel line 4oz of hyd fluid in bottom of plastic

UR-DNM #1 Engine O/B Fwd engine mount security Removal ENGINE 4Engine mount adapter attached bolt not properly tightened 1/4" gap

UR-DNM Fuel tank Safety Open FLT CTL 4Open fuel tanks procedures NOT followed (PRO 12 M22 and AMM)

UR-DNM Pitot-Static covers Protection Pre-dock Av/Elect 4 Aircraft not protected until advised on 4.2.2011UR-DNM #1 Engine Electrical disconnects protection Removal Av/Elect 3 #1 Engine Electrical Disconnects not covered

UR-DNM Fuel tank Safety Open FLT CTL 4Follow up on 4-2-2011 no warning tag in Flt Deck per the read & sign

UR-DNM Aircraft Shoring Jacking/Shoring PM 4 Aircraft being shored in the incorrect configuration

UR-DNM Aircraft Jacking Jacking/Shoring PM 3RH body gear lock ring not in locked position per SB and Best Practices

UR-DNM Hydraulic line disconnect Removal Ldg 3After line disconnect not capped and plugged, just bagged which creates potential safety risk to workers.

UR-DNM Damage to all four C-duct carts Removal ENGINE 3 Tongues damaged from over steering

UR-DNM C-duct carts usage Removal ENGINE 2Safety risk - fixture not tilted up to match hoisting angle, requied 6 people to support 50% of the weight of c-duct.

UR-DNM Body cradles floating Jacking/Shoring PM 4Jacks not depressurized, four jack lifted off mechanical lock, STA 1197 twice the amount of others

UR-DNM Body cradles floating Jacking/Shoring HM 2HM staff member rotated the mechanical locks when over pressure condition.

4-15-2011 Maintenance Surveillance Matrix

S7

Type of Check LDG CHG A4 C2 A1 A1 HIDE ACFT C-CHECK C-CHECK C-CHECK A check C-check

Induction Date 01/16/10 02/01/10 03/02/10 03/18/10 04/13/10 Unhide columns 01/17/11 02/15/11 03/02/11 03/23/11

Completion Date 01/21/10 02/02/10 03/17/10 03/19/10 04/14/10 to view 01/29/11 03/10/11 03/17/11 03/25/11 04/11/11

Registration HL7780 N492MC MSN35793 N497MC N492MC VP-BVH VP-BAX HL8206 N740WA VP-VVF Rolling 5 acft Last 5

FOD 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 10 122 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 11 113 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 11 82 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 10 92 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 10 72 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 10 52 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 10 81 1 1 2 1 4 1 92 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 7 73 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 4 11 82 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 12 52 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 10 53 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 1 3 11 102 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 10 162 2 3 2 2 2 4 1 1 2 11 102 2 3 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 13 162 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 11 112 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 10 92 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 10 73 2 4 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 15 134 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 4 15 143 2 4 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 13 123 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 13 13

053 47 53 46 46 43 47 41 38 56 245 225

Target 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44

Total by Aircraft

Documentation/processing of non-routine itemsApproved data for non-routines

Tracking/reporting of work flow and progress

Doc

umen

tatio

n

Jobcards properly/timely completed/stamped

Approved data for jobcards

Safety practices/PPE

PTP

Panels/tape/covering properly installed

Tool utilization

Spills/clean-up

Workmanship

Hou

seke

epin

gA

ircra

ft

Tooling certification/calibration

Lighting/electrical

Work benches/work stations

Tubing/ducting capped or plugged

Positioned/grounded safe for maintenanceSystems safed/tagged

Electrical/ESD componentscapped/grounded/protected

Parts/area identified/segregated/protected

Assortment of FOD

HazMat control

Entrance/work stands

Container labeling/storage

Total Discrepancies



Time Scheduled










35 Minutes


















Audit Schedule 2010 As of April 15, 20112011 Audit Schedule

Boeing ShanghaiAudit Schedule 2011

0

1

2

3

4

Aud

it Ev

ents

0.00%

50.00%

100.00%

150.00%

Scheduled Internal Audits 1 2 3 2

Customer Audits 0 1 0 1

Regulatory Authority Audits 2 0 1 1

Completed Audits 3 3 4 2

Percent Audits Completed 100% 100% 100% 50%

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

Audit in April●Scheduled Internal Audit: Material Management and Receiving Inspection

●Customer Audit: Boeing

●Regulatory Authority: CASA


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Created this period 7 24 6 16 0 0 0 6 0 21 15 0 0 0

Closed & Suspended 0 5 30 1 4 14 2 5 1 0 16 0

Open & Pending 7 25 2 17 16 2 0 1 0 21 20 20

Current Past Due * 7 20 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 1 1

2/28/10 3/31/10 4/30/10 5/31/10 6/30/10 7/31/10 8/31/10 11/30/10 12/31/10 2/28/11 3/31/11 Today

As of: 4/18/2011 Boeing Shanghai Regulatory Audit Findings

EASA

FAA

CAAC

EASA CAAC

FAA

EASA



Time Scheduled










35 Minutes




5 Minutes 3.3 MET user Matrix (QS Director) QS Director














Hazardous waste treatment reportWeek No.

沾染危废的清洗杂物及废包装Cleaning sundry and the packaging

polniumed hazardous waste废矿物油

Waste mineral oil

42-废有机溶液42 - waste organic

solution涂料染料废物

Coating dye waste有机树脂废物

Organic resin waste表面处理污泥

Surface treatment sludge废电池

Waste batteries We e k No. la bour hourWaste quantityper 1000 hours

week3 1500 5 week3 6591.5 228.3week4 4700 3600 week4 7113 1166.9week5 480 week5 484 991.7week7 2000 week7 4155 481.3week8 1800 2000 week8 7293 521.0Week10 2400 Week10 7863 305.2Week11 1000 1600 Week11 6795.5 382.6Week12 1100 600 Week12 6916.5 245.8Week13 611 680 100 100 Week13 6798 219.3Week14 420 1100 1150 20 Week14 4867.5 552.6Week15 686 Week15 6725 102.0GrandTotal(KG) 14697 11580 1150 120 100 5 average 472.4

Man hours analysis

Waste quantity per 1000 hours

0.0

200.0

400.0

600.0

800.0

1000.0

1200.0

1400.0

week3 week4 week5 week7 week8 Week10 Week11 Week12 Week13 Week14 Week15

Waste quantityper 1000 hours

Average is 472.4 kgs per 1000 hours


Waste oil recovery report


0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

FW01 FW02 FW03 FW04 FW05 FW06 FW07 FW08 FW09 FW10 FW11 FW12 FW13 FW14

Gas Consumption---m3

Gas AnalysisGas Analysis-- By WeekBy Week

Max

Mean

Min

FW 14 consumption is more than FW13, boiler is running about 2 Hours everyday to supply hot water to locker RM.

FW09 & FW03 was painting in Bay4.


0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

70000

80000

90000

FW01 FW02 FW03 FW04 FW05 FW06 FW07 FW08 FW09 FW10 FW11 FW12 FW13 FW14

Electricity Consumption---KWH

Electricity AnalysisElectricity Analysis-- By WeekBy Week

Max

Mean

Min

FW 05 is Spring Festival holiday.

FW09 & FW03 was painting in Bay4.


Cost percentage Cost percentage From Jan. 11 to Mar. 11From Jan. 11 to Mar. 11

Utility Cost Percent Mar 2011

36%

1%14%

49%

Electricity (RMB)

Water (RMB)

Natural Gas TTL (RMB)

Utility Total Cost (RMB)

Utility Cost Percent Jan 2011

48%

1%1%

50%

Electricity (RMB)

Water (RMB)

Natural Gas Kitchen (RMB)

Natural Gas Boiler (RMB)

Utility Cost Percent Feb 2011

70%

2%1%27%

Electricity (RMB)

Water (RMB)

Natural Gas Kitchen (RMB)

Natural Gas Boiler (RMB)

Utility Cost Item Jan. Feb. Mar.

Electricity (RMB) 344040 424560 449820

Water (RMB) 8723 9265 8284

Natural Gas TTL (RMB) 370196 170328 173357

Utility Total Cost (RMB) 722959 604153 631461



Time Scheduled










35 Minutes



















Time Scheduled










35 Minutes




5 Minutes 3.3 MET user Matrix (QS Manager)














Action Status Review



Time Scheduled










35 Minutes















10 Minutes 8.2 Status Review of Emphasis Programs SMS Development Status by prime responsible manager




Time Scheduled










35 Minutes




5 Minutes 3.3 MET user Matrix QS Director














Open Discussion/Emergent Issues


End

Thank you!

safety commitee

Documents