RUSSIAN INTREST IN CENTRAL ASIA AFTER 9/11

CONTENT

ABSTRACT

Background

Russian Interests and Policy

Russia and the West, Russia’s foreign policy, Central Asia

Russia’s interests in Central Asia

Russia and Central Asia’ Energy Resources

Democratic Central Asia and Russia’s Interests

US Presence in the Region and Russia’s Strategy

Recent developments

Conclusion

ABSTRACT

Background:

From the time the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 to the mid-1990s, Russia was

preoccupied with revolutionary internal reforms and deeply focused on joining

Europe. Russia’s tired security, economic, and political policies toward Central Asia

during this period exemplify its annoyance; a summary of the results of these policies

reveals that Russia reaped what it sowed.

Russia’s security and military cooperation with Central Asia in the early 1990s was

typified by very limited expression and even less action. Russia became compelled to

several Central Asian states via the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty of 1992, but in

practice drastically downsized its military cooperation. Russia’s regional border

troops and Tajikistan-based 201st Motor Rifle Division were obvious exceptions; that

said, these remnants could neither prevent civil war in Tajikistan nor curb the flow of

drugs traveling north from Afghanistan. Thus, despite Moscow’s announcement of a

new regional “Monroe Doctrine,” Russia was neither welcome as a big brother nor

capable of playing the role of the regional hegemony. Further representing policy

incoherence, Russia assumed the USSR’s treaty obligations toward Afghanistan but

turned its back on the “Afghan problem,” setting the stage for civil war.

Yeltsin’s early economic policies toward Central Asia were even more destructive

than his dissolution of Russia’s southern defense buffer zone. Shock therapy architect

Yegor Gaidar forced the Central Asian impediment out of the ruble zone in 1993,

leaving the fledgling countries without currency. While such Russian state practices

wreaked havoc, newly formed private Russian companies vigorously pursued

business arrangements in Central Asia, especially in the area of natural resources.

The proverb “no gardener, no garden!” rightly describes the results of Russia’s policy

of indifference toward Central Asia in the early 1990s. Due to Russia’s virtually

missing cultivation in the security, economic, and political realms, it effectively lost

the region. The states of Central Asia, lacking military and economic strength and

rapidly losing faith in Russia, actively sought “external guarantors of regional security

and foreign assistance.”In 1994 the countries enrolled in the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization’s (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. In 1995 the defense

ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan formed a joint council to assist

in coordinating their PFP efforts and constituted the Tsentrazbat (Central Asian

Battalion) to conduct PFP training. Russia’s significantly reduced level of access to

Central Asian natural resources—something it had taken for granted in Soviet days

and heightened awareness that the nations were “throwing off the mantle of the ‘little

brother’ ” soon convinced Russia that this “garden” needed a “gardener.”

During the mid-1990s, Russia’s foreign policy took a new direction under new foreign

minister Yevgeny Primakov, appointed in 1996. His aim of restoring Russia’s regional

influence took preference over integration with the West. Russia gradually took more

interest in the region, perhaps in reaction to the Central Asian nations’ ongoing efforts

to build new international relationships out of necessity. In fact, Primakov wrote that

the West was actively working to prevent Russia from having a special role in the

former Russian republics and accused the West of blocking Russian attempts at a

rapprochement with the region.

Developing its minor revival toward Central Asia in the latter half of the 1990s, Russia

made limited attempts to boost security and defense cooperation with Central Asia.

During this time, Islamic radicals had taken control of the Chechen Republic and the

Taliban had gained control in Afghanistan, so Russia had become more aware of

radical Islam’s threat to its national security. The link between Russia and Tajikistan

grew slightly stronger when the Tajiks informally granted Russia a basing agreement

for the 201st Motor Rifle Division. By the end of 1999, however, border guards were

virtually phased out of Kyrgyzstan, and Russian advisers had left Turkmenistan.

Adding insult to injury, Uzbekistan pulled out of the Collective Security Treaty, feeling

that Russia had not helped stem the Taliban tide. On the whole, Russia’s security role

declined and mainly centered on the sale of military supplies, a peace-keeping

contingent and coordination with these states over anti-terrorist measures.

Russian efforts to achieve the Primakov doctrine in the economic realm were aimed

primarily at hydrocarbon transport. Moscow asserted its right to transport Central

Asian hydrocarbons across Russian territory and opposed efforts to bypass Russia.

But other than limited oil-export partnership with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan,

Russia did not concentrate on strengthening economic cooperation in fact, overall

trade volume decreased below the level of the early 1990s.

Similarly, Russia made very little effort in the realm of multilateral cooperation with

Central Asia during this period. Relations became strictly bilateral since the CIS had

become ineffective after accomplishing its purpose of conducting the former republics

civilised divorce. Russia’s only multilateral success story was the resolution of the

Tajik civil war in cooperation with Iran and Uzbekistan.

In sum, despite new leadership in the Foreign Ministry, Russia failed to strengthen its

position in Central Asia in the late 1990s. Scholars attribute Russian shortfalls to lack

of consensus among senior leadership, numerous policy inconsistencies and

contradictions due to the rapid turnover of prime ministers late in Yeltsin’s tenure,

and economic and military weakness. Russia did not fully grasp the importance of the

region to its long-term security or economic interests. Regional experts Vladimir

Paramonov and Aleksey Strokov assert that Russian leaders essentially had it

backwards by thinking that in order to strengthen its position in Central Asia, Russia

first needed to recover its international status. Not surprisingly, the Central Asian

nations continued to lose faith in Russia. They did not appreciate how Russia’s lofty

pronouncements regarding its intentions for Central Asia were rarely converted into

sensible actions; furthermore, they recognized Russia’s economic and military

weakness and continued to rely on their own limited internal resources and external

relationships.

Introduction

For Russia, relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and

Uzbekistan are not a new Great Game, along the lines of the mid 19th century struggle

between the British Empire and Imperial Russia. But nor are they business as usual.

The Georgian war in August showed that Russia has a clear direct sphere of influence

that is marked by actual borders, those of the Soviet Union, excluding the Baltic States.

As a result of Russia’s tough stand in Georgia, it is likely that the European Union and

the United States will devote increased attention to Eastern Europe and the Southern

Caucasus, but also to Central Asia. After the break-up of the Soviet Union when Russia

was struggling to position itself internationally and aiming to integrate into western

structures, interest in its southern neighbours was extremely low. Central Asia’s

newly independent states were regarded as a annoyance that controlled Moscow,

which, in turn, felt obliged to show some leadership in the region. In the second half of

the 1990s, Yeltsin’s foreign policy slowly started to take a greater interest in Central

Asia, mainly in reaction to these countries’ efforts to look for new partners out of

necessity. These new partners foremost the EU member states, the US and China

reacted slowly or almost not at all in the case of Brussels, to the political and

economic vacuum in Central Asia. Only Kazakhstan succeeded partially to develop an

independent multi-vector foreign policy and attract foreign interest. When Putin came

to power in 2000, Russia started taking a keener interest in its neighbours. Although a

clear foreign policy strategy was never defined for Central Asia, all developments

pointed to Moscow making the five republics a priority and not wishing to risk losing

them. After all, Central Asia was part of Imperial Russia, later the Soviet Union, while

the 1990s were considered as a brief interval of lack of influence. This transitional

period – it is not concluded yet – resulted in the need to acknowledge and allow other

players in the region. Nonetheless, Russia still has clear geographical, 71 economic,

social and cultural advantages through its legacy in Central Asia. It will need these

assets to make sure that the interdependence between Moscow and its southern

neighbours remains strong, especially now that other players will be more alert to

Russia’s actions in its near abroad.

Russia’s interests in Central Asia:

Russia's interests in Central Asia are unusually similar to those of the United States.

Central Asia has lost its former importance to Russia as a military buffer zone first

between the Russian and British Empires, and then between the USSR and U.S. client

states in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between the USSR and China. After the Soviet

Union's collapse, Russian troops were withdrawn from all the Central Asian states

apart from Tajikistan and some token forces on the Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

borders with China. Today, Russia's chief concern is also one of security. Russia's own

territory has been threatened by the overflow from Afghanistan through Central Asia

of Islamic militancy, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Indeed, from the beginning of his

presidency in January 2000, Russia's President, Vladimir Putin, pushed the idea of a

concerted campaign against terrorism with American as well as European leaders. He

was one of the first to raise the alarm about terrorist training camps in Afghanistan,

and to warn of linkages between these camps and well-financed terrorist networks

operating in Europe and Eurasia. In addition, Russia actively supported the Northern

Alliance in its struggle with the Taliban in Afghanistan. In December 2000, Moscow

joined Washington in supporting United Nations sanctions against the Taliban, and

later appealed for additional sanctions against Pakistan for aiding the Taliban all a

precursor to cooperation with the United States in the war against terrorism after

September 11.

Russia's other major interest in the region is in Central Asian energy development,

with a new focus on gas as markets expand in Europe and Asia. Together, Russia, Iran,

and the Central Asian states hold more than half of world gas reserves. Gas is not as

mobile as oil and is destined for regional rather than world markets. Retaining a

major role in Central Asian gas production and export is a key issue for Russia's

energy industry. Energy analysts doubt that Russia can both meet its domestic

demand and growing ambitions for gas exports in the coming decades without having

access to and influence over the flow of Central Asian gas.

In addition, Moscow seeks the restoration of Soviet-era communications and trade

infrastructure between Russia and Central Asia, and some capacity for increasing

Russian private sector investment in the region beyond the energy sector. In line with

this interest, Russia has initiated a major project to revive and revitalize the former

North-South transportation corridor from Russian Baltic ports down the Volga River,

across the Caspian to Central Asia and Iran, and from there to Pakistan and India. In

the Soviet period, this served as a major freight route and an alternative to the

transportation of goods from Europe to Asia through the Mediterranean and Suez

Canal. All of this makes for a primary focus on economic rather than military and

strategic issues for Russia in the region and, therefore, an increased interest in Central

Asia's stability and development.

Russia and Central Asia’ Energy Resources:

For its own stability and Central Asia to Russia for energy imports nrbad active

participation in East Asia is very important. Russia's federal budget revenues and

about two-thirds of its exports of oil and gas accounts for 60% of exports. The fact that

Russia, despite the rich oil and gas resources, Oil and gas from Central Asia in bulk at

lower prices on imports to supply the lucrative European markets. Exploit its position

as a transit Country for energy supplies to Europe, Central Asia with Russia in energy

sector have signed various agreements. For six years from 1994 to 2000, Russia t

,rmyn did not buy gas, Gazprom, as the vast Russian energy (20% of world gas deal)ك

it cost him to buy it from Turkmenistan labhهyn thought. In a dispute with

Turkmenistan, the European market in 1997, Moscow cut off the flow pipe to the new

state.In an effort to achieve high energy prices, supply shortages. In September 2006,

Gazprom tكrmyn 1000 cubic meters of gas per 100 dollars for maternity costs for a

50% price increase agreed. Consensus already cost $ 65 / m thick was 1000.

In exchange, Gazprom and Turkmenistan's rich Yolotan access to natural gas sector.

Export routes Gazprom and Turkmenistan also adsys 2009.11 in November 2007 until

the actual control efficiency achieved .Turkmenistan with China also signed

agreements on energy imports. Chinese officials every year for 30 years in 2009,

Turkmenistan began exporting gas to 30 bysyym signed an agreement

with.Turkmenistan also exports gas to Iran. Regional gas export agreements signed

with countries, like Turkmenistan with Russia and other energy-hungry states

sudybajy whilst putting. The strategy worked, Turkmenistan increased its gas prices

in recent years has been able to export to Russia.

U.S. Baku - tybls - syهan (BTC), Trans - Afghanistan - Pakistan (NULL) and pipeline

(TCP), the Central Asian oil and gas export routes vowing to help. This aurqzaqstan

Western and Asian markets, Russia and Turkmenistan to separate will be able to

export their energy. But it is clear that considerable oil and gas pipelines aurqzaqstan

and Turkmenistan to Russia as Central Asia's energy resources are imported through

these pipes do not have.In 2004, Russian oil production company lyuكul syyrg as $ 1

billion for 35 years (pyysy) natural gas reserves of Uzbekistan signed with Uzbekistan.

Under pyysy, lyuكul Kandym, Khauzak and southern regions of Uzbekistan have

agreed to partner in the shade. Uzbekneftegaz lyuكul Uzbeki state gas firm, with a

90% stake acquired in the project.Uzbekistan in the early part of the development of

Karakal Ustyurt which borders Pakistan's western autonomous region of Aral Sea.

Under an agreement with Gazprom, Uzbekneftegaz for the same amount of gas to

southern Kazakhstan and 3.5 million m thick Karachaganak gas supplies from Russia,

Uzbekistan's state-owned oil and gas company Vostok Limited Soyuzneftegaz the

Russian gas company with an aide of Soyuzneftegaz pyysy announced. A five-year

joint research project and a 36-year South Western Madhya Ustyurt is Guisar adruه

arbn agreed to submit a development program. There is agreement that was signedك

between the British ayujy 2001 Uabekneftegaz pyysy UzPEC.14 registered all its

natural gas exports to Uzbekistan and Central Asia more than half of Russia is sending

to the rest. Russian President Vladimir Putin and 6 July 2005, President Nursultan

njrbayyu Kurmangazy oil field offshore production of a joint agreement signed 55

years. That same year, Russia and Kazakhstan also a Khvalynskoye agreed to develop

the oil sector.

According to press reports, for 2009, Russia cut off gas from Turkmenistan will

annually from bysyym 60-70. That supply a large part (42-51 per year bysyym) is to

go ahead for Ukraine. Turkmen gas supplies to Ukraine in 2006 were not directly, but

rather energy company RosUkrEnergo, the Russia - Ukraine gas deal is a mediator.

RosUkrEnergo Turkmenistan, 8.5 / aurqzaqstan and Uzbekistan each year for 2007

with 7 bysyym bysyym with 42 years of gas per year for imports of bysyym signed.

Even Russia's nuclear sector investment in East Asia is doing. Russia in February 2002

for a nuclear power plant construction, approximately 400 kilometers north of Almaty

offered to revive the project.Total costs for these institutions is estimated atabout 10 $

billion.17 with Uzbekistan, Russia (M o U) understand about 4500 tonnes of uranium

resources estimated Aktan uranium deposit with the development of Uzbekistan has

signed a Memorandum of Agreement.

Central Asia through the development of nuclear energy, Russia is protecting its

interests. If nuclear energy is increased in Central Asia, there is less loss of energy,

nuclear energy as an energy shortage in the domestic market of Central Asia can

serve. So, Russia and Central Asian oil and gas more easily be able to achieve. Russian

nuclear industry investment in uranium enrichment, the uranium imports from East

Asia can benefit. If Russia does not invest in this area, China, India and other states

like Iran against Russian interests in sensitive areas that could be invested. There are

also prohibited from providing nuclear materials to other neighboring countries in

Central Asia is a possibility. At the end of December 2007, a dangerous level of -137

syzym rydyudrmy material from Kyrgyzstan to Iran aboard a freight train was

searched. In your search, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) If an

application for managing details.19 Kyrgyz government for the development of

uranium resources, lack of money, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are forced to

sneak away to the poor garage sales Can any other country. Central Asia to Russia in

the nuclear sector participation is important not only for Central Asia, but also for

regional countries. Russia's nuclear sector, and U.S. shares common interests.

Russia’s Oligarch Power Plays

Russia has also successfully managed to use the commercial sphere to consolidate its

influence and power in Central Asia. This has been especially evident in Kazakhstan

possibly Russia’s only direct link to the other republics. Russia has made its initial

inroads in the Kazakh banking system through state-owned banks both through the

direct and indirect gaining of shares. In theory, this policy will allow Moscow to put

influence on the Kazakh economy by controlling access to loans, and decisions on

commercial debt. Vnesheconombank, for example, gave Astana a U.S. $3.5 billion loan

to be used solely to purchase Russian products. It is also likely that Kazakh BTA Bank

will follow a restructuring path that involves a possible sale to Russia’s Sberbank.

Despite a focus on cornering the financial market, Russia is also gaining influence in

the energy and mining sectors. Companies including Polyus Gold and Polymetal have

gained considerable leverage over gold and copper deposits; and LUKoil continues to

expand its presence. For example, Moscow offered capital at a time of crisis to ensure

that LUKoil could purchase BP’s stake in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium project. It is

also worth noting that LUKoil was invited to sit on Kazakhstan’s Foreign Investments

Council in 2003 by President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

Both China and Russia, in following commercial strategies to gain influence in the

region, have inadvertently contributed to securing the current political status quo.

Investigating various business deals that have included Chinese or Russian interests

has confirmed that in many instances the rule of law, corporate governance, and

transparency of beneficial ownership are considered to be luxuries and thus

dispensable. State involvement in commercial transactions thus has little to do with

contributing to the creation of sustainable economic growth. In fact, several

commercial transactions have merely worked to sustain the ‘shadow state’, ensuring

that income generation is not tied to economic development but to securing regime

survival.

Russian Interest in Central Asian Water:

Russia’s increasing interest in Central Asia’s water resources. former Soviet republics

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan an added element

in the environment is water, used by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan largely to generate

hydroelectric power, while the downstream states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan view it as a resource for supporting agriculture rather than an energy

source.

In the 17 years since the Soviet Union collapsed, the Central Asian nations emerging

from the debris have yet to resolve the issue of an equitable distribution of the arid

region’s most precious resource. The most significant amounts of oil and gas are

found in the westerly “Stans” of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan; the region’s aquatic

reserves are largely under the control of the most easterly (and poor) mountainous

states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which between them account for more than 85

percent of the region’s groundwater reserves, primarily in the form of alpine glacial

runoff that feeds the region’s two largest rivers, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya.

Earlier this week Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, during a state visit to

Uzbekistan, weighed in on the issue, telling journalists: “The construction of

hydropower stations in Central Asia should meet the interests of all neighboring

countries and should correspond to international rights norms of transboundary

rivers usage. It is impossible to act in isolation. It can cause tensions which can only be

solved not by economic but by political means.

“Hydroelectric power stations in the Central Asian region must be built with

consideration of the interests of all neighboring states,” he said, adding, “If there is no

common accord of all parties, Russia will refrain from participation in such projects.”

Medvedev’s comments delighted his hosts, who have argued that if Tajikistan

proceeds with constructing its planned Rogun hydroelectric cascade, which would be

Central Asia’s largest, it would severely impact the water needs of downstream states.

Uzbek President Islam Karimov stated: “I would like to especially speak on one issue.

Uzbekistan counts on Russia’s well thought-out and considered position on issues

relating to the implementation of hydropower projects in the Central Asian region.”

Medvedev’s statements caused Tajikistan to deliver a diplomatic protest, fearing that

Moscow was favoring Tashkent’s position over its own. There are, however,

alternatives to gigantic Soviet-legacy projects like Rogun, first begun in 1976, such as

smaller, more numerous hydroelectric facilities that would alleviate many of the

downstream nations’ concerns and have been advocated by Western specialists with

such institutions as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the

Asian Development Bank.

Russia’s Involvement in the Central Asia’ Security and Economy:

A Quest for Retaining Power in Central Asia, Russia economic security, and political

interests in East Asia's. Russian drug trafficking, arms trafficking, international crime

and terrorism in Central Asia that caters to the international threat is received. To

their area of influence in Central Asia, Russia, Central Asia is to maintain its presence.

For this purpose, the deployment of Russian military bases and lease them to the

various agreements signed with Central Asia. Russian troops on +14000 Armenia,

Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Georgia, mulduua, Russia and Tajikistan in the 201

Motorized Rifle Divisions in the garage Ukraine.20 deployed outside their borders is

the largest Russian deployment. More than 5,000 Russian soldiers dsaby, Kurgan-Tube

and Kulab areas are posted. Maintain its strong presence in Central Asia to Russia,

Central Asia and Russia's strategy for providing economic assistance to Central Asia

dyndaryu used as a bone.to recover, it was decided in April 1996 Russia Russia from

Kyrgyzstan to the Kyrgyz outstanding debt as a share in the industry will get. Deferred

payment of Kyrgyz debt to Russia in 2002. Kyrgyzstan and Russia $ 170 million after a

20-year extension was provided financial assistance for Kyrgyz debt service.Russia

agreed to import wheat for the 1996 loan.

 Bill Agreement with Tajikistan in 1993, Russia signed the situation, and amended in

April 1999. But many problems Russia.25 Tajikistan Tajikistan Soviet Russian troops

in Tajikistan also spend 50% of funding was $ 300 million loan for up to writing full

time and then woke up. Under the agreement, Russian troops in Tajikistan for 1993

50:50 Russia and Tajikistan through money should be shared. However, Tajikistan

maximum 5% of costs not yet paid. In 2004, under the influence of Russia, Tajikistan,

Russia ownership of a space control center confirmed. In June 2004, Russia, Tajikistan

reach an agreement with Russia on a permanent basis was able to change the military

deployment. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Tajik President Imomali

Rakhmanov, 4 June 2004 meeting and decided that Russia without pay and will use

Tajik bases. In foreign currency, it was concluded that Tajikistan emaining $ 250

million debt will be written off.26 16 June 2004, Putin visited Uzbekistan and a

strategic partnership agreement was signed between Uzbekistan and Russia. Both

countries pledged to cooperate against terrorism. Was agreed that Russia and

Uzbekistan sthapnau bases can be used if necessary. Russia has the responsibility to

protect Uzbek air space. Russia also used Navai Uzbek airspace. Russia in case of

emergency always has the right to use. In return, Russia and Uzbekistan advanced

navigation system will provide air defense weapons.Era.27 Soviet Russian influence in

Kyrgyzstan that was equal to that system will be relived.

In a September 2003 agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Russia launched 23

October 2003 Spin for 15 years, took control of the air base, the foundation allotted $

35 million for expansion. Central Asia in October 2005, Russian Foreign Minister

Sergey lauruu your visit, including Russia Iran, which includes troops from all coastal

states to establish a connection to the imposition of a military group NATO has tried to

reduce foreign influences.  In various public statements by Russian President Vladimir

Putin as Russia's foreign policy that was to be subordinated to domestic economic

interests. 26 January 2001 in a speech, Putin stressed that Russia's strategic goal of

working within a community are interlinked. In an era of globalization, promoting the

interests of economic policy.29 Russian Minister of Foreign Investment in countries

like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan key column, and its effects should be expanded; Russia

has tried to influence other Central Asia, and presented himself as the chief option for

East Asia and its resources for infrastructure development.

Recent developments

Putin protege Medvedev took up his mentor’s layer in May 2008. Putin has played an

active role in foreign policy from his current position as prime minister, so Russia’s

ongoing activist stance toward Central Asia can be seen simply as a continuation of

the policies of his presidency. Since the Medvedev presidency is still arguably in its

infancy, it is too early to fully analyze the results of Russian policy toward Central Asia

under his leadership. Nonetheless, a brief examination of his “Foreign Policy Concept”

(FPC) and an assessment of Russia’s recent unsure posture toward operations in

Afghanistan will prove useful to US policy makers.

The July 2008 FPC, a document similar in nature to the US national security strategy,

resounds with Russia’s perceived resurgence in both global aspirations and

responsibilities near abroad. The FPC asserts a “real capacity to play a well-deserved

role globally” as one of the “influential centers in the modern world.” One of Russia’s

chief foreign policy objectives, per the FPC, is “to promote good neighborly relations

with bordering States, to assist in eliminating the existing hotbeds of tension and

conflicts in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation and to prevent emergence

of the new ones.”

Another primary objective, according to the FPC, is to pursue partnerships aimed at

stability the essence of Putin’s multilateral efforts, discussed above. The CSTO,

Eurasec, and SCO are specifically mentioned as instruments for ensuring mutual

security and combating widespread threats such as “terrorism, extremism, drug

trafficking, transnational crime, and illegal migration” in the CIS. In its section on

“International Economic and Environmental Cooperation,” the FPC describes Russia’s

interest in energy security and its goal of strengthening “strategic partnership with

leading producers” in order to ensure secure transit. Such verbiage is consistent with

Russia’s demonstrated willingness to play hardball in the energy domain.

Recent developments indeed confirm Russia’s reassertion of a zone of influence in

this portion of the former Soviet Union. Andrei Serenko, cofounder of a Russian think

tank focused on Afghanistan, confirms that Russia wants to be the only master of the

Central Asian domain and to the maximum extent possible make things difficult for

the U.S. in making the transfer of American forces into Afghanistan be dependent on

the will of the Kremlin. Exhibiting its penchant for having the last word in the region,

in the wake of the eventual Manas-eviction rollback, Russia rattled Uzbekistan by

announcing plans to open a CSTO base at Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan.

Conclusion:

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian policy toward Central Asia has

progressed from passive and annoyed to active and engaged. Early in the Yeltsin

years, Russia concentrated on conducting domestic reforms and integrating with the

West; the new Central Asian nations, in turn, lost confidence in Russia and pursued

new partnerships. Russia paid slightly more attention to Central Asia during the late

1990s, but economic weakness and policy inconsistencies prevented meaningful

progress. Under Putin, Russia demonstrated its “ultimate intention” for the Central

Asian nations namely, to limit their sovereignty and expand control over their foreign

policies.” Medvedev’s FPC and recent actions in Central Asia confirm both Russia’s

hegemonic aspirations and its intense focus on security and energy interests. Mindful

of the evolution of Russia’s Central Asia policies, armed with an appreciation for

Russia’s historic sense that the region is in its zone of influence, and attentive to

Russia’s zero-sum thinking regarding areas near abroad, US leaders and airpower

practitioners will be better prepared to craft and implement mutually agreeable,

contextually sound strategic policy for Central Asia. Russia's interests, economy,

energy sector and the governments of Central Asia for a rapid reaction between

separate deal between Russia and Central Asia need to be implemented. Bureaucratic

rulers of Central Asia states that are growing in Russia for help in protecting the

interests are Therefore, democracy is not in the interest of Russia in Central Asia.

Militarily weak Russia in Central Asia will provide an opportunity to present a security

risk to our troops deployed in Central Asia and Russia for influence will endure

forever. East Asian economies with weak internal always happen according to Russian

interests. Russia with the European Union-style integration in East Asia does not want

It's always for their safety, economic development and supply of energy to try to rely

on Central Asia.