russian interst moldova

7/30/2019 Russian Interst Moldova

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Charles University in PragueFaculty of Social SciencesSeminar:Central European, Balkan and Eurasian Diplomatic Seminar - JMM126Teacher: PhDr. Slavomr Hork

Student: Kristin Kretzschmar (75977401)

Seminar Paper

Role of the Russian Federation in the Moldovan-Transnistrian Conflict

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. Background of the Conflict

2.1. Geographic Location and Ethnic Distinction

2.2. Historic Background

2.3. Reasons for the Separatism and Conflict Classification

2.4. Process of the Conflict

3. Interests of the Opponents

3.1. Moldova

3.2. Transnistria

4. Russia

4.1. Russian Interest

4.2. Instruments of Russian Foreign Policy

5. Conclusion

6. References

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1. Introduction

Belarus is often referred to as the last dictatorship in Europe. This might be true, if only internation-

ally recognized states are taken in consideration. But there is another area in Europe which by

freedom-house is labeled not free having comparable low scores as Belarus: Transnistria, which is

a separatist republic of Moldova (officiallyRepublica Moldova, RM). Except for connoisseurs of

obscure European wines, most Western policymakers have not heard of Transnistria or Moldova 1.

The Moldovan president described Transnistria as a dictatorship, having an atmosphere of the Sta-

linist Soviet Union in 19372. But the Transnistrian conflict is only rarely presented in Western me-

dia, even though the issue carries importance also for Western politics: a consolidation and maybe

legalization of the separatism could set example in Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) or in-

side the Russian Federation (Chechnya), but also in Western Europe, e.g. in Spain (Basque

Country). Pessimist might even argue that the future of the international system that still relies onthe sovereignty of states is at sake3.

Main purpose of this paper is to give an overview over the Moldovan-Tranistrian conflict, including

the interests and arguments of the internal actors. In order to classify the conflict and to give a deep-

er understanding of the arguments of the actors a historic review is included. This also useful, since

structural reasons for the conflict were developed historically. Furthermore the focus will be put one

one specific actor: the Russian Federation. While in the West this issue sometimes seems to be for-

gotten, in Russia much attention is being paid, ehich is also show in the Russian terminology refer-ring to this area: near abroad.

2. Background of the Conflict

2.1. Geographic Location and Ethnic Distinction

Moldavia is located in Southeastern Europe, sharing borders with Ukraine and Romania and there-

fore at the same time with the European Union. Moldavia might be divided into two parts: the main

part being located in between the rivers Prut, which is the natural Western border of the country and

Dniester. This region is often referred to as Bessarabia. Beyond the Dniester is a narrow strip ofland which is referred to as Transnistria and basically composes the PMR (Pridnestrovian Mol-

davian Republic, Transnistria)4. This is also referred to as a ethnic distinction: on the West bank of

the river mainly Romanesque Moldovans live and on the East bank mainly Slavs, such as Ukraini-

ans and Russians. Furthermore there is a second ethnic division of Bessarabia: in the south lays the

1 King, 1994: 1062 Klumann, 2009

3 Malek, 2006: 13f4 Additionaly to the East bank, the PMR claims also the mainly Russian inhabited city of Bendery on the West bank.

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autonomous region Gaugazia, which is mainly inhabited by Gagauzes who are ethnic Turcs5.

2.2. Historic Background

The region has been for a long time subject to strategic politics. Since it appears that in this area the

Romanesque and Slavonic culture meet, it was tried from both sides to attach the region to the own

sphere of influence. Historically speaking there has been different rule over Bessarabia: Ottoman,

Slavoinc and also Romanesque, while Transnistria always was under Slavonic rule and from 1924

to 1940 already part of the USSR, being a autonomous republic of the Ukraine which was called:

Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR). In 1940 Bessarabia was attached

again to the Soviet Union, after being in the interwar period under Romanian rule, obtaining the

status of a Soviet republic. This annexation was authorized by the secret protocols of the Mo-

lotov-Ribbentrop pact and Stalin tried to legitimize the demand by ideologizing the culture of the

Bessarabian region to be Moldavian, which was considered distinctive from the Romanian culture,closer to Slavonic cultures than to Romanesque ones6. Bessearabia and Transnistria henceforward

composed the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR).

In the MSSR cleavages in two areas became eminent for the further developments:

ethnic cleavage

Even though Moscow imposed a Russification over Moldova, there was still an ethnic cleavage,

mostly visible on the natural border of the Dniester river. On the East bank the population considerd

itself predominately Slavonic7 whereas on the West bank during perestroika pan-Romanism oc-

curred. A national front in reference to the movements in the Baltic states was formed, claiming

differences to Slavs and proximity to the Romanian culture. This national awakening lead to a new

language legislation in August and September 1989. Those laws included the proclamation of Mol-

dovan as state language, and the use of the Latin alphabet instead of the Cyrillic. Even though the

citizens were free to use whatever language they wanted to, there were reports of disadvantages,

e.g. when applying, for people who were not native Moldovan speakers. This legislation went along

with a nationalization of education, e.g. curricula or course offer in universities, and the growingidea of a reunification with Romania8.

economic and political cleavage

Furthermore there were economic differences in the two regions. Before the MSSR was found,

there were structural differences already. Bessarabia was used as a breadbasket for Romania, where-

5 Goebl, Nelde, & Stary, 2008: 19336 Goebl et al., 2008: 1933, 1935 & 137; King, 1994: 107

7 Kolst, Edemsky, & Kalashnikova, 1993: 975; Buzogny, 2003: 88 King, 1994: 109; Kolst et al., 1993: 979f

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as under Ukrainian rule Transnistria was modernized. This parting deepened in the MSSR. Even

though the USSR supported modernization and industrialization, the Transnistrian side was priv-

ileged. This industrial privilege led also to an amplification of the ethnic cleavage, since in Trans-

nistria trained workers from the whole USSR were settled. Additionally the MSSR political elites

were recruited mostly from the Transnistrian side. The USSR officials put more trust into the elitesfrom the Transnistrian side, since they were considered to be loyal to the regime and pro-Russian

Moldovan elites were deported or executed under Romanian rule during World War II9.

2.3. Reasons for the Separatism and conflict classification

Both sides claim that the conflict is not ethnic and in consideration of the facts this argument might

be supported. Both sides are not ethnically homogeneous and no one will experience reprisal for

ethnicity, but rather for political attitudes. Therefore the conflict might be classified as a political

conflict10

.

According to the cleavages depicted above, the possible causes for the conflict are found in the

same areas. Firstly it is important to mention that during the collapse of the USSR in the new emer-

ging states a uncertainty occurred which lead to the uprising of the national movements and eventu-

ally to secessionist conflicts in different areas, even within the Russian Federation11. But in the case

under consideration, the ethic causes is often overvalued, even thou it was used as legitimation for

the Russian intervention. One rather could argue, that there was a interaction in between ethnic and

political causes, since the new language laws lead to an anxiety on the Transnistrian side, to loosepower. Furthermore the Tranistrians claimed, that they would suffer from a possible reunification

with Romania12

Even though in the USSR the ethnicity was instrumentalized and the Russian forces did and do sup-

port the separatists no evidence can found that the reason for the separatism was Russian agitation

in the Transnistrian area already during the 1980s.

2.4. Process of the conflict

From September 1989, the city councils ignored the new language laws, which can be see as the ini-tial of the separation. During the winter 1989/90 referenda in Transnitria were held, whether the lan-

guages should be equal, which was agreed upon by 90%. In June 1990 the first Transnistrian Con-

gress of Soviets was held, which demanded an autonomous republic and in September of the same

year the second Congress of Soviets finally proclaimed Transnistrian Moldavian Socialist Soviet

9 King, 1994: 10710 Neukirch, 1998: 27

11 Buzogny, 2003: 812 Kolst, Edemsky, & Kalashnikova, 1993: 981

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Republic (PMSSR) as a part of the USSR as a response to the declaration of sovereignty of Mol-

dova in June and the disaffiliation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The key argument was: PMR

officials point out that, no less than the incorporation of Bessarabia into the Soviet Union, the abol-

ition of the Moldovian ASSR in 1940 was a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. The resurrection

of MASSR can therefore be seen as a natural corollary of the denunciation of this pact.13

. Firstfightings occurred already in November 1990 but the open civil war started in March 1992 and las-

ted until July 1992. The PMR benefited from the presence of the 14 th army of the Soviet Union,

which more or less supported the forces and Cossacks, which arrived in March 199214.

3. Interests of the Opponents

3.1. Moldova

The main Moldavian interest is of course the perpetuation of its territorial integrity. This claim is

based upon international law. But due to limited economic, military and political power it has only

restricted resources available15. As explained above, the Tranistrian side was the industrial center of

the MSSR. The RM did therefore not only loose control over the industrial center but also all the

tax revenue. Furthermore RM had problems with the transition from state-directed economy to a

free market economy, which weakened the economy even more16.

A comparison of the military forces shows, that the RM is definitely is in an inferior position. Even

though the PMR is only about one sixth of the area of the whole RM, the armed forces are larger

and better equipped17

3.2. Transnistria

The PMR claims its independence from the RM. This claim is basing upon the argument, that it has

won the war and therefor the RM has to acknowledge the new situation. Furthermore officials ar-

gue, that the PMR comes with all the symbols of statehood, such as institutions, president and own

currency. In addition it is argued that only the independence of the PMR ensures, that the RM won't

unify with Romania18. Both arguments can be opposed: firstly the national symbols were created il-

legally and the main part of statehood still is missing: the international recognition. Secondly, theidea of unification of RM with Romania already dissolved in the early 1990s for several reasons:

Romania had economically not much to offer, the deficits in protection of minorities in Romania

13 Kolst et al., 1993: 98314 Kolst et al., 1993: 980ff.; Neukirch, 1998: 1915 Malek, 2006: 1716 Goebl et al., 2008: 193517 RM: 5.710 persons in army, 1.040 in air-force, 2.379in the troops of the ministry of interior affairs and 900 special

police forces, equals up to 10.029PMR: 7.500 in military, 1.000 in special units and Cossacks and 15.000 reservists, equals up to 23.500.

(Malek, 2006: 21)18 Malek, 2006: 19

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were acknowledged and Romania only slowly democratized, therefore the RM feared to loose polit-

ical rights again19.

Basing upon two main principles the PMR has a broader elbowroom than the RM. Firstly since it is

not recognized by any state or international organization international law is not valid. That results

for example in a extensive mobilization and militarization since it is not under control of the Treatyon Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (see 2.1) but also to illegal activities affecting neighbor-

ing countries. Secondly, the Russian support in many areas is a stabilizing and supporting factor in

this issue20.

4. Russia

4.1. Russian interest

Russia did not only play an important role during the escalation of the conflict but also during the

stabilization of the conflict, which is now also often referred to as a frozen conflict, since there are

currently not escalations but a conciliation is also not conceivable. At the beginning of the conflict

Russia legitimized the intervention with the official argument to protect ethnic Russians21. But from

the beginning on it was obvious, that also other considerations were made and it might be argued

that security and geopolitical interests played an more important role than the protection of Russi-

ans. After the collapse of the USSR the Russians did not want to lose even more influence in their

periphery, therefore Transnistria is used in order to keep RM from orienting westwards or in an

European integration and to create a stable instability22.

4.2. Instruments in Russian foreign policy

It is beyond all question, that Russia has due to substantial resources extensive instruments to shape

the development in this area in compliance with its own interest. Generally the instruments could be

identified as support versus sanctions.

The Russian support of the PMR goes far beyond the military support during the escalation of the

conflict. Even now there is economic, political and symbolical support. The PMR receives natural

gas from the Russian company gazprom. But since there is no contract in between the PMR and

gazprom, Transnistria refuses to pay for the gas. In May 2010 the dept added up to 2.3 billion Dol-

lar. It should be remembered that the Ukrainian dept for gas was 1.3 billion Dollar, when in 2006

further delivery was refused. But de jure Transnistria does not have the dept, therefore Moldavia

could be held responsible for this dept. Thus the likelihood of a reunification is decreased, since the

19 Kolst et al., 1993: 98620 Malek, 2006: 18 & 21; Popescu, 2005: 17

21 King, 1994: 11422 King, 1994: 107; Malek, 2006: 10; Adomeit, 2008: 14

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RM fears to be held responsible for those dept. The argument, that the PMR receives gas for free

therefore could be accepted, this has also lead to low production costs for industrial products, which

get therefore highly competitive and are exported to the EU. In addition Ukraine and Russia accept

Transnistrian goods, as if they were Moldovan23.

Furthermore there is strong symbolical support of the PMR. For example the printing of the Trans-nistrian currency in Moscow or the receiving of Transnistrian officials in Russian public authorities

and institutions24.

The role of the Russian 14 th army during the escalation is still not totally clear: assessments range

from official support during the escalation and the drill of PMR forces 25 to intervention of the army

only to avoid further escalation. But the army is still stationed there and proclaimed to be guarantor

for peace. Opposed to this argument could be, that there was no escalation during the past 15 years

and that the presence of peace forces, which are definitely on the side of the separatist could stabil-ize their situation and add power since they are currently also mostly used as border guards26.

Besides the strong support of the PMR the RM is being sanctioned. Most obvious is the import ban

of Moldavian agricultural products, especially wine. The economy of the RM bases upon agricultur-

al production and the export of goods to the Russian Federation. The Germany newspaperDie Zeit

assumes that this is a continuation of the geostrategic politics27

5. Conclusion

As shown above, Russia was not only involved in the escalation, but also interlaced in the historic

development and the current situation. Therefore Russia is also referred to as the patron state28 of

the PMR, supporting and creating a status quo which currently can be considered a deadlock. The

Russian supports leads to a reinforcement of the PMR, which by now can be considered a de facto

state, hence the Transnistrian president Smirnov can demand extensive conditions for negotiations.

The Russian Federation is not interested in a reconciliation, since the instability in this area supports

Russian interests. Therefor one could argue that Moldova and its territorial integrity is a victim of

Russian geostrategic and politic interests.

23 euro|topics, 2011; Asaftei, 2010; rp online, 2007; Popescu, 2005: 1724 Malek, 2006: 2425 Malek, 2006: 1226 Popescu, 2005: 19f

27 Voswinkel, 16/200628 Popescu, 2005: 24

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6. References

Adomeit, Hannes (2008): Russland - EU und Nato. Konkurrenz in "Zwischeneuropa". In: Adomeit,Hannes; Schulze, Peter W.; Zagorski, Andrei (Hg.): Russland, die EU und "Zwischeneuropa".[Berichte beim Workshop des IILP vom 26. bis 28. Mrz in Wien anlsslich des Amtsantrittesdes neuen Prsidenten Medwedew]. Wien: Internat. Inst. fr liberale Politik(Sozialwissenschaftliche SchriftenreiheReihe Studien), S. 326.

Asaftei, B. (2010).Das transnistrische Gas-Kuckucksei, from Wirtschaftswoche:http://www.wirtschaftsblatt.at/archiv/das-transnistrische-gas-kuckucksei-422967/index.do.

Buzogny, A. (2003). Die politische konomie post-sowjetische Sezessionskonflikte.Forschungsstelle Osteuropa Bremen, Arbeitspapiere und Materialien, 45.

euro|topics (2011).Moldaus Wiedervereinigung zu teuer. Retrieved May 20, 2011, fromhttp://www.eurotopics.net/de/archiv/article/ARTICLE84383-Moldaus-Wiedervereinigung-zu-teuerhttp://www.eurotopics.net/de/archiv/article/ARTICLE84383-Moldaus-Wiedervereinigung-zu-teuer.

Goebl, H., Nelde, P. H., & Stary, Z. (2008). Kontaktlinguistik (Part 2) (1. Aufl.). s.l.: Mouton de

Gruyter.King, C. (1994). Eurasia Letter: Moldova with a Russian face.Foreign Policy, 97, 106120.

Retrieved May 18, 2011, from www.jstor.org/stable/1149443.

Klumann, U. (2009). Separatistenrepublik Transnistrien: "Sie sollten uns nicht mit der DDRverwechseln". Retrieved May 18, 2011, from Spiegel Online:http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,613231,00.html.

Kolst, P., Edemsky, A., & Kalashnikova, N. (1993). The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentismand Separatism.Europe-Asia Studies, 45(6), 9731000. Retrieved May 13, 2011, fromwww.jstor.org/stable/152665.

Malek, M. (2006).Der Konflikt im Dnjestr-Gebiet (Moldova): Analyse und Dokumente.Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie: Vol. 2006,7. Wien: BMLV LVAk.

Neukirch, C. (1998).Der Status Transnistriens aus politischer und vlkerrechtlicher Sicht. AktuelleStudien: Vol. 3: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Ukraine.

Popescu, Nicu (2005): The EU in Moldova - settling conflicts in the neighbourhood. Paris: Institutd'Etudes de Scurit de l'Union Europenne (Occasional paper / European Union Institute forSecurity Studies, 60).

rp online (2007). Gazprom droht Ukraine mit Lieferstopp. Retrieved May 20, 2011, from rp online:http://www.rp-online.de/wirtschaft/news/Gazprom-droht-Ukraine-mit-

Lieferstopp_aid_486050.html#comments.Voswinkel, J. (16/2006).Der Weinkrieg. Retrieved May 20, 2011, from Zeit Online: Der Weinkrieg.

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