ruling elite, frontier-caste ideology and resource conflicts in the sudan

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Ruling Elite, Frontier-Caste Ideologyand Resource Conflicts in the SudanMahmoud El ZainPublished online: 02 Apr 2012.

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36

Journal of Peacebuilding & Development

Abstract

The ruling elite of central-northern Sudan has maintained a split land tenure system – a system

that guaranteed the right to private ownership of ancestral lands to farming communities in the

Nile Valley region and denied that right to the majority of farmers and pastoralists in other regions.

Central to this tenure inequality was the emergence of an agricultural lobby which was politically

encouraged by colonial and post-colonial administrations through facilitation of modern irrigated

farming and was therefore economically the earliest to accumulate capital and invest further in

irrigated agriculture and mechanised farming in rain-fed areas. The agricultural lobby – acting

on the perception that the whole landscape of Sudan is a ‘wasteland’ that should be developed –

has claimed vast tracts of this land for mechanised farming, displacing large numbers of traditional

farmers and pastoralists and causing several localised conflicts. The feverish expansion of

mechanised farming coupled with recurrent droughts since the early 1980s has widened the regional

scale and increased the intensity of these conflicts, and the belligerents have increasingly justified

their participation in the conflicts in terms of racial and religious ideologies.

Introduction

The high-intensity conflicts that raged since early 1980s have claimed the lives of over

two million people over two decades and are still raging today. This article uses current

events in the Sudan to argue that these conflicts represent the peak of evolution of a

regime of ‘resource capture’ and ‘ecological marginalisation’ that have characterised the

recent history of the country. The article sees

these conflicts, which are often blamed on

actors at the local level, as being the outcome

of land tenure regulations that were

promulgated by the British colonial

administration and are maintained by its

successors, the ruling elite of central-

northern Sudan. The land tenure regulations

gave private land ownership rights to farming communities in the Nile Valley and

considered all remaining lands in the country – in actuality state-owned – as being

communally owned. The land tenure regulations have reinstituted notions about resource

accessibility and uses and dramatically changed the economic, political and cultural

relations among regions. This article examines the ramifications of these split tenure

regulations, using the concept of the ‘frontier-caste ideology’ as an analytical tool.

Ruling Elite, Frontier-casteIdeology and ResourceConflicts in the Sudan

MAHMOUD EL ZAIN

The land tenure regulations have reinstitutednotions about resource accessibility and usesand dramatically changed the economic,political and cultural relations among regions.

Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, Vol. 3, NO. 1, 2006

© Journal of Peacebuilding & Development

ISSN 1542-3166

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The frontier-caste ideology, according to Hultin (1995:36), ‘is an ideology based on the

ethnocentric self-perception of a core group which considers itself surrounded by large tracts

of land that are politically and physically open to exploitation and inhabited by people who

are “inferior” in that they belong to an “other” (i.e. different and thus lower) social order’.

This allows for a claim, to be substantiated in

this article, that the ruling elite sees the whole

landscape of Sudan as a ‘wasteland’ whose

inhabitants do not value it. This land therefore

is available for development and it is the elite

who should develop it; they perceive

themselves as modernisers, a superior breed

who should not be bound by any land tenure

limits in the pursuit of their ‘development’

mission. This perception of the ruling elite, providing the lens through which the landscape

and the rights of its inhabitants are seen, is largely responsible for the resource conflicts which

have haunted the Sudan for decades. Understanding how the frontier-caste ideology evolved

and how it caused and complicated resource conflicts is crucial for any conflict transition and

peacebuilding to take place in the Sudan.

This article is divided into three sections. The first presents an ethnic and ecological map

of the Sudan and describes how a disturbance in the balance of powers in this map has led

to the evolution of a frontier-caste ideology. It then traces the resource conflicts and their

recent culmination in the state’s ethnic/religious war against communities of the savannah

belt as the extreme expression of the frontier-caste ideology. The third section identifies

structural changes taking place in the Sudan which are deconstructing the frontier-caste

ideology and creating opportunities for a sustainable peace. Means for tapping these

opportunities for transforming conflict and achieving a sound and sustainable peace in

the Sudan are suggested.

The Evolution of a Frontier-caste Ideology

The changing conditions of ecological zones in combination with the ethnic and cultural

differences among the groups living in these zones influenced the scale and intensity of

conflicts in the Sudan. Indeed, ethnic distribution follows rainfall distribution: the ecological

zones, as described by Suliman (2000:113), vary from the southernmost to the northernmost

parts of the country. Thus the forested parts of the far south are inhabited by people of

African origin who neither speak Arabic nor espouse Islam; in the northernmost part are

groups of Arab origin who speak Arabic only and adhere to Islam. In between these two

extremes are a mosaic of cultures and an ethnic mix combining characteristics of both

cultures and ethnicities. The distance from each of these extremes defines the degree of its

influence on this mix. The longitudinal effect of thin resources in the north and relative

abundance farther south has determined the fortunes of the different population groups

(Goldsmith et al 2002:189).

In Sudan’s recent history, beginning with the Turkish invasion and colonisation (1820-

1885), the institutions that kept ethnic groups largely within the boundaries of their own

ecological zones and maintained the balance of powers were frequently disrupted. Under

the Turkish colonisation, the groups which became politically powerful were the inhabitants

of the resource-poor zones, while those inhabiting the resource-rich zones became

increasingly marginalised. The carving out of modern Sudan has brought large expanses

under centralised rule, which probably for the first time in history brought the whole of

Understanding how the frontier-casteideology evolved and how it caused andcomplicated resource conflicts is crucial forany conflict transition and peacebuilding totake place in the Sudan.

Ruling Elite, Frontier-caste Ideology and Resource Conflicts in the Sudan

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the northern, resource-poor zones in potential confrontation with the resource-rich zones

to the south. The inhabitants, considered rich in their own ways, historically relied on the

ecological zones to provide for their needs. During this ‘modernisation’ the ecological

zones were reclassified as ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ in accordance with the Turks’ need for human

(enslaved) and natural resources. This reclassification created a drive to conquer new ‘rich’

niches by an alliance between the land-hungry groups from the Nile Valley, nomadic tribes

from the resource-poor regions, and the state. The southernmost regions gradually became

important not only for their ‘resources’ but also for a ‘civilising mission’ viewed through

the lens of frontier-caste ideology. Nomadic tribes were used to spearhead the adventure.

Whether under the Turks, the British or the national elite, the Sudanese state has always

allied with, or used, Arab peoples – escapees and immigrants who took refuge in southern

and western Sudan to avoid the invaders and/or nomadic tribes – for its territorial expansion

and for subduing the opposition (Ibrahim & Ogot 1990:371-3; Harir 1993:25). The tendency

has become more apparent since independence. The ruling elite, espousing Arabism as

ideology, established its hegemony by manipulating ethnic and religious differences and

used the nomadic Arab tribes as important links in the chain of establishing its hegemony

and controlling resources. Worth noting here is that this Arabist elitist group includes

non-Arabs and uses the ideology to mobilise marginalised Arab communities for its

wholesale looting of the resources of both Arab and non-Arab communities. Pursuing the

same logic, the elite ultimately used religion to mobilise Muslim Sudanese – of whom the

Arab Sudanese make the core group – against non-Muslim Sudanese.

Dominance of the Nile Valley

A regional centre of power under the Turks, the Nile Valley had since the 1820s become

the seat of the ruling elite, instigating political dominance over other regions in the Sudan,

which it maintained by concentrating economic development in its domain and by

spreading and maintaining cultural

hegemony over the other regions. It has

been argued that until the beginning of the

19th century, the Nile Valley was forced to

share political dominance with Darfur (Beck

1998:259). The dominance of the Nile Valley

established a frontier-caste ideology which

rendered the other regions open frontiers

for aggressive resource capture, leading to

the ecological marginalisation of the

inhabitants. The ruling elite of the Nile

Valley has thus become the custodian of all

the resources of other communities in other

regions. This ideology has been structurally linked to state regulations governing the

accessibility to resources, especially under British colonial administration.

In 1899, the British passed the Titles of Land Ordinance, set up a commission for land

settlement and acted against land-hungry speculators. In 1905, another proclamation

brought the transfer of land under more rigorous control. These regulations were often

referred to as ‘land reforms’ (Awad 1987; Adam 1987). The impact of the land reform

measures, embracing land settlement, registration, acquisition and disposal, and the

codification of the rights and duties of the Sudanese population, differed from one part of

the country to another (Adam 1987:23). Whether the land is cultivated defines its tenure;

therefore, ‘in the Northern and Khartoum Provinces the cultivated land was recognised as

privately owned and appropriate titles were issued. Here, the only land which became

A regional centre of power under the Turks,the Nile Valley had since the 1820s becomethe seat of the ruling elite, instigating politicaldominance over other regions in the Sudan,which it maintained by concentratingeconomic development in its domain and byspreading and maintaining cultural hegemonyover the other regions.

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public domain was land lying too high or too far from the river to be commanded by the

sagia’, or water wheel (Adam 1987:23). The remaining unregistered land throughout the

country was considered ‘communal’ (in actuality state-owned) land, meaning that its

historical owners retained only usufruct communal rights. There is little doubt that ‘it was

the British who intervened to construct and maintain a new system of communal tenure’

(Kevane & Stiansen 1998:44). The tenure

regulations introduced by the British

effectively protected land rights in certain

zones, namely the Nile Valley, and left the

rest of the country to be used as an open

frontier for future speculators. The value of

land is judged by its connection to the Nile

River, specifically its cultivated banks, and

not by virtue of the livelihoods of the

communities who depend on it. On the one

hand, land that was truly useless for farming, i.e. land that could not be commanded by

the sagia, was not considered worthy of designation as private property. By contrast, those

lands useful for farmers and pastoralists in the expansive rainbelt areas, including upstream

banks of the Nile, did not qualify for private ownership. It can be argued that the British

administration subjected resources in the Sudan to an inequitable split tenure system which

represents the root cause of ‘resource capture’ and the problems of ecological

marginalisation that have occurred since. In this manner, the British reinstituted the notion

of the ‘open frontier’ either by designating the land as ‘communal’ or obstructing the normal

evolution of accessibility and ownership of resources outside the Nile Valley.

There were reasons for this discrimination. The colonial administration paid great attention

to increasing agricultural production in order to increase revenue. The way to fulfill the twin

objectives of revitalising agriculture and rehabilitating the farming community, according to

Awad (1987:48), ‘was to follow a land policy which would induce the maximum number of

people to settle down to cultivate the land with confidence. Hence the need to protect the

freeholders from expropriation by foreign capitalists (and the tenants from exploitation by

native landlords)’. Also, by refraining from registering the ‘superabundant’ land in the rainbelt

areas, ‘the policy of the colonial government aiming at the encouragement of capitalist farming

was realised through the disposal of government land, free from encumbrances, to private

tractor owners on a leased basis’ (Adam 1987:24). This protection of the freeholders’ land, in

contrast to leaving the communal land as an ‘open frontier’ for expansion, would define the

technologies of enrichment and impoverishment and access to economic and political power

in the Sudan. This was the beginning of the process that would result in the creation of a new

riverine elite in the Sudan (Tvedt 1993:185), an elite which would be part of the power bloc of

the British throughout their rule and which would inherit power from them. This appreciation

of farming operated as a sub-ideology, which disguised non-farming activities even when

they offered greater advantages. This sub-ideology would continue to define post-

independence land issues and largely determined the relationship between the Nile Valley

and the plains to the west and east of it.

Whereas land reforms had been part of the agenda of liberation movements in Africa, the

Sudanese elite which led the independence movement did not bother itself with reconsidering

the British ‘land reforms’. According to Awad (1987:31), ‘the pattern of land ownership in the

Sudan has hardly changed during the last fifty years or so, and it seems that very few people

regret the fact that this is the case’. Thus, from the time when the British ‘land reforms’ went

into effect up until today, the state practically owned almost all the land in the country. Save

for 6 million feddans that are privately owned, the total area of the Sudan of 596.6 million

It can be argued that the Britishadministration subjected resources in theSudan to an inequitable split tenure systemwhich represents the root cause of ‘resourcecapture’ and the problems of ecologicalmarginalisation that have occurred since.


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feddans is owned by the state, leaving tribal or village communities with mere usufruct rights

(Awad 1987:39) over what had been their ancestral lands.

After independence, state ownership of land was further reinforced through the practice

of allocating it to private investors and through the violence exerted by the state against

those who resisted the practice. Land tenure reforms in this respect helped to build the

power bloc of 20th-century Sudan. It reopened the southern frontier, ‘the savannah belt’,

in a decisive manner to the land-hungry riverine elite. With the colonial and post-colonial

administrations’ encouragement and facilitation of modern irrigated farming, the irrigated

farming group accumulated capital and was the first to invest further in irrigated agriculture

as well as in more lucrative mechanised farming in rain-fed areas. According to O’Brien

(1985:24), pump-irrigated agriculture served as the basis of initial capital accumulation in

Sudanese agriculture during the colonial period. This has given rise to a powerful

agricultural lobby that would use every possible manoeuvre to achieve its goals, driven

by an ideological belief in the righteousness of its limitless use of the resources of Sudan’s

landscape. Lands of traditional farmers and pastoralists have become the prey of this lobby,

pursuing its aggressive private mechanised farming enterprise.

The private sector became involved in mechanised farming in 1953 due to a shortage of

public finance (Mohamed Salih 1987:111) and the power that the lobby of riverine

agricultural capitalists had by now acquired. Abdelkarim (1992:23) observes that this

development pulled the state in two directions: first, to realise its ‘ownership’ of parts of

land (which were at that time only its property on paper) by expropriating them from

their original ‘users’ (in the government’s thinking) or ‘owners’ (in the people’s thinking);

second, to lease the land to capitalist producers. The lobby not only prevailed and expanded

its sphere aggressively; in fact, it used the state’s money for its own purposes: its ‘capital-

intensive commercial farming sector…owes its existence and profitability to state

intervention and subsidies’ (Ahmed 1993:118).

The agricultural lobby therefore had everything it needed to make its mechanised farming

enterprise expand. The area captured for mechanised farming expanded from 126,000 hectares

at the inception of the mechanised farming adventure in 1944 (Abdelkarim 1992:61) to 16

million hectares by 1989, and was doubled through the 1991 Investment Act (Suliman 2000:131-

3). The persistent and aggressive resource capture (and the ecological marginalisation it has

caused) transformed symbiotic relations among tribes. Since the 1980s, conflict rather than

cooperation has come to dominate most relations between settled and nomadic communities

as herds have been increasingly barred from agricultural fields (O’Brien 1985:27).

Resource Conflicts: From Micro to Macro Coalitions

Conflicts in the Sudan caused by resource capture and consequent ecological

marginalisation can be classified as those that stem directly from resource capture and

those indirectly attributable to such capture, including its long-run side-effects. The first

type relates to the expansion of mechanised farming and generates conflict in three areas:

between traditional farmers and the owners of large agricultural schemes; among

communities in the vicinity of large agricultural schemes, resulting from the contraction

in the size of cultivable land, obstruction of herds’ passage and the search for new pasture

areas; and between the state as protector of the large agricultural schemes’ owners on the

one hand and smallholder farmers and pastoralists on the other (Suliman 2000:138-9).

Being linked to the expansion of mechanised farming, all three areas of conflict emerged

largely in the 1970s and mostly took place in the fertile clay soil wetlands. Despite being

low-intensity conflicts, their appearance increased in frequency (Suliman 2000:139).

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The other type of conflicts, those caused indirectly by resource capture, occur among local

communities and are often triggered by droughts. These conflicts were observed mainly

in the sandy dryland zones with fragile soils, such as in the northern parts of Kordofan

and Darfur regions. They seem to have originated and evolved over a lengthy period as

the regional environments were overwhelmed by migrants and other displaced groups

whose resources were being captured for large-scale irrigated agriculture between the

1920s and the 1980s or by their own population groups who were blocked by direct resource

capture elsewhere. The latter were left with little choice but to cultivate cash crops in

expansive lands, and little space was therefore left for pastoralism.

Sudan’s local (micro-level) conflicts caused directly or indirectly by resource capture and

ecological marginalisation have since the early 1980s expanded on a regional scale and

increased in intensity, involving armed

alliances of tribal groups and leaning

towards racial ideologies. This development

represents a shift from localised conflicts

that in the past took place largely within

ecological zones – involving clans or

neighbouring tribes of a locality or a small

section of an ecological zone – to conflicts

between ecological zones. The long processes

of resource capture and ecological

marginalisation had thus brought to the

political scene meso and macro coalitions of tribes with the aim of conquering new niches

in other ecological zones.

Conflict between ecological zones was particularly exacerbated by recurrent droughts,

especially since early 1980s, when both the agricultural lobby and the ecologically

marginalised pastoralist groups from the resource-poor regions acted in harmony against

groups in the wetter zones to the south. While the agribusiness group was speculating for

greater fortunes from the grain dearth, the drought-stricken nomadic tribes were looking

for pasturelands in the south. The impact of these southward movements reached even

farther south, leading to hostilities between the Dinka of Bahr al-Ghazal and the Arabs

and Fellata who had invaded their homeland (Majak 2000:46).

The increasing competition over resources, resulting from the almost permanent

settlement of immigrant communities in the lands of those who hosted them, which started

since the early 1980s, has created seemingly insurmountable obstacles (Suliman 2000:127).

In my view, this development has brought the competing nomadic tribes together to

build meso-coalitions for conquering new habitats that might be defended fiercely by

their inhabitants.

Jihad as Justification for Resource Capture

The expansion of mechanised farming and the staunch resistance to it in the last two decades

has led to a shift in the state’s approach. At the height of their assault on local farmers’ resources

the agribusiness and nomadic groups have come to adopt new religious roles, which further

justify their claim of local farmers’ resources. Thus, while the nomadic groups were made (by

the state and agribusiness) to form the core of the mujahideen militias, the agribusiness group

played the role of supplying them with fatwas (religious rulings) justifying the mass murder

of their fellow poor farmers. The adoption of sharia (Islamic law) under President Nimeiri’s

dictatorship between 1983 and 1985 and under the totalitarianism of the National Islamic

Sudan’s local (micro-level) conflicts causeddirectly or indirectly by resource captureand ecological marginalisation have sincethe early 1980s expanded on a regional scaleand increased in intensity, involving armedalliances of tribal groups and leaningtowards racial ideologies.


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Front from 1989 to 2005, especially with its jihad (or holy war) component, arguably

represented the highest expression of frontier-caste ideology. Macro coalitions began at this

point, and widened and intensified the resource conflicts.

The implementation of sharia in September 1983 provided the ruling elite with a fresh

justification for capturing more resources, especially through jihad campaigns against the

rebels (or ‘infidels’) of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) who had launched a

second civil war in May that year. Since then sharia has been used as a tool of control and

suppression and, through jihad campaigns, it turned into a more overt expression of the

frontier-cast ideology. This is because the Islamic state requires that the faith be defended

and spread in the lands of the ‘infidels’. In the battleground of southern Sudan, the mujahideen

could justififiably loot southern communities’ resources for material rewards and a guaranteed

paradise when they fell as martyrs in carrying out aggressive jihad campaigns.

The second civil war witnessed a massive assault in the south by the Sudanese agribusiness

groups to capture cattle and other resources (Suliman 2000:142). This was for military

and economic reasons, notably the southward expansion of mechanised farming,

necessitated by the ecological degradation in the north; the discovery of oil in the current

Unity State in Southern Sudan; the possibility of channelling more irrigation water to

north Sudan from the expansive swamps in the south through the newly built Jonglei

Canal; and the potential exploitation of the swamps for mechanised farming after they

had been drained by the canal (Suliman 2000:142).

Capturing the resources of the southern Sudanese as well as of other communities in the

rainbelt took the form of a total religious war and led to the destruction of whole communities

of the savannah belt, particularly after the 1989 military coup backed by the National Islamic

Front (NIF). Communities which had undergone long-term ecological marginalisation, such

as the people of the Nuba Mountains and the Angessana of the south Blue Nile, created a

macro-coalition by joining the SPLM under the leadership of the late John Garang. In this

way, marginalised groups could counter-balance the macro coalition of the ruling elite, calling

for a restructuring of power relations and aspiring for a ‘New Sudan’.

The determination of marginalised communities to resist the state’s macro-coalition

involving the state itself is a measure of the enormity of the looting of their resources. A

striking manifestation of how the ‘frontier-cast ideology’ operates is the capture by the

agribusiness groups of almost entire areas of community land in some localities in the

Nuba Mountains such as Habila, where:

…rich agricultural lands were divided into two hundred schemes. Four were

leased to local cooperatives, one was leased to a consortium of local

merchants, and four individually to local merchants. The remaining 191 were

leased to absentee landlords, mainly merchants, government officials and

retired army officers from the north. Smallholdings were destroyed to the

extent that the inhabitants for the first time in their history faced famine (Al-

Karsani 2000:44).

Over 95% of primary land within this locality went to outsiders. The little that was left to

the local cooperatives was also shared unequally. Suliman (2000:219) notes that one such

cooperative, the Nuba Mountains Development Corporation established in 1970 to

increase the productivity of traditional Nuba agriculture, allocated only 37% of its land

and services to Nuba groups, while 45% went to Arab tribes and 19% to Fellata groups.

The Nuba community, historical owners of the lands, were left with about only 1% of

their previous lands. The Nuba took up arms, joining the SPLM, while the government

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courted their historical co-habitants, the Arab Baggara tribes, equipping them with arms

and promising them fertile Nuba lands after a swift victory (Suliman 2000:203). This

local conflict in the Nuba Mountains also became an ethnic and religious battleground

between the Africanist, Christian and animist ideologies of the SPLM and the Arabist

Islamism of the government (Ibrahim 2002:161). Further, the jihad campaigns targeted

Muslims and non-Muslims alike (Beswick and Spaulding 2000:xvii).

The new Holy Terror differed from anything the Sudan had seen before. Newly created

‘Popular Defence Forces,’ often called militia or murahilin, were enjoined to wage a total war

against anyone who was not an Arab Muslim. They were given complete freedom to kill,

rape, loot, and enslave such people, and above all to expel them from their territories so that

these lands might be colonised by Arab Muslim settlers from the north (Majak 2000:49).

According to Duany & Duany ( 2000:178), ‘The idea of creating a monolithic Arab and

Islamic society governed by the historical sharia law implies ethnic cleansing – the

extinction of the diverse cultures and different ways of life of the numerous non-Arab

communities’. Religious fundamentalism has given way to overt racism exercised by the

ruling Islamist elite.

Prospects for Transforming Resource Conflicts in the Sudan

There are three structural changes which can be identified as deconstructing the frontier-

caste ideology and may therefore pave the way for a new regime of resource distribution

that would contribute to the building of a sustainable peace in the Sudan. The first is the

increased settlement of nomadic communities leading to a decline of the nomadic mode

of production and in the influence of nomadism – the vanguard of the state’s territorial

expansion and subduing of dissident groups. This increased settlement may be understood

as stemming from the very conditions that were created by the ‘frontier-caste ideology’,

notably the diminution of pasturelands and environmental deterioration. Nomadic groups

are increasingly settling in cities and villages, sometimes as whole tribes. The arid and

semi-arid regions that have larger nomadic populations, namely Eastern, Kordofan and

Darfur, are likely to witness higher rates of urbanisation. In fact, Sudan’s nomadic

population fell dramatically from 2.1 million in 1983 to 0.7 million in 1993 (CBS 2000).

The wars in which nomadic tribes have participated in macro-coalitions with the state

have reduced the size of groups which had historically depended on nomadic livelihood

systems in several parts of the Sudan. Groups

are quitting the pastoral sector altogether,

primarily because of the grave insecurity the

wars have created. With the decrease in

influence of nomadism, the political capital

for an ethnic/religious state in the Sudan,

primarily in its wars against citizens of its peripheral regions, has probably come to an

end as the ruling elite finds it increasingly difficult to appeal to conservative group identities.

The second structural change is the discrediting of the universalistic ethos due to the fact

that the elite had ideologically antagonised the groups which had sustained its political

hegemony. The indiscriminate war waged by the elite and the state against Muslim African

Sudanese had lumped them in with the demonised non-Muslim African Sudanese. Even

some Arab Sudanese, the core group which had helped to maintain the elite’s hegemony,

now perceive the ruling elite as mere resource looters and have increasingly aligned

themselves with their African Sudanese compatriots in armed struggle against the Islamists.

Groups are quitting the pastoral sectoraltogether, primarily because of the graveinsecurity the wars have created.


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As the universalistic ethos of the elite is being discredited and environmental degradation

and civil wars bring mass displacements of people, the population map at the heart of the

political system has dramatically shifted. Khartoum has witnessed a dramatic change in

its ethnic diversity, with the city rapidly taking on an African identity rather than its

previous Arab character, and is more ethnically and culturally diverse than ever before

(Mohammed 2001:20-1). Importantly, this new diversity at the heart of the political system

may bring about a new rationale – a balance of demographic weights – that challenges the

majoritarian ethnicist ideology of the ruling elite.

The third structural change is manifest in the emergence of political movements and a confident

leadership among marginalised groups advocating a robust socio-political programme for a

modern state. While this leadership is active in defining agendas and setting out its terms, it

is also paying greater attention to addressing almost every aspect of peoples’ lives. This can

be seen in the minute detail of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which the SPLM

has signed with the Islamist government. The

most important political success of the CPA is

that it has practically and effectively

discredited the racist, religious propaganda of

the NIF in wider regions in southern and

central Sudan, while bringing dignity and

freedom of expression to northern Sudanese.

Armed movements in Darfur have taken a

similar line, which may bring similar results.

The power- and wealth-sharing deals which

the SPLM (GOS/SPLM 2004) and recently the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) of Darfur

signed with the government have effectively decreased the power of the ruling Islamist elite.

The following policy and strategy recommendations arise from these structural changes:

First, given that conflicts between micro and meso coalitions had primarily stemmed from

land capture by the state and state-backed groups, it is crucial that land reforms are carried

out if sustainable peace is to be actualised. The reforms should recognise in specific terms

the historical rights of communities to own their lands and subterranean natural resources.

It essentially should legalise the customary tenure rights to land, including the restitution

of lands looted by state-backed groups. It worth noting that the CPA did not address the

ownership of land and subterranean natural resources; however, the parties agreed to

institute a process ‘to progressively develop and amend the relevant laws to incorporate

customary laws and practices, local heritage and international trends and practices’ (GOS/

SPLM 2004). While this should apply to all regions where resource looting prevailed for

decades, the need for reforms that specifically recognise the rights to ownership of land

and other resources throughout Sudan remains paramount.

Second, equitable development and political participation are crucial to lessening conflicts

over resources and similarly represent practical ways of deconstructing the ‘frontier-caste

ideology’. Unequal development resulting from the biased allocation of central government

development funds or grants essentially stems from overlooking the potential of specific

sectors, particularly the pastoralist sector in the western regions which were trapped in chronic

conflicts. According to Shepherd and El Neima (1981:14), ‘there are natural resources outside

the central growth area which have not been developed because the political impetus was

repressed’. The building of the power bloc of the farmers’ community resulted in the exclusion

of pastoralists, and the leadership of marginalised communities could potentially reverse

this situation, especially through negotiated wealth sharing agreements.

The most important political success of theCPA is that it has practically and effectivelydiscredited the racist, religious propagandaof the NIF in wider regions in southern andcentral Sudan, while bringing dignity andfreedom of expression to northern Sudanese.

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Third, there is a need to effect a genuine decentralisation which would be a crucial framework

for any effective economic development and political participation. Being at the lowest tier of

the administrative system, indigenous institutions may be more efficient in resolving resource

conflicts and deciding accessibility and recognising the carrying capacity of each locality. It is

at the localised level that consultation for land reforms should take place.

Fourth, the central government needs to adopt and implement a short- to medium-term

policy to demobilise and disarm tribal militias and strictly ban their access to small arms.

There is also a need to design a conscious strategy for establishing harmony between the

mobility needs of nomadic communities and

the farm safety needs of settled communities.

As important is the need to deconstruct the

tribal war epics through civic education and

civic engagement, a role entailing the

involvement and strengthening of civil society

organisations (CSOs). At the national level,

CSOs should push for a strategy that reduces

nomadic tribes’ vulnerability to sinister

mobilisation by speculators. The strategy

suggested here is one of rural development

through small-scale supplemental irrigation with the primary purpose of rehabilitating the

localised ecosystem and encouraging the nomadic communities to irrigate farms for producing

fodder for their herds. Small-scale supplemental irrigation leading to increased output of

staple food crops and fodder for animals may help to achieve a greater degree of settlement

of nomadic tribes or at least reduce the mobility of herds and therefore the potential conflicts

associated with passage. It may also help to achieve a degree of afforestation, especially

through the planting of fodder trees, thereby helping to prevent environmental degradation.

To rehabilitate the localised ecosystems and resettle nomadic communities, the rural water

supply must be developed by increasing the number of water stations in order to decrease

herd concentration. Fifth, an equitable policy for allocating government grants for rural

development should be adopted, with a clear commitment to transforming the conflict in

unstable regions. Given that war is much more costly than regional development, the

policy should address first and foremost the degree of ethnic polarisation and the impact

of civil war, tribal feuds, and armed banditry in the region. It should also consider whether

the dominant economic sector is pastoralism, the extent of spatial mobility of communities

in the region, and the degree of environmental degradation. These considerations must be

given priority over existing development criteria which favoured the richer regions and

disadvantaged regions with larger herds (Fadlalla 1986:221-25).

Finally, complementary to the above is the need for a social conscientisation of the farmers

and pastoralists in rural communities, local authorities, and national policy makers on

environmental issues and alternative ways of dealing with emerging resource conflicts. This

implies the use of media to disseminate knowledge about resource use and resource-based

conflicts and alternative ways of overcoming such conflicts. It necessitates the development

of a national curriculum for environmental education, which should essentially deconstruct

the prevailing concept of the ‘open frontier’, bring on board the issues of indigenous resource

management, and reinvent localised institutions for conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Despite the grim situation in the Sudan, there is room for optimism that resource conflicts

can be overcome. The emergence of political groupings in ecologically marginalised

communities, particularly those concerned with defining the rights to resources at the

Small-scale supplemental irrigation leadingto increased output of staple food crops andfodder for animals may help to achieve agreater degree of settlement of nomadictribes or at least reduce the mobility of herdsand therefore the potential conflictsassociated with passage.


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local level and an equitable share in power and wealth at the national level, may help

bring a grassroots component into resource definition and planning and lead to

reconciliation at the local and national levels.

Establishing adequate channels for interaction between nomadic and settled communities

and building modern state institutions which protect local communities against state

oppression and resource predation would contribute significantly to bringing Sudan’s

chronic conflicts to an end. Building a lasting peace in the Sudan requires the continuing

deconstruction of the frontier-caste ideology, targeting components that may remain in

the collective psyche among groups and decision makers and therefore eliminating

potential causes of future conflicts.

MAHMOUD EL ZAIN is an assistant professor at the Department of Environment, Peace

and Security, University for Peace in Costa Rica. He is presently working on a PhD thesis,

‘Environmental Scarcity, Hydropolitics, and the Nile: The Pivotal Position of the Sudan’.

Endnotes

1 This area is equal to: 6228000 acres (1 feddan = 1.038 acres = 0.42 hectares).

2 I use the terms ‘meso-coalition’ to refers to relatively larger coalitions comprising tribes of a whole

or a larger section of an ecological zone; while I use ‘macro-coalition’ to refer to the alliance between

coalitions of tribes and the state and state-backed agribusiness groups where the state and the groups

it backs use ethnic/religious discourse to mobilise the tribes.

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