rosemiller, political power beyond the state (1992)

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Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of GovernmentAuthor(s): Nikolas Rose and Peter MillerSource: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jun., 1992), pp. 173-205Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and PoliticalScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/591464

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Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller

Politicalpowerbeyond the State:problematics

of government

A B S'I'RAC'I'

This paper sets out an approach o the analysisof politicalpower nterms of problematicsof government. It argues against an over-valuationof the 'problemof the State' n politicaldebate and socialtheory.A numberof conceptual ools are suggestedfor the analysisof the many and varied alliances between political and otherauthorities that seek to govern economic activity,social life andindividualconduct. Modernpoliticalrationalities nd governmen-tal technologiesare shownto be intrinsicallyinked o developments

in knowledgeand to the powersof expertise.The characteristics fliberal problematicsof government are investigated, and it isargued that they are dependent upon technologies or 'governingat a distance', eeking to create locales,entitiesand personsable tooperatea regulatedautonomy.The analysis s exemplified hroughan investigation f welfarismas a mode of 'social' overnment.Thepaper concludeswith a brief consideration f neo-liberalismwhichdemonstrates hat the analytical anguagestructuredby the philo-sophical opposition of state and civil society is unable to compre-

hend contemporary transformations n modes of exercise ofpoliticalpower.

The state,wrote Nietzsche, s

the coldest of all cold monsters . . (it) lies in all languagesof goodand evil; and whatever ts says, it lies- and whatever t has, it hasstolen . . only there,wherethe stateceases,does the man who is not

superfluousbegin . . .1As post-war welfare tates' n the Westand centralised party tates' nthe East have come under challenge, contemporarypoliticaldebatehas become suffused by imagesof the state as malignand potentiallymonstrous.Only 'beyond the State', t appears, can a life worthy offree human individualsbegin. Criticising he excesses, inefficiencies

BJS Volumeno. 43 IMueno. 2 June 1992



174 NikolasRoseand PeterMiller

and injusticesof the extended State, alternativeshave been posed intermsof the construction f a 'free market' nd a 'civil ociety' n whicha pluralityof groups,organizations nd individuals nteract n liberty.This concernhasbeen paralleled n social heory,whereanalystshavechallenged liberal pluralist and economic determinist theories ofpower, and argued that the specific form of the state is of crucialimpc)rtance, ot only in understanding eo-political elations,but alsoin comprehendingmodern forms of exerciseof power over national

9

terrltorles.6

But the politicalvocabulary tructuredby oppositionsbetweenstateand civilsociety,publicand private,governmentand market, oercionand consent, sovereignty and autonomy and the like, does notadequately haracterise he diverseways n which rule is exercised nadvanced liberal democracies. Political power is exercised todaythrough a profusionof shifting alliancesbetweendiverse authoritiesin projects o govern a multitudeof facetsof economicactivity, ociallife and individual onduct.Power s not so mucha matterof imposingconstraints pon citizensas of 'makingup'citizens apableof bearingakindof regulated reedom. Personalautonomy s not the antithesisofpoliticalpower,buta keyterm n itsexercise, he more so becausemost

individualsare not merely the subjectsof power but play a part in itsoperations.

In this paper we propose some ways of analyzing these mobilemechanisms f contemporarypoliticalpower.Our analysis e-locates'the State' within an investigationof problematicsf government.t ismore than ten years since Foucaultsuggested that the concepts thatorganized our thinking about power could not comprehend theexerciseof power n modernsocieties.Two centuriesafterthe politicalrevolutions that overthrew the absolutist monarchies of Europe,

Foucaultarguedthat n the fieldof political houghtwe had not yet cutoff the king's head.3 In his remarkson 'governmentality' oucaultsketchesan alternative nalyticof politicalpower.4The term govern-mentalitysought to draw attentionto a certain way of thinking andactingembodied n all those attempts o knowand govern the wealth,health and happinessof populations.Foucaultargued that, since theeighteenthcentury,this wayof reflectingupon power and seeking torender it operable had achieved pre-eminenceover other forms ofpoliticalpower. It was linked to the proliferationof a whole range of

apparatuses pertaining to government and a complex body ofknowledges and 'know-how'about government, the means of itsexercise and the nature of those over whom it was to be exercised.From this perspectiveon political power, Foucault suggested, onemight avoidover-valuing he 'problemof the State', eeing it either asa 'monstrefroid' confrontingand dominatingus, or as the essentialand privileged fulfilment of a number of necessary social andeconomic functions. The state possessed neither the unity nor the



Politicalpowerbeyond heState 175

functionalityascribedto it; it was a 'mythicalabstraction'whichhasassumeda particularplacewithinthe field of government. For thepresent, perhaps, what is really important 'is not so much theState-dominationof society, but the governmentalization f theState'.5

These schematicremarksform the startingpoint for the investi-gations of governmentproposed in this paper. We propose someelementsof an'analytic' f problematics f government,andillustratethese through a preliminarynvestigationof'liberalism', welfarism',and 'neo-liberalism'.The mentalitiesand machinationsof govern-ment thatweexploreare not merelytraces,signs,causesor effects of

'real'transformationsn socialrelations.The terraintheyconstitutehas a density and a significanceof its own. Government is thehistorically onstitutedmatrixwithinwhichare articulatedall thosedreams,schemes,strategiesand manoeuvresof authorities hatseekto shape the beliefsand conduct of others in desired directionsbyactingupon their will,theircircumstances r theirenvironment.It is-inrelation o thisgrid of government hatspecifically oliticalormsofrule in the modernWestdefine,delimitandrelatethemselves.

Central to the possibilityof modern forms of government,we

argue, are the associations ormed betweenentities constituted as'political' nd the projects,plans and practicesof thoseauthorities-economic, legal, spiritual,medical, technical - who endeavour toadminister he lives of others in the light of conceptionsof what isgood, healthy,normal,virtuous,efficientor profitable.Knowledge sthus central to these activities of government and to the veryformationof its objects, for government is a domain of cognition,calculation, xperimentation ndevaluation.And,we argue,govern-ment is intrinsicallyinked to the activitiesof expertise,whoserole is

not one of weaving an all-pervasiveweb of 'socialcontrol',but ofenactingassortedattemptsatthecalculatedadministration f diverseaspectsof conductthroughcountless,oftencompeting, ocaltacticsofeducation,persuasion,inducement,management,incitement,mo-tivationandencouragement.6

Problematicsf governmentmaybeanalyzed, irstof all,intermsoftheirpolitical ationalities,he changingdiscursive ieldswithinwhichthe exercise of power is conceptualised, he moral ustifications orparticularwaysof exercisingpowerby diverseauthorities,notions of

the appropriate orms,objectsand limitsof politics,andconceptionsof the proper distributionof such tasks among secular,spiritual,militaryandfamilial ectors.But, wesuggest,problematics f govern-ment should alsobe analyzed n terms of theirgovernmentalechnolo-gies,the complex of mundaneprogrammes, alculations,echniques,apparatuses,documents and proceduresthroughwhichauthoritiesseek to embodyandgive effect to governmentalambitions.Throughan analysis of the intricate inter-dependenciesbetween political



176 NikolasRoseanclPeterMiller

rationalities nd governmental echnologies,we can beginto under-stand the multipleand delicatenetworksthat connect the lives of

individuals, roupsandorganizationso theaspirations f authoritiesin theadvanced iberaldemocracies f thepresent.

1 GOVERNMEN VERSUS I HE S l A IE

Many have recognized that the philosophicaland constitutionalimagesof the sovereignstateare misleading.To the extent that themodernstate rules', tdoesso on the basisof anelaboratenetworkof

relationsformedamongstthe complexof institutions,organizationsand apparatuses hat make it up, and betweenstate and non-stateinstitutions.7ociologicalhistoriesof stateformationhaveshownthat,in Europefor manycenturies,economicactivitywasregulated,orderwasmaintained,awspromulgatedandenforced,assistanceprovidedforthe sickandneedy,moralitynculcated,f atall,throughpracticesthathadlittletodowiththestate.Itwasonlyintheeighteenthcenturythatstatesbeganto be transformed rom limitedand circumscribedcentral apparatusesto embed themselveswithin an ensemble of

institutions ndproceduresof ruleovera national erritory.8Historical ociologistshavedrawnourattention odiversemechan-

ismsof stateformation: he impositionof a national anguageand alevelof literacy;a commoncoinage,the fusing of a territory nto asingle time-space system through innovations in transportation,communication nd temporality, he unificationof legal codes andauthorities.9Key practicesof rule were institutionalizedwithin acentral,moreor lesspermanentbodyof officesandagencies,givenacertainmore or less explicitconstitutional orm, endowedwith the

capacityoraisefundsintheformof taxes,andbackedwiththevirtualmonopolyof the legitimateuseof forceovera definedterritory.Thiscoincidence f a definedterritoryof ruleanda projectandapparatusforadministeringhe livesandactivities f thosewithin hatterritory,itis suggested,warrantsus to speakof the modernnation-stateas acentralised et of institutionsand personnelwieldingauthoritativepowerovera nation.l°Further, t hasbeen arguedthatgeo-politicalrelationsand militaryconflictshave provoked and facilitatedthecentralisation f domestic politicalpower in the hands of a state

apparatus.These considerationshave led analysts o treatstatesasunifiedactorswithconsiderableautonomy,rulingdomesticallyandpursuingheirinterestsupontheworldstagebymeansof diplomacyandwarfare.1

We argue that such a perspectiveobscuresthe characteristics fmodernormsof politicalpower.Within he problematics f govern-ment,one can be nominalisticabout the state: it has no essentialnecessityrfunctionality.Rather, hestatecanbeseenasaspecificway



PoliticalpowereyondheState 177

in which the problemof government sdiscursively odified,a wayofdividing a 'political phere',with its particular haracteristics f rule,

from other 'non-political pheres' to which it mustbe related, and away in whichcertaintechnologiesof governmentaregiven a tempo-rary institutionaldurability and brought into particular kinds ofrelationswith one another. Posed fromthisperspective, he questionis no longerone of accounting or government n termsof 'thepowerof the State',but of ascertaininghow,and to whatextent, the stateisarticulatednto the activityof government:whatrelationsare estab-lished between politicaland other authorities;what funds, forces,persons,knowledgeor legitimacyare utilised;and bymeans of what

devicesandtechniquesarethesedifferent tacticsmade operable.Three differencesbetweenour approachand the new sociologyof

state formation are relevant here. The first concerns 'realism'.Historical ociologiesof the statearerealist n the sense that theyseektocharacterise he actualconfigurations f persons,organizations ndevents at particularhistoricalperiods,to classifythe force relationsthat obtain between them, to identify determinants and explaintransformations.Our studies of government eschew sociologicalrealismandits burdensof explanationand causation.We do not tryto

characterisehow social life reallywas and why. We do not seek topenetrate the surfaces of what people said to discover what theymeant, what their realmotivesor interestswere.Rather,we attendtothe ways n whichauthorities n the pasthave posedthemselves hesequestions:what s ourpower; o whatends should t beexercised;whateffects has it produced;how can we knowwhatweneed to know,anddo whatweneed to do in order togovern?

Second, anguage.Ananalysis f government akesas centralnotsomuch amounts of revenue, size of the court, expenditure on arms,

miles marched by an army per day, but the discursivefield withinwhich these problems, ites and formsof visibility redelineatedandaccordedsignificance. t is in this discursive ield that'the State' tselfemergesasan historicallyariableinguisticdeviceforconceptualisingand articulating ways of ruling. The significancewe accord todiscoursedoes not arisefrom a concernwith'ideology'.Language snot merely contemplativeor justificatory, it is performative.Ananalysisof politicaldiscoursehelps us elucidatenot only thesystemsfthought hrough which authorities have posed and specified the

problems or government,but also the systemsfaction hough whichthey havesought to giveeffect to government.

Third, knowledge.Knowledgehere does not simply mean'ideas',but refers to the vast assemblage of persons, theories, projects,experimentsand techniques that has become such a centralcom-ponent of government. Theories from philosophy to medicine.Schemesfrom town planning to socialinsurance.Techniquesfromdouble entry book-keeping to compulsory medical inspection of



NikolasRoseandPeterMiller78

schoolchildren.Knowledgablepersons from generals to architectsand accountants.Our concern,that is to say, is with the 'knowhow'

thathaspromised o makegovernmentpossible.Our analysisappliesas muchto geo-politicalssuesas to thosewithin

any nationalterritory.Inter 'national' elationsare constituted n amilitary-diplomaticomplex, through complex processesthat em-powerparticular gentsand forcesto speakandact in the nameof aterritory.2Theseestablishhe limitsand coherenceof thedomainsofpoliticalauthority,demarcate he geographical ndconceptual pacesof politicalrule, constitutecertainauthoritiesas able to speakfor apopulation,and place them in particular external'configurations

with other 'states'and internalrelationswith events in particularlocales.A 'geo-political' ield is established,embodyingdiplomacy,envoys, treaties,agreements,borders,customsand the like, at thesame time as the writof authorities s claimedover the subjectsand

* . . * .

actlvltles omposlnga natlon.War,asa keyaspectof suchgeo-politicalssues, s itselfdependent

upon certainpracticesof government: he elaborationof notionsofnational sovereigntyover a territoryunified by practicessuch aslanguageor law;the developmentof administrativemachineriesof

various types; and techniques for constitutingpersons as owingallegiance o a particularocusof identityand authority.Warfareandcolonialism, s theexerciseof rule fromacentreover distantpersons,placesand goods, involveassemblingsubjects nto militaryforces,disciplininghem,inculcating killsand solidarities,producing,distri-butingand maintaining quipmentand materialas wellas inventingthe intellectualtechnologies required for strategyand planning.Warfare,that is to say, requiresand inspiresthe inventionof newpractices f government: ngeo-political elations oo,we suggest,the

state should first of all be understood as a complex and mobileresultantof thediscoursesandtechniquesof rule.

2 POLI'I'ICALRA'I'IONALI'I'IES ND'I'HE ANALYSISOF LIBERALISM

In the remainderof the paper we elaborateand illustratesomeconceptual oolsfor ananalysis f modernformsof government.3 Let

us begin by considering in more detail the notion of politicalrationality.Politicaldiscourseis a domain for the formulationandjustification f idealised chemataorrepresenting eality,analyzingtand rectifyingit. Whilstit does not have the systematicand closedcharacterof disciplinedbodiesof theoreticaldiscourse t is, nonethe-less,possible odiscernregularitieshat wetermpoliticalrationalities.First,politicalrationalitieshavea characteristicallyoral form.Theyelaborateupon the fitting powers and duties for authorities.They



179oliticalpowerbeyond heState

addressthe proper distribution f tasksand actionsbetweenauthori-ties of different types - political, spiritual, military, pedagogic,

familial.They consider the ideals or principles o which governmentshould be directed freedom, ustice, equality,mutualresponsibility,citizenship,common sense, economic efficiency,prosperity,growth,fairness,rationality nd the like.

Second, political ationalities ave whatone might term an epistemo-logical haracter.That is to say,they are articulated n relation o someconceptionof the natureof the objectsgoverned society, he nation,the population, the economy. In particular, they embody someaccountof the personsover whom government s to be exercised.As

Paul Veyne has pointed out, these can be specified as membersof aflock to be led, legal subjectswith rights, children to be educated, aresource o be exploited,elementsof a population o be managed.4

Third, political rationalitiesare articulated n a distinctive diom.The language that constitutespoliticaldiscourse s more than rhet-oric.1 It should be seen, rather,as a kind of intellectualmachineryorapparatus for rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it isamenable o politicaldeliberations. t is here that a vocabulary f 'theState'has come to codify and contestthe natureand limitsof political

power. Political rationalities, hat is to say, are morally coloured,grounded upon knowledge,and made thinkable hrough language.We can illustratethese three points if we consider the question of'liberalism'.

Liberalism s usuallycharacterised s a politicalphilosophyby thelimits it places on the legitimate exercise of power by politicalauthorities.Duringthe secondhalf of the eighteenthcentury he term'civil society' ceased to designate a particular ype of well-orderedpoliticalassociation,and came to signify, instead, a naturalrealm of

freedomsand activities utsidethe legitimate phereof politics.6 Thescope of politicalauthoritywas to be limited, and vigilancewas to beexercisedover it. Yet, simultaneously, overnmentwas to take as oneof its obligationsand legitimate asks he fosteringof the self-organiz-ing capacities of civil society. Political rule was given the task ofshaping and nurturing that very civil society that was to provide itscounterweightand limit.

Liberalism, n this respect, marks he moment when the dystopiandream of a totallyadministered ocietywas abandoned,and govern-

ment was confronted with a domain that had its own naturalness, tsown rules and processes, and its own internal forms of self-regulation.l7As Graham Burchell has pointed out, liberalismdis-qualifiesthe exercise of governmentalreason in the form of raisond'etat,n whicha sovereignexercisedhis totalisingwillacrossa nationalspace. Power s confronted,on the one hand, with subjectsequippedwith rights that mustnotbe interdictedby government.On the otherhand, governmentaddressesa realmof processes hat t cannot overn




by the exercise of sovereign will because it lacks the requisiteknowledge and capacities. The objects, instruments and tasks of

governmentmust be reformulatedwith reference to this domain ofcivilsocietywith the aim of promoting ts maximal unctioning.

The constitutionaland legal codificationand delimitationof thepowersof politicalauthoritiesdid not so much 'free' a privaterealmfrom arbitrary nterferencesby power, as constitutecertain realms,such as those of market transactions, he family and the businessundertaking,as 'non-political', efiningtheir form and limits.Liberaldoctrineson the limitsof powerand the freedomof subjectsunder thelaw were thus accompaniedby the working out of a range of new

technologiesof government,not havingthe form of directcontrolbyauthorities, hat sought to administer hese 'private'realms, and toprogrammeand shape them in desireddirections.

This does not mean that liberalismwas an ideology, disguising astate annexationof freedom. The inaugurationof liberalsocieties nEurope accords a vital role to a key characteristicof moderngovernment: ction at a distance.lS Liberalmentalitiesof governmentdo not conceiveof the regulationof conductas dependent only uponpoliticalactions: he impositionof law;the activities f state function-

aries or publicly ontrolledbureaucracies;urveillance nd disciplineby an all seeing police.Liberal overnment dentifiesa domainoutside'politics' and seeks to manage t withoutdestroying ts existenceandits autonomy. This is made possible through the activities andcalculations of a proliferation of independent agents includingphilanthropists, octors,hygienists,managers,planners,parentsandsocialworkers.And it is dependentupon the forgingof alliances.Thistakes place on the one hand between political strategies and theactivities of these authorities and, on the other, between these

authoritiesand free citizens, n attempts o modulateevents,decisionsand actions in the economy, the family, the private firm, and theconductof the individualperson.

The elaboration f liberaldoctrinesof freedom went hand in handwithprojects o make iberalism perableby producing he 'subjective'conditionsunder which ts contractualnotionsof the mutualrelationsbetweencitizenand societycould work.l9Those who could not carrytheircontractual bligationswerenow to appear anti-social', nd to beconfined under a new legitimacy.The scandalous nd bizarrewere to

be placedunder a revisedmedicalmandate, n asylums hat promisedto cure and not merely to incarcerate.Law-breakers nd malefactorswere no longer to have the status of bandits or rebels, but were tobecome transgressorsof norms motivated by defects of characteramenable o understanding nd rectification.

The inventionof the disciplinary nstitutionsof prison and asylumwasaccompaniedby the promulgation f a varietyof programmesbylawyers,doctors, philanthropists nd other experts, who claimed to




know how to directbusinessactivity, amily ife and personalmoralityonto the path of virtue. 'The State' was not the inspirer of theseprogrammesof government, nor was it the necessarybeneficiary.Whatone sees is not a uniformtrend of 'State ntervention' ut ratherthe emergence,at a multitudeof sites in the socialbody,of healthanddisease, of crime and punishment, of poverty and pauperism, ofmadness and family life as problems requiring some measure ofcollectiveresponse,and in relation o whichpoliticalauthoritiesplayavarietyof different roles.20

The domain of politics is thus simultaneouslydistinguished romother spheres of rule, and inextricablybound into them. Political

forces have sought to utilise, nstrumentalise nd mobilize echniquesand agents other than those of 'the State' in order to govern 'at adistance';other authoritieshave sought to govern economic,familialand socialarrangementsaccording o their own programmesand tomobilizepoliticalresources or their own ends.

3 PROGRAMMESOF GOVERNMEN I

Government is a problematizingctivity: t poses the obligations ofrulers in terms of the problemsthey seek to address. The ideals ofgovernmentare intrinsically inked to the problemsaround which itcirculates, he failings t seeksto rectify, he ills t seeksto cure. Indeed,the history of government might well be written as a history ofproblematizations, n which politicians, intellectuals,philosophers,medics, militarymen, feminists and philanthropistshave measuredthe real against the ideal and found it wanting. From the danger ofde-population, he threatsposed by pauperismor the forecastsof the

decline of the race, through the problematization f urban unrest,industrialmilitancy, ailures of productivity, o contemporarycon-cerns with international ompetitiveness, he articulationof govern-ment has been bound to the constant dentification f the difficultiesand failuresof government.

It is around these difficulties and failures that programmesfgovernmentave been elaborated.The programmatics the realm ofdesigns put forwardby philosophers,political conomists,physiocratsand philanthropists,government reports, committees of inquiry,

White Papers, proposals and counterproposalsby organizationsofbusiness, labour, finance, charities and professionals,that seek toconfigurespecific ocalesand relations n ways houghtdesirable.Therelation between political rationalities and such programmes ofgovernment s not one of derivationor determinationbutof translation- both a movement rom one space to another,and an expressionof aparticular oncern n anothermodality.Thus in the earlyyearsof thiscentury in Britain, the language of national efficiency served to



182 NikolasRoseandPeterMiller

articulategeneral political ideals concerning the ends to whichgovernment houldbeaddressed,andprovideda wayof formulating

a range of competing programmesand disputes from differentpolitical orces.2lSimilarly,programmesor administering ndman-agingtheenterprisentheUSAintheinter-warperiodelaboratedhebasis of managerialauthorityin a way that was congruent withAmericanidealsof personalfreedom, initiativeand democracy.Atranslatability asestablishedbetween heidealsof Americanpoliticalculture and programmesfor governing the newly emerged giantcorporationswiththeirprofessionalmanagers.22uchtranslatabilitybetweenthe moralities, pistemologiesandidiomsof politicalpower,

and the government of a specific problem space, establishesamutualitybetweenwhatis desirableand whatcan be made possiblethrough hecalculatedactivities f political orces.23

Programmes,as Colin Gordon has pointed out, are not simplyformulations f wishesor intentions.24 irstof all, programmes ayclaimoacertainknowledgeof thesphereorproblem obeaddressed- knowledgesof the economy,or of the natureof health,or of theproblem f povertyareessentialelements n programmeshatseektoexercise egitimateand calculatedpower over them. Governinga

sphererequiresthatit can be represented,depictedin a waywhichbothgrasps tstruthandre-presentst in a formin which tcanenterthe phereof consciouspolitical alculation.The theoriesof thesocialsciences,f economics,of sociologyandof psychology,husprovideakindof intellectualmachineryor government,in the form of pro-cedures or rendering the world thinkable,taming its intractablerealityysubjectingt to thedisciplinedanalysesof thought.Theoriesandexplanations husplayan essentialpartin reversingthe elationsof powerbetween heaspiringrulerandthatoverwhichrules to

be exercised.Forexample,beforeone canseekto manageadomainuchasaneconomy tisfirstnecessaryoconceptualise setofprocessesndrelationsasaneconomywhich samenable o manage-ment.25n a veryreal sense, 'theeconomy' s broughtinto beingbyeconomicheoriesthemselves,whichdefineand individuatea set ofcharacteristics,awsand processesdesignatedeconomicratherthan,say,political or natural. This enables 'the economy' to becomesomethingwhich politicians,academics,industrialistsand othersthinkanbe governedand managed,evaluatedandprogrammed,nordero increase

wealth,profitand the like.Similarly ociology,as asetf techniquesand investigationshatrevealthe nationas a set ofaggregatedtatisticswiththeirregularfluctuations, nd as knowableprocessesith their laws and cycles,has played a key role in theconstitutionf societyand its diversecomponentsand domainsas agovernablentity.Relationsof reciprocityobtainbetweenthe socialsciencesnd government. As government depends upon thesesciencesoritslanguagesandcalculations,o thesocialsciences hrive




on the problemsof government,the demand for solutions and theattractionof theorieswhich have the plausibility f science and the

promise of the rationaldiscipliningand technologisingof the socialfield.

Programmespresuppose hat the realis programmable, hat it is adomainsubjectto certaindeterminants,rules,norms and processesthat can be acted upon and improvedby authorities.They maketheobjectsof governmentthinkable n such a way that their ills appearsusceptibleto diagnosis, prescriptionand cure by calculatingand

* * * a

norma lzlnglnterventlon.

4 IECHNOLOGIESOF GOVERNMEN

Government s a domain of strategies,techniquesand proceduresthroughwhichdifferentforcesseek to renderprogrammes perable,and by means of which a multitude of connectionsare establishedbetweentheaspirations f authoritiesand theactivities f individualsand groups.These heterogeneousmechanismsweterm technologzesf

gove1mment.26t is throughtechnologies hat politicalrationalities ndthe programmesof government hatarticulate hembecomecapableof deployment.But this isnot a matterof the'implementation' f idealschemes in the real, nor of the extension of controlfrom the seatofpower into the minutiaeof existence.Rather, t is a question of thecomplex assemblage of diverse forces - legal, architectural,pro-fessional,administrative,inancial,udgmental suchthat aspectsofthe decisionsand actionsof individuals,groups, organizationsandpopulationscome to be understood and regulated in relation to

authoritative riteria. We need to study the humbleand mundanemechanismsby which authorities seek to instantiategovernment:techniquesof notation,computationand calculation;proceduresofexaminationandassessment; he inventionof devicessuch assurveysand presentationalforms such as tables; the standardisationofsystems or trainingandthe inculcation f habits; he inauguration fprofessional specialismsand vocabularies;building designs andarchitecturalforms - the list is heterogeneous and in principleunlimited.

Bruno Latour'sreflectionson powerare suggestive here. Ratherthanconsideringpower astheexplanationf the successof authoritiesincomposinga networkof forces,Latourproposesa viewof powerasan effect f suchacomposition.27 powerfulactor,agent or institutionis one that, in the particularcircumstancesobtaining at a givenmoment, is able to successfully enrol and mobilise persons, pro-ceduresandartifacts n thepursuitof itsgoals.Powersare stabilisednlastingnetworksonly to the extent thatthe mechanisms f enrolment




are materialised n variousmore or less persistent orms - machines,architecture, nscriptions, chool curricula,books, obligations, ech-niques for documentingand calculating nd so forth. These stabilisenetworks partly because they act as potent resources in the localcompositionof forces. Thus architecture mbodies certain relationsbetween ime, space, functionsand persons the separationof eatingand sleeping, for example,or the hierarchical nd lateralrelationsofthe enterprise not only materializing rogrammatic spirationsbutstructuringthe lives of those caught up in particulararchitecturalregimes.Writingcodifiescustomsand habits,normalising hem, bothtransforming hem into repeatable nstructions s to how to conductoneself, and establishing uthoritativemeans of judgment. 'Power' sthe outcomeof the affiliation f persons,spaces,communications ndinscriptions nto a durable orm.

To speakof the 'power'of a Government, Departmentof State,alocalauthority,a military ommanderor a manager n an enterprise sto substantialise hat which arises from an assemblageof forces bywhich particular bjectives nd injunctions an shape the actionsandcalculationsof others. Again, the notion of translation apturestheprocesswhereby his diversity s composed.28 o the extent thatactors

have come to understand their situation according to a similarlanguage and logic, to construetheir goals and their fate as in someway nextricable, hey are assembled nto mobileand looselyaffiliatednetworks.Shared interestsare constructed n and through politicaldiscourses,persuasions,negotiationsand bargains.Common modesof perceptionare formed, n whichcertaineventsand entitiescome tobe visualizedaccording to particularrhetoricsof image or speech.Relationsare establishedbetweenthe nature,character nd causesofproblems facing various individualsand groups - producers and

shopkeepers,doctorsand patients- suchthatthe problemsof one andthose of another seem intrinsically inked in their basis and theirsolution.

These processes ntailtranslation lso in the literal ense of movingfrom one person, place or conditionto another. Particular nd localissues hus becometied to much argerones. Whatstartsout as a claimcomes to be transformed nto a matterof fact.The resultof these andsimilar operations is that mobile and 'thixotropic'associationsareestablished etweena varietyof agents, n whicheach seeksto enhance

their powersby 'translating'he resourcesprovidedby the associationso that they may function to their own advantage.Loose and flexiblelinkages are made between those who are separated spatiallyandtemporally, and between events in spheres that remain formallydistinctand autonomous.Wheneachcan translate he valuesof othersinto its own terms, such that they provide norms and standards ortheir own ambitions, udgments and conduct, a network has beencomposedthat enablesrule 'ata distance'.




5 INSCRIP'l'IONAND CALCULA'rIONAS'l'ECHNOLOGIESOF

GOVERNMEN'l'

In arguing againsta 'statecentred'conceptionof politicalpower, wedo not mean to suggest that governmentdoes not produce centres.But centres of government are multiple: it is not a question of thepower of the centralised state, but of how, in relation to whatmentalitiesand devices, by means of what intrigues, alliances andflows is this localeor that able to act as a centre.

Consider, first of all, the notion of statistics.Eighteenth-centuryEuropeanconceptionsof governmentarticulated notionof statistics,

or science of state, in which the operation of governmentwas to bemade possibleby the accumulation nd tabulationof facts about thedomain to be governed. From this statisticalproject, through therequirements mposed upon firms to keep accountbooks and maketax returns, through censuses and surveys, the investigationsofVictorian social reformers, the records kept by the newly formedpolice forces and the school inspectors, hrough the calculationsofsuch things as gross national products, growth rates of differenteconomies, rates of inflation and the money supply, government

inspiresand depends upon a huge labourof inscriptionwhichrendersreality into a calculableform. Written reports, drawings, pictures,numbers,charts,graphs and statistics re some of the ways in whichthis is achieved.29

The 'representation' f that which is to be governed is an active,technical process. Government has inaugurated a huge labour ofenquiry o transform ventsand phenomena nto information:births,illnesses and deaths, marriagesand divorces, levels of income andtypes of diet, formsof employmentand wantof employment.We can

utiliseBruno Latour'snotion of inscriptioneviceso characterise hesematerial onditionswhichenable houghtto workupon an object.30 ymeans of inscription, reality is made stable, mobile, comparable,combinable. t is rendered in a form in which it can be debated anddiagnosed. Information n this sense is not the outcome of a neutralrecordingfunction. It is itself a way of acting upon the real, a way ofdevising techniques for inscribing t in such a way as to make thedomain in question susceptible o evaluation,calculationand inter-vention.

The inscription f reality n these mobile,combinable racesenablesthe formation of what we can call, following Latour, centresofcalculation.3'Government depends upon calculations n one placeabouthow to affect things n another.Information concerning ypesof goods, ages of persons, health, criminality, tc. - must be trans-ported and accumulated n locales - the manager'soffice, the warroom, the case conference and so forth - so that it can be utilised incalculation.The accumulationof inscriptions n certain locales, by




certainpersonsor groups,makesthem powerfulin the sense that itconfersupon themthe capacity o engagein certaincalculations ndto laya claimto legitimacyor theirplansandstrategiesbecause heyare, in a realsense,in theknow boutthatwhichtheyseekto govern.The inscriptionsof the world whichan individualor a group cancompile,consultor controlplay a key role in the powersthey canexerciseoverthosewhoseroleistobeentries nthesecharts.

Figurestransform he domainto whichgovernment s applied.Inenablingeventsto be aggregatedacrossspaceand time, they revealand constructnormsand processesto whichevaluationscan be at-tachedand upon which interventionscan be targeted.The figuresthemselvesare mechanisms hat enable relationsto be establishedbetweendifferentphenomena,rendering thepopulation',theecon-omy', 'publicopinion', 'the divorcerate' into thought as calculableentitieswitha solidityanda density hatappearsalltheirown.

The complexinter-dependenciesbetweeninscription,calculationand governmentin Francein the second half of the seventeenthcentury llustrateheseprocessesclearly.Duringthefirsttwodecadesof thereignof LouisXIV,Colbert,Superintendent f CommerceandControllerof Finance,Superintendent f BuildingsandSecretaryof

Statefor Marine,can index the formationof a novelprogrammeofgovernmentthroughinscription.32 his involvedinnovationsn cal-culativetechnologiesfor privateenterprise: egal regulationin theOrdinanceof 1673; publicationof numeroustextbooksexplainingandcommentingon thisOrdinanceand providinggeneraladvicetomerchants;the elaborationof rationalesfor understandingtheseinnovations;and the emergenceof new pedagogicmechanisms orinstructingmerchantsnthetechniques f accounting. talso nvolvedasignificant trengtheningandextensionof theroleof theintendants

as all-purposelocal administrators, nd the constructionof moresystematic, egularandrefined nformation lowsfromthe provincestothecentre,frequentlybymeansof large-scale nquiries.

The componentpartsof thistechnologyof governmentwerenotallnew,butwhenconnected ogether heyoccupiedadecisiverolewithinaprogrammeof government hatelevatedadesiretoknow henationand tssubjectsnfinedetail ntoanessentialresourceof political ule.Distance,delaysarisingasa resultof lengthytravelandotherfactorssuchas establishing he localrelaysand networksupon whichinfor-

mationand cooperationdepended undoubtedly rustratedand dis-rupted hisidealmachineryof 'governmenthroughinquiry'.Never-theless heColbertperiod llustratesheformationof atechnology orgoverninga nationbyexertinga kindof intellectualmasteryoverit.Establishingnetworkof conduits orthedetailedandsystematiclowof information rom individual ocalesof productionand tradeto acentrehelpedconstitutea singleeconomicdomainwhoseconstituentelements ouldbe knownandregulated ata distance'.



Politzcalpoweroond heState 187

Fromthe inventionof doubleentrybook-keeping o the contem-porary deployment of accountingtechniquessuch as Discounted

CashFlowanalyses, ventsin the internalrealmof the 'rrivate' nter-prisehavebeenopenedup to government n thisway.3Governmenthere works by installingwhat one might term a calculativetech-nology in the heartof the 'private' phere, producingnew waysofrenderingeconomicactivity nto thought,conferringnewvisibilitiesupon the componentsof profitand loss,embeddingnewmethodsofcalculationand hence linkingprivatedecisionsand publicobjectivesin a newway- throughthe mediumof knowledge.Mechanismsuchas this,aswe haveshownelsewhere,problematizehe distinctionbe-

tween centrallyplanned and marketeconomies:for example, theproblemsand techniquesin the regulationof'nationalised' enter-prisesin the UK followingthe SecondWorldWarwereof a similarmodalityto those used to encourageefficiencyand profitabilityn'private' nterprises.34

Inscription tselfcanbe a formof actionat a distance.Installingacalculativeechnology n the enterprise, n the hospital, n the schoolor thefamilyenjoins hosewithin heselocales oworkout 'where heyare',calibratethemselves n relationto 'wherethey should be' and

devisewaysof gettingfromonestate otheother.Makingpeoplewritethingsdownandcountthem- registerbirths,reportincomes,fill incensuses- is itself a kind of governmentof them, an incitementtoindividuals o construetheirlivesaccording o such norms.By suchmechanisms,authoritiescan act upon, and enrol those distantfromthemin spaceand timein the pursuitof social,politicalor economicobjectiveswithoutencroachingon their 'freedom'or 'autonomy'indeed often preciselyby offering to maximiseit by turningblindhabit ntocalculated reedomto choose.Suchmechanisms,we argue

later,havecometo assumeconsiderablemportancencontemporarymodesof government.

6 EXPER'l'ISEAND GOVERNMEN'l'

Therearea numberof versionsof theprocess nwhichthepersonageof the expert, embodyingneutrality,authorityand skill in a wisefigure,operatingaccording o an ethicalcode 'beyondgood andevil'

hasbecomeso significantn oursociety.35n ourargument he riseofexpertise is linked to a transformationin the rationalitiesandtechnologiesof government.Expertise mergedasa possible olutionto a problem hatconfronted iberalmentalitiesof government.Howmightone reconcile heprinciple hatthe domainof thepoliticalmustbe restricted,withthe recognitionof the vitalpolitical mplications fformallyprivateactivities?The 'private' nterprisewas to becomeavital ocalefor the governmentof the economic ifeof the nation;the




'private' amilywas to be a resource or the governmentof social ife.Eachwasa complexmultivalentmachinewith nternalrelationswhich

could be understood and administeredand external consequenceswhichcould be identifiedand programmed.The inhabitants f theseprivate domains - bosses, managers and workers; parents andchildren - were to be simultaneously he locus of private hopes,ambitionsand disappointments, he source of varied types of socialdifficultiesand the basisof all sortsof sociallydesirableobjectives.

The vital inksbetweensocio-political bjectives nd the minutiaeofdaily existence in home and factory were to be established byexpertise.Expertswould enter into a kind of double alliance.On the

one hand, they would ally themselves with political authorities,focusing upon their problemsand problematizing ew issues, trans-lating political concerns about economic productivity, nnovation,industrial unrest, social stability, law and order, normality andpathologyand so forth into the vocabulary f management,account-ing, medicine,socialscienceand psychology.On the other hand, theywould seek to form allianceswith individuals hemselves, ranslatingtheir daily worries and decisions over investment, child rearing,factory organizationor diet into a language claiming the power of

truth,and offering to teachthem the techniquesby whichthey mightmanagebetter,earn more,bringup healthieror happierchildrenandmuch more besides.

Expertise nonetheless poses problems for politicalauthority.Ex-perts have the capacity o generatewhat we termenclosures: relativelybounded localesor types of judgment within which their power andauthority s concentrated, ntensifiedand defended.3fi nclosuresmaybe generated in governmentalnetworks hrough the use of esotericknowledge, echnical kill,or establishedpositionas crucialresources

which others cannot easily countermandor appropriate.Of course,such enclosuresare only provisional, nd the claimsof any particularexpertise are alwayssubject o contestation.But the example of theBritishNationalHealthService,whichwe discussbelow, llustrates heways in which doctors could deploy their expertise to translatetheinterestsof civil servantsand governmentministers nto their own.They managedto make their argumentsand calculations he obliga-tory mode for the operationof the networkas a whole, the lines offorce flowing, as it were, from the operating theatre to the cabinet

office and not vice versa.The complex of actors, powers, institutionsand bodies of know-ledge that comprise expertise have come to play a crucial role inestablishing he possibilityand legitimacyof government. Expertshold out the hope that problemsof regulation an removethemselvesfrom the disputedterrainof politicsand relocateonto the tranquilyetseductive territoryof truth. By means of expertise, self regulatorytechniquescan be installed n citizens that will align their personal



Politicalpoweroond heState 189

choiceswith the ends of government.37 he freedom and subjectivityof citizenscan in such ways become an ally, and not a threat, to theorderlygovernmentof a polityand a society.

7 'l'HE GOVERNMEN'l'ALlZA'l'lONOF'l'HE S'l'A'l'

The problematics f governmentoffer a different perspectiveon thepoliticalphenomena conventionallyaddressed in terms of the state.The discursive, egislative, iscal,organizational nd other resourcesof the public powers have come to be linked in varying ways intonetworksof rule. Mobiledivisionsand relationshave been establishedbetween political rule and other projects and techniques for thecalculatedadministration f life. Diversepartsare played n technolo-gies of rule by the political actors who hold elected office, make

. . . . . . .

aut zorltatlve pronouncements as to po lCy and prlorltles, createlegislationand get it enacted, calculatenationalbudgets, raise taxesand adjust heir levels and incidence,disbursebenefits,give grantstoindustryand charities, ommandand directbureaucratic taffs,set upregulatorybodies and organizations f all sorts,and, in certaincases,

set in actionthe legitimateuse of violence.Such 'political' orces can only seek to operationalizetheirpro-

grammes of government by influencing, allying with or co-optingresources that they do not directly control - banks, financial nsti-tutions,enterprises, radeunions, professions,bureaucracies,amiliesand individuals.38 'centre' an only becomesuch through ts positionwithin the complex of technologies,agents and agencies that makegovernment possible. But, once establishedas a centre, a particularlocalecan ensure thatcertainresourcesonly flowthroughand around

these technologies and networks,reaching particularagents ratherthan others,by meansof a passage hrough the cen-tre'. inancial ndeconomiccontrolsestablishedby centralgovernmentset key dimen-sions of the environment in which private enterprises and othereconomic actors must calculate. Money, raised in taxes or publicborrowing, s disbursed hrough the network, o certain ocalcentres,but the continuedsupplyof financial esources s conditionalupon theconviction hat an alignmentof interestsexists, that the local authori-ties, firmsand so on willremainmore or less faithfulallies.Hence the

threatof withholdingof funds can be a powerful nducement o otheractors o maintain hemselveswithinthe network,or an incentive orthem to seek to convince he centre that their concernsand strategiesare translatable nd mutual.

The enactmentof legislation s a powerfulresource n the creationof centres,to the extent that law translates spectsof a governmentalprogramme nto mechanisms hat establish,constrain,or empowercertain agents or entities and set some of the key terms of their




deliberations. mposinga regimeof licensure, or example,empowerscertain bodies to regulate those who seek to act in a certain pro-fessionalcapacity,both legitimatingand regulatingat the same time.Embodying he principleof 'the best interestsof the child' n law maynot deternzinehe decisionsof socialworkersand the courts,but it setsone of the terms in which those decisions must be calculatedandjustified. Programmesand strategiesformulated at the centre maylead to attempts o establish egulatory r negotiatingbodies,and maylead to more or less autonomybeing granted to other aspectsof thebureaucraticweb of government such as Departmentsof State orLocalAuthorities.

Yet entities and agents within governmental networks are notfaithfulrelays,mere creaturesof a controller ituated n some centralhub. They utilise and deploy whateverresources hey have for theirown purposes, and the extent to which they carry out the will ofanother is always conditional on the particularbalance of force,energy and meaning at any time and at any point. Each actor, eachlocale, s the point of intersectionbetween orces,and hence a point ofpotentialresistance o anyone wayof thinkingand acting,or a pointoforganizationand promulgationof a different or oppositionalpro-

gramme. Entities may defect from a network, may refuse to beenrolled, or may bend its operations at certain points beyond allrecognition.Budget holderswill refuse to releasesufficient unds, orrecipientsof funds will divert them to other purposes. Experts andacademicswill seize upon the tacticalpossibilities pen to them andseek to deflectthem to theirown advantage.And professionalgroupswill bargain,bickerand contest on the basisof quite different claimsand objectives instead of meshing smoothly and with completemalleabilityn the idealisedschemesof a programmaticogic.

Government s a congenitally ailing operation: he sublime mageof a perfect regulatory machine is internal to the mind of theprogrammers.The world of programmes is heterogeneous, andrivalrous. Programmescomplexify the real, so solutions for oneprogramme end to be the problems or another.Things, personsoreventsalwaysappearto escapethose bodiesof knowledge hat informgovernmental programmes,refusing to respond according to theprogrammaticogic that seeksto governthem. Technologiesproduceunexpectedproblems,are utilised or theirown ends by those who are

supposed to merelyoperate them, are hamperedby under-funding,professional ivalries, nd the impossibility f producing he technicalconditionsthat would make them work- reliablestatistics, fficientcommunication ystems,clear lines of command, properlydesignedbuildings,well framedregulationsor whatever.Unplannedoutcomesemerge from the intersection f one technologywithanother,or fromthe unexpected consequencesof putting a technique to work. Con-trariwise, techniques invented for one purpose may find their



Politzcalower eyondheState 191

governmentalrole for another, and the unplannedconjunctionoftechniquesandconditionsarising rom verydifferentaspirationsmay

allow something to work without or despite its explicit rationale.Whilst we inhabit a world of programmes,that world is not itselfprogrammed.Wedo not live in a governedworldso muchas a worldtraversedby the'will ogovern', uelled bytheconstantregistration f'failure',the discrepancybetween ambitionand outcome, and theconstant njunction o do betternexttime.

8 WELFAREAND'l'HE GOVERNMEN'l'ALIZA'l'ION F'l'HE S'l'A'l'

Political ommentatorsend to agreethatduring the firsthalf of thepresentcentury,manywesternsocietiesbecame 'welfarestates', inwhich the Statetried to ensurehigh levels of employment,economicprogress, ocialsecurity,healthandhousingthrough heuse of thetaxsystemand investments, hroughstateplanningand intervention nthe economy, and through the development of an extended andbureaucraticallytaffedapparatus orsocialadministration. romourperspective,however, his is lessthebirthof anewform of statethan a

newmodeof governmentof theeconomic,socialandpersonal ivesofcitizens. This mode of government, that we term 'welfarism', sconstitutedby a politicalrationality mbodyingcertainprinciplesandideals, and is based upon a particularconceptionof the nature ofsocietyand its inhabitants.This welfaristrationality s linked to anarrayof mutually ranslatable rogrammes,echnologiesanddevicesranglng trom tax reglmes to socla Insurance,trom managementtrainingto socialcasework, romemploymentexchangesto residen-tialhomesfor theelderly.

We havediscussedwelfarismandthe governmentof economic ifeelsewhere.39 etus here considerwelfarismand 'social'government.'Social'does not refer in this instanceto a given repertoireof socialissues, but to a terrainbrought ntoexistence bygovernment tself-the locationof certainproblems, he repositoryof specifichopesandfears, the target of programmesand the space traced out by aparticularadministrativemachinery.40The programmesof socialgovernment that proliferatedin the nineteenth century involvedcomplexalliancesbetweenprivateandprofessional gents- philanth-

ropists,charitable rganizations,medics,polemicists nd others,andthe state - formed around problemsarisingin a multitude of siteswithinthe socialbody.Fromthe latterhalfof the nineteenthcenturyonwards, heseprogrammes,and the schemestheygaverise to, weregradually inkedup to the apparatusof the state.These connectionswere, no doubt, inspired by diverseaims and principles,but theyappearedto offer the chance,or impose the obligation, or politicalauthoritiesto calculateand calibratesocial, economic and moral




affairsandseektogovernthem.Yetthestateapparatusdidnot,couldot,eliminateallothercentresof powerordecision,orreducethemtots creatureswhether through the mechanismsof command andbedienceor by subjectingeveryoneto perpetualsurveillanceandnormalization.Welfarism s not so much a matterof the riseof aninterventioniststate as the assemblingof diverse mechanismsandrgumentsthroughwhichpoliticalforcesseek to securesocialandconomic objectivesby linking up a plethora of networks withspirationso know,programmeandtransform hesocial ield.

Governinghenetworksfwelfare

TheEnglishexampleillustrateshreekeyfeaturesof welfarism.Theirstconcerns the relationsbetween politicalrationalitiesand theormationof networksof government. As a politicalrationality,elfarismsstructuredbythewishto encouragenationalgrowthandellbeing through the promotionof socialresponsibilityand theutualityf socialrisk.Thisrationalitywasarticulatednanumberofifferentways.The BeveridgeReportwasframed n termsof a kindf ontractbetween hestateanditscitizens,nwhichbothpartieshadheireedsandtheirduties.4'The statewouldacceptresponsibilityottackhe 'five giants of Want, Disease, Idleness, Ignoranceandqualor'hrougha nationalisedhealthservice,a commitment o fullemploymentnd a social nsurancesystemwhichwouldpreventtheocialemoralization ndotherharmfuleffectsof periodsof wantbyredistributingncomeacross helifecycle.Inreturn, hecitizenwouldespectis or her obligations o be thrifty,industrious,and sociallyresponsible.he LabourParty,on the other hand, articulated hisationalityntermsof the ustandequaltreatmentoreachandforall,oe realizedby planned,

rationalisedand universalstate dispen-ationf security,health,housingandeducation.42The rationalityof welfarismwas programmaticallylaborated nelationo a range of specific problematizations:he decliningirthrate;elinquencyandanti-social ehaviour;heproblem amily;heocialconsequences f illhealthandtheadvantages onferredbyaealthyopulation;and the integrationof citizens into the com-unity.hese were not novelproblems,but in the post-warperiodheyeretobe problematized ya multitudeof officialandunofficialxpertsnd, crucially,were to begovernedin new ways.The keynnovationsf welfarismlay in the attempts to link the fiscal,alculativendbureaucraticapacities f theapparatus f thestatetoheovernmentof social ife.The socialdevicesof thepre-warperiodonsistedf a tangleof machineryor thesurveillance ndregulationfhe ocial, amilialandpersonalconductof the problematicectorsfhe population. The personnel, procedures, techniques andalculationshat made up these devices were attachedto specific




locales and organizations:he courts,the reformatories, he schoolsand the clinics.Welfarism ought to articulate hesevariedelementsinto a network and to direct them in the light of centralisedcalculations s to resources, ervicesandneeds.

However,welfarewasnot a coherentmechanismhat wouldenablethe unfolding of a centralplan. The networkswereassembled romdiverse and often antagonistic omponents,fromwarringWhitehalldepartments o peripheraland ad hocagencies.43This was no 'stateapparatus', ut a compositionof fragileand mobilerelationships nddependencies making diverse attempts to link the aspirationsofauthoritieswith the livesof individuals.Assemblingand maintainingsuchnetworksentailedstruggles,alliancesandcompetitionsbetweendifferentgroups for resources,recognitionand power.The problemposed for the next thirtyyears, for those aspiringto form a 'centre'from which the welfare apparatuscould be governed, was one ofregulatingthose who claimeddiscretionarypowersbecause of theirprofessionalor bureaucratic xpertise.

The exampleof health llustrateshese difficultiesof welfarismasatechnology of rule.44How was one to make administrablethemultitudeof hourly and daily individual decisions by physicians,

consultants,generalpractitioners,nurses, dentists,pharmacists ndothers?Each of these agents claimed and practisedtheir rights tomakedecisions not on the basis of an externally mposed plan, oraccording o criteriareaching hemfrom elsewhere,' ut according oprofessional odes,training,habit,moralallegiances, ndinstitutionaldemands.The problemwas one of connecting them instead to thecalculations nddeliberations f other authorities.

Betweenthe Ministryof Health and the practitioners f the cureduring the 1950s,a complexadministrative tructurewasassembled.

In the hospital sector alone this comprised 14 RegionalHospitalBoards, 36 Boards of Governance or TeachingHospitalsand some380 HospitalManagementCommittees.To governthis system in a'rationalandeffective'mannerasenvisaged n the 1944 WhitePaperposed a problem of information:even the most basicinformationabout the number and distributionof doctors was lacking at theperiphery let alone the centre. This 'lack'was to be the start of amassiveattempt o transform heactivities f healers nto figuresthatwould makemedicinecalculable.The initial orm of problematization

wasfinancial or the newtechnologydisplacedearlierwaysof relatingmedical care to money. A series of studies lamented the limitedinformationpossessedbythe Ministry n the financialadministrationof hospitals,the absenceof costingyardsticks o judge the relativeefficiencyor extravagance f administration f varioushospitals,andhence the invidiousalternativesof accepting the plans of medicalagents wholesale as submitted without amendment, or applyingoverallcutsin a more or lessindiscriminatemanner.45



194 NikolasRoseanzlPeterMiller

Diverseprogrammes ought to transform he healthapparatus ntoa calculableuniverse n whichentitiesand activitieswouldbe mapped,

enumerated, translated nto information, transmittedto a centre,accumulated, ompared,evaluated,and programmed.The duties ofeach actorand localewouldbe relayedback o them down the networkin the form of norms, standardsand constraints.The problemsofcalculabilitywere to be raised again and again over the next thirtyyears, and in relation to differing political rationalitiesand pro-grammes. But in the 1950s, Ministryof Health policy making wasmore or less limitedto operatingby exhortatory ircular an averageof 120 a year throughout he 1950s- and political xhortations an be

ignored. For the medicalprofessionestablished he NHS as a medicalenclosure. Medics drew on a profound optimism concerning theabilityof medicalscience to alleviate llness and promote health, in avarietyof tactics hat succeeded both in shaping the 'policyagenda'concerning health and in placing certain issues out of bounds fornon-professionals.4fiurther,medicscame to dominatethe adminis-trativenetworksof health,forminga medico-administrativeloc thatappeared resistant to all attempts to make it calculable n a non-medicalvocabulary.

By the 1960s, the technologicalquestionsof how the machineryofhealth was to be governedwere re-posedwithina more general shiftof governmentalrationalities.The notion that efficiencyand ration-alitycould be achievedthrough mechanisms f planningcrossedtheboundariesof economicand socialpolicyand the bounds of politicalparty. The Plowden Report of 1961 called for the use of publicexpenditure control as a means to stable long-term planning, withgreater emphasis on the 'wider avplication of mathematical ech-niques,statistics nd accountancy'.4A range of new techniqueswere

invented by which civil servantsand administratorsmight calculateand hence control public expenditure: the Public ExpenditureSurvey Committee (PESC), he use of cost benefit analysis,of PPB(Planning,Programming,Budgeting)and PAR (ProgrammeAnaly-sis Review).And officialdocuments ike the FultonReportenvisagedthese as gaining their hold upon the machinery of governmentthrough their inculcation nto a professionalcorps of administrativeexperts, specialistsboth in techniquesof managementand those ofnumeracy.48

Management,mathematicsand monetarisationwere to tame thewild excessesof a governmental omplex n dangerof runningout ofcontrol. The Ministryof Health set up its AdvisoryCommittee orManagementEfficiency in 1959 and expenditure on 'hospital ef-ficiencystudies'rose from £18,000 in 19634 to £250,000 in 1966-7.Health economists nvented themselvesand installed themselves nthe Ministry f Healthand outside t, articulating new vocabularyordefiningproblemsand programming olutions.49 et for some fifteen



PoliticalpowerbewonzlheState 195

years these new mechanismsfor central planning according torationalcriteriaappeareddestinedto fail.

It was in the 1970s that the medico-administrativenclosureofhealthwas to be breached.Politicians ndplannersbeganto speakofthe insatiability f the demand for medicalservicesand hence theneed to impose some politicallyacceptablelimits upon nationalprovision. The very success of medics in promoting high-techmedicinehad vastly ncreased he costof treatment.Sociologistsanddemographersssueddire predictionsabout the consequencesof theagingpopulationandincreasesn lifeexpectancy ordemandson thehealthapparatus.Further,the medicalmonopolyover the internal

workingof the healthapparatusbegan to fragment.Generalprac-titionersand consultantsbegan to stakerivalclaimsfor dominance.New actorsproliferatedin the health networks- nurses, physios,occupationaltherapists- and began to organize themselvesinto'professional' orces, claimingspecial skillsbased upon their ownesotericknowledgeand training,demandinga say in the adminis-trationof health,contestingassumptions f thesuperiority f medicalexpertise. Ancillaryworkers became increasinglyunionised andpressedforbetterwages.The conflictsbetweenrationalplanningand

expertpowersbecamemoreevident.As the healthapparatus hreat-ened to become ungovernable,a new form of rationalexpertise,grounded in the discourseof health economics,began to provideresources for those who wished to challenge the prerogativesofdoctors.New devicesbeganto be developedfor evaluating he costsand benefitsof different treatmentsand decisions,renderingthemamenableto non-clinicaludgmentsmadeneitherby doctorsnor bylocalpoliticians,butbymanagers.5°

Further, he healthconsumerwastransformed,partlybydevelop-

ments in medicalthought itself, from a passivepatient,gratefullyreceivingthe ministrations f the medics,to a personwho wasto beactively ngagedintheadministrationf health f thetreatmentwastobe effectiveandpreventionassured.The patientwasnowto voicehis orher experiences n theconsultingroomif diagnosiswasto beaccurateand remedieseffective.The patientwas alsotobe actively nrolledinthe governmentof health, educated and persuadedto exercise acontinualnformedscrutiny f thehealthconsequences f diet, ifestyleandwork.And patients,reciprocally,wereto organizeandrepresent

themselvesn the strugglesoverhealth.By 1979,230 organizationsorpatientsand disabledpeoplecouldbe listedin a directory,providingforums for sufferers of particularconditions and their relatives,pressing or increasedresources orproblemsrangingfrommigraineto kidneytransplants,demandingtheir say in decisionsconcerningeverything romtheplaceof birth o themanagement f death.Out ofthisconcatenationof programmes, trategiesand resistances,a new'neo-liberal'modeof governmentof healthwasto takeshape.




Welfarentlresponsibleitizenship

Welfarism mbodiesa particularonceptionof the relationbetweenthe citizenand the publicpowers.As the 'contractual'anguageof

Beveridge'sprogrammeindicates,welfarismis a 'responsibilizing'mode of government.Socialinsurance,whichBeveridEemade thecentrepieceof his report, will serve to illustratethis. ' Insurancefundamentallyransforms he mechanismshatbind the citizenintothe socialorder.A certainmeasureof individual ecurity s providedagainst ossor interruptionof earningsthroughsickness,unemploy-ment, injury, disablement,widowhoodor retirement.Yet simul-taneously he subjectsof thesedangersare

constitutedasthe locusofsocialresponsibilityndlocatedwithina nexusof socialrisk.Prior to insurance,perhaps the principalsociallyregulated re-

lationshipwasbetweenthe employerand the employee.The tech-nology of insurancenot only entailsthe direct interventionof thestateasthirdparty ntothecontractof employment, t articulateshisrelationwithina differentbut complementary ontractbetweentheinsured ndividualandsociety, ntroducinga relationof mutualobli-gationin whichboth partieshavetheirrightsand theirduties.Pro-grammesof insurancedid not merelyaspire to the

preventionofhardshipand want.They alsosoughtto reducethe socialand politi-calconsequencesof economiceventssuchas unemploymentby en-suringthat,whetherworkingor not, individualswere in effect em-ployees of society. Within the political rationalityof welfarism,insurance onstituted ndividualsas citizensbound into a systemofsolidarity nd mutualinter-dependency. nsurantial echnologydidnotcomposea mechanismwherepremiumswereadjusted o riskorcontributionswere accumulatedin order to provide for futurebenefits.Rather,the vocabularyof insuranceand the technique

ofcontributionwerechosenin the belief that thiswouldconstitute heinsuredcitizenin a definitemoralform: paymentwouldqualifyanindividual o receivebenefits,would draw the distinctionbetweenearnedand unearnedbenefits,and teachthe lessonsof contractualobligation,hriftandresponsibility.

Welfarismndthe echnicisationfpolitics

The system of social insuranceembodied definite politico-ethicalaspirations.However, it had the paradoxicaleffect of expellingcertainssuesandproblems romthepoliticalothetechnicaldomain.This llustratesa thirdkeyfeatureof welfarism:he roleaccorded oexpertise.By incorporatingexpertiseinto a centrallydirectednet-work,welfarism acilitates he creationof domains n whichpoliticaldecisionsredominatedbytechnical alculations.

In most Europeansocieties,sicknessand insurancefunds were




developed by voluntaryassociations, rade unions, political partiesand religiousgroups. They had an immediate political'orm, in that

they allowedfor some participationby the insuredin decisionsoverthe administrationof these benefits,provided a base for workers'organizations,served as a resource for the creation of collectiveidentitiesand the mobilization f members or suchissuesas electionsand strikes.Such issuescan be 'de-politicized'n twoways:eitherbyre-locating them as 'private'mattersto be resolved by individualmarket transactions,or by transformingthem into technical, pro-fessionalor administrativematters obe resolvedbythe application frationalknowledgeandprofessional xpertise n relation o objective

and apparentlyneutralcriteria.52Even such a perceptivecommentator s T. H. Marshallwas towrite

of social nsurance, hat'This new sophisticationwasa scientificnot apoliticalphenomenon . . applying echniques,whichwere of univer-sal validity, to problems that were an intrinsic part of modernindustrial ociety'.53 etasJaques Donzelotsuggests,one of the mostimportant results of insurance is the de-dramatisationof-socialconflicts, hrough

eliding the questionsof assigningresponsibilityor the origin of'socialevils'and shifting the issue to the differenttechnicaloptionsregardingvariationsn different parameters equired o 'optimise'employment,wages,allowances tc.54

And, at the same time, insurancecreatesa form of passivesolidarityamongst ts recipients,de-emphasisingboth theiractiveengagementin collectivemechanismsof providingfor hard times such as tradeunions or friendly societies and their individual striving for self-

protection hroughsavings.Insurances certainlya 'technical' ption,but it is a technology that redrawsthe social domain and simul-taneouslyreadjusts he territoryof the politicalon the one hand -struggles,contestations,epressions-and the economicon the other-wage labour, he role of the market, ubsistence ndpoverty.

If the contemporarycrisis' f welfareas a rationality f governmentarose, in part, out of the difficultiesengendered by the technologiesthat soughtto operationaliset, the possibility f supplantingwelfareby a new rationality f governmentarose out of the proliferation f a

range of other, more indirectmeans,for regulatingthe activitiesofprivate agents. This entailed the implantationof technologiesofcalculationand the developmentof varioustechniques or attachingactualorpsychological ewards o certaindecisionsand makingothersfinancially r culturallyess attractive.Governmentwasto be vested nthe entrepreneurialactivitiesof producersof goodsand suppliersofservices,the expertise of managersequipped with new modes ofcalculation,he operationof a market hatwould alignthe activities f




producersand providerswith the choices of consumers,activelyseekingto maximise heir'lifestyles' ndtheir'quality f life'.

9 FROMWELFAREIO NEO-LIBERALISM

Letusreturntothecontemporary olitical hallenges otheextendedstate with which we began. For some thirty years following thepublicationof TheRoadtoSerfdom eo-liberalhostilityto the 'inter-ventionist state' seemed eccentric to the main lines of politicaldebate.55Fromthe mid-seventiesonwards, n Britain,the USA and

elsewhere in Europe, neo-liberalanalysesbegan to underpin theappealof conservativepoliticalprogrammesand pronouncements.The politicalmentalityof neo-liberalism reakswithwelfarismatthelevel of moralities,explanationsand vocabularies.Againstthe as-sumption hattheillsof socialandeconomic ifearetobeaddressedbythe activitiesof government, it warns against the arrogance ofgovernmentoverreachandoverload.It counter-poses he inefficien-cies of plannedeconomiesto the strengthof the market n pickingwinners.Itclaims hatKeynesiandemandmanagement etsinmotion

avicious piralof inflationaryxpectationsandcurrencydebasement.It suggeststhat big governmentis not only inefficientbut malign:partiesare pushedinto making avishpromises n theircompetitionforvotes,fuellingrisingexpectationswhichcanonlybe metbypublicborrowingon a grandscale.='6ecause thewelfarestate'dependsonbureaucracy,t is subjectto constantpressurefrom bureaucrats oexpandtheirownempires,againfuellinganexpensiveandinefficientextensionof thegovernmentalmachine.Because tcultivatesheviewthat t is the roleof thestateto providefor the individual, hewelfare

statehasamorallydamagingeffectuponcitizens,producingacultureofdependency'basedonexpectationshatgovernmentwilldowhat nreality nlyindividuals an.

Neo-liberalismreactivates iberalprinciples:scepticismover thecapacities f politicalauthorities o governeverythingfor the best;vigilance vertheattemptsof politicalauthoritiesoseektogovern.Itslanguagesfamiliarandneedslittlerehearsal.Markets reto replaceplanningasregulatorsof economicactivity.Thoseaspectsof govern-mentthatwelfareconstruedas politicalresponsibilities re,as faras

possible, o be transformed nto commodifiedformsand regulatedaccording o market principles.Economicentrepreneurship s toreplaceregulation,as activeagents seeking to maximisetheir ownadvantage reboth the legitimate ocusof decisionsabouttheirownaffairs ndthemosteffective ncalculating ctionsandoutcomes.Andmoregenerally,activeentrepreneurshipstoreplace hepassivity nddependency f responsible olidarity sindividuals reencouraged ostriveo optimise heirownqualityof lifeandthatof theirfamilies.



PoliticalpowerbewondheState 199

Neo-liberalism e-codesthe locus of the state in the discourseofpolitics.The statemustbe strongto defend the interestsof the nation

in the international phere, and mustensure order by providingalegal framework or socialand economiclife. But withinthis frame-work autonomousactors- commercialconcerns,families,individ-uals - are to go freely about their business,makingtheir own de-cisions and controlling their own destinies. Neo-liberal politicalrationalitiesweavethese philosophical hemesinto an operativepol-itical discourse.A rhetoricof the nation,the family,the traditionalgreatnessof Britain, he virtuesof lawandorder, andthe respectfortraditionprovidesa translatability etween neo-liberalismand tra-

ditionalrightwingvalues,andsimultaneously pensa complexspacefor the elaborationof governmentalprogrammes.

Whateverts rhetoric,withinthe problematics f government,neo-liberalismis not rendered intelligible by counterposing a non-interventionisto an interventionist tate.Rather, t shouldbe seenasa re-organization f politicalrationalitieshatbringstheminto a kindof alignmentwith contemporary echnologiesof government.Thenew political nitiativesoften takethe formof an attempted autono-mization'of entitiesfrom the state, or rather,an autonomization f

the state fromdirectcontrolsover, and responsibilityor, the actionsand calculationsof businesses,welfareorganizationsand so forth.They entail the adoptionby the centreof a range of deviceswhichseek both to createa distancebetweenthe formalinstitutionsof thestate and other social actors,and to act upon them in a differentmanner.

One of the centralmechanismsof neo-liberalisms the prolifer-ation of strategiesto create and sustaina 'market', o reshape theforms of economic exchangeon-the basisof contractualexchange.

The privatization rogrammesof the new politicshave formedper-hapsthe most visiblestrandof suchstrategies,andone most alignedwiththe political dealsof marketsversusstate.Butin termsof econ-omicregulationat least,a rigiddistinctionbetweennationalizedandprivateenterprisesis misleading.On the one hand, the degree ofpoliticaldirectionover the activitiesof nationalizedcompanieswasvariablebut small - perhaps the principalform that interventiontookwasthe provisionor refusalof investmentcapital.On the otherhand,privatesectorenterprise s opened, in so manyways,to the ac-

tion at a distance mechanismsthat have proliferatedin advancedliberaldemocracies,with the riseof managersas an intermediary e-tweenexpertknowledge,economicpolicyandbusinessdecisions.Ofcourse, market orces' ntersect n differentwayswith investmentde-cisionsandthe likewhenbusinessesare no longerformallyownedbythe state,as do the imperatives o profit.But we might considerthatthis reconstruction f the formof economicregulation s less a revol-utionagainst he real failuresof centralplanning,than a rejectionof



200NikolasoseandPeterMiller

thedealsof knowledge,powerand the effectivityof planningthat

suchationalitiesmbodied.

At the rhetoricaland programmatic evel, neo-liberalismalso

embodiesprofoundtransformationn the mechanismsor govern-

ingocial ife. In placeof collectiveprovisionandsocialsolidarityhe

newationality f governmentproposesnotionsof securityprovided

throughhe private purchaseof insuranceschemes, health care

purchasedy individualsand provided by the health industry,

housingffered through the privatesectorand efficiencysecured

throughhe disciplineof competitionwithinthe market.The public

provisionf welfareand socialsecurityno longerappearsas a vital

partf a programme or political tability ndsocialefficiency.Monetarisationasplayeda keyroleinbreaching heenclosuresof

expertise ithin the machineryof welfare. For example, when

contemporaryritishhospitalsare requiredto translate heirthera-

peuticctivities, rom operatingtheatresto laundryroom,intocash

equivalents,new form of visibility s conferred upon them, new

relationsstablishedand new proceduresof decisionmakingmade

possible. s we have alreadyargued, making people write things

down,ndthe natureof the thingspeoplearemadeto writedown,is

itself kindof governmentof them,urgingthemto thinkaboutand

note ertainaspectsof their activitiesaccordingto certainnorms.

Powerlowsto the centreor agentwho determinesthe inscriptions,

accumulateshem,contemplates hem in theiraggregatedformand

hence an compare and evaluatethe activitiesof others who are

merelyntrieson thechart.Managers ather hanconsultants ecome

thepowerfulactorsin this new network,and powerflowsfrom the

cabinet ffice to the operatingtheatreviaa multitudeof calculative

andmanagerialocales,rather hanin theotherdirection.This is not

anattemptto imposea powerwherepreviouslynone existed,but to

transformhe terms of calculation rom medicalto financial,and

hence o shift the fulcrumof the healthnetwork.Farfrom autono-

mizing he healthapparatus, hesenewmodesof actionat a distance

increasehe possibilities f governing t. Similarly, elocatingaspects

of welfarein the 'private'or 'voluntary' ectordoes not necessarily

renderthem less governable.To be sure, different proceduresof

translationand allianceare entailedwhen 'political'nstitutionsare

'de-centred'n networksof power.But the oppositionbetweenstate

andnon-state s inadequate ocharacterisehesetransformations.

Neo-liberalism lsoentailsa reorganization f programmesor the

governmentof personallife. The languageof the entrepreneurial

individual,endowed with freedom and autonomy, has come to

predominate veralmostanyotherinevaluations f theethicalclaims

of politicalpower and programmesof government.A sphere of

freedom is to be (re-)established,where autonomousagents make

theirdecisions,pursue their preferencesand seek to maximisethe



PoliticalpowerbeyondheState201

qualityof their lives. For neo-liberalismhe politicalsubject s less asocialcitizenwithpowersandobligationsderivingfrommembershipof a collectivebody,thanan individualwhosecitizenshipsactive.Thiscitizenships to be manifestednot in thereceiptof public argesse,butin the energetic pursuit of personal fulfilmentand the incessantcalculationshatare to enable thistobe achieved.57

Neo-liberalismorgesa kindof alignmentbetweenpoliticalration-alitiesand the technologiesfor the regulationof the self that tookshapein Britainduringthe decadesof the 1960sand 1970s.No doubtthis alignmentis not the only one possible,nor the mostdesirable.Nonetheless,neo-liberalprogrammesor the reformof welfaredrew

support romtheir consonancewitha rangeof otherchallenges o themechanismsof socialgovernmentthat emergedduring these samedecadesfrom civillibertarians,eminists,radicals, ocialists, ociolo-gists and others. These reorganizedprogrammesof governmentutiliseand instrumentalisehe multitudeof expertsof management,of family life, of lifestyle who have proliferatedat the points ofintersectionof socio-politicalaspirationsand private desires forself-advancement.Through this loose assemblageof agents, calcu-lations, techniques, images and commodities, individualscan be

governedthroughtheirfreedomto choose.

CONCLUSION

Muchof the analysisabove is preliminary,but its centralpoint is asimple one. The language of politicalphilosophy:state and civilsociety, freedom and constrairlt, overeigntyand democracy,publicand privateplaysa key role in the organizationof modern political

power.However, t cannotprovidethe intellectualools foranalyzingthe problematicsof government in the present. Unless we adoptdifferentwaysof thinkingabout he exerciseof politicalpower,wewillfindcontemporaryormsof rule hardto understand.It will thusbedifficult o makeproper udgmentof the alternatives n offer.

(Dateaccepted:April 199 1 NikolasRoseGoldsmiths'ollege

and

PeterMillerLondon chool fEconomics

NO I ES

1. F. W. Nietzsche,ThusSpokeZara- on an earlier and much longer draftthustra,London, Penguin, 1969, p. 75. which havehelped us in preparing hisManypeople gave us detailedcomments version. We would like particularly o



202 Nikolus osearulPeterMiller

thankGrahamBurchell,StewartClegg,MitchellDean, Mick Dillon, Michael

Donnelly,DavidGarland,TonyGiddens,(JolinGordon,AnthonyHopwood,Alan

Hunt, Ian Hunter, Thomas Osborne,AlessandroPizzorno, Michael Power,Stuart cheingold, ^rahame hompson,JimTomlinsonandRobertvanKrieken.

2. We have in mind recent non- orpost-marxist ritingson the sproblem f

the State', represented best by Gian-francoPoggi,CharlesTilly,ThedaSkoc-pol, Anthony Giddens, MichaelMann

andJohnA.Hall.Foracogentdiscussionsee B. Jessop, State Theory,(Jambridge,Polity,1990.

3. M. Foucault,The Historyof Sexu-

ality, Vol. 1: An Introduction,London,Allen Lane, 1978, pp.8v9. For an

extendedtreatmentof differentwaysof

conceptualisingpolitical power see S.

(Jleggs Frameworis of Power, London,Sage,1989.

4. M. Foucault, 'On governmen-

tality', &iC,1979,, pp.5-21. Reprintedin (J. Burchell, ,. (Jordonand P. Miller

(eds), The Foucault Effect: Studie.s in

GovernmentalRationality,Hemel Hemp-stead,Harvester-Wheatsheaf,991. See

theothercontributionsothisvolume or

relatedanalyses.5. M. Foucault, 'On governmen-

tality',&iC,1979, . 20.6. Cf. S. (Johen, 'ThinkingAbout

Social Jontrol', aperpresented tWork-

shop on ControllingSocialLife, Euro-peanUniversity nstitute,Florence,May

3>June 2,1989.7. See,forexample, hediscussion f

the limitations f constitutionalhoughtin I. HardenandN. Lewis,TheNobleLie:

TheBriti.sh otstitutionand theruleof law,

London, Hutchinson, 1986, and the

theoriesof neo-corporatismeveloped n

particular yPhillipeSchmitter,ee P. J.

Schmitter,Still he (Jentury f (Jorpora-tism',Reviewof Politic.s,1974,36, 85-131and P. C. Schmitter nd J. Lehmbruch,(eds),Trend.sTowardbs'orporati.stnterme-

diation,London,Sage,1979.8. (J. Poggi, The Development f the

ModernState,London,Hutchinson, 978;(j. Tilly (ed.), The Formationof National

States in WesternEurope, PrincetonNJ,

PrincetonUniversity ress,1975.Seealso

M.Foucault,sThePoliticsof Health in the

EighteenthCentury', in C. Gordon (ed.),

MichelFoucault.PowerlKnowledge:electedInteruiew.snd OtherWriting.s972-1977,

Brighton,The HarvesterPress,1980.

9. A. Giddens, The Nation State and

Violence, ambridge, Polity 1985.

10. See, for example, M. Mann, The

SourcesfSocialPowerVol.1., Cambridge,

Cambridge University Press, 1986; M.

Mann,State.s,WarandCapitali.sm,xford,

Blackwell,1988; See alsoJ. A. Halland (J.

J. Ikenberry, The State, Milton Keynes,

Open University Press, 1989; J. A. Hall(ed.), State.sn Hi.story,Oxford, Blackwell,

1986:J. Baechler,J. A. Halland M.Mann

(eds), Europeand the Ri.seof Capitali.sm,

Oxford, Blackwell,1988.11. I. Wallerstein, The Politic.sof the

WorldEconomy:TheState.s,TheMovements

and the Civilizatiorts,Cambridge, Cam-

bridge University Press, 1984; Giddens,

1985, op.cit.;Mann,1988, op.cit.

12. See M. Dillon, 'Modernity, Dis-

course and Deterrence', in CurrentRe-searchon Peaceand Violence,vol. 2, 1989,

pp.9s104.13. The current analysis builds upon

our previous studies of such issues, see N.

Rose, The P.sychological omplex:P.sychol-

ogy, Politic.s nd Society1869-1939, Lon-

don, Routledge and Kegan Paul,1985; N.

Rose,GoverningheSoul:TheShapingofthe

PrivateSelf, London, Routledge, 1990; P.

Miller and N. Rose (eds), The Powerof

P.sychiatry,Jambridge, Polity, 1986; P.Miller, 'Accounting for Progress -

National Accounting and Planning in

France',Accounting,Organizatiotsand So-

ciety,1986, pp.83-104; P. Miller and T.

O'Leary, 'Accounting and the (Jonstruc-

tion of the (Jovernable Person', Account-

ing, Organizations and -Society, 1987,

23545; P. Miller, and T. O'Leary,

'Hierarchiesand American Ideals,190>

1940', Academyof ManagementReview,

1989, pp. 25045; P. Millerand N. Rose,'The Tavistock Programme: The

(Jovernment of Subjectivity and Social

Life', Sociology, 1988, pp. 171-92. P.

Millerand N. Rose, '(JoverningEconomic

Life', Economy and Society, 1990, 19,

pp. l-31; cf. (j. (Jordon, 'Afterword', in

(J. (Jordon (ed.), MichelFoucault:Powerl

Knowledge,Brighton, Harvester,1980; (J.



Politzcal owerbeyond heState

Gordon, The Soul of the Citizen:MaxWeber and Michel Foucaulton Ration-

alityand Government',n S. Lashand S.Whimster,Max Weber, Rationality andModctnity,London,Allen&Unwin,1987.

14. P. Veyne, cited in (J. Burchell,'Peculiar nterests:Governing The Sys-tem of Natural Liberty ', n Burchell,Gordonand Miller, p. cit.

15. P. Miller and N. Rose, 'PoliticalRationalities and Technologies ofGovernment', n S. Hanninen and K.Palonen,Texts,Contexts,Concepts:Studies

on PoliticsandPower n Language,Helsinki,FinishPolitical cienceAssociation,1990.See also M. Shapiro(ed.),Language andPolitics,Oxford,BasilBlackwell,1984;J.

Taylor, Language nd HumanNature',in M.T. Gibbons ed.), nterpretingPolitics,Oxford, BasilBlackwell,1987; W. Con-nelly, 'Appearanceand Reality n Poli-tics', n M. T. Gibbons ed.),op. cit.;D. N.McCloskey,The Rhetoric of Economics,Madison,Wisconsin,Universityof Wis-

consinPress,1985; . S. Nelson,A. Megilland D. N. McCloskey, he Rhetoricof theHumanSctnces:Languageand ArgumentnScholarshipand Public Affairs, Madison,Wisconsin,University f Wisconsin ress,1987.

16. J. Keane, Despotismand Democ-racy, n J. Keane ed.),CivilSociety nd theState, London, Verso, 1988. For anattempt to revive the principleof civilsociety for modern times see J. Keane,PublicLifeandLateCapitalism,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversity Press, 1984; J.Keane,Democracy nd C'ivilSociety,Lon-don, Verso,1988;

17. M. Foucault, sSpace, Knowledgeand Power', in P. Rabinow(ed.), TheFoucault Reader, Harmondsworth,Penguin,1986.In theseremarkswe drawuponBurchell,1990,op. cit.

18. We borrow and adapt this termfrom the writingsof BrunoLatourandMichel Callon. See M. Callon, sSomeElementsof a Sociologyof Translation',in J. Law(ed.), Power Actionand Belief,London, Routledge and Kegan Paul,1986;M.Callonand B. Latour, Unscrew-ing the BigLeviathan: owactorsmacro-structure reality and how sociologistshelp them to do so', in K. Knorr-Cetinaand A.Cicourel,Advance.sn SocialTheorzy,

2031981; M. Callon, J. Law and A. Rip,Mappingthe Dwnamic.sf Scienceand Tech-

nology,London,Macmillan, 986.This isdiscussed in more detail in MillerandRose,1990,op. cit.

19. M. Foucault,Disciplineand Punish,London, Allen Lane, 1977; R. Castel,L'OrdreP.sychuxtnque,aris, EditionsdeMinuit,1976.

20. Cf. M. Foucault, The PoliticsofHealth n the EighteenthCentury', n C.Gordon ed.),PowerlKnowledge,righton,Harvester,1980.

21. Rose, 1985,op.cit.;also MillerandO'Leary,1987 p. cit.

22. Millerand O'Leary,1989,op. cit.;also P. Millerand T. O'Leary, MakingAccountancy Practical', Accounting,OrganizatiorLsnd Societ, vol. 15, 1990,pp.479-98. For a more general state-ment of these issues, see P. Miller,sAccountingand Objectivity:The In-vention of CalculatingSelves and Cal-culable Spaces',forthcomingAnnats of

Scholar.ship,, 1991, nos. 3/4.23. See also Millerand Rose, 1988,op.

cit.;Rose,1989,op. cit.24. Gordon, 1980, op. cit.; see also

Miller nd Rose,1989,op. cit.25. See Millerand O'Leary,1989,op.

cit. See also: A. G. Hopwood, sTheArchaeology of Accounting Systems',Accounting, Organization.s and Societ,vol. 12, pp.207-34; G. Thompson,sTheFirmas 44Dispersed ocialAgency', nG.Thompson, Economic Calculation andPolicy Formation,London, Routledge &KeganPaul,1986; . Tomlinson,Problemsof British Economic Policy 1870-1945,London, Methuen,1981;J. Tomlinson,sWheredo EconomicPolicyObjectivesCome From?The Case of FullEmploy-ment', Economy and Society, vol. 12,pp.48-65.

26. Miller ndRose,1989,op. cit.27. B. Latour, The Powersof Associ-

ation', in J. Law, (ed.), Power, Action,Belief, SociologicalReviewMonograph;B. Latour, Science in Action, MiltonKeynes:Open UniversityPress,1987;cf.Callon, 1986,op. cit.; Foucault,197S,op.cit.

28. We adapt this usage from Callonand Latour,but free it from the swill opower' hat motivates cts of translation




in their account. Cf. Callon and Latour,1981, op. cit., p. 279.

29. I. Hacking, 'Biopower and theAvalanche of Printed Numbers', Hurnani-ties in Society, 1982, 5, pp. 27W95; N.Rose, 'Governing by Numbers: Figuringout Democracy', Accounting,Organizatiotsand Societ, forthcoming. See also (J.

Gigerenzer et al., The Empire of Chance:How Probability 'hanged cienceanzlEvery-d:ayLife, Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 1989; I. Hacking, ThcTamingofChance,Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-

sity Press, 1990; and T. Porter, TheRiseofStatistical Thinking, 1820-1900, Prince-ton, Princeton University Press, 1986.

30. Latour, 1987, op. cit. See also N.Rose, Calculable minds and manageableindividuals, Historyof the HurnanScience.s,1988, 1, pp. 179-200; and L. Thevenot,'Rules and Implements: Investment inForms', Social Science nformation, o1.23,pp. 145.

31. Latour, op. cit.

32. See P. Miller, 'On the Inter-relations Between Accounting and theState', Accounting, rganizatiorLsnd Society,1990,vol. 15, pp. 31tS38.

33. See P. Miller, 'Accounting Inno-vation Beyond the Enterprise: Problema-tizing Investment Decisions and Pro-gramming Economic Growth in the UKin the 1960s' Accounting,OrganizatiorLsndSociety, 1991, vol. 16, pp. 73342. Forrelated analyses see S. Burchell, (j. (lubband A. (J. Hopwood, 'Accounting in itsSocial (ontext: Towards a History ofValue Added in the United Kingdom',Accounting,OrganizatiorLsnd Society,1985,pp. 381413; A. (J. Hopwood, 'TheArchaeology of Accounting Systems', op.cit.; K. W. Hoskin and R. H. Macve, 'TheGenesis of Accountability: The WestPoint Connections', Accounting,Organiz-ations and Society, 1988, pp. 37-73; A.Loft, 'Towards a Critical Understandingof Accounting: The Case of Cost Ac-countingin the UK, 191X1925',Account-ing, OrganizatiorLs nd Society, 1986,pp. 13749; R. Whitley, 'The Transform-ation of Business Finance into FinancialEconomics: The Roles of Academic Ex-pansion and Changes in U.S. (apitalMarkets', Accounting, OrganizatiorLsndSociety,1986, pp. 171-92.

34. P. Millerand N. Rose, Governingeconomic ife',Economy nd Society, p. cit.

35. E.g. H. Perkin,The Rise of Pro-fe.ssionalSocietg:England Since1880, Lon-don, Routledge, 1989; A. MacIntyre,After Virtue:A Study n Moral Theory,2ndedition,London,Duckworth,1985.

36. Cf. Giddens notion of 'powercontainers',circumscribed reas withinwhichadministrativeower anbe gener-ated:Giddens,1985,op. cit., p. 13.

37. Rose,1990,op. cit.38. See D. Ashford,Policyand Politic.s

in Bntain, Oxford, Blackwell, 1981,p. 57ff.; and I. Hardenand N. Lewis,TheNoble Lie: The British C'ortstitutionnd theRule of Law, London,Hutchinson,1986,p. 155ff.

39. Millerand Rose, 1990,op. cit. SeealsoP. Miller nd N. Rose, Programmingthe Poor: Poverty, alculation and Ex-pertise'paperpresentedat InternationalMeetingon Deprivation,SocialWelfareand Expertise,Helsinki,August1990.

40. J. Donzelot, Policing the Family,London,Hutchinson,1979.The divisionof social and economic is purely ex-positional, or 'economic' roblemswereto be solved by 'social'means as in thekeyroleof the familyand the familywagein engendering he requirement f regu-lar labour- and 'social' roblemswere tobe solved 'economically' as in therepeated attempts o resolve crime andurban unrest through decreasing evelsof unemployment.

41. W. Beveridge,Social Itsurance andAlliedServices,London:HMSO,1942.

42. K. O. Morgan,Labour in Power,Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress, 1984;F. W. S. (raig, Briti.shGeneral ElectionManife.sto.s1900-1974, London, Mac-millan,1975.

43. J. Bulpitt, 'The disciplineof theNew Democracy:Mrs Thatcher'sDom-esticStatecraft',oliticalStudie.s, 986,34,pp. l9-39, p. 24.

44. We draw heavily on RudolphKlein's nstructiveaccount in what fol-lows. See R. Klein, The Politic.s of theNational Health Service, London, Long-man, 1983. Cf. (j. Pollitt, The StateandHealthCare', n G. McLennan,D. Heldand S. Hall (eds), State and Societ inC'ontemporaryritain,Cambridge,Polity,



PoliticalpowereyondheStute

1984; P. Starrand E. Immergut,HealthCareand theBoundaries f Politics',n C.

S. Maier ed.),(J')ulnging oundane.s f thePolitical,Cambridge,Cambridge niver-sityPress,1987.

45. See,Jones, 1950 quotedin Klein,op. cit., p. 4v9.

46. Klein,op. cit., p. 27.47. (hancellor of the Exchequer,

1961,quoted n Klein,op. cit.,p. 65.48. Committee of the Civil Service

Report, (mnd. 3638, London, HMSO,1968.

49. Office of Health EconomicsEf-Jiciency in the Ho.spitalSenvice,London,Officeof HealthEconomics,1967.

50. M. Ashmore,M.J. Mulkay nd T.J. Pinch,Health and E#iciency:A Sociologof HealthEconomic.s,MiltonKeynes,OpenUniversityPress,1989.

51. N. Rose, 'Socialismand SocialPolicy: The Problems of Inequality',Politic.sand Power, 1980, 2, pp. l l l-36.On the questionof insurance ee also D.Defert 'PopularLife and Insurance

205Technology', and F. Ewald, 'Insuranceand Risk', both in (J. Burchell, C. Gordon

and P. Miller (eds), TheFoucaultEffect.52. Starr and Immergut, op. cit., 1987.53. T. H. Marshall, Social Policy,Lon-

don, Hutchinson,1975, p.69.54. J. Donzelot, 'The Poverty of Politi-

cal (ulture', Ideology and (J'orLsciousne.s.s,1979,5, pp. 73 86, p.81. Reprinted in (J.

Burchell, (j. (^ordon and P. Miller, TheFoucaultEffect.

55. F. A. von Hayek, The Road to

Serfdom,London, Routledge and Kegan

Paul, 1944; F. A. von Hayek, The(J'onsti-tutionof Libert, London, Routledge andKegan Paul, 1960; M. Friedman, (:apital-i.smand Freedom, hicago, (hicago Uni-versityPress,1962.

56. Cf. J. A. Schumpeter, (J'apitalism,Socialismand Democracy,3rd ed., NewYork, Harper and Row,1950.

57. (^ordon, 1986, op. cit.; J. Meyer,'SocialEnvironmentsand OrganizationalAccounting', Accounting, Organization.sandSociety,1986, pp. 345-56.

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