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Romancing the (Buddhist)Stone: Reality or Red Herring?Christopher J. Mruk aa Department of Psychology , Bowling Green StateUniversity Firelands CollegePublished online: 03 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: Christopher J. Mruk (2010) Romancing the (Buddhist) Stone:Reality or Red Herring?, The Humanistic Psychologist, 38:2, 190-195, DOI:10.1080/08873267.2010.485901

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Romancing the (Buddhist) Stone:Reality or Red Herring?

Christopher J. MrukDepartment of Psychology, Bowling Green State University

Firelands College

The recent special issue on mindfulness published by The HumanisticPsychologist was unusual in a number of ways. For one thing, it wasgenuinely international in scope, with a roughly equal number of authorscoming from the United States and from Australia. For another, thematerial was strongly multidisciplinary, with authors representing thehumanistic, Buddhist, biological, and cognitive perspectives. In additionto demonstrating such a broad scope in a mere hundred pages or so, theissue also generated considerable reader interest. For instance, HarrisFriedman took the time to write to the chief editor to express a concern,thereby creating an opportunity to continue discussion of the concepts,issues, and themes it raises beyond the usual single publication format.I suggested to the editor that we embrace the critique as a way of encour-aging more interaction in, and through, the journal. After all, such point–counterpoint or Comments formats found in other publications, includingthe American Psychologist, do just that, and with some success. Thus, inan attempt to welcome dialog, I agreed, as a co-editor of the special issue,to reply to ‘‘Is Buddhism a Psychology? Commentary on Romanticism in‘Mindfulness in Psychology’ ’’ (Friedman, 2010). From the outset, then, letme express my appreciation for the interest in our work and for the opport-unity to engage in collegial discussion.

There are many ways to counter the criticisms raised in the commentary,but in the interest of limiting my response to a similar number of pages,let me focus on only the most substantial limitations of the critique. One

Correspondence should be addressed to Christopher J. Mruk, Bowling Green State Univer-

sity, Firelands College, One University Drive, Huron, OH 44870. E-mail: cmruk@bgsu.edu

The Humanistic Psychologist, 38: 190–195, 2010

Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 0887-3267 print=1547-3333 online

DOI: 10.1080/08873267.2010.485901

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appropriate place to begin is by addressing the basic criticism driving thecommentary. This entire reply is to the commentary submitted to the editorby Friedman. He stated:

The recent special issue of this humanistic psychology journal on ‘‘Mindful-ness in Psychology’’ (Khong & Mruk, 2009a) presented an implicit variantof religious parochialism through misportraying mindfulness, a burgeoningarea of interest within psychology, as stemming predominantly from Buddhistbeliefs and practices, as well as ultimately being embedded in a Buddhistworldview. (Friedman, this issue, p. 184)

An attempt is then made to substantiate this claim by identifying severalalleged instances of such implicit parochialism and misportrayal that aresaid to occur in the special issue. For example, the commentary cited thefollowing sentence from the special issue as evidential: ‘‘although . . . thepractice of mindfulness does not require the practitioner to ‘adopt’Buddhism but to develop inner peace, the concept of mindfulness is never-theless drawn primarily from the Buddha’s teachings’’ (Khong & Mruk,2009, p. 112). If one reads the sentence as claiming that all mindfulness isdrawn primarily from Buddhism, it could be misrepresentative in the waythe commentary claimed. However, the fact of the matter is that thecommentary’s rendition of the actual quotation is incorrect: It also leavesout important language that presents a very different picture.

With the missing words italicized, the sentence factually reads,‘‘Although . . . the practice of mindfulness does not require the practitionerto ‘adopt’ Buddhism but to develop inner peace, the concept of mindfulnessexplored in this issue is nevertheless drawn primarily from the Buddha’s teach-ings’’ (Khong &Mruk, 2009, p. 112). Saying that the focus of the special issueinvolves a particular form or concept of mindfulness, in this case Buddhist, isvery different than making the considerably larger claim specified in thecritique! Quite the contrary, defining how one is operating in a given area isa hallmark of good science. The special edition could have just as easily focusedon another approach to mindful practices, such as those found in variousreligions.However, letting readers know that the special issue is concernedwitha Buddhist approach to mindfulness is not the same as saying that Buddhismis the only valuable approach to this topic, not to mention the weaknesscreated by basing criticism on a faulty presentation of a crucial citation.

Following this unfortunate foundation, the commentary summed up itsargument by using an analogy that contains the seeds of its own undoing.

Imagine how similar writings within a humanistic psychology journal, butfrom a Christian vantage, might be received, as illustrated by the followingfictionalized paraphrase: ‘‘although the practice of forgiveness does not

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require the practitioner to adopt Christianity but to develop inner peace,the concept of forgiveness is nevertheless drawn primarily from the Christ’steachings, cannot be divorced from the philosophical and psychologicalfoundations of the Christ’s teaching in which Christianity constitutes thebigger picture in which forgiveness needs to be contextualized, and the heartof forgiveness is the Christ’s teaching.’’ Surely such a statement, simplysubstituting ‘‘forgiveness’’ for ‘‘mindfulness’’ and ‘‘Christ=Christianity’’ for‘‘Buddha=Buddhism,’’ would not go unchallenged if published in a humanisticpsychology journal. (Friedman, this issue, p. 185)

One problem with this analogy is that, once again, it leaves out’’ a criticalphrase that changes meaning significantly. A phrasing that more closelyparallels the special issue would be to say that ‘‘the concept of forgivenessbeing examined here is nevertheless drawn primarily from the Christ’steachings.’’ As indicated earlier, such an operational definition shouldpresent little in the way of difficulties.

Another problem is that the analogy fails to acknowledge an importantpossibility that emerges if one adopts a genuinely phenomenological pointof view. In this case, instead of dismissing the value of a Christian (or anyother religious) approach to forgiveness, it might be far more scientific tobracket all of our presuppositions about a given outlook on a particularphenomenon before drawing conclusions. For example, by taking a moreopen stance toward the possibility described in the analogy, we might findthat for Christians, or at least for a certain type of Christian, being forgivenin this way is different from other experiences of it. Perhaps such things asperceiving a ‘‘personal God’’ that ‘‘loves one’’ in spite of being a ‘‘sinner’’make a crucial difference in the experience or meaning of forgiveness. Ifso, a more secular investigation might miss various subtleties that occurwhen being forgiven in this way, such as being ‘‘graced,’’ or becoming‘‘right’’ with the Lord, and so forth. Pargament (1997) makes this pointwhen discussing the problems involved in attempting to separate spiritualityfrom religious practices in research settings. In short, the analogy fails afairly standard test of phenomenological rigor: It seems reasonable to avoidcharacterizing such possibilities as parochial or romantic until they havebeen thought more thoroughly through by means of eidetic intuition orscientifically explored in the way that Giorgi’s (1971) method would allow.

Next, the commentary attempted to make another point that falls farshort of the mark when it is examined more fully. The critique stated that,

To be fair, there are a few isolated disclaimers in this special issue noting thatmindfulness is not exclusively under the domain of Buddhism, but alternativetraditions employing mindfulness are given comparatively short shrift andthe gist of this special issue, when read as a whole, overwhelmingly privileges

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Buddhism by positioning mindfulness as a Buddhist practice embedded withina Buddhist worldview. (Friedman, this issue, p. 185)

In fact, when looking at the special issue as a whole, it turns out that four ofthe seven articles (including the introduction) focused on something otherthan Buddhism as a major concern. In other words, considerable space isdevoted to ‘‘non-Buddhist’’ approaches to mindfulness, which is exactlyof the opposite condition claimed in the criticism.

For example, Siegel’s contribution centered on the brain and spent muchtime examining the biological underpinnings of meditation. From theoutset, Johanson introduced his work as a dialog between humanisticpsychology and cognitive neural science and then took great pains toemploy computational metaphors to help describe how mindfulness medi-tation may alter patterns at the neurological, perceptual, experiential, andconscious levels. The piece by O’Connell explicitly called for research onhow to modify a traditional, i.e., Buddhist, approach to mindfulness so thatit may be used effectively in drug rehabilitation work. Finally, the work pre-sented by Vallejo and Amaro also talked about the importance of modifyingmindfulness practices so that they do not risk harm to clients who mightsuffer from standard applications because of contraindications associatedwith a particular client or clinical condition. In short, it is a matter of factthat more than half of the special issue does not ‘‘romanticize’’ a Buddhistapproach in the way the commentary claimed. A more accurate portrayal ofthe special issue ‘‘as a whole’’ (Friedman, this issue, p. 185) would be topoint out that, although one of the main goals is to appreciate the use ofmindfulness in the larger context of Buddhism, another is to balance thisapproach by paying considerable attention to non-Buddhism-based workin the area of mindfulness and psychotherapy.

To be as fair-minded as possible, of course, it must be said that the otherthree pieces do, indeed, explicitly involve a Buddhist foundation for the useof mindfulness in psychotherapy. The latter part of the introduction to thespecial issue, plus the articles by Khong and by Rosenbaum, clearly empha-size the importance of keeping the relationship between Buddhism and itspractices in mind while using mindfulness in psychotherapy. However, suchan emphasis does not necessarily romanticize Buddhism or elevate it beyondwhat it happens to be—one of the oldest and most well-developed bodies ofthought on the subject. Moreover, the reader is informed about exploringmindfulness from this context from the outset, an enterprise that does notnecessarily mean giving Buddhism intellectual superpower status in this orany other domain. We simply wished to operate from this context becauseit has value. After all, much of Benson’s (1975) pioneering work on thescience of meditation was based on subjects steeped in Buddhist traditions.

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The commentary posited one final critique that can be addressed here. Itis the notion that the special issue failed to address the issue that usingmindfulness in psychotherapy is not without risk. Many people haveacknowledged this possibility and the need to respect this possibility (Mruk& Hartzell, 2003). Accordingly, at least two pieces in the special issueexplicitly deal with problems associated with using mindfulness in psycho-therapy. For example, Khong focused on the fact that problems arise whenusing mindfulness without appropriate training and discipline. In fact, thatis one reason she strongly advocated the need to have a deeper appreciationof mindfulness in the first place, in this case the one offered by Buddhism.Similarly, Rosenbaum went to great lengths to warn about something thatmay be called mindfulness lite or mindfulness as mere technique, a dangerthat can lend itself to commercialism, as well as clinical misuse. Accordingto these authors, mindfulness without the type of training that involvesappreciating it in a greater context, such as Buddhism, is particularly vulner-able to these risks precisely because it is not grounded in a larger frameworkthat can help the practitioner maintain a disciplined perspective.

In sum, it does not appear that the special issue romanticizes Buddhismin the way that the commentary claimed. However, good dialog usuallyinvolves finding some common ground rather than only disagreement. Itis in this spirit that I wish to agree with one issue brought up by thecommentary. Along with Friedman, I think it is important to guard againstthe tendency to romanticize in humanistic psychology. This problem seemsvery likely to occur when researching topics such as consciousness or trans-personal phenomena because of the elusive nature of such work. Forexample, if the special issue focused on mindfulness itself (and not mindful-ness in the context of psychotherapy, as the actual title specified), I wouldadvocate an approach similar to what Friedman recommended to minimizethe likelihood of this type of problem.

In that case, for example, I might begin by treating mindfulness as a‘‘cultural universal, like consciousness itself’’ (Friedman, this issue, 186)and set up a design that would ask a good number of participants from arange of religious and secular perspectives to practice mindfulness as theirtraditions know it. The subjects would then be asked to describe their experi-ence in considerable detail and perhaps be interviewed about it. This datacould be then analyzed following Giorgi’s (1971) method because it is capableof revealing situated and general structures. Such procedures and their find-ings may show us that mindfulness is a cultural universal. However, this dataand method might also led to the conclusion that, although many culturespractice some form of mindfulness, cultural influences alter the way the struc-ture is lived to the point that it is more accurate to see this or that particulartype of practice as being distinct or even unique. Either finding would be

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valuable providing the method was executed rigorously and duplicated byothers with similar results. Such thorough research might even lead to a raremoment of empirical consensus in phenomenological psychology.

This more open-minded approach is entirely consistent with the use ofthe scientific method when researching mindfulness and related phenomena.For example, when discussing science in transpersonal psychology, CharlesTart (1992) said that it is ‘‘a method of sharpening and refining knowledge,can be applied to the human experiences we call transpersonal or spiritual,and both science and our spiritual traditions will be enriched as a result’’(p. 4). To temper this thought, he also said in the very next breath that‘‘The creation of transpersonal psychology is a long-term undertaking’’(Tart, 1992, p. 4). Thus, Friedman is correct to remind us that it is importantfor humanistic psychology to guard against a tendency to romanticize whenresearching these and other dimensions of human existence. At the sametime, Tart made it clear that it is also prudent to develop a sense of toleranceand patience for the difficulties associated with doing such work.

The same two points could also be made about other ways of romanticiz-ing humanistic psychology. One of them involves overvaluing the use ofsingle subject research in that such a limited pool makes the process ofgeneralizing findings very difficult. Another is to rely far too much on theuse of reflection, rather than developing research methods that use bothqualitative and quantitative techniques in ways that balance one another(Mruk, 2006). Although these discussions are worth having, they must waitfor another time, such as the one that could be afforded by a special issuedevoted to this topic.

REFERENCES

Benson, H. (1975). The relaxation response. New York: Morrow.

Friedman, H. (2010). Is Buddhism a psychology? Commentary on Romanticism in ‘‘Mindful-

ness in Psychology.’’ The Humanistic Psychologist, 38, 184–189.

Giorgi, A. (1971). Phenomenology and experimental psychology: 1 & 2. In A. Giorgi, W.

Fischer, & R. Von Eckartsberg (Eds.), Duquesne studies in phenomenological psychology

(Vol. 1, pp. 6–28). Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.

Khong, B., & Mruk, C. (Eds.). (2009). Special issue on mindfulness in psychology. The

Humanistic Psychologist, 37, 109–116.

Mruk, C. (2006). Self-esteem research, theory, and practice: Toward a positive psychology of

self-esteem (3rd ed.). New York: Springer.

Mruk, C., & Hartzell, J. (2003). Zen and psychotherapy: Integrating traditional and nontradi-

tional approach. New York: Springer.

Pargament, K. (1997). The psychology of religion and coping: Theory, research, practice.

New York: Guilford.

Tart, C. (1992). Transpersonal psychologies: Perspectives on the mind from seven great spiritual

traditions (3rd ed.). New York: Harper Collins.

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