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AI-DOE--13542

TI86 026343

&-DC'E-- 13542

LMFBR- FUEL CYCLE klC-79T~

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SAFEGUARDS AND SECUAllTY CONCEPT FOR THE

SECURE AUTOMATED FABRICATION (SAF) AND LIQUID METAL REACTOR (LMR)

FUEL CYCLE SAF LINE TECHNICAL SUPPORT

V. J. Schaubert M. E. Remley ,

L. F. Grantham

Rockwell International Rochnaldvne OIwiiian 6633 Catiogt Asenue Canoya Parx, California 91303

DISCLAIMER

This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency Thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.

DISCLAIMER Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Images are produced from the best available original document.

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1 .Q

2.0

Sumary. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. e ,.. I). . - . ..-* .. . . . . . m . . . . . *. . . . 1 . I

1.2

1.3 1.4 1.5

l * l . I Plant Description. ........*.*.........................-. 1.1.2 Security Design Concept-. a . , . . . . .. .a .-. . . . . . . . . . .. *. .. 1.1.3 Pbsical Security.. u. . . . .no , , .~ . * . . . . - ..o...~.e...~....o

1 .1 .4 Nuclear Materials Qfegwrar&. e . . . . .. a . . . . . - -. . .. . *. Plant Description. . . . . . . e * , *. ." . . ,<. . . . . a . . .-. I( .. 1.2.1 Nuclear Island Buildings and ~tkue~~~............~..e Security Design Concept. .. .. . . . ., . *. e . . ., . I . . . ,, . . . . m . . a. Physical Securi ty....,.... ...,, .*, .p.n.S~......~...........e..-. Nuclear Haterials SafeguaMs,, e (, e I , o . . . . a .... . . * e e . e a.. .

2.1

2.2

2 .3

2.4

In t~duct ion. . . . . . . . . . . . . .~ .~ . .~ , ~ ~ , . ".~."..............."...~. 2.1.1 Objective... .....n....~. .""~,.....~.....-..........***.. 2.1.2 Functions.....,.,.ua.... a y k l + c .C..,,l...........u....CII +

2.1.3 Design- sis Threats., . -. . . ." *. . . . .. .. . . . * * *.. .. . . . *

,,*e. I . ~ . "*D...*...*...~..o~o.~.o..~.~~

p t unci Special Features.. . . e *.. I a . . . pt. .." 0 1 ,. ,3 '$ < ct

i t . Cmpoul~tiiir;~. +, I. . . . . . . . . ProWtfnn.. I* . .

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... . - . . . . n 0 * . e . . .. r . * 4 . e e .*..*...*. D . . . . ....*

i ty. , e , . .. ., C..*P.....*......*..

Related RuiSdings.. ,............ .. .... .. system Ih.scrSpticf!. . . f . 0 . 0 * 0 0 . . .* e.. led Areak,.,. .,.. .*........Y........g... .#.

Area, .. ". .*. D. ..*. 4 .0 . . . . 0 .0 . . . . . . *

2.4.4 Fuel Cycle Facility,. . . ,>. . ...u.. *. . . . . . . .. .. ..

Page 1 i 1 2 4 5 6

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11 13 13 13

13 13 15 15 17 18 23 23 24 28 32 36 36 37 37 41

1. 2.

Page 2.4.5 Security Force.. . . . . . .. ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 2.4.6 Security ComPlunications. ... . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 -

3.0 Plant Safeguards Nuclear Material Control Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3.1 Safeguards Organization. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . 45

3.1.1 Plant Organization Structure......... .................. 45 3.1.2 Nuclear Control St~c~~.........I.................... 46 3.1.3 Security Structure for Safeguards.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 3.1 .4 Separation of Functions. . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3.2 Nuclear Material Control Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3.2.1 Responsibilities and Authorities.. .. . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . 49 3.2.2 ICA/HBA Designations. . . . . . . .... . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3.2.3 Measurements Criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 52 3.2.4 Measurement Requirements.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 3.2.5 Fuel Supplier Certification............................ 56 3.2.6 Statistics. ..... . . .,. .. .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

3.3 Training.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 3.3.1 facil it ies ...................... ....................... 58 3.3.2 Requ n~..................b......b.......e......*o. 58

58 65 67

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3.4 MBA/ICA Acc i l i t y Plan.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . -. 4.0 Conclusions..... . 9 .*. . . 0. . . . .. 0 . . 9 * 0 = =

5.0 References., . , . . . . . , . . . . . . .. ..... . . . . . . . . . . *. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .*.

... 0 . .

0 . .

...

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FIGURES

1. S i t e Security Zone plan........................^........^..........

2. Protected Area Perimeter--Secti on (Typical ) . . . ---*.-*.--....= * - * -

3. Fuel Transporter .,.,... ...... ...................................... 4. Sodi um-Fi 11 ed Transporter Thimble with Fuel El ement. . . . . . . . e . . . . . . . 5. Generic Oxide flow Dfagram.. .....................................~. 6. Oxide Processing Floor Layout. .....................................

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19 26 27 29 35

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ALARA

BOP

CAS CB CCP CCTV

EI&C ESF

FC F FHS FMEF FTS

GTB

HLW HVAC

ICA IHE IHTS

LMR

MBA MOX

NDA N I NIMB NRC

PAX PHIS

QC RCB RV

SAF SAS SGB SNM

ACRONYMS

As Low as Reasonably Achievable

Balance of P1 ant

Control Alarm System Control Bldg. Core Component Pots Closed Circuit Television

Electrical Instrumentation & Control Engineered Safety Facil i t y

Fuel Cycle Facility Fuel Handling System Fue? s & Materi a1 s Examination Facil i ty Fuel Transfer Cell

Gas Turbine Bldg.

High Level Waste Heat Ventilation & Air Conditioning

Item Control A k a Intennedi ate Heat Exchange Intermediate Heat Transport System

UPS

AI-DOE-13542

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i 1.1 OVERVIEW

* This report i s a safeguards and securi secure automated fabrication ( i d =tal reactor (uQ1) . fuel programs.

1 . 1 .1 P l ant Description

The SAF and UIR plant newt consists of 4 dent pmr-generati ng units called Power Paks tha OnS Of mDdular units and a fuel recycle or reprocessing facility combined w i t h a fuel fabrl- cation facility.

t e d area and the balance-

.. grade components and non-safety-grade canp owner-controll ed area. to security w i t h

In addition, the

security system

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The fuel recycle and fabrication t ion by including additional within- controls and by use of closed-circuit television monitoring withi

afforded increased protec-

1 . 1 .2 Security Design Concept

The SAF and LHR security system is designdd to protect specfa1 nuclear material [SNM) and v i t a l equipreent i n the efficient way so t h a t cost, operational impact, and security force s i all minimized. The design integrates the often competing objectives o f ensuring nuclear plant safety and physical security whi o t adversely affecting the safety of plant personnel. Thus, the desig ects the i n t e n the safety and security requirements. The se nerability study of the plant that shows there t o be no apparent sa through which a credible adversary action might cause serious radiological consequences. The security system is designed to:

cess t o the faci l i ty

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The security design concept for this plant separates the s i t e into four increasingly sensitive security zones, each with i t s amn access control p o i n t , as follows:

0 Owper-control 1 ed area 0 BOP-controll ed area 0 NI-protected area 0 FCF-protected area.

These areas are illustrated on the Site Security Zone Plan, Figure 1. The protected area boundary surrounds only the NI: and the fuel cycle faci l- ity. T h i s approach has several benefits:

0 Increased operating efficiency because access control requirements are matched t o the appropriate Bevel of security

Reduced number of guards needed since the area t o be protected is relatively small

Reduced number of people requiring processing for entering or exit ing the NI compared w i t h the total plant population.

0

a

With in the NI, the following s y s ~ s potentially require protection against sabotage o r theft:

Reactor fuel handling and storage

Reactor cool ant boundary

Reactor shutdown

Shutdown heat removal

Fuel transport between the reactor and the fuel cycle fac i l i ty ( FCF 1 FCF .

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OHINER CONTROLLED A R U I

t

Figure 7 . Site Security Zone

I I I c I I I I I 4 I I I I I I I I I

I------ 95467.56

P1 an

Each reactor system has redundant protection equipment or has inherent design features that contribute to or secure against the design threat.

1.1.3 Physical Security

The physical security systan for the NI-protected area has the following primary components:

e Redundant i n

0 Surveil 1 ance

0 Hardened guard

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................. ......... . .---.... ......... ....................... .---- - _" , , ,

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e

e Positive personnel identification sys;tems

e Central and secondary alarm stations

e

e Hardened, access-controlled boundaries for v i t a l areas and

A computer-based card-key access control system

Redundant and uninterruptible power syst;ems

equi p e n t

e On- site guard force backed by off-site response forces.

These systems provide detection, assessment and delay of, and response agains t the threats of radiological sabotage and theft. Detection is accom- pl ished using sensors located a t t h e NI-protected area boundary. Assessment o f sensor alarms i s remotely accomplished using a closed-circuit te levis ion (CCTV) system. A delay t o intrusion is provided by the perimeter barriers t o permit CCTV assessment. A more substantial delay t o allow adequate time for an effective response i s achieved a t the exterior building envelope. Delay times and specific features o f t h e barrier system depend on tradeoffs involving the response force, such as the nuinber o f guards and the time i t takes for guards t o engage the intruders.

7.1.4 Nuclear Material s Safeguards

The objectives o f a safeguards system are to provide:

0 A physical protection system that prevents thef t of SNM and that prevents sabotage of vital equipment whose fai lure, destruction, o r misuse could result i n a radiological hazard t o the pub1 i c

0 A materials control an to maintain records on the amount and locatio the SNW t o verify that i t

The material measurement and accou and system used t o perform measuremen and perform data analyses t o account for SNM.

sses the procedures provj de reports

The accountability system

AI-DOE-13542 5

, , . , . -~ ,,,, ... , . . . ... . . . .. ... ". -. . . . ...... .

tracks and measures each batch o r stream containling SNM as i t enters or leaves the process and a t internal process locations.

The reprocessing and fuel fabrication fac i l i t i es are designed t o include materi a1 balance control t o provide an effective accountabil i t y system. To provide a total plant material balance, i t is essential t o measure t h e quan- t i t ies o f SNM entering and leaving the p l a n t .

7.2 PLANT DESCRIPTION

The SAF and LMR p l a n t consists o f one or more independent power- generating u n i t s called Power Paks and a FCF. Each Power Pa& consists of a sodium-cooled reactor system that transfers heat t o a steam system t h a t drives the turbine generator. The heart o f the Power Pak is a compact, pool-type, sodium-cool ed reactor. Primary pumps and intermediate heat exchangers ( IHXs 1 ci rcul ate primary sodl urn w i t h i n the reactor vessel and transfer reactor ther- mal power t o independent IHTS loops. Superheated steam is generated by steam generators (one per intermediate loop). H e a t i s removed from the reactor by the primary heat transfer system (PHTS), transferred t o the IHTS via the IHX, and then transferred t o the turbine generator system v i a the steam generator sy s tern.

The reactor conta-inment building (RCB) encloses the reactor vessel PHTS components, i n-containment fuel hand1 ing system (FHS) equipment, and necessary electrical instrurnenta (EIBC) equipment. The teac-

tor guard vessel constitu elope below the reactor closure.

the

The steam gen rbine side o f the RCB, are conventio ted on the basemat. Auxiliary systems are

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The FCF bui ld ing is designed for the various functions associated w i t h processing irradiated fuel from the M i n t o new assemblies for return and reuse. I t contains an area for irradiated fuel receiving, a fuel disassembly station, and a fuel reprocessing system that includes conversion stage, pellet fabrication, and pidelement assernbly stages.

Recovered plutonium solutions are stored within the bu i ld ing u n t i l required for mixed oxide pellet fabrication a t which time they are converted t o oxide form. Recovered uranium solutions are s tored as solutions which are converted t o oxide as required for mixed oxide pellet fabrication. An excess of uranium over that required for plant operations will occur as the plant operation continues. I t is expected that the plant will no t generate more p’iutoniun than is required t o maintain reactor operation.

Replacement blanket fuel assemblies, f o r economic reasons, w i l l be procured from outside vendors.

7.2.1 Nucl ear Is1 and Buil di ngs and Structures

A l l structures housing ’safety-related facilities and/or f ac i l i t i e s con- t a i n i n g radioactivity are included i n t h i s section. Most o f these structures are seismic Category I and are designed to protect safety-related f ac i l i t i e s from natural phenomena and t o withstand design-basis and beyond-desi gn-basi s accidents. Some of these structures are Category 11 (not safety related b u t checked t o ensure they cannot dam adjacent safety-related features under Category I design conditions), and some are Category I f1 (nonnuclear design standards).

0 Nuclear Island--The NI is a s ing i s t i n g of a Category I concrete mat, concrete slabs a t the lower and intermediate levels an ructural steel framing and metal s id ing a t the upper elevations. I t consists primarily of containment, the SGBs, and the auxiliary bu i ld ings .

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The con ta imnt consists o f the guard vessel surrounding the rexfQr vessel and of a carbon-steel-lined concrete box structure above the reactor vessel,

The auxiliary buildings adjacent Uo containment are o f concrete construction. They house various reactor support systems and penetrations i c t o containment.

The steam generator structures frlom one floor above the basemat are Category XI structures o f sltructural steel covered w i t h metal siding.

Immediately adjacent to the X I is a buried concrete vau l t on a separate basemat containing the SURPS/IHTS Na drain tank.

0 Nuclear Island Maintenance Building (N1MB)--The NIMB 1s a 1 arge . SI ngl e-story bui 1 ding. designed and constructed t o - - Category If1 requikents . foundations and a structural steel superstructure covered with metal siding. A large p a r t o f tlhe floor system w i l l be served by an overhead bridge crane.

The NIMB houses a radwaste processing facilf ty as well as a process water treatment facil i ty, both o f which serve a l l o n 4 t e units and related facil i ties.

I t has concrete ground floor and

A par t of the NIMB called the p l a n t services bu i ld ing contains access control and related faci1i.ties to serve a l l personnel working i n the radioactively controlled parts of the plant.

concrete building. I t houses the control room, the computer 0 Control Building (CB)--The CB i s a two-story, Category I

and the technical support center.

0 Engineered Safety Facility ( E S F ) Services Building-The ESF services buildins houses the essential chilled water chil lers,

l a ries, and switchgear, I t i s a Category I ,

co 9 as structural ly integral

0 Gas Turbine Bui ld ing (GTB)--The GTB i s a Category 1 concrete structure t h a t encloses safety- rade gas turbines and related facil i t ies.

0 Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF1-T shielded Category I concrete fuel from a l l Power Paks onsi t o this faci l i ty from each un a t grade.

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1.3 SECURITY DESIGN CONCEPT

The design-basis threats established i n 10 CFR 73.1 have determined the safeguards and security systems included i n the plaint design. In addition, the threat o f assaul t by a vehicle carrying explosives has also been considered, though not required by current regulations.

The security concept for t h i s plant separates the site i n t o several security zones and locates the protected area boundary barrier around only the NI and the FCF. This approach:

e Increases operating efficfency because access control requirements are matched t o the appropriate level of security

e Reduces the number of guards needed since the area t o be protected is relatively small

I, Reduces substantially the number o f people requiring processing f o r e n t e r i n g or exiting the NI: compared wSth the total plant population.

The p l a n t design has inherent and unique operating characteristics and safety features that reduce the scope o f the security design. These include:

Physical separation o f the N I from the BOP with no safety- related components and systems i n the fHTS or BOP

0 Physical separation o f the FCF from LMR w i t h i n the NI

e An inherent, passive reactivity reactor control device design

0

0 Long grace period be

LMR designed w i t h mu’ltiple passive decay heat removal systems

needed.

AI-DOE-1 3542 9

The following systems potentially require protection against sabotage o r theft:

0 LMR functions . Fuel handling and storage . Reactor coolant boundary . Reactor shutdown . Shutdown heat removal

a FCF faci l i ty 0 Fuel transport system.

Each o f t h e reactor systems has redundant protection equipment or inherent design features t h a t contribute t o the protection or secure the plant against the design threat.

The plant is designed t o permit incremental additions o f modular u n i t s . Operating units can maintain t h e required level o f security during construction o f adjacent u n i t s and whenever outside contractors are necessary w i t h i n the protected area o f an operating u n i t .

1.4 PHYSICAL SECURITY

The physical security concept focuses on providing differing levels of protection for the varujous areas o f the plant s i te , w i t h four levels, or zones, of access control measures corresponding t o the level o f security needed.

The owner-control 1 e first of these zones of access control w i t h acc cool i n g towers, admi n- is trat ion and training b second level o f con- t r o l allows access t o t h (BOP), w i t h empl oyee identification badges and card-keys issued i n the BOP guardhouse. The t h i r d level s t r i c t l y limits access t o those who have a need to enter the NI- protected area. The fourth and most restrictive level o f access control is ,

AI-DOE-13542 10

for the FCF, which is designed t o further limit o r restrict personnel access and where exiting personnel are monitored for SNM, The FCF is located within the NI-protected area.

The primary components o f the physical security system f o r the NI- protected area are as follows:

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Mu1 t i p l e perimeter barriers and isolaition zones

Redundant intrusion detection system,

Survei 1 1 ance and assessment equipment

Hardened guardhouse f a d i ties

A computer-based card-key access control system

Posi t ive personnel identification systems

Central and secondary alarm stations

Redundant and uni nterrupti bl e power systems

Hardened, access-controlled boundaries f o r v i t a l facil ities and equipment

On-site guard force backed by off-site response forces.

7.5 NUCLEAR MATERIALS SAFEGUARDS

The nuclear materi a1 s safeguards and control concept f o w e s on establishing a control and accounting system that ensures current knowledge of the location and quantity of nuclear material i n the plant and provides a means t o obtain ear’ly detection of thef t or d i ion of sucb materials. The control and accounting system will be computerized t o the ex t en t possible and whenever possible w i t 7 use recycle and fabrication fac i l i ty on-line stations ’ informa- t i o n t o continuously upgrade the records systems.

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The physica7 security section describes the physical protection devices and systems designed to prevent theft or sabaltage. describes the controls and accounting means used t o detect theft o r diversion and t o determine rapidly the quantities involvcrd,

The safeguards section

The components of the safeguards control and accounting system are out-

7 ined i n regulatory documents. Primary compoiients consist o f the fol 1 owing concepts :

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C1 early delineated responsibilities for the control of nuclear materials

Specific assignment o f personnel t o nuclear material and accountability functions

Integrating safeguards requirements w i t h physical security concepts

Devel oping and maintaining wr i t t en safeguards procedures

Establ i sh ing clearly defined nuclear material control areas

Establishing measurement cr i ter ia and measurement records

Establ ishing and maintaining central accounting and subsidiary accounting systems

Establ fshing nuclear material inventory and inventory control sys tern!;

Near-real-time location o f f i s s i l e material i n the FCF and the reactor areas

Separated plutonium stored as aqueous nitrate solution

Plutonium and uranium mixed before conversion to mixed oxide for refabrication.

0127Y/1 j m

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2.0 PHYSICAL SECURITY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

T h i s section describes the physical security system developed for the SAF

and LMR program, reflecting its unique design characteristics and operating concept.

2.1.1 Objectt've

The objective o f t h e security system is t o provide physical protection t o prevent the theft o f special nuclear materials (SNlrl) and t o prevent the sabotage o f vital equipment such as the failure, destruction, or misuse of which could result i n a radiological hazard t o the public, T h i s system i s designed t o achieve t h i s objective as efficiently as possible so t h a t cost, operational impact, and security force size are a l l minimized.

2.1.2 Functions

The functions of the security systems are to:

0

a a Delay unauthorized activit ies 0 Deter potential adversary actions a Prevent theft of SNM 0

Al low authorized personnel and material access t o the fac i l i ty Keep out all unauthorized personnel and material Detect and verify unauthorized activit ies

Prevent sabotage o f vital equipment.

2.1.3 Design-Basis Threats

The design-basis threats established in 10 CFR 73.1 determine the safe- Specific acts of sabo- guards and security systems described i n this report.

tage and t h e f t are discussed.

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2.1.3.1 Radiological Sabotage

This is defined i n 10 CFR 73.1 as:

a A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions of several peicsons w i t h the following a t t r i - butes, assistance, and equipment:

. Well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated i ndivi dual s

. Inside assistance, which inay include a knowledgeable i n d i v i d u a l who attempts t o particlpate i n a passive role (e.g. , provide information), an active role (e.g., facil- i ta te entrance and exit , disable alarms and connnunica- tions, participate i n violent attack), or both

Sultable weapons, up t o and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped w i t h silencers and having effective long-range accuracy

. Hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools o f entry or for otherwise destroying reactor facil i ty , transporter, o r container integrity or features of the safeguards system

.

e An internal threat o f an insider, i n c l u d i n g an employee ( i n any posi tian).

2.1.3.2 T h e f t or Diversion o f Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nucl ear Materi a1 -

This is defined i n 10 CFR 73.1 as: -

0 A determined vio lent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, by a small group w i t h the following a t t r i - butes, assistance, and equipment:

. Well-trained (including military training and skills) and

. Inside assistance, which may include a knowledgeable

dedicated individuals

ind iv idua l who attempts t o participate i n a assive role (e.g. , provide information), an active role fe.9. , faci l- i t a t e entrance and exit, disable alarms and comunica- t ions , participate i n violent attack) , or bo th

AI-DOE-13542 14

.. . - -. ... ... . ... .... . ”-

. Suitable weapons, up t o and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with s i l e n c e r s and having e f f e c t i v e 1 ong-range accuracy

. Hand-carried equipment, includiitng incapac i ta t ing agents and explosives f o r use as tools of e n t r y o r for otherwise destroying reactor, facility, t ranspor te r , or conta iner i n t e g r i t y o r features of t h e safeguards system

. The a b i l i t y t o opera te as two or' more teams.

An individual , including an employee (in any pos i t ion)

A conspiracy between ind iv idua ls i n any pos i t ion who may have:

Access t o and deta i led knowledgie of nuclear power p l a n t s o r the f a c i l i t i e s referred t o i n 10 CFR 73.2Na)

0

0

.\ Items t h a t could facilitate theft of SNM (e.g,, small tools, s u b s t i t u t e materials, false documents, etc, 1

. Both o f the above.

Recent worldwide acts o f t e r ror i sm suggest tha t it would be prudent t o add a s s a u l t by a veh ic l e car ry ing explosives t o the design-basis t h r e a t . This design addresses measures t o p r o t e c t against such acts, though no t required by regulat ions.

2.2 DES1 GN CHARACTERISTICS

T h i s section describes the p l a n t design and security components, A con- ceptual site plan o f the p l a n t is shown i n Figure 1 t o illustrate t h e design

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the SAF and LMR program.

2.2.1 P lan t Design Concept.and Special Features

The SAF and LMR program includes several innovative design concepts and special safety f ea tu re s , These a r e sumMrized below.

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. .. __ . - . . - -. . . . . .. . . . . . . . - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .

2.2.1 .l Phased Modul a r Expansion

The SAF and LMR program consists of one to four independent power- generating u n i t s call ed Power Paks. The design permits incremental additions of these modular units. Operating units can maintain the required level of security dur ing construction of adjacent units and whenever outside contractors are necessary w i t h i n the protected area of an operating reactor u n i t .

2.2.1.2 Nuc'l ear Is1 and Protected Area

The p l a n t is separated into nuclear and nonnuclear areas. This results i n a "zoned" approach t o security w i t h fewer fac i l i t i e s and personnel w i t h i n a reduced NI-protected area. The required level of security can be maintained with smaller guard fac i l i t ies , fewer security forces and less security hardward.

2.2.1.3 Plant Safety Features

The plant design' has inherent and unique operating characteristics and safety features t h a t reduce the scope o f the security system. These include:

0 Physical separation of the N I from the BOP w i t h no safety- related components and systems i n the IHTS o r BOP-controlled area

Physical separation o f the LMR and the SAF w i t h i n the nuclear i sl and

0

Inherent reactor safety control designs

,

.

.

An inherent, passive reactivity control device

Multiple passive decay heat removal systems

Long grace period before corrective action is needed.

AI-DOE-1 3542

16

2.2.2 Security Concept

The SAF and LMR security design is based on is vulnerability review i n which threats against system capabilities for both active and passive reactor shutdown and decay heat removal systems were assessed. The review showed t h a t there are no apparent "windows" through which an adversary action might cause serious radiological consequences. The security design reflects this conclu- sion by providing differing levels of protection fa r the various parts o f the p l a n t , w i t h four levels, or zones, of increasingly sensitive access control measures a t four different p o i n t s corresponding to the levels o f security needed.

The owner-controll ed area boundary constitutes the first of these zones of access control w i t h access 1 i m i ted to the warehouse, administration and training bui ld ings , cooling towers, and parking lots. The second level of control allows access to the nonnuclear side of the plant, the BOP-controlled area, w i t h employee identification badges and card-keys issued i n the BOP guardhouse. The t h i r d level s t r i c t ly limits access t o the NI-protected area t o those who have a need t o enter. The NI guardhouse also monitors exiting personnel for SNM. The foirrth and most restr ict ive level of access control is for the FCF, which is located w i t h i n the NI-protected area. The NI guardhouse controls access and egress from the FCF and monitors e x i t i n g personnel fo r SNM. FCF personnel badges will be keyed t o permit only positive identification entry i n t o specific areas o f the FCF.

Thus, the security concept for this p l a n t :

0 Addresses an increased design-basi s threat

AI-DOE-13542

17

e Separates the si te i n t o several security zones

Locates the protected area boundary barrier around only the NI and the FCF.

The benefits are as follows:

0 Increased operating efficiency because access control requirements are matched to the approprlate level of security

0 Reduced number o f guards needed s,ince the area ;rO be protected is relatively small

0 Greatly reduced number of people requiring processing for entering or exi t ing the NI compared t o the total plant populat ion.

2.2.3 Physical Security Components

The physical protection system provides early detection, assessment and delay o f , and response t o the threats o f radiological sabotage and theft. Detection is accomplished using sensors located a t the N I boundary. Assessing sensor alarms i s remotely accomplished us ing a CCTV system. A delay to intrusion i s provided a t the perimeter fencing to permit CCTV assessment. A more substantial delay to allow adequate time for an effective response i s achieved a t the exterior b u i l d i n g envelope. Delay times and specific features of the barrier system depend on tradeoffs involving the response force, such as the number of guards and the time i t takes for guards t o engage the intruders.

'

The components of the physical security system are discussed below.

2.2.3.1 Barriers, Protected Area

Barriers around the site boundary and the nonnuclear side o f the p l a n t will consist of s tandard chai e NI-protected area, however , barriers w i 11 i ncl ude i th barbed wire above, plus alarms and/or electr if ic gh concrete or concrete u n i t masonry b u i l d i n g walls w i cle barriers to prevent crashing through the a i l of the double fence, vehicle barrier, and other security system components discussed below.

A I -DOE-1 3542

18

20 ft (MINI ISOLATION ZONE -- ISOLATION ZONE- I 20 ft (MIN)’ 2511

-CLEAR ZONE-

95467-57R1

Figure 2. Protected Area Perimeter-Section { T y p i c a l )

2.2.3.2 Intrusion Detection Systems

The areas between and around the dual fences will be equipped w i t h electronic equipment tha t sense intrusion, such as:

a Ground-mounted microwave system; that alarm when their trans- m i t t e d signals are interrupted

e Fence or ground-mounted E-Field systems that alarm when their constant magnetic f i e ld is disturbed

e Motion-detection CCTV systems tha t alarm when movement takes place w i t h i n their view

Fence deflection systems that alarm when a fence is deformed or deflected t o a predetermined degree.

Interior systems include area occupancy monitors that alarm when the air environment is disturbed and l ight detectors tha t sense changes i n reflected light. Also, the CCTV motion-detection system will be used.

2.2.3.3 Survei 1 1 ance and Assessment Systems

The C C l Y system i s the primary means of surveillance and assessment. The system w i l l include a bu i l t- in time delay so t h a t monitoring personnel will have time t o focus their attention on the projection screen. In addition, the various site-specific alarms indicate the area penetrated, not simply that a penetration has occurred. Guard personnel w i l l always be available t o respond promptly t o investigate alarms. A l l alarm systems will have monitors i n both the central and secondary alarm stations.

2.2.3.4 Exterior Lighting

Illumination of the NI-protected area will be no 'less t h a n 0.2 fc ( f t-candl e ) w i t h automatic switchover t o the on-si t e standby power source.

AI-DOE-1 3542

20

2.2.3.5 Access Control and Positive Personnel Identification

A computer-based, card-key access control system will be used to control each employee's access t o any secured area. Such systems will be l inked t o both central and secondary alarm stations for monilming and keeping records o f a l l entries t o vital areas, This system wil l also provide positive ident i- fication of personnel entering the protected area through the use o f equipment that compares and verifies hand geometry patterns, retinal eye patterns, or voice patterns w i t h known parameters for each empl oyee.

2.2.3.6 Response Capabil i ties

The guard force w i l l be manned so that several guards are always imnedi- ately available t o respond t o alarms and ensure t h a t the design threat adversary can be neutralized u n t i l off-site forces arrive.

2.2.3.7 Nuclear Is1 and Guardhouse

The NI guardhouse is the single point o f personnel and vehicle access control t o the NI-protecte,d area. I t w i l l be equipped w i t h identification and detection equipment and prlDvide search facilities t o monitor a17 personnel and vehicles entering and ex i t i ng the NI-protected area. t ions will be located i n the tJ1 guardhouse.

One of two alarm sta-

2.2.3.8 Power Sources

Power suppl ies will be provided w i t h adequate capacity and access t o o n 4 t e ac standby power sources. provide power for security system electronjcs,

An uninterrupt i bl e power source (UPS) w i l l

2.2.3.S Central Alarm Station (CAS)

The central alarm station (CAS) is designated as a vital area and will be located within the NI-protected area. This station will contain:

AI-DOE-1 3542 21

0 Facilities for comnunications with each security guard on duty, the secondary alarm station, and a l l off- site lawenforcement authorities

e Monitors and controls for the CC:W system

. 0 Central alann and display panell for the intrusion-detection systems console and p r in te r for the card-key access control system

0 Any other special emergency alarms.

The UPS system will be located w i t h i n the MI-protected area.

2.2.3.10 Secondary A1 arm Station

The secondary alarm station (SAS) is located i n the control building. It i s designed t o assume control o f the security system should the CAS be un- available. suitable controls a t the SAS. Once t h i s has tDccurred, the CAS will become isolated from the remainder of the security system.

Control capability can be removed from the CAS by activating

The SAS will contain:

a An alainn panel for intrusion-detection systems

e E1ectr;mic data processing equipment necessary to operate the system

e Radio and telephone (PAX and c m e r c i a l ) communications w i t h the CAS and off- site law-enforcement authorities

0 Emergency ex i t alarms, and other alarm systems as required.

I t w i l l be possible t o monitor and control the CCTV system from the SAS.

AI-DOE-1 3542 22

2.2.3.11 Vital Areas

Vi ta l areas are located within the NI-protected area and are protected by b u i l d i n g walls, roofs, and floors, which constitute a second physical barrier. Vital equipment and fac i l i t i es are isolated $From nonvital equipment and fac i l i t i es where feasible. The second physical barrier enclosing v i t a l equipment will be capable of deterring intrusion by unauthorized persons and pro- v i d i ng reasonable resistance t o penetration.

2.2.3.12 Fuel Cycle F a d i ty

The FCF is located inside its own "island" w i t h i n the NI-protected area. It i s surrounded by its own perimeter barriers w i t h personnel entry and ex i t v i a an underground tunnel from the NI guardhouse. Vehicular and rail t ra f f ic must pass through guarded gates a t the fac i l i ty ' s perimeter.

2.3 PLANT OPERATING SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMEKT

2.3.1 Systems Requiring Protection

Normally, a system analysis of the faci l i ty would be made t o identify and locate SNM and vital equipment and t o determine the consequences of sabotage of the v i t a l equipment; however, t h i s cannot be done u n t i l a more detailed plant design is avai lable . While lacking such a design, i t is still possible t o identify major plant systems t h a t , i f sabotaged, have the potential t o result i n an off-site release i n excess of 10 CFR 100 limits. Vital equipment types and approximate locations can also be identified. The following systems potential ly require protection:

a 0 Fuel handling and storage 0 Reactor coolant boundary a Reactor shutdown

Fuel recycle faci l i ly (includes the fuel recycle and SAF areas)

AI-DOE-13542 23

e Reactor shutdown heat removal e Fuel transportation between the LMR and FCF.

To maintain a reactor plant i n a safe condition dur ing a sabotage event, three essential functions mus t be met: s h u t down the reactivity, remove decay heat, and maintain the reactor coolant boundary.

For the reactor fuel transfer cell (FTC) and fuel transfer system, the essential functions are t o prevent the fuel from overheating and t o prevent the fuel cladding from breaking.

The essential function for the FCF is t o confine the fuel, confine other radioactive materials, prevent sabotage, and detect and deter theft.

2.3.2 Reactor Fuel Hand7 i n g and Storage

Vital areas and material access areas associated w i t h the fuel handling and storage system include the spent fuel shielded transporter area, the fuel transfer and storage cel l , and the reactor vessel (RV).

Fresh driver fuel consists o f an enriched uranium and plutonium matrix of mixed oxides, Driver fuel i s contained i n large, heavy, welded assemblies. Each assembly will con,tain a significant amount o f plutonium. The quanti ty of plutonium and uranium w i l l be determined a t the time the reactor design i s completed. New fuel assemblies are transported on a specialized r a i l sy5tem from t h e FCF i n a ' shielded transporter device. Conventional rail equipment cannot enter FCF or NI areas because of e rail specialization.

Newly refabricated driver fuel assembli are remotely inspected a t the FCF and are temporarily stored i n sodium-fi core component pots (CCPs). New blanket assemblies and control assembl i assuming they are fabricated elsewhere, also will be inspected a t the FCF before being stored in CCPs. These core assemblies (driver, blanket, and control 1 are transferred singly i n the shielded top-loading transporter by rail from the FCF t o the power plant.

AI-DOE-1 3542

24

Movement of the shielded transporter u n i t (see Figure 3) is restricted t o the NI-protected area. In the receiving and s h i p p h g area of the Power Pak, the shielded transporter is mated t o an entry port i n the fuel handling cell . In the inert atmosphere of the fuel handling cell!, new fuel assemblies are placed i n t o temporary storage. Spent driver fuel iissemblies remain i n the RV t o decay for one year before being removed to the FTC. Decayed spent fuel is then moved through the FTC and deposited i n FTC storage positions. refueling and reactor start-up, spent fuel is moved over a period o f several days from the fuel handling celt via the shielded cask transporter t o the FCF.

After

The fuel assemblies i n the sod imf i l l ed CCPs are stored i n cylindrical thimbles (see Figure 4) t h a t form part of the fuel transfer cell inert gas boundary. Decay heat is removed by natural convection a i r flowing on the exterior of the cylindrical thimbles. The design consists o f a single a i r in le t and a single exhaust stack for t h i s cooling a i r f low. The in le t opening area i s approximately 36 f t , located 30 f t above grade. The opening is protected agains t tornado missi'le damage by heavy steel louvers, backed by a heavy wire mesh protective screen agains t entry of small objects t h a t may pass through the louver openings. The natural convection exhaust stack rises approximately 56 f t from the roof of the N I building. The exhaust openings are a lso protected w i t h heavy duty steel louveis and heavy wire mesh screens.

2

There is considerable inherent theft protection in the fuel handling and storage system since the fuel assemblies are relatively heavy and are remotely handled. Theft of fresh driver fuel assemblies would appear t o be an extreme- ly time-consuming risk, requiring the use of special hand1 l n g equipment and vehicles, as the assemblies must be handled remotely because of their inherent plutonium content and radiation field.

The primary sabotage concern would be i n the FCF, where the irradiated assembl ies have been reprocessed and consequently would be less radioactive t h a n unprocessed assembl ies,

AI-DOE-13542 25

DOUBLE

/SHIELD DOOR

21 t

i-

3 in.

41.0 in. OD-

DOOR I (ON

1 CENTER CY LIN DER

-CY L1 N DER SHIELDING

\BOTTOM &MA1 6-59-3

SHIELDING

Figure 3. Fuel Transporter

AI-DOE-13542 26

9.120 in. OD 7.75 in. ID 1

8 SCHEDULE 20 PIPE 8.625 in. OD BY 0.25 In. WA-- \ I

f 8 in. I 3 3 % . I -- ?a U.

95467-736

Figure 4. Sodi urn-Fi 1 1 ed Transporter Thimble w i t h Fuel Element

A1-DOE-13542

27

Protection against radiological sabotage iis also inherent i n the fuel handl i n g and storage system. Throughout the fuel handl i n g sequence, spent fuel i s under sodium and w i t h i n i naccessi bl e, iiierted cell s.

When removing decay heat from the spent fuel temporarily stored i n the FTC, the primary sabotage threat is blockage of the natural convection cooling a i r inlet or outlet openings by sabotage. The heavy steel plate louvers are designed t o prevent significant loss o f flow area caused by impacts from tornado missiles. The louvers would provide similar protection against sabotage threats. In add i t ion , the small free area between individual louvers, together w i t h the heavy wire mesh backing, prevents the entry o f significant amounts o f explosive materials. Blockage o f both the inlet and outlet is further complicated by the location of the in le t 30 f t above grade and the outlet approximately 56 f t above the roof 1Jne. Even i f the inlet and outlet were total ly blocked, there would be approximately 36 h of time availabJe t o remove the blockage before sodium b o i l i n g would occur.

2.3.3 Fuel Cycle Facility

Spent fuel assembl ies and spent blanket assembl ies are transported from the reactor t o the reprocess1 ng faci 1 i ty i n sodi um-f i 11 ed thimbl es. These thimbles contain one element and are moved i n a transporter on a dedicated rai l line.

The fuel flow through the FCF i s planned as a continuous process that processes material around the clock i n 35-day campaigns (see F igure 5). then shut down for 2 months for the high-level waste handling, maintenance, and for nuclear material safeguards and accounting inventories. Plans call f o r reprocessing a number o f spent fuel assemblies i n series followed by reprocessing a number o f spent blanket assemblies. A small spent fuel storage

I t is

capability has been designed for the reprocessing plant.

The in i t i a l process will have the sodium-filled thimble containing the assembly brought into the receiving faci l i ty where the sodium is melted and

AI-DOE-13542 28

Figure 5. Generic

+ TO REACTOR

95467-138

Oxide Flow Diagram

the assembly removed. The assembly is first washed and then stored i n a water-cooled pool.

Refabricated assemblies are transported back through the receiving faci l- i t y . To accomplish this transfer, the refabricated assemblies are piaced into the sodi om-cool ed thimbles I) replaced back on the transporter, and transported back t o the reactor f o r storage pending eventual insertion into the reactor.

2.3.3.1 Reprocessi ng

The spent assemblies are taken i n t o the head-end cell and placed i n thg horizontal position. A laser is used t o remove the ducting. The t o p hardware i s placed i n the intermediate solid waste containers. The remainder of the

AI-DOE-1 3542 29

assembly is moved t o the shear where the fuel bundle is sheared i n t o 2- in.- long pieces, which fal l i n t o a rotary dissolut ion drum. The remaining por- t i o n o f the assembly containing the bottom hardware is transported t o the intermediate1 eve1 waste container.

The uranium and p lu tonium contained i n the 2-in. slugs of fuel in the rotary dissolver are dissolved i n aqueous n i t r ic acid. The h u l l s remaining i n the drum are washed and placed i n high-level s o l i d waste disposal canisters. Empty drums are returned t o the dissolver fo r collection of more sheared fuel sf ugs.

The vessel off-gas collected dur ing shearing and dissolution operations contain the volatile fission gases and ni t r ic acid fumes, which must be removed before release t o the atmosphere. The xenon and krypton are separated by fluorocarbon adsorption and stored. The iodine i s trapped i n zeolite scrubbers, the ruthenium is recovered w i t h absorbers and the gas i s f i l tered t o remove particulates. The gas is scrubbed t o remove acid vapors and mixed w i t h ventilation air before release to the atmosphere.

After digestion and centrifuging t o remove particulates, the acid solu- t i o n is sampled, analyzed, and adjusted t o ensure proper valence and concen- t ra t ion of the dissolved heavy metals. The solution i s fed near the center of a series o f countercurrent centrifugal contactors where i t i s repeatedly mixed w i t h and separated from the organic extractant. I n these contactors the uranium and plutonium are complexed by tributyl phosphate and extracted i n t o the organic phase. The fission products remain i n the aqueous phase and, thus, are removed from the uranium and plutonium. The aqueous phase is scrubbed t o remove traces o f heavy metal remaining and transferred t o high-level liquid waste storage.

After scrubbing t o remove traces o f fission products, the heavy metals are partitioned by reducing and back extracting the plutonium i n t o an aqueous phase. The plutonium i s purified th rough a series of contactors where i t i s repeatedly extracted i n t o the organic phase and back extracted i n the aqueous

AI-DOE-I 3542 30

6 a phase. In this manner decontamination factors of IO t o 10 can be obtained. The pur i f ied plutonium i s concentrated and transferred to storage where i t is sampled and analyzed. The organic extractant i s pur i f ied and recycled t o the centrifugal contactor feed tanks.

The uranium is back extracted i n t o the aqueous phase and reextracted into the organic and finally back extracted into the aqueous phase i n a series o f contactors. The purified uranium is then concentrated, sampled, analyzed, and placed i n storage tanks. The solvent i s washed, purified, and recycled.

Both the plu tonium and uranium w i l l be stored as aqueous ni t ra te solutions. These will be mixed i n the required proportion before being converted t o oxide. Sufficient storage i s provided i n a series of crlticality safe slab tanks so that refahsication operations can he withdrawing from one series of tanks whi 1 e reprocessing i 5 feeding another series.

Sufficient uranium and plutonium i n solution i s withdrawn from the storage tanks t o give the desired plutonium/uranium ratio i n recycled fuel. These solutions are blended, mixed wi th additives, and thermally decomposed t o the oxide. The oxide i s reduced t o the substoichiometrSc dioxide, granulated, pressed into pellets, and sintered. The pellets are inspected and the rejects are recycled. appropriate number o f o f f - s i te procured U02 blanket pel 1 ets.

The MOX pellets are then loaded i n t o magazines along w i t h the

The pellets are loaded i n t o p i n s followed by the plenum tube and hold-

down pins. The p i n s are capped, welded s h u t , and decontaminated. After inspection, the p i n s are wire wrapped, assembled i n t o assembljes, and locked i n t o place. The duct i s placed over the assembly and welded. The t o p subassembly hardware i s inserted into the other end of the d u c t and welded i n place. The completed assemblies are given a f ina l dimensional and straight- ness inspection and transferred t o storage for subsequent transfer t o the reactor.

AI-DOE-1 35421 31

B1 anket asseinhl i ES are procured offsi te an,d received i n t o the receiving They a re p?aced i n sodium-filled pots, which are i n turn placed in faci l i ty .

the transporter for transfer t o the reactor.

The high-level liquid waste (HLW) i s vitrif ied, poured i n t o disposal containers, sealed, and transferred to the HLW storage for ultimate transhipment t o the HLW repozitory.

The foregoing process has the advantage of allowing a direct conversion of a mixture o f plutonium and uranium solution t o a mixed oxide t h a t has the correct proportions o f plutonium t o uranium for fabrication into recycle fuel pel lets. T h i s el iininzltes the requirement for separate plutonium and uranium conversion t o oxibr! steps, the subsequent reblending of the oxides t o obtain the correct ratu’o For pellet production, and tends t o simplify and reduce the number of accortntabi 1 i t y control and measurements steps.

T h i s process w i 7 1 create an excess o f removed uranium solution since, for economic reasons, ‘it is more expedient to fabricate blanket assemblies offs i te and transport these t o t h e reactor s i t e f o r storage and eventual insertion i n t o the reactor. The excess uranium will be converted i n t o an oxide for ultimate disposal.

2 3.4 19ml e a r Tsl a.rad4kl ated B u i l d i n g s -_--._----

Most of these structures are seismic Category I and are designed t o protec t safety-re7 ated fac i l i t i es from natural phenomena and t o withstand desi gn-basi s and beyond-desi gn-basi s accidents. Some of these structures are Category I1 (no t safety-related b u t checked t o ensure they cannot damage adjacent safety-re1 ated features under Category I design conditions), and some are Ccteyory I11 Inbnnuclear design standards). The other bu j ld ings associated w i t h the p l a n t are not cri t ical for controlling radionuclides or pre- venting the t h e f t Q F nuclear materials.

AI-DOE-1 3542 32

I

Each LMW i s controlled from a main control room. Although the main control room i s located w i t h i n the NI-protected area, the LMR control and shutdown scheme does not rely on availability of the main control room t o achieve a safe, monitored shutdown. The main control roan does not contain safety-grade contro'ls; these are located in remote shutdown rooms, one fo r each Power Pak.

Both the control room and the remote shutdown rooms are located i n a seismic Category 1, tornado-hardened, reinforced-concrete structure. The remote shutdown rooms are provided w i t h redundant safety-re1 ated heating, ventilation, and a i r conditioning (HVAC) systems to ensure continuous habit- abil i ty i n a l l postulated events.

The i ndi v i dual btii 1 dings are described bel ow.

2.3.4.1 h c l ear Is 1 and--Reactor Bu i 1 dl'ng --_-__

The NI is a single structure consisting of a Category I concrete mat, concrete walls, and floor slabs a t the lower and intermediate levels, w i t h Category I I structural steel framing and metal s id ing a t the upper elevations. I t consists primarily o f containment, the steam generator bu i ld ings , and the auxlliary b u i l d i n g s . The containment consists o f the guard vessel surroundicg the reactor vessel and o f a carbon-steel-1 ined concrete box structure above the reactor vessel. The a u x i l i a r y bulldings adjacent t o containment w e o f concrete construction. These bui ld ings house various reactor support systems and penetrations into containment. The steam generator structures from one f loor above the basemat are Category X I structures o f structural steel covered w i t h metal s id ing .

2.3.4.2 - Fuel Cycle Facility

The oxide FCF *is a hardened structure designed t o meet aJl NRC inclement weather and seismic regulations. the FMEF b u i l d i n g .

I t is designed It i s a four-story structure

t o the same specification as w i t h two floors below grade

AI-DOE-13542

33

and tw fluors dbove grade. The main priocessin!g and p i n fabrication cells are located an the bottom underground floor. enters the facl’li-ty, is the t h i r d f loor o f the building.

Grade level, where the spent fuel

Two high-bay areas above each other are along one side o f the facil i ty. The reprocessing cell i s located i n the bottom high-bay area, and the maintenance cell is located i n the top high-bay area above it. corridor i s located the conversion, pelletizingt, and p i n fabrication ce l l s on

the bottom level The p i n inspection and f ina l assembly areas are located i n the second leuel of the fac i l i ty abowe pelletizing and p i n fabrications. The final assembly area i s also a two-story high-bay area to fac i l i t a te handling the l ong t h i n fuel assemblies.

Across a central

AuxiY i a . q systems such as laboratory cells , waste hand1 ing and storage cell:;, rnain1:enw-m and shop areas arc located along either end of the fac i l i ty a t var ious f l o o r levels.

~ .. lni! layout o f the main processing bottom floor is shown i n Figure 6.

Spent fuel i s received two stories abowe and placed i n storage o r brought down i n t o the head-end cell. The fuel i s disassembled, chopped, and dissolved i n the head-end cell and decontaminated and partltioned i n the adjacent process cell After purification and concentration, t h e uranium and plutonium stream are taken across the corridor t o the uranium conversion and mixed oxide ( M I X ) b lend ing and conversion cells. Here the pure uranium and blended uranium- p’tutioniirai solutions are thermally converted t o oxide. The MOX is s tored i n the v a u l t area u n t i l i t i s fabricated into fuel.. The MOX is transferred t o the potvder and pellet processing area where i t i s granulated, pressed into pe77ets, and si“n-tered. The pellets are placed into loading magazines along w i t h a x i a l UD2 blanket pellets procured offsite. i n t o p i n s t h a t ape capped, welded s h u t , and decontaminated i n the fuel p i n loading area.

f ina l assernbiy .into fuel assemblies.

The pellets are loaded

The p i n s are transferred t o the floor above for inspection and

AI-DOE-73542 34

PROCESS CELL

Wi'm&R AND PELLET PROCESSING

rDPiVERSlON MAGAZINE LOAOING NU PIN LOADING

Figure 6, Oxide Prxessing Floor Layout

On the taafn pi?"clr;c:ssing - floor, the hiqh-radiation level materials such as spent fuel storage dnd hancll ing, fuel disassembly, high-level waste storage and processi nil area w e 1 ocated together behind 6-ft-thick shielding wall s. As the radiation level o f the fuel i s decreased as i t progresses through t h e processing and fabricn t ion areas, the shielding thickness of the cell walls i s

decreased. This , t:f!e processing floor layout not only facilitates operations and maintenance b u t a7 so minimizes construction costs while maintaining as low as reasonably achievrtba e (ALARA) personnel exposure criteria.

AI-DOE-*I 3532 35

-. rhe layout: a f the remaining floors o f the f a c i l i t y are given i n documents

In these Aidcuments the design criteria arid faci l i ty design f e a t u r e s a r e prepare3 by Oax Ridge National Laboratory and tne Westinghouse Hanford Com- pany. presmted. Figure 6 i s taken directly from this documentation.

2.4 PHYSICAL BRKECTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

'This section of the r epo r t describes the pbysical protect ion system t h a t provides detect-ion, assessment and delay of, arid response t o the threats o f rad io logica l sabotage and theft. The SAF and LMF program design has fou r d i f f e r e n t s e ~ ~ i t j ' zones, each with a different leve l o f security, as descri bed he1 ow,

7 h s i n i t . i 4 i I level o f secu r i t y is provided a t the site boundary where a 6- f t -h igh c h a i r l i n k fence w i t h t h e appropr ia te warning s igns w i l l be erected along w i t h a marivied guardhouse a t t h e entrance o f the main access road i n t o the s i t e , unauthorized persons and t o observe approaching vehicles. No i n t ru s ion detection wiwrs wT;l he provjded along the fencing, and no pa t ro l l i ng would be reqd w d under. m-rnal circumstances, a1 though a boundary road will be provided for ptitm'i du!-f~sg A period o f t h r e a t warning and for f i r e f igh t ing . Persons entering wouK d tmve access t o the admini s t r a t i o n and t r a in ing bui ldings, park- i n g I n t s , the wiil'ehouse, and the cooling towers.

The purpose of this barrier i s t o keep out animals and casual

A gcardhocrw t h a t is loca ted tit the entrance of the main access road i n t o the s i t e is the i i i i t ial control point for- vehicles and persons en t e r ing the site. I t i s iraiilind dur ing normal w r k i n g hours, temporary badges are issued t o visitars, ewi persons being v i s i t e d are no t i f j ed by the a t t endan t guard. phone 1 ;:k w i t ? ; ?:he NI guardhouse i s provided for persons *requir ing access when 1:hi s guarrlimuse i s unattended.

A

. -

t

2.4.2 BOP-Control led Area

The second level of security is provided around the nonnuclear side o f the p l a n t (BOP). T h i s area i s surrounded by a 6-ft-high chain l i n k fence w i t h three strands of barbed wire mounted on a single outward-facing 45" out- rigger. T h i s i s intended as a standard industrial security fence and no intrusion detection sensors are provided. However, an inner boundary road is avai l able f o r patrol. A determined adversary would be delayed only minimally a t t h i s barrier, Only one entry p o i n t is provided, and a71 personnel and vehicles enter there. Employee identification badges and card-keys are issued i n the BOP guardhouse. These card-keys permit access t o specific b u i l d i n g s as necessary fo r t h e performance of the employee's assigned duties. personnel are monitored for SNM. through t h i s guardhouse. The faci l i ty is not hardened.

Exi t ing Outsl'de contractor forces enter the BOP

2.4.3 NI-Protected Area

The third level of security is provided around and w i t h i n the NI- protected area where severai penetration detection systems, assessment systems, and physical barriers are provided, as described bel ow.

2.4.3.1 Perimeter

The perimeter protection system consists of a vehicle barrier, two chain l i n k fences, and inner and outer isolation zones plus detection and assessment sensors (see Figure 2 ) .

The outer fence i s 6 f t high w i t h t h k e strands of barbed wire mounted on single, outward-facing outriggers. Outside t h i s outer fence i s a 2 0- f t isola- t i o n zone, which includes a vehicle barrier intended to prevent penetration o f the perimeter by a vehicle.

AI-DOE-1 3542

37

The inner fence is 7 ft high w i t h 12 in. of barbed tape concertina mounted on dual outriggers. Between the two fences is a 25-ft-wide clear zone containing detection equipment such as microwave and fence-deflection sensors.

Inside the inner fence is another 20-ft isolation zone, which contains an E-field system. A 24-ft-wide perimeter patrol road i s provided inside the inner fence. Sclid reinforced-concrete bui lding walls form p a r t of the inner boundary (see security s i t e plan, Figure 2).

The perimeter detection .system is t o be configured in to sectors so as t o 1 ocate intrusion attempts, fac i l i t a te assessment of sensor alarms, and direct on-site response forces t o specific areas.

2.4.3.2 Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment

Each sector i n the perimeter has three types of sensors, such as a microwave transmitter and receiver pa i r , a free-standing E-field u n i t , and a motion detection system. These are representative sensors. Actual sensor types w i 11 be dependent on environmental conditions, such as heavy precipitation, electr ical storms, or h i g h winds, that would prevent detection of an unauthorized intrusion i n t o the isolation zone. A t leas t one o f these sensors w i l l operate effectively during most environmental conditions. If conditions become too

severe o r i f breakdown of a sector processor occurs, the perimeter mus t be patrol led by a guard t o satisfy detection requirements.

CCTV cameras and the requisite 1 i gh t i ng provide the assessment elements w i t h i n the sector. fence and positioned on extended mounts t h a t projsct outward over the inner

Cameras and l i g h t poles are situated just inside the inner

fence. zone.

Thus, the poles do not obstruct viewing or l i g h t i n g o f the isolation

Video coverage extends from the outer edge o f the outer isolation zone t o the inner edge of the inner isolation zone. Thus, there i s CCTV coverage fo r a l l sensors i n the sector.

AI-DOE-13542 38

Because the alarm center operator may be unable to’ observe and assess the cause o f the alarm i n real time, a CCTV recording capability i s provided t h a t i s triggered by the alarm signal. I t requires 1 t o 2 s to activate the recorder and store the f i r s t video frames, Approximately 4 t o 5 s o f CCTV recorded video are sufficient for assessment purposes. Thus, a nominal 6-s delay, as provided by t h e inner chain l i n k fence, is an adequate perimeter delay t o record an attempted intrusion.

Alarm signals from t h e sensors are relayed t o both alarm stations. Appropriate controls are activated t o a l e r t the operator of the a?am and t o in i t i a te the assessment process.

Light ing is provided so tha t assessments can be made during periods of darkness. Lights must be positioned so that a minimum o f 1.0-fc lurnination i s

provided w i t h i n the assessment area. Furthennore, 1 ight/dark rat ios over the area should not exceed 6/1 t o prevent unacceptable degradation i n the qual i ty of the CCTV imagery. Continuous illumination i s automatically provided during cloudy or dark conditions. Manual lighting switches are provided a t both control centers.

In some cases, there may be occasions when heavy fog or precipitation prevents CCTV assessment of an alarm. Procedures w i l l be established t o provide supplementary 1 oca1 assessment by security personnel whenever CCTV assessment cannot be accomplished. Security personnel mus t be on station o r readily avail ab1 e for d i spatch t o assess a1 arms dur ing periods o f res t r i cted v i s f b i I i t y .

2.4.3.3 Personnel and Vehicle Access Control

The access control system is located i n the MI guardhouse and includes the personnel portal and vehicle ga identification badges and card-keys are issued here. As on the nonnuclear side, these card-keys permit access only t o specific bui ldings and spaces as necessary for the performance of the employees assigned duties.

AI-DOE-13542 39

Positive personnel identification of persons passing through the perimeter will be provided by verifying hand geometry patterns, retinal eye patterns, or voice patterns. Packages and vehicles w i l l be manually searched t o protect against explosives and other contraband being brought i n t o the protected area. Random pat-down searches may be conducted t o deter persons from attempting t o br ing i n contraband materi a1 .

The perimeter personnel portal i s a mu1 til me, man-assisted system. Functional operation i s controlled by a security guard, located i n a protected guard station, through the entry control console. the turnstiles to ensure that proper passage procedures are followed.

This guard also monitors

The portal exterior i s hardened, and the guard station has bul le t- resisting walls and glass. When n o t i n operation, the portal can be secured. Door microswitches are provided for this purpose. If forcible entry attempts should occur, alarms are relayed to the alarm centers i n the same manner that sector alarms are relayed. Likewise, CCTV cameras are provided i n the portal for assessment purposes.

The vehicle gate consists o f motor-operated gates, gate locks and closure switches, and microwave sensors. portal operator and have an automatic override that prevents the simultaneous opening of both gates. An access door from the personnel portal guard station is provided so that a guard can inspect vehicles before they enter or leave the protected area. A vehicle radiation monitor, CCTV cameras, and portal 1 i g h t i n g equipment arc a1 so provided for the vehicle portal.

The gates are operated by the personnel

Normally, a l l sensors i n the vehicle and ra i l portals are active, and alarm signals are relayed to the alarm stations i n the same manner a s the perimeter sector alarms. When the vehicle portal t's t o be used, sensors are placed i n an access mode by t h e alarm station operator. The outer gate is opened t o allow the vehicle to enter and the driver and any passengers t o 'leave the vehicle and exi t the portal through the open gate. The gate i s closed and the vehicle i s inspected while the driver and passengers are

AI-DOE-1 3542 40

cleared through the personnel portal. If a l l checks are satisfied, the inner gate is opened, and the driver and passengers return to the vehjcle and exi t the portal. The portal i s then returned t o i ts secure active state.

2.4.3.4 Building Barriers

The areas identified i n Section 2.3 provide a substantial barrier a t the bui 1 ding exterior to provide enough delay against determined adversaries so that the on-site response force can be alerted and deployed. A barrier a t the exterior would delay adversaries outside the bui ld ing i n the open, thereby allowing the response force to neutralize them outside the bui lding rather than w i t h i n .

A b u i l d i n g barrier 1s integrated into the reactor b u i l d i n g design. Bui 1 ding oxteri or wal1,s have a hardened constructi OR equi val ent t o a t 1 east 8 i n . of rei nforced concrete. Penetrations { e .g. , portal sa doors, ducts, vents) are a lso hardened t o yield a comparable delay.

The hardened b u i l d i n g walls are constructed to a h e i g h t of no less than These hardened walls encompass the entire build- 18 ft above ground level.

ing. Penetrations through the hardened surface are kept t o a min imum.

Normal personnel access through the hardened surface would be a t the bui 1 d i n g personnel portal , where posi ti ve personnel recogni ti on i s requi red. Other potential access portals are secured to guard against unauthorized entry.

The fourth and highest 1 vided a t the FCF. As shown i n Figure I , this fac i l i ty 1 the N I and benefits from the previously described NI security featur ition, the fac i l i ty i s surrounded by i t s own 7-ft chain l i n k fence w i t h strands o f barbed wire mounted on dual outriggers. vehicle gate and the facility. "Normal personnel access is via a below-grade

A vehicle barrier is provided between the NI

AI-DOE-1; 3542 41

tunnel that begins i n the basement o f the NI guardhouse and daylights inside the fac i l i ty ' s boundary fence. Vehicle and rai l access are through gates and require escort and observation by guards.

2.4.5 Security force

2.4.5.1 Organization

A security organization that reports to management is required to ensure that overall direction of physical security operations is provided a t a l l times. Procedures that establ ish the order of responsibi 1 i ty for security and detail the du t i e s of the security forces are also required.

2.4.5.2 On-Site Guards

The on- site security force is used for alarm stat ion operations and communications, escort and patrol duties, assessment, and 1 imited response. The size o f the force has not been *determined b u t will reflect the minimized NI-protected area and subsequent reduction i n numbers o f operating personnel w i t h i n the NI.

2.4.5.3 Off-Site Response Forces

Off-sSte forces are used for response and adversary neutralization. The size and deployment capability o f the off-site response force will depend on

the location o f the faci l i ty and on the bilitles of the local lawenforcement agency. Actual forc t y coordination plans, deployment routes, and neutral ization e dependent.

AI-DOE-13542 42

2.4.6 Security Comunications

2.4.6.1 A1 arm Station-Securitv Force Comaunicatio:ns

Communications among t h e alarm stations and t h e on-site security personnel will be by a two-way mobile radio system that provides to ta l coverage o f the entire owner-controlled area, 6uards rill carry radio units t h a t have antijam and authentication features to ensure that guard messages are neither counterfeited nor masked.

A handset microphone and speaker connected t o the security force radio transceiver w i l l be located i n the access control area o f the NI guardhouse, central and secondary a1 arm stations, and the secuipi t y supervi sor ' s office. Base station radio transmitters and antennas w i l l be located w i t h i n the protected area.

A dedicated intercom comnunication system wi l l 1 be provided between securi ty-related locations.

2.4.6.2 Duress Alarms

The personnel radios carried by the guards will have an emergency Signa1 tha t can be activated t o transmit a signal t o the central and secondary alarm sta t ions i f the guard i s under coercion o r duress. A similar feature i s t o be

incorporated i n the control centers so tha t a duress signal can be s e n t t o the o f f - s i te response headquarters.

2.4.6.3 A1 arm Sta ti on--Of f - S i t e Conununicati ons

Both telephone and radio' frequency channels w i l l be used t o communicate among the central and secondary alarm stations and the off-site response force alarm station. The radio frequency l i n k is t o be a spread-spectrum system that uses a pseudorandom sequence, frequency-hopping carrier. T h i s results i n

A I -DOE113542 43

,~ ~ , , ~ . .. .~.. ....... ~. ... . .., . " . . . , ,

a highly jam resistant and secure system #at minimizes couser interference. An alarm signal w i l l be generated a t the of f- s i te station i f jamming o r transmission failure uccurs.

These systems will be located in the central and secondary alarm stations and will have a minimum of two-channel transmission and reception capability.

2.4.6.4 Normal Communications

Private automatic exchange (PAX) and conmencia1 telephones will be provided i n the access control area of the NI guardhouse, central and secondary alann stations, and the security supervisor's office.

0127Y/ljm

AI-DOE-73542 44

3.0 PLANT SAFEGUARDS NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTROL PLAN

3.1 SAFEGUARDS ORGANIZATION

3.1.1 P1 ant Organization Structure

The organizational structure for establishing nuclear materials safeguards control and accountability functions for the nuclear reactor should foll ow the guide1 ines established by ANSI-Nl5-8-1974. Fabrication plant guidelines should follow pertinent sections of NRC Regulatory Guide 5.45, "Standard Format and Content for a Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Section of a Special Nuclear Materi a1 License ,I' and Regul atory Guide 5.52, "Standard Format and Content o f a Licensee Physical Protection P1 an for Strategic Special Nuclear Material a t Fixed St tes.

Tit le 10 Part 70, "Domestic Licensing o f Special Nuclear Materials," and Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Material 5," are the regulations t h a t must be met t o satisfy NRC c r i ter ia for the safeguards and control of SNM.

The assignment of material control functions i s such that the activities of one person or u n i t serve as a control' over and a check of the act ivi t ies of other persons o r units. scribed for a l l facets o f the nuclear material control system. Material control functional and Organizational relattonshlps are se t forth i n wr i t i ng i n organizational directives, instructions, procedure manuals, or other documents. Such documentation i ncl udes ion requi tements and definitions o f authority Delegating mater4 a1 control responsibilities and authori

Specific assignments of responsibilities are pre-

3.1.1.1 PI ant Superintendent

The pl an t superintendent physical control and physical rials a t the plant site. The

a t each nuclear SAF and LMR plant has overall surveillance responsibilities f o r nuclear mate- plant superintendent's responsibilities include

AI-DOE-13542 45

appointing a nuclear materials custodian for each material balance area (MBA)/ item control area ( I C A ) w i t h i n each reactor plant.

3.1.2 Nuclear Control Structure

3.1.2.7 Nuclear Materials Manager

The plant supervisor appo in t s a nuclear materials manager who has the overall responsibility for implementing the nuclear material control system. The nuclear materials manager's position, t o be effective, must be independent o f plant operating personnel . The nuclear materi a1 s manager's duties i ncl ude establishing a central material control and accounting office under his direction. This office will maintain the material control records for nuclear materi a1 s i n the pl a n t ' s possession.

3.1.2.2 Staffing

The nuclear materials manager i s provided a staff o f personnel or, de- pending on staffing arrangements, has personnel. available who can provide nuclear material control expertise i n such fields as computer programing, quality assurance, s tat is t ics , ' reactor fuel burnup evaluation/calculation, and nuclear material accounting.

3.1.2.3 Nuclear Materials Custodian

are responslble for the ontrol ' of nuclear material s e responsible manager o f the

performance o f the f a t each p l a n t s i t operating area and a or. Each assignment i s approved i n wrSting by the nu individual can be

named custodian of more t h a n one control area provided that he does not transfer material from an area for which he has custodial responsibilities t o another arda for which he also has custodial responsibi?ities, and that his dual custodial responsi b i 1 i ties are effectively discharged. A1 1 nuclear

AI-DOE-13542 46

material transfers are signed by two authorized Individuals, one from the s h i p p i n g function area and one from the receiving function area. MBMICA custodians should physical ly witness transfers.

3.1.2.4 Job Descriptions

3.1.2.4.1 Nuclear Material s Management

. The nuclear materials manager should report to the plant superintendent. He is responsible for establishing and maintaining a program to control and t o account for a l l source and SNM for the plant i n accordance w i t h the pertinent federal, s tate, and local regulations. In addition, he acts as the u t i l i ty representative fo r contacts w i t h federal, s tate, and regulatory agencies i n matters pertaining t o source and SNM,

Authority and resources t o accomplish h i s assigned responsibilities are to be ensured by the plant superintendent.

Minimum qualifications for holding this position include a bachelor's degree or equivalent i n one of the physical sciences or engineering disci- plines, w i t h 3 to 5 years' experience i n the area o f nuclear materials management functions. The Smdividual i n this position must be able to demon- s t ra te the management and technical capabilities t o coordinate, develop, and impl ement management systems as required t o impl ement corporate and government policies and* regulations.

The bachelor's degree requirements may be waived w i t h explicit review by t h e p l ant manager. In wai vi ng academic requirements, speci f i c consi derati on may be given to the potential appointee's formal education and demonstrated capabi l i ty and performance i n j ob assignments associated w i t h and/or related t o the position.

AI-DOE-1 3542

47

3.1.2.4.2 Nuclear Material Custodians

Minimum qualifications for nuclear material1 control custodian is satis- factory completion of SNM managernent training aind demonstrated capabil i ty t o perform the particular activity involved.

3.1 2 .4 .3 Staff

Key positions w i t h i n the plant for nuclear imterial control functions are those i n the fields o f computer programing, quality assurance, s t a t i s t i c s , reactor burnup calculations, and nuclear material accounting. Minimum requirements for these positions include a bachelor's degree o r equivalent i n one of the applicable engineering, science, or business administration fields with demonstrated capability t o perform a1 1 functions required o f a particular staff position.

3.1.3 Security Structure for Safeguards

The on-site physical protection system and security organization are structured t o provide assurance that activities involving SNM meet the protection requirements fair comnon defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to pub1 i c heal t h and safety. The security organization and system, including guards, is designed t o protect the fac i l i ty against radiological sabotage and t o prevent theft o r diversion of nuclear material.

The security system is structured so t h a t a t least one full-time member who has the authority to direct t h e physical protection act ivi t ies w i l l be on s i t e a t a l l times.

3.7.4 Separation of Functions

The nuclear material management function as well as the security force function i s t o be organizationally independent from other plant management organizations and other supporting functions. Thus, i t can have complete

AI-DOE-13542 48

independence for objective performance i n establ ishif ng cr i te r ia and procedures t h a t ensure the effective achievement of nuclear material management goals. Appropriate interface relations are established by plant standard operating policies t o provide for the unifonn application of nuclear material safeguards and accountabil i ty control s.

3.2 NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTROL PROCEDURES

3.2.1 Responsibilities and Authorities

The basic responsibility for nuclear materials management and control is assigned t o the plant superintendent. The nuclear material manager is responsible fo r planning, procedures, coordination, and akinis t ra t ion of SNM control and accounting functions. The nuclear material manager forms h i s functions w i t h i n the foll owing framework o f procedures:

0

0

P1 ant standard operating policies

Fundamental materials controls established by the nuclear mate- r i a l s manager

The detailed procedures establ ished i n a nuclear material s management manrial for basic control and accountability of SNM

The nuclear safety analysis for the reactor, for the fuel storage areas, aind the fuel recycle faci l i ty

0 Regulatory agency requi rements.

3.2.2 ICA/MBA Designations

The nuclear materials manager i tody and control o f SNM fo r the plan source and Sr4M control is t o balan tor ies. To accomplish this control h material may be divided i n t o a a l l e r units o f M A S o r fCA drawn. The nuclear materi a1 s manager is responsible f o r designating control

AI-DOE-13542 49

areas t o serve as subsidiary accountability stations for materials i n use i n the reactor core for materials assigned t o a specific storage area w i t h i n the plant, and for the various recycle and reprocess;ing phases i n the fuel recycle faci l i ty.

Material control areas and subsidiary accoiientabil i t y stations are used to determine the location and quantity of nuclear materials i n the faci l i ty. Three basic functions are perfomed:

e Data collection, including measuirernents and maintenance of the data base

e Data analysis for loss detection

0 Data dissemination and reporting,

3.2.2.1 Selection Criteria

The basic criterion for establishing an MBA or ICA is a uniquely defined, geographical area under the cognizance of a spec-ifically assigned organizational entity i n which a l l i n p u t s and releases of material can be individually and completely controlled. This disallows t h e establishment o f MBAs/ICAs that have overlapping geographical areas and hence would have the potential for dual responsibility f o r the material.

I n establishing ClBAs and IC&, consideration i s given t o individual

processes, process steps, geographical areas, organizational control , health arid safety cuntml, security control, and any applicable state ur federal regulatory requirements.

3.2.2.2 Reactor Area Control s -..

Each reactor u n i t is to be designated as a single I C A w i t h subsidiary accountability stations assigned wi th in the ICA. Using t h i s system, movements af assemblies, or elements, *thin a reactor unit are ~ o c : ~ I w F & ~ ~ w i t h j n the

AI-DOE-1 3542 50

subsidiary accountability system; movements between, out of, or i n t o reactor units can be documented as I C A transfers.

With in an ICA, a minimum a f three subsidiary accountability s t a t i o n s shod d be establ $shed:

0 Fresh assembl ies 0 In-cool i ng assembl ies 0 Reactor vessel assemblies,

The basic u n i t of control for nuclear material is the nuclear fuel assembly. Each nuclear fuel assembly will be ident i f ied i n the material control records by i t s serial number and location. Nuclear material contained i n fuel elements, not part o f an assembly, uill be separately ident i f ied on a l l mate- r ia l control records.

Each I C A and each subsidiary accountability station w i t h i n the I C A m u s t be an identifiable physical area such that t h e nuclear fuel assemblies or fuel elements being moved in to or out of the ICA or subsidiary accountability sta- t ion can be counted and identified.

3.2.2.3 Number of Control - Areas

Sufficient IC&, w i t h subsidiary accountability stations, must be estab- 1 i shed so t h a t nuclear material s components can be 1 oca1 i zed, i denti f i ed, inventoried, and controlled.

Sufficient MBAs, w i t h subsidiary accountability stations, must be estab- 1 ished so nuclear material recycle and fabrication operations throughput can be control 1 ed, hol dups establ i shed, i n-process bal ances can be determined, product and waste stream contents established, and so t h a t inventory differences can be determined and controlled. The FCF should be divided i n t o a minimum o f two MBAs, one for the receiving and processing o f fuel from the reactor, and one for fuel fabrication and assembly. A t h i r d f o r plutonium and uranium should be considered.

AI-DOE-1 3542 51

3.2.2.4 Method of Control

Control into and o u t o f ICAs and associated subsidiary accountability stations is by item identity and previously determined nuclear material quan- t i t i e s contained i n each item,

Control within MBAs and associated subsidiary accountability stations i s based on measurements, Measurements a t some o f the associated subsidiary accountability stations will be on a v o l ~ or weight basis, other stations will require sampling for elemental and isotopic content, as well as weigh t o r volume measurements. Certain stations ( i-e- , stwage areas) can operate as an I C A accountability s ta t ion provided material is controlled i n accord w i t h regulatory cr i ter ia , Waste streams can be controlled for safeguard purposes by appl ication of nondestructive measurement teclhniques.

3.2.3 Measurements Criteria

Measurement procedures ate prepared and qualified for each type o f measurement used. Performance qualification. is required o f individuals responsi- bl e for conducting SNM measurements. Procedure and performance qualification cr i ter ia are 'konsi sterit measuremnt results w i t h i n the neasurement 1 imi t of error fo r three consecutive measurements of u n l i k e known 'standards. " SNM measurements, which art! used as source data for SNM accounting purposes, are performed i n accordance w i t h procedures of proven val i d i ty by personnel who have demonstrable competence i n the conduct o f the procedure.

3.2.4 Measurement Reqtai rements

3.2.4.7 Reactor Fuel Measurements

The liquid-metal reactor units have no capabilities for operations i n- vo lv ing source and SNM other than handling reactor fuel assemblies and fuel elements; therefore, the materials management accounting system i s based on assembly or element item accounting. For each reactor area, an assembly

AI-DOE-I 3542 52

and/or element record is maintained. SNM content *Is assigned and controlled based on original manufacturing data as certified by the vendor o r by FCF operations. For each ICA and each accountability cmntrol area, a book inventory i s maintained. A l l records are periodically adjusted for fuel burnup and generation i n accordance w i t h regulatory cr i ter ia .

3.2.4.2 El ement/Assembly Record

A record is maintained for each assembly. As a minimum, t h i s record con- s i s t s o f the

a

following data points:

Assembly serial number

Element serial number and assembly location

Element average bulk weight

Element average nonfuel constituent weights

Fabricator's element and/or assembly fuel chemical composition

Fabricator's element d/or assembly source and SNM content (e.g., net, uranium, 2 3 h , plutonium)

Assembly wcsi g h t , i ncl udi ng average wei g h t s of assembly constituents

Reactor site receipt date

New assembly storage locat ion

Date i n t o core

Core position(s)

Assembly core discharge date

Spent assembly storage position

Burnup calculations

. By reactor core

. By assembly

AX-DOE-1 3!XZ 53

0 Discharged assembly source and SNM content

e Off-site/recycle reprocessor shiipment date

e Shipment date, cask number, cainister number, and transfer document .

3.2.4.3 FCF Fuel Measurements

The fuel recycl e f aci 1 i ty operati on, w i 1 1 require measurements to be made a t several steps i n the reprocessing/recycl e operation. Primary measurement requirements w i t h i n a generic plant are as follows:

e Fuel Receipt from LMR and Storage-Item control shou ld be used. Accountability i s maintained by fuel assembly serial number. SNM content 1s calculated based on the fuel assembly manufacturing data as adjusted by reactor burnup/transmutation calculations.

0 D i sassembl y/Reprocessi ng/Concentration/Parti ti on--Once el ements have been dissolved, partitioned, and the solutions stored, sampling and measurement of the solutions is required, unless the ciperation is continuous through conversion to oxide.

Major plutonium and *uranium storage is planned t o consist of . materials i n the aqueous stage stored i n c r i t ica l i ty safe slab

tanks . Solutions s tored as an interim production l ine item require t h a t a weight or volumetric determination be obtained against each tank or storage u n i t . Three samples from each u n i t for a total element and for isotopic analysis should be considtrred t h e minimum for basic safeguards accountability control purposes. Accountability records can be balanced by comparf ng i npu t based on reactor burnup calculations against dissol wtion values.

0

0 Conversion-If conversion is e required other ampaign or a t an anium oxide or

More sampling may be required if a conversion l o t is fair ly large and proves n o t t o be re1 a t i vely homogeneous.

AI-DOE- ? 3542 54

. . . ~,-- . . ...... . ....,........... " ......... " .

Storage--This is an item control area. Containers should be maintained under tamper-safing contfi tions , and safeguards accountabi 1 i ty s houl d be based on un i que container i d e n t i f ica- t i o n control w i t h weight and analysils values obtained d u r i n g the conversion cycle.

Pellet Production-Incoming MOX poudetr ~CcbuntabSl f t y should be based on data obtaSned from the storage records tha t have been based on weight and analysis determinations obtained dur ing the conversion process. A weight check should be made on each container t o minimize record errors that might have occurred i n prevfous steps.

During this stage, the MOX will be j e t milled, moved to the collector and storage hopper, and then apportioned t o the blender where a bfnder is added and the matertal f s blended. The resoltfng mixture is then pressed i n t o s1ugs, which are t h e n granulated before being pressed into pellets. Each container o f granulated MOX should be identified and a weight determination made for safeguards accountabil i ty purposes.

MOX granules are fabricated i n a blender and then transferred t o a press feed hopper t o where green pellets are manufac- tured. Green pellets are transferred t o boats for transfer t o a debinder furnace and then t o a sinterjng furnace, A weight mus t be obtained for a17 containers of sfntered pellets. De- pending on productton qual f ty control measurement s t a t i s t i c s , uranlum, plutonium, and fsotopic values for a l o t o f .MOX pellets might be determined by applicatlon o f incoming MOX powder analysis. To use th i s system, i t must be shown tha t a l l binder and 1 ubricarit i s driven off during the debinder s i nterl ng cycle and that pel let production controls are such t h a t pel let manufacturing i s identifiable to measured incoming contajner (i.e., semibatch control through the process to assure tha t batches differing i n plutonium, uranium, and isotopes are not intermixed).

I f the foregoing controls are not feasible, then three pet'let samples, representing each batch are t o be selected from urani urn, pl utoni urn, and i sotopt c mination to meet the safeguard accountabil i t y requireme

In addition t o the above, a l l side measured for safeguards accountabi the usefulness of the s i d r ial t o a measurable s ta te green pellets, reject sine material may be measurable by nondestructive techniques t h a t will meet safeguard accountability cri ter ia .

Is also must be

AI-DOE-1 3542 55

., . ,

0 P i n Assembly--Pellets loaded i n t o p i n s will be weighed. Sepa- rate weighings for MOX pellets anld other pellets are to be considered. In addition, a l l compoiients of a p i n assembly should be recorded for weight, composition, and dimensions to ass is t i n burnup/transmutati on calculations, curie generation, and associated isotopes, and future recycle safeguards accountabil- i t y evaluations. Element and isotopic values can be based on previously determined analyses values and as-1 oaded pel 1 e t wei g h t determi nations . P i ns/El ements--From this point, a1 1 safeguards and accountabil- i t y controls should be based on p i n and elentent serial identification numbers.

e

The material management accounting system, physical security safeguards system, and containmentjsurveill ance system ensure inspection authorities of continued assembly or el ement security.

3.2.5 Fuel Supplier Certification

For nuclear material furnished by a fuel supplier, the reactor u t i l i ty or i t s representative will establish the v a l i d i t y of the supplier's cer t i f ica t on by appropriate qual i ty assurance checks and audits of the supplier's processes..

3.2.5.1 Supplier Audits -

For nuclear material furnished by a fuel supplier, the reactor u t i l i ty or i t s representative i s ?A:

0 Review the adequacy of the supplier 's material control system used i n establishing the quantities and assays of nuclear mater i a 1

trol system

and rework affect ing the nuclear mater1 a1 quanti t i e s and assays

Perform o r require the performance o f NDA measurements on fuel e7ements t o confirm the validity of supplier's measurement data and t o confirm the fuel element source and SNM content.

Audit the implementation of the fuel supplier's material con-

0 Audit the fuel supplier's lyses, computations

e

AI-DOE-13542 56

I f there i s a significant discrepancy between the fuel supplier's values for nuclear material quantities and assays and those determined by audit, the cause o f such discrepancies w i ? 7 be investigated w i t h the fuel supplier and the differences reconciled expedi tiousiy.

3.2.6 Stat is t ics

3.2.6.1 Fresh Fuel

Statistical evaluation of the measurements establ i s h i n g the SNM content of fuel elements/assemb?ies is required o f the vendor. determinations are ma-i ntained by the nuclear matertal s manager.

Records o f these

3.2.6.2 Irradiated Fuel

On discharge from the reactor, the calculated burnup values are calculated. T h i s evaluation includes the development of confidence intervals for the remaining SNM content o f each fuel assembly as well as for material trans- mittedlgenerated and burnup quanti ties.

3.2.6.3 NDA Measurements

NDA techniques (gross gamma, gamma spectra, passive neutron, and active neutron interrogation) cain be used as at tr ibute checks and t o identify the f i s s i l e content o f fresh fuel. These checks normally are conducted before the fuel elements are delivered t o the reactor uni ts .

3.2.6.4 Recycle Processes

Measurements on standards are used t o determine the confidence intervals for the measurement technique and a1 so for the determination of differences between analysts. The variability of analyses obtained against the independent batch/process samples will be used t o calculate the confidence interval around each ba t c h/process.

AI-DOE-13542 57

3.3 TRAINING

3.3.1 Facil i t ies

The plant s i t e includes fac i l i t i es i o conduct group training. The training area contains equipment for us ing vugraphs, video tapes. f i l m , and s l i d e s f o r individual and/or group t r a in ing .

3.3.2 Requi rements -

Reactor p l ant operating pol icy requires t h a t individual s performing tasks invo lv ing control o r handl ing o f SNM have skill levels consistent w i t h the task requirements a To ensure continued maintenance of competency comensurate w i t h respective positions, documented programs of instruction and training w i 7 'I be establ ished. The p l a n t supervisor, i n cooperation w i t h the nuclear materials manager, the security manager, and operating departments, will establ ish t r a in ing programs covering the aspects of physical security and SNM control. Assigned i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l be instructed i n sufficient depth t o ensure functional competency i n their assignments.

The program i s designed to provide for an annual course o f instruction t h a t i ncl udes the requirements of federal regulations, 15 cense conditions, and SNM control procedures. portions, r'f desired. Attendance records w i l l be kep t and w i l l be available f o r inspection for a period of 2 years.

The course is designed t o be given i n incremental

Personnel responsible for p l a n t physical security will undergo periodic training i n accordance w i t h the precepts outlined i n 10 CFR 73, Appendix 6.

3.4 MBA/ICA ACCOUNTABILITY PLAN

MBA and ICA def in i t ions are covered i n 10 CFR 70.58 and Regulatory Guide 5.26. lations.

MBAs and I C A s must be established i n accordance w i t h the regu- These areas nilcst be physically definable areas and must be o f such

A I -DOE-I 3542 58

s ize t h a t inventory differences, losses, or thefts can be identified and 1 oca1 i zed.

The reactor faci l i ty i s considered t o be a single ICA. However, the FCF

should be divided i n t o seueral MBAs, each of which relate t o speclfic operational functions. As a m i n i m u m , one MBA should consist of the fuel receipt from the reactor an'd the disassembly/reprocessing areas. Consideration should be given t o making the solution 'storage process and area into another MBA, although this function might be considered as p a r t o f the disassembly/reprocessing operation.

MOX processing and pellet processing through pellet storage should be considered as a separate M A while pin fabrication through element assembly can either be a separate MRA or be part o f the pellet processing function.

MBAs can be defined more appropriately when processes and process layouts become finalized. A basic process and inventory control system will include detailed nuclear material operational steps, measurement requirements, and structural evaluations based on "accountability station" control concepts. Thi s system concept a1 1 okrs the s i t e nuclear materials manager t o 1 oca1 ize 1 osses 'and holdups by prov id ing sub-PBBR processing records and by prov id ing near-real-time inventory da ta .

Tables 1 and 2 define the accountability station nuclear material management control points. required t o afford adequate plant nuclear material controls.

These should be considered t o be the minimum number

AI -DOE -73542

s9

'TABLE 1 REACTOR A,CCOUMYABI L I TY STAT I ON S

Reactor vessel

Description

New assemblies as received from the FCF or from o f f s i te

Assembl 1 es stored i n-cool ing and wai t- ing t o be moved t o the FCF or t o be reinserted into the reactor

Assembl i e s located within the reactor vessel

- 1

AX-DOE-13542 60

TABLE 2

FCF ACCOUNTABILITY STAT1 014s (Sheet 7 of 3)

Opera t i on

Fuel receiving

D i sassembly/ reprocessing

Solution .storage

Conversion

I Accountability Station iDescripti on

Fuel receiving I Receive fuel a t FCF. Mate transporter t o receival flange. Open transporter, remove assembly i n Na-fi’lled pot. PI ace i R sodium me1 ter. Me1 t sodium and remove assembly. Wash assembly and pl ace i n storage. P1 ace refabricated assembly i n sodium pot. Place assembly and p a t i n transporter. Unmate transporter for return t o the reactor.

D i ssol u t i on and partitioning

Concentrate storage

Conversion

Obtain assembly from storage and transfer t o disassembly. Laser cut d u c t i n g and hardware from assembly, transfer hardware and duct t o TRU waste. Shear assmbly p i n s i n t o &in. slugs that fa1 1 i n t o rotary dissolver drum.

Djssolve fuel i n h o t n i t r ic acid. Transfer ac id solution t o feed adjust- ment and accountabi 1 i ty t ank , wash, and package h u l l s as TRU waste.

Feed ac id solution . t o decontamination and parti t i m i n g systems. Decontami n- ate arid partition U/Pu. Transfer U and Pu separately t o cleanup and concentra- t i o n systems. Transfer solvent t o sulvent cleanup and recycle. Collect MLLW for vitrification.

Send concentrated solutions t o conversion storage.

Pump p l utoni urn nitrate solution and

ver t nitrates and press and sinter t e s t samples periodically.

Operati on ~~

Oxide s i o rage

Prepare fuel and prepava- t ion o f pel 1 ets/pi 1-15

Pel 1 e t storage

Fa bri cati on o f cl ad/end cap subassembly and p i n fabrication

'TABLE 2

[Shelet 2 o f 3) FCF A C W t N'TABI L I TY STAT I ONS

Accountabi 1 i ty Station

Oxi de storage

Pel 1 e t fabrication

Pel l e t storage

P i n fabrica- t i o n

Descri p t i on

Can MOX pcatder and transfer t o vau l t storage. Convert extra urani urn ni t rate solution t o UO3 powder i n separate t h e m 1 calnverter. Transfer UOg powder t o U03 stclrage.

Obtain MOX powder from vault storage and transfer t o j e t mil hopper. Mill mixed oxides and convey MOX t o collec- ti a d s torage hopper.

Conwey MOX t o blender hopper. Add binder t o blender hopper. and binder. Transfer t o press feed hopper and press slugs. Granulate sl ugs and cl assi fy granul es. Recycl e off-spec granules and transfer on-spec granules t o t u b e blender.

Blend MOX

B1 end MOX granul es w i t h 1 ubricant. Transfer t o press feed hopper, press green pel 1 ets and recycl e off-spec. Trasisfer green pellets t o boats. Trartsf'er boats t o debi nder furnace. Debind green pellets. Transfer boats t o continuous sintering furnace. Sinter pel 1 ets.

Transfer t o inspection. Analyze and qual ity control (QC).. Prepare account- a b i l i t y documents. Transfer pellets t o storage. Recycle rejects.

Receive, clean, inspect, and store components (clad tubes, bottom-end caps, 'cop-end caps, springs, plenum tubes a driver sl eeves , etc. 1. Assign and f i x serial numbers t o clad tubes. Assemble and weld bottom end cap t o clad lube. Inspect weld and sample. Ultrasonic test cl ad/end cap subassembly. Transfer rejects t o scrap. Transfer subassembl ies t~ storage.

AI-DOE- I 3542 62

~~

Operation

Fabrication of cl ad/end cap subassembly and p i n fabrica- t i o n (continued)

Fabricate assembly

- Accmntabi 1 i ty

Sta t ion

El einent/assein- b7y fabrica- t i o n (Note: P i n and assembly fabric ii ti on

bfried i n t o a s-i ngl e accountabi 1 i ty sta ti or1 .

be corn-

- Descri p t i on

Receive clad/end cap subassembly. Receive and sltack MOX pe'llets.

Receive and stack axi a1 bl anket pel 1 ets. Stack blanket and MOX pellets i n inagazi ne.

Attach clad subassembly t o magazine, 'load pellets into clad subassembly. Detach magazine and decon clad end. E.vacuate clad,, backfill and insert plenum tube, spring, t op p lug , and c;smpression we1 d.

Ikcontaminate p i n , QC, ultrasonically t e s t weld, transfer rejects t o recycle. Wire wrap, spat weld, and inspect pins .

Receive duc t subassembly and components [retainers, wire wrap, attachment rai l s, 2;hield i n l e t assembly, locking bars, iand piston rings).

iksembl t? strip 1 ayers w i t h attachment mils and inspect. Assemble pins , ::trip 1 oyers , and shield assembly. h s t a l ? 1 scking bars. Inspect p i n bundle subassembly. Assemble duct subassembly aver p i n bundle subassembly. Jnstall retainer, weld, and inspect.

1nstal1 piston rings, QC inspect.

wear pad center1 ine) , check decon. l'ransfer assembly t o storage.

nal dimensional inspection (1 ength,

The zoned physical security aspect enhances the protection of nuclear fuel by reducing the number o f plant indiwiduals having direct access t o fuel processing, storage, and hand1 i og weas. I t reduces the guard force requirements because o f the nuclear rnaler*ial control functions having been 1 oca1 ized into a small phys-ical area.

Protection from internal threats and possiblle diversion i s met by meeting Regulatory Agency Control requirenmts as noted i n 10 CFR 70, 10 CFR 73, and 10 CFR 74 by hav-ing an independcnb orgawizatioirs overseeing and controlling nuclear material movements and trarsfers, AddS-tional control s are instituted by implementing "accountability station" controls t o localize and define process step anom7 ies.

IAEA goals a s noted i n 10 CFR 75 far early detection of a loss are met by the accountabil i t v station system t h a t a1 50 provides a near-real-time plant nuclear i nventory ,

5.0 REFEREMCES

A l i s t o f the applicable regtrlatorgr documents iused t o derive this safeguards and securi ly concept i s given below.

5.1 DOE ORDERS

5630.1

5630.2

5630.9A

Contro? and Account~b-i 7 i ty of Rlucl ear Materi a1 s

Contrul arid ACCOUtItii:Di 1 i ty of Nuclear Materi a1 s Basic Pri nc:i pl es

Nuclear Materials Reporting and Data Submissions Procedure Man tdr?. 1

5632.1

5632.2

Physical Protection of Classified Matter

Physd cal Protection o f Speci a1 lducl ear Material s

5632.3 Operat-; ng Security .

5.2 NRC CRITERIA

10 CFR 50 Domestic Licensing of Productl”on and Util izat ion Facilities

10 CFR 70 Dowes?:‘ic Licensing uof i;pecial Nwr:l ear Material

10 CFR 73 Physf.:al Protection of‘ Flants and Materials

10 CFR 74 M a t e r i x S Control and &:counting of Special Nuclear Mater ia l

10 CFR 75 Safegdards on Nuclear Material --Imp1 ementation o f US/IAfA Agreement

10 CFR 95 Security Facility Approval and Safeguarding of National Security lnformation and Rest;rqmicLrd Data

5.3 NRC REGULATORY GII!:DES

1.8 Perscnnel Selection and T r a i n i n g

1.17 Prat-ecti on o f Nuclear P I ants Wgaa’ nst. Industrial Sabok‘ttge

5/77

6/73

1.134

3.39

5.10

5.12

5.14

5.75

5.20

5.24

5.29

5.43

5.44

5.45

M ~ d 7 : c nl Eva1 uation of Hucl ea I* P o w e ~ P1 ant Person- n ~ l &qui ri ng Operat;r? rs License

S t a n d m i Format and Content o f License Appl ica- t i o f i s f o r P1 utonimt Pr-ocessjng and Fuel Fabrica- t i o n P1 ants

ScTecta'on and Use o ? Pressure Sensitive Seals on Containers f o r Oiir'ite Storage of Special Nuc! 6351' Materi a1

Gericra'l Use o f Locks i n the Protection and Control o f Faci7 i t i e s and Special Mucl ear lYaterials

Use ii f Observation { W i sua1 Surwei 11 ance) Tech- n iques i n Materia? Access Areas

Sccwrlty Seals f o r the Protcr t* ion and Control o f Spec.'i a1 Nuclear Ms t,erial

T r s i r iny , Equippi! XJ atnrf Qual iri',y.y.!ng o f Guards arid

Arrcllysis and Use of Process D a t a for the Protec- tiw o f Special Mucl ear Mat@ri ia ' !

Nur:'l par Material Control System o f Nuclear Power PI a n t 5

P'iar,i. Security Force f h t i e s

F'erin.eter* Intrusion A'1 arm ,F?yst.em

Stmriard Format and ;.:ontent far the Special Nuclear h'm:.r,ial and AccourrLi ng Secbion of d Special lduc ! i w tlateriaY L*icc w e Ai t i j l $ c a t i o n

W J i i iEO

3/79

7/73

11/73

5/80

1 /74

1 /74

6/74

6/75

7 /75

5/80

12/74

01 27Y /emh

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