National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC354254

General J. Lawton Collins, the Armychief of staff left, visited X C'oips on 6December and warmly praisedMajGen Almond, right for his con-duct of the battle. Collins got to thecommand posts of the 3d and 7thInfantry Divisions, but bad weatherkept him from seeing MajGen Smithand the command post of the 1stMarine Division at Koto-ri.

was concerned over the coordina-tion of artillery fire by the 3dDivision. Almond promised that itwould be under Marine control.He spoke briefly with Puller andLitzenberg and noted that night inhis diary, "Morale is high in theMarine Division."

All elements of RCT-7 hadclosed into Koto-ri by 1700 on theevening of 7 December; hutDivision Train No. 1, which theywere to have shepherded, did notget out of Hagaru-ri until 1600 onthe 6th. A little more than a mileout of Hagaru-ri the Chinese camedown on the column. They mighthave thought the train would beeasy pickings; if so, they werewrong. They hit Major Francis"Fox" Parry's 3d Battalion, 11thMarines. The artillerymen, fightingas infantry, held them off. Another

mile down the road and theprocess was repeated. This timethe gunners got to use their how-itzers, firing at pointblank range,and happily, if optimistically,guessed that they had killed orwounded all but about 50 of theestimated 500 to 800 attackers.

As the night wore on there wasmore fighting along the road. Thedivision headquarters had a stiffscuffle sometime after midnight.The members of the division bandwere given the opportunity todemonstrate their skills as machinegunners. The Military PoliceCompany was bringing out a bagof 160 able-bodied prisoners ofwar. The prisoners got caughtbetween Chinese and Americanfires and most were killed. Nighthecklers from David Wolfe'sVMF(N)-513 helped and at dawnthe omnipresent Corsairs fromFrank Cole's VMF-312 came on sta-tion and resolved the situation.The column moved through thestark debris—there were still bod-ies lying about and many brokenvehicles—of Hell Fire Valley andby 1000 on 7 December DivisionTrain No. 1, after an all-nightmarch, was in Koto-ri.

Eleven miles away in Hagaru,Division Train No. 2, unable tomove onto the road until DivisionTrain No. 1 had cleared, did notget started until well after dark on6 December. At midnight, the headof the train was still barely out ofthe town. Lieutenant ColonelMilne, the train commander, askedfor infantry help. Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, wasdetailed to the job. Taplett movedforward with two companies.Nothing much happened untildawn on 7 December when thecolumn was able to continue onunder air cover.

In Hagaru-ri engineers and ord-nance men were busy blowing upeverything that could be blown up

304

and burning the rest. Stevens' 1stBattalion, 5th Marines; Ridge's 3dBattalion, 1st Marines; andDiysdale's 41 Commando stoodpoised to leave but could not getout of town until Thursday morn-ing, 7 December, after some fight-ing in Hagaru-ri itself, because ofthe clogged roads. Roise's 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, came offEast Hill and fell in behind them asrear guard at about 1000. TheChinese once again seemed moreinterested in looting what was leftof the town than in further fight-ing. After some light interferenceon the road, all elements of RCT-5were safely tucked into the Koto-riperimeter before midnight on the7th.

A number of units—includingRoise's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines;Ridge's 3d Battalion, 1st Marines;and Drake's 31st Tank Company—assert that they provided the rearpoint coming out of Hagaru-ri.Able Company engineers, howev-er, busy with last-minute demoli-tions in the already burning town,probably have the best claim. Inround figures, 10,000 Marines andsoldiers, shepherding 1,000 vehi-cles, had marched 11 miles in 38hours. Marine losses were 103dead, 7 missing, and 506 wounded.

Marine engineers, arguably thegreatest heroes of the campaign,had widened and improved theairstrip at Koto-ri so that it couldhandle World War II TBMs, nolonger used as torpedo bombers,but now stripped-down utility air-craft that could bring in a few pas-sengers—as many as nine—and liftout a corresponding number ofwounded. The TBMs, plus the lightaircraft and helicopters from VMO-6, took out about 200 casualties on7 December and 225 more on the8th. Most of the TBMs were pilot-ed, not by squadron pilots, but byotherwise desk-bound aviators onthe wing and group staffs.

March South from Koto-ri

There would be no rest at Koto-ri. By somebody's count 14,229men had piled into Koto-ri, includ-ing the long-waited Army's 2dBattalion, 31st Infantry, which hadarrived far too late to go forward tojoin its regiment, the shreddedRCT-31, east of the reservoir.Reidy's battalion was to continueas part of Puller's RCT-1 in thebreak out.

Anderson's two-battalion collec-tion of soldiers, quite separatefrom Reidy's battalion, had suf-fered additional casualties—bothbattle and from the cold—comingin from Hagaru-ri. Major Witte, oneof the battalion commanders, wasamong the wounded. Andersonreorganized his shrinking com-mand into two companies: a 31stCompany under Captain George A.Rasula, a canny Finnish-Americanfrom Minnesota who knew whatcold weather was all about, and a32d Company under CaptainRobert J. Kitz, who had been a

Jones had jumped with the 101stAirborne Division near Eindhoven,Holland. Now, coming out ofKoto-ri, his improvised battalionremained part of Litzenberg's RCT-

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5457

Chinese prisoners within the Hagaru-ri perimeter were Marines evacuated the town they left the wounded prisonersherded into a stockade guarded by a detachment of Capt of war behind in a compound, telling them that their corn-John H. Griffin's Military Police Company. When the rades would soon be down from the hills to help them.

company commander in Reilly's 3d As a paratrooper in World War II,Battalion, 31st Infantry, in TaskForce Faith. Anderson thenstepped aside from immediatecommand, giving the battalion toMajor Robert E. Jones who hadbeen Don Faith's S-i and adjutant. 7.

The Marines left Hagaru-ri in flames, wanting to leave no shelter for the Chinese.Veterans still argue as to which unit was the last to leave the town. Marines fromCompany A, 1st Engineer Battalion, charged with last minute demolitions, prob-ably have the best claim to this honor.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5458

305

The march south was to beresumed at first light on Friday, 8December. It would be a "skin-the-cat" maneuver with the rifle com-panies leap-frogging along thehigh ground on each side of theroad while the heavily laden vehi-cles of the division trains madetheir way toward Funchilin Passand then down the pass toChinhung-ni. At the foot of the

pass the Marines could expect tofind elements of the Army's 3dInfantry Division manning theouter defenses of the Hamhung-Hungnam area. But the road wasnot yet open. Smith had beenwarned, as early as 4 December,that the Chinese had blown a criti-cal bridge halfway down the pass.Here water came out from theChangjin Reservoir through a tun-

306

nel into four giant pipes called"penstocks." The bridge hadcrossed over the penstocks at apoint where the road clung to analmost sheer cliff. If the divisionwas to get out its tanks, artillety,and vehicles the 24-foot gap wouldsomehow have to be bridged.

Lieutenant Colonel Partridge,the division engineer, had made anaerial reconnaissance on 6

December and determined that thegap could be spanned by four sec-tions of an M-2 steel "Treadway"bridge. He had no such bridge sec-tions, but fortuitously there was adetachment of the TreadwayBridge Company from the Army's58th Engineer Battalion at Koto-riwith two Brockway trucks thatcould carry the bridge sections ifthey could be air-delivered. A sec-tion was test-dropped at Yonpo byan Air Force C-119 and gotsmashed up in the process. Notdiscouraged, Partridge pressed foran airdrop of eight sections—togive himself a 100 percent insur-ance factor that at least four sec-tions would land in useable condi-tion. The 2,500-pound bridge sec-tions began their parachute drop at0930 on 7 December. One fell intothe hands of the Chinese. Anotherwas banged up beyond use. Butsix sections landed intact. Plywoodcenter sections for wheeled trafficwere also dropped. Next, theBrockway trucks would have todeliver the sections to the bridgesite three-and-a-half miles away, alocation likely to be defendedfiercely by the Chinese.

Partridge met with Litzenbergand it was decided that theBrockway trucks would move atthe front of the 7th Marines' regi-mental train after RCT-7 jumped-off at 0800 on 8 December. Thebridge site was dominated by Hill1081 so Lieutenant ColonelSchmuck's 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, at Chinhung-ni was

l'hoto by David Douglas Duncan

As the Marines moved south from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri they had to pass through"Hell Fire Valley, " site of Task Force Drysdale's heaviest losses. The Chinese hadmade no attempt to salvage the abandoned vehicles, but the Marines did andlearned that some needed nothing more than a push to start them.

would be no chance of a crippledtank blocking the road.

Task Force Dog, under BrigadierGeneral Mead and consisting of the3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, liberallyreinforced with tanks and artillery,had started north on 7 December,passed through Su-dong, and bylate afternoon had reachedChinhung-ni. Schmuck's 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, after beingrelieved by Task Force Dog,moved into an assembly area sev-eral miles north of Chinhung-ni.

The jump-offs from both Koto-riand Chinhung-ni on the morningof 8 December were made in aswirling snowstorm. Schmuck'sMarines started the six-mile marchup the MSR to the line of departureat 0200. His plan was for CaptainRobert P. Wray's Company C totake Hill 891, the southwesternnose of Hill 1081, and hold it whilehis other two rifle companiespassed through and continued the

ordered to advance overland three support would be placed on the attack. Captain Barrow's Companymiles to the north to take the hill. Corsairs and organic mortars. A was to attack east of the roadAll of this required exquisite tim- Tanks would follow at the end of and on up to the summit of Hilling. the vehicular column so there 1081. Captain Noren's Company B

First objective for Litzenberg's7th Marines coming out of Koto-riwas the high ground on the right ofthe road for a distance of about amile-and-a-half. Murray's 5thMarines would then pass throughthe 7th Marines and take and holdthe high ground for the next mile.Puller's 1st Marines was to stay inKoto-ri until the division and regi-mental trains had cleared and thenwas to relieve the 5th and 7thMarines on their high ground posi-tions so the trains could pass on toFunchilin Pass. The 5th and 7thMarines, relieved by the 1st, wouldthen move on down the passtoward Harnhung. The 11thMarines artillery would displacefrom battery firing position to bat-tery firing position but for much ofthe time would be limbered up andon the road. Heavy reliance for fire

Photo by Sgt William R. Keating, I)epartment of Defense Photo (USMC) A5461

One of the vehicles salvaged by the Marines in "Hell Fire Valley" was a bullet-rid-den Army ambulance. Battered, but still in running condition, the Marines usedit to evacuale casualties incurred along the line of march. Once sa/ly in Masan,a large number of Army vehicles were returned to the Army.

Koto-ri as it looked on 8 December, the day that the march to the south contin-ued. Virtually all the combat strength of the 1st Marine Division, plus some Armytroops, had concentrated there Jr the breakout. The next critical terrain featurewould be Funchilin Pass where a blown bridge threatened to halt the march. Itsrepair posed a problem Jbr Marine engineers.

Photo by Sgt William R. Keating, Department of Defense (USMC) A5354

307

Photo by Sgt William R. Keating, Department of Defense Photo (IJSMC) A5361

Snow-dusted M-4A3 Sherman tanks of ItCol Harry T peiformance with Task Force Drysdale. There would beftir-Mime's 1st Tank Battalion await the word at Koto-ri to move ther problems with the tanks in Funchilin Pass.out to the south. The tanks had turned in a disappointing

Immediately outside of Koto-ri, two Chinese soldiers willing- Hagaru-ri, from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri, and from Koto-ri toly surrender to members of a Marine rifle company early on Chinhung-ni, showed a marked improvement in Marine9 December. Each leg of the withdrawal, from Yudam-ni to tactics to deal with the situation.

Photo by Cpl Petei W. McDonald, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5388

308

would he on the left flank, movingalong the slope between Barrowand the road.

Wray had his objective bydawn. On it Schmuck built up abase of fire with his 81mm mortarsand an attached platoon of 4.2-inch mortars—the effective, butroad-bound "four-deuces." Alsoeffective, hut tied to the road,were five Army self-propelled anti-aircraft guns—quad .50-calibersand duel 40mms—attached fromCompany B, 50th AntiaircraftArtillery (Automatic Weapons)Battalion.

Things went like clockwork.Schmuck's main attack jumped offat 1000. Barrow clambered up thehogback ridge that led to the sum-mit of Hill 1081; Noren advanced

Photo hy SSgt Ed Barnum, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130504

Aerial view taken from one of VMO-6's light observation air- precarious nature of the road occupying a thin shelf cutcraft, flown by istLt John D. Cotton, shows the power station, into the precipitous slope.the pipes or 'penstocks" that carried off the water, and the

A mixed group of Marines and soldiers struggle up an ice-covered slope some-where south of Koto-ri. The weather and the terrain were at least as much of anenemy as the Chinese. Marines, disdainful of the Army's performance east of thereservoir, learned in the march-out from Haga ru-ri that soldiers, properly led,were not much dfferent from themselves.

Photo by Cpl Peter W. McI)ona!cI, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5389

309

along the wooded western slopeof the hill. Noren met scatteredresistance, was stopped momentar-

Fresh snow fell during the march from Koto-ri to the top ofFunchilin Pass. When the column on the road halted, as itfrequently did, the Marines tended to bunch up, making

complex, took it after a savagefight, and found a kettle of ricecooking in the largest bunker.Schmuck moved his headquartersforward and set up his commandpost in the bunker only to find itlouse-ridden. The day cost Norenthree killed and six wounded.

Barrow had gone up the ridgeagainst no enemy whatsoever,impeded only by the icy ridgeline,so narrow that he had to march ina dangerous single file. Through abreak in the snowstorm, Barrowgot a glimpse of a stronglybunkered Chinese position on aknob between his company andthe crest of the hill. He elected todo a double envelopment, sendinghis 2d Platoon around to the leftand his 1st Platoon around to theright. He went himself with the 3dPlatoon up the center in a frontalattack. It all came together in asmashing assault. Barrow's Marines

themselves inviting targets for Chinese mortar and machinegun fire. March discipline had to be entbrced by tough cor-porals and sergeants more than by orders from the top.Photo by Sgt Frank c. Kerr, National Archives Photo ([JSMC) 127-N-A5358

Sketch by Sgt Ralph Schofield, USMCR

Going downhill was easier for the most part than going up, but wherever it wasthe march was single file of Marines, or at best a double file. Even stripped downto essentials, the average Marine carried 35 to 40 pounds of weapons, ammuni-tion, rations, and sleeping bag. Anything more, such as toilet articles, shelter halfor poncho, was a luxuiy.

schoolbook solution—engagingthe enemy with his own machineguns and 60mm mortars while a

ily by two enemy machine guns, platoon worked around in a rightwhich he then took out with a tidy hook. He then ran into a bunker

310

counted more than 60 Chinesedead. They themselves lost 10

killed, 11 wounded. The snowended and the night was clear. Atmidnight a Chinese platoon brave-ly hut foolishly tried to evictBarrow's Marines and lost 18killed. To Barrow's left, all wasquiet in front of Noren's position.

To their north, Litzenberg's 7th

Marines had come out of Koto-rion schedule on the morning of 8December. Counting the Armyprovisional battalion he had fourbattalions. Two were to clear eachside of the road. One was toadvance along the MSR, to be fol-lowed by the regimental train andthe reserve battalion. Major Morrishad been assigned to take Hill

311

1328 on the right of the road withhis 3d Battalion. Going was slow.By mid-morning Litzenberg grewimpatient and urged him to com-mit his reserve company. Morrissnapped back: "All three compa-nies are up there—50 men fromGeorge Company, 50 men fromHow, 30 men from Item. That's it."Shortly after noon, Litzenberg com-mitted his regimental reserve,Lawrence's 2d Battalion, to cometo the assistance of Morris. Bynightfall the two battalions hadjoined but not much more wasaccomplished.

Left of the road, the provisionalArmy battalion, under Major Jones,had jumped off on time and, withthe help of two Marine tanks, hadmoved along against light resis-tance. In two jumps Jones reachedHill 1457 where his soldiers dug infor the night. Their position wasraked by Chinese automatic fire,and in a brief nasty action 12

enemy were killed at a cost of onesoldier killed, four wounded.

Litzenberg's executive officer,Lieutenant Colonel FrederickDowsett, had been shot throughthe ankle the day before. Litz-enberg moved Raymond Davis upto executive officer to replace himand gave the 1st Battalion, still hisstrongest battalion, to MajorSawyer, whose wound had provedsuperficial. Sawyer's initial missionwas to move a mile down the roadand wait for the 3d Battalion tocome up on his right flank. The 1stBattalion now had it own fight.

Sawyer's lead platoon cameunder fire from Hill 1304. BakerCompany continued to moveagainst the high ground just left ofthe road while Able and CharlieCompanies moved more deeply tothe right against the hill. BakerCompany was caught in a cross-fire; the company commander,Lieutenant Kurcaba, was killed,two of his platoon leaders were

of a perimeter.

wounded. First Lieutenant WilliamW. "Woody" Taylor took over com-mand of the company and had hisobjective by nightfall. Able andCharlie Companies meanwhile hadtaken Hill 1304 without much trou-ble. Sawyer divided his battalioninto two perimeters for the night.Vehicular movement along theMSR was halted.

It had been nearly noon on 8December before Murray's 5thMarines, following behind the 7thMarines, moved out of Koto-ri.Stevens' 1st Battalion was in thelead. Stevens sent out his Bakerand Charlie Companies to take Hill1457. Charlie Company joined upunexpectedly with the Army's pro-visional battalion and the soldiersand Marines had the Chinese offthe high ground by mid-afternoon.Baker and Charlie Companies,combined with the Army troops,formed a perimeter for the night.Able Company had its ownperimeter closer to the MSR.Murray moved 41 Commando, inreserve, up behind the 1stBattalion.

Meanwhile, the 2d and 3d

Battalions of Puller's 1st Marinesheld Koto-ri itself. For the defend-ers the problem was not the scat-tered small arms fire of theChinese, but the flood of civilianrefugees coming down the roadfrom the north. They could not beadmitted into the perimeterbecause of the probability that theChinese had infiltrated them.

During the bitterly cold night, twobabies were born with the help ofNavy doctors and corpsmen. In alltheir misery these thousands ofcivilians had to wait outside thelines until Koto-ri was vacated.They then followed behind theMarines, as best they could, untilthe presumed safety of Hamhung-Hungnam might be reached.

During the day Smith, alwaysconscious of his dead, attended afuneral at Koto-ri. What had beenan artillery command post, scrapedmore deeply into the frozenground by a bulldozer, became amass grave. A total of 117 bodies,mostly Marines but some soldiersand Royal Marines, were loweredinto the hole. A Protestant and aCatholic chaplain officiated. Thebulldozer covered the bodies witha mound of dirt.

Sergeant Robert Gault, head ofthe Graves Registration Section ofthe 7th Marines, remembered thefuneral this way:

We had a chaplain of eachfaith, and the fellows hadmade a big hole and laid thefellows out in rows the best

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5357

A section of two 81mm mortars set up in the snow to give fire support for a riflecompany in the attack. These high-angle medium mortars, with a shell almost aslethal as a 1 05mm howitzer round, were considered to be the infantry battalioncommander's own "artillery. " Mortars were particularly effective in the defense

Task Force Dog included these self-propelled 155mm howitzers shown in firingposition covering Funchilin Pass on 10 December near Chinhung-ni. Marine1 55mm howitzers at this time were still tractor-drawn and some were lost com-ing out of Yudam-ni. At a greater distance an Army tank can be glimpsed.

Photo by TSgt James W. Helms, Jr., Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 156320

312

trip to Korea, this time as"Represen-tative of CommanderNaval Force, Far East, on mattersrelating to the Marine Corps andfor consultation and advice in con-nection with the contemplatedamphibious operations now beingplanned." Shepherd may havethought he had more authoritythan he really had. In his 1967 oralhistory he said:

we could and put ponchosover them. As soon as eachchaplain had said his little bitfor the fellows, we wouldcover them up and closethem in. Everyone wasgiven—I think under the cir-cumstances—a very fine bur-ial. It wasn't like the one backat Inchon and Hungnam. Itwasn't like the one where wehad crosses for the boyspainted white and all the pre-liminaries: flowers that wecould get for them—we'd goout and pick them. It wasn'tlike that, no. It was onewhere we were just out in afield, but it was one withmore true heart.

There was more snow duringthe night, but Saturday, 9December, dawned bright, clear,and cold. South of Funchilin Pass,Noren moved his Baker Companyto the next high ground to hisfront and Barrow had his AbleCompany test-fire their weaponsbefore beginning the assault of Hill1081. Barrow then attacked in acolumn of platoons behind a thun-derous preparation by close air,artillery, and mortars. Even so his

lead platoon, under FirstLieutenant William A. McClelland,was hard hit as it moved forwardby rushes, stopping about 200yards from the crest. Under coverof air strikes by four Corsairs andhis own 60mm mortars, Barrowmoved his 2d and 3d Platoons for-ward and by mid-afternoon hisMarines had the hill. The two-daybattle cost Barrow almost exactlyhalf his company. He had startedup the hill with 223 Marines; hewas now down to 111 effectives.But 530 enemy dead were countedand the Marines held the highground commanding FunchilinPass.

On the MSR that Saturday, mov-ing south from Koto-ri, the 7thMarines resumed its attack. Therest of Hill 1304 was taken.Captain John Morris with hisCompany C and a platoon fromCompany B moved down the roadand secured the bridge site. Therest of Company B, followingbehind, overran an enemy positiongarrisoned by 50 Chinese so frozenby the cold that they surrenderedwithout resistance.

The old war horse, GeneralShepherd, arrived from Hawaii theday before on what was his fifth

313

When reports came backthat the cold weather had setin and they weren't able tomake the Yalu River andthings began falling apart,Admiral Radford sent me toKorea—I think [the orders]came from the Chief of NavalOperations on the recom-mendation of Admiral Joy—that [II was to take charge ofthe evacuation of the Marinesfrom Hungnam.

More accurately, the Chief ofNaval Operations, Admiral ForrestP. Sherman, had probably beenprompted by back-channel mes-sages to Admiral Radford to sendShepherd to the Far East "for thepurpose of advising and assistingCommander Naval Forces, Far East[Admiral Joy], with particularemphasis on Marine Corps mat-ters."

Shepherd did recognize thatthere could be a conflict of com-mand because of Almond's actualcommand of X Corps. On arrivingin Tokyo on 6 December he metwith General MacArthur and noted"General MacArthur was unquali-fied in his admiration and praisefor the effective contributionwhich Marines had made through-out the whole of the Korea fight-ing. His general demeanor [howev-er] was not one of optimism."

After more conferences andmeetings in Tokyo, Shepherd lefton 8 December for Hungnam and

Photo by Cpl James Lyle, National Archives Photo (USA) 111-sC354456

A squad-sized Army patrol, led by Sgt Grant J. Miller, from the 3d Infant'yDivision's Task Force Dog, moves up from Chinhung-ni into Funchilin Pass on9 December. The tank at the side of the road appears to be a Soviet-built T-34knocked out a month earlier by the 7th Marines.

on arrival went immediately to theMount McKinley. Here on the nextday he attended a meeting on out-loading and naval support alsoattended by Admirals Joy, Struble,and Doyle, and General Harris. Apress conference followed.Shepherd praised the operationsof the X Corps and said that he

was there to assist GeneralAlmond. He was anxious to get upto the reservoir to see things forhimself. He made the trip in aTBM, landing at Koto-ri after cir-cling Hagaru-ri. He then met withSmith for an hour or more. Smithtold him that all casualties wouldbe out by the end of the day.

Shepherd announced that heintended to march out with thedivision. Smith dug in his heelsand said absolutely not.

Shepherd returned to theairstrip. A number of war corre-spondents, among them "Maggie"Higgins, Keyes Beach, and thephotographer David DouglasDuncan, had wangled their way toKoto-ri. While Shepherd's planewas warming up, Colonel Pullerarrived leading Higgins by thehand. Puller said: "General Smithsays take this woman out of hishair and see that she goes out onyour plane." Shepherd turned toHiggins, whom he had met atInchon, saying, "Maggie, it's toobad. I wanted to march down too."The plane completed its loading ofwounded and taxied to the end ofthe strip. It was dusk and as theplane took off Shepherd could seemachine gun tracer bullets reach-ing up at the underside of the

Two C'hinese anxious to surrendeiget a quick pat-down search forweapons by members of Company 67th Marines, but there was no fight leftin them. Once given a cigarette andperhaps a chocolate bar by their cap-tors, they would follow along uncom-plainingly into eventual captivity.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5378

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5370

Litzenberg 's 7th Marines led the way out of Koto-ri at dawn on 8 December.Murray's 5th Marines followed the 7th Marines and in turn was followed by twobattalions of Puller's 1st Marines. Infantry units, moving from hilltop to hilltopon both sides of the road covered the movement of the division trains. Somecalled the maneuver "hop-scotch, " others called it "skinning-the-cat."

As the march went on, cold-benumbed Chinese soldiers surrendered in increas-ing numbers. This group, probably the remnants ofa platoon orperhaps a com-pany, surrendered to Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, south of Koto-ri on.9 December.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5377

314

Photo by Cpl Peter W. McDonald, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5379

First step in evacuation of casualties, alive or dead, during the march-out was toget them down to the road by stretcher. Here fbur Marines, without helmets orpacks, cariy a stretcher down from the high ground somewhere south of Koto-rion 9 December. Fresh snow had Jàllen the previous night.

From Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni

The column of division vehi-cles, protected on both sides bythe Marine infantry in the hills,crawled along the road south ofKoto-ri at a snail's pace and withfrequent stops. The Marines, whowatched the crawling columnfrom their perches in the hills,wondered profanely why the vehi-cles had to be piled high with tentframes, wooden doors, and otherluxuries of life.

Partridge had held back theArmy's Brockway trucks, withtheir precious cargo of bridge sec-flons, in Koto-ri until first light on9 December when he consideredthe MSR secure enough for him tomove them forward. He thenjoined Sawyer's 1st Battalion at thehead of the column. Everythingworked at the bridge site like apracticed jigsaw puzzle. Army andMarine engineers rebuilt the abut-ments with sandbags and timbers.

A Brockway truck laid the steeltreadways and plywood deck pan-els. At noon, Almond flew over-head in his "Blue Goose" to seefor himself that things were going

well. Installation was done inthree hours and at 1530 Partridgedrove his jeep back to the top ofthe pass to tell Lieutenant ColonelBanks that he could bring DivisionTrain No. 1 down the defile. Thefirst vehicles began to cross thebridge at about 1800. Sawyer'sMarines kept the enemy at a dis-tance and captured 60 prisoners inthe process. All night long vehiclespassed over the bridge.

At 0245 on Sunday morning, 10December, the head of the columnreached Chinhung-ni. ColonelSnedeker, the division's deputychief of staff, had positioned him-self there to direct the furthermovement of the vehicle serials.The 7th Marines followed DivisionTrain No. 1 down the pass. Up onthe plateau Ridge's 3d Battalion,1st Marines, had come out ofKoto-ri and relieved the 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, on Hill1328 where it had a fight with

plane. Leaning over to Higgins,the irrepressible Shep-herd said toher, "If we get hit, we will die ineach other's arms."

Frozen coipses are unloaded from a truck at Koto-ri where they will be buried ina mass grave. A 1 55mm howitzer can be seen in the background. The dead, 117of them, mostly U.S. Marines but some soldiers and Royal Marines were interredin a hole originally bull-dozed into the ground to serve as an artillery fire direc-tion center.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5366

315

about 350 resurgent Chinese. At1030, General Smith closed hiscommand post at Koto-ri and flewto his rear command post atHungnam.

Puller brought out the remain-der of RCT-1 from Koto-ri on theafternoon of the 10th. Milne'stanks, including the tank companyfrom the 31st Infantry, followedbehind the elements of RCT-1 onthe road. Ridge's 3d Battalion wasalready deployed on the highground on both sides of the MSRsouth of Koto-ri. The plan was forSutter's 2d Battalion to relieveStevens' 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,on Hill 1457.

As the last Americans left Koto-ri, the Army's 92d Field Artillery,firing from Chinhung-ni, shelledthe town with its long-range155mm guns. There was confusionat the tail of the column as Koreanrefugees pressed close. Thetankers fired warning shots tomake them stay back. Panic devel-oped as the rumor spread that theMarines were shooting the re-

fugees. The tanks passed on downthe road, protected on both sidesat first by Ridge's Marines in thehills. But Sutter, having begun hisclimb up Hill 1457 and finding it along way off and with no enemyin sight, asked Puller's permission,which he received, to return to theroad.

Ridge pulled his companies offHill 1304 and the high ground onthe opposite side of the MSR atabout 2100. Ridge's battalion wasthe last major unit to descend thepass, following behind Jones' pro-visional battalion of soldiers andthe detachment of the 185thEngineers. Harry Milne's tankswere behind Ridge with noinfantry protection except thelightweight division Reconnais-sance Company mounted in jeeps.It was now about midnight.

By then both division trains, allof RCT-7, and most of the 11thMarines had reached Chinhung-ni.The 5th Marines followed the 7thMarines. Beyond Chinhung-ni,guerrillas were reported to be

316

active in the vicinity of Sudong,but the division trains and both the5th and 7th Marines passedthrough without interference.Some time after midnight whenthe vehicles of RCT-1 reached thetown sudden swarms of Chinesecame out of the houses of the vil-lage with burp guns and grenades.Truck drivers and casuals, bothArmy and Marine, fought a wild,shapeless action. Lieutenant Colo-nel John U. D. Page, an Armyartillery officer, took charge, waskilled, and received a posthumousMedal of Honor. LieutenantColonel Waldon C. Winston, anArmy motor transport officer, tookhis place. It was dawn before theplace was cleaned up. RCT-1 lostnine trucks and a personnel carri-er; 8 men killed and 21 wounded.

Meanwhile, Milne's tanks, some40 of them, descending the nar-row, icy-slick road of FunchilinPass had run into trouble. About amile short of the Treadway bridgethe brakes of the ninth tank fromthe end of the column froze up.The tanks to its front clanked on,but the immobile ninth tankblocked the eight tanks to the rear.Close behind came the refugees.Left guarding the nine tanks wasFirst Lieutenant Ernest C. Hargett's28-man reconnaissance platoon.Five Chinese soldiers emergedfrom the mass of refugees andone, in English, called uponHargett to surrender. Hargett, cov-ered by a BAR-man, approachedthe five Chinese cautiously. TheEnglish-speaking one steppedaside and the four others producedburp guns and grenades. A

grenade wounded Hargett. HisBAR-man, Corporal George A. J.Amyotte, cut the five Chinesedown, but more Chinese material-ized on the road and the steepslope of the hill. Hargett backedaway with his platoon. The lasttank in the column was lost to the

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A402841

LtGen Shepherd, right, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacitic,arrived on 8 December on his fifth trip to Korea. Although not in the operationalchain-of-command, he had arrived to oversee the evacuation of the Marines.RAdm Doyle, left, and MajGen Harris, center, greet Shepherd. All three look glum.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5376The Chinese had blown a critical bridge halfway down Funchilin Pass wherewater Jiowed downward from Changjin Reservoir and passed through four giantpipes called 'penstocks. " As early as 4 December, MajGen Smith knew that this24-foot gap would have to be bridged if his vehicles were to reach Hungnam.

Marines from Litzenberg's regiment, along with someattached soldiers, on 9 December reached the blown bridgein Funchilin Pass, which, unless replaced, would stop any

Chinese. Meanwhile, the crew ofthe tank that blocked the road hadsucceeded in freeing the frozenbrakes and was ready to proceed.But the crews of the remainingseven tanks had departed, leavingthe hatches of their tanks open. Amember of Hargett's platoon, whohad never driven a tank, managedto bring out one tank. The night'sadventure cost Hargett two menkilled and 12 wounded.

Engineers were waiting at theTreadway bridge, ready to blow itup. They thought the two tanksand Hargett's platoon were the lastto come by. They blew the bridge,but one Marine had been leftbehind. Private First Class RobertD. DeMott from Hargett's platoonhad been blown off the road by aChinese explosive charge. Regain-ing consciousness, he got back onthe road and joined the refugees.

further southward movement of wheeled or tracked vehicles.Plans were already afoot to bridge the gap with a Treadwaybridge to be airdropped in sections at Koto-ri.Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5375

317

Photo by Sgt William R. Keating, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5408

By evening on 9 December the Treadway bridge was in tance was limited to small-scale firefights and ambushes.place and men and vehicles could move unimpeded down The most sizable resistance would come near Sudong.the MSR through Funchilin Pass. From here on enemy resis-

The wind that blew from Manchuria and beyond, "down —that wind," said noted photographer David Douglasover the Yalu and the mountains all around. . . down into Duncan, "was like nothing ever known by the trappedthe gorges with their frozen streams amd naked rocks. . . Marines, yet they had to march through it."down along the ice-capped road—now shrieking and wild- Photo by David Douglas I)uncan

318

Warm Welcome at Hungnam

Donald Schmuck, from his posi-tion on Hill 1081, watched thelights of the tanks descending thepass and at 0300 gave orders forBarrow's Company A to begin itswithdrawal. At 1300 on 11December the last units of thedivision passed through Chin-hung-ni. By 1730 they had gonethrough Majon-dong and by 2100most had reached their Hamhung-Hungnam assembly areas. Theyfound a tent camp waiting forthem. Lieutenant Colonel Erwin F.Wann, Jr.'s 1st Amphibian Tractor

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5372

Marines from Koto-ri and the simultaneous advance of the1st Battalion, 1st Marines, from Chinhung-ni to take thehigh ground controlling the pass.

Coming down Funchilin Pass on 10 December, the Marine column was inter-mixed with many Korean refugees fleeing the Chinese. Numbers were such as tointerfere with military traffic. Behind them, Yudam-ni Hagaru-ri, and Koto-riwere left as deserted ghost towns.

Photo by Sgt William R. Keating, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5407

Marines march along a particularly precipitous portion ofthe road winding down through Funchilin Pass on .9December. The day beJbre had seen the launching of anexquisitely timed maneuver—the exit of the 5th and 7th

He heard the detonation that blewthe bridge, but figured that hecould make his way on footthrough the gatehouse above thepenstocks. This he did as didmany of the following refugees.

319

Masan in early January 1951.

Battalion had done much of thepreparation for their arrival. Chowlines were open for the continu-ous serving of hot meals. Wann, 31and Naval Academy 1940, hadbeen an amphibian tractor officerat Bougainville, Guam, and IwoJima. The weather seemed almostbalmy after the unrelieved sub-zero temperatures of the plateau.Milne's tanks continued on to theLST staging area, arriving justbefore midnight. From 8 through11 December, the division had lost75 men dead, 16 missing, and 256wounded, for a total of 347 casu-alties.

As late as Saturday, 9December, General Smith believedthat the 1st Marine Division, onceconcentrated, would be given adefensive sector to the south andsouthwest of Hungnam. A day ear-lier his deputy chief of staff,Colonel Snedeker, who was run-fling his rear headquarters, issuedtentative orders for Puller's RCT-1

to organize defensively atChigyong, with Murray's RCT-5and Litzenberg's RCT-7 preparingto defend Yonpo airfield.

But on that Saturday, Almondreceived his formal orders fromMacArthur to redeploy X Corps toSouth Korea and Smith learnedthat his division would be loadingOut immediately on arrival. At thispoint Almond regarded the 1stMarine Division as only marginallycombat effective. He consideredthe 7th Infantry Division, exceptfor its loss of almost a completeregimental combat team, to be inbetter condition. In best condition,in his opinion, was the 3d InfantryDivision, which he visited almostdaily.

Almond therefore decided thatonce the 1st Marine Divisionpassed through the Harnhung-Hungnam perimeter defense itwould be relieved from activecombat and evacuated. Secondpriority for evacuation would he

320

given the 7th Infantry Division.Last out would he the 3d InfantryDivision.

The Hungnam-Hamhung defen-sive perimeter, as neatly drawn onthe situation maps in Almond'sheadquarters, consisted of a mainline of resistance (MLR) about 20miles long arcing in a semicirclefrom north of Hungnam around toinclude Yonpo. In front of the MLRwas a lightly held outpost line ofresistance. The northernmost sec-tor, beginning at the coastline, wasgiven to Major General Kim PakIl's ROK I Corps, which, havingarrived uneventfully from Songjin,began moving into line on 8December. The lift-off fromSongjin by LSTs, merchant ships,and the attack transport USS Noble(APA 218) had been completed inthree days. Counterclockwise,next in line on the perimeter,came Barr's 7th Infantry Divisionwith two sound regiments, fol-lowed by Soule's 3d InfantryDivision. The southern anchor ofthe perimeter was held by the 1stKorean Marine Corps Regiment,which had the mission of defend-

LtCol Harry T Mime, commandingofficer of the 1st Tank Battalion, in apost-war photograph. Tanks were vitalto the Marine breakoul but theirrecord was marred by poor perfor-mance with Task Force Drysdale anc1later, in Funchilin Pass.National Archives Photo (USMG) 127-N-A552011

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5901

LtCol John H. Partridge, whose engineers performed miracles, particularly inscraping out the airstrz at Hagaru-ri and installing the airdropped Treadwaybridge in Funchilin Pass received a second Bronze Star from MajGen Smith at

Photo by Sgt William R. Keating, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5404

Once the high ground commanding Funchilin Pass had been taken and theTreadway bridge was in place, the 1st Marine Division could descend almostunimpeded to the sea. All day long on 10 December Marine troops marcheddown the pass until they reached first Chinhung-ni and then went beyondSudong-ni where they took trucks to Hamhung.

ing the Yonpo airfield. As the evac-uation progressed, the MLR was toshrink back to successive phaselines.

Admiral Doyle, as commander,Task Force 90, assumed control ofall naval functions on 10December. Marine Colonel Ed-ward Forney, a X Corps deputychief of staff whose principalduties were to advise Almond onthe use of Marine and Navy forces,was now designated as the Corps'evacuation control officer. TheArmy's 2d Engineer SpecialBrigade would be responsible foroperating the dock facilities andtraffic control. A group of experi-enced Japanese dock workersarrived to supplement their efforts,

Years later Almond character-ized Forney's performance as fol-lows: "I would say that the successof [the evacuation] was due 98 per-cent to common sense and judg-ment and that this common senseand judgment being practiced byall concerned was turned over toGeneral Forney who organized the

on the status of the 1st MarineAircraft Wing. Ashore were Marinefighter squadrons -312, -542, -513,and -311. Afloat were VMF-212 inthe Bataan, VMF-214 in the Sicily,and VMF-323 in the Badoeng Strait.Shepherd learned that the winghad been offered either the K-bairfield near Masan or K-i nearPusan. K-i was preferable becauseit was the better field and close toPusan's port facilities.

The 11th of December was abusy day. X Corps issued itsOperation Order 10-50, calling forthe immediate embarkation of the1st Marine Division. The perimeterwould shrink progressively as thenthe 7th and 3d Infantry Divisions,in turn, were withdrawn. As theperimeter contracted, naval gunfireand air support would increase todefend the remaining beachhead.General MacArthur himself arrivedthat day at Yonpo, met withAlmond, and approved the XCorps evacuation plan. He toldAlmond that he could return to

(Continued on page 326)

activities in fine form. I meanColonel Forney, he should havebeen a General!"

General Field Harris briefedGeneral Shepherd on 10 December

A Marine, left, and a Korean soldier, right, check the meager baggage of aKorean family on 10 December at some point east of Chinhung-ni before allow-ing the family to proceed to Hungnam. Some 91,000 refugees, driven by hunger,the cold, and fear of the Chinese, would be evacuated.

Photo by Cpl James Lyles, National Archives Photo (UsA) 11 1-Sc354459

321

Medals of Honor

Staff Sergeant Archie Van Winkle,25, of Juneau, Alaska, andDarrington, Washington, a pla-toon sergeant in Company B, 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, awardedthe Medal of Honor for gallantryand intrepidity in action on 2

November 1950 near Sudongwherein he led a successful attackby his platoon in spite of a bulletthat shattered his arm and agrenade that exploded against hischest.

Sergeant James I. Poynter

Sergeant James I. Poynter, 33, ofDowney, California, a squadleader with Company A, 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, post-humously awarded the Medal ofHonor for his actions on 4November south of Sudong,

322

where, although already criticallywounded, he assaulted threeenemy machine gun positionswith hand grenades, killing thecrews of two and putting the thirdout of action before falling mor-tally wounded.

he Medal ofHonor, theNation's highest

award for valor, hasbeen given to 294Marines since its incep-tion in 1862. TheKorean War saw 42Marines so honored. Ofthis number, 14 awardswere made for actionsincident to the ChosinReservoir campaign.Seven of these awardswere posthumous.

Staff Sergeant Archie Van Winkle

Corporal Lee H. PhillipsCorporal Lee H. Phillips, 20, ofBen Hill, Georgia, a squad leaderwith Company E, 2d Battalion,7th Marines, posthumouslyawarded the Medal of Honor foractions on 4 November 1950 nearSudong where he led his squad in

a costly but successful bayonetcharge against a numericallysuperior enemy. Corporal Phil-lips was subsequently killed inaction on 27 November 1950 atYudam-ni.

Second Lieutenant Robert D. ReemSecond Lieutenant Robert D.Reem, 26, of Elizahethtown,Pennsylvania, a platoon leader inCompany H, 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, posthumously awardedthe Medal of Honor for actions on

6 November 1950 near Chinhung-ni. Leading his platoon in theassault of a heavily fortifiedChinese position, he threw him-self upon an enemy grenade, sac-rificing his life to save his men.

First Lieutenant Frank N. MitchellFirst Lieutenant Frank N. Mitchell,29, of Indian Gap, Texas, a rnem-her of Company A, 1st Battalion,7th Marines, posthumouslyawarded the Medal of Honor forextraordinary heroism in waging

a single-handed battle against theenemy on 26 November 1950near Yudarn-ni to cover the with-drawal of wounded Marines,notwithstanding multiple woundsto himself.

Staff Sergeant Robert S. Kennemore

Staff Sergeant Robert S.

Kennemore, 30, of Greenville,South Carolina, a machine gunsection leader with Company E,2d Battalion, 7th Marines, award- sion cost him both of his legs.ed the Medal of Honor for extra-

ordinaiy heroism during the nightof 27-28 November 1950 north ofYudarn-ni in deliberately coveringan enemy grenade whose explo-

323

Private Hector A. Cafferata,Jr.Private Hector A. Cafferata, Jr., 21,born in New York City, a riflemanwith Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th

Honor for his stouthearted

defense on 28 November 1950 ofhis position at Toktong Passdespite his repeated grievous

Captain William E. BarberCaptain William E. Barber, 31, ofDehart, Kentucky, commandingofficer of Company F, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, awarded

the Medal of Honor for his intre-pid defense of Toktong Pass from28 November to 2 December inspite of his own severe wounds.

Private First Class William B. BaughPrivate First Class William B.

Baugh, 20, born in McKinney,Kentucky, a member of the Anti-Tank Assault Platoon, WeaponsCompany, 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, posthumously awardedthe Medal of Honor for covering

with his body an enemy grenadethrown into the truck in whichhis squad was moving from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri on the night of 29November 1950 as part of TaskForce Drysdale.

Major Reginald R. MyersMajor Reginald R. Myers, 31, ofBoise, Idaho, executive officer ofthe 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,awarded the Medal of Honor forleading a hastily organized provi-

324

sional company of soldiers andMarines in the critical assault ofEast Hill at Hagaru-ri on 29November 1950.

Marines, awarded the Medal of wounds.

Captain Carl L. SitterCaptain Carl L. Sitter, 28, born inSyracuse, Missouri, commandingofficer of Company G, 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, awardedthe Medal of Honor for his valiantleadership in bringing his compa-

ny from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri aspart of Task Force Drysdale on 29November. He then led it in thecontinued assault of vital East Hillon 30 November 1950.

Staff Sergeant William G. WindrichStaff Sergeant William G.Windrich, 29, born in Chicago,Illinois, a platoon sergeant withCompany I, 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, posthumously awardedthe Medal of Honor for his extra-

ordinary bravery in taking andthen holding a critical positionnear Yudam-ni on 29 Novemberdespite two serious woundswhich eventually caused hisdeath.

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. DavisLieutenant Colonel Raymond G.Davis, 35, of Atlanta, Georgia,commanding officer of the 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, awardedthe Medal of Honor for his con-spicuous gallantry and skill in

leading his battalion, from 1 to 4December 1950, across mountain-ous and frigid terrain to come tothe relief of the beleaguered com-pany holding Toktong Pass.

Sergeant James E. Johnson

Sergeant James E. Johnson, 24, ofWashington, D.C. and Pocatello,Idaho, regularly a member of the11th Marines but serving as a pla-toon sergeant of a provisional rifleplatoon attached to the 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, posthu-

mously awarded the Medal ofHonor for continuing to engagethe enemy single-handedly inhand-to-hand combat on 2

December south of Yudam-ni afterbeing severely wounded.

325

the weather at Hungnam was mild intures of the C'hangjin plateau.

GHQ and pick up his duties asMacArthur's chief of staff or hecould remain in command of XCorps. Almond replied that hewished to stay with X Corps evenif it became part of Eighth Army.The 27th of December was set asthe day that X Corps would pass toEighth Army control.

The evacuation of the 1stMarine Division began with theloading-out of the 7th Marines inthe MSTS Daniel I. Sultan. The 5thMarines would follow on the 12thand the 1st Marines on the 13th. Itwas anticipated that the shipswould have to make a second,even a third turn-around, to lift theentire division. The docks couldberth only seven ships at a time.To compensate, there would besome double berthing, but most ofthe passengers would have to loadout in the stream. Approximately1,400 vehicles had been broughtdown from the Chosin plateau,about the same number as hadgone up, but now some of thecomplement bore U.S. Army mark-ings. Most of the division's vehi-cles would go out in LSTs. Green

comparison with the sub-zero tempera-

Beaches One and Two could han-dle 11 LSTs simultaneously.Thankfully there was no great tideto contend with, only one foot ascompared to Inchon's 30.

Major Harold E. Allen command-ing, shut down at Yonpo on the11th, passing control of air defenseof the perimeter to the MountMcKinley. The sky remainedempty of enemy aircraft. Overallair control stayed with MTACS-2,the Marines' tactical air controlsquadron, under Major Christian C.Lee. Each of the infantry battal-ions had gone into the Chosincampaign with two forward aircontrollers assigned, most of themreserves, all of them qualifiedMarine aviators. They broughtwith them both expertise in closeair support and rapport with thefighter-bombers overhead. Al-though inclined to lament not hav-ing a cockpit assignment they real-ized they were providing anunmatched link to the air. Theyknew how to talk a pilot onto atarget.

Between 1 and 11 December,Marine aviators, ashore and afloat,flew more than 1,300 sorties insupport of their comrades on theground. Of these, 254 were flownfrom the Badoeng Strait and 122from the late-arriving Sicily.(Lundin's Blacksheep squadron,still at Wonsan, reembarked in the

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5754

LtCol Murray's 5th Marines jbund a tent camp waiting for them when theyarrived at Hungnam afler the long march. Much of the camp was the work of the1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Although there was still snow on the ground,

Marine Close Air Supportat Its Finest

The Marines' ground controlintercept squadron, MGCIS-1,

MajGen Almond gave his Marine deputy chief of staff ('ol Edward H. Forney,much of the credit for the orderly departure of X Corps from Hungnam. here, on14 December, he presents Forney with a Legion of Merit.

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC355068

326