risk management presentation september 17 2012

7/28/2019 Risk Management Presentation September 17 2012

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International Association of Risk and ComplianceProfessionals (IARCP)

1200 G Street NW Suite 800 Washington, DC 20005-6705 USATel: 202-449-9750www.risk-compliance-association.com

Top 10 risk and compliance management related news storiesand world events that (for better or for worse) shaped the week's

agenda, and what is next

George LekatisPresident of the IARCP

Dear Member,

Wewill look at how firms make their money, how they paytheir staff and whether they are designing, and selling products withcustomers in mind.

This is a change from the traditional regulatory model, which involvedsetting standards and then looking back at what firms have done.

Who said that?

Martin Wheatley, Managing Director, FSA, UK (speaking about theincentivisation of sales staff).

A really interesting change in the regulatory model.

Read more at Number 8 of our list.

Today we can also enjoy the speech by Jaime Caruana, General Manager,Bank for International Settlements (at the Federal Reserve Bank ofKansas Citys 36th Economic Policy Symposium).

He said that There is little doubt that, since the crisis, we have had thewidest, deepest and most far-reaching regulatory cooperation in history.

International Association of Risk and Compliance Professionals (I ARCP)www.risk-compliance-association.com
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Participation has broadened, coordination has intensified, andimplementation will be peer-reviewed.

Institutionally, all G20 members have joined the BCBS.

Similarly, the Financial StabilityBoardsmembership has become moreinclusive.

Emerging market representatives bring useful macroprudentialexperience to the table.

And attention is being paid to vulnerabilities in the shadow bankingsystem, outside the narrow scope of the regulated sector.

Cooperation has intensified with Basel I I I s requirement for more andbetter capital, backstopped by a simple leverage ratio and internationaloversight of weights and implementation.

Cooperation has also widened with the inclusion of internationalstandards on liquidity management.

But he continued: I am acutely aware that, even as intended regulatorycooperation has reached an all-time high, the risks of fragmentingbanking along national lines have grown.

Read more at Number 1of our list.

Welcome to the Top 10.

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Policymaking in an interconnected world

Luncheon speech by Jaime CaruanaGeneral Manager, Bank for International Settlements -The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas Citys36thEconomic Policy Symposium on The changing policy landscapeJackson Hole

Gabriel Bernardino, Chairman of EIOPA Creatinga global insurance supervisory LanguageConference on Global Insurance Supervision

Quarterly Banking Digest, Q2Important parts and Highlights

10 September 2012Government lays new MoneyLaundering regulations before Parliament

On 10 September the Government introduced legislation to Parliament toimplement important changes to the Money Laundering Regulations

2007.



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For a European Public Space

Remarks by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB onreceiving the M100 Media Award 2012, Potsdam

Basel II I Jobs

Average salary % change year-on-year +12.50 %

(Source: http:/ / www.itjobswatch.co.uk/ jobs/ uk/basel%20iii.do)

Speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rt HonGeorge Osborne MP at Scotland CBI

The incentivisation of sales staff are consumersgetting a fair deal?

Speech by Martin WheatleyManaging Director, FSA

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Interesting comments for the ComFrame

A compilation of comments on a common framework forthe supervision of internationally active insurance groups,known as ComFrameby the International Association ofInsurance Supervisors (IAIS)

Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act

Frequently Asked Questions

In these Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), theDivision of Trading and Marketsis providing guidance oncertain provisions of theJumpstart Our Business StartupsAct (JOBS Act)as they affect firms and their obligations with respect tosecurities analysts (analysts) and research reports.

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NUMBER 1

Policymaking in an interconnectedworld

Luncheon speech by Jaime CaruanaGeneral Manager, Bank for InternationalSettlementsThe Federal Reserve Bank of KansasCitys 36th Economic Policy Symposiumon The changing policy landscapeJackson Hole

Let me extend my thanks to PresidentGeorge and the organisers for the

opportunity to address this gathering atan event that is more keenly anticipated bypolicymakers and journalists with every passing year.

My question today is: Is there scope for more international cooperation inmonetary policy?

After all, we see international cooperation as essential for financialregulation.

Why do we reject keeping ones own house in order as a precept forfinancial regulation but accept it for monetary policy?

The question is not a new one. In his famous Critical essays on monetarytheory, Sir John Hicks argued that individual central banks have onlylimited influencebecause: they have been national central banks. Only in a national economythat is largely self-contained, can a national central bank be a true centralbank; with the development of world markets, and (especially) of world

financial markets, national central banks take a step down, becomingsingle banks in a world-wide system .Thus the problem that was(partially) solved by the institution of national central banks hasreappeared. on the world level.



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That was in 1967, during the waning days of Bretton-Woods.

And financial integration over the past 45 years has made the problemthat H icks identified even more intractable.

The burden of my remarks today is that central banks need to take a moreinternational perspective, recognise their collective influence and take intoaccount monetary policy spillovers.

Monetary policy that contributes to financial stability needs more of thecooperation that we already practise in financial regulation.

Let me break my main question into four questions and then turn to each:

1.What was the state of cooperation infinancial regulation and monetary policybefore the crisis?

2.Where does cooperation stand after thecrisis?

3.Why is the scope for internationalcooperation in monetary policy often

underestimated?4.Do we need to improve the institutionalframework for monetary policycooperation?

Q1. What was the state ofinternational cooperation in financial regulation and monetarypolicy before the crisis?

Since the financial liberalisation of the 1970s, the cooperation onregulatory standards for large international banks as embodied in Basel Iand II extended well beyond any cooperation in monetary policy outsidethe euro area.



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This cooperation involved:

(i)Exchange of information;

( i i ) Information-sharing based on a common understanding of how theworld works;

(iii) Joint decision-making; and

(iv) Standards set by an international committee.

The very first papers circulated to the Basel Committee on BankingSupervision (BCBS) in 1975 surveyed theRules and practices to protectthe bankssolvency and liquidity.

It turned out that these varied a great deal.

Subsequently, regulators evolved a common intellectual framework andcame to speak a common language.

In 1988, Basel I went one step further, to joint decision-making. I t setdefinitionsof capital, risk weights for assets, and, crucially, a minimumratio of capital to assets.

These formulations werebased on consensus, not enshrined in a treaty orin international law.

Instead, the original Basel accord was enacted in national law andenforced by national regulators.

In fact, market pressurequickly made Basel I the standard even for banksin countries not represented on the BCBS.

The driving forces for this cooperation are well known.

As countries liberalised their capital accounts and moved to floatingexchange rates, banks seized the opportunity to intermediateinternational capital flows.



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Soon after, Bankhaus Herstatt and Franklin National collapsed.

These banks were not globally systemically important financialinstitutions, in todaysparlance, but their messy failures did help to driveforward international cooperation on bank regulation.

When, in August 1982, the big banks suddenly stopped lending to LatinAmerica, Congress increased the IMFs resources but demanded highercapital levels for big US banks.

Concerns about competitive neutrality then prompted the FederalReserve to pursue joint action in what became Basel I.

Basel I I I, to be discussed in a moment, has marked an even more explicit

shift towards internalising the externalities imposed by big banks andbankscollective behaviour.

By contrast, monetary policy remained mainly national after thebreakdown of Bretton Woods.

Attempts at cooperation were episodic, mainly relating to exchange rates.

This gave monetary cooperation a bad nameespecially in countries withcurrent account surpluses, which came under pressure to expanddemand.

At the level of theory, monetary policy shifted from the 1930s focus oncompetitive devaluation, first to the post-war treatment of monetarypolicy as just one instrument in overall macroeconomic stability policy,and then in the past 25 years to the guardian of domestic price stability.

Flexible exchange rates, it was thought, would provide buffers againstexternal shocks while policymakers kept their own house in order.

In fact, the largest economies not only remained relatively closed but alsohad banking systems with very low proportions of foreign currency assets.

To be sure, the quality of global monetary policy discussions hasadvanced over the past generation, as a common intellectual frameworkevolved.



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Indeed, one could argue that monetary policymakers shared a morethoroughly elaborated intellectual framework than did their counterpartsin financial regulation.

Even so, this shared framework could be indifferent (or even hostile) tocooperation in monetary policy.

Q2. Where does cooperation stand after the financial crisis?

The short answer is that we have agreed to cooperate more deeplyon theregulatory/ financial stability front.

But on the monetary policy front, the pre-crisis convergence of views hasbecome strained.

There is little doubt that, since the crisis, we have had the widest, deepestand most far-reaching regulatory cooperation in history.

Participation has broadened, coordination has intensified, andimplementation will be peer-reviewed.

Institutionally, all G20 members have joined the BCBS.

Similarly, the Financial StabilityBoardsmembership has become moreinclusive.

Emerging market representatives bring useful macroprudentialexperience to the table.

And attention is being paid to vulnerabilities in the shadow bankingsystem, outside the narrow scope of the regulated sector.

Cooperation has intensified with Basel I I I s requirement for more and

better capital, backstopped by a simple leverage ratio and internationaloversight of weights and implementation.

Cooperation has also widened with the inclusion of internationalstandards on liquidity management.



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Recognition of potential procyclicality in the operation of capitalstandards has led to the adoption of mutual recognition in the newcountercyclical capital requirement, whichempowers host countryauthorities.

Tougher solvency standards have been set for banks whose failure couldhave system-wide effects.

We should not minimise the challenges ahead.

I am acutely aware that, even as intended regulatory cooperation hasreached an all-time high, the risks of fragmenting banking along nationallines have grown.

While there are long-standing differences in the tax treatment of loan-lossprovisions, national bank bonus taxes have been imposed and nowfinancial transaction taxes are being discussed regionally.

While Dodd-Frank is improvingthe funding model of US-charteredbanks, other banks that rely on wholesale funding have gained marketsshare in dollar intermediation.

While important advances have been made, serious obstacles remain inconcerting resolution regimes given different bankruptcy laws.

A particularly troubling source of fragmentation along country lines is theinclination to put up national barriers against contagion.

As Mario Draghi has said,even though each of them may be right,collectively they have been wrong.

While regulatory cooperation is the prerequisite for open financialmarkets and the free flow of funds, capital controls seem to be gainingacceptance as a response to the challenge of managing currencies whenyields are zero in most major money markets.

These developments threaten to segment financial markets, not only inthe euro area but around the world.



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Nevertheless, I remain hopeful that themovement towards globalconsistencyand more harmonisation will prevail over the forces workingto fragment international banking regulation and supervision.

On monetary policy cooperation, there were notable steps during thecrisis.

Widespread, and ultimately in some cases, open-ended, cooperation inforeign-currency funding through central bank swaps had both themonetary goal of controlling the relevant market rates like Libor and thefinancial-stability goal of providing emergency funding.

Such arrangements are temporary.

But the willingness of central banksnot least the Federal Reserve toact quickly and massively averted what could have been a meltdown.

The global nature of the crisis also saw episodic cooperation in policy ratesetting.

For instance, on 8 October 2008, interest rates were simultaneously cut bythe Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the ECB, the Federal Reserve,the Riksbank, the Swiss National Bank and the PeoplesBank of China, ina concerted move that was strongly backed by the Bank of Japan.

But a number of issues have strained the pre-crisis convergence of viewson monetary policy.

What can monetary policy contribute to financial stability? And how doesmonetary policy work alongside macroprudential action?

Q3. Why is the scope for international cooperation in monetarypolicy often underestimated?

This question raises three more.

First, do flexible exchange rates insulate economies as some theorysuggests?



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Second, are bond markets so globally integrated that policies affectingyields in major countries now have a bigger impact on yields in othercountries than they once did, possibly exerting an even larger effect thanlocal policies and conditions?

And third, can central banks properly assess the aggregate impact of theiractions on global outcomes, or do they suffer from a fallacy ofcomposition?

Starting with exchange rates, flexible rates do of course help to insulate acountry from inflationary or deflationary shocks coming from abroad. Butthey do it imperfectly.

First, since major currencies are used internationally, the policy rates set

by their issuers directly affect monetary conditions elsewhere.Borrowing in foreign currencies may be rare in the biggest economies,but it can be significant elsewhere.

And common monetary and risk factors affect the flow of internationalbank credit and portfolio capital.

Since the crisis, while credit to US households and businesses has barelyresumed its growth, dollar loans to such borrowers in the rest of the world

has grown at up to 20% and has reached about $7 trillion.

Second, the foreign exchange markets behaviour does not always satisfythe textbook interest rate or purchasing power parity conditions.

Exchange rate movements do not merely compensate for interest orinflation differentials.

Instead, most of the time, currencies with an interest rate advantage

actually appreciate against lower yielding currencies and can do so forsome time, making the domestic industry less competitive.



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The depreciation of higher-yielding currencies tends to happen fastduring episodes of stress in global asset markets, and many emergingmarket economies have found this destabilising.

Next, there is the issue ofinternational bond markets.

As policy interest rates and official bond purchases affect bond yields,their effects ripple across globally integrated bond markets.

This happens even with independent setting of policy rates and floatingexchange rates.

Large-scale bond purchases can have global effects whether they are partof an explicit monetary policy or a side-effect of currency intervention.

There is evidence that the large Japanese interventions of 200304lowered global bond yields, as dollars purchased in the foreign exchangemarket were invested in bonds.

There is also evidence that the Federal Reserves recent large-scalebond-buying has also reduced global bond yields.

So the integration of global bond markets makes for a global interest inpolicies that, intentionally or not, affect bond yields in major markets.

Turning to the possibility of a fallacy of composition, I believe that aninternational perspective is essential if we are to correctly assess theimpact of central bank policies on global outcomes.

The price dynamics in commodity marketswhich are increasinglysimilar to those in financial markets could be taken as a signal of globaldemand pressure rather than being considered by central banks as asupply shock for each of them.

Similarly, each emerging market central bank might hesitate to raiseinterest rates out of concern for capital inflows, given the very low interestrates prevailing in major currencies.



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Indeed, if central banks were to take an international perspective, theymight discover that they would all be better off by raising rates, therebysetting global average interest rates more appropriately.

These questions are not easy to answer.

How can we cope with these spillovers: the interconnections arising fromthe behaviour of exchange rates, the globalisation of bond markets, andthe collective impact of policies?

John Hicks knew that the one simple answer to the limitations heidentified a global central bankwould be totally unrealistic.

National central banks have national mandates, and meeting these is

already difficult enough.

We know less about the workings of international linkages than we doabout domestic linkages.

How interest rates will affect the major centres in other countries dependsin part on those countriesown policies and institutions.

And it would not be difficult to add to this list.

A number of factors combine to make nation states less than willing tocooperate on monetary policy.

For instance, monetary policy can be redistributional, shifting wealth andincome between creditors and debtors.

This makes it even more politically charged than regulatory policy ifthat is possible.

Nevertheless, I do not believe that monetary policy can be restricted tokeeping oneshouse in orderat all times.



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While such house-keeping is necessary, monetary policy does requireinternational perspective and cooperation, particularly when it providesthe backing for financial stability.

Q4. Do we need to improve the institutional setting for monetarycooperation?

We hope that the structural trend that deepens interdependence, namelythe globalisation of financial markets, continues.

If it does, there will be periods, in good times and bad, when internationalspillovers will be substantial and highly relevant for monetary policy.

If this notion and the underlying analysis are accepted, then the question

arises of how to strengthen cooperation in monetary policy.

This does not necessarily mean monetary policy coordination at theglobal level, but it does require central banks to better appreciate,internalise and share the side effects that arise from individual monetarypolicies.

This will require a shift to a more global analytical approach, one thatseeks to factor in collective behaviour, interactions and feedback effects.

This would also help us to better frame international cooperation.

I therefore tend to agree with the recent call from prominent academicsand practitioners for global considerations to play a more explicit role inmonetary policy frameworks.

But I am more sceptical about their proposal to formalise cooperativearrangements.

The major central banks would not be able to publicly outline the mutualconsistency of their policies.

Drawing attention to areas of inconsistency and dissent would probablyundermine effective cooperation.



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Traditionally, the BIS and the various Basel committees have alwayssought to complement the domestic analysis at central banks with a moreglobal perspective.

The informal but structured nature of the meetings that take place at theBIS has often facilitated analysis and discussion of the many internationaldimensions of monetary policies.

For example, after providing support to a central bank review of globalliquidity we are working on regular indicators that seek to capture globalfinancial conditions.

These and other global measures also serve as inputs to vulnerabilityanalysis and the early warning exercise conducted by the Financial

Stability Board and the IMF.The IMF is playing a role as well, with its spillover reports andmacroeconomic policies consistency analysis

Let me conclude by saying that much needs to be done.

Moving towards a more cooperative approach makes more sense thanreversing the internationalisation of markets and segmenting thosemarkets in the hope of protecting them against spillovers.

We need more research on these questions and I hope that some of thepowerful analytic talents represented here at Jackson Hole will bebrought to bear on them.



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NUMBER 2

Gabriel Bernardino, Chairman of EIOPACreating a global insurance supervisoryLanguageConference on Global Insurance Supervision

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen,

On behalf of EIOPA I would like to thank theInternational Center for Insurance Regulation forthe cooperation and efforts in organising together with us this Conferenceon Global Insurance Supervision.

I am very happy to see todayso many colleagues from the supervisoryauthoritiesas well as prominent experts and executive officers of theinsurance industry.

Our purpose with this Conference is to create a platform of discussionand exchange of views about the international context of insurancesupervision.

Your presence and contribution to this event is key to its success and willcertainly contribute to a better understanding of the different regimes andwill foster further convergence of practices of insurance supervisionworldwide.

Insurance markets are increasingly global.

Many insurance groups have nowadays a huge part of their revenuescoming from business outside their home countries.

This creates new opportunities but also new challenges for insurers, but

also for supervisors.The promotion of sound and stable insurance markets calls for moreinternational cooperation.



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We firmly believe that the best way toreinforce financial stability and consumerprotection is to develop strong globalregulatory and supervisory standards.

This will create a level playing field forinternational players, foster a commonlanguage between supervisors and improveinternational cooperation and informationexchange.

I would like to share with you some views onthe ways of improving the efficiency ofsupervision from a global perspective.

ComFrame ( Common Framework for theSupervision of Internationally ActiveInsurance Groups (IAIGs) - ComFrame is an integrated, multilateral andmultidisciplinary framework for the group(wide supervision ofinternationally active insurance groups.

ComFrame was initiated in response to the recognition that, despite thegrowing relevance of IAIGs in the global insurance marketplace,nointernationally coherent framework exists for the supervision of such

large, global groups.

I would like to stress that EIOPA is highly committed to contribute to theestablishment of such standards and, in this regard, we consider ourparticipation in the IAIS very important. EIOPA is actively contributing tothe work of ComFrame.

We consider it necessary to enhance regulatory capital requirements inorder to achieve adequate consumer protection on a global level.

Of course, while calling for this measure, we take into account differentperspectives and developments worldwide.



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Seen historically, the EU had experienced comparable discussions adecade ago.

We fully support the move to enhanced group-wide supervision.

Cooperation between supervisors in colleges is essential for the propersupervisory approach to Internationally Active Insurance Groups.

We believe that information sharing and supervisory cooperation underconditions of professional secrecy is a key, determinative element ofeffective supervision.

We need more shared supervision.

Furthermore, Comframe should comprise a capital element, establishingstrong principles for group capital calculations concerning the risksincluded, the metrics used to assess them and the overall level ofconfidence.

Without this consistency, there is no level playing field internationally.

It is not about one unique system, but about a set of strong principles thatwould deliver a range of closer and compatible systems.

Comframe should not be another regime on top of the already existentones.

The local regimes should evolve to comply with Comframe.

This is my vision. I recognize that we cannot deliver this immediately, butat the IAIS we need to set a timetable and concrete milestones to developthis concept in a step by step approach.

We need to be courageous and open-minded.

We need to be open to change and evolution because the industry realityis also evolving and changing.



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An extra effort needs to be done by all of us because like Charles Kettering(a famous American inventor) said one day: People are very openminded about new things as long as they're exactly like the old ones.

Systemic risk in insurance

The crisis prompted a new look at systemic risk, including in theinsurance sector.

The identification and regulation ofGlobally Systemically ImportantInsurersis currently being discussed under the umbrella of the FinancialStability Board and the IAIS.

EIOPA is keen to contribute to a robust identification process ofG-SIIs

and to develop appropriate regulatory and supervisory tools to deal withtheir characteristics.

Traditionally, systemic risk was a banking concept.

However, the recent crisis showed us that certain activities developedunder the insurance sector can also pose systemic risk.

Insurance companies or groups that engage in non-traditional, ornon-insurance, activities (for example:CDS, financial guarantees or

leveraging assets to enhance investment returns through securitieslendingare more vulnerable to financial market developments and,importantly, more likely to amplify, or contribute to, systemic risk.

Of course, this assessment may change over time, depending on theinnovations and changes in insurance business models, especially in lifeinsurance, as well as in the complex interactions between insurancegroups and financial markets.

We should be especially attentive to any kind of maturity transformationand leveraging occurring in the insurance sector.

As a consequence, the identification of a systemically important insurer assuch, should be a direct reflection of its source of systemic importance.



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While the size of traditional insurance activity is still an important factor,it should not be the dominant factor in the identification process.

Clearly, the non-traditional and non-insurance activities and the degree ofinterconnectedness with other components of the financial system aremore relevant from a systemic point of view.

Consequently, the differences between insurers and banks in the impactof failures suggest that requirements for loss absorbency and resolutionregimes for insurers should accept these salient differences and proposesolutions that differentiate accordingly.

As a conclusion I would like to underline that we should have no illusions:the creation of global insurance supervisory standards is a very long

processthat is complicated by the difference of cultures and unevendevelopment of supervisory systems in different countries.

But it is important that the regulators all over the world are willing toreach mutual understanding and to develop a common supervisorylanguage, which will help us to promote stability of the financial markets,to enhance their transparency and to foster consumer protection.

Together we can achieve these objectives.



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NUMBER 3

Quarterly Banking Digest, Q2

Important parts and Highlights

- Capitalisation improved slightly as system-wide leverage declines.The aggregate risk asset ratio (RAR) increased to 22.1% during thequarter due to a decline in risk-weighted assets (down 0.7%) and anincrease in capital (up 0.6%).

- Some banks continue to experience significant asset qualitychallenges driven by the recessionary environment. Althoughnon-performing loans (NPLs) relative to total loans declined from

8.3% to 8.1%, large exposures to the real estate sector have led to a risein specific provisioning and charge-offs, which has affected the banksearnings capacity.

- Sector earnings have been impacted by higher provisions. Provisionsto NPLs increased from 16.2% to 26.2% in Q2 2012 as a result ofprudent efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of future assetimpairments. As a result, the annualised RoE declined from 8.9% inQ1 2012 to 1.2% in Q2 2012, and the annualised RoA fell from 1.0% inQ1 2012 to 0.1% in Q2 2012.

- The Bermuda dollar funding gap widens further. The BD$loan-to-deposit ratio increased to 154.0% (up from 151.0% in Q1 2012and 142.0% a year earlier) as BD$-denominated customer depositsdeclined (down 1.3%). H owever, the large FX-denominated deposits,which declined by 5.1% during the quarter, continues to supplementthe BD$ funding gap.

- Lower investment activity and interbank lending have mitigatednegative effects on domestic credit supply thus far. Lending remainedstable despite de-leveraging during the quarter resulting fromdecreases in investment activity and deposits with other financialinstitutions.



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Table V shows the liquidity condition of the banking sector over the lastfive quarters.

Profitability

Quarterly returnsdeclined sharply as banks start absorbingnon-performing loan balances aggressively.

Despite stable net interest income over the quarter, increases inprovisions resulted in lower profitability in the sector on average.Annualised RoE and RoA decreased to 1.2% (Q1 2012: 8.9%) and 0.1% (Q12012: 1.0%), respectively.



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NUMBER 4

10 September 2012

Government lays new MoneyLaundering regulations before Parliament

On 10 September the Government introduced legislation to Parliament toimplement important changes to the Money Laundering Regulations2007.

The changes will reduce the regulatory burden imposed by the currentregulations, while strengthening the overall anti-money launderingregime. These proposals were set out in July 2012 following extensiveconsultation and are expected to save firms around 3 million a year.

The changes to the Regulations will come into force on 1 October.Notes

The Government announced the changes it was bringing forward toMoney Laundering regulations in July 2012.The

Money Laundering Regulations 2007 require regulated businesses tohave appropriate systems and controls in place to identify and verify theidentity of their customers and carry out ongoing monitoring asappropriate, based on their own assessment of the risk from moneylaunderingand terrorist finance.

The Governmentsapproach to money laundering regulation is designedto make the UK financial system a hostile environment for moneylaundering and terrorist finance, while minimising the regulatory burdenimposed on UK businesses.

Changes to Money Laundering Regulations to reduce burden onBritish businesses

On 17 July 2012 the Government published its response to a consultationon changes to the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 and the impactassessment of the proposed changes.



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Following the consultation the Government will now take forwardproposals to reduce the regulatory burden imposed by the currentregulations, while strengthening the overall anti-money launderingregime.

The proposed changes to the regulations will apply to businesses that areat low risk of money laundering and terrorist financing and are thereforenot required to be regulated to the same extent as other institutions, undercurrent global standards.

The aim of the changes is to make the UKs money laundering regimemore effective and proportionate, with the proposed changes saving firmsaround 3 million a year.

The Government committed to performing a post-implementation review

of the 2007 Regulations, which implement the European Union ThirdMoney Laundering Directive, two years after they came into force.

This review was undertaken in 2009-10, in conjunction with the BetterRegulation Executive, and entailed an extensive call for evidence,meetings, conferences and interviews.

The Governments response to the review was published in June 2011 andcontained a consultation on seventeen proposals to improve the regime,reducing the impact of the regulations.

The changes to the Regulations are intended to come into force on 1October.



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NUMBER 5

For a European Public Space

Remarks by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB onreceiving the M100 Media Award 2012, Potsdam

Important parts

It is no secret that the course of Europeanintegration is currently difficult. The globaleconomy is facing serious challenges.

These challenges are not all of Europesmaking, as some observers would have us

believe. But Europe is perhaps experiencingthem more acutely than others.

The reasons for this are complex. But onepart of the explanation is clear: the originalinstitutional design of the euro area did not meet expectations.

In the euro area we have a single monetary policy, but our economic andfinancial policies are only loosely coordinated.

This is because the euro area is a union of nation-states with strong

national traditions and preferences.While there was sufficient consensus to share a currency, economic andfinancial policies remained organised largely at the national level.

The global crisis has revealed the vulnerabilities in this arrangement.

Loose coordination of policies neither ensures stability nor does itfacilitate effective crisis management.

The institutional design of the euro area therefore has to be reviewed to

put our economic and monetary union (EMU) on a more secure footing.

But how should this be done?

There are two possible paths.



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The first is to go back to the past, to make the original design workbetter.

The second is to develop a new architecture that properly reflects lessonsof the crisis.

In my view, the first path is not viable. We have seen that the euro area istoo interconnected for economic and financial policies to be a purelynational responsibility.

We must find ways to guarantee that national decisions do not harm othermembers of the monetary union.

In the event of a crisis, there should be effective mechanisms for crisismanagement.

And where necessary, this means going beyond coordination, becausethis is a matter of europische Innenpolitik.

We have also seen that maintaining stability requires commoninstitutions that can react to events.

The euro is the worldssecond most important currency. It

makes up 25% of the worlds foreign exchange reserves.

1.5 trillion euros are traded daily on the worldsforeign exchange markets.

And it is used daily by the 330 million citizens of the euro area.

A currency that plays a central role in the lives of so many people has to bemanaged with effective decision-making.

The second path, designing a new architecture, is therefore the only wayforward.

The key challenge today is to present a vision to Europescitizens of whatthis would entailwhich is precisely the theme of this conference.

Together with the Presidents of the European Council, the EuropeanCommission and the Eurogroup, I have been given the task of working onsuch a vision for the next decade.



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We have aimed to be as pragmatic as possible: to establish what are theminimum requirements to make the euro function to its full potential.

And our conclusions are both realistic and attainable.

Member States will have to pool more sovereignty in selected policy areas.

This is a clear lesson of the crisis. But we will not need to cede all powersto Brussels.

Sovereignty will only be pooled where it is essential to ensure a stable andprosperous monetary union.

This will be accompanied by broad democratic participation andlegitimation.

Our vision for EMU has four pillars fiscal union, financial union,economic union and political union.

Progress on all four should be made simultaneously.

The first three pillars will help to steer fiscal, financial and economicpolicies in a sustainable way.

They will also help to create institutions commensurate with the degree ofmonetary integration in the euro area.

But today I would like to focus briefly on the fourth pillar, political union.

This pillar is essential for engaging euro area citizens more deeply andmaking the other three pillars legitimate.

Some observers argue that because of the common decision-makingimplied by the other three pillars, political union has to come first. I donot agree.

Political integration can and will develop in parallel with economicintegration.

Over the past 60 years of European integration, this has always been thesequence.

For example, public engagement with euro area issues has naturallydeepened through responding to the crisis.



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To commit money via the European Stability Mechanism, Member Stateshave had to explain the responsibilities of euro membership to theircitizens.

Parliaments are now taking a sharper interest in European affairs.

Closer economic integration has de facto strengthened democraticengagement.

But this does not mean that we should not strive to strengthen democraticparticipation in Europe further.

Democratic engagement already takes place through the Council ofMinisterswhere citizens are represented by elected ministers and theEuropean Parliamentwhere citizens elect their MEPs directly.

But more has to be done to make the voice of Europescitizens heard. Weneed what in Germany is calleddemokratische Teilhabe.

And this is where you are needed. I would like to ask all of youjournalists and publishers but also policy makers and academics to helpto develop a genuine European public space, eine europischeffentlichkeit.

Most of us in Europe are exposed mainly to our national media in ournational languages.

These media naturally define our perspective: our sense of thepublictends to stop at national borders.

But this no longer describes reality.

What is happening in other Member States matters to all of us. Problemsthat cross borders require citizens to find consensus around commonsolutions.

Again, the crisis is itself having an effect.

For example, newspapers in some countries now take a keen interest inthe welfare systems of other countries.

Citizens closely follow the elections of ministers they would previouslyhave never heard of.



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Certainly, there is an unwelcome side to this related to the potential forreviving outdated national stereotypes.

But there is also a positive side insofar as it leads citizens in the euro areato develop a sense of belonging together and to care about decisions in

other regions.One way to strengthen this trend would be to exchange more mediabetween countries. And here I would like to invite your contribution.

Could you consider, for example, publishing what we might callimported pages from foreign newspapers?

This would allow citizens to get a better sense of how issues are seen inother countries; it would increase cultural sensitivity; and it couldgenerate Europe-wide debates that divide along policy lines rather thannational lines.

Over time, such debate would help to put European decision-making ona more legitimate footing.

Imported pagesare but one idea, a starting point. I t is with yourdedication and creativity that more such ideas can be developed.

It is a privilege to be part of the European project, for citizens andjournalists alike.

But it is also comes with responsibilities, for citizens and journalists alike.

Ultimately, a genuine European public space is essential for supportingthe long-term vision of the euro area.

Citizens need to be in basic agreement that, within a monetary union,certain economic models are no longer possible.

They must understand that there are limits to national discretion ineconomic policies that affect the area as a whole.

In other words, there needs to be a new consensus on economic policiesthat will reinvigorate the European social model and make it fit for the21st century.



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This is a discussion we must begin today. Setting EMU on a path towardsstability is essential so that we can move permanently beyond the crisis.

It will send a clear signal to citizens and financial markets that the euroarea is committed to staying the course.

And it will remove any grounds for doubting the euros future.

There are many reasons to be optimistic that Europe will find this path.

The pattern over recent decades has always been to move forwardtowards a stronger and more united Europe.

When we have faced challenges, we have invariably found solutions.

Those who have predicted the worst have turned out to be mistaken.

Whatsmore, the solutions we need do not require extreme approaches orimpossible choices. They require a structured and achievable pathtowards completing EMU. This is fully within our reach today.

I am confident that one day I can return to this beautiful historical settingsans souci.

In the meantime, I am most grateful for your support.

Thank you once again for this award and your kind words tonight andthank you very much for your attention.



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NUMBER 6

Basel I I I Jobs

Average salary % change year-on-year+12.50 %

(Source: http:/ / www.itjobswatch.co.uk/ jobs/ uk/basel%20iii.do)

The first part of the table below looks at the demand for Basel I I I skills inIT jobs advertised across the UK.

Included is a guide to the average salaries offered in I T jobs that havecited Basel II I over the 3 months to 11 September 2012 with a comparisonto the same period in the previous 2 years.

http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii.do)


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Note:

IT Jobs Watch provides a unique perspective on today's informationtechnology job market. They present a concise and accurate map of theprevailing UK IT job market conditions. One of our favourite web sites.http:/ / www.itjobswatch.co.uk

International Association of Risk and Compliance Professionals (I ARCP)www.risk-compliance-as

risk management presentation september 17 2012

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