risk communication for the natural gas industry

GRI-97/0116 ®

7RSLFDO�5HSRUW

Risk Communicationfor the Natural Gas Industry

Prepared by:Resource Strategies, Inc.Madison, Wisconsin

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Environment and Safety GroupMay 1997

Risk Communicationfor the

Natural Gas Industry

Prepared by:

Kathryn A. TrudellSusan M. Tikalsky

Resource Strategies, Inc.634 West Main Street, Suite 202Madison, WI 53703

Prepared for:

The Gas Research InstituteUnder Contract No. 5094-250-3035Project Manager: Ted A. Williams

May 1997

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Disclaimer

LEGAL NOTICE: This report was prepared by Resource Strategies, Inc. ofMadison, Wisconsin, as an account of work sponsored by the Gas ResearchInstitute (GRI). Neither GRI, members of GRI, nor any person acting on behalf ofeither:

a. Makes any warranty or representation, express or implied, withrespect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the informationcontained in this report, or that the use of any apparatus, method, orprocess disclosed in this report may not infringe privately owned rights; orb. Assumes any liability with respect to the use of, or for damagesresulting from the use of, any information, apparatus, method, or processdisclosed in this report.

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1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE

May 19973. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

Topical Report (5/96-5/97)4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

RISK COMMUNICATION FOR THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY5. FUNDING MEMBERS

GRI contract number6. AUTHORS

Kathryn A. Trudell, Susan M. Tikalsky

5094-250-3035

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Resource Strategies, Inc. 634 West Main Street, Suite 202 Madison, WI 53703

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Gas Research Institute 8600 West Bryn Mawr Avenue Chicago, IL 60631-3562

10. SPONSORING / MONITORINGAGENCY REPORT NUMBER

GRI-97/0116

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT

This document serves the natural gas industry as a resource manual on the principles of risk communication and their specific application tosituations involving environmental health or safety issues. Recent research in risk perception has identified non-technical factors thatinfluence the public’s determination of whether a risk is acceptable, such as whether the risk is unfamiliar, involuntary, inspires fear ordread, and is distributed unfairly. The public’s level of trust in the individual or organization imposing the risk is also a key factor. Based onthis knowledge, practical techniques and tools are described which can help the gas industry improve its efforts to communicate about risk,establish trust, explain complex technical information to lay audiences, and interact with the media and activist groups. The reportconcludes with a process for planning and evaluating risk communication programs.14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES

105

Risk management, risk communication, natural gas safety, natural gas transmission, natural gasdistribution, natural gas end use, environmental health

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Research Summary

Title Risk Communication for the Natural Gas Industry

Contractor Resource Strategies, Inc.

PrincipalInvestigator Kathryn A. Trudell

Objective This project is aimed at serving the natural gas industry as a resource manual on theprinciples of risk communication and their specific application to situations involvingenvironmental health or safety risks.

TechnicalPerspective Risk communication can enable gas companies to work effectively with policy-makers,

reduce liability, reduce hostility, maintain management flexibility, and reduce costs byfocusing resources on those areas in which real safety and environmentalimprovements can be made. Effective risk communication can also reduce the costsassociated with project delays or cancellations.

In the past 15 years, much progress has been made in understanding theunderlying factors which influence the way in which people perceive, evaluate, andmake decisions on issues involving risk. Research has found that in addition tostatistical data, individuals consider non-technical factors, such as whether the risk isunfamiliar and involuntary, whether it induces fear and dread, and whether risks andbenefits are distributed fairly. In addition, in an increasingly technological society,individuals must rely on others to manage the technologies that affect them daily. Thelevel of trust that an individual has in the person, organization, or agency that isresponsible for the technology is also a key factor in whether or not the risk associatedwith the technology is deemed acceptable.

Understanding these non-technical factors can improve the ability ofgas companies to communicate to the public, to regulators, to customers, andto employees.

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TechnicalApproach The information contained in this document comes from an extensive review of the

risk perception and risk communication literature, from consultation with nationallyrecognized risk-communication experts, and from the professional experience of theauthors in applying risk communication in the utility industry.

Results This manual provides the gas industry with:• An overview of risk communication and the potential benefits it offers business,• A summary of the results of academic research in risk perception,• Practical communication tools for addressing the non-technical factors affecting

risk perception and for establishing and maintaining trust among various audiences,• Techniques for explaining complex technical information to lay audiences,• Strategies for dealing with the media and with activist groups, and• A process and checklist for planning and evaluating effective risk communication

programs.

This information includes many examples of successful and unsuccessful effortsin the gas and other industries to convey information about the potential risks thataccompany technology.

ProjectImplications The principles described in this manual can be applied by gas companies in managing

many issues involving health, safety, and environmental risks, including facility siting,indoor air quality, accidents, and employee safety.

GRI ProjectManager Ted A. Williams

Environment and Safety

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Contents

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction 1

Case Study: Contrasting Approaches Produce Contrasting Results 2Risk Communication in Engineering and Operations 6Risk Communication in Marketing and Customer Service 7Risk Communication in Employee Relations 7Benefits of Risk Communication 7The Manager’s Perspective 9The Limits of Risk Communication 10The Contents of This Report 11

1 An Overview of Risk Communication 13

Case Study: The Power of Public Opinion Shapes Business Outcomes 14The Basis for Risk Communication 15Risk Communication and the Natural Gas Industry 16Characteristics of Risk Communication 16Chapter 1 Summary Points 19

2 Risk Perception: Understanding and Respondingto the Way People Worry About Risk 21

Case Study: Perceptions Play a Part in Everyone’s Decisions 22Technological Risks — Past and Present 23The Elements of Risk Perception 25Responding to Risk Perception 31Chapter 2 Summary Points 33

3 Building Trust With the Public 35

Case Study: Open Communication Contributesto Business Success 36The Basis of Mistrust of Industry 37Earning Trust and Credibility 39Chapter 3 Summary Points 43

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4 Explaining Risk 45

Case Study: Effective Communicators Develop the Skillto See through the Eyes of their Audience. 46The Influence of Personal Experience on Judging Risk:The Scientific Perspective and the Public View 47Providing the Appropriate Information 48Presenting Information, Explaining Risk 50Chapter 4 Summary Points 55

5 Working With the Media and Activist Groups 57

Case Study: Skilled Communicators Can Usethe Media as a Conduit to the Public 58Signal Impact 59The Benefits of Media Exposure 60Working With Activists 66Chapter 5 Summary Points 68

6 Plan Carefully 71

Step 1: Assess the Company’s Position 74Step 2: Plan the Program: Appropriate Tools and Timing 78Step 3: Evaluate the Program 82Chapter 6 Summary Points 83

Appendix A: Federal Laws Requiring Risk Communication 85Appendix B: Historical Incidents 87Appendix C: Checklist for Preparing a Risk Communication Program 89References 93

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to express their appreciation to the following individuals fortheir suggestions, comments, and review in conjunction with this document: Mr.George A. Davidson, Jr., Consolidated Natural Gas Company; Dr. Sharon Dunwoody,Institute of Environmental Studies and Department of Journalism and MassCommunication, University of Wisconsin - Madison; Mr. Thomas J. Erstad,Wisconsin Power & Light Company; Dr. William R. Freudenburg, Social ScienceResearch Associates, Inc. and Department of Rural Sociology, University ofWisconsin - Madison; Mr. Daryl L. Hosler, Southern California Gas Company; Mr.James E. Moylan, Jr., Southern Natural Gas Company; Mr. Raymond S. Pyrcz,AEGIS Loss Control Services, Inc.; Dr. Peter M. Sandman; Mr. John H. Shafer, ANRPipeline Company; Mr. Lee Stewart, Southern California Gas Company; Dr. Chris G.Whipple, ICF Kaiser Environmental and Energy Group; and Mr. William Wilson, SanDiego Gas and Electric.

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Introduction

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CASE ST UDY

Contrasting Approaches ProduceContrasting Results

isk communicators often refer to two incidents that are now classics forillustrating the importance of risk communication. Each involves a crisis that

jeopardized public trust. Each company had credible, competent employees andtrustworthy senior management. The differences lie in each company’s approach torisk communication, particularly in their general preparedness to handle the non-technical aspects of the crisis. The manner in which they perceived the importance ofand acted upon the factors crucial to maintaining public trust led to dramaticallydifferent social and financial results for the companies and the industries theyrepresent.

Before the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Plant, MetropolitanEdison had a policy of issuing weekly press releases to the local media.While the quantity of information was sufficient, the press struggled tounderstand the technical jargon contained in the press releases. Becausethe press could not understand the information provided, the releases wereeither not used at all or were printed verbatim, with neither method fulfillingthe public’s need for information. The public was unintentionally lulled intocomplacency. Subsequently, the communication difficulties experienced atthe time of the TMI accident on March 28, 1979, were exacerbated by thelack of a public outreach plan. A once-complacent public suddenly feltbetrayed and mistrusting of any plant communication. Engineering staffresponded with assurances that the crisis was under control and asked thepublic to trust that it had nothing to fear. Even though no fatalities occurred,the public sense of betrayal resulted in greater public opposition to nuclearpower, reduction in operations of reactors worldwide, tightening of nuclearlicensing, reliance on more expensive energy sources, and, in some states,moratoriums on future nuclear construction (Slovic, 1987).

Three Mile Island stands in stark contrast to Johnson & Johnson’s style of publicinvolvement and communication:

A classic example of successful risk communication arose in response to aproduct-tampering incident that could have destroyed Johnson & Johnson,a venerable, profitable firm. After seven people died from taking poisonedTylenol capsules in 1985, the company launched into full alert as prescribedby a predetermined communication plan. The company did not try to assurethe public that everything was okay. It did not try to hide behind platitudesnor attempt to minimize short-term losses. Recognizing that customer trustwas its most important asset, the company developed a strong publicpresence and immediately withdrew the product from the shelves. James E.Burke, the CEO of Johnson & Johnson, appeared frequently on all majornetwork news programs and initiated abundant, direct communication to thepublic. Instead of simply asking the public for trust, Johnson & Johnsondemonstrated its respect for customer attitudes by working to earn that trust(Swanson, et al., 1991).

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Effectively managed risk influences public acceptance of a company and itsproducts. A Johnson & Johnson spokesperson relates, “Tylenol’s 35%market share fell away to 7% soon after the seven people died inSeptember, 1982, but by May, it had made a near complete marketrecovery” (Elias, 1997).

This influence is also felt on Wall Street. When considering investmentchoices, 7 out of 10 Americans polled revealed that corporate citizenshipmakes at least some difference when people decide what to purchase andthirty percent said it made a lot of difference (Marlin, 1996).

Risk communication is an effective means for gas companies to reach and engendertrust among their customers, their neighbors, and their investors.•

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Today, business must be data-driven to survive. We must constantlybalance costs and benefits. However, when handling delicate matters ofpublic concern, the benefits are not always easy to identify until the costsof not addressing those concerns are imminent.

Raymond S. Pyrcz, President, AEGIS Loss Control Services, Inc.

When business loses its trial before the court of public opinion, it isusually forced to accept costly legislative, regulatory, administrative, orjudicial verdicts that severely inhibit the entrepreneurial decision-makingfunction at the cost of loss of productivity.

B. L. Jones and W. H. Chase (1979)

isk communication is an interactive, pre-emptive communication technique designed to anticipate public, regulator, or employee concerns and

address them before they become obstacles to meeting business objectives. Inaddition to satisfying certain regulatory requirements (see appendix A), riskcommunication provides a company with early and accurate information aboutpublic opinion. Properly used, risk communication enhances the likelihood thatpublic responses to risk are based on sound information and on a confidence thatthe company is handling risk in a straightforward and responsible manner.

Scientists, engineers, and risk managers often view risk as a statisticalcombination of the frequency of occurrence and the severity of the physical andfinancial consequences of an incident. When the general public is presented with arisk, however, risk perception research shows that people weigh two basicconsiderations roughly equally in their decisions about risk acceptance (Swanson,et al., 1991). The first includes information on the actual statistical risk. Thesecond, equally important category, includes perceptions of familiarity, sense ofcontrol, fairness, fear, and the relationship with the risk-maker. Offering anaudience statistics and engineering concepts alone will not produce satisfaction oneither side, and may, in fact, contribute to an increase in public concern. The basisfor risk communication is the assertion that if a company addresses only thefactual portion of this equation, it is giving itself only half a chance for success.

Risk communication can enhance the public’s understanding of a risk and itcan provide a company with information on the public’s perception about itsproducts, services, or operations. Risk communication, coupled with riskassessment, provides the gas industry with complementary tools that can beapplied to a company’s most sensitive situation and provide a source ofinformation that risk managers and project engineers can use for ongoingimprovements. Risk communication can be applied in an emergency or be part ofa long-term strategy. Risk communication can be applied in circumstances asvaried as operations (e.g., facility siting and maintenance), end use and marketing(e.g., carbon monoxide hazards), and managing conflicts that might otherwiseattract the attention of regulators or result in increased liability.

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A risk communication program entails a combination of companycommunication activities established to share information with regulators,employees, or the public. These activities occur in a structured sequence in orderto produce specific outcomes:��To gain insights on constituencies’ concerns,��To provide information on current or proposed activities,��To address concerns,��To limit conflict, and��To develop workable solutions.

Each company is unique and each situation involving risk is unique, and theresponse must be tailored to the circumstances. No single approach is perfect forall occasions. The information presented in this reference document will helpindividual companies design a program to suit individual styles and particularneeds for various situations. To identify and address those needs in the mostrelevant way, the body of published research has been condensed and applied toissues that affect the operations within the gas industry. This reference documentis written to provide the gas industry with the tools necessary to meet its businessgoals by understanding and implementing risk communication.

Risk Communication in Engineering and Operations

It is not uncommon for a company to follow all environmental and safetyregulations during the course of a venture only to discover that the project hasbeen derailed by a sudden surge of public opposition. Nor is it unusual for anindustrial accident to result in highly publicized liability suits and calls for stricterregulation of industry. Such circumstances are unpredictable, yet the potentialliabilities for the gas industry are enormous: loss of income, increased operatingcosts, litigation, project delays, and project abandonment. Typically thesereactions stem from a combination of two factors: public misunderstanding ofenvironmental and safety risks; and industry’s lack of information, attention orboth to public or employee concerns about risk. The public wields increasingpower and influence over the policies that directly impact a gas company’soperations and profitability. This influence, paired with the business needs of gascompanies to make large capital investments in complex technological facilities,creates a scenario ideally suited to benefit from the practice of riskcommunication.

From an engineering perspective, risk communication has three goals(Sandman, 1996):��To present technical material to the lay person in an understandable

manner,��To manage nontechnical perceptions of risk so they don’t distort people’s

understanding of technical material, and��To present the company’s plans and actions accurately so people can make

informed and balanced decisions.

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Risk Communication in Marketing and Customer Service

As consumers are given more choices in their energy providers and in the end-useappliances they purchase, cost will not be the only consideration. The safety ofproducts and services, and the environmental performance of both the product andthe company that produces it, are of increasing importance to the buyer.Successful risk communication about natural gas products and services is requiredto abate unfounded concerns so that the industry can maintain and expand itsmarket.

Risk communication affects not only the customer’s willingness to purchasenatural gas appliances, but how he or she uses those appliances as well. Usingflammable materials around gas water heaters or neglecting to maintain a furnaceto prevent hazardous levels of indoor CO are examples of behaviors that stemdirectly from a person’s perception about the risk. Because gas companies areoften held partially liable in such cases by the courts, it is in their best interest tocommunicate effectively to their customers about risk.

Risk Communication in Employee Relations

Risk communication principles apply to internal communications as well as thosewith the public, regulators, and customers. Employees need to be informed aboutthe risks they encounter in their work and the risks that their work potentiallyimposes on others. As discussed in chapter 2, the familiarity of their work maymake employees overcomplacent about the risks and may lead them to circumventsafety procedures. Understanding how employees perceive risk can make internalsafety programs more effective.

Benefits of Risk Communication

A well-designed risk communication program can accomplish several things forgas companies. Effective risk communication can aid a company in efforts toparticipate in policy decisions, reduce liability, reduce hostility, reduce the costsof real safety by targeting limited resources, and maintain or create flexibility formanagement. This introductory chapter examines the business benefits of riskcommunication and addresses management concerns. The remainder of thereference document discusses the rationale and process for implementing a riskcommunication program.

Influence Policy

When regulators are the audience, a risk communication program can producesignificant benefits when applied to efforts on policy development. Riskcommunication can help clarify priorities and therefore can affect the order inwhich risk management actions are taken. In the same way in which it educatesthe public, risk communication can give regulators a closer view of the realities of

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a business, thereby creating a more open dialogue and more effective (as opposedto increased) regulation.

Reduce Liability

The goal of risk communication is not to convince a constituency to blindly acceptcompany actions. Such a goal may in the long run be as dangerous to a companyas interacting with a public that blindly obstructs company actions. Havingfulfilled a duty to warn can prove to be a valuable asset if a company confrontsliability concerns later on.

Reduce Hostility

If potential for risk is substantial, it is advisable to educate people up front ratherthan arouse feelings of betrayal when a problem surfaces later on. When acompany’s communication program develops clear, thoughtful risk messages andapplies them consistently to the target audience, it helps the company to maintaina dialogue with its public. A well-developed system can address people’sconcerns before the public becomes hostile, and can mitigate the potential forpublic reactions that attract media and regulator attention.

Maintain Management Flexibility

When the public is reassured that its best interests are being fairly considered, itwill more readily accept management decisions and will feel less compelled toguide or coerce the company with litigation or regulatory action (Sandman, 1993).Once a company has developed a cooperative attitude, it can harness it to give thecompany greater flexibility in choosing among its management options for a givensituation.

Reduce Costs/Target Resources

The level of public concern is not determined solely by the actual risk. Issues ofhigh public concern have been found to receive more policy attention than thosecarrying a statistically higher risk (U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1989).When the public believes that its concerns are ignored, it is predictable that publicpressure will build for increased regulation to address these concerns. When thishappens, company resources may also be misallocated, causing exposures to realrisk and increased liability. Effective risk communication may enable a companyto make more appropriate risk abatement investments and reduce the cost of realsafety risks.

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The Manager’s Perspective

Managers in today’s heavily regulated gas industry might wonder why complyingwith all environmental and safety rules should not be sufficient. Responsiblemanagers should consider whether the benefits of a risk communication programwill exceed the costs, how it will affect the bottom line, and whether working withthe public will create more problems than it solves.

Arousing an Unconcerned Public

Many managers may question the wisdom of introducing risk concerns toemployees or the public without provocation. Decisions to do so must always bemade on a case-by-case basis. Yet there is no doubt that successful companiesmake extraordinary efforts to consistently listen to their publics. If the public isnot presently concerned about an issue, company efforts to inform and educateabout that issue are unlikely to arouse concern. Indeed, advocacy groups can attestto the overwhelming task of trying to arouse an apathetic audience.

On the other hand, if the public has had a lingering concern over an issueassociated with company operations and the company fails to address thatconcern, the company may encounter unpleasant surprises. As is discussed inchapter 5, advocacy groups are often effective when they can portray a companyas lying, stonewalling, or leaving out the facts. Advocacy groups can seize upon acompany’s disinterest as an ideal opportunity to be the first to inform the public.A company that fails to adequately communicate its information about a real orperceived risk can be cast in the role of the antagonist.

Careful assessment of public concerns is an important prerequisite fordeveloping a risk communication strategy, and in particular for identifyingspecific issues that need to be addressed. These planning considerations arediscussed in chapter 6.

Benefits Versus Costs

Managers must weigh the value of establishing a new program within limitedbudgets. The quality of a company’s technical program and the degree of interestheld by its public will determine whether risk communication is economicallyadvantageous to implement. A company with an attentive public and a goodtechnical program has much to gain and little to lose by implementing riskcommunication. A company with an inattentive public has less to gain and acompany with a poor technical program has much to lose (Sandman, 1996).Particularly for large-scale projects, the cost of implementing a project-specificrisk communication program must be evaluated against the potential costsassociated with project delay or project abandonment due to public opposition, thepotential costs of a lawsuit resulting from poorly managed conflict, or the erosionof public trust. If these impacts are plausible, a risk communication programshould be considered. For companies in which these impacts are standardconditions of operation, an ongoing risk communication program should be

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established as a business practice that continually reinforces a company’strustworthiness, technical proficiency, and credibility.

Going Beyond Compliance

Risk communication is required by some federal laws (listed in appendix A).However, from a business perspective, risk communication is not undertakensolely to achieve compliance; it is about achieving company goals throughincreasing public awareness and acceptance of company practices.

Traditionally, regulated industries have responded to public environmentaland health concerns by complying with existing regulations. This serves as a goodstarting point, and it is an essential point to make with regulators. However,history reveals that if the public does not feel adequately protected by theregulators or by the company’s compliance, or if it feels its concerns are not beingheard, it will demand more protection in the form of more regulation. On thewhole, it is usually cheaper to attend to people’s concerns up front than to respondto regulatory requirements later. Risk communication techniques offer anapproach to finding a balance in this equation.

Chapter 3 explores how going beyond compliance can build trust and help toenhance the company’s image as an exemplary performer. In the event of a seriousindustrial accident, a trusted company is likely to be viewed as a caring memberof the community rather than as an outsider that focuses on compliance and thebottom line. This attribute can be an important asset to business.

Going Beyond the Facts

Companies should not expect disagreements about risk to evaporate in light offactual evidence. Hard data are an important part of the risk equation, since theysupport regulatory and legal decisions. But facts alone do not determine personal,regulatory, or legal decisions. Research shows audiences will not be receptive tofacts until they’re certain their concerns and feelings have been, or will be,addressed (Slovic, 1987). These personal, non-technical components of riskevaluation (personal experiences, concerns about fairness, etc.) are not addressedwhen a spokesperson communicates using standard measures of safety (poundsper square foot, smart-pigging, etc.). Rather, non-technical concerns should beaddressed through a company’s written, spoken, and acted-upon commitments tosafe practices, environmental compliance, and being a good neighbor (furtherdiscussed in chapter 2). An effective risk communication plan must address bothtechnical and social factors.

The Limits of Risk Communication

Because unpredictability is inherent in business, results of risk communication areoften uncertain. Risk communication does not offer a way out of all conflicts withthe public. In fact, avoiding an existing conflict is not a legitimate or realistic goalfor any company’s risk communication plan. A regulated business in an open

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society cannot expect an inequitable solution to rectify a legitimate complaint.There will be times when concerns over a risk are justifiable and more protectivepolicy is needed. There will also be times when technical and value disagreementsensue. These should not be seen as risk communication failures. The job of riskcommunication is not to make these disappear but rather to clarify them in orderto lessen the chance of distorting them with anger or misunderstanding.Communicating and discussing risks will increase mutual understanding betweena company and its public, and may help provide a realistic basis for equitablesolutions. Risk communication may not produce the ideal result, but it willproduce a workable and pragmatic result.

The Contents of This Report

This fully referenced document on the science and art of risk communicationoffers the gas industry a guide to achieving risk communication goals. It exploreswhat risk communication is, the scientific research that supports its principles, andrecommendations for its successful application. Chapter 1 discusses thecharacteristics of risk communication and the role it plays in today’s businessworld. Chapter 2 explains the basis for public perception of risk and suggestsstrategies for responding to it. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 discuss practical applicationsof risk communication in the business world in general and to the gas industry inparticular. These chapters discuss implementation issues such as establishing yourcompany as a trustworthy community member, explaining complex information,and working with the media and with activist groups. Because riskcommunication requires careful planning, a step-through process for planning aprogram is presented in chapter 6. As demonstrated by Johnson & Johnson’sexperience, these strategies can directly and positively affect a company’s place ina competitive market.

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1An Overview ofRisk Communication

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CASE ST UDY

The Power of Public Opinion ShapesBusiness Outcomes

isagreements over risk are common in our society. And, they are not new to thenatural gas industry. It is often difficult to anticipate public reaction to risk, formed

from diverse viewpoints and focused in opposition to a project or a company.Discussions of risk often originate in perceptions of the severity of risk. They are fueledeither positively or negatively by the nature of a company’s relationship with its public. Afailed relationship with the public can result in discrediting sound technology and goodscience. Likewise, a company’s failure to inform regulators about technological risk mayresult in unsound regulatory decisions not grounded in science and economics.

In 1973, Pacific Lighting Corporation and El Paso Natural Gas Companyproposed siting a liquefied natural gas terminal at Point Conception,California. The gas companies stressed the need for fuel for economicgrowth. Local landowners were concerned about property devaluation. TheSierra Club and a local group, Ventura County Concerned Citizens,opposed the project on the basis of safety, need, and economics. Further,Native Americans considered Point Conception to be sacred land. Thedebate waged for ten years, complicated by an unclear regulatory agendaand unclear safety goals. Eventually, after ten years, Pacific Lightingdecided to postpone the development of the plant at Point Conceptionindefinitely. The decision came in part because of the decreased demandfor natural gas, in part because of the strong opposition to the project, andin part because of the general uncertainty surrounding technologicalregulation (Edwards and von Winterfeldt, 1986).•

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1The success of any communication program depends on seniormanagement commitment and support. Executives who understand theimpact of public perception on their companies and who send clearmessages regarding the importance of risk communication give theircompany a competitive advantage.

George A. Davidson, Jr., Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer,Consolidated Natural Gas Company

The Basis for Risk Communication

isk communication is a strategy designed both to inform people aboutpotential health, safety, and environmental risks and to gather information

from the public about the issues they are most concerned about. Riskcommunication addresses the reality that, as members of an industrial society,everyone is exposed to certain kinds of risk (Russell and Gruber, 1987). A riskcommunication program must be grounded in an understanding of the varied andoften complicated ways people perceive risk. Approaches that avoid thesecomplexities or ignore public concern are no longer the most profitable way toconduct business. Three important facts reveal the growing importance of riskcommunication to helping a company meet its business objectives:��Living in a technological society incurs unavoidable and involuntary risks,��The public has gained an increasingly strong voice in the regulation and

management of risks, and��Communicating with the public about risk by minimizing difficulties or by

simply asserting that the public is unreasonably concerned will not usuallymeet the public’s need for information and it is an approach that mayactually impede progress.

The practice of risk communication is an interactive, two-way approach. Arisk communicator both informs the public about potential risks and listens topublic concerns. A risk communicator recognizes the importance of perceptionsof risk based on non-technical factors. These perceptions, which are explored inchapter 2, are intrinsic to the definition of risk and they help explain why peopleworry more about some risks than they do others.

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Risk Communication and the Natural Gas Industry

The hallmark of a risk communication strategy for the natural gas industry isacknowledging potential dangers while stressing the industry’s efforts,sophisticated and simple, for preventing accidents. If people aren’t made aware ofpotential problems, they may end up feeling betrayed when eventually they learnthat there are, indeed, real problems that may occur with the transport or use ofnatural gas. In the event of an accident, these feelings of betrayal can lead to anoverreaction. This reaction applies to both chronic exposure risks (such as indoorair contaminants from appliances) and acute exposure risks (such as explosions).Industry communicators are most effective when they reveal both sides of an issueto the public.

Despite the exemplary safety and environmental records held by the gasindustry, the potential for harm from a gas industrial accident is real. As one mid-sized western gas company recently learned during a facility-siting failure, ifmistrust is high enough, people will respond with a demand for zero risk, ratherthan a reasonably balanced compromise. Many industries — whethermanufacturing, utilities, or service — must respond to public sentiment if they areto maintain and to grow their business. Imagine trying to introduce natural gas totoday’s marketplace: a highly flammable gas, pumped cross-country for hundredsof miles, stored in bulk, and piped into homes. How likely is it that thistechnology would gain wide acceptance today? What would it take to gain thatacceptance? Risk communication plays a significant role today in the acceptanceof new technologies and new facilities.

On the other hand, some experts believe that the public actually perceivesnatural gas to be safer than it may be from a “technical risk perceptive” (Sandman,1996). If the public eventually determines that risks can be substantial, and if theydo not recall having been informed of the risk, the resulting mistrust of theindustry can have long-term effects. A more detailed discussion of building trustis presented in chapter 3.

Characteristics of Risk Communication

While the need for risk communication in the gas industry is clear, there is nosingle formula for a successful program. An understanding of the basiccharacteristics of risk communication leads to adopting strategies that will workfor particular companies and situations.

Risk communication messages of many kinds surround us and are sent topeople in all aspects of life: as parents, children, voters, politicians, regulators,scientists, farmers, industrialists, factory workers, and writers. Examples of riskcommunication include the Surgeon General’s warning on every pack ofcigarettes, the safety director of a company explaining chemical handling in theworkplace, and gas company representatives discussing a new liquefied naturalgas terminal with regulators and landowners (Lundgren, 1995).

The National Research Council (1989) describes risk communication as “theinteractive process of exchange of opinions among individual groups andinstitutions concerning a risk or potential risk to human health or the

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environment.” The particular role of risk communication will differ depending onspecific circumstances. It can be used when a real risk exists and the public isapathetic, or when a highly motivated public perceives a risk as significant despitedata indicating otherwise. In the first situation, the communicator shouldencourage action to reduce the risk, while in the second case, the communicatorshould seek to understand the basis of the concern and address the non-technicalfactors.

Risk Communication Is Interactive

Sharing information with the public is a necessary function, but listening toconcerns is often the more important task. Two-way dialogue helps a companygain insight into public concerns. Business communicators find that applying thescientific principles of risk communication leads to dialogue with the public, andeffective dialogue is more profitable than stonewalling (Marlin, 1996). Two-waydialogue becomes more important when feelings run high. Angry people are notlikely to listen to company information until they’ve had an opportunity to venttheir anger. In the long term, decisions made in cooperation with the public willbe more acceptable and easier to implement.

Risk Communication Is Ongoing

An organization’s trust and credibility will be enhanced if it makes a continuingeffort to communicate with the public. Ongoing risk communication can beconsidered a maintenance tool. Just as routine maintenance on a pipeline is notperformed in the middle of a hurricane, risk communication is not ideally suited tobe introduced in the middle of a facility-siting imbroglio or immediately followinga serious accident. Instead, it should be applied when the demands on the systemare low. Its diligent use insures that if demands increase, the public will be morelikely to cooperate, thus avoiding a more serious predicament (Sandman, 1993).

Risk Communication Shares Information

Risk communication requires a more interactive role than the more traditionalcorporate communication functions. Risk communicators are called upon to meeta significant challenge that marketers and public relations professionals have beenconfronting for years — how to inform the public. However, public relations andmarketing typically focus on addressing an audience that is uninterested. Gettingthe public’s attention is the key task, and attempts to build trust are notchallenged. Risk communicators have to address an audience that is attentive butskeptical, or one that is highly agitated. Under these circumstances gainingattention is easy, but building trust is very difficult.

Because there are complex thought processes that contribute to how peoplemake decisions, an effective approach to risk communication should be broadenough to accommodate individual characteristics (Whipple, 1996). People usemany methods to arrive at their decisions about risk issues. Some want to be told

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the facts in order to decide for themselves, some want to know what variousopinion leaders and technical experts think, and others decide based on their trustand confidence in the operating organization. For example, a public meeting todiscuss facility siting should include the pertinent information about the project —construction methods, size of pipe, demonstrated need, and reason forconstruction. Organizers should also consider enlisting support from localindustry, homeowners, and environmental groups. This may be an excellentopportunity to reinforce the company’s commitment to customer service or itsenvironmental mission statement.

Regardless of how or where it is used, risk communication must meet thefollowing challenges:��Knowledge challenge. The audience must be able to understand the

technical information about a risk.��Process challenge. The audience must feel involved in the process.��Communication challenge. Communication must be accomplished in a

way that brings together knowledge and process. Further, it must engendera willingness to listen in order to produce a focused discussion (Rowan,1991).

Understanding the characteristics of risk communication and then finding themost appropriate approach is a complicated process. Because the decisions beingmade during these interactions with the public or with a group of employees arenot only informational, but also emotional in nature, practitioners of riskcommunication must simultaneously inform, empathize, and respond.

The information in this reference document serves to guide a company towardbuilding a bridge between the groups communicating with one another — stepsthat require an understanding of business communication in general.

Risk Communication Requires Corporate Commitment

An effective risk communication program will require commitment from seniormanagement with buy-on and follow-up throughout the corporate structure.Regina Lundgren (1995) related the following story about her experience at aresearch and development firm:

They had a standing policy that any information given to the publicregarding the organization had to be approved of and released by publicaffairs. Unfortunately the public affairs staff had the attitude that nothingbut excessively positive information could be released. When I wanted toadd information about the firm to information about an environmentalimpact statement which analyzed both the negative and positive aspects ofa risk, the public affairs staff responded, ‘I just can’t let you say that’.However, communicating risk often requires that some negativeinformation about an organization be released.

Corporate commitment to risk communication will help to insure that aprogram meets both business and public needs. It will also insure that the riskcommunicators have necessary resources at their disposal to plan an effective,enduring program.

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Chapter 1 Summary Points

��Risk communication is a strategy designed both to inform people aboutpotential health, safety, and environmental risks and to gather informationfrom them about the issues that concern them most.

��Risk communication is not the same as public relations. It is a two-way,interactive, ongoing process whose basic elements include listening,informing, empathizing, and responding.

��A risk communicator’s typical audience is very interested in the subjectbeing addressed, sometimes to the point of being highly agitated. On theother hand, public relations communicators must work hard to get theaudience’s attention. Thus, the communication techniques theseprofessions choose often involve very different strategies.

��The high capital costs, complex technical projects, and inherent risksassociated with the transport and use of natural gas, coupled with thenatural gas industry’s exemplary environmental and safety record, createan ideal situation for the benefits of risk communication.

��Enhancing the public’s understanding of risk, and building trust betweenthe public and the company, can help a gas company maintain itsmanagement options and support its business objectives.

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2Risk Perception:Understanding andResponding to the WayPeople Worry About Risk

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CASE ST UDY

Perceptions Play a Part in Everyone’s Decisions

ost people respond to issues in a manner not grounded solely in statistical fact orengineering solutions, but rather one based on personal experience and perception

— be it gun control, welfare, environmental pollution, or the size of the defense budget.Their reactions stem from the non-technical factors people use to judge risk.

Experts at the Centers for Disease Control estimate that the likelihood ofgetting AIDS from a dentist during a lifetime of dental visits is less than 1 in400,000. It is higher than that if the dentist is confirmed HIV-positive, but notmuch higher if the proper precautions are taken. The risk of choosing anHIV-positive dentist, in other words, is much smaller than many other risksthat an industry may impose on a public. Assume for a moment that HIV-positive dentists tend to charge less than their healthy colleagues and thatthe money saved by employing an HIV-positive dentist could be spent onvitamins, more regular medical checkups, or a new vehicle with airbags —all resulting in a possible net gain in the health of an entire family. However,the dread of AIDS, the distrust of numbers, the loss of control that peopleexperience in the dentist chair regardless of the HIV status of the dentist,the horrible notion that health care providers could transmit a deadlydisease to a patient, the moral overtones of the disease, the anger over thefact that some dentists do not want to divulge whether they are HIV-positiveor not — all of these add up to a risk that most people would probably notventure taking, despite the statistical data.

Peter Sandman, a consultant who manages many different kinds of risks,has this advice for risk communicators: “The next time you claim that thepublic should be more rational about their favorite risk, consider the factorsthat contribute to their perceptions about the risk and consider whether youwould send your children to an HIV-positive dentist” (Sandman, 1993).•

M

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2We’ve learned from experience that public concerns often revolve aroundissues of control, fairness, trust, and the public’s perception — accurate ornot — of the risks associated with our facilities.

Thomas J. Erstad, Manager, Right-of-Way, Wisconsin Power & Light Company

isk communication would be much simpler if risks were perceived inblack and white. In discussions about risk, a company and its audience will

need to have an exchange that provides technical information and statistics to anaudience that may or may not have a background in science or technology. Theexchange must also address the concerns that are perceived, or felt, by thataudience. Providing technical information alone will not further a company’scause. The company experts’ approach to understanding, and then responding, torisk perceptions has a great effect on the ultimate success of the communicationprogram.

This chapter contains three sections that address the issue of risk perception.The first section places risk perception in an historical perspective. The secondsection identifies and categorizes the elements upon which risk perceptions arebuilt. The chapter closes with suggested responses to assist companies and thepublic in establishing common ground and mutual trust.

Technological Risks — Past and Present

It might seem logical that the fear of technological risk is relatively recent, gainingsignificance only in today’s “high tech” world. However, the first moderntechnological risks which led to regulation occurred as early as 1858. RobertFulton’s first steamboats experienced frequent disasters, not the least of whichwas an occasional catastrophic boiler explosion. As a consequence of mediaattention and public outrage, the Boiler Inspection Bill was passed, requiringtough engineering safety criteria, inspections, and licensing. The bill created theBoard of Directors of Inspectors, which was supervised by presidentialappointees. Arguments presented both for and against the new boiler technologyand its regulation were not unlike arguments heard today regarding risks (Edwardsand von Winterfeldt, 1986).

R

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Citizens with views on both sides of the 1858 legislation regulating risk arereported to have commented:

I consider that the only question involved in this bill is this: whether we shallpermit a legalized, unquestioned, and peculiar class in the community to goon committing murder at will, or whether we shall make such enactments aswill compel them to pay some attention to the value of life.What will be left of human liberty if we progress on this course muchfurther? Can a man’s property be said to be his own, when you take out hiscontrol and put it into the hands of another, though he may be a Federalofficer? (from Burke, 1965)

Today we hear these same voices when technologies viewed as bringingunwelcome risks to a community are imposed on an unwilling public. Thesecontroversies have been repeated in countless scenarios with landfills, gaspipelines, electric transmission lines, factories, and other development pressures.As members of industrial society, most people are challenged to adapt theirbehavior in some fashion to accommodate technology. In fact, the ways theseadaptations are perceived frequently focus less on the potential benefits to societyand more on how the technologies represent a range of uncertainty andinconvenience (Russell and Gruber, 1987).

Since World War II, the world has seen a proliferation of federal, state, andlocal agencies that seek to control risk and public exposure to it despite the factthat the availability of energy sources, complex technologies, and modernconveniences pose relatively small risks that are far outweighed by benefits. Thegoal of a risk-regulating agency is to seek uniform compliance from alltechnologies that pose specific risks. However, the creation of these agencies hastaken the control of risk even further away from the public and placed it inregulators’ offices, courtrooms, and legislative chambers. This separation of thepublic from personal control over technology has created a further shift in riskperception. Now the public must not only judge an actual risk but also evaluatewhether or not the regulating agency and the regulated industry can be trusted.

While technology and industrialization have improved the standard of livingand increased human life span, a sense of lost control and other factors used tojudge risk has produced hypersensitivity and distrust for industry and government.Arguments on either side of a new technology or planned industrial facility remainthe same because, for the most part, public perception and acceptance of risk hasnot changed from the past, nor is it likely to change in the future. People continueto judge risks based on life experience and perception of how that risk will affectthem personally. What has changed is the body of research now available on thesubjects of risk perception and risk communication. Practitioners now can have abetter understanding of why people perceive risk as they do and how theseperceptions can be managed most effectively.

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The Elements of Risk Perception

The risk communicator who understands the technical aspects of natural gas andthe potential risks associated with its use possesses only half the informationneeded to be effective. A successful risk communicator must accept that thefactors which trigger an emotional response are neither irrational nor immaterial.These factors are known as the elements of risk perception, and understandingthem may be the greatest challenge for a risk communicator.

Private industry and governmental bodies alike commonly assume thatdisagreements about risk result from public misunderstanding of the relevantstatistics. Thus, in the past, industry and government spokespeople communicatedabout risk using what was to them a logical approach — explaining technicalmaterial to the layman. The rationale was that once people understood thetechnology or data (e.g., average annual mortality) associated with the risk, theywould lose their fear of the risk.

This view, however, does not incorporate the factors such as individualperception, societal values, and other beliefs people may have about the companyor technology imposing the risk (Swanson, et al., 1991). As most people makedecisions about risks, the information they consider is, on average, approximatelyhalf based on the technical data and approximately half based on the followingelements of risk perception: familiarity, sense of control, fairness, fear, andrelationship with the risk-maker (Swanson, et al., 1991). Peter Sandman (1993)defines risk as a combination of hazard and outrage. The hazard componentcomprises the statistical risk and the outrage component is comprised ofcombinations of personal perceptions. The ability to communicate risk requires anunderstanding of the distinction between a statistically calculated risk and aperceived risk. Each must be treated fully in discussions about risk.

Risk researchers have identified approximately 30 different elements thatinfluence the acceptance of a risk (Slovic, 1987; Sandman, 1993). The followingsections of this chapter group these elements into five primary categories relevantto the gas industry. A section outlining a company’s potential responses to eachrisk perception category follows.

Category 1: Unfamiliar Risks

This element of risk perception is associated with the public’s level of familiaritywith a given risk, whether it is new (versus old), industrial (versus natural), andwhether there is a clear scientific consensus about the nature of the risk.

People are more suspicious of risks that are unfamiliar or unknown. RobertFulton, inventor of the steamboat, faced a public that was unfamiliar with andfearful of this new invention. His technology was not widely understood and theconsequences of its use were infrequent but dramatic accidents that left indeliblesketches of violent explosions and tragic deaths on already skeptical minds.Today, natural gas vehicles face a similar obstacle. Until they become a familiartechnology to most people, the perceived risk associated with them will likely behigher than the statistical risk.

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One way of managing the concerns associated with an unfamiliar risk is tomake that risk more familiar. A southwestern gas company addressed the issue offamiliarity and was able to assure the public regarding the safety precautions builtinto their system by holding open houses at their facilities and explaining safetyprecautions and construction methods. This technique of making an unfamiliartechnology visually familiar and understandable serves to make it moreacceptable.

When the source of a risk is a natural substance or process, it is also moreacceptable than an unnatural risk. People do not judge natural and human-maderisks equally. When natural gas is in the ground it is a natural phenomenon, but assoon as it is processed and enters the pipeline, it becomes industrial gas, and theperceived risks associated with it are higher. Industry is held to a higher level ofresponsibility because of the man-made nature of the risk. As a result, whendiscussing industrial risks with the public, it is particularly important not tocompare them to natural risks even if the statistical magnitude of the risk is thesame, because in the public’s viewpoint, they are very different kinds of risk.

New science and technologies bring risks that are often, at first, undefined bythe scientific community. For a time, there may be opposing opinions among theexperts and a lack of scientific consensus. This scientific uncertainty creates evenfurther uncertainty in the public’s mind. When dealing with a risk in which thereis scientific uncertainty, risk communicators must acknowledge this up front, andexplain the efforts underway to advance the state of knowledge. A company’sliterature review or investigations should be described, and government, industry,and academic research cited.

Inside the workplace, the issue of familiarity takes on a different twist. Here,the greatest risk communication challenge is confronting workers’ excessivefamiliarity with their work. Workers can become so familiar with the risk thatconcern disappears. They may fail to take the precautions necessary to protectthemselves, leading to higher exposure and accident rates. Instead of finding waysto reduce concern, the dominant risk communication challenge inside an industrialfacility is devising a method to keep people alert and concerned.

Risks can be made more familiar through exposure and involvement, andsome concrete methods for doing this are listed later in this chapter. Working withuncertain issues is also discussed further in chapter 4.

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Industrial versus Natural Risk

Regulatory standards are moving toward limiting lifetime cancer risk to 1 in1,000,000. An industrial facility that represents a cancer risk to thecommunity of 1 in 10,000 will find itself in a difficult situation with itsregulators and the public. Yet in northern New Jersey, the state departmentof environmental protection and energy estimates that 30% of the homeshave enough radon in their basements to represent an excess lifetime lungcancer risk of somewhere between 1 and 3 in 100, far surpassing mostindustrial risks (radon is a naturally occurring radioactive gas that comesfrom naturally occurring uranium in the soil). Many New Jersey residentswho might be concerned about an insignificant industrial risk still resistspending $20 on a charcoal canister to test for radon. Because radon is anatural risk it is deemed more acceptable.

Coincidentally, at the turn of the century New Jersey had a luminescentpaint factory where radium (a radioactive metal that decays into radon gas) wasadded to paints to make them luminescent. The factory’s slag was radium-contaminated. Eventually the slag was used as landfill and homes were builtover it. The result was a radon problem. Instead of coming from uranium in therock and soil, this particular radon was coming from radium in the landfill. Itwasn’t considered natural radon, but industrial radon. When the state dug upsome 40,000 barrels of this radium-contaminated soil and tried to move it to anabandoned quarry in rural New Jersey, it became the government’s radon.

The result was widespread civil disobedience in New Jersey. Hundreds ofcitizens pledged to lie down in front of the trucks before they would let thisradium-contaminated soil come into their town, even though the level ofradiation in the average basement from natural radon is about the same as thelevel of radiation that would have been generated in the quarry where the statewanted to dispose of the soil. The citizens did not misunderstand the data. Theirconcerns were reflected in statements at the hearings such as: “It’s bad enoughI’ve got radon in my basement. You’re not going to move any more of it into mytown” (Sandman, 1993).

Category 2: Involuntary Risks

This element of risk perception differentiates between risks that are controllable(or voluntary) and those that are uncontrollable (or involuntary). When a risk isvoluntary, it is considered to be more easily reduced and to have less of an effecton the recipient. Voluntary risks are more easily accepted than risks that areimposed on an individual or risks that pose effects that are not easily reduced.

Public involvement in decisions involving risk can reduce the involuntarynature of the risk, and hence, the fear. If the public feels that it has no choice whenexposed to a new risk, it is likely to be less open to accepting it than if that riskhas been chosen from a list of options. An audience presented with a final

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decision has no incentive to listen to the rationale. On the other hand, if severaloptions are provided, the public will be more willing to hear the data that supportone option over another. People will still form their own preference, but they willfeel more in control. Presenting options also alters the public’s view of a risk asone that can be reduced.

When a gas company is siting new facilities, the affected public will oftenfeel it is having unwelcome risks imposed upon them. When people are givenonly one choice, they will push for more options. A southern gas company wasrecently forced to change its routes when residents vehemently protested theproposed project. One resident asked why the company hadn’t consulted theresidents before developing its final plan? Had the company offered a selection ofroutes and presented the project to the public as a choice of routes, giving peoplean opportunity for input, the company would have helped to demonstrate that thefacility siting process was more voluntary. Regardless of the route selected, theproject would have stood a better chance of moving forward — on time and onbudget. If a company selects pipeline routes during the planning process, thenpublic comment should be solicited in the planning process. If route selectionoccurs during engineering, then public involvement should occur at that time.Soliciting comments early on will not only give the public a sense of greatercontrol, it may provide the industry with important information — localdevelopments, road improvements, etc. This also creates an early opportunity toadjust plans to meet local concerns which would need to be confronted later —resulting in a more efficient process. Making the process feel more voluntary willalso result in better informed decisions (National Research Council, 1996).

Companies may feel that if public members are given input into facilitysiting, they will obstruct the process to slow it down. Ironically, people becomemost active when they will be affected by a decision over which they believe thatthey have no control. Having some degree of control offered is often moreimportant than exercising it. Peter Sandman recalls the battles for studentparticipation on university committees during the 1970s. Faculty insisted that thecommittees were none of the students’ business, but students insisted on theirright to participate in university governance. Although the students werevictorious, they rarely showed up for committee meetings. The issue was notactual student control but rather the faculty offering to hear their opinions.

Category 3: Risks That Are Unfair

People believe risks should be equitably distributed in time and space. Risks aremore acceptable if the benefits and risks affect locations similarly and do notunfairly burden future generations or vulnerable populations.

EquityEquity figures prominently in people’s decisions regarding whether or not toaccept a risk. Determining equity is inherently complicated by the fact that whatseems fair to a gas company may not seem fair to the public. Companiesfrequently respond to risk controversies by demonstrating that the benefits of theproposed actions outweigh the risks. While it may well be true that the total

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benefits outweigh the risks, it may be irrelevant if, as often happens, the benefitswill be received by a different population than the recipients of the risks. If peoplefeel an industry is imposing a risk with little or no benefit to them as individualsor to their community, they will resist more than if the risks and benefits appearevenly distributed (the public will make, indeed may insist upon, exceptions madefor vulnerable populations). Perception of unfairness increases public resistance torisks and decreases public trust in the company.

Public outcry over an unfair distribution of risk and benefit is exacerbated ifthe process itself is unfair. At the time of the Bhopal accident (appendix B),several thousand mostly illiterate people were living in shantytowns across thestreet from a pesticide plant. They had no idea how hazardous the plant operationsmight be or of the financial condition of the plant (Shrivastava, 1987). In fact,many people in Bhopal only knew that the plant made a substance that “madeplants grow.” Siting this facility may have been relatively easy, but liabilitiescontinue to be the most significant exposure the company has ever faced.

In another example, an eastern gas company encountered opposition from arural landowner group that felt they were bearing the burden of a pipeline on theirland in order to benefit a distant metropolitan area. They were also concernedabout the siting process the company used. “We were not aware of this projectuntil the company wanted to survey our land. That was the only time we werecontacted about their intentions.”

An unfair outcome (receiving few or no benefits but significant risks) may betolerable if there are convincing reasons for one group being burdened by the risk(Sandman, 1993). However, an unfair process only augments an unfairdistribution of risks and benefits. To the public, a process that considers onlyengineering and economic criteria is unfair: it is based on industry’s decisionsalone and does not incorporate public sentiment or interests into the project-planning or decision-making process. However, if members of the public areasked to play a role in the decision process, they are more likely to be accepting ofboth the decision and the process.

Intergenerational EffectsRisks that pose long-term effects for future generations are less acceptable thanthose that are not intergenerational. So, for example, while the EPA may considerair emissions to be the country’s greatest health risk, the public is more concernedwith hazardous waste disposal. The perception is that air emissions disperse witha puff of wind; hazardous waste facilities remain for generations.

Category 4: Risks That Induce Fear

Many risks induce fear. Generally these risks are catastrophic (versus chronic), orthey evoke a memorable or dreaded experience.

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MemorabilityMemorable events, either experienced personally or captured on film, exacerbateresistance to a potential risk. Events are made memorable when they create a vis-ual memory of damage. These images, known as signals and discussed further inchapter 5, leave an indelible imprint on peoples’ minds. Signal events or mentalimages often come to mind when people consider a given risk. Consider how“Jaws” (both the book by Peter Benchley and the 1975 movie) affectedswimmers’ sense of safety, even though, statistically speaking, the risk of a sharkattack is very low.

Whether the event is represented by signals, symbols, fiction, news, orpersonal experience, a memorable risk is going to generate the most outrage. Highmemorability is particularly destructive when it is paired with low familiarity.Memorability also feeds on itself, often by way of media coverage. Memorableevents such as Love Canal and Times Beach, for example, made dioxin apowerful symbol of toxic horror. The Challenger explosion created an indelibleimage of technological fallibility (see appendix B for incident summaries).

Images of explosions, fires, and evacuations are typical signal events for thegas industry. The news coverage of the Edison, New Jersey, natural gas explosion(appendix B) revealed the charred remains of people’s homes as fires continued toburn into the night. Anger or horror justifies media coverage, which makes therisk more memorable, which leads to more emotion — creating an upward spiralof risk perception (Sandman, 1993). Techniques and information about workingwith the media under these circumstances appear in chapter 5.

The easiest way to break this spiral is to acknowledge past events up front(this will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3). Past events can be used tohighlight improved operations or enhanced safety practices. The challenge is touse the event to demonstrate a commitment to prevent the recurrence of such anevent. If the company has a particularly memorable event, the need to communi-cate about that event is never diminished. Once people associate a particularcompany with a memorable event, they will always note if mention of the event isomitted. Exxon’s display at Epcot Center in Orlando, Florida, for example, doesnot include mention of the Prince William Sound accident (appendix B) — yet itis the environmental catastrophe for which Exxon will be remembered long intothe future. Despite a short-term specific memory, the public’s general perceptionsare long-lived. When a memorable event is consistently left out of discussions, theglaring image of an untrustworthy company is created.

Chronic versus Catastrophic EventsThe public is much more concerned about catastrophic risk than it is aboutchronic risks. Society will better accept a technology whose harm is spread outover space and time. This is especially true if that risk is voluntary. The classicexample is the very different reaction people have toward automobile-relateddeaths and airplane-related deaths. In the first instance, people are killed a few at atime, while in the latter, many deaths are contracted into a single accident, often amemorable one. It is less acceptable to impose a (rare) catastrophic risk on asmall, specific population than a chronic risk on a large population, even thoughthe total statistical risk may be identical.

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DreadA dreaded risk may be one that strikes without warning or discrimination. Eventhough heart disease is far and away the leading killer in the United States, cancerand AIDS are the most dread-inducing. Cancer has such ominous feelingsassociated with it because when or where it will strike is unknown. PeterSandman (1993) relates an incident dramatizing this:

Three Mile Island was the only time I have ever seen a roomful of reportersrush a press secretary and demand to be moved farther from the story. I askeda reporter who had been through endless wars and hurricanes and other riskysituations. ‘Why are you scared here?’ His answer was very revealing. ‘Atleast in a war,’ he said, ‘you know you haven’t been hit yet. If only radiationwere purple, I’d be a lot less worried.’

This is eloquent testimony to the dread induced by the undetectability ofradiation in particular, and of carcinogens in general. When cancer appears, itdoesn’t come with a tag that informs of its origin (see appendix B).

Category 5: Relationship Factors

As previously discussed, in a society increasingly dependent on technology, it hasbecome increasingly important that the individuals or companies that controltechnology are deemed to be trustworthy. Effective risk communication requiresthe communicator to demonstrate characteristics of responsiveness, courtesy,compassion, and sharing (not confronting) community values. The public’s accep-tance of risk depends greatly on how a company interacts with its audience. Theaudience will weigh how they’ve been treated as they form opinions about risk.

Peter Sandman (1993) describes an experiment that was conducted toevaluate the importance of civility in the process. Hypothetical newspaper storieswere written about a spill of perchloroethylene. Three elements of the story weresystematically varied. The first two were the seriousness of the spill and the extentto which the underlying technical information was explained or left vague. Thethird variable was the relationship variable — whether the agency handlingcleanup was expressing compassion or contempt for local concerns, whethercitizens were quoted as satisfied or angry, etc. Participants in the study read onearticle, then answered such questions as whether they believed the risk wasimportant or whether they would be worried about it. The results revealed thattechnical detail had no effect whatever on the people’s perception of the risk.Seriousness had a small effect. The relationship between the community and theagency had a substantial effect.

Responding to Risk Perception

Once a risk communicator understands the basis for the perception of a specificrisk, the communicator can adapt the company’s response. What follows areconcrete examples of actions that gas companies can take to respond to thosefactors that are evident in determining the acceptability of risk. Each example

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must be considered on a case-by-case basis to reflect the conditions and needs ofthe situation. The examples are grouped according to the previous five categories.

Category 1 Responses: Unfamiliar Risks

��Use plant tours, mall displays, school curriculum materials, etc. to increasethe audience’s familiarity with a risk.

��If an unfamiliar risk is also uncertain, acknowledge the source of uncer-tainty. Tell what you do know and what you’re doing to find out more.

��Express an uncertain risk with a range of estimates which includesactivists’ estimates.

��Don’t compare risks that are familiar or naturally occurring with risks thatare unfamiliar or industrial (see chapter 4).

Category 2 Responses: Involuntary Risks

��Make the risk more voluntary by providing a range of options.��If you have control, consider sharing it — through community advisory

panels, third party audits, negotiation with activists, etc.

Category 3 Responses: Risks That Are Unfair

��To the extent possible, allocate benefits in proportion to risks.��Negotiate benefits to offset risks. Remember that compensation and

restitution are better hostility reducers than unilateral philanthropy.��In responding to environmental justice claims, take the injustice seriously

even when you think the environmental damage is negligible.��Resolve fairness issues before discussing mitigation plans, making sure

there are options for achieving fairness other than excessive mitigation.

Category 4 Responses: Risks That Induce Fear

��Identify sources of memorability. Memorable sources may includepersonal experience, news coverage, fiction, signal events (chapter 5) andsymbols.

��If you suspect that past memorable company or industry events are on peo-ple’s minds, discuss them — preferably before the audience raises them.

��Watch for your own tendency to want to stop talking about the problemsprematurely. Be the last, not the first, to drop the subject.

��Legitimize the dread. If you don’t share people’s dread (in other words, ifyou don’t understand how people could be fearful of cancer, oil spills,etc.), you are disqualified from explaining that the hazard is low.

��Take low-probability, high-magnitude risks more seriously than yourquantitative risk assessment suggests as you discuss them publicly.

��Discuss the concrete actions you have taken to reduce the magnitude of arisk.

��Make sure your worst case scenario is really the worst.

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Category 5 Responses: Relationship Factors

��Respond to the audience’s concerns and keep the process responsive.��Pay attention to the little things — return telephone calls promptly, send

promised documents, notify people if deadlines won’t be met.��Treat people with dignity and respect.��Acknowledge problems when they are real, so your denials (when they are

legitimate) have context and credibility.��Instead of demanding trust, demonstrate trustworthiness.��To increase the value of regulators as a source to whom you are

accountable, publicize your negotiations and their enforcement actions.��Negotiate binding agreements with traditional opponents, so they can

certify that you did the right thing (because they made you) instead ofcomplaining that you didn’t.

��Don’t keep secrets — relatively benign information often becomes toxicsimply because it is withheld.

��Acknowledge misbehavior or error. Remember that forgiveness alwaysrequires an apology and sometimes requires a penance.

��Treat concerned stakeholders with courtesy, even if they are discourteous.��Look into complaints seriously, even if you doubt their validity and

suspect a hidden agenda.��Without being patronizing, try to adjust to the cultural norms of your

stakeholders. For example, don’t come to a rural public meeting in a three-piece suit or a brand new pair of overalls.

��Show compassion, not dispassion. People don’t care what you know untilthey know that you care.

��Make your interactions personal, not impersonal. Hiding behindbureaucracy only heightens the controversy.

��(After Sandman, 1993)It is important to recognize that there is no way to make risk entirely familiar,

voluntary, and fair, but that any honest attempts to make it more so will also makeit more acceptable.


��In the past, industry and government spokespeople informed the publicabout a risk by explaining technical material. Their rationale was thatunderstanding technology would lead to understanding risk. However, thisview of risk does not consider individual perceptions, societal values, andother beliefs people may have about the company or technology imposingthe risk. Indeed, if a public appears to ignore the presented facts, they maybe responding to the other factors that contribute to the acceptability of therisk.

��Two categories of information are used by people making judgment aboutrisk. Generally each category is weighed equally in the decision. The first

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category includes the scientific or engineering data on the risk. The secondcategory includes non-technical factors.

��Risk researchers have identified several characteristics that comprise thenon-technical components of risk perception. These characteristics can beseparated into five major groupings. In general people respond lessfavorably to four types of risks: those that are unfamiliar, induce fear, areinvoluntary, and do not distribute the risks and benefits evenly. The fifthrisk perception category reflects the fact that people respond less favorablyto a risk if their relationship with the company imposing the risk isunsatisfactory. A risk may be more easily accepted if the company orindividual imposing the risk is responsive, compassionate, and respectful,and attempts to reduce the non-technical factors which make the riskunacceptable.

��There are specific actions risk communicators can take to assist people intheir judgments of risk acceptance.

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3Building TrustWith the Public

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CASE ST UDY

Open Communication Contributesto Business Success

s natural gas company engineers well know, planning a major gas line expansioncan open a Pandora’s box of permits, public concerns, and construction difficulties.

Yet, NorAm (formerly Arkla Energy Resources) successfully negotiated the permitprocess for a 225-mile pipeline, as it saved the company over $30 million, expanded tonew gas markets, created 2,000 jobs and received several environmental awards for itsefforts, including the first Corporate Wildlife Stewardship Award from the U.S. Fish andWildlife Service.

The primary choice for a 225-mile transmission line route required crossingtwo wild and scenic rivers, a state park and natural area, three federallylisted endangered species, and creating a right-of-way corridor through apreviously uncut forest that was woodland bird habitat. NorAm came to theplanning table with members of more than 30 government agencies andspecial interest groups, including The Nature Conservancy and the U.S.Fish and Wildlife Service. Together this team arrived at a final solution thatenabled NorAm to use its primary route. NorAm agreed that in exchange forpermission to suspend the pipe across one of the wild and scenic rivers,they would construct a pedestrian walkway and purchase 160 acres ofadjoining land and donate it to The Nature Conservancy. In exchange for aright-of-way in the uncut forest, they purchased nearby acreage anddonated it to The Nature Conservancy. These actions protected threefederally listed endangered species and set aside 1,600 acres of wild lands.NorAm spent a total of approximately $4 million for the crossing and habitatto accomplish this work, but saved over $30 million in construction costs.

As important, however, they established trust and goodwill among regulators and theenvironmental community. In the end, members of the newly formed planning teamwere quoted as saying “Anytime they want to sit down at the table and discussproblems, the table will be available” (American Gas Association, 1990).•

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3Conveying information to people is always more effective if you have theirtrust. Conveying technical information to non-technical people isbecoming an increasingly important element in implementing our strategy.

James E. Moylan, Jr., President, Southern Natural Gas Company

company may not be able to strongly influence an individual’s precon-ceived notions of risk. However, companies do have control over their

relationship with their target audience. This relationship provides opportunitiesfor companies to exert a strong influence on risk acceptance.

Chapter 2 discussed the characteristics of risk that influence its acceptabilityand outlined how a company’s relationships with the audience affects that riskacceptance. This chapter will discuss the role of trust and the characteristics of acompany’s risk communication program that can influence the public’s trust. Thisdiscussion is followed by a presentation of methodologically sound techniquesthat enhance a company’s credibility and promote public trust.

The multidimensional nature of trust can be illustrated by a typical doctor-patient relationship. A risk from medical treatment is typically a voluntary risk.Usually the patient has ultimate control over whether or not to accept it. It is also afair risk. The patient bears all the risk but also incurs its benefits personally. Apatient and doctor engage in discussions about the problem, the solutions, and thealternatives. These discussions are characterized by an exchange of facts andopinions (Boyle and Holtgrave, 1989). Thus, as in many other situations, aperson’s acceptance of a risk is influenced by three factors: the nature of the risk,the process, and the skill of the risk messenger. This chapter focuses on the roletrust plays in all three of these factors, and how those factors are integrated intotechniques for earning trust at every opportunity.

The Basis of Mistrust of Industry

Both trust and mistrust have many dimensions. In order to understand and gaintrust, the primary factors leading to mistrust must be identified.

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The Nature of the Risk

For reasons discussed in chapter 2, mistrust is greater for risks associated withindustry and technology (e.g., genetic engineering, by-products of manufacturing,and pesticide residues). Technological risks are often associated with the mainelements of risk perception: fear, unfamiliarity, and loss of control. Of all thetypes of information people receive, that which is least trusted is informationprovided by industry regarding technological risks (Frewer, et al., 1996). Ingeneral, the greater the potential for environmental and human health-relatedcatastrophes, the less trusted is the risk-producing industry (Sandman, 1993).

The Perceived Loss of Control

Many conflicts and controversies surrounding risk management are the result oftechnological and social changes. As individuals become increasingly more reliantupon sophisticated services and technologies, control shifts away from the indi-vidual. Consumers cede that control, and the responsibility for managing the risk,to industry and the governmental bodies that regulate it (Frewer, et al., 1996). Theaverage individual’s limited understanding of how these complex technologieswork contributes further to that feeling of lost control (Freudenberg, 1995).

Chauncey Starr has studied risk perception for the electric power industry. Hedescribes the feelings of loss of control with the following metaphor:

Imagine yourself slicing a roast. This is an informal occasion so you have nofork — one hand is on the meat and the other is carving. Try to picture howclose to the knife the hand on the meat is as you carve. Now make it a two-person job. Someone else gets the knife. What happens to the hand on themeat? You pull it right back or you get a fork (Sandman, 1993).

Trust becomes more important when people feel a loss of control.

The Risk Messenger

In addition to mistrust based on the attributes of a specific risk, an audience mayharbor concerns because it lacks trust in the company. Mistrust may stem from thecompany’s track record in managing prior risks, or it may be due to the style ofthe company spokesperson. Company spokespeople carry a heavy burden for thesuccess of a company’s risk communication program. It is difficult for companiesto build and maintain trust. A critical element is whether or not the companyspokesperson comes across as a caring, thoughtful, and knowledgeable individual.

Spokespeople must relate technical information but also must earn areputation as being trustworthy and credible. In addition to possessing thenecessary knowledge and technical competency, it is essential that spokespeoplepresent a balanced picture. Once a spokesperson assumes a strong position, theyare no longer seen as a credible source of information. An audience will morewillingly work with a spokesperson who clearly represents a company but who isskilled at balancing this role with the needs of the audience.

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Spokespeople need not distance themselves from their company. Audiencesaccept the reasonable (and necessary) fact that the spokesperson is working onbehalf of company interests. Frewer, et al. (1996) found that an expert’s increasedindependence from a company does not necessarily lead to greater trust in theinformation provided. Rather, the most trust is likely to be placed in those sourcesthat have moderate degrees of accountability. That is, trust will be placed in thoserepresentatives who have a partial vested interest in promoting a particular viewand who are reasonably self-protective, yet who balance this obligation withmoderate accountability to others. These spokespeople demonstrate an under-standing of the audience’s position and a willingness to consider it as acomponent in company plans.

Since an audience prefers balance, extreme motivations are suspect. Blindcorporate loyalty leads to mistrust because it can be interpreted as dishonesty or alack of personal values. Conversely, a total lack of accountability (as some activistgroups or experts who will testify on seemingly any issue are viewed as having)can be criticized for slanting or sensationalizing information. The companyspokesperson needs to present his or her case in a way that shows a balancedpicture.

Earning Trust and Credibility

Building trust requires a visible, high standard of integrity over a considerableperiod of time; it can tolerate no substantial lapses. The more a company asks tobe trusted, the less it will be trusted (Sandman, 1993). Trust is won by concreteaction. Commitment, both personally and organizationally, evokes trust.

Researchers at Columbia University (Covello, 1984) have developed tech-niques for maintaining trust and credibility while managing risk. The followingdiscussion presents eight principles and describes how these business methods,combined with common sense, work together to build trust. These principles,adapted from Covello’s study, are grouped into three categories based on theoptimal timing or opportunity. While not all of these principles are applicable oreven advisable in each situation, the underlying themes of openness and integrityare essential in designing risk communication strategies that build trust.

Planning for Trust: Develop Opportunities

Release information early

A company may fear that disclosure of preliminary or incomplete information willresult in misdirected efforts. However, the public will argue that holding on toinformation is seldom justified, especially when it concerns health and well-being.People are understandably anxious when they believe information is being with-held and this anxiety may lead to anger, particularly if they believe it has beenwithheld unnecessarily (Hance, et al., 1988). The most important reason to releaseinformation early is to reduce the opportunities for the audience to develophostilities. An atmosphere of openness and responsiveness enhances the ability tocommunicate clearly about risk.

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Involve the audience

Typically, companies hold off involving their public or their employees until it iscertain that they can respond to all of the concerns. This may seem a logical wayto consider the risk communication process, however involving the public in fact-finding and decision-making allows them to verify that the company is moving inthe promised direction. Companies may be concerned that people who don’tunderstand the whole picture will push for unreasonable solutions, but the publicis more likely to be unreasonable if they are not given any information. Allowingpeople the opportunity to observe and understand how decisions are being madegives them greater familiarity and confidence in business practices.

Don’t delay talking to other organizations

As will be discussed in chapter 6, it is important to identify and include all keyaudiences — especially those that are likely to be the most difficult. The groupsthat a company is most reluctant to involve often represent the most criticalaudiences. Engaging in early discussion with groups that are likely to oppose aproject will sharpen a company’s ability to consider diverse viewpoints and willalso provide the opportunity to obtain information important to the project’ssuccess. Even outside the context of a specific project or event, it is important toknow who the company’s key stakeholders are, and to maintain an ongoing dialogwith them.

Establishing Trust: Use Each Step in the Process

Don’t send your most introverted scientistto discuss risk with the public

The company spokesperson is the linchpin in a risk communication program. Whothe best spokesperson will be depends entirely upon the circumstances; theoptions must be weighed carefully. Companies need to impose the same rigor inselecting the people who work with the public as in selecting those who managerisks. Ideally a company should choose a spokesperson who has a goodunderstanding of both the technical data and dealing with the public concerns.Trusted individuals must be seen as knowledgeable, or at least as sources of well-researched information (Frewer, et al., 1996). It may be best to choose aspokesperson with a strong technical background who is “good with people”rather than a public relations professional who has no technical background(Hance, et al., 1990).

There may be situations when a CEO is the best person to instill a sense ofcorporate commitment and promise. At times, a familiar face, a local presence, orsomeone involved in the community is the best choice. There will be other timeswhen a voice external to the company (a regulator, community leader, or anoutside expert) has the most credibility. A more detailed discussion of appropriatecompany spokespeople appears in the boxed text.

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Don’t ignore people’s feelings

Use empathy when facing a public to discuss risk. Recall the factors that drive theaudience’s decision of whether or not to accept a risk. “Feelings” are oftendifficult for corporate personnel to acknowledge, discuss, and handle because theyare consciously barred from the typical corporate environment, but to ignore themin a risk communication setting is a poor and ineffective practice.

Be accountable, follow through with promises

Accountability includes things that require consistency and honesty, such asreturning phone calls, keeping a list at meetings of unanswered questions that youwill respond to later, or keeping people informed as soon as it is clear that adeadline is going to be delayed. Lack of follow-through erodes trust.

Maintaining Trust: Interacting with the Public

Admit to uncertainty

As will be discussed in chapter 4, managing uncertainty is difficult, and not beingable to give definitive answers to a hostile audience is frustrating. Admitting touncertainty or facilitating public understanding of science as a process canincrease a communicator’s trustworthiness (Frewer, et al., 1996). When theaudience trusts that the company will acknowledge what it doesn’t know, theywill more likely trust what the company does know (Sandman, 1993).

Speak plain English

Words that unduly mask the issue will make the audience feel patronized or thatan attempt is being made to mislead them. As chapter 4 will emphasize, it isimportant to avoid jargon, euphemisms, and loaded words. Other rhetoricalmistakes include oversimplifying, omitting, or distorting information.

Because trust plays such a key role in risk acceptance, companies mustconsistently promote their trustworthiness. These eight research-based techniquescan be employed in a variety of communication opportunities in order to build andreinforce a trustworthy reputation.

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Determining the Most AppropriateCompany Spokesperson

Choosing the Company’s Chief Executive Officer as SpokespersonPeople want to hear from the person in charge. They want assurances thatthey will be protected, and a CEO can make commitments that othercompany spokespersons cannot. Sending lower-level officials to speak to thepublic on a health and safety issue people find important may indicate thatsenior management doesn’t think the issue is important. Many CEOs arereluctant to face a hostile audience because often the presence of the CEOcreates an opportunity for active opponents to turn a meeting into a mediaevent, but the risks of “hiding” the CEO must also be considered.

Coaching Scientists and EngineersIf a technically-oriented person speaks for the company, there are some keypoints for him or her to consider.

��Public response to risk situations often evolves out of fear of theunknown.

��The public will accept that interpretations of scientific data vary. Anawareness of various interpretations helps people develop theiropinions.

��Think about what the audience most likely knows and pre-testtechnical material with a non-technical person.

��Most people don’t respond to numbers or long lists of facts. Theywant the information that is important to them.

��Technical information is best organized according to people’squestions, not according to company answers.

��It is important to recognize the limits of expertise. Engineers are notaccepted as medical experts, and vice versa.

Involving Corporate Communications OfficersThe role of this office is critical both during a risk crisis or when planningany public communication. During a crisis this office will, most likely, bethe focal point of company activities, especially for involvement with themedia. It is important to remember, however, the distinction between publicrelations and risk communication. Persons trained to promote a company ora message may not be effective at the two-way dialogue that riskcommunication requires.

Enlisting Voices External to the CompanyWherever possible, give the public an opportunity to hear from qualifiedexperts other than company representatives. Provide the public with namesof other organizations to which they can turn for information. These mayinclude regulators, academic experts, special interest groups, or communityadvisory panels. These groups do not have a vested interest in the companybut may be seen as technically credible.

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The conventional wisdom is that physicians, especially from the localhealth care facility, are particularly credible if they understand the nature ofthe technological risk and if the concern is health and not property values(Sandman, 1993). A physician who takes care to establish his or her caringnature can be particularly effective.

Peter Sandman (1993) offers this caution for companies consideringregulatory agency staff as spokespersons:

The 1990’s have heralded a period of widespread concern forenvironmental and personal health and safety. Concurrent withthis, people no longer inherently trust government to keep industryhonest. Over the years industry has spent considerable time,money and energy touting that government is poorly run anddisorganized — it is no wonder that the public fears for theirpersonal health and well-being. Now, if the company wants to leanon regulators as a way to establish trust and credibility they willneed to provide a clear and consistent message that regulatorshave high integrity and that their regulations are reasonable andsound.

Determining the Lawyer’s RoleLawyers protect the company and employees from getting involved in asituation that may produce a legal exposure or liability. However, ascompany spokespeople they may give the impression that the company ismore concerned about its legal position and protecting itself than it is aboutpeople’s welfare. Because they are trained to choose their words verycarefully, attorneys’ language in this dialogue may fail to convey empathy,caring, or concern.


��Companies can exercise control over their relationships with their targetaudiences. Building trust into these relationships is a crucial factor in riskacceptance.

��Building trust requires a visible, high standard of integrity over a sustainedperiod of time. The greater the potential for environmental and human-health related catastrophe, the less an industry or company is likely to betrusted.

��The knowledge, authority, and risk communication skills of companyspokespeople are critical to success. These representatives should beselected carefully.

��There are several techniques that can be used to enhance trust. Thesetechniques may be incorporated into a company’s risk communicationstrategies:

❏ Disclose information early.

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❏ Involve the public.

❏ Talk to other, especially opposing, groups.

❏ Send the appropriate spokesperson.

❏ Acknowledge people’s feelings.

❏ Be accountable.

❏ Acknowledge uncertainty.

❏ Avoid using jargon or oversimplification.

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4Explaining Risk

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CASE ST UDY

Effective Communicators Develop the Skill to Seethrough the Eyes of their Audience.

he public exerts substantial influence over policy decisions on a variety ofcomplex issues involving risk. Yet, the public’s technical understanding of these

issues is often weak. Technical experts may be surprised to learn how easily technicalissues are confused or misinterpreted by a non-technical audience. For example,researchers at Carnegie-Mellon University found that even relatively well-educated laypeople did not clearly understand two of the most fundamental facts about globalwarming:

1. If significant global warming occurs, it will be primarily the result of an increase in theconcentration of carbon dioxide in the earth’s atmosphere.

2. The single most important source of carbon dioxide addition to the earth’satmosphere is the combustion of fossil fuels, most notably coal and oil.(Read, et al., 1994)

These findings were reflected in interview responses such as the following:

OK. Let’s see. What do I know? The earth is getting warmer because there areholes in the atmosphere and this is global warming and the greenhouse effect.Um. I really don’t know very much about it, but it does seem to be true. Thetemperatures do seem to be kind of warm in the winters. They do seem to bewarmer than in the past. [When asked to elaborate:] I think there are holes in theatmosphere and the sun is more powerful because of that. I think of what causesit, I think of Right Guard actually and like, sprays and things that put holes in theozone layer.

Even though they knew little about the scientific basis, interviewees in this same studyhad many opinions about policy solutions to global warming that included taxes andpollution control, recycling, forest protection, emission-trading schemes, investing inmass transit rather than highways, and investing more in research to increase energyefficiency. Many of the policy options suggested were framed in terms ofchlorofluorocarbon emission reductions (Bostrom, et al., 1992). Explaining technicalmaterial to lay audiences requires an understanding of the risk perception factorsexplained in chapter 2 and an ability to execute the skills presented in this chapter.•

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4A presentation steeped in engineering jargon is, for most people, much likelistening to an opera sung in Italian. It may be mildly entertaining, there’s apossibility they won’t fall asleep, but it is highly unlikely that they’llactually learn anything.

Lee Stewart, Senior Vice President Transportation Services, Southern California Gas Co.

discussion about risk is much more than a discussion of statistics andscience. Methods of delivery, understandable explanations, and an aware-

ness of the information that the audience already has about a risk all contribute tothe value of the discussion. This chapter explores why explanations of risk shouldtake into account risk perception factors and must acknowledge what individualsalready perceive about a risk, whether it is accurate or not. The chapter includes adiscussion of techniques for motivating an audience’s interest in technical dataand recommendations for how to best communicate complex information.

The Influence of Personal Experience on Judging Risk:The Scientific Perspective and the Public View

In chapter 2, the factors that people use to determine the acceptability of a riskwere described. These include non-technical factors that are drawn from personaljudgment. Regardless of the strength of the scientific evidence, people draw upontheir own judgment to interpret findings and determine relevance (Slovic andFishoff, 1980). The gap that exists between the data presented by experts and theconcerns of a non-technical audience will not be narrowed by simply forcing moredata on the public (Kasper, 1980). In order to effectively relay technicalinformation, the communicator must assist the audience in bringing the full rangeof resources, both information and non-technical factors, to bear on their decisionmaking.

In addition to the general risk-perception factors described, people select andprocess new information using a personal frame of reference that reflectsindividual biases, attitudes, and values. In general, an expert’s frame of reference(within that expert’s own field of expertise) tends to be scientific and objective.That same expert, however, will use a different frame of reference when assessing

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risks outside his or her field of expertise. In fact, in those situations, the expertwill use a frame of reference similar to that used by the lay public; one that mightbe considered biased, subjective, and more dependent on personal concerns (e.g.,economic or medical) (Shrivastava, 1987). Because the two frames of referencefor understanding technology and its attendant risks often conflict with oneanother, suspicion and mistrust can occur on each side. To communicate technicalinformation to an audience successfully, the expert must state up front that eachviewpoint is valid and that every contribution to a discussion of risk willcontribute to its interpretation. An expert must acknowledge and accept thevalidity of public opinion before the public will accept the science.

If experts disagree over what appear to be minor points, the public developsan even greater mistrust of them and their emphasis on data and science. Byemphasizing data alone, technical experts may define a problem in an overlynarrow way, as illustrated in the following example.

A site in the Texas panhandle (Deaf Smith County) was considered as acandidate for a radioactive waste repository. Farmers in the region expressedconcern that the presence of a repository would make it more difficult forthem to sell what they produced or would lower the prices they received. TheDepartment of Energy (DOE) responded by having a number of experts pointout that, given many geologic barriers, waste would not come in contact withtheir groundwater. The likelihood of contamination of their crops was nil.The farmers’ response was that while DOE was probably right and knewwhat it was talking about, they were concerned, nonetheless, that the pricesthey received would be lowered by the presence of the repository and by theircustomers’ perceptions that contamination was possible, even if nocontamination actually occurred. DOE considered this a perceived rather thana real risk; but the farmers naturally considered anything that would reducetheir income a real risk (Whipple, 1996).

An honest representation of the modest role science can play in strengtheningpublic confidence will improve the process. The gap between the information thatspecialists want their audience to know and what the audience wants to hear canbe bridged by taking a careful approach to communicating complex information toa lay audience.

Providing the Appropriate Information

The company spokesperson who relays the message must determine the keyinformation that must be conveyed. He or she must decide what people need toknow in order to achieve the company’s communication goals, making certain toinclude information that must be released for ethical reasons, to establish long-term credibility, or to satisfy a duty to warn. It is difficult to teach people thingsthey don’t especially want to know, so it is worthwhile to limit teaching points tothe two or three key points the audience must understand. (For more informationon determining communication goals, see chapter 6.)

In addition, the communicator should anticipate issues about which theaudience is likely to want more information. Answering questions and responding

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to concerns is more likely to get results than explaining points about which theyhave no interest.

Determining What the Audience Knows

Before communicating any information, the communicator must determine whatthe audience already knows (versus what they think they may know). Thecommunicator must weed out and correct what people currently misunderstand. Amisimpression that prevents the audience from understanding key information, orone that may affect the audience’s opinion, needs to be identified, confronted, andcorrected.

An expert who must communicate a complex subject to the lay public is notwell served by relying on intuition about what people already know, becausepeople often base their decisions on incorrect information. Using mental modelresearch, risk communication researchers have found that an individual’s ability tograsp the fundamentals of an issue is often encumbered with a large number ofsecondary, irrelevant, and incorrect beliefs prohibiting understanding andinformed decision making (Read, et al., 1994). Mental-model interviewing beginswith a general statement such as, “Tell me what you know about carbonmonoxide.” Follow up questions probe interviewee responses to initial questionsto produce a model of an individual’s understanding of an issue. Mental modelsoften reveal confusion among and linking together of distinctly separate issues.This confusion should not be interpreted as naivet`e on the part of the public butrather serves to emphasize that the myriad of issues the public confronts daily arebound to be confusing. Despite the public’s misinformation or misperception,their views shape public policy.

Perception research provides the following insights:��Technical experts should not trust their intuitions about public beliefs.

Many controversies in risk communication arise when experts eitherunderestimate or overestimate public knowledge, and

��Risk communication will be most successful and efficient when it isdirected toward correcting those knowledge gaps and misconceptions thatare most critical to the decisions people face (Bostrom, et al., 1992).

Addressing and Correcting Mental Models

Everyone uses mental models to judge risk. Mental models are the set ofprinciples from which people generate predictions about a risk. The riskcommunication must seek to define these sets of principles in order to determinewhat the audience knows about a risk (Bostrom, et al., 1992).

The communicator should assess, in a general way, what an audience knowsor misunderstands. One company spokesperson frequently takes the opportunityduring public meetings to ascertain her audience’s knowledge about a generaltopical area by simply asking for a show of hands in response to questions such as,“How many of you are familiar with FERC and their role in our business?”

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Peter Sandman (1994) recommends beginning a meeting with the companyspokesperson asking the members of the audience what questions they would likeaddressed. This technique is effective because it gives the company a sense of theissues the audience will raise and their general reactions to these issues. Moreimportant, it focuses the meeting on what the audience wantsto know. Prepared remarks can then be augmented with discussions of audienceconcerns.

Admittedly, this makes planning for a meeting more difficult to do, because itmay completely change the focus of discussion. But the goal is to avoid adiscussion of issues that are of no interest to the audience. People come to apublic gathering focused on particular personal questions, often with somenervousness and embarrassment. They may barely listen to the speaker becausethey are busy rehearsing their questions. If a meeting begins by eliciting thosequestions, the meeting immediately takes on a more responsive and interactivetone both for the expert and the audience. After gathering the information aboutaudience knowledge, the presentation of technical information can begin.

Presenting Information, Explaining Risk

This section discusses techniques for communicating complex information. Thesetechniques can be applied in any instance where a gap of understanding existsbetween technical experts and their audiences.

Motivating the Audience

In order for an audience to learn new information, the audience must want to learnit. Motivating an audience to care about technical information, even though theymay care intensely about a risk, may be the hardest part of risk communication(Sandman, 1994). The easiest way to motivate an audience to care about thetechnical information is to make it relevant and personal. One way to do this is topresent people with a decision that they must make based on that information.This technique also conveys to the audience a sense of cooperation, rather thancoercion into accepting a company’s solution. When people feel coerced, theylisten to the expert only to use the information to prove themselves right.

Orienting the Audience

The old adage “Tell them what you’re going to tell them, tell them, and then tellthem what you’ve told them” is especially true when explaining complexinformation. During the course of any technical discussion, a primary task iskeeping the audience focused and oriented. Just as orienting tools in a text includetopic sentences, transitions, flow charts and summaries, orienting tools in a verbalpresentation include flip charts, lists, and timelines all used as road maps thatguide the audience as the risk is explained. They keep the audience focused on theproject at hand (Sandman, 1994). Constant references to the material covered andto be covered helps the audience understand the links between concepts.

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Simplifying Complex Material

Every risk communicator must determine the level of complexity best suited tothe audience. When the content of a risk message is oversimplified, keyinformation that the audience needs in order to make a decision may,inadvertently, be omitted. To strike the balance between presentingunderstandable material and leaving out essential information, the communicatorshould strive to simplify the way the material is presented but not the materialitself (Sandman, 1993). Complex information can be presented in layers ofincreasing complexity. The message can become gradually more complex, similarto a technical report that begins with an abstract, then describes the problem ingreater detail, and ends with technical appendices. As in a report, the technicalinformation must support the simplest layer of information presented. It must beconsistent and without contradictions, but it is important not to omit informationthat seems overly complex. The audience doesn’t have to understand it at thesame level as the risk expert, but they have to understand it well enough to makean informed decision. Several techniques lead to this goal:

Use graphics

Graphics are useful for presenting statistics or numerical information. They arealso a useful way to compare risks. Well-designed graphics leave a visual memoryof data that is easier to recall than a list of numbers. Some simple rules fordesigning graphics include the following:��Don’t simply copy a graph or a table from a report. The format may not be

appropriate for many reasons: the type face or font may not be clearenough; there could be too much information or not the appropriateinformation; the material may contain technical language that will confusethe information/message; or the numbers may be presented in units thatdon’t make sense to the audience. A graph or table will be more useful ifaccompanied by explanatory text.

��Avoid using charts with logarithmic scales. They may confuse and/ordistort what people think they are seeing (Whipple, 1996). Unfamiliarunits, like unfamiliar ideas, must be explained in an understandable way.

��Keep graphics simple and be sure they illustrate only one point per frame(Hance, et al., 1988).

Personalize statistics

It is useful to present risk statistics in a way that people can relate to, or that makesense on a personal level. Numbers or statistics can be made less abstract by thefollowing methods:��Use ranges. Instead of simply comparing one number to a standard,

present data in a range from safe to unsafe. This avoids making a standardinto a watershed figure with everything above it interpreted as dangerousand everything below it safe. In this way, the audience can understand adetermination of what is safe and what is not (Swanson, et al., 1991).

��Don’t be afraid to personalize risk numbers and statistics. Riskcalculations are typically done on a macro-level, projecting what will

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happen to the community as a whole. But citizens’ concerns are at themicro-level, “What might happen to me and those I love?” Address thequestions with specific responses rather than generalizing.

��Consider using concrete images to give substance to abstract data. Avoidusing distant, abstract, unfeeling language about death, injury, and illness.Enhance the discussion of numbers with more “human” aspects of theissue, and listen to people when they express their concerns. Respond in away that shows an understanding of the content of their comments and theemotions they are expressing (Swanson, et al., 1991).

Avoid loaded words, euphemisms, and jargon

In any discussion of risk, word choice is extremely important. Loaded words areusually those that evoke fear, such as “hazardous,” “toxic,” “deadly,” or “cancer”(Swanson, et al., 1991). When the audience is a group of employees, and thesubject is workplace safety, loaded words may be appropriate as they tend tocreate attention. When the audience is the general public or the media, however,loaded words may create perceptions beyond what was intended. Swanson, et al.(1991) recommend choosing words with an understanding of the associations thereceivers will make based on their individual frames of reference. Communicatorsshould consider the images the words will conjure up for them based on thestereotypes often associated with these words. If the audience injects loadedwords, however, the company spokesperson should not ignore them.

At the other end of the spectrum, risk communicators should avoid usingeuphemisms, i.e., words or phrases that mask an issue. They may sound cold oruncaring, and they may suggest that the specialist feels superior or that somethingisy being covered up. Swanson, et al. (1991) note the following examples ofeuphemisms: hospitals referring to deaths as “negative patient outcomes,” and thenuclear power industry referring to Three Mile Island as a “nuclear incident” or a“nuclear excursion.” While the word “conservative” is not necessarily either aloaded word or a euphemism, consider the following reasoning behindsubstituting the word “cautious” when discussing matters of risk.

People generally are not aware that the numbers used to set standards arequite cautious and that, in many cases, state standards or guidelines are morestringent than federal ones. In addition, they often do not know the type ofbuffers built into risk assessments to ensure that companies err on the side ofcaution. This is misunderstood by people who think that a conservativeestimate is a low estimate and that a conservative risk assessment procedurethus means that the agency is not regulating strictly enough. Thereforesubstitute the word cautious or protective for the word conservative (Hance,et al., 1988).

Use appropriate risk comparisons

Technological risks are often compared with other, better-known risks in order toput them in the context of people’s everyday lives. When used properly, riskcomparisons take people one step closer to understanding risks. When usedimproperly, they can sound patronizing (Sandman, 1993). A risk comparison must

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not trivialize but should be relevant to the question being discussed with theaudience. The risk being imposed on a group should not be compared tosomething that will appear too trivial. The audience will feel it is being deceivedby a risk comparison that is designed to make the risk in question seem smallerthan it is.

These rules of thumb are useful:��Compare risks associated with similar risk perception elements (as

described in chapter 2). For instance, don’t compare a risk that isinvoluntary (e.g., exposure to electric and magnetic fields from electrictransmission lines) to one voluntarily assumed (e.g., smoking). Eventhough the risks from two activities can be compared statistically, in thepublic’s mind they may have nothing to do with one another.

��Compare risks to a regulatory standard. Comparing performance toregulatory requirements will show where a company’s numbers stand withrespect to regulatory determination of what is safe. Before using thiscomparison, the risk communicator should be certain of the audience’slevel of trust in that standard. If it is widely viewed that the standard is notset low (or high) enough, then this would not be a useful risk comparison.Again, caution should be used to ensure that the regulatory standard is notinterpreted as a strict demarcation of safe and hazardous levels.

��Make comparisons that demonstrate trends with respect to time. Forexample, “The risk of gas line explosions is 25% less than it was two yearsago, before implementation of new safety technology.”

��Present risks associated with action versus non-action. “If people adhere tosafety practices, their risk of an on-the-job accident will be A. If theydon’t, their risk will be B.”

��Compare risks to those experienced in other places. “The most seriousproblems involving X have been encountered in the Denver area; the Xproblem being presented here is about 1/5 as serious as Denver’s.”

��Don’t form judgments. Don’t interpret the previous statement for theaudience as “The problem being presented is only 1/5 as serious asDenver’s.”

��Compare alternative solutions to the same problem. “The risk associatedwith incinerating waste is X. The risk associated with landfill disposal is

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Y.” The company experts also should bring up alternatives with lowerrisks than the one they are advocating.(Adapted from Swanson, et al., 1991 and Lundgren, 1995)

Dealing With Uncertainty

In most risk situations, statistics are often presented in the form of average annualmortality, incidence of disease, or event probabilities. It is unlikely that there willever be absolutes. Yet the audience wants the answer to a basic question, “Is itsafe?” If there are relevant regulatory standards, a company’s compliance withthem is one basis for answering this question. It is effective risk communication tobe able to say that the company’s performance is much better than required by thestandard. It is also good risk communication to say, “We’re not yet in compliance,but we’ve made progress and we’re close.” In situations that are not clear cut,however, it is necessary to explain to the public how the data were gathered andanalyzed, where the sources of uncertainty are, and how the results are interpreted.Although people may not like answers that have caveats attached, they will bemore mistrusting if they are given an answer that later turns out to be wrongbecause it included faulty assumptions (Lundgren, 1995).

Peter Sandman (1993) provides these suggestions for communicatingeffectively in an uncertain situation or about a health risk that is not supported byconclusive research:��Don’t wait to be confronted. Acknowledge uncertainty up front.��Explain what you have done or are doing to reduce the uncertainty.��If the remaining uncertainty is very small or very difficult to reduce

further, say so.��Report everyone’s estimates of the risk, even those of advocacy groups,

not just your own.��Don’t perpetuate uncertainty. If there are reasonable actions you can take

to find answers to a question, say so and do so.��Stress that finding out for sure may be less important than taking

appropriate precautions now.��Acknowledge that people disagree about what to do in the face of

uncertainty.��Get people involved in their role to reduce uncertainty.Even if the data are tentative, it is better to communicate early and often with

credibility and clarity than to wait for absolute certainty. The public will be betterserved and the company will begin to build trust. In issues involving uncertainty, acompany’s visible commitment to seeking answers is the best asset that a riskcommunicator has.

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��A gap exists between expert and layperson understanding andinterpretation of risk. The technical expert must understand the non-technical factors that influence public opinion and acknowledge thevalidity of public opinion and concern before he or she can expect thepublic to accept the science.

��One of the key steps in designing a risk communication strategy is todetermine what the audience already knows and thinks about the issue, andwhether this information is correct or whether misconceptions exist whichwill obstruct communication efforts.

��Risk communicators should target the information presented to those fewkey points that (a) are needed to address the concerns of the audience, and(b) are essential for them to make informed decisions regarding the issue.

��To strike a balance between presenting understandable material andleaving out essential information, the communicator should simplify theway the material is presented but not the material itself. Methods forsimplifying include: orienting the audience in the midst of complexinformation, using graphics, personalizing statistics, choosing wordscarefully, and making suitable risk comparisons.

��In uncertain situations, risk communicators should acknowledge thatuncertainty up front, explain what is being done to reduce the uncertainty,and get people involved in helping to reduce it.

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5Working With theMedia and ActivistGroups

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CASE ST UDY

Skilled Communicators Can Use theMedia as a Conduit to the Public

ffective media relations take time and effort. Success is influenced by the skills ofthe players on both sides — from their familiarity with technical issues to their ability

to translate the difficult language of science. Stephen Schneider describes thestrategies he has developed to disseminate public information through the media:

Steering a safe course between scientific respectability and good copy isn’t easy,particularly for a young scientist. It’s even tougher when the pen — or editingpencil — is not in your hand.

After a decade of experience, I have developed several strategies as a source.First, I try to anticipate what I believe the public wants — and needs to know.Rather than stress my own work I generally try to present a broad overview of theentire field with very little specialized detail, then later on I hone in on the particularspecifics to which my own research contributions may be relevant.

Second, I try to get a reporter to include in a story some notion of the longer-termglobal-scale policy implication of the scientific research and the recognition thatpublic decisions to deal with these issues are value judgments for which scientificexpertise is only an input not a special license to choose for society how to act.Being a source is a two-way street, the reporter is getting information that can leadto a credible story and I am getting public exposure for ideas that I think areimportant and for which the media are my best routes to the public. While I neverexpect a writer to hammer out a story that reflects all or even most of what I wantsaid, I do expect that at least some of the material I want aired will appear.

Third, I use analogies and metaphors that are common to the experience of mostreaders but don’t do violence to the scientific content that the metaphor is toillustrate (Schneider, 1986).

There are always some risks in dealing with the media. On the average, however,helping to inform the public will yield benefits to technology, to your industry ororganization, and even to you, that outweigh the risks (Miller, 1986).•

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5his document has examined many aspects of a risk communicationprogram: factors that influence risk perception, communicating complex

information, and building trust with the public. As a company undertakes theseactivities, risk communicators who are external to the company are alsoaddressing the risk. These communicators include the media and activist groups.The importance of developing a relationship with these constituents is accentuatedby a phenomenon called signal impact. This chapter examines signal impact, howthese external communicators work, and how a company might manage itsrelationship with them.

Signal Impact

What truly grips us in these accounts is not so much the numbers as thespectacle of suddenly vanishing competence, of men utterly routed bytechnology, of fail-safe systems failing with a logic as inexorable as it wasonce — indeed, right up until that very moment — unforeseeable. And thespectacle haunts us because it seems to carry allegorical import, like thewhispery omen of a hovering future [In reference to Bhopal] (The Talk of theTown, New Yorker, 1985).

When a crisis occurs, the public immediately begins to form opinions aboutthe severity of the event and the responsibility of the company. If the event hassignificant consequences, the effect on and of public opinion will begin to extendbeyond the particular event. This phenomenon, sometimes called “ripple effect”or “signal impact” has been likened to a stone dropped in a pond: “the ripplesspread outward encompassing first the directly affected victims and the respon-sible company or agency, and potentially reaching other companies, agencies orindustries” (Slovic, 1987). It can amplify and distort the risks associated with anevent. It may ultimately result in increased regulation, opposition to industryoperations, and may ultimately affect a company’s profitability.

Signal impacts have occurred many times and have had an impact on manycompanies and industries. The two most notable examples are the accidents atThree Mile Island (TMI) and Bhopal (see appendix B). The accident at TMIproduced no deaths and few, if any, latent cancer fatalities are expected as a resultof it. Yet the accident gave rise to intensified regulation and extensive backfitting

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requirements for other plants, lengthened construction times for new plantsthrough a tightened permitting process, increased opposition to nuclear powerworldwide, public pressure for alternative energy sources, and as a furtherconsequence, an increased dependence on traditional fossil fuel sources (Slovic,1987).

Despite the fact that the Bhopal chemical-fertilizer accident occurred inanother country, it gave rise to federal legislation in the U.S. dealing withemergency planning and community right-to-know. These acts affected a broadspectrum of industries beyond the fertilizer industry. The Bhopal accidenttriggered sanctions and protests against Union Carbide all over the world. In Indiaand the United States, public interest and activist groups initiated a variety ofgrassroots campaigns against the company. In Scotland, despite a localunemployment rate of 26%, the city of Livingston rejected Union Carbide’sproposal to set up a plant to manufacture toxic gases (Shrivastava, 1987).

From a business perspective, signal impact implies that the costs of a singleindustrial accident will extend well into the future. It may be associated with lossof public trust, increased regulation, future construction delays, and perhaps evensignificant process changes. Companies must also be prepared to respond to crisesthat are the result of similar operations in another company or industry. A signalimpact has its greatest impact on a company’s trustworthiness and its ability toovercome a negative image. Once an event begins to erode public trust, thecompany must exert additional effort and expense to rebuild it.

The Benefits of Media Exposure

Most people don’t stop investing in the stock market if they lose a smallamount of money. They do it again and try to improve their odds. That is thesame mind set for dealing with the media, and with practice your investmentpays higher returns with less risk (Swanson, et al., 1991).

Sharon Dunwoody (1996) describes three reasons why media exposure iswarranted.1. Media As a Major Source of NewsA residential consumer attitude survey performed for the American GasAssociation in 1994 found that 73% of respondents depend on television forinformation about natural gas. Television, newspapers, and magazines accountedfor the top three information sources on natural gas issues (American GasAssociation, 1994). Because these sources of information are so important, acompany must learn to manage information distributed by them or the companymay lose control of the issue or event.2. Legitimization by the AudienceBecause the media are a widely used source of information, they are continuallylegitimized by their audience’s continued use. The legitimacy of the mediareinforces the need for a company to develop an effective relationship with themedia.

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3. Opportunity to EducateWhile people don’t need to be told what to think, they do need information to usein decision making. The mass media serve as an alerting mechanism; theyinfluence what individuals know about topics more than how they feel aboutthem. A common misconception in risk communication is that the news media arethe primary cause of hostility and misperceptions among the audience. The mediado not create this hostility, but can focus it (Lundgren, 1995). The effort to informshould not be abandoned for fear of not being able to make convincing argumentsin the face of a media blitz.

Understanding the Media

In most cases, the costs of avoiding the media far outweigh any alarm that aproactive strategy may provoke. Losing total control over the story, losingcredibility with the media and the public, and losing the opportunity to educate themedia and its audience are some of those costs (Hance, et al., 1990).

Commonly held views that might lead a company to avoid media contactinclude the following:

��Journalists are anti-science and anti-technology, and their coverage thusassumes that any risks posed by scientific and technologicaldevelopments are both unnecessary and venal.

��Journalists focus unduly on some risks while ignoring others. Thatuneven distribution of attention skews interpretation of scientists’judgments about the relative importance of risks to public safety.

��Journalists are in the business of selling their products to consumers; thusaccuracy might take a back seat to colorful, sensational attributes of risksituations.(Dunwoody and Peters, 1992)

Central to these perceptions is the fact that journalists work under differentconditions and with a different educational emphasis than scientists or engineers.The first step in developing a proactive media strategy is to understand some ofthe attributes of American journalism.

Lack of Technical Training and Education

Journalists, like many people, often lack depth in their scientific and mathematicaleducation. The typical U.S. journalist is less likely to have majored in science ormath than is the average U.S. resident. But, like other people, they believe that theimpacts of science and technology are generally positive ones (Dunwoody andPeters, 1992). The same holds true for editors. A Canadian study found that of the49 editors who responded to a survey, fewer than one-third had had any sciencecourses in college. Only 15 had taken courses in political science. Eleven hadenrolled in sociology, psychology, or business and economics courses. Fewer than10 percent had taken courses in biology, math, chemistry, physics, agriculturalsciences, or engineering (Friedman, 1986).

Some implications of this lack of technical training are:

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��Safety- and environmental health-related issues are often reported aseither/or situations. Risk estimates are reported as discreet numbers andfacts, and not as variable phenomena; either you are safe or you are not.

��Because of their lack of background, general assignment reporters aremore likely to portray a story as newer or bigger than it actually is.

��As the technical level of a story’s material increases, journalistic interestdecreases.

��When confronted with the complexities of scientific debate, it is easier tofocus on human interest than on technical concerns.

��To reach as many people as possible, science news must be simplifiedand translated into lay terms. This can lead to oversimplification and evendistortion, particularly if there are no specialists or science writersworking for the organization (Friedman, 1986). Science writers for themajor wire services relate that they often put out brush fires started bylocal reporters who get involved in scientific and medical stories abouteverything from unorthodox cancer cures to the latest diets (Russell,1986).

��Journalists do not see their role as conveyors of technical information.They convey news.

To accurately report on a complex scientific or engineering issue requirestaking time to uncover and to understand details and background. However, injournalism, more attention is often given to breaking the story and to seeking anew angle than to in-depth follow-up of the story (Friedman, 1986).

Deadline Constraints

Journalists for both the print and electronic media work under a rigid set of rulesand deadline pressures. Therefore, if a representative from one side of a technicaldebate is more readily accessible for comment, there is greater opportunity forbiased reporting (Swanson, et al., 1991). Among the many decisions the mediamust make are: what aspect to emphasize, what material needs explanation, howmuch research detail to present, how to translate scientific jargon for the audiencein question, and how to achieve a balanced piece. Influencing these decisions aredeadline and editorial pressures, the need for visuals, the problem of gettingcomplex material across to a lay audience in a short article or an even shortertelevision or radio presentation, and, perhaps, hostility or lack of cooperation fromscientists (Friedman, 1986).

Friedman (1986) recounts the following as told to her by a televisionjournalist:

If a story breaks at 11:15 AM, I have to do an interview at 12:15 PM. By 2:15PM the crew and I return from shooting and I write a script. Along with otherreporters reporting science news, I have to beg and scrape for two minutes ofair time, including the introduction and closing. Editors have fits if I ask formore than three minutes because, excluding commercials, sports, andweather, there may only be six to eight minutes left for news of the world.

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How the Media Cover Risk

Journalists choose topics to cover partly based on personal interest and partlybased on organizational priorities, audience needs, and pressure from theirsources. They are often guided by the view that a rare risk is more newsworthythan a common one, a new risk is more newsworthy than an old one, and adramatic risk — one that kills many people at once suddenly or mysteriously — ismore newsworthy than a chronic, familiar risk (Singer and Endreny, 1987). In astudy conducted between January 1984 and February 1986, Peter Sandman (1994)performed a content analysis of evening news coverage. He observed thesecommon characteristics in the way risk is covered in the media:

��When technical information about risk is provided in news stories, it haslittle if any impact on the audience. The other elements of a risk story(i.e., visual prominence, timeliness, or high alarm) are given precedencewhen the media cover risk.

��Alarming content about risk is more common than reassuring content orintermediate content, except perhaps in crisis situations, when theimpulse to prevent panic seems to moderate the coverage. “Missing aproblem is a much greater journalistic sin than overstating it. Thepossibility that X is dangerous makes the story worth covering. The claimthat X is safe is newsworthy only because someone else claims it is not.And so the dangerous side naturally gets more attention. As for themiddle, how do you make an interesting story out of ‘further research isneeded’?”

��A reassuring industry source will have more difficulty getting attentionfrom a journalist than will an alarming activist source. However, goodcoverage depends even more on sources who are skilled at working withthe media.

In a nutshell, Sandman (1996) explains his findings: “Coverage of thealarming perspective is more common than coverage of the reassuringperspective. This isn’t sensationalism, it’s newsworthiness and a journalisticanalogue to the risk manager’s conservativeness.”

Media coverage of risk may be even more intense and more of a managementchallenge to the gas industry in the future. Vierima (1996) identified the followingmedia trends likely to affect risk reporting:

��Competition and pressure to become more economically efficient. Thereare now many more sources of news for the public. In addition totraditional news shows and publications, people now get news in the formof news tabloids, talk shows, and from the Internet. While diversity in themedia is on the rise, diversity in news content may diminish withcorporate mergers and chains.

��Focus on ratings. What news to cover and how to cover it areincreasingly being determined by how well it will sell. Marketing skillsare becoming as important as journalistic standards.

��Increased use of news services. Events in one locale will become newsnationwide, and the social and political impacts of an accident will be feltacross a wider area. A single story by a wire or subscription service

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reporter will have a broad impact. This trend is likely to accentuate theimportance of signal impact.

��Increasing sensationalism. Gas issues are less likely to receive attentionwhen they are not in the context of an accident or other dramatic event.Positive stories about natural gas or public service safety messages areless likely to be of interest to the media.

��Shorter stories. News reporting is increasingly based upon sound bites or3-line quotes. This loss of narrative means that stories are presented in amore simplistic manner. Stories on gas safety issues are not likely topresent the public with any information of a complex nature or to presentthe issues in a deliberative fashion.

��Emphasis on the visual. Visual images make up an increasing portion ofnews stories. Even technical information is more likely to be presented interms of illustrations and charts rather than text. Because many gasaccidents have very visual, memorable images associated with them, theyare likely to be prominent in news coverage.

��Increase in news commentary. Stories are more likely to assess blame, inaddition to reporting the facts of an event.

��Shorter deadlines for reporters. In a competitive market, being first maybecome more important than being right. Reporters will be pressured touse sources who are the most accessible rather than those who have thegreatest expertise. There is a need for tools that explain complex technicalissues to non-technical reporters and their public.

Suggestions for Working With the Media

Understanding key aspects of journalists and the media business allows companycommunicators to prepare media strategies. The following points are some generalguidelines for working with the media. In addition, there are several techniquesfor planning a media strategy and steps to take before, during, and after a crisis.

��Be prepared with background materials that explain and visualize yourindustry in non-technical terms. If done well, they may be used verbatim.

��Emphasize only three or four major points during a media interaction.Keep the presentation simple. As discussed in chapter 4, simplify the waymaterial is presented, not the material itself. Be careful not to usetechnical language; it will only serve to distance the audience.

��Be familiar with media deadlines. The reporter is unlikely to have enoughtime to communicate more than the highlights of complex researchmaterial.

��Avoid speculation of an outcome. Company spokespeople must be care-ful not to over-emphasize the positive, especially if the outcomeis unclear.

��When considering what information to give the media, give them the kindof information they are good at conveying — news — such as actions thecompany is taking.

��Be prepared for personalized questions. Responding from a personalperspective reduces the polarity between the company and the audience.

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��Don’t belittle differing views. As discussed in previous chapters, audi-ence opinions will be based partly on risk-perception factors and existingmental models and partly on a company’s data. Acknowledging thevalidity of differing views heightens company credibility in the long run.

��Openly disagree when there are premises in a question you do not accept.It is appropriate to disagree with an interviewer, as long as a professionaldemeanor is maintained.

A Checklist for Working with the Media

When Planning Media Strategy��Develop a cooperative relationship. Become familiar with the

media’s needs and their interests.��Approach media with good news instead of waiting for them to come

to you when bad news occurs.��Prepare a media information packet. This packet may contain:

❏ a fact sheet explaining how natural gas is produced,transported, and delivered,

❏ brochures or fact sheets describing your company,❏ descriptions of your construction process and

accompanying video if possible,❏ fact sheets explaining/describing your compliance with

environmental and safety regulations, and brochurestargeted at specific issues.

��Develop a communication plan for dealing with the media anddesignate clear lines of authority.

��Make sure all employees understand your company policy on givinginformation to reporters.

��Know what you are authorized to discuss.

When an Incident Occurs��Don’t downplay the seriousness of an emergency or problem.��Know the technical or scientific knowledge base of the reporters you

are working with. Help them understand the technical issues.��Volunteer to provide information.��Assume everything is on the record.��Recognize and applaud meritorious efforts of incident-response

personnel.��Be careful not to escalate fears.��Emphasize what is being done to correct problems.��Give a reason if you can’t talk about a subject. Don’t use “no

comment.”��Provide a question-and-answer session at the end of a briefing.��Be aware that the public and the media may trust you during an

emergency situation but trust will decrease after the emergencysubsides.

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��Provide media with both company and independent sources soreporters can get more information.

After an Incident��Offer praise for good media coverage.��Evaluate communication efforts to determine if they were effective in

conveying information and addressing concerns.��Correct major media errors quickly so they are not repeated. Do not

complain about minor mistakes.��If an inaccurate article or news piece has been written, try to

determine what went wrong and set the record straight.��Do not be afraid to take problems with media coverage higher than

the reporter, but do not approach a reporter’s supervisor beforediscussing the situation with the reporter. Use a “low-key” approach.(Adapted from Swanson, et al., 1991, and Lundgren, 1995)

Working With Activists

Most of the time an outside group may not have the community’s bestinterest at heart. Then again we may not have either and there is a reason they[activists] can come in and get set up. I think they get set up where peoplehaven’t established relationships. Scarlet Lee Foster, Monsanto (from Hance,et al., 1990)

Understanding Activism

Although some companies have had running battles with activist groups,most companies overestimate the power of activist groups. In terms ofmembership, contributions, and media coverage, the most profitable outcomefor an advocacy group is to “beat the bad guys” (Hance, et al., 1990).Polarization of a situation or an issue is almost always in an activist’s self-interest and almost never in the company’s. An Exxon Chemicalrepresentative who has worked closely with environmentalists at one of thecompany’s plants relates, “Although the environmentalists may not representthe community as a whole, they do represent the concerns the average citizen,even a trusting one, may have in the back of his or her mind” (Hance, et al.,1990).

Setting the Stage for Activism

In most cases, when an audience is angry, that anger began as a result ofsomething a company has done or proposes to do, and the activistorganization has merely taken the opportunity to make it a cause (Hance, et

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al., 1988). Blaming an audience’s hostility on activists, therefore, is fruitlessand self-defeating. It is much more productive to figure out what thecompany might have done that produces anger and what can be done todiminish it.

Sources of Audience Hostility

Consider these possible reasons for audience hostility:��The organization communicating the risk is seen as not being

credible. This was the situation for the EPA during the Reaganadministration. The agency was viewed as being more often on theside of the polluter than on the side of the environment; henceanything agency officials said was viewed with great suspicion.

��Your risk message is too positive. Most audiences react with hostilityif they feel they are merely being placated, and if the message is fullof trite phrases or facile reassurances, especially in the face ofnegative information in the media.

��Audiences can be hostile if they don’t understand either the processor the data being communicated. The information may be too tech-nical (e.g., full of difficult concepts or laced with acronyms andjargon) or the presentation may not meet their needs (e.g., a presen-tation in English for an audience whose primary language is Spanish,or a presentation that ignores their key concerns). The obvious way toovercome this reason for hostility is to use language and a mediumthat meets the needs of your audience (Lundgren, 1995).

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Suggestions for Working With Activists

Some companies who have dealt with activist groups successfully havelearned to work toward mutual respect and dialogue rather than agreement.Kelli Kukura of Du Pont says of a company meeting with Greenpeace, “Wereally have the same goal in mind, it’s just that ours is a day-to-day down inthe trenches goal for source reduction and waste minimization. They admittedtheirs is a pie in the sky viewpoint and they’re holding it up for industry to tryto meet” (Hance, et al., 1990).

It is important to come up with achievable goals when being confronted by anactivist group. Hance, et al. (1988) suggest some guidelines.

��Don’t attempt to “beat them.” This is emotionally attractive, but it almostnever helps. Polarization is their game and even when you win, you lose.Gestures of respect and offers to cooperate are much more productive andwill probably bear the most fruit.

��It is not productive to try to convince them to join your side. This rarelyhappens.

��Attempt to persuade the rest of the community that you are trying. This isalways a worthwhile goal. An interaction with activists is in part aperformance. You can win over some of the audience even if you cannotwin over your opponent.

��Legitimize the activist group. This is often the most difficult goal forcompanies and agencies to accept. Acknowledge that some of the pointsthe activist group makes are credible. The result will be to reduce thepolarity between the company and the activists.

The importance of establishing good relationships with both the media andwith activist groups in advance of an event or issue cannot be stressed enough.Your interaction with these groups will directly affect the type and quality ofinformation that your ultimate audience, the general public, receives. Keepingaudience hostility to a minimum helps to insure flexible management optionswhich in turn keep business goals within reach.


��Gas companies can expect major, memorable accidents in other gascompanies or related industries to have a “signal impact” on them throughmedia coverage. The results may include loss of public trust, increasedregulation, future construction delays, and perhaps fundamental processchanges imposed upon them.

��Existing practices and future trends within the media cause the media tofocus their coverage of risk-related events and issues that are visual,newsworthy, and often alarming, and to emphasize human rather thantechnical aspects of a story.

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��Some of the practices gas companies can use to increase their effectivenessin dealing with the media are:

❏ preparing background materials in advance,

❏ being accessible to reporters and accommodating their deadlines,

❏ avoiding speculation,

❏ responding to personal questions and accepting other viewpoints, and

❏ disagreeing in a professional manner.

��While activists can’t create a situation, they can create a focus for people’sopinions and direct public energy. They may not represent the communityas a whole, but they often do represent the concerns of the average citizen.

��Gas companies can work more effectively with activist groups by:

❏ minimizing polarization of the issue,

❏ acknowledging the legitimacy of the group’s role, and

❏ demonstrating to a larger audience that you are attempting to workwith the group.

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6Plan Carefully

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6It’s all in the planning...

John Shafer, Director of Environmental Affairs, ANR Pipeline Company

isk communication is not a quick solution. Risk controversies often involveconflicts in fundamental values. Good communication, which aims at making

values clearer, does not come without effort. Successful risk communicationtackles many tasks: it provides citizens with access, information, and participationin decision making; it measures citizen perceptions of the risks involved; itacknowledges and accommodates these perceptions in working with the public;and it concurrently works with the media and activists. For a risk communicationprogram to fulfill these roles, it cannot be hastily thrown together when a publiccontroversy occurs. The management of Johnson & Johnson in the Tylenolincident (see case study in the introduction) benefited from advance planning anda risk communication strategy that best fit their company. Before the crisis everoccurred, a careful plan had been developed.

Since risk communication must be tailored to the specific issue, there is nosingle predetermined set of players nor is there a predetermined set of rules(Swanson, et al., 1991). There are general guidelines, however. Experiencedcommunicators develop an ability to make sound, intuitive choices during theirinteractions with the public. Communicators who have primarily a technicalbackground may need broader training for an effective risk communicationprogram: successful risk communication requires an understanding of the bigpicture — seeing beyond the immediate problem and anticipating additionalproblems and hot spots. Similarly, communicators whose experience is in atraditional public relations role may need to adapt their skills to the two-wayexchange of information that takes place in risk communication. Some companieshave found that an effective risk communication program integrates the skills ofthe technical staff with the talents of the corporate communications staff. A riskcommunication program designed in this way informs at the proper level of detailwhile maintaining technical merit.

This chapter is divided into three sections that describe the steps in planning arisk communication program.Step 1: Assess the Company’s PositionStep 2: Plan the Program: Appropriate Tools and TimingStep 3: Evaluate the Program

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Following is a discussion of the activities that comprise each step. Dependingupon the intended application of risk communication, a combination of a few ofthese activities may be all that is required. To make that determination, however,it is helpful to be familiar with all of the steps, beginning with awareness of acompany’s strengths and constraints. To assist the communicator withimplementation, a more detailed outline and activity checklists for each stepappear in appendix C.

Step 1: Assess the Company’s Position

Recognizing both a company’s strengths and its constraints is critical tocommunicating effectively. A primary strength of the natural gas industry is itsdelivery of a desired commodity and its proven track record of soundenvironmental and safety performance. These strengths are further enhanced whencompany personnel can acknowledge and work within their particular company’sconstraints. Constraints may be organizational, personal, or they may relate to acompany’s past practices.

Recognizing Strengths

Customers and others directly affected by natural gas facilities may question theprocess companies use to site facilities, viewing it as unfair. However, thepublic’s desire for energy options and, in particular, the public’s desire for accessto natural gas, places a company’s business goals in general alignment withconsumer desires. This is a strength. It is beneficial to frequently remind publicmembers of the company’s purpose and continued commitment to providingreliable energy on demand, as well as the company’s intent to include the publicas a partner. Commitments may be contained in corporate mission statements,environmental and safety policies, and in performance, environmental, and safetyawards.

The gas industry is already heavily regulated, and in risk communication, thiscan be an asset. Much can be gained from explaining to the public just howheavily regulated the industry is. In addition, gas companies operate safely and aregenerally environmentally friendly. If people are reminded of these facts,especially before an incident, they are less prone to overreact to a specific safetyor environmental problem. Emphasizing the role of regulators can beaccomplished by distributing written material on their behalf (after consultingwith them) or having regulators available at public gatherings to explain their role.

Recognizing Constraints

Inevitably, there are constraints that will hamper even the most well-plannedprogram. Being aware of the types of constraints communicators face can helpovercome the problems they pose.

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Lack of organizational support

A first step in the planning process is responding to the concerns of seniormanagement and eliciting their involvement and support. Some issues will requireparticipation from several company spokespeople, and they must all support andunderstand the mechanics of the risk communication program. The best laid plansare easily derailed by company representatives who are not aware of thecompany’s risk communication goals and policies. There may be times when it ismore prudent not to undertake a risk communication program than to attempt itwithout executive support.

The importance of senior management support of risk communicationactivities cannot be overstated. Support of a program from the top down helps toensure that proper resources are available to risk communicators and that riskcommunication messages are delivered in a consistent manner.

Past practices

Utility companies have been permanent fixtures in people’s lives for nearly acentury, and carry with them both positive and negative images. Many companiesand individuals recognize the significance of past mistakes when it is too late —after they’re already embroiled in another crisis. When past mistakes haveoccurred, it is important to be able to demonstrate that the company has fullyinvestigated and can explain its causes. The company spokesperson must assumeresponsibility for past company mistakes, while offering a commitment to moveahead in a way that avoids a repetition. Apologies, no matter how late in coming,are meaningful and preferable to denial of any wrongdoing.

Public values and beliefs

As discussed in chapter 2, public perception is often the major driver behind risk-based regulation; therefore, relying solely on science or “the facts” to drivedecisions ignores the non-technical factors and the audience values. An effectivecommunicator must be perceived not only as a company representative, but alsoas an individual who respects, if not shares, the audience’s values and concerns.Respect is a key component of risk communication.

Identifying Communication Goals

Business and company goals — for example a pipeline expansion or reducedliability exposure — will direct communication goals. Before entering into adialogue with the public about risk, a company must clearly understand what ithopes to achieve. A risk communication program can then be framed to meetthose goals.

Even the simplest communication effort, for instance a telephone call to agovernment official, can be a step toward furthering a business goal and thusconsideration should be given to any such conversation and its desired endpoint.Hance, et al. (1988) identified four communication goal categories to considerwhen developing goals and a structure for risk communication plans.

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��Organizational goals benchmark the credibility and communication abilityof the company. Examples of organizational goals may include enhancingthe credibility of the company in the minds of the public or coordinatingactivities within the company to ensure a consistent response.

��Information goals benchmark both the information the public receivesfrom the company and that which the company receives from the public.For example, a company’s information goal could be to strive to providedata in an understandable and caring manner. The stated goal shouldconcisely describe the process the company uses both to provideinformation to the public (for example, the need and preferred site for newfacilities) and to receive information from the public (for example,information from landowners about known problems with the site).

��Legally mandated goals include compliance with applicable regulations,mandated communications, and contractual responsibilities.

��Process goals benchmark the process for communicating risk, follow-through, and relationship building. These might include providing routineupdates on construction progress, following through on commitments tolandowners and regulators, and being certain to involve all key decision-makers and audiences (even the hostile ones).

Lundgren (1995) recommends framing communication goals with respect tooverall company goals and getting concurrence from everyone involved in theproject, especially from senior management. Company communicators mustunderstand the concrete company goals that their communication efforts aredesigned to achieve.

After company goals and communication goals have been established, aprogram can then be developed to meet audience requirements. The nature andtenor of your audience interactions are the primary variables that will determinehow your goals can be achieved.

Knowing the Audience and How It Perceives Risk

A key to successful planning is identifying and including potentially affectedparties early. A forgotten group may quickly fall into the opposition camp. If acompany excludes a segment of the public, communication of facts and buildingtrust will become extremely difficult (Hance, et al., 1988). The audience’s primaryneed is to know that the company is aware of the risks and that it is working toprotect people. However, the diversity of concerns that underlie the needs of theaudience makes answering these needs a complicated process.

Audience identification

Internally, an organization may be affected by shareholders, management,and employee associations. External pressures come from the mass media,government, special interest groups, customers, and landowners (Grunig, 1994).Commonly, the audiences that are most difficult to deal with are the ones acompany most wishes to avoid. Yet, these are in fact those with whom a companyshould begin its initial work.

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Most utilities and energy providers are frequent communicators with thepublic. The following groups are among those with which the company shouldestablish early and ongoing, two-way communication.��Government: All levels and many branches — federal, state, and county

agencies, local elected officials, regional and local plan commissions, andemergency responders

��Environmental groups: Local special interest groups, national, statewideand local groups, groups associated with specific activities or features(e.g., Trout Unlimited, Ducks Unlimited, The Sierra Club)

��Affected landowners and customers��Employees��Civic organizations (e.g., Kiwanis, Rotary)��Educational and academic organizations

Identifying affected publics is an ongoing process. Even if a company’sprojects all take place in one geographic area, each project will differ with respectto affected demographics and public values, opinions, and perceptions. Riskcommunicators should identify the groups or individuals that the company canwork with best, as well as those that may be opponents. Messages must be tailoredto fit the needs of all of these groups (Swanson, et al., 1991). Including the mostdifficult audiences in the planning process may bring them on as potential allieslater. Efforts to identify new audiences (as well as updating information aboutknown ones) should be conducted on a routine basis. The checklist in appendix Cprovides more guidance on identifying new audiences.

Anticipation of audience concerns

As described in chapter 4, it is important to have some sense in advance of thefollowing:��What the audience already knows,��What incorrect information and misperceptions may exist,��What information the audience needs to make an informed decision, and��What information they will want, based upon their most pressing concerns.

It is important to clarify the audience’s true, underlying concerns. There are,for example, many underlying issues at work in the NIMBY (Not In My BackYard) syndrome, many of them rooted in the non-technical factors described inchapter 2: some parties may unfairly bear uncompensated risks, the consequencesof the risk may be catastrophic, or the organization imposing the risk is not trustedbecause of poor past performance.

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One issue may sometimes screen other issues that may appear negligible tomany regulators but is extremely important to those concerned. The electric utilityindustry found that concerns about the health effects from electric and magneticfields (EMF) were often used as a screen by people who didn’t want an electrictransmission line near their homes for aesthetic reasons, ranging from concerns ofproperty devaluation to simply not wanting their trees removed or trimmed toaccommodate a transmission line. In some cases, when the utility was able towork with landowners to identify and reduce their real concerns, EMF became anon-issue. Typically, these types of concerns are best revealed in one-on-onemeetings, especially if an audience seems hostile.

Concerns from the public or from employees that appear to be based on faultyscientific information and misperceptions, or that seem to the risk communicatorto be peripheral to the real issue, should be examined and addressed, notdiscounted (Lundgren, 1995).

It’s also important to keep a clear understanding of the big picture as youinform the public about the details. An example from Lundgren (1995) shows whythis is important. A scientist was asked to speak about atmospheric fallout at apublic meeting. After explaining the process and associated risks, a man from theback of the room rose and identified himself as a local farmer. “You tell me that Ihave this plutonium stuff all over my crops. What exactly does that mean? Can Istill sell my crops? Can I eat them myself? Should I let my children play outside?I don’t know who to trust anymore!” The scientist responded, “Excuse me, sir, butit’s strontium-90, not plutonium.” The big picture — that the farmer wasconcerned about who to trust — was lost.

Step 2: Plan the Program: Appropriate Tools and Timing

Determining the Appropriate Tools

After establishing goals and assessing audience needs, the next planning step isdetermining the set of tools most appropriate for the job. There are two maincategories of tools to consider — those that involve a risk communicator in a two-way dialogue with the audience and those that provide information to the audiencewithout personal interaction. The types of messages that fall within these majorcategories are oral, written, visual, audience interaction, and computerapplications. In most situations, what will work best is an integrated package, forexample, a written brochure that supports an oral message. In the followingdiscussion, each tool is described and followed by a discussion of those situationswhere its use is most advantageous and those where it may be inappropriate.

Oral messages

Oral discussions of risk may take place in many different forums. Examples maybe presentations at club meetings, coffee klatches, or public meetings. Personalspeeches, oral testimony, and question-and-answer sessions can be the mosteffective tools available to a company. They also carry the most risk. When thisform of communication fails (usually because of an inappropriate setting or lack

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of training or experience by the communicator) it can seriously set back efforts toachieve communication goals.

The primary advantage of communicating orally is that there is an identifiablehuman representative presenting information in a credible, personal way. Itimplies that there will be two-way dialogue. This method enhances effectivenessthrough audience interaction. Feedback provides an opportunity for the companyto learn about and respond to the audience’s immediate concerns. A successfuloral presentation demonstrates a high level of technical credibility and reflectscaring and concern.

Among the difficulties associated with an oral risk message ismisunderstanding. If the audience is hostile, it can be especially difficult to clarifythose misunderstandings. In these situations, it is particularly helpful toaccompany an oral presentation with an informational brochure that can be readlater, after tempers have cooled.

Because of the emotional memorability associated with personal messages, acommunicator who is seen as distant or stonewalling can leave a long-lastingnegative impression upon the audience. Without a good verbal communicator, onewho is technically credible and who understands principles of riskcommunication, this medium may not be successful. However, when done welland by a credible and skillful risk communicator, oral communication can be thequickest and most successful way to advance communication goals.

Written messages

Risk messages presented in text format include press releases, fact sheets,brochures, question-and-answer sheets, and newsletters. Written documents cancarry more complex risk messages and can inform in detail. They may bedistributed for future reference during open houses, or in situations where anaudience may forget important details of the oral or visual message. A well-written brochure will strengthen the consistency of an oral message. Writtenmaterials are usually inexpensive to prepare, quickly developed, and can be easilymodified to address a number of issues or projects. A risk communicator mayhave the feeling of greater control with a written message. However, an oraldiscussion allows the communicator to course-correct if the audience doesn’tunderstand the presented material (Sandman, 1996).

As with an oral message, care must be taken to avoid using excessivelytechnical language or jargon that only professionals in the field understand. Amessage that is difficult to understand, or that is too long, will not be receivedwell.

Visual messages

Examples of visual messages include posters, symbols, slide presentations, tours,open houses, or television spots, that is, anything that leaves your audience with avisual image of the information you need to communicate. The use of graphicelements like shape, color, or imagery bring very simple messages to life.Examples include a company logo or the orange triangle that designates a slowmoving-vehicle. Raising awareness at a very basic level is easily accomplished

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with a visual message. The goal is to leave the audience with an easilyremembered symbol.

The greatest advantage (or disadvantage if used unwisely) of an effectivevisual message is its memorability. Because visual images are so powerful, theycan leave a lasting impression. If critics use an image that portrays a company in anegative way, the company would be wise to use that image with anaccompanying verbal or written explanation. Visual messages should only be usedwhen it is possible to direct additional, sufficient attention to the details throughother means of risk communication.

Despite the advantage of communicating information in a memorable way,visual messages cannot easily communicate complex technical information. Theycan also be time-consuming and costly to produce. Furthermore, the overuse of avisual can cause it to lose its impact. This is especially important to rememberwhen risk messages contain information critical to employee or consumer safety.

Audience interaction

Audience interaction involves the audience in discussion, analysis, ormanagement of the risk. It may be in the form of advisory committees, focusgroups, community-operated environmental monitoring, or formal hearings wherethe audience is invited to give testimony.

An interactive forum allows the audience to witness firsthand and participatein the process that companies and regulatory agencies use to evaluate companyoptions that may pose risks. A prime advantage of audience interaction is thatdecisions reached in consensus with the public at an early stage are more likely toresult in a lasting, equitable decision that meets a wider variety of audience needsthan those reached by company members alone. If risk management of an issueoccurs over a long period of time, audience interaction is an effective means toincorporate a diverse array of opinions. Care must be taken to distinguish betweenconsulting with people (listening) and negotiating (bargaining) with them.

A disadvantage of this communication tool is that company decision makersmay fear a loss of control over the decision-making process. It requires a firmcommitment to listening, incorporating audience suggestions, and a willingness tostay with the process for the long haul. One of the surest ways to turn an audiencehostile is to make them believe they will be participants in the decision, and thento ignore their input. Audience interaction is not appropriate for crisis situationswhere decisions must be made on the spot.

Computer-based applications

Computer-based applications fall into two categories: computer informationstations, and use of an Internet home page and e-mail. Computer informationstations display an issue-specific computer program developed by the company.The audience has access to the program through a company computer, usuallylocated at a customer service or safety training center. Home pages are web sitesto which an audience can gain access from a home or workplace computer with amodem and Internet access. The Internet also provides options for feedback fromthe public through electronic mail.

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Despite their benefits, computer-based programs can be expensive to produceand complicated to use. Computer information stations are an impracticaltechnique for mass dissemination. The medium can be intimidating to somepeople and cost-prohibitive for issues of lesser importance. In addition, the timerequired to develop a suitable program makes this an impractical communicationtool for projects that require a quick response or involve rapidly changinginformation.

While not enabling real-time audience interaction, an e-mail link can providea direct pipeline for viewer feedback and a direct response by a companyrepresentative. E-mail makes it possible for a company representative to respondto individual inquiries.

Disadvantages to using a home page and associated e-mail applications centeraround limited public access, demands on the time of company personnel, andaudience passivity. An Internet home page is a vehicle only for those with aninterest and with access, and it creates a general expectation that information on acomputer is up-to-date. Text will need to be updated regularly, even daily if thereis a high level of activity associated with the issue of interest. Immediate responsewill also be an expectation with e-mail unless a response time is specificallystated. In addition, e-mail correspondents may intentionally or unintentionallyconsume an inordinate amount of attention. Finally, purveyors of informationthrough electronic means must account for audience passivity: a home page willbe seen by only that portion of the target audience that actively seeks theinformation. Therefore, organizations with the obligation to provide riskinformation to a target audience will need to use additional forms ofcommunication.

Timing the Message Appropriately

Each step of a project timeline should consider when the public can and must bepart of the process and when the risk messages can be most effective. There aretwo primary considerations influencing the timing of a message: the company’sspecific goals (including regulatory, financial, operational, and safety), and legaland regulatory communication requirements.

Numerous federal, state, and local laws and regulations mandate publiccommunication as part of the risk assessment and risk management process.Despite the fact that these laws can run to several volumes, risk communicatorsneed to be aware of which laws affect risk communication efforts. A list of federalrequirements most commonly applied to the gas industry is contained in appendixA.

Many organizations accept that to achieve company goals it is good businessto keep communities, shareholders, and employees aware of potential risks. Whenrisk communication is not mandated by regulation, the question of when to releaseinformation becomes a matter of company choice. The two most common reasonsfor not releasing information are fear of getting the public stirred up for no reasonand fear of going forward with incomplete or potentially inaccurate information.However, research shows that companies rarely make the mistake of releasing theinformation too soon. Under some circumstances, it is advantageous to release

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provisional information early and ask for feedback, rather than to wait to releaseinformation that people are already demanding or that they will later resent acompany for having withheld (Sandman, 1993).

Step 3: Evaluate the Program

Because business organizations will nearly always be involved in activities thatnecessitate some form of risk communication, it is important to have a plan forevaluating the communication program, and creating an ongoing system forrefining communication policies and practices. Information gained about whatworked and what didn’t in one effort can be used to strengthen future efforts(Lundgren, 1995). If, during the course of a specific communication effort, theprogram doesn’t seem to be working, a procedure will be in place for evaluating itin a timely manner and providing corrective measures if necessary.

Evaluation efforts provide important documentation for demonstratingcompliance and outreach. In addition, thoughtful evaluation can lead to anunderstanding of whether or not the communication effort has contributed toreaching the operational goal it was designed to achieve.

Because risk communication is a two-way process, soliciting feedback fromthose with whom the company is communicating is an important element ofevaluation. This can take two forms. Formal, statistically valid surveying iscomparatively more costly and methodologically difficult, but is typically used toevaluate major efforts. The other alternative, a more informal interview process, ismethodologically easy, reasonably inexpensive, and can be used to adjust anongoing program. In either case, the evaluation must be conducted with theassumption that the results of the evaluation will be considered and change will beimplemented. While there may be some chaos with mid-stream changes to anongoing program, the benefits of evaluating, and perhaps revising, a program willbe beneficial to satisfying the company’s operational goals. A more detailed list ofsuggested evaluation activities is included in appendix C.

If evaluation results show that the communication effort has metorganizational goals, future efforts are more likely to warrant support andcontinued funding. If results show that efforts have failed to successfullycommunicate about risk, perhaps at the expense of a major project, theinformation gained in the evaluation will show where improvements and supportare needed (Lundgren, 1995).

In summary, the three steps necessary for planning a risk communicationprogram — assessing the company’s position, planning the program, andevaluating the results — all require careful thought and decision making. Theeffort is worthwhile when the end result is not only an effective way tocommunicate risk, but also a deeper understanding of a company’s position: itsvarious audiences, its operational, financial, and regulatory goals and constraints,as well as the strengths it brings to its regulators, employees, shareholders,customers, and the broader community.

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��Designing an effective risk communication program entails three steps:

❏ assessing the company’s position,

❏ planning the program, and

❏ evaluating the program.

��In assessing the company’s position, the risk communicator should:

❏ identify its strengths, such as the fact that natural gas service is viewedas desirable,

❏ identify its constraints, such as a lack of organizational support or ahistory of past mistakes,

❏ identify organizational, informational, legally mandated, and processgoals, and

❏ identify its audiences and anticipate their concerns.

��Planning the program consists of selecting the appropriate communicationtools and determining the optimum timing for their application. There aretwo main categories of tools to consider — those that involve a riskcommunicator in a two-way dialogue with the audience and those thatprovide information to the audience without personal interaction. Withineach of these categories, messages can be delivered orally, visually, bycomputer, and as text. Each situation will have distinct advantages,disadvantages, and preferred tools.

��Periodic program evaluations will help benchmark a risk communicationprogram, document its successes and shortcomings in meeting the statedgoals, and allow the company to revise and improve its riskcommunication efforts.

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Appendix A

Federal Laws RequiringRisk Communication

This appendix contains a list of some of the federallaws requiring risk communication, including briefexplanations of the relevant requirements. It is notintended to be an exhaustive list, but rather asampling of federal requirements for riskcommunication that affect the natural gasindustry.

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA)This act requires states to allot time for publiccomment, or to hold public hearings, when theissuance of air emission permits for new facili-ties or changes in existing permits are pro-posed. In addition, under the Accidental Re-lease Prevention portion (Section 112(r)(7)) ofCAAA, facility owners or operators with anamount of regulated hazardous substance abovea threshold level must develop risk manage-ment plans which include an emergency res-ponse plan in case of accidental release. Thismust include specific plans for contacting theappropriate responding agencies and the public,a hazard assessment, and worst-case scenarioestimates of damage to the community healthand the environment. Sources must submit theplan to a central point specified by EPA, andmake it available to state and local govern-ments and the public (U.S. Federal Register:June 20, 1996, Vol. 61, No. 120, pp. 31667-31730).

Superfund Amendment and ReauthorizationAct (SARA)SARA requires the organization responsible forclean up of a toxic waste site to develop a commu-

nity relations plan including meetings with com-munity representatives to hear their concerns. Inaddition, the Administrative Record andInformation Repository requires that documentsand information used in making decisionsregarding the clean-up process are made publiclyavailable. The public must also be givenopportunity for involvement in the decision-making process through the Advertisement ofPublic Involvement Opportunities (42 U.S.C.9601-9657; P.L. 99-499; October 17, 1986; 100Stat. 1613).

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (Title III of SARA)This act contains requirements for publicnotification of storage of hazardous chemicals inthe community, and procedures for emergencyplanning and public communication ifaccidental releases of toxics and other chemicalsoccur. Businesses generating hazardouschemicals must produce an annual list ofchemicals stored at each site and make itavailable to the public and regulatory agencies(40 CFR, Sections 350, 355, 370, and 372).

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)This act requires federal agencies to conduct en-vironmental assessments prior to taking a majoraction. Public communication is requiredthroughout the process, but actions with a largerlevel of impact on the environment require moreopportunities for public comment and moreextensive communications (40 CFR, Part 1503).

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Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 asamended (49 U.S.C. 1671 et. seq.)In addition to developing detailed emergencyplans, pipeline operators must establish acontinuing educational program on pipelineemergencies. The purpose of this program is toenable customers, the public, and others to rec-ognize a gas pipeline emergency and report it tothe pipeline operator or appropriate officials(Pipeline Safety Regulations, U.S. Departmentof Transportation, Research and Special Pro-grams Administration, Part 192, ß192.615).

Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)

The Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-tration (established under the act) has issued aHazard Communication Standard requiring em-ployers to explain to employees any work-placethreats to employee health and safety (29 CFR1910.1200).

Resource Conservation andRecovery Act (RCRA)This act gives EPA the responsibility forregulating the “cradle-to-grave” management ofhazardous wastes. The EPA recently released anew rule requiring expanded opportunities forpublic participation in the RCRA permittingprocess which has an effective date of June 11,1996. This rule requires prospective applicants(for permits to hold and treat hazardous wastes)to hold an informal public meeting beforesubmitting a RCRA permit application. The rulealso gives the permitting agency the authority torequire a facility owner to establish aninformation repository at any time during thepermitting process or permit life (in cases withsignificant public interest). The rule requiresthat combustion facilities notify the public priorto conducting a trial burn (for facilities that burnhazardous wastes) (U.S. Federal Register,December 11, 1995, Vol. 60, No. 237, pp.63417-63434).

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Appendix B

Historical Incidents

This appendix contains brief descriptions ofseven incidents which occurred between 1977and 1994 which are used as illustrations in thetext.

Bhopal, IndiaOn December 23, 1984, toxic gas leaked from aUnion Carbide chemical-fertilizer plant inBhopal, India, killing thousands of area res-idents and injuring or affecting hundreds ofthousands more. Those exposed but not killedoutright when the 40 tons of methyl isocyanategas leaked out and escaped into the air were leftwith lingering disabilities or diseases. (“Tradeand Environment Database Homepage,” Case233, Bhopal Disaster, <http://gurukul.ucc.ameri-can.edu/TED/BHOPAL.HTM>. No date.)

Love Canal, New YorkFollowing flooding of the Niagara River in 1977,hazardous substances began seeping intoresidences in Love Canal, a residential area ofNiagara Falls, New York, raising fears ofadverse health effects. Love Canal was built overan old hazardous waste disposal site. In additionto the obvious smells of chemicals in basements,drinking water tasted and smelled strange, androcks struck against the sidewalk gave offcolorful sparks. Widespread ground-watercontamination was soon discovered. Over 200dangerous chemical compounds were identifiedin the groundwater and 1,004 households wereevacuated. (Mazmanian, Daniel, and DavidMorell, Beyond Superfailure: America’s ToxicsPolicy for the 1990s, Boulder, Colorado,Westview Press, 1992, p. 3.)

Times Beach, MissouriIn February 1983, the United States Environ-mental Protection Agency and the Federal Emer-gency Management Agency, in a joint actionwith the State of Missouri, announced thatresidents of Times Beach, Missouri, would bepermanently relocated because of dioxincontamination in the community. The Centersfor Disease Control advised that the hazardposed by the contamination was a continuingthreat to the community, and relocation ofresidents was necessary to protect the health andsafety of people in the flood hazard area. TheEPA determined that a local developer had useddioxin contaminated material for residential fill.(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “JointFederal/State Action Taken to Relocate TimesBeach Residents,” Press Release, February 22,1983.)

Space Shuttle ChallengerOn January 28, 1986, the Challenger shuttlecrew of seven astronauts was killed in theexplosion of their spacecraft shortly after launch.The explosion was caused by a leak in one of thesolid rocket fuel boosters that ignited the mainliquid fuel tank. (National Aeronautics andSpace Administration Home Page, “The Crew ofthe Challenger Shuttle Mission in 1986,” p.1,<http://venus.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/Biographies/ challenger.html>. No date.)

Edison, New JerseyOn March 24, 1994, a natural gas pipelineruptured and exploded in Edison, New Jersey,

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causing a giant fireball and leveling eightapartment buildings. Approximately 80 peoplewere injured, and one person died of a heartattack during the incident. Following the blast,flames shot 200 feet into the air and were visible20 miles away. (Fainaru, Steve, and ColumLynch, “Gas Line Ruptures, Explodes in NJ…,”The Boston Globe, March 25, 1994, p. 3, andPlevin, Nancy, “Disaster Relief, Probe of N.J.Blast Under Way,” The Boston Globe, March26, 1994, p. 3.)

Exxon ValdezShortly after midnight on March 24, 1989, thetanker vessel Exxon Valdez ran aground onBligh Reef, in Prince William Sound, Alaska.The grounding punctured the hull, spillingapproximately eleven million gallons of crudeoil into the water. When temperatures warmed,oil moved along the coastline of Alaska,

contaminating over 600 miles of the shoreline,including a National Forest, four NationalWildlife Refuges, three National Parks, fiveState Parks, four State Critical Habitat Areas,and a State Game Sanctuary. (Oil Spill PublicInformation Center, “What Happened on March24, 1989,” Anchorage, Alaska, <http://www.al-aska.net/ ~ospic/>. No date.)

Three Mile IslandIn March 1979, on Three Mile Island nearHarrisburg, Pennsylvania, a nuclear power plantsuffered a near catastrophic reactor meltdown.The plant was within 30 to 60 minutes of ameltdown which would have required at least theprecautionary evacuation of thousands ofresidents. Investigations of the nuclear industryfollowing the incident, by a panel hired by theNuclear Regulatory Commission, showed thatsimilar nuclear accidents could have happened inmany other areas in the U.S. (Associated Press,“More N-Accidents Likely, Says Panel,” TheBoston Globe, January 24, 1980.)

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Appendix C

Checklist for Planning a RiskCommunication Program

The key to using risk communication effectivelyis planning ahead. Thoughtful planning can helpa company allocate appropriate resources to riskcommunication. A well-designed riskcommunication program can help a companyintegrate risk communication with othercompany efforts, such as system expansion andcompliance planning (Chess, et al., 1989). Theinformation that follows outlines specific steps,and offers examples and other considerations, toguide risk communication planning.

STEP 1: ASSESS THECOMPANY’S POSITION

1. Recognize Company Strengths andConstraints.A company’s commitment to environmental andsafety initiatives is portrayed throughout a com-pany’s business plan and historical record.��Use those documents that demonstrate

community service, environmentalcommitment, and employee safety.

Annual reportMission statementsUnion contractsEmployee safety manualMembership or involvement inenvironmental or civic groups

��Develop a track record that demonstrates aconsistent resolve to maintain commitments.

��Emphasize the regulated nature of theindustry in the areas of environment andsafety.

Other factors unique to a company and itsspokespeople comprise the focus and strength ofrisk communication.��Elicit organizational support.

Support from senior managementFinancial and human resourcesCompany goalsReview and approval proceduresEmployee training

��Recognize past practices.Relationships with regulatorsCommitments to landownersPrevious accidentsSafety record

��Recognize audience beliefs and values thatmay impede communication.

Skepticism about the communicatorLack of trust in company commitmentsMistrust of regulators

��Recognize the personal beliefs and values ofthe risk communicator that may impedecommunication.

Belief that regulations are unreasonableand that compliance is impossibleMistrust of regulatorsResistance to sharing controlLack of trust in public process

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2. Identify Communication Goals.Company support and dedication of resourcesare more likely if a risk communication programis integrated with overall company goals.��Identify specific company goals.��Develop communication objectives that

support overall company goals.��Integrate audience’s concerns with

communication objectives.(Swanson et al., 1991)

3. Know the Audience and How it PerceivesRisk.The next step is to gain a clear picture of theaudience.��List the different aspects of the issue and the

types of organizations that might beconcerned.

��Contact organizations and interest groupswith which the company is familiar.

��Ask these groups the names of others whomight have an interest in the issue.(Hance et al., 1988)

��Some audiences are obvious, others are not.Consider expanding a company’s list ofaudiences.

Groups that are likely to be affecteddirectly or who think they areaffected directly

Groups that are likely to be confronta-tional if they are not consulted oralerted to the issue

Groups that would be helpful to consultwith to gain important information,ideas, or opinions

Groups that others seek out for theiropinions on the company’s action

Groups that have responsibilities relevantto the company’s action

Groups that may not especially wantinput, but need to know what thecompany is doing

Groups that the company would prefernot to deal with — These may be themost important people to involve.They may be the likeliest to derail aproject at the 11th hour.

(Swanson et al., 1991)

Anticipate the questions and concerns anaudience is likely to raise.��Anticipate concerns most likely to be raised

(e.g., company past practices, current issues).��Identify concerns and objections that may be

felt but not expressed.��Determine how risk perception factors may

shape an audience’s concerns (see chapter 2).��Identify concerns that may be based upon

misinformation or misperceptions.

STEP 2: PLAN THE PROGRAM

1. Determine the Appropriate Tools.The goal of the communication program willplay a role in choosing the most appropriateway to deliver a message. The following infor-mation has been adapted from Lundgren (1995).Refer to chapter 6 for a more detailedexplanation of the tools.��Increase audience awareness of the risk.

Oral messagesVisual messages

��Inform the audience.Oral messagesWritten messagesComputer-based applications

��Build consensus between the audience andthe organization assessing or managing therisk.

Oral messagesWritten messagesAudience interaction

��Change behavior for the risk.Oral messagesWritten messagesVisual messages

2. Time the Message Appropriately.A company may have several reasons forholding onto information. However, mostprofessional risk communicators advocate forearly release of information. Timely release ofinformation can lay the groundwork forsuccessful risk communication.��Earn the public’s trust through meaningful

public involvement in decision-making.��Set the pace for resolution of the problem.

91

��Increase control of the accuracy ofinformation (if the company is the first topresent it).

��Require less work than responding toinquiries or attacks that may result fromdelayed release.

Withholding or delaying release of informationmay result in barriers that must be overcomelater on.��The public may feel angry and resentful

about not learning of the information earlier.��Interested parties may tend to overestimate

the risk.(Hance, et al., 1988)

STEP 3: EVALUATE THE PROGRAM

1. Review the General Aspects of theCompany’s Plan for Risk Communication.��Evaluate the situation.

The degree and strength of organizationalsupport in place

Compliance with regulatory requirementsRecognition of audience needs and

concernsThe use of appropriate tools and timing

2. Evaluate the Results of SpecificMessages.��Evaluate safety programs.

Reductions in lost time accidentsAwareness of safety practices throughout

the companyClarity of safety/risk messages

��Evaluate facility siting.Representation of audience sectorsPublic understanding of the riskSuccess in implementation of projects

��Evaluate industrial accident response.Consistency of informationLevel of informed decision-makingRepresentation of audience sectors

3. Review Entire Efforts for Methodologyand Process.��Evaluate process with a combination of

tools.Public opinion pollingFocus groupsMeeting evaluation formsObservation and debriefingAssessment of communicator style

93

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