risk-based oversight

8/12/2019 Risk-Based Oversight

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Fall 2005Nuclear Oversight Conference

Strategies forImplementing

Risk-Based Oversight


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Fall 2005Nuclear Oversight Conference2

In This Presentation:

Excerpts from the St. Lucie Nuclear

Assurance Business Plan: Department Areas of Emphasis Administrative Letter 17, Risk Based

Oversight Daily process used for assigning oversight Results

Risk -B ased Overs ig h t


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St. Lucie Nuclear Assurance Organization

Kathi ButlerStaff Technician

Ed ArmandoSRO (PWR, BWR)

Bruce ParksSRO (PWR)

Lead AuditorQC Inspector (Mech II)

John HaugerSRO (PWR)

Bob EavensonChem Tech

QC Inspector (Mech I)

VACANCYRadiation Protection

Mike SnyderAudit Supervisor

Areas = Operations,RP / CHM

Kathy GettyISI/IST, ENG

QC Inspector (Mech I)Lead Auditor

John LuchkaChem, Ops

QC Inspector (Mech II)Lead Auditor

Jim McNeySecurity

QC Inspector (Mech I)Lead Auditor

Doug MelodyQC Level III Elec/IC

QC Inspector (Mech II)Lead Auditor

Bob CarrollEngineer

Dom FucaTechnical Reviews and Assessements Supv.

Areas = Engineering,Fire Protection

George IngramQC Level III Mech

QC Inspector (Elec/IC II)Lead Auditor

Mike MeileyQC Level III Civil

QC Inspector (Mech I)

Jim NormanQC Inspector (Mech II)

QC Inspector (Elec/IC I)QC Inspector (Coatings II)

Lou PanessaQC Inspector (Elec/IC II)QC Inspector (Mech II)QC Inspector (Civil II)

VACANCYQC Inspector

Greg PustoverQuality Control Supervisor

Areas = Maintenance,Work Management

Rob De La EspriellaSite Quality Manager


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Areas of Emphasis*:

Nuclear Safety

Plant Reliability

Risk Significant ctivities

*Established in 2000



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Areas of Emphasis:

Nuclear Safety

RCS Pressure Boundary SSCs required to mitigate theconsequences of an accident

SSCs required to shutdown and maintainthe plant in a safe condition



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Areas of Emphasis:Plant Reliability

Processes and Procedures that supportequipment reliability System Health Reports Plant Health Committee Maintenance Rule Work Management Process Outage Management PM Optimization

Critical Spare Parts Program



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Areas of Emphasis:Risk Significant ctivities

Risk = Probability + Consequences(Error Rate) (Defense in Depth)


Error Rate: Work Preparation Work Performance Work Feedback

KEY: Focus on CRITICAL TASKS

Defense-in-Depth: ENGd Controls

ADMIN Controls Oversight Controls


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Administrative Letter 17,Risk Based Oversight

SCOPE:

Risk-management is a fundamental component ofmaintaining safety at operating nuclear power plants. The guidance in this AL defines how theQuality Department evaluates the risk associatedwith plant activities on a daily basis, and howQuality Department Supervisors will establish theappropriate oversight plan based on relative risk,department priorities and available resources.



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Administrative Letter 17Risk Based Oversight

INPUTS: St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Daily Status Reports for

both units (including operational focus items andunplanned control room annunciators)

Configuration Risk Management ProgramImplementation (ADM-17.16)

Daily Configuration Risk Management Program(CRMP) calculations (Modes 1, 2, 3) CRMP / Shutdown Safety Assessments (Modes

4,5,6, defueled) Operations control room logs for both units



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INPUTS:

The Top Ten Equipment Issues list for the station The list of Operator Work-Arounds and Burdens The list of control room deficiencies for both units The list of Red and Yellow PWOs being worked for

the week The list of Maintenance Rule systems in a(1)

status The list of System Health Reports with RED

systems



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Nuclear Safety Elements1. Operations

Conservative Decision Making Culture Use of OLRM/Shutdown Safety Assessments Involvement in Work Management & Equipment

Reliability2. Configuration Management

Design (e.g. TEDB, Drawings & Plant)

Operational Margin (e.g. GL 91-18 evolutions) Regulatory Control ( e.g. Tech Specs)3. Equipment Reliability

System Health Monitoring Maintenance Rule Program

4. On-site / Offsite Safety Review Committees - Oversight



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Plant Reliability Elements1. Work Management

Daily Scheduling & Planning Outage Scheduling & Planning Metrics & Process Improvements

2. Maintenance Corrective Elective On-line Maintenance (CMMs) Predictive Preventative Modifications

3. Corrective Action Program Problem identification Problem resolution Self Assessments Significant Events/Root Cause

4. Chemistry Controls Primary (SG tubes) Secondary (e.g. Secondary Pipe Walls)

ODCM controls



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Other Risk Significant Activities

1. Personnel Safety Industrial (e.g. PPE, Fall Protection,

Confined Space, Electrical Shock) Radiological Protection

2. Emergency Preparedness3. Security4. Fire Protection5. Training (e.g. Qualifications & Safety Culture)



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DAILY ASSIGNMENTS: Assessment of individual risk Assessment of aggregate risk Assignments based on skills available Tracking assignments to conclusion



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Risk -B ased Overs ig h tRisk Based Oversight for Wednesday 9/1/04

Protected Train: BC o n d i t i o no r A c t i v i t y

R i s k A g g r e g a t eR i s k

I s s u e s o r C o n c e r n s P l a n tS c h e d

ule

O v e r s i g h t Ta s k A s s i g n e e P r o d u c t s C N OD N ASQM

ReactivityManagementoversightgroupmeetings

Lack ofoversight =Potential forReactivityMgmt event

Secondarysystems thatcan affectreactivity notbeing properlymaintained

Is the ReactivityManagementOversight groupoperatingeffectively/adequately

Access station'ssensitivity toReactivityManagement

CR / DQS/ QR

RCS LeakRate -30Day LCOstarted8/23/04

Potential RCSpressureboundary leak

Problems withRCS leakdetectionequipment incontainment

Flange downstream ofV-1452 (top of Pzr)leaking

1330meeting

Leak repair activities

QR - PanessaDeveloping V1452repair plan

CR / DQS

1A ICWPedestal

SeismicIntegrity ofLevel 2Structures

Backlog andLack of fundingfor level 2PWOs

Continual long termdegradation with norepairs on correctiveactions

Meeting@ 1000

Surveillance ofStorm Action Plandevelopment

DQS

1A ECCS onlinemaintenance

ORLMcontributor

Critical MaintenanceManagement couldresult in exceedingLCO and a unitshutdown

Preps & Executionof CMM (dependentof HurricaneFrances)

DQS CNO

Fire Sealsdo not matchdesign

A fire couldspread andaffect systemsneeded forsafe (App R)shutdown

Security Firewatches werefalsifying logs

Fire seals do not meet10 CFR App R andlicensing basis

10/31 Inspect Fire Seals -LER inspectioncommitment for QCfrom QA Finding

DQS

Hurricaneapproaching- SevereWeatherPreps

EmergencyPreparedness maintainingthe ERO intact

Low number ofqualified peoplein somepositions

Hurricane FrancesHurricane Jeanne

9/19/21

Ensure storm prepsare adequatelyimplemented

DQS


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Risk -B as ed Overs ig h tResults:

Area Issues Identified

Boric Acid Corrosion

Controls

Significant weakness in process

for addressing active leaksConfigurationManagement

- Breakdowns in control of mods- Lack of control of EQ panels

ReactivityManagement

Lack of sensitivity to secondarysystems affecting reactivity

Equipment Reliability Longstanding equipmentreliability issues linked toweaknesses in corporate long-range planning


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Fall 2005Nuclear Oversight Conference

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risk-based oversight

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