Kyoto University, 7th May 2018

Der-Chin HorngResearch Fellow/Professor

Institute of European and American Studies,

Academia SinicaE-mail: dchorng@sinica.edu.tw

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Risk Assessment in the European Food Safety Authority and Its Lessons for Taiwan

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OutlineI. IntroductionII. Food Safety TheoriesIII. Jurisprudence of EU Food Safety LawIV. EU Food LawV. The EFSAVI. Lessons for TaiwanVII. Lessons Beyond TaiwanVIII. Conclusion

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I. IntroductionA. Motivation (1)

1. Food safety emerged as a key health and safety issue following a series of food scandals in Europe and Taiwan which began in the 1990s.

2. A proper risk assessment has been recognized as anessential element for food safety, therefore

3. the EU acted to establish the European Food SafetyAuthority (EFSA) pursuant to Regulation 178/2002.

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I. IntroductionA. Motivation (2)

1. This seminar examines risk assessment in EFSAand compares this with corresponding institutions inTaiwan.

2. It also offers some proposals for reforming Taiwan’slaws, to enhance food safety and consumer welfarein general.

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I. IntroductionB. Background (1)

Since the 1990s, European countries andTaiwan have been plagued by major foodsafety crises and scandals, such as mad cowdisease (BSE), foot-and-mouth disease(Aphtaeepizooticae), dioxin poisoning,plasticizer additives, tainted cooking oil, etc.

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I. IntroductionB. Background (2)

These scandals have put public health andconsumers’ interests at serious risk. The re-occurrence of food fraud and poisoning leadsto what sociologist Ulrich Beck terms apostmodern and post-industrial “risk society”.

One of the prominent sources of risk insociety is a very basic, but now distant,need—food.

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I. IntroductionC. Key Elements of a Food Safety System (1)

According to the United Nations Food and AgricultureOrganization (UNFAO), the key elements of foodcontrol and a food safety system are:

1. Food safety regulations and standards;2. Risk assessment and risk management institutions;3. Laboratories;4. Food police;

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I. IntroductionC. Key Elements of a Food Safety System (2)

1. Risk communication;2. Coordination mechanism for food safety related

institutions;3. Food safety crisis management and an alert system

for emergencies; and4. Education, training and international cooperation.

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I. IntroductionD. Risk Analysis

(1) Three Elements

1. Risk Assessment;2. Risk Management;3. Risk Communication.

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I. IntroductionD. Risk Analysis

(2) Risk Assessment/Concept

Risk assessment means a scientifically based process consisting of four steps: (1) hazard identification;(2) hazard characterization;(3) exposure assessment; and(4) risk characterization.

As a whole, scientific evidence, based on riskanalysis, which should be taken into account in thefood policy.

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I. IntroductionD. Risk Analysis

(3) Role of Risk Analysis in the EU

1. to achieve a high-level protection for humanhealth and life;

2. risk analysis is the basis for food law;3. risk assessment shall be undertaken by an

independent institution;4. risk management shall be based on risk

assessment ; and5. risk analysis shall be conducted in a transparent

manner.11

I. IntroductionE. The Aims of the EU Food Safety System

The formation of the EU Food Safety System came in directresponse to such food crises. This system is intended to:(1) establish a high-standard food safety to protect humanhealth and consumer interest;(2) ensure the free flow of food products;(3) ensure the effective functioning of the internal market;(4) ensure fair competition among food business; and(5) restore consumer confidence in European food.

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I. IntroductionE. EU Food Safety Policy (1)

The EU’s food safety policy is designed to guarantee:1. safe, nutritious food & animal feed;2. high standards of animal health & welfare & plant protection;3. clear information on the origin of food, content-labelling & instructions.

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I. IntroductionE. EU Food Safety Policy (2)

General principles of EU food Law comprise:

1. comprehensive food and feed law;2. sound scientific advice for food policy decisions;3. efficient organizational arrangements and

procedures, enforcement & control; 4. transparency; 5. precautionary principle can be lawfully adopted

in a special case; and6. international cooperation.

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I. IntroductionF. EU Food Safety Requirements (1)

1. Food shall not be placed on the market if its is unsafe;

2. Food shall be deemed to be unsafe if it is considered to be:(1) injurious to health;(2) unfit for human consumption.

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I. IntroductionF. EU Food Safety Requirements (2)

3. In determining whether any food is unsafe, regard shall to had:

a) to the normal conditions of use of the food by theconsumer and at each stage of production,processing and distribution, and

b) to the information provided to the consumer,including information on the label;

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I. IntroductionF. EU Food Safety Requirements (3)

4. In determining whether any food is injurious to health , regard shall be had:

a) not only to the probable immediate and/or short-term and/or long-term effects of that food on thehealth of a person consuming it, but also onsubsequent generations;

b) to the probable cumulative toxic effects;c) to the particular health sensitivities of a specific

category of consumers.

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II. Food Safety TheoriesA. Institutional Protection (1)

1. A Food Safety System's food laws, risk assessmentmechanisms, test laboratories, risk managementorganization and law enforcement personnel are thekeys to establishing a strong food control systemcharacterized by public confidence and trust.

2. Risk Assessment should be directed by workconducted by professional scientists and functionalexperts who enjoy a certain degree of independenceand who have clear lines of responsibility.

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II. Food Safety TheoriesA. Institutional Protection (2)

A robust institutional framework can therefore maintainthe efficient execution of food law, ensure the legalityand justifiability of food policies, and increase thecredibility of food safety for consumers in general.

The food safety system of the EU exemplifies acomprehensive and robust institution and serves as agreat point of reference for Taiwan to modernize its foodgovernance and provide institutional protection forconsumers.

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II. Food Safety TheoriesB. Food control Theories (1)

1. Food safety has its origin in governmentcontrol theory, particularly the theory ofpublic interest.

2. Food control is necessary because itprotects consumer interest, public health,fair competition and the properfunctioning of the market, and it detersbusinesses from engaging in illegalactivities.

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II. Food Safety TheoriesB. Food Control Theories (2)

3. Food controls also effectively prevent foodbusinesses from engaging in unfaircompetition practices that would trigger a“race to the bottom” and degrade publichealth.

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II. Food Safety TheoriesB. Food Control Theories (3)

4. Information asymmetry also posesproblems in building a food controlsystem. Pesticides, additives and otherchemicals are common in the productionand processing of food products, butdetailed information is often not easilyavailable to consumers.

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II. Food Safety TheoriesB. Food Control Theories (4)

5. The role of government is essential inensuring the quality and safety of foodproducts by, for example, restricting theuse of pesticides and additives andrequiring businesses to reveal pertinentinformation on product labels.

6. Therefore food control can provide aninstitutional protection for consumers.

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III. Jurisprudence of EU Food Safety LawA. Major Tasks of EU Food Safety Law

The major task of food law in the EU,according to Article 1 of Regulation 178/2002,is to provide assurances of a high level ofprotection of human health and consumers’interests, while ensuring the effectivefunctioning of the internal market.

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III. Jurisprudence of EU Food Safety Law B. TFEU (1)

In the EU the protection of consumers’ interests enjoysconstitutional status. Article 169 of the Treaty on theFunctioning of the European Union (TFEU) providesthat:

“[i]n order to promote the interests of consumers and toensure a high level of consumer protection, the Unionshall contribute to protecting the health, safety andeconomic interests of consumers, as well as topromoting their rights to information, education and toorganise themselves in order to safeguard theirinterests”.

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III. Jurisprudence of EU Food Safety LawB. TFEU (2)

Article 12 of the TFEU also stipulates that“consumer protection requirements shall betaken into account in defining andimplementing other Union policies andactivities”.

Therefore the EU will carry out policies toprotect consumers’ interests; failure to do somight violate constitutional treaties.

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III. Jurisprudence of EU Food Safety Law C. EUCJ (1)

The Court of Justice of the European Union (EUCJ)in the 1979 case Cassis de Dijon confirmed thatconsumer protection is a compulsory requirement inthe functioning of the internal market.

The EUCJ proposed that the principle of publicinterest could serve as a justification to limit the freeflow of products and services in the internal market.

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III. Jurisprudence of EU Food Safety Law C. EUCJ (2)

In the judgements of other cases, the EUCJ alsoruled that the EU and its Member States may, basedon reasons of public interest or public health,institute regulations and laws with regard tolabelling, information disclosure or othercompulsory measures.

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IV. EU Food Law A. Legal Basis of the EU's Food Safety Policy (1)

1. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)Article 168: public health protection;Article 169: consumer protection;Article 191: precautionary principle.

1. Regulation 178/2002, passed by the EU on the 1stof February 2002 and in force since the 21st ofFebruary 2002, is the basic EU legal frameworkfor food safety.

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IV. EU Food Law A. Legal Basis of the EU's Food Safety Policy (2)

1. Regulation 178/2002: General Food Law(1) laying down general principles and

requirements of food law;(2) establishing the European Food Safety

Authority (EFSA);(3) laying down food safety procedure.

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IV. EU Food LawB. Regulation 178/2002 (1)

Regulation 178/2002 establishes the generalprinciples, responsibilities and basicrequirements concerning risk analysisinstitutions, traceability, the precautionaryprinciple, emergency measures and riskmanagement.

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IV. EU Food LawB. Regulation 178/2002 (2)

More importantly, Chapter III of theRegulation establishes the official risk safetyinstitution—the European Food SafetyAuthority (EFSA).

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V. The EFSAA. Background (1)

The establishment of EFSA, according to Regulation 178/2002, is a response to the need to create an independent and scientific institution dedicated to food safety risk assessments.

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V. The EFSA B. The Competent Authority

1. EFSA provides scientific advice and technical support for the EU’s food and animal feed legislation and policies.

2. According to Article 23(c), scientific opinions relating to food safety shall be based on the foundation of risk assessment.

3. Therefore EFSA is the competent authority for food safety related risk assessment in the EU.

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V. The EFSA C. Main Missions (1)

According to Article 22 of Regulation 178/2002, themain missions of EFSA include:1. providing scientific opinions with regard to foodsafety related problems raised by the Commission,European Parliament and Member States;2. conducting practical risk assessment on, forexample, genetically modified organisms, pesticides,food and feed additives;

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V. The EFSAC. Main Missions (2)

3. supervising special risks, as well asidentifying and defining new risks; and4. conducting food and feed riskassessment by developing and applyingnew integrated scientific methodologies.

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V. The EFSAD. Function

By providing scientific opinions in allareas regarding food and feed safety,EFSA has become a major scientificpoint of reference for the EU.

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V. The EFSA E. Status of EFSA (1)

With regards to legal status, Articles 37, 43 and 46stipulate that EFSA enjoys an independent positionwithin the EU, drafts its own budget and has legalpersonality. Its staff enjoy privileges and immunities.It is due to these characteristics that EFSA can“express independently its own conclusions andorientations on matters within its mission”according to Article 23(k).

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V. The EFSA E. Status of EFSA (2)

Functional Independence

Article 37 provides that members of theScientific Committee and ScientificPanels shall undertake to actindependently of any external influence.

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V. The EFSA E. Status of EFSA (3)

Financial Independence

Article 43 stipulates that EFSAimplement its own budget planningprocesses. The independent budgetscheme makes EFSA free of control andinfluence from other EU agencies andMember States.

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V. The EFSA E. Status of EFSA (4)

Legal Personality

Article 46 provides that EFSA shall have legalpersonality. In all Member States it shall enjoythe widest powers granted by law to legalpersons. In particular, it may acquire anddispose of movable and immovable propertyand institute legal proceedings.

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V. The EFSAE. Status of EFSA (5)

Accordingly, EFSA is a sui generis supra-national scientific organization charged withrisk assessment tasks. Its independent legalstatus in the EU makes it an importantcornerstone of the food safety system and amodel for success.

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V. The EFSA F. Legal Effect of EFSA’s Scientific Opinion (1)

Article 39(3) also stipulates that the conclusions of theScientific Opinions delivered by EFSA shall beconsidered in drafting food safety laws and in theirimplementation.According to Article 6 of the Regulation, riskmanagement shall take into account the results of riskassessments based on the available scientific evidenceand undertaken in an independent, objective andtransparent manner.

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V. The EFSAF. Legal Effect of EFSA’s Scientific Opinion (2)

In the judgement for the Pfizer v. Commission case(2004), the Court of First Instance clearly ruled thatthe Commission shall provide an explanation if itchose not to adopt the Scientific Opinions of theEFSA. The explanation is deemed valid only if basedon scientific evidence provided by scientificinstitutions at the same level as the EFSA.

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V. The EFSA F. Legal Effect of EFSA’s Scientific Opinion (3)

This case implies that if scientific opinionsprovided by EFSA are not taken intoconsideration, the Commission might violatethe law in its risk management decision underArticle 6(3) of Regulation 178/2002 andArticle 114 of the TFEU.

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V. The EFSA F. Legal Effect of EFSA’s Scientific Opinion (4)

The fact that Scientific Opinions provided bythe EFSA are legally binding has beenconfirmed by the EUCJ. In the Pfizer AnimalHealth Case, the EUCJ has established ageneral duty whereby organizations withinthe EU shall consult EFSA for ScientificOpinions when it comes to food safety issues.

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V. The EFSA F. Legal Effect of EFSA’s Scientific Opinion (5)

The example above demonstrates that scientificopinions released by EFSA have substantial legaleffect and are subject to judicial review.

It also shows that the EUCJ and the EU arecharacterized by judicial activism in promotingcoordination between risk assessment and riskmanagement, and the Europeanization of riskanalysis.

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V. The EFSAF. Legal Effect of EFSA’s Scientific Opinion (6)

In practice 95% of the Scientific Opinionsreleased by the EFSA to the Commission in2010 were accepted and adopted.

The rejections of the 5% were due to political,economic, social and other non-scientificconcerns.

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V. The EFSA F. Legal Effect of EFSA’s Scientific Opinion (7)

It is fair to claim that EFSA has establisheditself as an authority on food safety riskassessments capable of providing validscientific opinions.

Therefore EFSA plays a key role in the EUFood Safety Policy and contributes toproviding a high standard of protection forEU consumers.

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VI. Lessons for Taiwan A. Background (1)

1. In Taiwan, the plasticizer additive scandal of 2011and the tainted cooking oil scandal of 2014dramatically undermined the credibility of foodbusinesses, weakened consumer confidence andstained Taiwan’s reputation as a “kingdom ofdelicacies”.

2. The social costs and medical expenses that mightaccrue in coping with public health problems areconsiderable.

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VI. Lessons for Taiwan A. Background (2)

3. The re-occurrence of food safety breachesshows that Taiwan has much room forimprovement compared to the EU withrespect to food control regulations, foodsafety institutions, law implementation,food crisis management, etc.

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VI. Lessons for Taiwan A. Background (3)

4. The Act Governing Food Safety and Sanitation ofTaiwan came into force on the 28th of January1975. Between the 10th of June 2011 and the 20thof January 2015 the Act underwent sixamendments, incorporating such measures asemergency alerts, labelling, traceability, self-governance, market monitoring, imported foodorigin certification, border inspections, etc.

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VI. Lessons for TaiwanA. Background (4)

5. The three most recent amendmentsfocused on increasing administrativepenalties, but failed to touch uponestablishing risk assessment andmanagement institutions, which are keycomponents of a food safety system.

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VI. Lessons for TaiwanB. Risk Assessment in Taiwan (1)

1. Food safety law in Taiwan did not incorporatea risk assessment mechanism until amendedon the 31st of May 2013.

2. Article 4.1 provides that “the actions taken bythe competent authority in the governing offood safety shall be based on risk assessment”.

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VI. Lessons for TaiwanB. Risk Assessment in Taiwan (2)

1. Article 4.2 stipulates that “the centralcompetent authority shall assemble expertsand scholars specialized in food safety,toxicology and risk assessment, as well asnon-governmental organizations, to form afood risk assessment advisory committee.”

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VI. Lessons for TaiwanB. Risk Assessment in Taiwan (3)

On the 10th of January 2014 the Ministry of Healthand Welfare published the Food Safety RiskAssessment Advisory Committee EstablishmentRegulations.

Article 3 of the Regulations provides that themission of the Food Safety Risk AssessmentAdvisory Committee is to consult and makerecommendations on food safety risk assessmentsbased on the principles of scientific evidence,precaution, information transparency, etc.

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VI. Lessons for TaiwanB. Risk Assessment in Taiwan (4)

Article 4 of the Regulations stipulates that theCommittee is to be made up of 15 to 19members (appointed by the Minister ofHealth and Welfare), consisting of expertsand scholars specializing in food safety,toxicology and risk assessment, andrepresentatives of civil societies in relateddomains.

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VI. Lessons for TaiwanB. Risk Assessment in Taiwan (5)

1. Article 6 provides that a meeting shall be heldbi-annually, and an interim meeting may beconvened as deemed necessary.

2. This would not have substantial impact sinceit is only held bi-annually.

3. The meeting is not a permanent institutionand is not authorized to carry out riskassessment tasks.

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VI. Lessons for TaiwanB. Risk Assessment in Taiwan (6)

4. The Committee might not be able to carryout its tasks independently since all itsmembers, including the Chair and DeputyChair of the Committee, are appointed bythe Minister of Health and Welfare.

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VI. Lessons for TaiwanB. Risk Assessment in Taiwan (7)

In summary, the Food Safety Risk AssessmentAdvisory Committee is unable to carry outprofessional and systematic risk assessmenttasks on a regular basis because it is not apermanent institution, and because itsmembers and staff are employed on acontractual or part-time basis.

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VI. Lessons for TaiwanC. Future Reform (1)

The current food safety institution in Taiwan isincapable of conducting the mission specified in Article4 of the Act, which states: “the actions taken by thecompetent authority in the governing of food safety shallbe based on risk assessment and shall align withsatisfying citizens’ rights to have healthy and safe foodand the right to know”.

As a result, it is fair to claim that food safety riskmanagement in Taiwan is, at the moment, not based onscientific evidence.

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VI. Lessons for TaiwanC. Future Reform (2)

The experiences of the EU demonstrate thatindependent risk assessment based on scientificevidence is vital to credible and efficient foodsafety policy.Taiwan should take the EFSA as a point ofreference to establish a National Food Safety andRisk Assessment Committee at the Ministry levelin the Executive Yuan.

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VII. Lessons Beyond Taiwan A. EFSA and International Standards (1)

Article 5.3 of Regulation 178/2002 statesthat international standards should betaken into consideration in thedevelopment of the EU’s food law.

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VII. Lessons Beyond TaiwanA. EFSA and Codex (2)

(1) The Codex Alimentarius Commission develops and adopts food standards that serve as a reference for international food trade;

(2) Codex also develops standards with respect to food quality, nutrition and labelling. These standards are relevant to the WTO/TBT Agreement;

(3) The EU also has access to Codex and actively participates in Codex activities. DG Health & Food Safety is the EU Codex contact point.

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VII. Lessons Beyond TaiwanA. EFSA and WTO (3)

1. The WTO is the leading international organization that sets international rules for trade;

2. The SPS Agreement concerns the application of food regulations;

3. One of the major reasons for the establishment of the EFSA was the EU’s loss in the WTO case of Hormones.

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Article 2.1“Members have the right to take sanitary andphytosanitary measures necessary for the protectionof human, animal or plant life or health, providedthat such measures are not inconsistent with theprovisions of this Agreement”

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VII. Lessons Beyond TaiwanB. WTO/SPS Agreement (1)

Article 2.2“Members shall ensure that any sanitary orphytosanitary measure is applied only to the extentnecessary to protect human, animal or plant life orhealth, is based on scientific principles and is notmaintained without sufficient scientific evidence, exceptas provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.”

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VII. Lessons Beyond TaiwanB. WTO/SPS Agreement (2)

Article 2.2

shall ensure:

Basic Rights and Obligations

applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or

health

is based on scientific principles

is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence

except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.Source: WTO (2000)

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Article 5:7“qualified exemption”

the measure is imposed with respect to a situation where “relevant” scientific information is insufficient;

the measure is adopted “on the basis of available pertinent information”

Allowed to provisionally adopt a measure if:

1

2

and

Source: WTO (2000)

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Article 5:7“qualified exemption”

“seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk”; and

“review the … phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time”.

+ additional obligations:

3

4

and

Source: WTO (2000)

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VII. Lessons Beyond Taiwan C. Some Key Elements for SPS Measures (1)

1. Rational or objective relationship between the measure and the science

2. Approach by Panel and AB to risk assessment (food-borne and pest- or disease-borne risk)

3. The use of precaution in situations where there is insufficient scientific evidence (5.7)

4. Approach by Panel and AB when showing for discrimination (5:5)

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VII. Lessons Beyond Taiwan C. Some Key Elements for SPS Measures (2)

Scientific Evidence

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Basic Rights andObligations(Article 2)

Int’l org.(Article 12:3)

Harmonization(Article 3)

Risk Assessment(Article 5)

Expert advice(Article 11:2)

Source: WTO (2000)

VII. Lessons Beyond TaiwanD. WTO Case: EC-Hormones (DS26, 48) (1)

1. The case relates to the EU prohibition on the importation from the US and Canada of meat and meat products treated with certain hormones;

2. The panel concluded that the EU measure violated Article 5.1 (and thus Article 3.3) because it was not based on a risk assessment.

3. Precautionary principles shall also be based on such risk assessments, and the failure to do so would violate Article 5.7 of the SPS Measures of the WTO.

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VII. Lessons Beyond TaiwanD. WTO Case: EC-Biotech Products (DS291, 292, 293) (2)

1. The EU applied a moratorium on approvals of biotech products imported from the US, Canada and Argentina;

2. EC Member States also adopted safeguard measures prohibiting the importing/marketing of specific biotech products;

3. The panel concluded that all safeguard measures by EC Member States were not based on any risk assessment, were contrary to Article 5.1 and inconsistent with Article 2.2.

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VII. Lessons Beyond TaiwanD. WTO Case: Korea-Import Bans for Radionuclides (DS495, 2018)

1. SPS measures adopted by Korea included: 2011and 2013 additional testing requirements, 2012product-specific import bans, 2013 blanketimport ban, etc;

2. The panel found that Korea's import banmeasures did not fulfil the four requirementsprovided in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement;

3. Korea's measures were more trade-restrictivethan required to achieve its protection purposes,and inconsistent with Article 5.6;

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VII. Lessons Beyond Taiwan D. WTO Case: Korea-Import Bans for Radionuclides (DS495, 2018)

4. Korea did not ensure that its measures do notarbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate betweenMembers and constitute a disguised restrictionon international trade, therefore those measuresare inconsistent with Article 2.3;

5. Korea did not publish all related measures andacted inconsistently with Article 7; and

6. The above-mentioned reasons together led toKorea’s lost of this case.

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VIII. Conclusion (1)

Since the EU food safety law passed in 2002, foodsafety has been marked mainly by theestablishment of an independent risk assessmentinstitution, the EFSA.

The EFSA demonstrates that thisEuropeanization of risk assessment wouldsignificantly benefit the implementation of foodsafety law in Taiwan.

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VIII. Conclusion (2)Major findings reveal that:

1. The EFSA must have an independent status andlegal personality in order to conduct risk assessmentbased on scientific evidence, and to strengthen theobjectivity of EU risk management and food policy;

2. One of the prime goals of risk assessment andfood safety in the EU is to enhance consumerprotection and restore consumer confidence in theEU food market.

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VIII. Conclusion (3)3. Since the outbreak of major food crises

concerning plasticizer additives and taintedoil, food safety in Taiwan has developed into amulti-faceted issue in which individuals,families and industries are actively involvedand affected.

4. In a macro-economic sense, this affectsconsumer interests, public health, foodindustries, tourism, international trade andthe environment, among other issues.

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VIII. Conclusion (4)

5. It is recommended that the Taiwanese governmenttake note of and refer to EU laws, practices, andinstitutions such as the EFSA, and establish anindependent risk assessment committee.

6. Ensuring that the aforementioned institutionalframework and policy instruments are legally basedon safeguarding consumer interests would greatlybenefit the food safety system, public health,tourism, fair competition in the food industry andthe export of food products.

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VIII. Conclusion (5)

By enforcing the domestic food safety system,Taiwan would be able to connect withinternational food safety standards and thereforeimprove the international image of Taiwan whileproviding a sustainable institutional protectionand the highest standard of consumer protectionfor the general public.

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Reference1. Der-Chin Horng, August 2012, "International Law on Biotechnology,"

in International Law and Institution, UNESCO-EOLSS JointCommittee (eds.), in Encyclopedia of Life Support System(EOLSS), Developed under the Auspices of the UNESCO, EolssPublishers, Oxford, UK, 27 pages.

2. Der-Chin Horng, "World Trade Organization on ConsumerProtection," 2014 Discussion Interim Report, InternationalProtection of Consumer Committee, Report of the 76thInternational Law Association Washington Conference(London: International Law Association, August 2014), pp. 548-550.

3. Der-Chin Horng, November 2016, "The EU Food Police. ItsLessons for Taiwan," Journal of Global Policies and Governance, Vol.5, No. 2, pp. 93-108.

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4. Der-Chin Horng, November 2016, "Risk Assessment in theEuropean Food Safety Authority and Its Lessons for Taiwan, " inChang-fa Lo, Nigel N. T. Li and Tsai-yu Lin (eds.), Legal Thoughtsbetween the East and the West in the Multilevel Legal Order: A LiberAmicorum in Honour of Professor Herbert Han-Pao Ma. Singapore:Springer, pp. 395-407.

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6. Der-Chin Horng, Selected Issues in WTO Law and Policy (Taipei,Sharing, 2017), 3rd ed., 721 pages. (in Chinese)

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Website

1. EFSA: https://www.efsa.europa.eu/2. Europa: https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en3. European Commission:

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/index_en4. European Commission DG Health and Food Safety:

https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/health-and-food-safety_en

5. WTO: https://www.wto.org/6. FAO: http://www.fao.org/home/en/7. Codex: http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/en/8. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Taiwan:

https://www.fda.gov.tw/EN/index.aspx

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Thanks for Attention

Comments are welcome

Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taiwan

http://www.ea.sinica.edu.tw/