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Risk and Insurance 14.73: Lecture 15 Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo 1

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Page 1: Risk and insurance (PDF)

Risk and Insurance

14.73: Lecture 15

Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo

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Page 2: Risk and insurance (PDF)

Risk is central in the lives of the poor

• In 2009, Robert Zoellick warned the world that the economic crisis could be a disaster for the world’s poor.

“The global economic crisis [sparked by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008] threatens to become a human crisis in many developing countries unless they can take targeted measures to protect vulnerable people in their communities. While much of the world is focused on bank rescues and stimulus packages, we should not forget that poor people in developing countries are far more exposed if their economies falter”

© 2009 Robert Zoellick. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our CreativeCommons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/fairuse.

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Page 3: Risk and insurance (PDF)

The crisis, there and here

• Surprisingly, the crisis did not end up being so important. It is not that jobs were not lost, prices did not drop: But compared to the risk that the world’s poor usually face it was not such a huge event.

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Page 4: Risk and insurance (PDF)

Risk and the poor

• 50% of the urban global poor run a non agricultural business. 30% to 98% of the rural poor have a farm, depending on the country

• Those who don’t have a business are often casual laborers, paid on daily wage:

– Easily lose their job

– Wage volatility is much higher in poor countries than in rich countries

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Page 5: Risk and insurance (PDF)

Wage Volatility and GDP

Source: Jayachandran, 2006

© 2006 Journal of Political Economy. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from ourCreative Commons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/fairuse.

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Food Prices are also volatile

© 2004 The Economist. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our CreativeCommons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/fairuse.

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Shocks in the S-Shape World

• A very small business may not be profitable, while a somewhat larger one is: – One shock may plunge a household in a poverty trap

– Ibu Tina and and her clothing business

• You may need to choose between your children • We saw in the previous lecture, on gender discrimination

that girls are more likely to die than boys during drought.

• You may need to chose between your children – We saw in the previous lecture, on gender discrimination

that girls are more likely to die than boys during drought

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After the theft

Before the theft

Ibu Tina 3

Ibu Tina 2

Ibu Tina 2

Ibu Tina 3

P

Ibu Tina’s Wealth today

Ibu

Tin

a’s

Wea

lth

to

mo

rro

w

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Page 9: Risk and insurance (PDF)

Shocks in the S-Shape World

• A very small business may not be profitable, while a somewhat larger one is:

– One shock may plunge a household in a poverty trap

– Ibu Tina and and her clothing business

• You may need to chose between your children

– We saw in the previous lecture, on gender discrimination that girls are more likely to die than boys during drought

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Unequal Sharing of Poverty C

hild

’s f

itn

ess

Y Y/2

Investment in child’s nutrition 10

Page 11: Risk and insurance (PDF)

Stress can cause poverty

• Risk can cause poverty

• Stress can exacerbate it as well:

– Under stress body produces cortisol, which partly affect decision making ability

– Cortisol in pregnancy also affect the development of the fetus: babies of stressed out mothers do less well in life!

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How do the poor cope with risk?

• Saving and borrowing

– However, we will see that ability to borrow is limited

– Suppose you cannot borrow, and your income follows an i.i.d process

– Nearly optimal “rule of thumb” You consume everything when you have very little cash on hand, and otherwise save a fraction above some treshold

– Even if you save a lot, there will be years when you consume very little!

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Source: Simulations by Angus Deaton

Deaton, Angus. 1997. The analysis of household surveys : a microeconometricApproach to development policy. Washington, D.C. : The World Bank.

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Page 14: Risk and insurance (PDF)

How do the poor cope with risk?

• Try to work more

• But when everybody try to work more at the same time (say, because there is a drought), what will happen to wages?

• The poor are more likely to want to work harder when they face a shock, because of the drop in consumption is more costly to them

• Jayachandran “Selling labor low”: this leads to an increase in risk: – Not only does risk cause poverty, poverty cause risk!!

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Page 15: Risk and insurance (PDF)

Selling labor low

Source: Jayachandran, 2006

© 2006 Journal of Political Economy. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/fairuse.

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Avoiding risk

• Knowing that risk is ever-present and would be very costly, poor try to avoid it:

– Avoid more profitable but more risky investment (new seeds, etc.)

– Diversify portfolio of activities: each person in a family have several job

– Migrate for short periods of time, keeping the family home

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Costly strategies

• All these strategies contribute to maintain people in poverty

– Agriculture: profit rates would be 30% higher if there was no weather risk.

– Many jobs: no investment in specific skills.

– Short term migration: no career

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Example: Weather insurance

• Pilot program in Ghana for a simple weather insurance program:

– At full “actuarily fair” price, demand for the product is almost nil

– At almost fully subsidized price, every farmer demands it

– And there were large effects on adoption of fertilizer/food security afterwards, when insurance was combined with credit.

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0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

0 1 4 8 9.5 12 14Price per Acre (GH Cedis)

(Act. Fair = 9.5)

Take-up of Takayua Insurance

for 2010 Season

© Dean Karlan, Issac Osei-Akoto, Robert Osei, Christopher Udry. All rights reserved. This content isexcluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/fairuse.

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Page 20: Risk and insurance (PDF)

Example: Weather insurance

• Pilot program in Ghana for a simple weather insurance program:

– At full “actuarily fair” price, demand for the product is almost nil

– At almost fully subsidized price, every farmer demands it

– And there were large effects on adoption of fertilizer/food security afterwards, when insurance was combined with credit.

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Page 21: Risk and insurance (PDF)

228.28 Ghc **

146.03 Ghc

168.71 Ghc

155.39 Ghc

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Both Capital Only Insurance Only Control

(in

Gh

an

aia

n c

edis

)Total Chemical Spending

46.9% increase in spending on chemicals relative to controls

Note: Two asterisks (**) indicate a statistically significant difference relative to the control group, at the 95% confidence level. Orange bars show 95% CI.

21

© Dean Karlan, Issac Osei-Akoto, Robert Osei, Christopher Udry. All rights reserved. This content isexcluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/fairuse.

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12%**

22%23%

21%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Both Capital Only Insurance Only Control

(% o

f h

ou

seho

lds

wit

h m

em

ber

s m

issi

ng m

eal

s)Proportion of Households with

Members Missing Meals this Year

Note: Two asterisks (**) indicate a statistically significant difference relative to the control group, at the 95% confidence level. Dotted orange lines show 95% CI.

42.9% decrease in households with

missed meals this year

22

© Dean Karlan, Issac Osei-Akoto, Robert Osei, Christopher Udry. All rights reserved. This content isexcluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/fairuse.

Page 23: Risk and insurance (PDF)

Conclusion: Where is insurance?

• We can see that risk is costly for the poor

• But also that insurance would help them greatly

• Why are they not insured??

– By official insurance companies

– By their friends

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Where are the insurance companies?

• Forbes magazine presents insurance for the poor an “unpenetrated natural market”

• Many microfinance institutions would like to see in microinsurance the next microcredit revolution.

• And yet the attempts have been disappointing

– Very low demand

– Low use even among those who are insured.

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Why is it so difficult?

• Insurance is inherently difficult

– Moral hazard

– Adverse selection

– Outright fraud

• To solve this problem, market offers only very limited set of products:

– Catastrophic health insurance

– Parametric weather insurance

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Page 26: Risk and insurance (PDF)

An offer in search of a demand

• But the poor have little interest in these products and the take up is very low:

– Lack of understanding

– Mistrust

– The product is not what they actually need or want

• The market may be missing for a reason.

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What role for public policy?

This opens an obvious role for public policy: step in to complement the market to insure social protection.

But this could take several forms: – Food aid

– Cash transfers (conditional or not)

– Free primary health care

– Offer publicly provided insurance

– Subsidize insurance offered by the market

– And many more!

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MIT OpenCourseWarehttp://ocw.mit.edu

14.73 The Challenge of World PovertySpring 2011 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: http://ocw.mit.edu/terms.