rimisHillsdale College Hillsdale, Michigan 49242 Vol . 11, No . 7

July, 198 2VMORAL LEADERSHIP INPOST-SECULAR AMERICABy Richard John Neuhaus

Richard John Neuhaus was born in Canada andeducated in Ontario, Nebraska, and Texas. He holdsdegrees from Concordia Theological Seminary ,Washington University, and Wayne State University .Ordained in 1960, he was from 1961 to 1977 headpastor of the Church of St . John the Evangelist, a low -income, mainly black and Hispanic parish in the Wil-liamsburg section of Brooklyn. He now pursues his sev-eral ministries as "Pastor on Assignment " for the EastCoast Synod of the Association of Evangelical Luthera nChurches, as editor of Forum Letter, a monthly com-mentary on religion and culture, and as a Senior Fel-low of the Council on Religion and Internationa lAffairs .

This presentation was part of a seminar entitled"The Bible and the Republic in a Secular Age," hel din the Center for Constructive Alternatives at HillsdaleCollege March 7-11, 1982 . Other speakers in additionto Pastor Neuhaus included Carl F . H . Henry, RabbiJakob Petuchowski, Ralph David Abernathy, Malach iMartin, William Ralston, Russell Kirk, Cal Thomas ofthe Moral Majority, and futurist Barbara MarxHubbard .

When we set out to talk about moral and religiou sleadership in post-secular America, we are facing cer-tain perennial questions, questions that are not going t ogo away until, if the Christian gospel turns out to b eright, the Kingdom of God comes .

Jesus talked about rendering to Caesar what i sCaesar's, and to God what is God's . Paul talks i nRomans 13 about the powers that be, and more nega-tively in other places about the principalities and pow-ers that stand against the rulership of God . Likewisewith Augustine, Innocent III and all of the contro-versies between the Popes and Emperors during th eHoly Roman Empire, Thomas Aquinas, Luther ,Calvin's grandly flawed experiment in Geneva—all the

way up to today's debate about Roe vs . Wade and abor-tion, about prayer in public schools, about tax exemp-tion and what is meant by religion for purposes of theIRS .

It was thought until very recently, by the cultura lleadership of the Western world, that these issues ha dbeen resolved in some way—basically by excluding re-ligion or religiously-based morality from the publi carena, where the serious business of society was take ncare of. The idea of the separation of church and state ,which most of us have taken in with our mother's milk ,has by remarkable convolutions of logic and law cometo mean in the minds of many people the separation o freligiously-based values from public policy . But theperiod is now past when it was assumed that theseissues could be resolved simply by removing one sideof the debate from the public square . We are entering anew period in which we are asked to read the signs of

im .pri .mis (im-pry-mis) adv . In the first place . Middl eEnglish, from Latin in primis, among the first (things) . . . .

Imprimis is the journal of Hillsdale's two outreachprograms seeking to foster clear thinking on th eproblems of our time: the Center for Constructiv eAlternatives in Michigan, and the Shavano Institute fo rNational Leadership in Colorado. A subscription is fre eon request.

the times in a different way, recognizing that in somevery profound sense we are entering a post-secula rworld .

This has all kinds of ramifications . It will affect notonly American life, but also—if America is, as som epeople allege, the advance society of world history, i fwhat is happening in the United States today is what i slikely to be happening elsewhere tomorrow—then th epost-secular character of American society tells u ssomething about the likely prospects of world-historica lchange .

Thus we find ourselves back in what is for mos tintellectuals today an unfamiliar cluster of questions ,but one which within the broader range of ou rcountry's history has been most characteristic ofAmerican thought : namely, the role of America in th eworld, the idea that in some sense America represent ssomething new, both promising and ominous, about th efuture of humankind . That certainly was the basic be-lief of the constitutional founders and, even more im-portant, of the religious and spiritual and poeti cvisionaries at the beginning of the American experi-ment .

This attitude toward America as being experimental ,as being provocative, as being a test of human possibil-ity, has almost totally been lost . It has been driven ou tof public discourse in recent American history, so tha tnow it almost sounds quaint, like a nostalgic throwbac kto a time long ago, back to a period of innocenc ebefore Vietnam and the Second World War andAuschwitz . It seems difficult now to envision a worldin which the American proposition would once agai nbe something of promise in a world-historical context ;yet I think that that is the kind of world which we ma ynow be entering . A time is coming in which we wil lhave to make some decisions, not simply at a prag-matic or economic level, but much more solemn an ddaring decisions about what we think history is about .

Politics, I would argue, is always a function ofculture, and at the heart of culture is religion . Ourculture consists of those symbols, those ideas, thosestories which inform the way we try to shape our live stogether . It is those values we hold up, those some -times intuitive, sometimes articulate notions of what i shonorable and what is base . It is our notions of excel-lence . And at the heart of all such cultural assump-tions, are ultimately beliefs about what is true .Whether we call them religious or not, whether the yhave a denominational brand name pegged to them ,they are religious in character—in that they engage ou rintuitions about the absolute, about that which trans-cends all possible discussions of simple utility o rpragmatism . When we ask what it is that really thi sworld of ours is all about, and whether indeed there isfinally any kind of meaning, we are dealing withreligion .

Today, the role of religion in public has change dvery dramatically, because of the recent outburst o fwhat is called the religious New Right, the MoralMajority, Christian action groups of all sorts . And inmany people's minds—especially people who hav ebeen brought up to believe that the separation of churc hand state means the separation of public business fro mreligiously-based values—this movement is viewed a sa kind of invasion of the barbarians, of the people wh owere once presumably locked into their cages way backin the 1920s during the famous "Monkey Trial," wit hH. L. Mencken's acid caricaturing of these funda-mentalist Neanderthals .

So now the question many people in "respectable "circles are asking is, how do we get these animals backin their cages, these people who are disrupting the wayin which we have decided to conduct our business i npublic? Well, my premise is that they are not animals ,they are citizens of this Republic ; and for those of u swho are Christians, they are recognized as sisters andbrothers in Christ . They are new and vital participant sin the always raucous process of democratic govern-ment . In fact, it may even be that Jerry Falwell and th eMoral Majority have kicked a sort of tripwire—ratherclumsily, perhaps inadvertently, sometimes perhapseven with an element of malice—a tripwire alerting u sto a much more massive change. That massive chang eis, if I may put this rather ambitious proposition to you ,the collapse of the 200-year hegemony of the secula rEnlightenment .

The Naked Public Squar eThe cultural and, therefore, political elites of our

society have for the last 200 years assumed that th edogmas of a secular Enlightenment ought to prevail a sthe formative influence in how we shape our publicdiscourse . Those dogmas were distinctly hostile toparticularist religious belief . It was assumed, comingout of the more militant secularism of the lateeighteenth century in France, that enlightenmen t(which is to say, education) is incompatible with relig-ious belief, and hence that as people become moreenlightened they will become less religious . Religionwill wither away, or will at least be confined to th eprivate sphere of life . This is the basic model whic hnot only militant secularists, but also a good manyreligionists, have bought into . Our century is plaguedby this notion that somehow what one does religiousl yis a private negotiation between oneself and God ,hermetically sealed off from public discourse abou tquestions of right and wrong in the agora, in the publi csquare .

Thus we have ended up, as a consequence of th esecular Enlightenment, with the idea of the nake dpublic square—that is, the public space, in terms of th egovernmental process, legislative, executive, judicial ,but also in terms of a mere physical and psychologica l

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space that we call public—the idea that all of this spac eought to be sterilized of any specific religious influ-ence . At one relatively trivial level, but nonetheles simportant if one thinks about it, the issue of the nake dpublic square arises every year around Christmas time .As sure as the date itself, there are lawsuits wit hgroups like ACLU and Americans United for Separa-tion of Church and State joining in to make sure tha tthat Christmas tree isn't put in the town square, or tha tChristmas carols are not sung in the public school . Thi sis merely symbolic of a much more profound assump-tion : that somehow it is possible to take care of all th epublic business without any reference to the relig-iously-based values of the American people .

Now the idea of hermetically sealing religion of ffrom the political process is not without its understand -able historical roots . Coming out of the seventeenth -century wars of religion, in which the post-Refor-mation conflicts between various religious partisangroups almost destroyed the civil fabric of Europe, it i sunderstandable that it was assumed that religion inpublic is, by definition, divisive and destructive an dthat it therefore must be kept out of the public squar eor we will end up in perpetual civil war . Yet it is ob-vious today that the notion of a secularized, religiousl ysterilized public space is no longer believable .

Not only in the area of religion and politics, but in s omany other areas, the hegemony of the secular En-lightenment no longer seems very plausible . In our lawschools today, for example, there is a refreshingupsurge in ethical questions—not simply in terms ofhow you stay out of trouble with the law, but in a mor eprofound sense of what are the issues of right an dwrong which make law legitimate and illegitimate ;what finally are the values that give force to law ,beyond simply the mechanistic notion of precedent orthe relativistic notion of that which serves the severalinterests in conflict .

The collapse of the secular hegemony is equally evi-dent in the sciences . Especially in physics, but also inbiology and a whole host of fields, people are realizin gthat science is not the solving of problems so much a sit is an encounter with mysteries which are to b erevered. We are hearing that somehow there is an abso-lute mystery at the center of it all, which when seriousscientists talk about it sounds more and more lik etheology .

In a whole host of endeavors, then, the cutting edg eis moving toward an understanding of a religiou scharacter in the nature of the reality of which we arepart . Certainly this is true in the realm of public polic yand in the political process . We need, in the phrase o fsociologist Peter Berger, an understanding that we live"under a sacred canopy." At one time secularis mitself, with all of its very noble and frequently compel -ling visions of human progress, provided a sort o fsacred canopy for many of the intellectual and cultural

leaders of the Western world . Today it doesn't, as werealize that we can only become more mature person snot by outgrowing mystery but by entering ever deepe rinto the mystery .

Fifteen years ago, sociologists of religion and ofculture would almost all assert that as society becamemore modern, it would inevitably become more secu-lar. Today many of those same sociologists, scholarslike Peter Berger, Clifford Gertz, Daniel Bell and othe rneo-conservatives, have done a 180-degree turn and ar esuggesting that as we move further into modernity therole of religion will become not less but moreimportant . As we move deeper into what Max Webe rcalled "the iron cage" of a specialized and rationalize dsociety, the irrepressible question about the meaning o fit all, the religious question, will come increasingly tothe fore .

There are other reasons as well why the new asser-tiveness of religion in public portends a different kin dof future for American politics and social change . Onemajor reason is, quite simply, that the United States i sa democracy, which means that if governance is no talways of, by, and for the people, it is at least not i ncontempt toward the people . And the fact is that inAmerican life, the overwhelming majority of thepeople understand their values to be inseparably con-nected with their religious belief . Observers from othe rsocieties have often seen it more clearly than hav eAmerican social critics, but the sociological evidence i sthere even if one has very little power of perception :for better or for worse, Americans are incorrigibl yreligious. You can list for yourself all the ways i nwhich our understandings of what is right and wrong ,of good and bad, of that which gives reason for hope ,are tied to particularist religious beliefs—primarily, o fcourse, Christianity and Judaism .

This is why it is not possible for public policy to g oon acting indifferently toward the religiously-base dvalues of the people in whose name the democracy pre-sumably has moral legitimacy . Take for example themost heated issue in American life today, one tha tunavoidably joins religiously-based values and publi cpolicy: the issue of abortion . In the Roe vs . Wade deci-sion of 1973, Justice Blackmun, writing for the major-ity, acknowledged correctly the solemnity and the cent-rality of the issue joined : who belongs to the humancommunity for which we accept common responsibil-ity? Or in Biblical language, who is my neighbor?

The reason why Roe vs . Wade has been repudiate dby the American people, and why it will eventually b eturned around, is that for the first time in Americanjurisprudence, it was explicitly stated that it is possibleto address these issues of ultimate importance withoutany reference to the Judeo-Christian tradition that ha salways been the primary source of public values inAmerica. The strength of the religious New Right ,which I find a very troubling phenomenon in many

ways, is positive to the extent it has alerted us that th edirection pointed by Roe vs . Wade is no longer possi-ble, not unless we as a society are willing to enterdeeper and deeper into what sociological jargon calls alegitimation crisis—a situation in which governance i sdivorced from morality, in which law is asserted as la wsimply because it is the law .

Toward a Theonomous SocietyThe great task of our time, then, is to develop a new

kind of public ethic that is able to engage the ultimat equestions, that is able to be responsive in a democrati cway to the juices of belief among the poeple . The onlyalternative is a legitimation crisis in which, in HannahArendt's phrase, we no longer have governance tha trepresents authority, but governance that represent sonly power and that can only be continued by the us eof increasing doses of coercion . That is where we areheaded unless we can begin to talk again about ultimatevalues in public .

I am not referring to the kind of formulas which th ereligious New Right often seems to suggest, where yo ugo straight from a Bible passage to the enactment of apiece of legislation . That would imply going back to apre-Enlightenment situation or even to a pre-Refor-mation situation, back to some kind of unified Chris-tendom, which is just not possible today . This task ofconstructing a new public ethic, informed by the livin gbeliefs of the American people, will have to be a post-Enlightenment adventure . It will be a quite new chap-ter, an experience that will have internalized all of th eEnlightenment's great contributions with regard to crit-ical reason, all of its criticism of authoritarianism invarious forms, so as to suggest a new way of recogniz-ing what is authoritative .

It will mean that we have moved, in Paul Tillich' sphrase, from the heteronomous society that existedprior to the modern age—a society in which one isruled by others in an authoritarian way, you do whatyou are supposed to do because I say so or the Bibl esays so or the Church says so or the King say sso—through an autonomous society—the great notio nof the secular Enlightenment, of every individual bein ghis or her own Pope, own Bible, own King, the kind o fsociety which has brought us to our present impass eculturally and politically and morally—to achieve, atlast, a theonomous society, a society that recognizestranscendent values by which it is held accountable .

As late as 1954 the phrase "under God" was putinto the Pledge of Allegiance : "one nation underGod." Some people find that phrase distressing ,because they think it suggests that America is someho wimmune from the sins and the ambiguities, the com-promises and the crimes of other nations . Well, i fthat's what Americans mean when they say "unde rGod," then it's indeed unfortunate that the phrase i sthere . But I would urge you to consider that it is a great

thing that it is there if we understand "under God" t omean under judgment . To be under God in this sense i sto acknowledge that there is an absolute to which w eare historically held accountable . Moral leadership i nAmerica, from the Mayflower Compact way back i nthe beginning of the seventeenth century right down t oDr. King's August 28, 1963, "I Have A Dream"speech at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, ha salways conveyed that sense of historical destiny . It i sthat sense of historical destiny, of calling, of vocation ,of accountability, of purpose, of intent, of testing, ofexperiment, which I think is required if we are toreconstruct a public ethic .

Historically in the United States it was the Puritantradition that gave most vigorous expression to tha tsense of destiny . If you look at American religiontoday, there are a number of churches that are the heirsof the Puritan tradition, the churches that ordinarily ar ecalled mainline Protestantism . The United MethodistChurch, the United Presbyterian Church, the ProtestantEpiscopal Church in America, the United Church o fChrist—these are the churches that accepted, up unti lthe middle of this century, the culture-forming tas kwhich Puritanism saw as its vocation for America . Buttoday the Protestant mainline has, I believe, largel yabdicated its culture-forming task, thereby raising theissue of which new religiously-based communities o fmoral leadership will provide the kind of moral visionthat is required for the reconstruction of a public ethic .

There are many other candidates; the brand-nameProtestant churches in America are not in fact, numeri-cally speaking, the mainline at all . The largest singleChristian community in the United States, of course, i sRoman Catholic, of whom there are roughly 50million; they are not part of the so-called mainline .Another 20 million Americans claim they are Lutheran ,and the majority of these are in no way part of th emainline either . There are approximately 30 million ,some would say as many as 50 million, under the broa dbanner of Evangelicalism and they are not mainline .And obviously the Jews and the Eastern Orthodox arenot mainline Protestant . The so-called mainline major-ity is, in fact, the minority .

Is America a Force for Good?Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian social theorist at the

beginning of this century, had a little theory which h ecalled the circulation of elites . He said that in anysociety you have a certain number of functions thatneed to be taken care of: military, economic, cultural ,religious, artistic, and so forth . Each of these func-tions, Pareto said, gathers around itself an elite—people who by an old-boy network, by family connec-tion, from one generation to another, lead the defini-tion of the task relative to that function . But eventu-ally, he says, an elite will weary of its function, or los eits confidence, or lose touch, so that it drops away an d

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a new elite then circulates to that function and begin sto take over .

Today in the United States the religiously-basedmoral leadership of the country is witnessing a ver yvigorous contest in the circulation of elites . Themoment obviously calls for a new community of lead-ership, a community that can give religiously-base dmoral definition to the American experiment and thu slay the groundwork for the reconstruction of a publi cethic. To a lot of people it is very frightening to hearsomeone talk this way . They say, you're talking abou tChristian America, aren't you? Yes—yes, I am . Theextraordinary thing is that today it is though tun-American to talk about Christian America .

Up until 1931 the U .S. Supreme Court itself coul dsay, without any fear of contradiction, that of coursethis is a Christian society, and it could tick off thepoints of reference which make that characterizatio nmeaningful . But it is all different now . Really the ideathat the belief systems of a people, especially in ademocracy, ought not to inform and shape the way inwhich we construct our life together is a very novelidea indeed—and, I think, a very bankrupt one . We arenot talking about imposing a belief system, but rathe rabout resisting the imposition of alien belief systemsthat impose themselves under the guise of being value -neutral and value-free, when in fact they are laden wit hall kinds of values which are alien to the beliefs, thedreams, the convictions of the American people .

Throughout American history, certainly as recentl yas the late nineteenth century and the early part of thi scentury, the great religious leaders of the Social Gospe lmovement, like Washington Gladden, Rauschenbush ,and the rest, had no doubt but what their goal was t oAmericanize Christianity and to Christianize America .They had no doubt about this being an experiment no tonly in politics and in economics, but also in culture—the carrying forth of a heritage which was the merge rof Greek classicism and Judeo-Christian faith . Whereastoday, mainline Protestant religion has largely suc-cumbed to the illusions of the secular society . It is nolonger thought to be possible nor even desirable toexert a distinctively Christian influence within thepublic square . Thus in the World Council of Churches ,for example, a slogan that has dominated for the last 1 5years has been, "The world sets the agenda for th eChurch ." You look around to see what, by seculardefinition, is happening in the world and then assumethat it is the business of the church to advance that, t oget on that bandwagon .

able public subject, but without any believable connec-tion to the distinctive truth-claims of the Christianfaith . It is a vast disillusionment with the Americanexperiment that has led to this loss of nerve, this abjec taccommodationism, this retreat from being distinctive-ly Christian, even distinctively religious, in public .

I have taken a little survey, unscientific but nonethe-less I think reliable . I have asked people in the worl dof 475 Riverside Drive, the National Council o fChurches and so forth, that if you put a certain proposi-tion to the middle- and upper-level leadership ofmainline Protestantism in America, what would thei rresponse be? The proposition is this : That on balanc eand considering the alternatives, American power is aforce for good in the world . On balance and consider-ing the alternatives, American power is a force fo rgood in the world . A rather carefully nuanced proposi-tion, I would say . The response I have found has beenalmost unanimous, that if one put that question to th emiddle- and upper-level leadership of mainline Pro-testantism in America today, probably less than 15% ,at the most 20%, would say yes, that is true . Probably50% or more would flatly say no, that the contrary i strue . And the rest would so equivocate in their answerthat in effect they too would be saying no .

To Dream Anew

Now what does this tell us? It doesn't tell us thatthey are necessarily wrong ; I think they're wrong and Isuspect most of you think they're wrong, for I believ ethat America is, on balance and considering the al-ternatives, a force for good in the world . But it doe stell us that whether they're right or wrong, they clearl yare not in a position any more to provide cultural defi-nition for the American experiment . Dr. Martin Luthe rKing, with whom I worked for several years back i nthe '60s as a liaison between his SCLC and variou sparts of the anti-war movement, was fond of sayin gthat whom you would change, you must first love . In asense it's very simple ; any good parent or teacher orpastor knows that . People are not going to take thei rsense of direction from their declared enemies . It is no tat all obvious that the National Council of Churche sloves America . Indeed, it is rather manifest that thei rposture is basically one of hostility, a posture tha tclearly excludes them as a candidate for providin gcultural leadership .

There are other groups in America who obviousl yare prepared to do it . For one, the whole religious Ne wRight. I do not think that they are going to win inPareto's game . I hope that they are not, or that if theforces they represent do come to dominate the publi cdiscussion of religiously-based values, certain of theircharacteristics will have moderated by that time .

That kind of loss of nerve is at the heart of the col -lapse of the influence of mainline Protestantism . Theseare the churches that are in the doldrums, the churche sthat are not growing, the churches that are in institu -tional trouble, out of touch with their own constit- There are other contenders, the Roman Catholi cuencies, running all kinds of "church and society" Church perhaps first of all . Certainly in many ways thi sprograms, issuing pronouncements on every conceiv- ought to be the Catholic moment in America, th e

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moment in which Catholics with their rich intellectua ltradition, with a heritage of conceptualization about th erelationship between the city of man and the city o fGod, are in a position finally to play a culture-formingrole that in the past, because of anti-Catholicism on th epart of Protestants and because of their own immigrant -based insecurities, they have not been able to play . I donot know whether indeed the Catholic Church will ris eto that challenge . It seems to me that the leadershipsectors within the Roman Catholic Church are toda yAmericanizing themselves in a pattern that is in man yways imitative of the mainline Protestantism that i salready struck out . But theoretically, it could be th eCatholic moment, for Catholics up to now have been a tbat, so to speak, in shaping American culture .

Lutherans have not been at bat . Their experienceagain is very similar to the Catholic immigrant experi-ence, but without the conceptual riches and without th etheological equipment, quite frankly, for dealing withthe issues posed by a democratic society . On anotherfront, I would say that the great issues posed byCalvinism, by John Calvin's grandly flawed experi-ment in Geneva, also hold a great deal of promise i nthe so-called evangelical churches . I am very impressedthat today, if one moves around the United States ask-ing where are the people and where are the communi-ties that are really posing first-principle questionsabout the meaning of modern society, the relationshipof God and the Republic, the nature of social legitima-tion in the modern world, a surprising number o fpeople who are probing these issues with intelligence

and imagination call themselves Calvinists .The Jewish community in America also plays a vita l

role in the possible reconstruction of a public ethic . Ithink it was generally agreed in the leadership circle sof American Jewry, somewhere back in the 1930s, thatthe more secular the society, the safer it would be fo rJews and other minorities . Today within the Jewishcommunity, led by organs such as The Public Interes tand Commentary, by figures such as Daniel Bell an dIrving Kristol, that basic decision is being re-thought .The question is being raised whether the naked publi csquare isn't a very dangerous place after all . For whenthe public square is really naked, when there are n otranscendent sanctions of either a positive or a negativ enature, then what finally are your protections agains tevil, including the evil of anti-Semitism ?

This discussion of moral leadership has ranged farafield, all of it in search of rediscovering what Joh nCourtney Murray, a great Roman Catholic theologianand political philosopher, called the American pro-position—the audacity, the freshness, the almost unbe-lievable chutzpah, that is the United States of America .Revivifying what is unique about this kind of polity ,this kind of democratic aspiration, revitalizing it an ddreaming it anew, it seems to me is the great an dinvigorating challenge of our generation and of th egenerations to come. For I do believe that it is not wit hembarrassment, but with a profound sense of account-ability to the transcendent judgment of God, that w ecan say it remains true today that this America, this pro-position, this experiment, is the last best hope of earth .

Harrington

Hillsdale's `Counterpoint' TV Series Starts August 4Debate - Documentary Show to Run on WTBS Cabl e

Free-market economist Walter Williams wil ldebate socialist author Michael Harrington on thequestion of economic opportunity in America ,Wednesday evening, August 4, 1982, at 9 :05 pmEDT over WTBS cable television nationwide .George Roche, President of Hillsdale College ,will moderate the debate .

The program, entitled "Counterpoint," is thefirst in a regular series produced by Hillsdale' snew outreach division, the Shavano Institute forNational Leadership . During the hour, Williamsand Harrington will each present a short docu-mentary film specially produced to argue his sideof the issue; then they will face off in a livedebate before Turner Broadcasting's potentia laudience of over 18 million homes coast to coast .It's an evening Imprimis readers won't want tomiss .

Williams

The opinions expressed in Imprimis may be, but are not necessarily, the views of the Center for Constructive Alternatives, the Shavano Insti-tute, or Hillsdale College . Copyright © 1982 by Hillsdale College . Permission to reprint in whole or in part is hereby granted, provided custom-ary credit is given . ISSN 0277-8432 . Editor, John K . Andrews, Jr ., Assistant, Patricia A . DuBois .

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