right-sizing: the right move t in the airline business h c w. hamlin hamlin transportation...

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George W. Hamlin Hamlin Transportation Consulting Fairfax, Virginia [email protected] Right-Sizing: The Right Move in the Airline Business December 11, 2012 Northwestern University Icarus Society H T C H T C T C 1

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George W. Hamlin

Hamlin Transportation Consulting

Fairfax, Virginia

[email protected]

Right-Sizing: The Right Move

in the Airline Business

December 11, 2012

Northwestern University

Icarus Society

HTCHTCTC 1

Fundamental Airline Economics

Which is more important?

• Unit Costs

• Yields

2

Two Ways to Make Money

COMMODITY:

Sell a large quantity at a low margin

DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT:

Sell a small quantity at a high margin

3

0

5

10

15

20

25

RASM CASM RASM CASM

MARGIN

Two Ways to Make Money:

Unit Profitability

COMMODITY

DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT

MARGIN

¢/ASM

4

In the Airline Business

The Love of Capacity

Is the Root of All Evil

5

U.S. Airline Net Profits 1947-2010

Source: ATA Data

$(30,000)

$(25,000)

$(20,000)

$(15,000)

$(10,000)

$(5,000)

$-

$5,000

$10,000

$15,000

$20,000

$25,000 1

94

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U.S. Airline Profitability ($M)

Net Income

6

U.S. Airline Net Profit: Regulated Era

Source: ATA Data

$(400)

$(200)

$-

$200

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$1,200

$1,400 19

47

1948

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1978

U.S. Airline Profitability ($M)

Net Income

7

What Caused the 1970 Losses?

8 Photo © George Hamlin

One Thing that Caused the 1970 Losses

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1969197119731975197719791981198319851987198919911993199519971999200120032005200720092011

747 Deliveries

9 Source: The Airline Monitor, May 2012

An Extraordinary Chunk of Capacity

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

747 Deliveries as a Percent of Total

10 Source: The Airline Monitor, May 2012

U.S. Airline Net Profit: Post-Deregulation

Source: ATA Data

-$30,000

-$25,000

-$20,000

-$15,000

-$10,000

-$5,000

$0

$5,000

$10,000

$15,000

$20,000

$25,0001

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U.S. Airline Profitability ($M)

Net Income

11

1980s Right-Sizing: Problem

12 Photo © George Hamlin

1980s Right-Sizing: Solution

13 Photo © George Hamlin

Long-Haul, 1980s-Style

Transatlantic Transpacific

14 Photos © George Hamlin

Long-Haul, 1990s-Style

15 Photos © George Hamlin

The 1990s: Heyday of the RJ

16 Photos © George Hamlin

Long-Haul, 2000s-Style

17 Photos © George Hamlin

The Intercontinental A319

18 Photo © George Hamlin

And the First of Two Game-Changing

Aircraft is Now in Service

19 Photos © George Hamlin

Once, Pricing was Fairly Uniform,

and was Available in Print

20

In 1971, Fares were More Uniform

Market Class Fare Notes

NYC-LAX F 205.00$

Y 163.00$

YN 130.00$ One-stop

EX 142.00$ Except Fri/Sun; Saturday night

stay; 30 day max

Market Class Fare Notes

NYC-LON F 782.00$

Y 452.00$

YH 552.00$

T 412.00$ One-stop; turboprop

TH 502.00$ One-stop; turboprop

EX4 141.00$ 17-28 day; low season

EX5 191.00$ 17-28 day; high season

EX12 134.00$ 29-45 day; low season

EX13 164.00$ 29-45 day; high season

Source: July 1971 OAGs

21

Preparing for the pricing challenge of

deregulation

22

9% of United’s passengers

produce 41% of the revenue.

Source: Gerald Greenwald, Former United CEO, in a speech at The Washington, D.C. Aero Club May 27, 1999

23

Effective Yield Management Can

Enhance Profitability

3 3

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0

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CR7 B737

Pas

sen

gers

pe

r D

ay

Sample Short-Haul Market: CR7 vs. B737 by Onboard Passenger Yield Band

> 50¢ 40¢ - 50¢ 30¢ - 40¢ 20¢ - 30¢ < 20¢

22.4¢ avg.

29.4¢ avg.

24 Source: Airline data

Higher-Yield Passengers are More

Valuable than Lower-Yield Traffic

Yield Band 737-800 CRJ 700

% of Passengers % of Revenue % of Passengers % of Revenue

< 20¢ 51.6% 28.5% 34.1% 14.4%

20¢ - 30¢ 26.5% 28.9% 26.4% 22.7%

30¢ - 40¢ 12.7% 19.5% 19.7% 22.8%

40¢ - 50¢ 6.3% 12.7% 13.9% 21.2%

> 50¢ 3.0% 10.4% 6.0% 18.9%

Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Avg Yield 0.224$ 0.294$

25

Sometimes Less (Passengers) is

More (Higher Yield)

Type Passengers Yield

737-800 95 0.224$

CRJ 700 43 0.294$

26

Direct Operating Cost by Type

$-

$0.0200

$0.0400

$0.0600

$0.0800

$0.1000

$0.1200

$0.1400

$0.1600

$0.1800

$0.2000

737-800 CRJ 700 CRJ 1/200

Direct Cost per ASM: 350 Miles(Stage Length Adjusted)

Cost per ASM

27 Source: The Airline Monitor, August 2012

DOC Indexed to the 737

100%

113%

140%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%

160%

737-800 CRJ 700 CRJ 1/200

Direct Cost per ASM: 350 Miles Indexed to 737(Stage Length Adjusted)

Cost per ASM

28 Source: The Airline Monitor, August 2012

CRJ 700, Margin Improvement

CRJ 1/200, FAIL

100%

113%

140%

100%

131% 131%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%

160%

737-800 CRJ 700 CRJ 1/200

Revnue & Cost per ASM: 350 Miles Indexed to 737

(Cost Stage Length Adjusted)

Cost per ASM Revenue per ASM

29

All travelers are not

equal, from a

revenue perspective;

some should get left

behind

30

Airline Economics 101

Frequency

Share of High-Yield Traffic

Greater Profitability

Higher Return on Investment

31

Not Being Able to Right-Size Can

Limit Market Opportunities

Carrier 70/90 125 150 175

AA LIMITED NO YES YES

DL YES YES YES YES

UA YES YES YES YES

US YES YES YES YES

Size Category (Seats)

32

At the Other End of the Size

Spectrum

33

Body Count vs. Revenue

Class

Seats

Load

Factor

Pax

Yield

Rev/

ASM

Rev/

Mile

Prem

125 70% 88 $0.40 $0.28 $35.00

Econ 430 70% 301 $0.10 $0.07 $30.10

Total 555 70% 389 $0.168 $0.117 $65.10

34

Body Count vs. Revenue

Class

Seats

Load

Factor

Pax

Yield

Rev/

ASM

Rev/

Mile

Prem

0 0% 0 $0.40 $0.00 $ 0.00

Econ 800 70% 560 $0.10 $0.07 $56.00

Total 800 70% 560 $0.10 $0.07 $56.00

35

Body Count vs. Revenue

Class

Seats

Load

Factor

Pax

Yield

Rev/

ASM

Rev/

Mile

Econ

400 70% 280 $0.10 $0.07 $28.00

Econ 400 70% 280 $0.05 $0.035 $14.00

Total 800 70% 560 $0.075 $0.053 $42.00

36

If it Were a Beer, it Might be Hard to

Sell… (Even a Kellogg Grad Might

Have a Difficult Time with This One)

37

More Filling…Less Taste

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.1

0.12

0.14

F/C/Y Y-Current Y-Realistic

RA

SM

(cen

ts)

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Reven

ue p

er

Mil

e (

$)

RASM Rev per Mile

38

Very Large is Currently a Small Niche

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

747, A380 Deliveries as a Percent of Total747 747 & A380

39 Source: The Airline Monitor, May 2012

He who dies with the

most market share…

40

He who dies with the

most market share…

Dies

41

British Airways “New Strategic Model”

• More capital-efficient aircraft

• Improved mix of traffic

• Short-haul network structured to

maximize returns rather than feed

• Profitability, not size

Source: British Airways Presentation at Merrill Lynch Conference, June 8, 1999

42

Wonder which one has the higher

average yield…

Lufthansa’s 747-8 Intercontinentals

have about the same number of

premium seats as on the airline’s

A380 fleet: eight first class and 80

business, compared to eight and 98

on the Airbus double-decker.

However, in LH service the A380 has

considerably more economy seats:

420 versus 298 on the 747-8.

Source: Airways, August 2012, page 19 43

More Recently

Turkish Airlines said it’s close to

ordering 100 planes to provide short-

haul links from Istanbul while scrapping

plans to buy the biggest jumbo jets in

favor of more modestly sized wide-body

planes.

Source: Bloomberg November 28, 2012 “Turkish Air Seeks 100 Narrow-Body Jets After Ditching Jumbos

44

A Key Consideration

“Our biggest problem is the capacity and

the frequency,” the [Turkish] CEO said.

“We want to go to higher frequencies.

The 777 is big enough.” Possible plans

include switching daily services to cities

including Chicago and Hong Kong to

double-daily, he said.

Source: Bloomberg November 28, 2012 “Turkish Air Seeks 100 Narrow-Body Jets After Ditching Jumbos

45

Fundamental Airline Economics

Which is more important?

• Unit Costs

• Yields

46

Fundamental Airline Economics

The Answer:

• Neither

• What is most important:

Maximizing the difference

between total revenues

and total costs.

47

Critical Mass Size

Is Necessarily Better?

48

Big is not necessarily better

49 Photo © George Hamlin

Extremism in the Defense of Market

Share is No Virtue…

50

Summary & Conclusions

• Appropriate frequency enhances

profits

• Utilize the right aircraft size for the

market

– Too large can reduce yields

– Too small can increase unit costs

– Right-sizing benefits are largely

independent of competitive response

• Don’t follow the herd; optimize carrier

profitability, not market share

51

George W. Hamlin

Hamlin Transportation Consulting

Fairfax, Virginia

[email protected]

Right-Sizing: The Right Move

in the Airline Business

December 11, 2012

Northwestern University

Icarus Society

HTCHTCTC 52

Go Cats!

Beat

Mississippi

State 53

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