IN THE SIJP E E C IJ RT OF OHIO

PERSONAL ID IFI

Relator

In propria personaJerry L. Harper307 East Main StreetS. Amherst, Ohio 44001

Respondents

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judge James M. BurgeLorain County Court of Common Pleas225 Court StreetElyria, Ohio 44035

Attorney Matthew GladwellRiesenfeld & Aassociates3962 Red Bank RoadCincinnati, Ohio 45227

For: Bank of America, BAC Home Loan Servicing;FKA Country Wide Home Loan Servicing

MAY ^6 nq

Case Nun►ber:1®CV16721Lorain County Court of Common Pleas

UtO Oi COiJRTSUPREfViL CUUR -1 OF OHIO

13 - 0705

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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OHIO

COLUMBUS, OHIO

Case No. 10CV167218

Lorain County Caurt of -Common Pleas IJudge James M. Burge

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

To the Honorable Judges of the Ohio Supreme Court

April 9, 2013

Supreme Court of Ohio65 Front Street, 8th FloorColumbus, Ohio 43215-3431

To Whom It May Concern:

This letter serves as an explanation-to flie-attached Writ of Mandamus that I am requestingthe Ohio Supreme Court to consider. At issue is that Judge James M Burge has exhibiteddirect bias as well as his Magistrate James M Blaszak, which is a matter of court transcriptrecord. The Code of Judicial Condu.ct.s-e.ems. clear to me in this matter concerning bias.Judge Burge has failed to implement the Mandatory Judicial Notice filed October 5, 2012. Itappears that the Judge is ignoring his duty and obligation, which is the basis for the

enclosed filing.

I believe that Judge James M. Burge has also violated my rights under the United StatesConstitution as well as that of the Ohio Constitution. I believe that because of his bias he hasdenied me due process of law and ignored every single substantive, lawful challenge that Ihave made via motion filings and has not responded to Affidavits submitted before thiscourt, The Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. These are respectfully submitted with thehope The Code of Judicial Conduct will be upheld in this case before Judge James M. Burge.

Your consideration of this request is sincerely appreciated. Thank You.

Res

erry . Harp307 East Main StreetSouth Amherst, Ohio 44001

440-610-2305

TABLE CONTENTS

E I L TT

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

EX I BI'T

1. Mandatory Judicial Notice Of Void Judgment for Violations Under

28U.S. C. 455 I Civ.R. 60(B) And Memorandum of Other Points and

Authorities. w^

2. Oaths of Office of Judge James Burge and Magistrate James

Blaszak

3. Court Transcript of March 14, 2012 Hearing where Magistrate James

Blaszak stated on the record his bias toward Harper, page 4, lines 12-

25 and page 5, lines 1-20.

4. Affidavit from Harper of Magistrate James Blaszak's previous

involvement as an attorney with Harper.

5. Supreme Court Letter noticing Judge James Burge and BOA counsel

Matthew Gladwell of filing.

6. Judge James Burge's undated Denial of Harper's Motion to Quash

and Striking the Writ of Mandamus from the record in this case Lorain

County Court of Common Pleas.

7. Affidavit of Opposition To Denial For Misstatements of Facts By The

Court on its Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Quash Invoking

Reversible Error.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OHIO

COLUMBUS , OHIO

Case No. I OCV1 ^^18

Lorain County Court of Common Pleas

Judge James M. Burge

TIT1 IT OF MANDAMUS

To the Honorable Judges of the Ohio Supreme Court:

Jerry Harper, in propria peronsam/su juirs Petitioner(s), state as follows:

Petitioner Jerry L. Harper seeks a Decision or Statement of the Case as set forth

herein below. Further, this action seeks the opportunity to file a Petition for an award of

attorney's fees, costs and expenses under 9 2412 of Title 28, United States Code, the Equal

Access.to justice Act, in that there is no regulatory justification for Judge Jarnes M. Burge in

not issuing a Statement of the Case under Petitioner Harper's MANDATORY JUDICIAL

NOTICE OF VOID JUDGMENT FOR VIOLATIONS UNDER 28 U.S.C. 455 / CivR. 60 (B) AND

MEMORANDUM OF OTHER POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.

In support of this verified petition, Petitioner alleges the following:

THE PARTIES

1. Petitioner, Jerry Harper in propria personam/sui juris (hereafter Harper dwells

in the state of Ohio2. judge James M. Burge, is an officer of the court as judge in the Lorain County

Court of Common Pleas presiding in an action between Harper and Bank of America and, is

named herein solely in his official capacity.

JURISDICTION

4. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action under the

All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 9 1651(a), and under the Ohio Judicial Code of Conduct.

5. This Court has jurisdiction on Harper's Petition for Writ of Mandamus to

require judge james M. Burge to adhere to the provisions of Ohio Judicial Code of Conduct

rF'

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APR 1 7 '2013 1

20 U.S.C. 455 / Civl2. 60 (B) to issue "void ab initio" all decisions made in the action against

Petitioner flarper due to clear and convincing "bias on the record" by officers of the court, as

more fully set forth in court transcripts and affidavits. See Exhibits attached to the

MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE OF VOID JUDGMENT FDRVICLA`TIDNS UNDER 28 U.S.C.

455 / Civ.R. 60 (B) AND MEMO RANDUM OF OTHER POINTS AND AUTHORITIES. Case No.

10CV16721$, .This Court also has jurisdiction to order attorney fees, costs and expenses to

Petitioner Harper under (28 U.S.C. 9 2412), as do all courts established under Article I of the

United States Constitution. See Essex Electro Engineers, Inc. v. U.So, 757 F. 2d 247, 251

(Fed.Cir. 1985) and U.S. Navy®Marine Corps Ct. of Mil. Rev. v. Cheney, 29 M.J. 98 (CMA 1909).

FACTS

1. On April 19, 2010, Reisenfeld & Associates filed a complaint in Foreclosure on

behalf of Bank of America and Countrywide Home Loans Servicing against Petitioner Jerry

L. Harper on his "land" under Acct No. #22661645, located at 307 East Main Street, South

Amherst, Ohio, 44001.2. On April 19, 2010, Plaintiff Rank of America by affidavit alleged it is the holder of

the note and the mortgage in due course through an "assignment" from then Bankrupt

Taylor Bean & itaker. Although the alleged "affidavit" was attached to Plaintiff's

compliant of April 19, 2010, but the date on the alleged "affidavit of assignment" was

allegedly notarized on May 7 2010, a full three weeks "after" the filing of the complaint by

BoA.3. From February 10, 2011 through August 22, 2011, the court gave BoA "eight

extensians " of time to file a"dispositive motion" in pursuit of a Summary Judgment against

Petitioner Harper without allowing any hearings or oral arguments regarding genuine

"issues of material fact" left unresolved. See (Deutsche Bank v. McKiernan, Case No.

09-1-000910, Hawaii First Circuit, 21st Division) in that the Hawaii Circuit Court rules: "(a)

a homeowner's challenge to a foreclosure based on "defective assignments", and (b) that

these defects give rise to genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment.

Also See: Naranjo v. SBMC Mortgtage et al., No.11-cv-2229-L(UVVG), U.S. District Court for

the Southern District of California4. On September 30, 2011 Magistrate James M. Blaszak grants Bank of America

a Summary Judgment without a hearing as required prior to making such a ruling, ... fill in

case None of the documents submitted by Bank of America's Summary Judgment motion

were authenticated, so as to be admissible as bona fide evidence, and therefore did not meet

the "lawful" standards in support of plaintiff's motion. All the documents submitted by

plaintiff were "inadxnissible hearsay" and not admissible evidence. Yet the Judge ruled

without the benefit of Harper's opposition of the genuinely raised facts or any hearing. The

procedural practice under which the record is produced must be "shown by the testimony of

the custodian ^r other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with a rule

promulgated by the supreme court or a statute permitting certJfication." Here, the

documents were not supported by the testimony of the lawful custodian.

Plaintiff Bank ofAuzerica's failure to produce the contract on which its claim is based

is fatal to its alleged claims. Plaintiff did not attach a copy of any contract to its cornplaint.

Plaintiff Bank ofAmerica's failure to produce the contract on which its claim is based, as

required "warranted dismissal of the contract claim with prejudice:" English Gardens

Condominium, LLC v Howell Twp, 273 Mich App 69, 81; 729 NW2d 242, 250 (2006). "In

presenting a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the initial burden of

supporting its position by affidavits, depositions, admissions or other documentary

evidence:" Smith v Globe Life Insurance Co. 460 Mich 446; 455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). Only

after the movin^ party has carried its burden does the burden shift to the opposing party to

show that a genuine issue of disputed fqct exists. Id. "The moving party must specifically.

identify the matters that it believes have no disputed factual issuesa' St. Clair Medical, P C v

8orgiel; 270 Mich App 260, 264; 7151®IW2d 914 (2006. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109,

124-25; 597 NW 2d 817 (1999).Affidavits must be made on personal knowledge and state with particularity facts

admissible as evidence establishing the grounds stated in the motion. If the affidavit refers

to any papers, sworn or certified copies of those papers must be attached. Plaintiff Bank of

America's affidavit signer does did not attach, or even identify the data on which her

testimony is based and, as an employee of the "assignee", rather than the "original credit

giver", lacked the requisite personal knowledge to support plaintiff's claim. Courts have

frequently held that an "employee of the assignee" of an alleged debt does "not have" the

personal lmowledge necessary to testify about events or documents pertaining to the

original credit giver. See: Martinez v Midland Credit Management, 250 SW2d 481 (Tex Ct of

Ap. 2008), Ex 2; Asset Acceptance v Lodge, 325 SW3d 525, (MO App 2010), Ex 3; CACH v

Askew, 2011 Mo App LEXIS 429 (Mo App 2011) Ex. 4.

Plaintiff Bank of America failed to show that it was the bona fide "owner" of the debt

alleged. An essential element of a Plaintiff's action is proof that it is owner of the debt

claimed. Judge James M. Burge knew or should have known that these lawful tenants are

essential and necessary for consideration of summary judgment. Yet Judge James M. Burge

ignored and was bias toward Harper in his obligation and duty to "carefully examine the

record" to determine if Bank of America met the required standards of summary judgment

applied. Instead, Judge James M. Burge set aside these requirements of standing and

without allowing Harpers a hearing, moved in the favor of Bank of America without Harpers

being allowed to raise and present legitimate arguments of "material fact" or examine

witnesses on the record as to the veracity of their statements. In this present case, Plaintiff

Bank of America clearly did not produce the agreement by which it allegedly acquired the

debt or standing, and there was no evidence presented that any amount involving the

Harper was included in whatever accounts were identified in -the alleged'Assignment".

5. On January 17, 2012, Harper filed a Motion Rule 60(b) to vacate the Summary

judgment and a Supplement to the Motion 60(b) and 12(b) Motion to Dismiss

6. On February 17, 2012. Magistrate James M Blaszak again, denied Harper a

hearing or oral arguments on the on the Motion 60(b); which clearly contained "factual

evidence"of fraud.on the court by BoA. (See Exhibit B Motion 60(b)

An abuse of discretion is "more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the

court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable:' Blakemore v Blakemore

(1983 , 5®hio St.3d 217 219. 450 N.E.2d 1140 (internal citations omitted1®

To satisfy the required elementi;of, Motion. 60(B), Harper only needed to allege a

"meritorious defense": Strinka v. Witten, 9th Dist. iVo.11CA0099B4 2012- Dhio-539,®^

14-15.. Harper raised numerous defects and defenses in his Motion including fraud upon the

court by Bank of America in its Affidavit of assignment. The trial court erred in its ruling by

denying Harper's motion for relief from summary judgment in the absence of a hearing

involving controverting evidence and deprived Harper of the opportunity to contest

questionable evidence by Bank of Arnerica's alleged in their affidavit along with other

notable factual defects noted in Harper's Motion 60[b). Harper requested a evidentiary

hearing so that Harper could contest the veracity of Bank of America's alleged affiant and

cross-examine Bank of America's employee regarding the statements made in her affidavit

executed on behalf of BofA. See Tenth District in Dugger v. Spratt, 10th Dist. No.

94APE12-1713, 1995 WL 454736 (July 2S, 1995). There, the court stated: "

Given the existence of unresolved factual issues, and given defendants' contention

that the affidavit testimony presented by defendants lacks credibility, the trial court should

not have granted the motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing to determine the

sufficiency and veracity of the factual allegations made in defendants' motion".

Although it is not automatically an abuse of discretion for a trial court to grant a

motion for relief from judgment without first holding an evidentiary hearing, where facts set

forth in a Motion 60(B) are disputed or uncertain, an evidentiary hearing is required.

7. At the March 14, 2012 hearing (the only hearing Harper was ever given by Judge

James M. Burge / Magistrate James M Blaszak) Defendant Harper's Motions 60(b) and 12(b)

was completely ignored by Magistrate Blaszak or even discussed, even after Attorney Marc

Dann, then counsel for the Harper brought up the Motion to Magistrate Blaszak. The

driving issue was the veracity of the affiant since the affidavit was not from a first hand

knowledge -vvitness and because questionable defects in the filing date and notary date were

questionable. Case law distinguishes between "false and misleading inf®rrnation being

presented on an issue to be tried and conduct which prevents a party from trying the issue:'

DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So.2d 375, 377 (Fla, 1984) The former is intrinsic fraud; the latter

is extrinsic fraud.

8. On April 24, 2012 Magistrate Blaszak granted Foreclosure and Sale Order based

on summary juagment, Harper then filed a Motion to Vacate and Dismiss Summary

Judgment on July 27, 2012. Harper's motion was based on grounds which rendered the

adjudication void ab initio, Am. jur, 2d, judgments, s.910. Such as in this case on the grounds

of fraud in the procurement of a judgment or decree, Dr. P. Phillips Co. v Bil1o109 Fla. 316

147 So, 579 (193 ®Clear and convincing "bias" by the court removed its jurisdiction on the subject

matter. Or in the alternative of a lack of jurisdiction to render it. Trotter vVan Pelt.144 Fla.

517, 198 So. 215.131 A.L.R.101$ (1940 , Additionally, Harper's objection was founded on

alleged judicial errors, made in the proceedings that were not authorized by law and failure

of correcting the adjudication, showed of want of power in the tribunal whose judicial

judgment or decree is challenged. Bemis V. Loftin.127 Fla. 515.173 So. 683 (1937 ,

The court loses jurisdiction when bias is clearly evident in the proceeding and all

judgments or rulings become and are in fact of law, void ab initio. A court has the power to

eritertain an action to relieve a party from a judgment or decree or to set aside a judgment

or decree for a fraud upon the court

judge James M. Burge knew or should have known by the Motion 60(B) that

sufficient evidence merited "close scrutiny" on the "affidavit of assignment" which defects

gave rise to questions that could only be fully discoverable through adequate legal due

processes. Presenting false evidence or false testimony in a case constitutes intrinsic fraud

State v. Glover. 564 So.2d 191.15 Fla. L. Weekly D1715 (Fla. 5th DCA 19901 Because the

court received and considered that false evidence in the original proceeding.Johnson v. Wells. 72 Fla. 290. 73 So. 188 (1916

9. On September 7, 2012, judge James M. Burge and Magistrate Blaszak denied both

Harper sMotion to Vacate summary judgment without a hearing. A court's entry order

without giving Harper opportunity to be heard violated Harper's due process rights and

protections under the 4th,5th, 6th,7th and 14th Amendementss. Sanchez v. Bi urnme 0

so.2d 886. 2 Fla. fFla 3rd DCA 19981, reh` enied =(M ar 18 ® 1998

Misconduct by court officers ineludes any conduct that prevents an opposing party

from fairly presenting his or her own claim or defenses. This conduct cannot be reconciled;

it must be dismissed as void ab initio;. Bias by the court meant Harper was denied

opportunity to be heard. The "Intrinsic fraud" indicated a "sham legal process" applying to

judicial misconduct that arose within the proceeding and periained to the issues in the case

elis, 72, 2 Q 73 So,188 ( 9 6,;that could have been tried. Jobnson x. W

Necessity of This Action

Harper is seeking" relief" through this independent action showing that (a) he could

not avail himself of his factual and material defenses, and, (b) that defenses could have been

made if given opportunity and (c) Harper was deprived of lawful due process by being

denied an opportunity to present his defense through lawful due process under the VII

Amendment. The deprivation of Harpet's opportunity to assert his right to face his

accuser's claims was not caused by Harper's own negligence, but by the willful and

deliberate bias of the court as evidenced in Harper's affidavit and the transcripts of the

court.

Defendant Harper filed on October 5, 2012 a MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE OF

VOID JUDGMENT FOR VIOLATIONS UNDER 28 U.S.C. 455 / Civ.R. 60 (B) AND

MEMORANDUM OF OTHER POINTS AND AUTHORITIES for judicial code violations and

judicial bias.

As of January 31, 2013, Judge James M. Burge has not acted on as is his duty to act in

voiding the judgment of the court and remanding Magistrate James M Blaszak before the

Tribunal for disciplinary action in keeping with the Ohio Code of Conduct.

Where the judgment or decree is void as a matter of law, the court has nodiscretion to act except to give the appropriate relief.If a party pleads fraud or misrepresentation with particularity and how it affected thejudgment, the party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on its motion for relief from thejudgment, See; St. Surin X. St. Surin. 684 So.2d 243. Z 19 6

If a sworn affidavit is included in the motion, it must contain facts by which the court

can determine the sufficiency of the grounds raised. Harper's affidavit where Magistrate

James M. Blaszak had previously testified against Harper, along with transcripts of bias on

the record, attached to Harper's Motion, has not been rebutted and offers clear and

convincing evidence of bias and fraud upon the court.

NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT

Petitioner Harper seeks an order directed at judge James M. Burge to comply with statutes

under the Judicial Rule's of Conduct of the State of Ohio.

PETITION

Harper also seeks in its petition of a Writ of Mandamus to direct Judge James M.

Burge to comply with Ohio judicial Code of Conduct prornptly notifying the tribunal, as

required under Ohio state law, to take disciplinary steps against Magistrate James M.

Blaszak for bias and abuse of discretion.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT

OF THIS PETITION

A basic rule of statutory construction is that when the words of a statute are plain

and unambiguous and convey a definite meaning, courts are not permitted to resort to rules

of constrciction. The courts must instead read the statute as written, because to do

otherwise would constitute an abrogation of legislative power. Nicoll v Baker, 668 So. d

989 990-991 {1996 citin HollXv. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (1984 . See also Savona v

Prudential Ins VVeber v Dobbins and Fqrsvtlie v Lon^^osion Control District

To ignore Petitioner Harper's rights would only further demonstrates the bias

already a part of the record. If the judgment of Magistrate James M. Blaszak / judge James

M. Burge is left to stand in contradiction to both the Federal Rules of Conduct and the Ohio

Rules of Misconduct, such a construction of the statute would render Petitioner's remedy of

such open bias on the record, meaningless in its intended affect.

The language of Ohio Judicial Code of Conduct makes it clear that Petitioner Harper

has a clear legal right to ask this honorable Court to compel performance in keeping with

these laws. Should the judgments of Judge James M. Burge be allowed to stand, Harper will

suffer irreparable harm by what can only be deemed as creating a "sham legal process" in

the Court of Common Pleas, with "unclean hands" and "fruit of the poison tree" to benefit

Bank of America based in bias by the courts own words on the record.

The Ohio judicial Code of Conduct does permit a judge to use hisown discretion

when clear and convincing bias is a matter of record. He is required to be faithful to the law

and serves on "good behavior" by maintaining professional competence. He is to "accord to

every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, the right to be heard according to law.

Moreover, it would be incongruous if the principle "ignorance of the law is no excuse"

applies to everyone but those charged with interpreting and applying the law to others.

The Court, in law and equity is required to answer such a prayer by Harper in his

MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE OF VOID JUDGMENT FOR VIOLATIONS UNDER 28 U.S.C.

455 / Civ.R. 60 (B) AND MEMO NDtIM OF OTHER POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.

By requiring the Lorain County Common Pleas Court and judge James M. Burge to

comply with Ohio judicial Code of Conduct with respect to setting aside the entire "sham

legal process" of theft of Harper's "®land".

Petitioner Harper has the better of the legal argument as the inferior court has

shown no statutory or regulatory authority to refuse to take the actions which James M.

Burge must take, Petitioner Harper satisfies the All Writs Act tests for relief by carrying the

burden of showing a clear and convincing entitlement to the writ.

To date, the Lorain County Common Pleas Court and judge James M. Burge has failed

to respond to said Mandatory Judicial Notice.

There is an administrative failure on the part of judge James M. Burge to apply the

correct statutory and regulatory provisions to correct the misconduct. The failure of judge

James M. Burge to follow the correct requirements of due process with Harper is the sort of

error which, had it not been made thorough clear and convincing bias of the court, would

have manifestly changed the outcome with Harper at the time such rulings were made;

which bias was sufficient to require the judgment to be set aside and declared °void' by

judge James M. Burge.The inferior court and judge jarries M. Burge xnust.be made to comply with the laws

it would lawfully impose on others.The Court has noted that "All.Writs" jurisdiction is particularly applicable where, as

here, an alleged refusal to act, when it has a "duty to act', would frustrate petitioner Harper's.

ability of the Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction. The Court clearly has the power to

issue writs under the All Writs Act in aid of its prospective jurisdiction of the inferior court

and Judge James M. Burge.This is not merely a matter of a delay by judge James M. Burge in taking

administrative action, or in resolving Harper's claim, or an inadvertent failure to do his

sworn duty, it is a clear avoidance and purposeful action to "deny" Harper's rights to

affective due process of law; and only furthers Harper's claim of deliberate open bias and

neglect of James M. Burge's obligations under the Ohio statutes and judicial Code of

Conduct.Only this Honorable Court can compel the agency of original jurisdiction to issue a

Statement of the Case and restore justice and due process to Petitioner Harper. The Court

has recognized that sometimes a lawsuit is necessary as a"catalyst" in prompting courts to

take action to meet a Petitioner's claims... Lematta v Brown, Yet.pp. U.S. Vet:App

tVo. 93-923 (1LZ6/95 J.

Requiring judge James M. Burge to strictly comply with the Ohio statutes and

Judicial Code of Conduct is also consistent with the orderly administration of justice and

public policy. Denial of the requested relief only invites further legal chaos in this case.

Failure of the Court to issue the Writ of Mandamus, would frustrate the ability of Petitioner

Harper to have his valid claim appropriately and lawfully heard, and frustrate the ability of

the inferior court to exercise and so order the appropriate jurisdiction in this matter.

This action also seeks the Court's allowance to file a petition for an award of

attorney fees, costs and expenses under (28 U.S.C. E 2412) in that there was no substantial

justification, or "lawful" support in the regulations for the unreasonable refusal of the judge

James M. Burge to issue a final judgment of the Case in this matter without Petitioner°s

lawful and constitutional right to trial by jury in keeping with Article III of the and the Bill of

Rights/Amendments IV, V, VII and XIV of Petitioner Harper's right to lawful due process.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner Harper prays that a writ of mandamus be issued under the seal of this

Honorable Court commanding (a) judge James M. Burge to produce a Decision or a

Statement of the Case based upon Ohio Judicial Code of Conduct; or in the alternative,

command Judge James M. Burge to issue a Decision in response to the Harper/Petitioner's

claim; that the Court grant the Petitionor Harper the opportunity to file a petition for an

award of attorney fees, costs and expenses incurred in bringing this Petition and in the

expense of defending the actions initiated by Bank of America, against Harper; and that the

Court grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner Harper requests that a Writ of Mandamus issue out of this

Court directed to the trial judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Lorain County, Elyria, Ohio,

commanding him, James M. Burge, as such Judge, to comply with Ohio Judicial Code of

Conduct and so ordered.

All Rights Reserved

Respectfully submitted,

Jerry Harper [in pri erso a/sui juris.)

UCC 1-207,1-308, 1-103.6

Without prejudice

j^ L. H PEIZ (A.I^,I2.)

II 1-300, 2- 103.6 witho^t pree}uuddieee

State of OHIOCounty of LORAIN

ribed and sworn to (or affirmed) before me on this A-y- daySub Ecof 2013By 1:.1 d8KPQ proved to me on the basis of

satisfactory evidence to be the person who appeared before me.^

r,^ t Weal)

Notary Public DENISE M. KADERNOTARY PUHLIC, STATE OF OHIOMY COMMPSSIaN EXPIRES

- ^__ _._--------- ^

L. ^^^^ COUNTY

Court of Common P0easy E

RON NABAKOWSKI, ClerkLORAIN COUNTY JUSTICE CENTER

2- 255 COURT STREETEimYR9A, OE^^^ ^^^31551

Cashier%Bookkoeph7g (4401) 329-5625

i,

Rece`spt Number: PeceiptDate/Timo

12-0033663 Oct 6 2012 1 1019AM

Reoeipt Type:DEPOSIT

---; ---- -. _ ^^_---- ---_ `^ ^ - - ^ -- _ ,

Case Number: _. ~------_-^-- Judge:I 0CV-1 67218 Hona Judge James M. Burge

------------------_ Case Ca.ptiori:

BANK OF AME-R9CA NA V9S JERRY HARPER

- - ^ u > -g-- R

^-P

aid By:

,..,_ .^.. - .

Paid ror:

JERRY HARPER

Payrment Type: Paid To:Check C.C.

-- ^_Amount Tendered: Balance Due

( after this payment):

$100.00

Description:mandatory judicaa9 notice/dac

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^^^ THE ^^^^^ OF COMMON PLEAS^^^^^^^^ ^^UNTY. OHHIO

`^^^^`^^^'^^^Baaik ^f A^e^^ca, BAC ^^om - _o^^n Case No.^

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Loan ^^^^^^^g LLP^ Magistrate- James M. Blaszak

Plail.itiff

V. ^^

JERRY L. HA^^^ER, aka Jorrlf L. Harper)

Eto Ale, o^^^^^^^ive Defendant in Error

^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^L NOTICEOF VOID JUDGMENT FOR

VIOLATI•^^^ ^^^ER 28 U^SaCn456 1 Civo. a60 (-) ^^^MEMORUNDUM OF OTHERPOINTS AND AUTHO T9ES

CO l^^^ P^^^9 Jerry l^^rp^r, ^li^ir^g, fl^reati^ing, n4tura! bor^^ .^mer°^i^n cltizer^

and Ohio resident, saaejutes,non-licensed attorney litigant= the undersigned, and now

rabse Cdurt Purgi^aes a,

Mandato^ J^adicoal Notice to this l^o^a^a^^^€^r^f to ^i^l^^i^rs^ ^f th ^JR. ^^ ^e^d 66^^srtt^ ^r^d ^^th^r^ta^

Federal and Ohio Rules 28 Ct.^. 4^ and Civ

fvr eathgr violatica^^ bv th^ ^^urt..^ in I^f^r^^t, Notice the court

Def^r^dant in error Harpers (as a Real Part

rO9ardless, if dearrtad in-artfully.plead, must be held to a lessstringent standard than

formal ^leadirags drafted. by bar-adrer'itte^l attorneys and can only be disr^issed.far failure

^to state a clairri; Pickin v. Penns lvani^ Rai6wa 151 F2d 24.^ fThird Circuit urt of

[iri the nature ^f HaIr^es.^ GSerper, 404 ^l.S., 5^^^5^21; Riz^(^^ v.F^A^^9a ^ Get^biC 29 lJ^.S. 9^ 8.^t. 2^^, ^Q

ider v War&, i

ts6 see Pro se 1-iti ants` Pack^^ ^ Cox 4:55 FZtI

Jrnk®r^^ ^ ^^^^^then._395 tJ ^ di 1, 421

According t^ Rule 8(f) Fk^^p and tl^^ State CoLiri r^ile, which holds that °a((

_. ; pleadings shall be coristruerk to do ^ubstarrti^.! jusfi^,e."

There is iegal sufficier^cy'io show Harper is entit^e-d to relief under fhis Judicaa!

Notice and M^rriorandum: AComqiaint should not be dismlssed for failure to 'sfafe a

cisim unles^ it appearsbeyo:^d a d^^^.^bt that the P@aa^^taff can prove no ^et of facts

^u^ @^ort of his ^-@ai^^ which ^^o^a@d entitle him to re@Bef. See Co^^l11 ^ ihs o ^^. 3 ^E, LJ.^

^ ^

45_46 (1957) a@so Neit^V v. p'9aaaQ "@09 S. nt ^827 1839 ^ l989) R^^ldoes

f` ^a a. a"' ^^^ ^mf^Inot count^^a^ar^M^ dis^wissals ba^eP

^^ on a judge's di^ ^belie^ ^ piac^^^Fs 5^^^

a@@egations. i n applying the "^on@ey standardF9; the 'C'ourt will `accept the trLi8h of the wa@!s

pleaded factual a@@eq4taons of the Cor-tplaint.`The deciiared Supreme 8gw of the land is the ^onstitut^^^ of the United S'Lates as

ratified with the Bi@@ of Rights Moli, ^^^suant to Artic@e Vi paragraph 2, "...and the

Judges in every state are bound thereby, any Thing in the Constituf@on or Laws of any

State to the Contrary no'Lwithstandinga9, Johnsot €^s Za^°bst 304 US 459, o 69.fh^

Pursuant to Article IV SOctiors 4 of this Constitution, eacn sfate 0,

stafe of Ohio being one of those ^tates is guaranteed that it will be governed bY t^t^ rule

^f^r@d ^fts^e Vo!lcstn^a i o^^ v. Woodser^: 444 ^1S 286 291.of law and hot of men. seea

"A judgm€^^t rendered in violation ^^^^^^^ Pr^^^^^ ^^ void.'^:.

Among the ^raa^^grated Righti`o^f the People, au^d provoo^o-s@^^ asserted by

Harpers are;1. The Fourth Amendment provides "°The right of the People to be secure in their

pprsans, houses, Papers, and effects Against unreas®nab9e searches and

seizures Sha!l not be violated.2. The Fifth Amendment provides irs pertinent part that "No Person sha!l be

d6praved of iif.e, liberty, or property without due process of law...": Due process is

denied when a:.meaningf€al hearing is de-nied as in this cause.

3. The- Seventh Amendmenf provides in pertiri $20, the ^!^!-!'T to TRIALlaw, in uvhichthe amount in contraa^rer.^y sha!l exceed

BY JIJRY SHALL BE. PRESERVED...4. The Fourtee I nth Amendmaht, Sectaon. 1.0 All persons barn or riatura!«ed irr the

dUnited 8fates., and. subject to the jurisdiction thereof, ar.e cit'izen ^ drt^^f^ ice

ite^ ^

States and of the State wherern they re.^iele. No State sha!l rna@^,law, which sha!l abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the UnitedStates; nor shall any State deprive any person of !lfe, liberty, or property, without

due process df law; aicir deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.

I_.

Judges occupy their offices under "good behavAOr=' and ir3 cor^^^nc-tion with the

Constitutcon, the Federal Rules, both civil and -riminal. Local Rules must not violat8q either

Feder^6 Rules nor the Constit^.^fio^al Rights of the people, ^^^^^ °f ^^^ °i ^^^, ^°^^^.^the.

These ru8es n -ither enlar^e nor abridge rights g ranted by Constitution. Kena^^^

^^ Ruh.1nff DWY^^ 1 cj66, 254 F. SUM ^90.

Furhea, •;If ^.^^ul^; officers ;eust °-o^^scig^^^sh°^s and du-^ifull^ f^.^lfdls their ^^^^r^ oaths in

equitt.g and justice to the "People" th^^ ^erve.

"The judge has a duf^- go ^^^^^^^^aftly inspect the re-cord of the case, and if subject°

matter jurisdiction ^^^^ not appear at ^n_y ti ^ from the record of the case, then he has

the duty to d°isniiss the case lacking s^9bject6r^^tt^r jr9, h.^^^ ac^ng udunlage

any case in when he does not have subject iurisdictioA 1 1 66 L.Ed2d ^^^ O6 198 0)` Ce ^^^^^s va

" authori. .

INTRODUCTION

4^OT@CED9 is hereby given to the court, pursuaht to Rights guaranteed to natural

Americavl ci•tiiens in the Biil of Rightk^s we0l as those secured in the state Const^i^ tiori

of Ohio, and pursuant to themandates of Article III of the Constitution of the Ur^it^

ttates of America, this court is now a "Judiial proceeding'',,and not an administrative

trihunai.

In Q ^^ e^^J^^^^^ ^ tJ ^ 6 i^ t ^35 ^^-Justie^ Bradie}^ stated: °°It ¢^ayandbe that it i^ the ^brt^^i^u^ thir^g i^ its ^^tdost forrr^, bu t allegitie^^tro^ h^^ ^^ ^lht r`aI

th^t waY; ¢^arnei^t, by ---practices g^t th^ir fir^t fio0ti^ig ind^viati^^ frrn l^^^i ^,ed^^ ^f ^r^?dedure This can 0r^ly be obvi^f^d by adhering to the

and property should berule that constitutiortaG provasaoris for the Security of persans,

: ^^1^^^ ^^d literal construction deprives them of taalf their efficacy,liberally construddand leads to gradual depreciatic^n af the right, as if it ^^^^i^^^ tit^at^e,r^^l Rights of th^substance. It is the duty of the Cocarts.to be watchful for theCitizens, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon: Their rhotta should

be Qbsta

'Prindipils.°'

Stiil further, the Court declared in e2L Za ^r^^^^^ ^^^^^ 2^4 lJ.^. ^3Q 358: "f

do not understand the government to contend that it. is any less bound by the obligation

than a private individual would iae...4" ,°It is not the function of our government to ke&p the

citizen frbm fai9ing into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the government from

falling into error "

FURTHER NOTICED, Harpers, -as defendant-in-error, (frorn the beginning) is a

°^aturai born Ai^^,er•ican citizen, who retain^ fuil Cons^¢it^^tior^ai Rights and enjoys thenatural notice,

fi an contrast to ^^f^^^^^ ^,^^^

^Y.a g ^b^°,e^°.^

^^^ mh ^^,r^,of 5 and her^b°^ stafi^- t hama ^ no for discrefiio^^ on the g^=^r'^ of this

P^^^^^^^^^adi^i^i notice 9^^=.f^^^ ..^ ^^^L^; whatsoever,^^^° wrsi^aV^i to the pV^^s@dan^

or the .^^w^-^,^°r°^^ dV^t s s

^^a^^ ^^, ^, ^ this ^r< :^^^^i°,^^

^ fi '^^^V€s to ^i^^^^ ^^^ a^@^^^^^. A` Oath otJudge ^a^^e.^ M. BLrge and kA^^gistrate Jai^ies

^`^ ^^^P e^ _R^;^^^^^^^ oath(s) (See Exhibit ^

hV1,B1asza°^ o^ ^stitutionaiiy ",^^@ ¢ d ^^fii^- there under ee-__

U

^. ° ^^^d t^,x t ^s^ ^ ^ ^^a^G^

1^^^-^^ ^t ^40 26°6 27 i Ed 1e`1 ^^ ^ ^^^ ):

^^^ ^^ 720 ^

"No tnan in this country is so high that he is above the iaw. No officer of fih p. i-pw

may set that eaw at defiance, with impunity, AI@ fihe officer's of the ^go^^er^i^ethento^^ulyom the

highest to the Iolo^^est, are creatures of the ia^^ are bound to obey by accepting office

supreme power in our system of go^^^`^^e^t^tr^ ^^^^^ nd to submitn^afi to that ^^a^r^i^^^^f,

participates en its functions, i^ only theand to observe the Iimitafiioras which it imposes on the. ^xe-reise of the aufihonty which it

.gives.'°

FUR°^^^ER NOTICED, In the 4th editi®n of B9ack`s Law, under "St tute"fihe word

is used to designate the written law f0i:confiradistinction to the unviritten oaweFoster

Unwr'tten law is co,^^^n

fi€'oUV7 to Common i^i^^;?^. . i ne

law, contradistinction ^ahich r^ear^s as OpP^sed to, oppotite

Commercial ^^s^^ ^^^^6 says : e^f^e Code is cornpfems^ata^

Uniform^ in i^^r^^^^A statute should. be construed

Commot^_ Law, virfsfcf^ ^^sae^as in fOece.. e .. ..wiff7 the Camrnarr Law, unfess there fs a dfearRfegisfarfvainfent to abrogate the

Carnmon

1^aw. o,

FURTHER NO 'i°I^E^: A judg^ is ^v^r^rh to uphold the Cdr^stit^¢tiori a^ his "first

duty" to adhere tc^the law of the land and topreser^re ^h^ rights of the People, ^h^rncontract

ourt is a. court of contract.. Under the Common Law, everyhe/she serves. Th^ c,must be eiltered into knowingly, v®9E:antari.1y; and intentionafly by both parties or it is "void°'

and °`unenforceable." In "remedy", the rnaking of a valid Reservateon, of Rights Ipreserves

whatever rights the person then possessed, and prevents the loss of such rights by

^f^^ €^7:4application of concepts of waiver or esfioppel. (lJi^iforr^ Coi^r^^r:cia[ Code (UC

C

I^^rsdv^ UCC ^i®3Q.B). says: The Suf^cien^ of the ^.eservation -a a^^y ,

expressrr^t^ r^

an intentior to r^^^^^e dghts; "is seaffacf^^F,as Notice" to the court of reservation of

Rights.

TheIcourt was obiiq-ated to takg

Ijudici^P r^:^tice in Defendant HarpeE's court filings

and exhibits dated July 31, 20`i`£^, and to enforce t6^^^e "Reservntion of Rights" inof

keeping ^.^dit^? the judge(s) oaths of office; to .^bide by and uphold the C-onstit^Etion, BEin oe

Rig i^^^ ^6nd due pr^s:^^s of ia^^ir^ its deter^sE^`Eations.I The court f^iied in Ets Obligation to

g^E.^soid ^^ar peE'^= ^.sser^ed Co9^s^.iu.^Et6o^^a9 .^nEE^^ edrE^eE^'^ Rights of chai$eE`ged jurEsd6ctEon,

sE^^'^ic-1 e^^c! C^f s^^^ ^^^i ^E^`I3ber, standing ah^d ^,^^,Ee pk`oc^'-`^`^s, as set for"•'<^": ^€Eadr^= ^^^^^^^ i^E

ihese d^curnents and the itS de2ermiE'^^^^ons.

d ^`^b^EttabEeFURT ^i^^ ^^^^i^^^ ^ i j^ ^^Epre:^a ^oa ^^`t di^C^^SS6S .^^^b.^ta^^ti^^e E^

pE°^su^ptions iE^ ^^eireE^ v ^^^^^^_ ^^^ ^.^. ^^ ^, (1932), where the court held that:

",.. to see f^^^r^ a ^^^tu^cr, ^b^^fitabfe ,^i^s^,g^pti^_^^ is turned rs^o^ a ^°^af^ Orit i^ hard

eg^iden ce or of sub^a^^tive law 9s the r ^^^f^ of ^^^^ f^^^^ statute ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^^^^ ^o fj ^a^ndf^

both cases it is a substitute for pmof; in ^f^e One, ^^^^ to ^^^^^^^^ ^

the other coxscfus1ve° Howeverf whether the f^tte^ f^^ s^a ^^s f^^ ^f^^f^^t^^^ atos a

e^ ^°ct^ntooP of s^ef^stanfive law, it constitutes ^evrdence

f

existence fact whsrh here does not, and cannot be, to exist in actu6ffty; an-d the result

is , the ^^mes... FFTf^^^ ^otirt Lias hqfE^ ^or^ ^^^^ once ff^a-t a ALfgu-te-c-C-9-2-1e02-8le ^a^e

^ Sa^ ^®^^ ^^f^d^^s ^ ^^ ^^ d^ a fair 0 oi to i ebgE^^^En^^E^^^^andmen^ For q,cat`^ p. ^qo

r^^^abwfEon cannot be ressed indErect1'i bY thOcW,

thanit caE^ iae vio@ated bly a dErecf r^n^cfEnsE^fi"-

legislative body is ^,^itC^^eut pow-r to enact as a rule ofFURTHER NOTICED: if a

certainly the

evidence, a statute denying a titig.ar^t the right to prd'^^ the facts of his ^d^e,

power cannot be made to e merge by putting the enactment in the gUise of a rule of

substantive law.

MANDITORY JUDICIAL NOTICE OF VIOLATIONS OF

28 U

Dpfendant in error, F1arper's "Facts,; for the declaration of "void judgment" in this

instant matter, derives from the Federal and Ohio C I odes of Conduct 28 9.C. § 455 1

^i^a^. ^® ^), and the doctrine of "oar^c9ear hands", due process and Amendment Rights

^i^f^t^fude, but are not. limited to the following:

1. Declared, Judicial Bias violations as evidence in court transcripts. See attached

Exhibit 6 Trar1script.

2,

3.

4

5,

6.

7

8.

Denlas of, inc-iuding hLit I-lot llmited to, 4tr 5th, 6th, 7 tn and 14th Aniendniont to

Harpers o . f aawfu& and conStitLitsonatl due process Of law of thc,-suhject matter,

jurisd;^:tion, due pr^^^ss- and their pr^^^entation of rights

Deniai of Hearing or oral arg^^^^ent^ on SF.^^^^^r^,, jds'^^^^ent issuedon Septa-mber

^-^.r. - t^=^^s and code ri ghts s^s 'a^°^^'s'^e^^P^^9^^ ^^^:^q^

33W F2011 as per estaUshed rn- ^^ r. ^ ^

dBsput^^^^ facts are cleady in question due to ^^^ court's bias.

Denial of a hearing or oral argijments on JurisdictEon when raised by Defendants

in^ ai ^ ^'.^ ` 6^t any time", and

error Harp^'rsa ?^g^`^icl's' Harpers can co^`9s^^9^.^6^ally rao^=e `^

which must be addressed and estabiished by the court when, raised,

Denial of a haaring or orai arguments on the efficacy and authenticity of Piaintaff's

Subject Matter Jurisdiction and boha fide standing iz?y Plaintiff when r5aised by

Defaridant

Denial of a hearing or oral arguments on Motion 60(b) when raised by Harpers

with "mu9t°ipW9 and `®factaaai and gl^iing,s defects in F Baintoff's,alleged Xerox copy

of "affidavit of a-Qsignment" of mortgage allegedby Jason Cody and .t,h ^

byE^ur^aero^a^ defects of un-auttienticated documents preser^tatior^s raised ^

Harpers, due to bias of the ^6kirt.

Lackof Judic¢a9 care and neutrality, as a reqUired duty by the court to

continuousRy "examine the record" for inconsistencies andfor abuse of judicial

Defendants in erro.r.d.iscretion and open bias toward Harpers,

Failureof the court to provide any writtein "fact of iaW in support of any ruling in

summary judgment, Motion 60(b) or final judgment decree in defense of fhe

courts determination.

A Vo-ld judgment For ^^^icla .1 Bias

Before or about October 6, 2010, the Court introduced Magistrate Jarnes M.

Blaszak into the courts proceedings in. the alleged foreclosure claim actidn against

Harpers pro.perty located at 307 East I'Iain-Street, South Amherst, Ohio. Frorn theMagistrate

outset of the magistrate's occupation on the bench in the subject matter,

James M. Blaszak dembnsfirated partiality and unrestrained bias in deciding for the

Plairltiff on every sing}e issue before the court, frbm the initial.granting a Summary

JudgnYent to Plaintiff in the face of "significant evidence" by Harpers of insufficier^cy of

process, insufficiency of standing, sham pleadings, alleging Plaintiffs use of altered and

what appeared to be "doctored or amended documerits" after the fact of their existence,

arid possibiiity fraud.Q^on tfi-je co€art - to its final decree of j^^^md-n It determinatior3.

of which Magistr, JamesThese defects were obvious to any thoughtful ^xaMination,M. Bl^szak, and this couit had a d^lty to adequately inspect and authenticate for the

rp-cord, and for which the court should be ^^^^^^^^ed to take .Pch notice.

Magistra^e ja^^s K Bfiaszai demonstrated his ^^^n bias by turning a blind eve

to these ^bvious d^^e&,ts ir € laintiff's case, and demonstrated complete disregard Qor

Defendant 5^ $ a` gfi^^^ to^^ ^e^ ds^^k ^ .C'^ pM1 B'+^a^:-^ ^^-s €rb°r^ the outset in 2-^9 B^^W=y 5 s{p+1r^ryN9 P ^-`^r^^

fi^^r^^rawhere there ^^^q^^^^^^

judgment" t o plaintiff when the Federal Rules clearly state that,,^ E^`^ ,_

reasonable dispute of the facts, s€^m€^ar'^ j^4dg^^`^^nt E6^:ar^^^ot"be grante^,

James M. 510szak proceeded with suwmary judgment for plaintiff, without even the

beroefilt of a open hearing ,.N°hi^^^ ^^oLtfid a9fiow oral arguments an.d disputed alleged facts,

bef-ore, advWng the Judge or making the court's determination; thus, dem-iing Defendant

in error Harper the right to present counter=claim evidence or objection i-inder reasonable

and equitable defenses as provided for by the Rufies.

Further, summary judgment wasgranted, withoc?t requiring Pfiainitiff (Bank of

America) to estab9ish, on the record, fiawfufi "subject matter sufficiency and jurisdiction"

by the prod-uctiorro of the "originafi" No and Mortgage d.ocurhents in support of their^.;

alleged standing and subject matter as required by Iaw for the. court to initiate jurisdaction

arld standing of p4airutiff. (See Attached: Points and Authorities)

Magistrate James M. Bi^^zak's violations and miscondUdt are clearly described

in both the Federal. and the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct and by bias conduot has

made "void" the entire dourt proceedings regarding Harpers. The. Federal and Ohio

' Codes clearly required Magistrate Ja¢^^s M. B{aszak ta «recuse„ himself when hiS bias

was clear to the court and to gl6 concerrted. The violations by the court through

Magistrate James M. fi31aszak., read as fcailow:

28 U.S.C. 455The pr.ir^ary Sa^arc^e of the federai judicial sysferr^, 1=491_0 who sho^€s bia^^r:

^^^^nz%f ^^-^^r ^^r^^^a9 r^^^^a^ s i^sr^ediattl^t ^anguafi^^ed to act ia^.

dIS ^.DB.s^"s'^vmau.ue. . • _-__ . -__ . . .

initi.o. it provides, as follows: ^ 455.

Oo^qualification of jusfice, judge or magis.trate judge

(a) Any justice, judg e., or magistrate jud^c- ot.thig United States A8fi1wRiaht

dls uaIi n6mseiT i[d afldreas )r^i^^^l be ue^tio^^ed.(b) 6°°iesha&fi also disqualify himseffi in the following

circumstarices;

(1) Whe ahP ^ ^^^r^qnai bias or 2re^udice conqerw^^ ^ ^^iL

or

per^^nti1 knowledge of disputed evedentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

;^) I^J6^^^^ ^^ ^r^^^^^ ^r^^^^^e he serve ^ai in the ma^O^i^^^^ ^^rir^^

Co^^tro`^'^r^^'aor a iaL^^yer ^?'^it`^ ^^^'i^^ he pr^^;y^u^^^y practiced law

sU., ch association as a hav-F^^^ ^o^^cer^^9^ug the matter, aLihi pg:^^ ^r ^^°^

Ner has i^ een a materia i Wot^^s -s c ^^^^iaX€:^1 Where he has senied in governmental employment and in such ^^^^^ci^y

participated ^^ ^ounseG, ^dviser aormaterg^l v.4t^^^^ c.^aergir^ati^

the merot-s cpt the

^^se- in contr `G

(C)Administrati^^es Re-sponsibilitBe-SMo ^e^ ^^^ ^^^iE^ii^tr^^i^^^,^ dischara- the^ m rr^^^^

e-s without bi.ga or 2 rof^s-sioi'ial0m^^t^r^^^ ^hou9d c^pperate with other judges

and b^siru^^

(2)ns^^^rt^^f^9^^^9^ QfAr^da^ds

. of fide^ t^y an

authrit ^MLered to 1MG Ptii MW ^r ^ct.upon the vido9;taons

^h^99 u ^^ r^ ^^^t f^69 r^v ^^9 th^ vici teoo^ l^ec^ aw ^red to in^resfi te 0 r ^^t ^ on th^ ^'iol ^ti^^o

(E) Di^qLig6ifipation.I A °ud. G sha9^ ^iS ^^(if hims8lf or h'erse@f in a. ra^ce^t^i^ ir^ ^hi^h th^

bu td g,q's i^ a ^tia ii t mi ht r^^s 0r^ab9 he cl^ad in r^^^

Eimited ta instances wThe 'ud e! has.a Persona9 b1&s_2r rR:udiqe A.Memin-2-a art or

a party'^ lawyer, or ^aersa^aai kno^r9ed^e ^f UiR^^at^^ ^^^^^^t^^r^^ f^^t^

concamin"he proceeb 1`h^ ^rvp-d as a law hr in the matter in controver1 y=&_q

R--q%4k6 ^. ^^'^ed duriragN AMch

makeriai

(D) ®iscip9iinary Responsib aEiitiese^ A^^ &a-6 -^^&^,ar a^odae has co^su^stt^_^ a

Aithough ^1^^i^tr^'^^ J^^^^^^ M. Bias-ak ^^.i€^uEd argue he obtainedcor^vent fr^^^

Harper's attorney to proceed in the case, the Ohio/i-'ederai codes do not allow a^h

j'^d^/rnagistrate who expresses b ^^s to obtain consent in order to remain on the b^^^^ ,

nor

Et 9su ch ^ se9^t ,cm8^Q SF9P&Enu'd^Bi^^ 9t Ys not k§82,>_^,

^ o^ C^'^.^e €R..€

^^^^'S any ^a^'s^^rL^^^g^^ ^^^°^^^^', ^Ga €^r^r^^

^mr^'rd fi

^^ ^ ^F ^°

qn- or^ the attorney(s) to make thds decision whenthe Code of Jwdi. i =i C- ^ uctts

absoluteit

" ^^}" . aa^'^ j' ^^C-S ge ok'k"EF`igisnrS^.ete has

^^ ^i^^^^^ to what the ^ud^^^^^^^^^gLr^ ^^^ 66^h^ £^^ ^

4PD$ L^'1sy^+p

e bias xpressed, to ``

g^^^,^^^^te itseif into 6dseif serving

.^ is ^ E @^z'^5^^ or T

stat ^^^^^^^^ f-o'^_y 6e€ to

on the beE`^^+h, An ^'s>torr^ yis, i ,^[r^`^

Harper ' s counsel as his mq^•^,.^e ^^^r^ _

duty is `t.^ thm bench, not their cl t_ervt. Regardless of the u^qwry, the judge or magistrate

E.must recuse hir^Eseif' as a matter of iavv, (not corg^ent) nor g9ilen t^.^ sRjbjective self

ser%iing analysis or permission. &^t^d and has harmed and d^r^^g^dThe e^^tir- process of th'^ COur^.has been c,1i^

Har^ers and Harpers hav- been "irreversib9y" damaged by Magistrate Jara^ss M.ached}

^6^^^^^'^ known hi^t^ri^^i bias ^^ more clearly

Iset forth in Exhibit C (Affida^^at att

then attorney James M. Biaszak did representhereto and made a pSrt here0f. In 199.8, ^h^^^hq^Abundant Life Christian Center and its' r^^mbershig^ of ^^^r^ I am the Senior

Isinde 1985) in a civil matter invoRvin^^..^ ra^a6 estate contract. He di.^msssed. the . . .r

present legal counsei (Thompson, .Hir^^ & Mory) for this rnatter rdaulting in a later

litigation of Thompson H ihe and Flory (who terminated their representation for the

church) and who then filed a civil suit against the churdhover the matter.. Although

Attorney James Blaszak represented the church only a short ti¢ne and referred us to

another firm, he had intim at^ knowledge, facts, and insight particular to Abundant Life

and myself. In October of 2002, when the matter came to trial to my shock, A,ttorney

James M. Blaszak did testify against the church and rriyself as a negative and hostile

witness. Magistratertd^rr^ing aur f^r^^l^^^r^,Then in our March 14, 20`( 2 hearing bo

Blaszak ^cknowfedges his long °standing bias and states for the record that he "has.

n6gative, feelings against Pastor Harper for a few reasons". (in the present tense) Se-e

Exhibit B.This court andthe Honorabie Judge James M. Burge is oblagatJed under ^^

^' ab ^r^r^^ the entire9-s-C-5-455 Civ.R. 60 ^^ (established iauv) to declare "va^i

and judgr^i^^ts.bv the court, by reason of this maxim of f^.^nr _(_frupiproceedings, rulings

or the o(son andthe doctrine of "unclean hands"

Jud;icia9 Abuse Of Judsciial Dtscre-tion

in Court deterrul Mations

^^ ^i^,^. 6 ^^l^i^ ^; ^^hicl^ ^^^^.l i^^ an abuse of di^^^^^i^^€ ^tartdard.

^nder tl ^^^9u

^; °' ^. y ^ [ ^ ^^ ^`t^- ^^^2_d ^ ^2^ ; i987i . A r^9bing n^^ill be re^^er sad or ar.^ CG^ ^S^ F R^ p-^p' ry^5 Yg--p^^t' ^, ^^P

E° rp ikt°^5^^^ r^ a3YSlp^f^c^'+'^[Ea[^: ^p

^ @^ ^ ^^^^@-^ that ^^R^ ^ ^ ^^abuse ^^G a.36^^e^^p^^^^ only -=^ ^` ^

1 ^^`^^ d?5 ^.'i

arbitrary, or unco^^^cfo?^ab1^. Bie-'a^'!^ ^^_0hic S4.3d ^ i ° ^

^;,^9g; ^

^^,^ ^d ^ ^4^' 4`1^2^j^ ard to the summary ju^^g^^e^^4 4^^^^g^ll;e filed For by plar.^fg^,

^^ r 1=xampE^: in r^g bias ^ beganabuse of dis^,retior^ ^^iaS e^iid--^^i and bia^ ^'o^^ar^°^t Degend^'n ^ Harper had ^lr^^d^£ ^.<^'^^to-

raise quesfio^^s of abuse of di.^enafior^. Th- foel.^^^^ing ruli^@gs ^n sur^^^^rY judg^^ants are^r over

pp9icab1e in this instant r^afterand demonstrate the abuse of discretio^.

established tsw regarding summary judgrnenf decistons. fact, the"1^^here doubt exists as to whether there is a genuine issuf a

matefutl o^rB^l ^h^

frt^i ^^sdg^ shOLald ek on the side of den °tV3 the motion and

- rits." EfilS V. Po^vs, 645 So. 2d.947, 950 also Beo___wr^^^, C^d€t ^fr. Inc 444 So. 2d

r_ ^358, 362 (Miss 1983).

Neither Magistrate James ^t ^9^^^^^ or ^^5^ court, ^^^ claim

ignorance of the obvious defects arsd^g4artng inconsistencies in p9aintiff's alteged

"Affidavit ir^ Support of P1ger^fiff's Cos^bilair^f and the Assignment of Mortgage" documents

nd other suspect evidence in Pdainttff's sham pleadings which to any reasonable ey(^a r^^f^r ^^r°fid^ ^^^^lu^i^r^^r^^ ^^ed^^^^UkPoL4ld create legitimate doubt req@;^6r1nC,^ g ^- . in favor

Magistrate James M. Stasz^^t^ and thec®ur^t ruled or^ summary judgment^

f d^^ if^ such nur^t^r^^is or^issi®ris aetd glaring ie^cort.^ssteracies arid defecfs ofof plaintiff, Ratlegpd "facts", submitted by Plaintiff (Bank of Amer`ca), and t.haf, witho.uf 'eve¢^ a

allowing Defendant in error Harper a hearing or oral arguments to contest r^^hf

v^:rious d^.fertse^.; which is cus^tc^rnary and- routine ir^ matters of surhr^ary judgment.orfur^if Surnri^ary, jqdgri^enf is rea61y an

i^d such ^^^ YDefendant ir! errc^r Harper ^ras den

issue "over evidence", which clearly did not eAsf in t his case. ud rr^^r^t canCase law" tiot unproven postulations of so called facts, a surnr^raryij g

only be rightfully determined i^^ider the criteria set forth iri. ^d^Y^^ ^ Larsen s

Manufacturbq ^Q. ^f^r^^^^.fll/here the facts Kaefo^ the coaart ^°o coe^c^'u.^ivefy pr^cEude a ,^a^y'

s [e^

could ^o^tcluc^e, asa rr^a^erof law, tl^atanfyo^recdr^clusic^n a ^fact[is]

^^r^t ^P7e court t ^A:.mw ^ie, ► ^^ ^^^^ Ha^^es v. L@I'^ei'PO.`".a 'SfK^1^. P t^tcs evevab .m.._

Coe ; F.^R_-_5 ^^ l^i^.^gg^^

The Fifth Amendment, provides in pertinent part that "nor be deprived of @ife,

liberty, or proE°°e€ty, wthout due process of 6aw..°° Dt.&e process is denied when a

£^ ^ a ^ ^ were ^ ^.a^¢^d on wegstimate ^of fact, as ^^^^^s 'E^°il this causei^^^r^^^^ ^$^F s6^^e^lY^.gi,^) ^ ._ ^ ^ questions

due to bia`y . . . .

Fur'c[uer, Th--'" ^ek^anth Amendment, provides in ^ertme,-M part the hn .-^^GysR a,

^ , the ^&^^^ to ^^°6^t

^,os°n^^ior^ sa^`^g, ^^ther• the value in controversy shall exceed ^^venLy d^'ll6r -ca, t

b^' Ju ry&^ g be preser F's^^'gua;:^.^>

^^ does not i€^G€^^de a singi^ h'erere^^ce toby s`^.'8^^9,^o-

'^^_s.. ^^ ^ h3^ C . . . .-

&`r°^ar^ip^.uiptoor^°° by ih.^ ^ourt ira conspirac^r to design a verdict suitable to a.he Co^^r-^,

through the use of Sham gegai. pr^c-e-sses as a result o f bias,

The oN^ expia^aALion as to why Magistrate James U1. Blaszak, and "k-he court

would rule in Bank of America's favor every tir^^e 1041^out due process of rehuttai or

defenses in the, face of glaring suspect, inconsistent and non bos^a ffda a9i^^^^^ evidence

byp9aintiff, is testimony of the glaring bias against Harpers in the face of obvious

ciu^s I tions of fact, which Harpers could and would have put forth in their deferase. The

courts' glaring neglect of juris prudence and due process of law. required under the

judiciary of this court, if left to stand, ould violate the very purpose of its existence of

equitable fare play.. Sh®uId a judgeAmagistrate not have subject®¢^^^te-r juruisdiction, , then the law.

states thatthe judge has violated 6^othhis oath of bffi^^ to uphold the constitutional

rights of Harpers, as well as Federal and Ohio codes of ethics and conduct as set -forth

ir7 28 ^9 3,Q455 iq!^ Rn ^^^_.Vlith c[ear and expressed bias by Magistr^^e James M. Blaszak, the courfis

jurisdiction was "never estabfished", n1aking the entire proceedihgs a sharn legal process

and putting fraud upon the court."A judge must be acting within his jurisdic;.fion as to subject matter and person, to

be entitied to irr^^iunify from civil action for his acts. ®avDs v^^eetWa, 51 Ariz. 220, 75

P.2d.689 (1938)

The Courtmust "void" the-entire proceedings against Defend^nt in error Har.ppr,

with prejudice, so that justice is ddne so that the integrity and confidence of the court of

the people it serves can be preserVed. Magistrate James M. Bi^^^ak's conduct violated^due process of law and opens the process to claims of damage and harrr, to Defendant

Harper by numerousviolations under U.S.C Title 42 and Title 18. and The Tort Law, 28

U.&C. 2674, if judgment is not recognized as "void ab initio":

kR € hc- Un€aed States shalI be I€a}a}e, ... in the same, manner and to the samp- extent

a private €nd€v€duaI under like c€rcu€ms-tances.e.°R(a) To ensur- that any pe-rso n vvhose rightS or tr(sedoms as he,rein recognized are

violated sha61 have an effective remedy, ^^^tw€t}^stand€ng the v^Wation has been

committed

'F^^$F ^^t^€^^i^l ^^^^^it^^.

by persons .^ r i."ctry66^+^} kg Fd

y"A JuQge €s not immunej fo€` to€^^ous acts ^orna€^ffaed in d a pu^ }^ Ad ^^&W^^ ^a^^^ °

^^^^ ^^^ i:^. at '^ 7 -`9Q ^ ^ __.C ^ ^ ^ ^^Eat.^ uo€^¢j^¢^di^iai c^^a^ vV

^^LLI^^e`^•

Be^^^^^^ I^^i^^i^^€^t^ 2^^€^^^^ M. Blaszak's known "hist^^,. of ^€as, prej^Yd€ce and

abuse of discretson toward DG-fendant Harper, the court was, at a01 t€^^8-Q aE°€ci in a}l

manner, acting sRw:thoua iu€^^^iCtion or authorffy,; under the co}or of iaw, thus comMitti ng

numerous crimes against Defendant Harper throughout what can only be mterpreted as

a "sham 16gaI process" and thus, putting fraud upon th^ ^o-urt.

FURTHER NOTICED, NOT AS A THREAT TO THE HONORABLE COURT, but

iaursuar^t to Clnil^^1 ^^^^^^ V. ^^^a

183

r^ ce ^^^^^ 6&3^, ^^^^7, }^OT6CE is hereby given

^^^: ^^ ^^^ ^each r€^^€^^of th^ ^}^i€^ti^t ^.€^^

1

6^^ffi^^r 0 t th^ ^^^€rt, I^^ addition,

^^^^^^^ ^^^ 4^^ ^^^ ^^ ^ ^ ^^^^ 1 4in ^^hich th^ Supreme ^ourt stated

th afi,

"When a state officer acts under a state Iaw in a manner, vioRativO of the Federal

C4r€gtitution, he comes irrt0 conflict with the superior author}ty of thatcmnstitut}on, and he is in that case srtripped of his oftof h^^^^d ^ie}u^

character and is subjected in his person to the consequencesconduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from

responsihi}ity to the supreme authority ot'the United States.°

See, a}s: . Gper v. Aaron 358 U .S 1 78 S . Ct 1401 (`f 95 in

lJ:S: Supreme Court stated that ^Fn^, state legestator^ or executive 1udicial of^^^, .. ^^.g^`F

can waragainst the ConstEtutiot^ without violating his u^tclertakc^tg to s^a^^

124^ U.S. 200 88 U°Se v._W111449iU:See also In Re Saw er °}

, 216, 101€ €^^(B Wheaf)

^21 .

FURTHER NOTICE: "Anyjud9e whd does not ^ompfY with his oath to the

Cons€`iac^^i'on of the United star`es wars against thatConstitut6on and engage.t, in acfs in

violation of the saapreme.lawof the 8and.T-hejue.^^^ is engaged in act•s of tr^^^on"

"FederM tort ttawa judgas cahr€ot invoke- Judicial ir-nmuni.ty for acts that vio@ate

l.ito^ ants civil rights4 Robe^ C^^^ W^t9^°3a ^"o^ ^^^ I^^su^°er^^ ^^^ ^^^^^1^^4 ^^^6 21^

KII_509_5_ 16"

C-0,NCLU SlON

cd^^^s are 4^o^ ^^^^^^nd b;^ at o^c r'^^^^ t in ^ ^^^^^ .^^ ^ ^Fv ^^^ ^^rt^. , .,.^^^4 i^^^

_ y+, E^` ..'^` r^ ^^^e^^^^` ^^^^ ^ ¢^ @^^l^

e^

the under€Pt^^^^f'^`^3^^^^F^E' of

^s^€&54^bg^yF'c^which he Q?}^s^Y ^e.

d convincing bias ^R^d ^l^^Rse of discretion ^ towardiL^^^ ^AiL because of ^l^^r ^r^The court,Defendant in error Harper, results in the lack of judicial authority and a!s rulings,

deter minations and j:^^gments resulting from "breach of the public trList' under the c-o@or

of law are herein void ab initGo. theFURI"^lER, Plaintiff, (Bank otAr^erica), was also co R^^@i^it ^^r^^pir^t^r to

^ourts bias in that it clearly witnessed this bias against Dete-rRdant Harper in open ^ouR

as witness to the statements of Magistrate JarA^s M. Blaszak, and openly accepted the

many ,fbenefits of a prejudicialcaus^".^Rq their favor throughout the procee^lings.

`^heretore, p:9aiR^ti^t, nor its 9egal co^sn^'^ !, can be held ^i^rr^eless knowing they were a

"heneficiary19 of its own "sham pl^adRngs59, RR^suttRcReR^cy of process, lack of staiidEng 46 due

process of law, jrRr@scliction and suspicious alleged evidence so caIled, in front of a non

subjective, non-rReutra!"biased, court. The plaintiff Bank of America's lawyers acting in

conspiracy with state aeLors under color of law have become state actors in this case.be

The U.S. Supreme Co^Rrt has ruled that oppR^iv€ate pa^ies , lawyers oRi this case, may

held to the same standard of "state adtors°" wWe the final and decisive act was carried

out in conspiracy with a state actar or state c^f^cial. See Dois v igaLks 449 lJ.^ 24

I R^1 11; .ct.. 1 83 also See R:dickes. v. S. H. Kress & Co. 398 U.S. :144 0. S.Gt. 1598.

Section 1985(3) under Title 42The court comes i°^t^ q^^stior^ when it shows a pattern of behaving or ruling in a

maR7nerthat is: preventing or hindering paRtY(s), such as De^endant,iRl error Harper,impartial hearings or the full, fair trial, impartial adr^RnRgtratta[^ ^:

from receivihg full, fair,justice or has experienced ^rRd^Rct, which would lead a reasonable person to believe

could be prevented or hindered from receivir ► g f^R!@, fair, lr^p^rtR^! hearings ^{hthehiull,they

fair, impartial ^dmeR^o^^r^^g^^ ^! ^^e^^titutior^a! j^Rstice as «guaraR^teed"by the 4 ; 5 , 7

and 14t" Ameridments.

the ^Rigi^ts of theThe criteda used in d^^idi^°^^ a cOur^ of equity, is how it. handles

iTF^F^iLi=,w^ and^sr^rep reses^^ied. A o.ou^ is cos^sid-red inequitable if it does not F^5

t-ONSi^^ENTi=Y adhere to their oath of office and aggresss^.^eiy pursue justice for ALL,

e ef-id is the de`^initioh^ of a bi;^sed.^ouk^e.,^_s^at^^sng l ess is ussaceepte^V

The v[oPations, of a-aths of o'^^^^^^ and conduct reachesboth conspPracies under

^°'^` ^private Cor€d^;^,d. ^ e this case^^^^-^,^^ effectuated through a purely

€ ^i^r of l aw and ^2a`^^ ^€^ ^^^^t'^rs`

.^ltscria t`^i^a^.tes^ ani^^^s' i - beh;r^dthe ^.ns^

§^^^^^`^^°.^^^^. in error Harper ^^i^'a^d ` ^ : a "r^^g€s

actios^ as the court records ^fiect. That actionable ^,:e^^se is t^`^^^ treatment ^a

^avqer pro se uitigant59, as a distirdct "° ^ass°base-d Subject" of €heCourt , wheresn d enW, of

eprotectio^^ of the laws and of due ps°ooes^. ^^^as cie^iray ^enied a^ the Pr^^duct ofequal

^.bias and prejudice of the ,o^ss^^. See 0 q v ^^^^^^^^^^^ 403 U.S 88 102 (1971).

WHEREFORE, Defendant in error Harper requires this court tO act with integrity

and `udiciousiy irs accordance with 2^ S . C^4^5 in declaring "void" and dssqeaai.i^is^^

^the borsdi`^'s-det-rr^sinatidr^s and }udgr^eo^fs: Further, the Court is obligated to file a report

the tribunai on Magistrate Jarrsas m; Biaszak's behavior and misconduct in keeping

with his violations of Civ.R.. 600 for failure to disqualify himself due to his bias at

thm oLitset of his involvement of this case.imurther, the Court must decree and declare ail proceedings, rulings and

`by this court in this instant matter void ab initao, with prej^a^ioe, accordirsgiy,judgments

FLsrther, the court should remit to Defendarst Harper, as pro se litigant, Attorney

'Fees and costs under the Civii.^i ht^ ^ttors^_^ °s Fee Award Act of 1976 90 St. 2641

as arrtended 42 l.1SC. 1988.U.S. Constitutior2ai Essues: and to such additional relieo, as is,

appropriate to this cause of action; including financial reimbursement for aii attorney

i:eies, court costs and related costs damages, in defending this instant mat'i:er, of not less

than $ 7,O0O.OO, in dismissing aii alleged oia.irr^s v0ti°s prejudic^"wi^ich Plaintiff has

alleged agais^st Harpers as acts and product of "unclean i^arrd

Jerry H 4 ^r (At^CC 2Q7.^ ((UCC 1a 103.6)

} without prejudice

^^^^6^^ that a^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^:^ ^^ ^^^ foregosng ^^and^^or^ ju^^^^^^^ ^^^8^^ andPY ° " ' ,

^^^^^^ and ^^^thoritg^^ ^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^dwekl= Reis^^el d & ^^^^tes LLPA LLU, .^9^^®

Red Bank p^.^ad, Ci^^c€nnati; t^^^ic 45^2.^ e this '

AH ^^^^^^ ^^^erved9PJ P

y-

ce^H . . ,`G lr

^^^NT ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^ ^^^

^^^^ ^^^^^

^^^^ LI l^^^ri0^-^_ Rii ^ets° ^ ^ G^.^E LA,?^ ^ `.^31^ic1^ @eguca-tes

Har^p^r^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^z,:^^^r^^^^ ^1^^ ^^^^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^ b^^ ^1^^ ^_^ ^ <^^ ^^Vio'^atdor^^^ and bias of i^`^e Co^9ft ^'e1ated to ^-°s^^8ers ^IA^^D1 ^ .^c E

and Memorandum of Points and >^^^thoriii^^ ^^tensio€'`6 to tha^' do^.<^^^^^^^ by ^i^

.^'tl'^ie^ ^^^5^^that ^^ ^^`.GE LAW, and other ; 6f^r^er;^.^.s ar^ .no^:^ ^ ^

l° given ^h^. e^^ .

in'Lo the JUDlClAL NOME.

CASE LXWJudgsss Required "s^^^y" of continued careful ^^^xami^&UOM =6

of thje record and to aci. in lawf-ul equity Of his Oath

UeS o V. VVId' qlqvzj ^.^r. -! m .._ y5 la.Ed.257 .1g l and.w6^ pu ,,nCo

the record of ttnehe

casdca^ ,$ ^0^dud€o^.®^o^^

inspe the

if sul^j^'^'^°B`^^^^^r^^ri.^dl^'$i^Y^from

then ct^inatterj€jri he B^^ ^^d^e^g

judge ^ct in any case in when l^e doe^ ^®r^atter j^.^fi ssdfic^or^

unlaWuliy,

See: *-Cagnc n.mo ^^^^easuffn^r^

^^rti^^al^r4 where a judge

Acts in exceSS Of judicial authority constitutes r^iscohduct, ^ y

clel'iberately disregards fhe. requirements of fairness and due process.

See: r91ompson v ^ ^ ^ 1 54 SE 583rdwherr actingto enforce a statue and its subsequent arrrerrdrrrenfis to the present date,

the judge ofthe municipal court is acting as an admistrative officer and not in a judicial

capacity, cvur^^ in admirristerong or enforcrng sfatLies do natactjudicialfy, but merely

tr^ir^^^^rsafly,r

^^e ASiS F^S 568 F2d 284 A judge ceases to sit as a judicial officer because

the goverriing principle of administrative law provides that courr`s are ^prohibited

^at ^^substituting t^re^r evidence, testimony, record, arguments, and rationaleagency. Adittionally, courts are prohibited from substituting their judgmerrt for that ofthe ac^ency. Courts in adminlstrative issues are prohibited fram even fEsterring to or

hearing argunients, preseniations, or rational"

^^^^ ^ Ct. SF, 1,40 ^al I"Ministeraa` o^^^^e^ a^^ ir^cOMP^tea^^ ^^ receive

^^g R^^^ ^^6+'^^¢^c^^^ ^^^E^^^^^^^^ ti^^ ^^^i.^.^ature,

t^^ei^° act^ in atEenoptir^g to ex^^^is9 s^C.^

^^^^em- ai e necessarikv nuflifies.

^3 nEA6l that goi.^em n9 erd^ ^^^^ ^^ ^ ^^^^^^^20€ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^ ^^nkle fi^^h^^^^^ ^f ^^ ^^t^ to ^^rovide p^"otectio^`^ for r^ya te

's Pi. tielyh o^€^e^ ts eP'^ors ^^^^ ^ ^^ ^ ^^

a^-h debe se&^d dut^^ Ws ^^^^,^^r9^d^e^6^^^^^^ ^ ^^^

^-o rn atte r ^^hst t h e^ ^^2^^^^^^ and ^^^^#^a the

gover^^m entistate provides ^^ us Rr^ ^f conv^ ^^ ^^, _ ^._._ - P ^e. •^^ -^+1-in^^ to f.he de^^er m-n¢ Hale v-. H^.^kV 201

U. ,S. 43,

=d,57 3

See: S . C . R. 1795s Penhalilow v^ D®^nqVs

Daid. 5^a abstraction and a

ov^.C°nr^er^f gs an artificial person,^ aalra^^^^9^h as ^^^r^^ g

^^ ^^^artificial

^a^d1c°eature of the mind o0y, a governmen^^a^^^^t^^^^, ^^lf^rw ith

The iE°^agiE^ary, having neither act9,^alet^attaining parity with the tangible. The legal snanifestatiors of this is that no government,as we91 as any law, agency, aspect, court, et.^^ can concern itself Wth anything other than

corporate, artificiM persons and thepontracts between therr'i.'°

See: Nir. justac^ ^i ^%uds; oa o - ^ _ _nkel, 201 U . S. 43Aig^906

d least repulsive form; h^^t^^ and

l modes of pra^cedure This ^^ n 1on^y

,hbe

oberiatedby ac9hering tc^ th^ provigions themand property should bo liberaily c€^r^str^sed. A close and literal constr

t^Fh^e^^ dhf^l f^ithet consisted more

of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciationin sound than ir^. substance. It is the duty of the ^uconstitutional rights of the citizehs, and agaie^st any stealthy encroachments thereon_

Their motto should be obsta prinfcpalis,"Chfdr. Justice Brewer, disserttifllg, quoting

See: Rankan v.Howard (1930) 633 F.2d 844, c:ert den. Z6 v . Pankin,

^^^ ri^didtion. or2020, 45'l U.S. 339, 68 L.E0 2d $26. " 1^fhen a judge knows that h ju ^di^i^lacts in the face of clearly valid statutes expressly depariving him of j^.^risdictia^r^,1

immunity is lost.

See: lp6 o,i'^ Pe-ars®t^ 2- Gra - 7 Zu Gawu #®^ ^^u -=. ^ .646 l^72 '" Vt^here there is no jurisdictioi°^, there can be no discreti@n, for discretioro is

incident i:o jurisdiction."^^ when the Court has not jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is

(la^f^r^ a person is not a judge], and ^^tior^s will lie against them ai^^itho^i•

^ any regard^ s.`.5n who

... of the precept^r^r^4d^^^v^,.,94

PFk^`l`.s.' 8F14N

& Ba9EW4^bY 77 E^fYa ^^^u^^Gh^Sr

^'-'+l

Case ^d^

^P r^ both cases rig ht 06

the l^^r^l^^ ^ q^^ ^^^.^^^-.,^ w'b

Chamber.

Tl'^-a^e !s ^ g^P`zer al rule that a P`^:iP^i^^^ P`s^a^,e^^ 1^ ^ ^ ^^ F201 a §l ^ ^^i^3 ^`^ ^: ^^^^ ^ ^'o^^, ^ ^f`^l^c, ne-^^^`,^elerS ^aai^le in a i.:

^fP^l^Y, ^^^^^^P^^l^ ^ ^ good ^^^A ^officer who aot^ ^^^roP^ ^^

and taannoR ^6aum the iP11^n^Pnnty oR the S,^^^e^-eigP=@;

^y,^°.State P&se of Ltk -11^s^fi arace withsE ^^P^ ^ ^^di^i^l ^^ae^P° a^;ts eP^tir-iy ^^i'tl^ou ff j^PrPsP^^^^^I,^ or wPtl^o^^t ^OP^pl

;P^ri^di^^teP^ r^qP^tsites he may be held cuviii^^ liable for abuse ^f pR0^^ss even tho.^^t^ his

act involved a decision Polade -M good faith, fh-at,he had jurisdicfion.

^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^r^P^^l^ ^ 37`1 ^^ the paP^ic^9laP phrasecl09Y of the-

Sc ^: ^^ ^ os-ed to beIconstitut¢On of the Un°sLad States

r^

confirms^ that ^^a ^ repugnant t^ the constito-^tion is void, and

essential ¢o atl written corPstPtutPo^1^^^ tu^^^rrPrr^^^^,that courts, as well as other d^ep^.rtP^entsg are bound by

Ablemaa^ ^ ^^^^^^ 21 Howe rd 506 ^^59). FF No ja^dic6ai pr ^ ^^^ s^rt^do ^i ^r ofPt6 i eit

^CC.may ^^^&,P6'^°3e, can have any laWfP^l

si$.'^l^orP'^y o1Pts4de of'tl`he lP((n&ts of

P^ it is iss^^ed; d an attempt to -t-Pforce it beyond these^fi^^court or judge

boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence,"

CASE LAW

Jud es Bound. Cia^h IFRCP. F.RekvpF aaid

Constitution,

Unuted qt_ates Constitutdon ArtIO96 V9

^ ^hP ^t^ll be betmade-in... .... This Cansfiitufian, and fhe0.lavers of the United a^uthori!y of

sum.the lJnited States .^hal e ^sl^all he lac^und th0^hYthiP^g in $h^ ^or^ S'ifP^^ioh ^r l^^nrs of a^y Staf^ to ^h^ e^i7 rat^

ne^tv^ifk^^^^iidi^g. The Senators and l^^^re eP7tativ6^ hefc^re rr^e^fi^d ^ ^,l of^cers hofh ^fmembers of th^ ^^v^ral state l^gi^ilt^Pres , and ^.ll xe^a^tPV^ ^P^the United States and Of ^th^^ sev^r3l states sE^ail be ba^PrPd b ^^^h ^^ ^ffirrr^^ti^P^ ^^

sPa ort this Constifutiean ... .."

FRCIVP =FRCP ^15.Seea eaadsoe v. ^'e^adome PetrOlOum Co^°porati®e^, D.C. La. 1940, 35 SU

P P.

"SLibsfantivc rights remain unaffected by these rules and will he erlforced.

3

^ ^. _

]^^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^ Zi -a.n ^urt as ^apor^ cou

1^^^^^ the ^^r^^^ effect ^s ^ statute and are as binding ^a^on the ^^^s^l.

g ^ ^.ll '^966 254 F ^9^^D. 90°These rules neither e^Nl^r=ge°,^ee: Ke^^^ged^^ v. Rub^^ ^

nor abridge rights granted bv ^onstitut.ion.

^ ^ ^^^ • T =°a^

^ ^ ^ Ka^ ^ ^ A. 1^^59 , 266 F 2d 68 1^'. e ^ ^^ ^See : r0un^l^ yr N^ ¢F p^ ^ 5

purpose dr 6^^^^^ Y V^iIS ^ 4s A`a-A ^,^46^o3ca^ the I'.9^^ga^^t a j5„^-t, fC iex^$^k fsJve a^ $

-ds^^^ ^ trsa

i^SLMS,

^^ ^E LAVYI-Jurisdictii^^^^^^ ^ ^^^ ^^^^F vVeevede juradv^:^lanr^ ^el, _^

^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^or-wed and failed "^ ^^^-PAII VIO^a#^Article ^lk, ^^^^^^^^g Junadictiona

^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^onfundi ^q^^ ^e unicuiquejurisdicti ^^^ ^^ u^r The,^^^ order ot thi^^gs is

lnst.^tifounded if every one pr^^ssrvOs not hls jurasdica^^

^^^^ Bra 'a s^ ^^atler 13 WaH 336 351 352 " e.. e any authority exercised is a^d authority and for the ^^^r^^^^ of such authority, when the want of jurisdictior^ is

usurpedknown to the judge, no excuse is ^erfpissible,

See: State v. Dhu . 27003 ME 75 Parac ra h 8 825 A.2d,335 34,i^ ^ . may be rae^ d ata Jd^isdictiou^ is the essential hasis of the court sauth^aritv, and this

any time. ttie

The general requirement that °°... the burden is on the defendant to show47 S F^.4a^;e^on^.xis-tehce of J.^urisdictie^r^^l facts; Russell ►r. B^if ^^^'^^ ^^^^

^^'s Volume 2, PageGibch^sst v. Odl. Land Co., 21 ^f.^^. ^ f ^, 45 ^^^a.^ ^

1763) , is resolved b *y Article @A which ^efi^^^ ^^act1y, Who ^ Con^ractijaity Bound by

Jurisdiction of the ^^^^^^tutiora^uch Constt^ ®n in Consia^eratson for Offlces Of^ath or Affa^atoo^^ to s^a^^^^ "... The

Paabli, Trust and thdse Bonef°ts of ^^^tla ed, and the ^ rnbers of ^t[ e ^several StateSenators and Representative before rn ^^ ^^ ^ ^ ^st^t^ti^^d Qf the^^gisi^t^r^s, and all executives and j^adicial Officers, bQth thes^veral States, shall be bound by Oath or Atfdrr^^tiort, to supp

to deti ne exactly to "^^hor^" the Constit^rtior^al J^arisdictior^Articl^ \A ^rti^l^ VI isSince the intent of

appiies;

s^e: st^a^k v W edacal Ea^anlft 1^^q 94 Ca 2d 751.211 P2d 3^^ "Once ^^^^^f^r^g^^";

ju. fisdicr';^^ ^finnot be assurned, ^tinust be p;^^ed to exsst.

4

9^^4^^^ ^r^ "^r^^ ^P9 ^E46^ 4&^r^aeavu,,,... •

a^ce cl^aller^ged, is to b^ proven,See: N^^^^^

29?^' U'

^^urisdictioE^. Tl^a^ bLAr der^ if proof ofnot b^ the^^r i^dicti^r^ r-le on the sufficiency of the proofstendered.

- ^ S 149 79S CT lf a^[V Tr^^°^^^^l ^^^^^^t^ t9n^^Q absence of proof^^^

^^ j^°^^^f^.^^^^s^ o^F^^a person and ^^ ie^^t matter, the -z,.^se must ^a^^ ^^.,is '"^`^issed

^,^

CASE LAW

Harper's Constitutional Right to Chail^^^^eJ^n'sdiction vioiated by the ^^urt

84 ki- S 436 125e,9 "WtreM' t^gtgs secured^^^^^ ^ ^^^tffion are

^nvot,led5 there can be no rui^_^^a^-ing or.^egislatio^^a, which would ^

^b "I V^ gooth (1 858), 56 u.S. (21 How.) 506, 16 L.Ed. 169, `g^i^^ii r^^__ ^. --- a.^^a --qn4^ ^amAd authojtt ^^t^id^ t^a^ ii^^it^ of tk^^

(^i-nphasis added)

ecided."

id 2 Gray 12, But an act don(a in ^ornp9ete absea^ce. of allsee:jurisdiction cannot be a judicia! act. It is no more than the act.of a private citizen,

pretending to have judicial power which does not exist at a^1^l ^^eaectafi on that tbe ^ togrant absolute judicial ir^rnur^ifiy is contrary to t&^e, public policy p

shall be a Rule df Law.Field

ifiddleton:^ Lo^ (1866),30 C. 596, citing P ^^.^^Grv. 5^^^^ (1 849) 5 {^arb.(N.Y) 607,

603. "No officer canacquire ju'risdiction by deciding he has it. The ®ffioer, Whether

judicial or ministerial, decides at hi^ own neril."'3'il I Pd:

646 (187421 there is no jurisdiiction, thera can be no discretion, for discretion is

incident to jurisdiction."

See State L- ®huy, 2003 Mf 75 l 8 , 825 A .,2d 336 341; M R Civ. t^^(hd at

"Jurisdiction is the esssr^tial basis of the c^a^art' s authority, and this issue may be

any fime:

5

"Jurisdiction, once challenged, canno,

^^^^ LAW

ivah^ees. Constritu^^onal 14"' Amea^^^^^iet

-?,o "da^^ ^^^^^^s" Rights F6vloiated'^ ^^ the ^ouep-

^ ^25 0 ^^ `^^ ^4^^ora.^^^tutioraaia^^t os ^^ot^ r ^^ ^^^: irt^^^^` confers ^^^ rights; 6i imposes no dutRe%. affords no piotect9orw, it k eatesf¢n^ ^ ff ic,e, it

is in ^^^^^ ^onremprafion, ^^^ inoperative as though it had ne=v^d" been ^^^4se^^a.

^ee° ^ ^ lFe Cul^' z^^ ^ ^^ ^^^ ^^$^^^ ^^^^^^ ?e ^ ^ ^r^F^^s^^^ ^^^^ be ^^ ^^^^^tE^n or penalty upon one b^^j;^^^ of h°s^ ^^ ^ e -t

consfitutronag tiightM.a°

See: IfWfan iica^ °^^^^ The federal courts are open ao^^r^`i^^ suitorst^r^ as ^^.^

othors, and proc!eduW. rules are not to be construed so as to Rrilpose conditions on

litigants that in effect ar^ouiit to a denial of Juris-diedon.

See: 0kns v. C wofindepandence 100S.Ct ^ ^^^ ^^Rm °¢The innocent individuaE

who is harmed by an abuse of governmenta@ authority is assured that he will be

compensated for his injury."

See: FRCP 201 H ^m va ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^ ^^^^s C.A.N.Y. 1954 , 213 E.2d .22^. " The

federW courts are open to foreign sui as to others, and procedural rules are not to beconstrued so as to impose condiitions on litigants that in effect amount to a denial of

jurisdir-tiors.

See: ^^3 v. Bedwe^d 182 LJ.S. 244Court of the ielrfited States

rtAgd: "it will be an evil day for American Libertsi if the theory of a government outsidesupreme law fiinds (odgmerst h our constitutional jurisprudence, No higher duty res ts

upon this Court than to exert its full autho-rity to p^^e v*ent all vio6atior}s of the principles of

the Constitutior`i.°.°

^^^^-LAWFRCPIFRGIvP

The Courts den'a6 of an Article 61I, Subject MatteriurosdictionVoids Jurisdiction over Harpers

^^Q8Buae 12„S utaject rriatteg"jurisdictiorr may not.^e waived arzd courts may raise the issue sua

sponts'.'

FRCPs ^^^^ ^^fhj 3"Lack of s^rject matter j^ari^dictioa^ is a defense that is never ^r^iv^^.d^

6

See: Ze-nafh Radna Co^^sup• I

.Pa e. 19 5O ^^°^^4fh^^^^^^^ ^'^^O^V^^^^^ that

t6Q^ coK.set Escks j^r^isdi^•E^^1^ q.^d^ Y^^^^^^0^.5'^

^^^^^^E_,eL matterJurisdi^^^^^c^ Y <Pr^se, even

^ifter ?riai'°.

^ [L '- ^t^i+^'s^ f4^ ^ a^,^ P^^°^F 3(^ e`y 'P^^^^3 ^^^ ^^ ^,, ^'^4 ^^@ ^^ ^ ^

^^^= ^^d^^^^^" ^a ^4^Y^^ ^ ^ that ^^ ^ a! any ^4^^^^,One of the ^^a@o4^aa^`G^.^ of subject matter s^^"isdi?^o^^ is ^ie ca4' ^^ raRs. ^^

iricVudi9i`^^ on ^ppeal. If the Distri^` Cour p 9.cked subject matter ^urisdicfion, we would

V^ave to va-cate itc- order.

See: Laws v. A ader 15C 296- ^^^ ^^ ^^ ^^^ard of Delegates of S.F. Fire

2g2idM2s^^1AQAF 2=2` Therefore, it is necessar^^ that the record presen'^ the fact

^^tab94shing the jurisdoat4on of the trabunai.a4

S ^G: gobbit vo Frank ca Webber & CO_ 130 ^^.E^. 78i 4 78a E6 J^^ri^@diction is of two kinds,

d both must concur or the judgment ^^iii R^^^^r^^^, ^r^of the subject matter and of the

kroid in any case in which a court has assumed to act, the. difference being that

jurisdictionIof tt^^ subjec^^^^^tter given by law cannot be conferred by consent, whii^

jurisdiction of the person may be obtair^^d by consent.

Seea ^^^ens vr ^evine, 41^.^ U.S: 583'(1974) "The law r^^quir^^PROOF OF

JURISDICTION to appear on ^hs, Record of the administrati^^ ^gffl^^y and a9i

admiiiBstrative procoedlngs:'°

See: ^ou^s.vvQA^^ ^^ ^ A4^^1QX 21 1 l^ ^ 149, 29 S-C-1 -42 (11-9AB) ^@a^h^t^^^^ r^ ^^^ be

finds absence of proof of jurisdect¢or^ o^rer person and subject ^ta^er,

dimissed."

See: ^Iarshalsta_.@° jO CORO ^^° ^^^^.^^°a^^^ ^ ^®^^^^ 18 WaV160 s^ a^^sugus^

v. Ketch^r^ ^8 F 2d 948. '°Wh^'re tf^ere is no jurisdictiort there is no ju^fge; fi^he

proceeding is as hathing,

^^^^ ^^^Harpers un-e°^^utted A^^^^^^t(A)0 tJot®^^^ stand as

Facts before the ^^urt

See: Mores v Nat®onaI cash Regjlter ^^ SW 2nd 433, (1981)- "Uncontested

a€fegations of fact must be ^^ce-pted I as true

^^^: ^^^7thern Pac, Coo ^^a Fis^^6 186 ^'<^l.Ap€^.2e^ :^^^, 362, 333 P.2d °133. "Wi°ien rio

^

,.,

affidavi^s are filed in oppositioil, the trial court is entitled to acc Ie pt as true the facts

° ^facts are ^r^i^^hi^^ the af^ian^^'s personaf^i0^.ged in respor^der4t's affidavits if ... such.

k ^^^^rviedge and [are o^^es] to which he ^.oufd competently tesci^^^...."

&Rte^n3 42F^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^ °Us^^ ^^^ ^^itpd StatP ^ ^ ^^^O^^ 550 F - 2d 29

^3^^^ 3^ ^ leg a l or^ ^, ESifena e c^r^ogsfy be equated with fraud where t

F.2d aY^^ ^ At 1 ^^ ^ ^mor^f ^^9^E Ar where an ir^^",uir~^ left ^9^^ars^°^ere^a ^^oufd be i^^^^,sti;O^^a ^f^^ €"ki@^^-`ad^€^^..

-rA^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^ ^.^d ^^^, ^^ ^^^ CaIf6^re ^^ state the trUe faCtS

^^^h,f^^ one r^f ^^^^^.^ uponwhen such stater^ent i, iegaffy required, to the detrir^^er^^ of '

s

co^^duct..." can be termed "fra^^,

^ and deceit " .

as or C^e^File V.Bowen 54 A, G1123 E6Silence is a sP-.cE^s cif conductg a'nd constetut,eS

an implied representation of the Oxi^aencs of facts in ques^ion, ^^^^^^ ^ ^^^e ^9 oh^ such

frorn is a^ordingl^; a ^cees of esto^^ b^ mis^-epr^^^^^^^^^^a character and under such circa^^^star^c-S that ^i ^^^^ ^ ^^^d ^^^u^ ^ ^ h^^^^ ^ ^^

party to permit the sifent party to deny ^^.ha^. his ^

believe^ ^^^ QPSEand act upon, it- will. ^^ ^^

. ^^^^ LAWHarpor'^ judgment as `G^^urt disquaEafied"

and is void &`^b InItIo'

^^^: In ^ ^d^^^s^a^^(9317) 177 C, 93, 170 ^. 9^16G^"fgnorance of the la^v dc^eq not

excuse misc®nduc-$ in anyone, least of a1l in asworrt OfTIGUr of the faW:'°

ne Cou ho9d.i^ LNG v. U.S 114 S-Cti 1147^ ^s^^a^i ^^^

That "Disqualification is required if an cbjectir<e observer wouldentertain

questio r^s about the judg^°^ irr^p^ ► iafity. 6f ajui^ge°s attit^ad^ or s^^t U [^^ir^d6^d^^^

detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearoreg y the

must be disquaf ►fied.°' [Emphasis added].

See: L6ffebe^ v, Hea6^^ ^ervaces Ac Ue.10tdos^ ^or . 486 U.S. 847 106 S.Ct 2194not

^^^} _Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof oE the partial ity^ ^ ^^fi^ c^^^i^^ or

a requirement, only the ^.ppeararice of partiality (^ahat matters is not .he ^`

i.^rejGldice but its appearance); Une^ ^s v, Ba9lsta°^eni 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.

^^

1 g§5 (^^^^._,.® ^onel ^5(a^ ls dir^^^ed against t^s^ appearance of E^artialat^^, whether or not

the judge e is actualEy biased.`) i54ectioG^ 45 Nq of the Judici Codu t ^ ^ r t ^r^^noteid not intended to protect litigants f^°orfi actual ^.[gs in their judg+vF ^

public confidence in the impartialitsy° of the ;udicoaE pro^^s-q.@@a

^ _Cee: ^^Y10^ $ rq^r@res a r^Ag ^ t0^

^2(60 t^ ^^r 1 97- , s E^at ^O^^rt also stated Aghat SI-CtiOr^ 455(^^ q

^g in ^^^e^ich a^isEE^er °^^paftiaEi^; might rea4oiiabE^^ be^'=kra 1^sL' r ^^'°^ P ^'^recrr^^ ^°ii^^@^eE^^ ir^ ^E^y pro^.eed r^

A^@ 9 " t^^e Cour'g -^tate^^ that"it9ssa^p'^^^`ar^^ thatit^ ^^ i`;F^e^r^^ ^E

^^?^^^^^^^.fiiust;ce, ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^efieves that he has : ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ce_

_f ,s^^r officer who actS in ^^ioEation of tixe co„dstitf9tronSee: ^^^1^^1^1^ ^'^a ^^: ^^^^^^a-ses to represent the government.'¢

^^^r ^^^^^^t^iSee; U ^.^V G.^^88s^ c9un vs ^ 75 l^ic^^ 1 19^^. "° The rule of gorrar^u^rif^R as f ^opiti^E subdivisior^s of gover r^r r ^e^ at i- E^grab^^ abrogat^^d.as it has

i unicipai corporati^herefofor^ been abrogated as tO s^ab^isir cities.

^^ pe^^s of whether the^^defense of Vverr^r^^enfial as^mur^ity^or tort iiabdEr^ av

involved poiitical subdivasion is functioning °^overnmentaily` or °proprietariEy@.@a

sover s224,P2d °i 037 The pri^^ ^ i^^ re°^^a^^ur^ur^- ^) d^ is

^^^u^ ^aa i^ffl^^t flr^r1u g (not effer-t of its'actions^^^^^^ is ^os^ thenot

p^a^a6i^.@p hare) gove

6arwbreaker ar gurisdi^tio^ ^ ^ ^^^^^ 622 (196Q).

CASE LAW91am eaa are elititied to a "VO1d"' Judgmapat

91iot V. Peers0!1 Pet. 32R 34^Q 26 US. 328 3^^ 1^^^ Under

Ff^^^. ^

wrfhc^ut ^ ^c^fyl. . . .

is fAppl^^VGAEdlV to ^Gi!l states, the `^. ^ f-pVbA

as dlid^^l^19,They G^^

^E1^®t^'W^4^@G8n+_lrv, but Jill@.^Ey MtJid,,

^fi^luc^^rt^^r^ls ^^aacf c^°d^r^ ar^^ a^^ d4A osdtiOrr to them. Theyri^r to a reversal in ^P^^.rrd forrr^ no bar tc^ a recovery sougVit; even pconstitute no ju^tifi^^ti^rr; and ^!! pe rsorrs concerned in executing such judgrr^e^ts or

sentenues, are considered, in law, as trespasser

k @^ Law ^i^fl^^^ S1^'h Eg1t1o t74, *`^ofd j^iclgr^tent^^ ^ se ^^^^^

See: lac ^ cr^^hhas no legal force or effect, i•nvalidif ^ dT tnrhich may be asserted by any p

is ^^ndare affected at any time and at aiiy place directly or coIlateraEl^i^h ^ ^^d ^s .i^Volunteer

Life Ins. Co., Te;^.Clv.App., 80 S.tl^.2d `1 Q87, 1092. One. w^rfi^^ or

forever continues to be al^solutely null, Without f^^lf^^^ra^^^neff^^^^^1^ ^^`co ^irr^a`tion,support a right, of no legal force and effectritifIc,tlorB, or enforcement in any rn anrVer or(o any degree.

n

see

^ ^^ ^^^ (M,D. fis. (^^^

^^^)ji 4-,7,affirnied'29 F3dI^^^i^^^ (((, l

'10i^(udgr ^ne^ br ^^^ ^=-^eil ! 10 F. ^ ^^ .^ ^( 'n ^^^^^'c^^^^e o(ated due^^^ 4^^^^^ E^^^`'n

-ourl (a ¢ ^rs. '-Via rendered^^

; ,?' ^V u^t. ^trR^a^r3^, a Et`far'Vnerone ^^^he^°^proCeSsi N^^^d^^ ^^^.^ ^

judga^ ^^VrV£^du^tiOrl ^f i^ . S _C.r^^r9g ^^^ ^(^^s i

iNrconvstent with due e"^,t'r^^^Q,-:, Fed R£J'rl^s UY,

r^ann ^ ^aa^^P^. ^92 (U . S .C ^.$

S^h^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^.^,^d ^^^^ A judgment obtasned ^yi

^^juu°isdicfio over the defendant is void:"

FQ(a ) ch^.llenged gudgr^er^f is eith^ r valid ^r %toid." ^^id and ^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ted if the cOur,Mara ra h 6 736 A.2d 273 2 ^^. `° A judgment isissuing the judgment (^ck^ ^^^^ect mat^^^Jumisdiction," ld.

OTHER soURCE MATERiALCP I FRCIVP

See; Me^r^^^^^^Q^ohave the force of law

See: ^^^^2g!^vRUb1n D-C l61 1 9,56, 254 F. Su19Co r^^ti^^tic^rl.

°CE^e se rules neither ^nlargenor ^bridge rights grarsted by

dA The I se rules

{f

SEE: YV.,^tlgnd.0i1 20. Z- FirOstonethese r^al^ ^have duty of givir€g full expressic^n to clearDistricf Courfs, in adr^inisfcrir^g ^fh^r.rr^^^nir^^ e^f w^ard^ u^ed withouf c^r^e rule r^r^tlifying arc C^L 1977

ausee: ^la^tsaa) fund Invr^stoe°s Ir^ca V. Pu^^^^ district cc^un^f^^ y a ^ no ^ ^ddr^^is^f

^^ ^d^^t^d b^F.2d 62®. ^E LocaB ru9es may

vvith federal rules.227 F 417. " The courts are not bound by an

^^^^ ^a I^^ ^^ 9^ C^E^f^ 3^,See: ^^^^officer's interpretation of the fa^rv ^rnder^nrhrch he pred^ar^es to act."

AttorFieys First duty is to the CourtNot his client .

^,10

li, ^

® ^^9S. vo^ua^e '^ se^oon. 4 ^^o^^^^A o

The^^^n the

see Cor US Juris SeRa^^^^u^ ^ ^blic, not to t9le cleent, and ^^^ ^^^^^^ Clie^ s ^ ecourt

al 50

theqtt^?^ey`s first duty €s tO the ^^^6ra^ and t^-^e P

`^ dGient cOn^^l6ct with those he o^^E^8s 2s alle^t^n^^i^^ to ^eadmintistr^^g^^n of justice, the ^^hei^^ ela"^ onship ^^wi.th their attonneYs'^,^a?^ds°0 of the cou^ in reg^r_ & ^ ^ g ^9 a ^^^^ ^^^^o€^s I thrs^$a^^ 9:

g

^^ see sco^n^, Of °re^^^^`ds^^g 4_avv^^e^- Discipli^^e ^. other -^ e

_!

. . ^'^^. . _ . . . - .

( . . ^ ^ ^ ^ .^ . .. . - . .. - . . .

'!II -... . . - .

ti

-^ ^^^^^^^ ^

oa^^ ^^ of^^^^^ judge ^aricies NgL B-Ltx^^

0.ai^ of offices Magist°^^^ James M. ^laszak

`^;

^- ^

1. S t

0 RT

^^^.z..^. . .

^^ DE -^ ^ ^- ^ ^ M. ^^G^ 0

. O^^ PLEASOF CO^^-='^^wN ^^^ COURTL O R A I N ^^^^NATM OHIO

^,A,MF,S M. BU GEa DGIE

F Ea ,^:^1Rg!N- COIIN i

00

PLL ASn y'

LFh^`. O ,^ta i;,

`3^.0i:

- ^ C

^^ ^str^t^ ^^^^^s L. B@aszak ^a@@ se^e as the Courtffs Magistrate ^^° all purposes^

and to all ^^^nts as permitted by. @awo ^^^^°s all ^@^^@ trials and hearings toP^arsuar^t to C6^^@ @^^@e 53, the C^^^art herebyr

which no °^ury trial right attaches, or to which the jury r@ght has been wa6ved.e All

hearings for garn@shmentg attachment, execution, replevin and judgment debtor

exani6nations are. IQ@cew@se referred to the Magistrateo defendants, set b^i^^

Pursc^arct to Crirridr^a( Rule 19p the Magistrate r^.a^{ arraign

appoint counsel and c'ohs@der all -matters permitted under Rule 19.

IT IS SO O. E. D-

^PA^^^L^F

IIIl IIH I II9 6iI R ClI l lili llNlikl lplGl B ll'ilG l ll ll l! iSPl l9!^;;

^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^CE,.

^^- upp ^ ^ ^^c^ that{^ `^^ ^I^ ^rE, : s^lc^^^^ ^^ ^w'^

^ J` ` ^ ^^

^ ^^^^do . ^^ ^i^ l^ ah^ ^^CO^^81i^^^^^^ ^ ^^^ the ^^af^^^^

^^^^^^ to ^^^^^Wgj^^^^cc Wed ^M^^ d ^^ ^ ^^ out

b^ge ^dpc^^.^ ^ dud^^@ p ® . Y ^B

^^^ of the L^.^ ^ ^ ° , CO ^ C^.^M^.D Co to ^^^^-tlUP®^ ^^ as ^^ofm^ ^^Mty and

been ^^ected, ^ccor0 ff tO the best^°- --1.;.-r- c ^.,

39^:0 ^^nde^`^^`^

^ ^i,r_! L) T

l^J102 9

6! Ay 1

CD . ^ . . . . - . . . , .. ^. . . . , . ^ . ^ . .^- ^ - - .. . . ^ . . . . , .. . _.^--^. ^ - . . . . . ^ . ^ .

^TA ^ .^' OF C^.tIlO ^

zVTYOFLORArN ^Cou

^^^^^^^e ^^ ^Z day of

`-' Sworn to before me and gubs^ribed to ^ ffiYp,-^

I^^ce-mDer, _IUU6

,^Qch2c1N®tar7 Pubfic

0291

^ i L ^ ^.;.CiRAIN COl)P^ i v

^L^^^ A^^ ° 5 A 0a ^ ^^^ ^^.^c C

QF C OF'ii°i0^j r'l A

^.0 F^

^`^^^^r^^%i^`^^5^^^^^^^1^^^'^ f^^CS ^°° ^c U

f 'h^ m^ ^^^ s e n ^^ th e C^.^-Fti^ [^^ 0^ ^ ^^ ^C^^^^

^^^e C^^^s^e uli^.^ ^.^

^^^^^^^^^^^^^ r^^-.^^^ ^^^^^^ 2igeao ^^^^.^^ ^^^ ^^^t.^W^:Mjf2it^1^ ^^ ^^.

^ ^^ as ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^all duties incumbent ^^^o

to which Io ^°^^^. ^^^°^r^ ^O^rrr^^j C®mmon ^^^^ oul°t

.^ ^^ ^^^z^^^^^ acco.rdin^° to the best ^.^°^YOb^.^ave been appo

^crsi-^^^^^

L

rjAMESL

,^TA TE OF OHIO ^1

^^^^^^^^UT,(A-'2v )

o^°.a^ to before me and subsci°rhe^1° r^O in R,I^.^T^e.^cc this Z'8TH'day 0Sworn^

,2®06D,gcEmBER

1a^^ae1 C creBaceNotary`Pa^bfic

lryirnal Page

1 ._.

of Court Hearilig on ^^arn^^^^^ ^^Transc

^^^^ligh^^ ^ ^^^e m, ents

____-----

The State of Ghion

County of T,orai n - ) SS :

IN i H^ CnUR iOL' COMMON PLEAS

JANK, UT p-M EP.iCA

pla.inrif fP

) Noa 10Cv267218v ,s .

JERRY HARPER, ET AL © ^ )

Defendant®

^O:L%WLETE.^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^^^^N'^;S

^^^^^, cH 14 , 2012^^^

APPEARA^?^CES

Appearingon behalf of the Plaintiff :

Reisen.feld &_Associates, byRebecca N. Algenio9 Fsq..

aridSarah E. Leibel, Esq.p

Appearing on behalf of the Defenda.ntse

Dann, Doberdruk & Wel.lenP byMarc Danri p Esq a

andGrace Dobetdruk, Esq.

^^^DAY MR -H 14f 2012^TE^OON SES^^10^ ,

THE COURT: All right = For the record. ^ we are

con 1 ^JCV^_5721^ aen.ed ]^ere t1nis afternoon in Case C^umber

^ 1 ed Bank of Pkn-r^_ca ,^it^ successor ]^y^; me^cier toIt ,_s 5 ^1

T^' as p1_a_^nti f f ^^er sus ^ce rryBAC Home Loan Ser^^^-cing^

^ understanding is thatFiarper and others as desenadnts ^ N^1'

^ ement ^we are here on a motion to vacate, a motion to supp-

ion to vacate, a motion to dismissf and pl aintiff'sa motcorn:.bined motions to respond in oppo,sition thereto °

MSa LEIBELe Yes^

THE COURT: right?

Okay o I'V`e go% a little. housekeeping to do

before weget started. For the record, foi our court

are Attorney Rebecca

reporter, in attendance today

Algeni.o

NISo ALGENIOo Yesethat correct?

THE COURTe -- did I pronounce73 MS m AL.GENIO o Yes, Your' Hon.or e

THE COURTe -Attorney Sarah Leibel.

9 .

0 MS. LEIBEL.e Lei.bele

1 THE COURTe Leibel?

2 MS. LEIBELe Yeahe

3 THE COURT: That's a bad name for a lawyer.

4 M,So LEIBEL: I agreem It's not.fortunateo

5 THE COURT: Attorney Marc Dannfor defendant, and

/

At torney Grace Doberdruk

MS ; DOBERDRUIKa Yes

THE COUR.T : did I pronounce that correctly?

m,5 . DOBERDRUK : (Nodding head atTirmati-%%ely).

THE COU.R'T n OI-.ay. Thank yo u for all co1111nq

I spoke on the p1_-ione to Attorney McC1_ain.. He

will not be attending this hear.ing, although he did not

vaithdraw as counsel of record

MRo DANN: That' s correct ®

THE COURT: as far as the file is concerneda

The housekeepii^g that I have to do is this: In

my former life I did some legal work forF I believe

Reverend Har_pe_r's church, I Bm guessing1996, 1998,

sornewhere around there. I wound up referring him and his

church to another counsel, but I did have a period.i.n my

life where I represented either Rever-.eri.d Harper or his

churche

MR. HARPER: The church.

THE COURTo The churchP okayo

I.was later called as a witness in some

litigation that involved Reverend Harper's church, not as

a lawyer but as a witness, and the.result of that

appearance in court left me with a negative feelingsabout

Reverend Harper for a few reasonsP as a witness, not as a

3

4

5

6

^

8

9

10

11

12

_3

14

1 1 l awyer a I°m not tall;.ing about aeny privilege, o],ayo I was

put in. a verv uncomfortabLe position as ,3. wi tness ,

I told this event to Attorney McClain when i

first got the pl eadi-ngs. I_ says tF °°l ll recuse m.ysc-lf out

of this case if you want me to, I di_d not make any

representa tei_ons to ti-ie plaint i tj= I told the plaintl if' s

counsel that just prior to you walking in, Attorney Dann.

So t1_-ie long and short of it is this o I do not

believe I have a conflict, but if any party or attorney

thinks that I have a conflict, I'll recuse r_nyselfe But I

want that on the record. I d.on ° t want di s cip l i.n.ary

^:council looking over my g^^?oulder for anything, okay?

Attorney for plaintiffs, do you have any problem?

MS. ALGENIOe No objection,. Your Honor.

15 THE COURTa Attorriey Dann?

16 MRo DANND Your Honor,.i,discussed this issue

17 both with my client, who raised it separately with me, and

18 with Attorney.McClairi.; and based onthose.conversations,

19 we have no objection to your proceedinga

20 THE COURTa Thank youe It's riotede All righto

21 Don't ever have anything to worry about if you

22 put everything in front of everybody, right?

23 Okays Before we get.into the merit discussion of

24 the motions, I have a -- I just have a practical issue

that I want to talk about here. See if I'm read.ing this

^e .-FBIT C

ja^^es M. B-aszakRs Judicial biasof ^^ ^ Harper concerningAffidavit`^I ^.rr

^^.

.;.^

STATE OF OHIO

COUNTY OF LORAIN

berri L e 1-1arp^src st^^t:es t.^e ^'^;lf€ vkk '^ -

I

4.

S.

^ ^^^^^^A-VIT

^^^ owledgehas pea sonal'^^ledgd of ghe:r^^^s in this Affidavit and a$n .^

^o j..e^^^Yt t^ ^:.^^^ 3^ ^ac0-^, .^et.egfl'€-3 . . .

r^e^^^s repa esentation and6. 1^:ffiant had conversations with rriy counsel, Azr concern d^.e to Magistrate Janles M. Blasz ak

p self in th ethen 1^ecogning an ad^rersarial vvitness against.thetohme ^^od d request aabove stated civil trial. Attorney Dann indicateddismissal prior to my one and only i^earing ^^ ^ Qr^a^ h hQa^ n^ ^a ^th

my

l^no^nrledde, the issue vv^.s not addressed s.

only one we had throughont these proce?d.ingso

^ ^^^^^^^:^s as an ^^' ^^'r'^r did`-- that ^'^^^.gbs^'^. _ ^ ^aSL`ne,r^ l^ E ^^ ^

^^fi^^s^ ^^ s^y^^ Cen^.e ^^` Lorain ^^o^Ean^^, myself as. p ^.^ ..^a

@^^epresen^:<b ^,i^dan^ Life Chr istian^t^^^ ^i9^^ in a r^^atter involving a conslm_

a^d its r^^enab ^'s beginning ia^ --^of interest ^ ^^^ estate c^3n^:r ^c€.^. counsel at the "tun°^^= on a^ ^i L I's le^,-^.g^^ s.^e ^:.^^:R^`^ ^'^¢'^Y'c'^ $^l ^d a

^°he^i a^orne ^p j^.^es ^^.^o Blasza^. and h^.s firm^^l-§^s `a^ ak &

conflictof interest in opposition to the Thomp, ^^ that g^^^ wd Thi^ yni ^ia1 ^iiYng

in Cle^^eAand ^^hat was repres^^^^in^ the church h andby Blaszak did dis^.iss our represe^^.t^.tion (^^-ho^.psO ail^t the ^iu^ real

^estate c^sntraet which resulted in ca^ril suit by `^l^ F ^^

myself and a court trial in October of 2001.

Affiant adrnits^ ^bun.dant. Life Christian Genter^^^or^.in ^`onn^ is the church

thatAffiant has been the p^.stor since June of ^._

Afflat^.d?rnits that M^.gistA a^:^ J^.n^.es M. Blasza^9 after being an attorneyn typ self as

reprosenting ^ound and having pr^^ le^e^ infc^r^n^$%o^ ^^.ct^and insi.^htsgpastor and its unernbor s self and the church in adid thex^ become ^.^. BQad^rersaria^l ^^uitness ^eagairist. r.nycivil co^.rt trial (Case # 404035 C^xya.la.oa ^o^:^ty Court of Common Pleas) in

Hine & Florys the very la-or firm heOctober, 2001 and testified for Thonrpson,had previously dism.issed as representation for the church.

Affiant admits that Magistrate James M. Blaszak did a.c o^ ^a^eQ Ho ^as

held pei°sor^.al bias ^-.^ainst affia.ntin court proceedingsd F, (as per court

negative feelings against Pastor ^Iarpor fh^for BOA attc ^e^s az^d^°anscripts, page 4, lin:e24°25) ir^. our hearin^Attorney Marc Dann Cmy counsel) on March 14, 2012= in our foreclosure

proceeding of which Magigtrate James M. Blaszak presided ovei.

a . ^ - . . . . . _ .

_ ^ ^ . . . ^ . ^ ^ . _ ^. a . ^ . .. .

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F A-.v

F^^'R``HE^.^-FFnsu^^'^` SA^^E^.1-^ NI.^UG^ B ^!

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V^^^2^.9.-e

. . . ^ ^ 99

Ohio by^,^ ^2 ^^ ^^ r d

s^,^d'%arii to and

€-^ ^^E^ ^^^i^ ^' ^4^ of^ s§2 ^b -sc°^l^^:^^ F.?'fr r ^^4^' a ^i

^'^ o=.,^gyi, ^.a:6^. ^ ^. as." ^i^l7

^^ da;d° ^i^

h^:-° £'ai .^ fia6 L ".k^i^ t^^Ps ^^-

1 1 A ^!£3.aQ^ ^ y-^

a^ c

E^^^ry ^^^^ic

DEN^SE: K KADER

^f^ MI S IO^ ^^ ^l ^ ^P

ertific te of ^r-O

I re - ffy that a true and c rr ct copy of the Writ of Mandamus . s

served on Judge J _ -s M. Bur . e, Lorain County Court ® on

Pleasg 224 Court treet, Elyriap Ohio this - day of

2013.

-^h s °$r

0 r rai1. 7® ! ^® ,1®1 e

Without Prejudice

10