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Learning about History through the Truman Doctrine Speech

Denise M. BostdorffProfessor of Political RhetoricDepartment of Communication

Rhetoric

Rhetoric ≠ Empty Words

Rhetoric can also be strategic –words can serve as a means to an end.

Rhetoric is generative—words generate and/or shape our perceptions of reality.

Truman’s Worldview:

Wilsonian IdealismPeace Through Cooperation

Power PoliticsPower as the Ultimate Arbiter

Evolution of White House Views of the Soviets and “Crisis” in Greece & Turkey

-USSR’s Expansion of Control in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria in 1945

-Stalin’s Election-Eve Address, Feb. 6, 1946

-George Kennan’s Long Telegram, Feb. 22, 1946, which drew on historic “stockpile” of anti-Communist rhetoric in U.S.

Charge d’affaires, Moscow Embassy

-Churchill’s Westminster Address, Mar. 5, 1946

-Events in Iran and Turkey, Mar.-Sept. 1946

-Clifford-Elsey Report, July-Sept. 1946

Clark M. Clifford, George M. Elsey Special Counsel Assistant to to the President Special Counsel

-Truman’s silence led to a rhetorical vacuum filled by anti-communists

Sen. Styles Bridges, R-New Hampshire

First post-war anti-Communist comic book, 1947

Rep. Everett Dirksen, R-Illinois

Greek Civil WarStarted 1943

-ELAS, largest resistance group to fight the Nazis, included the KKE or Greek Communists

-EDES, the second-largest resistance group, was anti-Communist and, eventually, began collaborating with the Germans against ELAS

-Security Battalions, formed by the occupied Greek government and funded by the Germans, were strongly motivated by anti-Communism and also fought ELAS

-Civilians Suffered the Most

-All sides committed terrible atrocities, with the effects compounded by World War II devastation at the hands of the Germans.

U.S. intelligence believed, incorrectly, that Yugoslavia was training and funding ELAS as part of “Soviet-inspired plan to dominate all of Balkans.”

YET, U.S. felt no urgency about helping.

-Post-war Greek government was corrupt, refused to institute economic reforms, kept Nazi collaborators in the police & military, and acted repressively.

American officials deemed Greek Prime Minister Constantine Tsaldaris to be “a silly man” (Under Sec. of State Dean Acheson) and a “stupid fool” (Mark Ethridge, U.S. delegate to UN Commission to Greece).

-U.S. considered Greece to be Great Britain’s problem, given Britain’s tacit agreement with Soviet Union and Britain’s use of force against an ELAS-organized protest in December 1944.

-American citizens were also largely anti-British at the time and wary of more possible war.

-Republicans swept the 1946 elections with the agenda of rolling back taxes and foreign involvement.

-The British sent Tsaldaris to the United States in December 1946 to get help, but the Truman White House refused to make any commitments.

And Then—Winter Happened. . . . .

Delivery of the British Diplomatic Notes, Friday, Feb. 21, 1947

Dean Acheson, Loy Henderson, Director ofUnder Secretary of State Near Eastern and African Affairs

The Greek Situation Becomes a Crisis Requiring the Truman Doctrine

*Henderson had submitted a report the day before that made the case for assisting Greece.

“Critical Situation in Greece”

“Crisis and Imminent Possibility of Collapse in Greece”

*Acheson edited Henderson’s report to emphasize urgency before passing it on to Marshall.

*Public Information and Public Affairs personnel at the State Department worked with Policy personnel on policy.

*Francis H. Russell, director of the Office of Public Affairs, worked with both information officers and policy officers of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) to develop what U.S. policy was and an information campaign to gain support for it.

(1) Developed “Informational Objectives and Main Themes” to be included in messages

See Russell’s “Informational Objectives and Main Themes” in Appendix A

(2) Decided the President should give an address to Congress and a fireside chat.

One problem: American citizens might be shocked by such a speech since the White House had not treated Greece as a crisis previously.

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doc03trine/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947--07&documentid=5-8&pagenumber=1

5(3) Recommended preconditioning news management campaign through off-the-record briefings to stimulate supportive coverage and prepare the way for Truman’s speech.

Second problem: Not enough time to write two speeches, so fireside chat is scrapped.

James “Scotty” Reston of The New York Times was one of many journalists who publicized the White House point of view on Greece in the week prior to Truman’s speech.

See Appendix B for sample summary of radio coverage.

The Truman Doctrine Speech-After a first draft in the State Department, it underwent 8 revisions.

Truman before joint session of U.S. Congress, March 12, 1947

-Some of the wording derived from Russell’s “Informational Objectives and Main Themes”

-Countless individuals from State (most notably Joseph M. Jones of Public Affairs and Acheson) and the White House (most notably Clifford and Elsey) were involved

Time to Analyze the Strategic Rhetoric!

Group 1: How did Truman convince his audience that Greece was in a state of crisis and deserving of $250 million in aid? (paragraphs 5-22, 41)

Group 2: How did he justify an additional $150 million in aid to Turkey, a less than democratic country that had refused to fight the Axis powers during World War II? (paragraphs 23-29, 41; compare to paragraphs 5-22 for Greece)

Group 3: How did Truman justify bypassing the United Nations? (paragraphs 12, 19, 32, 40)

Group 4: How did he encourage his domestic audience to see the situation as a crisis that demanded immediate action? (paragraphs 2, 3, 15-17, 30-39, 41-51, 54-58)

http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/truman-special-message-speech-text

Group 5: At the same time, how did Truman attempt to allay the fears of isolationist Republicans and American citizens that his policy would lead to military intervention or even war and to excessive cost? (paragraphs 47, 48, 52-53)

Group 6: What exactly did Truman say that U.S. policy was? (paragraphs 31, 37-39) How did he avoid provoking the Soviet Union? (paragraphs 12, 32-39; you may also want to search the text electronically)

Group 7: How did Truman’s direct and simple style and his delivery assist him in conveying his message? You may want to listen to part of his speech:

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/audio/sr64-47.ram

Group 8, the devil’s advocates: How did Truman articulate policy in a way that might be problematic for him in the future? (paragraphs 37-39 are key) How did Truman’s language inadvertently feed internal anti-Communist fears? (paragraphs 32-43)

Sample of Truman’s Reading Copy: Note the wide margins and extra spacing to accommodate his poor eyesight.

Additional Resources

Texas A&M University Press’s Series on Presidential Rhetoric:http://www.tamupress.com/Catalog/ProductSearch.aspx?filter=Titles&search=Presidential+Rhetoric&ExtendedSearch=False&ConsortiumID=0&rhl=&cid=0&sort=Name&itemsperpage=100&view=List&currentpage=0&pf=&sf=&sj=0

Voices of Democracy Website for *Free* Assistance

Truman Doctrine:

http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/deliberative-topics/u-s-internationalism-2/harry-s-truman-special-message-to-the-congress-on-greece-and-turkey-the-truman-doctrine-12-march-1947/

Other Significant Speeches:

http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/

Contact Info:

Denise M. Bostdorff Professor of Political Rhetoric Dept. of Communication The College of Wooster Wooster, OH 44691 dbostdorff@wooster.edu

Appendix A

Francis Russell’s “Informational Objectives and Main Themes,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. 5, The Near East and Africa (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), 76-78.

Appendix B

Radio Comment of March 3, 1947, “Summaries of Radio Comment and Newspaper Editorials-March 1947,” SMOF (Staff Member and Office Files): Rose Conway, Subject File, Truman Presidential Library