rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence · 2 rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of...

Rhodesia’s Unil ateral

Decl aration of Independence

An International History

Carl Peter Watts

pal-watts-book.indb iii 10/29/12 9:48 AM

Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070

RHODESIA’S UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Copyright © Carl Peter Watts, 2012.

All rights reserved.

First published in December 2012 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the

United States— a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue,

New York, NY 10010.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world,

this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited,

registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke,

Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and

has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,

the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN: 978- 1- 4039- 7907- 0

Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data

Watts, Carl Peter, 1971–

Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence : an international history /

Carl Peter Watts.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-1-4039-7907-0 (alk. paper)

1. Zimbabwe—History—1965-1980. 2. Zimbabwe—Politics and

government—1965–1979. 3. Zimbabwe—Foreign relations—Great Britain.

4. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Zimbabwe. 5. Great Britain—Politics

and government—1964–1979. 6. Great Britain—Foreign relations—

Commonwealth countries. 7. Commonwealth countries—Foreign relations—

Great Britain. 8. Great Britain—Foreign economic relations—United

States. 9. United States—Foreign relations—Great Britain. I. Title.

DT2981.W38 2012

968.9104—dc23 2012040839

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Scribe Inc.

First edition: December 2012

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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Contents

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction: The Rhodesian Crisis in International History and

International Relations 1

1 “Cudgelling Themselves Numb”: Anglo- Rhodesian

Negotiations and the Search for a Settlement 13

2 “A Classic Strategic Blunder”:

The Failure of British Deterrent and Coercive Strategies 53

3 “Moments of Tension and Drama”: Britain, Rhodesia,

and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings 83

4 “A Concert of Convenience”: Britain, Rhodesia, and

the Old Commonwealth 115

5 “An Essential Part of Our Cooperation in World Affairs”:

Anglo- American Relations and Rhodesia 155

6 Preventing a “Red Army in Blue Berets”?

The Rhodesian Problem at the United Nations 183

Conclusion: Reflections on the Rhodesian Crisis 203

Appendix: The Rhodesian Franchise 209

Notes 211

Bibliography 285

Index 303

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Introduction

The Rhodesian Crisis in

International History and

International Rel ations

On November 11, 1965, the Rhodesian prime minister, Ian Douglas Smith,

broadcast a proclamation to the people of Rhodesia that was modeled on

the American Declaration of Independence. The proclamation observed that

it was an “indisputable and historic fact” that Rhodesia had enjoyed self-

government since 1923, claimed that the people of Rhodesia supported their

government’s request for independence, and lamented that the British gov-

ernment persisted in “maintaining an unwarrantable jurisdiction . . . to the

detriment of the future peace, prosperity, and good government of Rho-

desia.” The proclamation declared the Rhodesian government’s belief that

“procrastination and delay strike at and injure the very life of the nation,”

and that it was “essential that Rhodesia should obtain without delay sov-

ereign independence, the justice of which is beyond question.” Finally, the

proclamation affirmed the “unswerving loyalty” of the Rhodesian people to

Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, and asserted their “undoubted right . . . to

promote the common good so that the dignity and freedom of all men may

be assured.” Annexed to the proclamation was a new constitution that uni-

laterally severed British responsibility for Rhodesia’s affairs. Smith went on

to reiterate the justice of the Rhodesian cause and told the Rhodesian people

that they had been cast in a heroic role of “worldwide significance.” He con-

cluded, “We have struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilization,

and Christianity— and in the spirit of this belief we have thus assumed our

sovereign independence.”1 As Smith delivered his broadcast, the governor of

Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, issued a statement to the press in which he

announced that in accordance with his instructions from London he had dis-

missed Smith and his Cabinet from office: “I call on citizens of Rhodesia to

refrain from all acts which would further the objectives of the illegal authori-

ties. Subject to that it is the duty of all citizens to maintain law and order in

this country and to carry on with their normal tasks. This applies equally to

the judiciary, the armed services, the police and public services.”2 However,

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Rhodesia’s Unil ateral Decl aration of Independence2

the dismissal of the Rhodesian government was not reported to the Rhode-

sian public because of strict press censorship.

The situation in Rhodesia remained calm, but the Rhodesian government

had taken steps to ensure that this would be the case. On November 3, Smith

asked Gibbs to sign a proclamation introducing a state of emergency, which

was supported by an affidavit from the commissioner of police. Smith assured

Gibbs that this was not a prelude to a (Unilateral Declaration of Indepen-

dence) UDI and the governor was therefore persuaded to sign the procla-

mation, which was issued two days later.3 With the domestic situation under

control, the Rhodesian government hoped that the international controversy

over the UDI would last only a matter of days. Smith recognized that UDI

would infuriate “starry- eyed liberals and the frustrated communists,” but he

placed his faith “in the theory that sudden storms are short.”4 This was a sad

delusion; the storm would be anything but short. The situation in Rhodesia

was inescapably part of what W. E. B. Du Bois had famously predicted would

become “[t]he problem of the twentieth century . . . the problem of the color

line.”5 The international indignation aroused by UDI— among the African

nationalists in Rhodesia, within the Organization of African Unity, among

the members of the Commonwealth, and at the United Nations— combined

with the intrusion of the Cold War into African politics meant that the Rho-

desian situation remained a festering sore on the international body politic

for the next 15 years. A combination of economic sanctions, guerilla war-

fare, and changing political attitudes toward Rhodesia in the United States

and South Africa eventually undermined the capacity of the white minority

regime to further resist the transition to black majority rule. As the respon-

sible colonial power, Britain was embarrassingly impotent throughout the

UDI period, and was not able to grant legal independence to the state of

Zimbabwe until April 1980. This book seeks to examine why Britain, in con-

junction with its international partners, was unable to manage the issue of

Rhodesian independence more effectively and prevent a UDI from occur-

ring, or to bring a swift end to the crisis as it unfolded.

The Rhodesian Crisis:

Historiography and Sources

During the 1960s, the disintegration of the Central African Federation

and the concomitant problems of granting independence to Southern

Rhodesia attracted a significant amount of coverage in the British media

and a high degree of interest among academics. The level of scrutiny inten-

sified in the wake of Rhodesia’s UDI. Many books were published that

examined the events leading up to UDI and subsequent efforts to bring

Rhodesia back to legality through diplomatic negotiations and economic

sanctions. With the escalation of the armed confrontation between Afri-

can nationalists and the UDI regime, a number of books also appeared

about the guerilla war. After Rhodesia eventually became legally indepen-

dent as Zimbabwe in 1980, a couple of studies of the Lancaster House



Introduction 3

negotiations emerged and a few other books on Rhodesia’s independence

were published, then interest generally subsided for almost twenty years.6

However, during the last decade or so, a combination of media attention,

fresh archival material, new oral histories, ongoing archival cataloguing

and digitization projects, periodic academic conferences, and a flurry of

publications, has revealed a resurgent interest in the Rhodesian crisis and

the recent history of southern Africa.

Media reports about Ian Smith’s activities a few years before his death, and

accounts of the troubled rule of Robert Mugabe in present day Zimbabwe,

have contributed to a renewed focus on the country’s history and contem-

porary politics.7 In a debate at the Oxford Union in October 2000, Smith

refused to apologize for atrocities committed while he held office. He said

he had no regrets about the estimated 30,000 Zimbabweans killed during

the period of Rhodesian Front rule. On the contrary, Smith suggested, “The

more we killed, the happier we were. We were fighting terrorists.”8 Professor

Welshman Ncube, then shadow Home Affairs Minister for the Movement for

Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, was astounded that Smith “could actu-

ally today stand up and feel no remorse, no contrition, find nothing wrong

in the system he defended.”9 When Smith died in November 2007, some

commentators noted that many people who remembered the Rhodesian cri-

sis would remain sympathetic to Smith because he had been correct in his

prediction that the Mugabe regime would become just as dystopian as so

many other African states. However, such assessments neglected the fact that

Smith’s ruthless defense of UDI left a legacy of bitterness that ultimately

made Mugabe’s rule possible.10 One writer even asserted that “those black

Zimbabweans who lived through the Smith years would still prefer Mugabe,

despite the current brutalities inflicted upon them.”11 This is a bold and con-

troversial claim, but it does serve to underscore the continuing significance

of the UDI period for Zimbabweans.12

Research on the Rhodesian crisis has been assisted by the vast numbers of

public and private records that have been released during the last 15 years

in Britain, Zimbabwe, South Africa, the United States, Australia, Canada,

and New Zealand.13 These records have been supplemented by several oral

history projects that have captured the story of Rhodesia’s painful journey

toward independence in the words of the people who lived through it. In

1999, David Dimbleby presented a BBC documentary series titled Rebel-lion!, which featured interviews with many of the surviving protagonists.14

In September 2000, the Institute for Contemporary British History (ICBH)

organized a Witness Seminar on UDI, held at The National Archives, Kew,

United Kingdom.15 This was followed by a further Witness Seminar on the

Lancaster House settlement organized by the ICBH and the Cold War Stud-

ies Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE),

which was again held at The National Archives, in July 2005.16

Archival cataloguing and digitization projects have also facilitated the

study of UDI. For example, the Rhodesian Army Archive is a major research

collection deposited at the British Empire and Commonwealth Museum in




London.17 Cataloging of that collection has facilitated an oral history project

about the Rhodesian security forces who served during the guerilla war of

the 1960s and 1970s.18 Other highly significant developments include the

Aluka Project’s Struggles for Freedom in Southern Africa Collection, and the

Nordic Africa Institute’s Documentation Project on the Liberation Struggles

in Southern Africa, which have greatly assisted scholars examining the UDI

period from the perspective of African nationalists.19

The availability of this abundant and rich material has generated a great

upsurge in scholarship, which was evident in two academic conferences that

marked the fortieth anniversary of UDI in November 2005. In Septem-

ber 2005, the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humani-

ties, Cambridge, organized a conference titled “UDI Forty Years On:

Liberation, Confrontation and Cooperation,” which was opened by Ken-

neth Kaunda, former president of Zambia (1964– 91).20 In January 2006,

a similar conference was held in the Cold War Studies Centre at the LSE,

which was opened by Lord Owen, who was involved in the Rhodesian crisis

as Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for the Navy (1968– 70), and later

as Foreign Secretary (1977– 79).21 Those conference proceedings generated

an edited collection of essays on southern Africa in the Cold War that was

wide- ranging in its chronological and geographical scope but did not deal

comprehensively with UDI.22

The last decade has seen significant research output on the Rhodesian cri-

sis, with the completion of several doctoral theses and an increasing number

of specialist journal articles on various aspects of UDI.23 Many useful books

have also been published, although none purport to be an international his-

tory of UDI. Scholars of British policymaking have been well served by the

British Documents on the End of Empire Project, which has made available

a wide selection of documents on the Rhodesian crisis.24 There have been

several recent studies of Harold Wilson’s government that deal in whole or

in part with international policy, including Rhodesia, and these books have

made an important contribution to the debate on Labour’s performance in

office during the period 1964– 70.25 In terms of autobiography and biog-

raphy, historians of Rhodesia during the UDI period have had the benefit

of Ian Smith’s vituperative memoirs,26 and Alan Megahey’s study of the

“beleaguered” governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs.27 No

books have been written recently on the Commonwealth and the United

Nations aspects of the Rhodesian crisis, but there have been some excel-

lent studies of the United States’ involvement.28 Richard Wood has fur-

nished the scholarly community with what is undoubtedly the lengthiest

account of Rhodesia’s attempts to obtain independence, which is based on

the papers of Ian Smith as well as British public records.29 However, Wood’s

chronological narrative is heavy on detail and does not effectively separate

the various international strands of the Rhodesian crisis. A key task of this

book is therefore to provide a clearly structured international history of the

period leading up to UDI.



Introduction 5

Arguments and Scope of the Book

Historians have tended to view UDI as the inevitable outcome of an intrac-

table political problem. Robert Holland, for example, has commented that

“Anglo- Rhodesian talks were really concerned with the cultivation of images

for media presentation, since the two sides were too far apart for a real agree-

ment to be practicable.”30 This view is supported to some extent by the fact

that a feeling of inevitability pervades the documentary record for many

months before Rhodesia actually declared its independence.31 More recent

oral history records have also tended to confirm the contemporary impres-

sion that a UDI could not be avoided, and that it was really a question of

when, rather than if, it would occur.32 It is a common observation that histo-

rians can become captives of their documentary evidence, which often leads

them “to conclude that what was done was the only thing that could have

been done.”33 It is a central contention of this book, however, that although

the problem of Rhodesian independence was highly complex, a UDI was

by no means inevitable. The documentary record does suggest that there

were courses of action that were dismissed or remained underexplored— not

only in Britain but also in the Commonwealth and the United States— which

could have been pursued further and may have prevented a UDI. This book

will also demonstrate that there were structural weaknesses in the machinery

of government of each of the major actors, particularly in Britain. This made

the management of the Rhodesian crisis more difficult, contributed to the

likelihood of a UDI, and exacerbated tension in relations between Britain

and its international partners.

Chapter 1 explains briefly the collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia and

Nyasaland— also known as the Central African Federation (CAF)— and the

emergence of the Rhodesian independence problem. However, the main

purpose of the chapter is to survey the negotiations between the British and

Rhodesian governments in the year preceding UDI. The chapter observes

the dominant role that Harold Wilson played in the shaping of British policy

and in the conduct of negotiations, but suggests that the focus of the negoti-

ations was misplaced. Although British ministers and officials did remarkably

well to keep the Rhodesians talking for so long, they expended an enormous

amount of effort trying to reach agreement on constitutional arrangements

that were acceptable to the British government, the Rhodesian government,

the African nationalists in Rhodesia, and the wider international community.

It would have been more realistic to try to maintain the status quo for a few

years, during which time the transition to African majority rule could have

been planned. Such an arrangement might have been acceptable if the British

government had been prepared to offer a massive program of aid and techni-

cal assistance, which would have engaged the Rhodesian government’s key

concern about economic uncertainty, and facilitated the education and train-

ing of Africans for future majority rule. Literature on negotiation theory is

used in this chapter to analyze and evaluate the conduct of Anglo- Rhodesian

negotiations.




Chapter 2 uses correspondence from former members of the Rhodesian

security services, recent oral testimony from British politicians and civil ser-

vants, and documentary evidence from archives around the world to reexam-

ine the viability of British military intervention in Rhodesia during 1964 and

1965. The chapter argues that the military and political obstacles to the use

of force cited at the time and since have been grossly exaggerated. This chap-

ter demonstrates that with sufficient resolve, the British government could

have used force to prevent or end UDI. This would have offered an effective

solution to one of the most protracted and embarrassing international prob-

lems that confronted successive British governments during disengagement

from Empire. The chapter situates the arguments on the use of force in rela-

tion to theoretical analyses of deterrence and coercive diplomacy.

The British government’s decision to abjure the use of force exposed it

to profound criticism within the Commonwealth. Wilson and the right wing

of the Labour Party had hoped that the Commonwealth would continue to

serve as a vehicle for British economic and strategic interests, but these hopes

foundered on the sharp rocks of the Rhodesian problem, which threatened

to tear the Commonwealth apart. Chapter 3 examines why, despite wide-

spread fears that it would not survive, the Commonwealth did not disinte-

grate during the Prime Ministers’ Meetings held between 1964 and 1966.

The chapter argues that a combination of British diplomatic dexterity, sup-

port from the Old Commonwealth, and political divisions among the African

Commonwealth states in particular allowed the Commonwealth to survive

relatively unscathed. Chapter 3 also discusses the founding of the Common-

wealth Secretariat, whose immediate origins are to be found in the context of

the 1964 and 1965 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting. The chapter

shows that the Rhodesian crisis quickly exposed tension between radical and

conservative views about the proper functions of the Secretariat, but it also

acknowledges the long- term implications of the Secretariat for the organiza-

tional character of the Commonwealth.

Chapter 4 extends the discussion of the Commonwealth dimension. It

demonstrates that Canada developed a particularly proactive approach toward

the Rhodesian problem but Britain, Australia, and New Zealand gave only

limited encouragement to Canadian initiatives. This chapter also explains

how the conventions of Commonwealth diplomatic representation made the

problem more difficult to manage. By the mid- 1960s the arrangements for

intra- Commonwealth representation between its sovereign member states

were well established. The exclusion of Rhodesia from the Commonwealth

Prime Ministers’ Conference ruled out the possibility of multilateral diplo-

matic engagement. Opportunities to influence the Rhodesian government

were therefore restricted to bilateral exchanges, but the mechanisms for such

diplomatic representation, though technically correct, were limited and inad-

equate. This chapter uses representation theory to confirm the necessity for

sufficient bilateral exchanges between sovereign states and other international

actors but demonstrates that the parties to such a diplomatic relationship can

conceive the functions of representation in different terms.



Introduction 7

Chapter 5 explores Anglo- American consultation and cooperation during

the period leading up to UDI. The chapter considers the formulation of US

contingency plans to deal with the eventuality of a UDI, and US efforts to

provide diplomatic support for Britain in its attempts to prevent a UDI. It is

argued that on both issues there was considerable misperception and miscom-

munication between Washington and London, which caused disappointment

and even suspicion at senior levels of government on both sides. This chapter

explains the misunderstandings and frustrations in Anglo- American relations

by using some theoretical perspectives on alliance politics and thereby makes

a useful contribution to the literature on the “special relationship” during the

Wilson- Johnson era.

Chapter 6 examines support for Britain in the United Nations during the

Rhodesian crisis. Britain relied heavily on its Old Commonwealth partners

and the United States to prevent the Rhodesian crisis from slipping out of

its control in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, but this

gave rise to certain anomalies. For example, Canada and New Zealand saw

the United Nations as a cornerstone of their external relations, but they were

placed in the invidious position of supporting the British claim that Rhodesia

did not fall within the United Nations’ sphere of competence. The United

States also found itself— not for the first, or the last time— supporting Brit-

ish colonial policy despite America’s supposedly anti- imperial heritage. The

situation offered opportunities for China and the Soviet Union to exploit

anger among Afro- Asian nations who perceived racism in British policy. Brit-

ain and its supporters feared the possibility of a “Red Army in blue berets” in

southern Africa, but economic concerns were also highly significant. A Chap-

ter VII resolution imposing mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia would

have created a precedent that could have been used to bring similar measures

against South Africa. This would have had more profound effects on West-

ern economic interests than sanctions against Rhodesia. This chapter there-

fore examines both the strategic and economic foundations of cooperation

between Britain and its supporters at the United Nations during the Rhode-

sian crisis. The chapter includes a theoretical consideration of the nature of

international crisis and explains why Rhodesia’s UDI can be conceptualized

in such terms.

Methodology

This book is first and foremost an international history, which seeks to

illuminate the Rhodesian crisis from the perspectives of Britain, the Com-

monwealth (especially the Old Commonwealth), the United States, and the

United Nations. However, in the last two decades the field of International

History has come to mean something very different from the state- centered

approach of this book. The “cultural turn”— which has been driven mainly,

but certainly not exclusively, by American historians— has greatly affected the

pattern of scholarship on international history. The trend began with analy-

ses of the way in which states used culture as a policy tool in the ideological




context of the Cold War. A range of new approaches has proliferated, such

as those based on race, gender, “collective memory,” and identity, which has

transformed the field of inquiry.34 Historians have also seized on the con-

cepts of globalization and transnationalism in order to address themes such

as diasporas, migration, disease, the environment, human rights, and terror-

ism.35 The significance of these developments is evident in the response of the

Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), which has

sought to remain relevant by reaching out beyond its original constituency

of diplomatic historians. SHAFR has encouraged closer association with pro-

fessional bodies such as the American Studies Association and Organization

of American Historians, whose members pursue scholarship on cultural and

transnational history, and the SHAFR journal, Diplomatic History, regularly

publishes articles on these themes.36 Cultural approaches have also become

dominant in the “new imperial history,” whose adherents emphasize the

mutual interplay of cultural influences between metropolitan and colonial

societies, and the continuing effects of this even after decolonization.37 It is

undoubtedly true that the “cultural turn” has enhanced understanding in

the fields of international and imperial history and it is certainly no longer

the case that practitioners of international history are characterized by the

reactionary conservatism lamented even a decade ago.38 Younger scholars

especially have been quick to embrace cultural approaches, lest they be con-

sidered “old- fashioned” or “retrograde.”39 However, as Frederick Cooper

has suggested, the bandwagon effect has produced a “conformism of the

avant- garde,” which militates against other approaches.40 One would hope

that a more traditional international history of the type found in this book

can still find acceptance, first because “it is the diversity of approach in our

profession that helps to make the discussion of controversial historical issues

exciting and productive.”41 Second, a state- centered approach is clearly rel-

evant when discussing issues such as the collapse of a federation, the nego-

tiation of constitutional arrangements under which a colony may become

independent, the possible use of force to achieve a policy objective, inadequa-

cies in the arrangements for diplomatic representation, structural problems in

the relationship between allies, or the utility of economic sanctions to coerce

a rogue state. This is certainly not to say that a state- centric approach is the

only way to write about the Rhodesian crisis; it is merely that the themes

selected for investigation in this book are concerned with the interaction

between states.

Although the book is traditional in its focus on the diplomatic relationship

between states, it is more novel in its interdisciplinary methods, as it uses

multiple theoretical perspectives from International Relations (IR) to frame

different aspects of the empirical research. Many theoretically oriented works

tend to test and illustrate a single theory by using multiple comparative case

studies or by adopting an in- depth case study approach. For example, the

International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, established in 1975, adopted

both qualitative and quantitative methods to investigate the nature of inter-

national crisis, consisting of “in- depth studies of perceptions and decisions



Introduction 9

by a single state; and studies in breadth of the 412 crises that plagued the

international system from the end of World War I.”42 The ICB Project classi-

fied Rhodesia as a “protracted conflict,” consisting of 11 international crises

during the period 1965– 80. In a very detailed case study, Douglas Anglin

used the ICB Project’s model of international crisis to analyze the nature of

Zambian decision making during 1965– 66.43 By contrast, academic stud-

ies that apply more than one theoretical perspective to the same case study

are relatively uncommon. The classic example, written by the political sci-

entist Graham Allison, is Essence of Decision, which was first published four

decades ago. Allison explored US decision making during the Cuban missile

crisis from three perspectives that explain foreign policy outcomes differently:

the Rational Actor Model, the Organizational Process Model, and the Gov-

ernmental Politics Model.44 A more recent example of multiperspectivism is

Roger Pfister’s Apartheid South Africa and African States, which uses theo-

ries from political science and IR to explain the formulation of South African

foreign policy and the interaction between South Africa and other states in

sub- Saharan Africa.45 The methodological approach in this book is similar; it

is intended to illustrate how the different facets of a historical case study can

be analyzed using a variety of theories, such as those on negotiation, deter-

rence, coercive diplomacy, and alliance theory.

It has been suggested that the relationship between the fields of Interna-

tional History (IH) and IR has been “ambiguous, indeed at times downright

hostile.” But during the last 15 years, there has been “a thawing between the

two fields.”46 Thomas Smith has explained the perception of the acrimoni-

ous relationship through a familiar metaphor: “Perhaps because it is a child

of history, International Relations, as it developed, has tried to distance itself

from historical discourse, through methodological and theoretical innova-

tions seeking general knowledge about international and global politics.”47

It is commonly observed that in the 1960s a transatlantic divide became

established between the historically informed English school of IR scholars

and the ahistorical community of American IR theorists that was increas-

ingly turning to quantitative methods. Writing in 1972, Hedley Bull, one

of the leading academics of the English school, lamented what he called the

“long, dark winter of the ‘social scientific’ ascendancy.”48 Two decades later

it seemed that the separation between theorists and empiricists was no less

pronounced, as evidenced by the controversies over Francis Fukuyama’s “end

of history” thesis and Samuel Huntington’s theory of the “clash of civiliza-

tions.”49 In fact, the perception of a division between ahistorical American IR

theorists and atheoretical British international historians has been somewhat

exaggerated. John Hobson and George Lawson have recently commented

that “history never really went away as a tool of IR theory” even among

neorealist scholars who are renowned for their static world view.50 It has also

been suggested that IR theorists have become more interested in historical

narrative “not as an adjunct or empirical resource, but as a theoretical per-

spective in its own right.”51 Neither is it true that the craft of the historian

is inherently devoid of theory. Although historians pursue narrative- based




explanations aiming for accuracy and descriptive completeness, they nev-

ertheless seek to ascribe primacy to different categories of causes and con-

sequences, thereby using theory implicitly.52 Perhaps the crucial difference

is that “[w]hereas political scientists (standing aloof from the material they

propose to organize) theorise first and then illustrate the theory, historians

usually plunge in, then try to explain where they are, what is going on, and

how they might explain what they have seen.”53

The divide between IH and IR has also been overstated in other ways. It is

not particularly helpful, for example, to distinguish between history and political

science by comparing the complexity of historical explanations with the parsi-

monious preferences of political science. Historians certainly do recognize the

complexity of events and processes but they nevertheless emphasize causal or

consequential primacy, which places them not too distant from the political sci-

entists’ emphasis on key “independent variables.”54 Jack Levy has contended that

what best reflects the distinction between history and political science is the idio-

graphic approach of the former compared to the nomothetic aims of the latter. In

other words, historians are usually concerned with explaining particular events,

whereas political scientists try to generalize about classes of events.55 Historians

usually examine single cases in great depth, whereas political scientists mostly use

clusters or sequences of examples, known as “data sets,” which tend to be largely

devoid of detail. Edward Ingram has commented on this difference between the

two disciplines: “The historian’s single example may be more representative than

the political scientist’s cluster. It is researched more deeply and comprehensively

and set in a broader context. It implies a theory and tries to advance its develop-

ment, perhaps by refinement, perhaps by revisionism; it continues a discussion

instead of claiming to be a proof. Nor are historians persuaded that a cluster of

lightly researched, detached— at best semidetached— cases, often written up by

different scholars, is likely to advance the argument any better.”56

However, this distinction should not be pushed too far because histori-

ans do not always write single case studies; they often adopt a comparative

approach or test hypotheses against a range of cases.57 Neither is it uniformly

true that political scientists base their findings on evidence that lacks sufficient

depth. Douglas Anglin’s Zambian Crisis Behaviour, which is one of the ICB

Project’s qualitative studies mentioned previously, runs to 254 pages exclud-

ing notes and appendices, and cannot be said to be “lightly researched.”58

Two further bases on which history is sometimes distinguished from polit-

ical science are predictive capacity and policy relevance. Since historians are

first and foremost concerned with explaining the past, they usually decline

to make predictions, whereas political scientists are inclined to believe that

their theories have predictive utility.59 However, the confidence of politi-

cal scientists was severely dented by their failure to predict an end to the

Cold War, which raised questions about the utility of political science for

understanding a phenomenon that dominated global politics for almost five

decades.60 Unlike IR, the field of International History does not claim to

be explicitly policy relevant. IR theorists tend to focus on the recent his-

tory that is most relevant to the present concerns of policymakers, whereas



Index

Africa Bureau, 21, 23, 71

African National Congress, 15– 16, 22

Algeria, 57, 186

alliance theory, 177– 82

Alport, Cuthbert, 17

Anderson, John, 59– 60

Angola, 157, 159, 169

Armah, Kwesi, 90

Attlee government, 14, 21

Australia: aid and technical

assistance policies of, 125–

27, 154; Canadian policy

given limited encouragement

by, 6, 94, 120, 130– 31, 135,

138; Commonwealth Prime

Ministers’ Meetings and, 90ff.;

Commonwealth Secretariat and,

95, 110– 11; contingency planning

by and response to UDI, 14,

116– 17, 146, 149– 50, 153– 54,

206; deterrence and, 116, 132–

39; diplomatic representation in

Salisbury, 116– 17, 139– 46, 153–

54; economic sanctions and, 135,

146, 149– 50, 183– 84, 195ff.;

force against Rhodesia opposed

by, 58, 68, 118, 132, 149, 205;

influence on Rhodesia perceived

by other actors, 116, 132, 252n4;

interests in Rhodesian question,

118– 19; sympathy toward white

Rhodesians, 118– 19, 138,

144, 149, 153; United Nations

and, 119, 133, 136, 149, 187–

89, 194– 95; white Rhodesian

migration to suggested, 126–

27, 154. See also Hasluck, Paul;

Menzies, Robert

Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 101– 6, 110–

11, 138. See also Nigeria

Ball, George, 162, 165, 167– 70,

172– 82, 199, 268n46, 272n105,

276n175

Banda, Hastings, 101, 165, 248n137

Beadle, Hugh, 38, 39

Belgium, 186

Bellenger, Frank, 68

Bennett, Oliver, 124, 129

Benoy, Maurice, 142

Bentley, Alfred, 59– 60, 63, 171

Berlis, N. F. H., 142

Bermuda Conference, 184, 196

Billericay Constituency Labour Party,

207, 284n22

Board of Trade, 45, 49

Bottomley, Arthur: bureaucratic conflict

with Foreign Office and, 49– 51;

Canadian relations and, 134–

35, 148; Commonwealth Prime

Ministers’ Meeting (June 1965) and,

98, 100, 101, 103; Confederation

of British Industry unimpressed

by, 206; correspondence with Ian

Smith, 25, 34; economic sanctions

doubted by, 77; negotiations with

and assessments of Ian Smith, 30,

32, 35; Rhodesia policy summarized

for Cabinet, 28; Rhodesia visit by

(Feb.– Mar. 1965), 29– 30, 40, 76,

221n123; technical and financial

assistance for Rhodesian government

suggested by, 44; US relations and,

180; Wilson’s trip to Salisbury (Oct.

1965) assessed by, 37; Zambian

copper production and, 66

Bowles, Chester, 160



304 Index

Britain. See armed forces; civil servants; institutions of government; political parties; politicians; relations with individual countries and organizations

British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), 57

British Council of Churches, 71

British Defence Liaison Staff (Salisbury),

59

British South Africa Police (BSAP), 61–

62, 64, 234n65, 234nn68– 71

Brodie, J. K., 143

Brown, George: Central African

Federation and, 21; contingency

planning in Department of

Economic Affairs and, 175; defense

spending and, 67; opinion of

Wilson’s Cabinet management, 46

Bruce, David, 179– 80

Bundy, McGeorge, 172– 73, 175

Butler, David, 32

Butler, R. A., 17– 18, 162, 192

Cabinet (British): Conservative, 18– 19;

Labour, 25, 27– 28, 30, 36, 38– 39,

46– 47, 60, 81, 98, 131, 181, 205

Cabinet (Rhodesian), 1, 17– 19, 31, 38,

131, 162

Cabinet Office, 45, 166

Caccia, Harold, 157– 58

Callaghan, James, 22, 53– 54, 67,

237n115, 283n10

Canada: aid and technical

assistance policies of, 120–

25; Commonwealth Prime

Ministers’ Meetings and, 90ff.;

Commonwealth Secretariat

and, 95, 110– 11; contingency

planning of and response to UDI,

14, 116– 17, 139, 146– 49, 154,


39; diplomatic representation

in Salisbury, 116– 17, 139– 46,

153– 54; economic sanctions and,

118, 135, 147– 48, 183– 84, 195ff.;

force against Rhodesia opposed by,

68, 99, 132, 205; foreign policy

characteristics, 121– 22, 254n40;

interests in Rhodesian question,

117ff.; political initiatives of,

128– 31; Rhodesia policy given

limited encouragement by Britain,

Australia and New Zealand, 6, 94,

120, 128, 130– 31, 135; sympathy

toward African nationalists, 117,

120; United Nations and, 7, 122,

141, 188– 89, 195, 202; white

Rhodesian migration to suggested,

126– 27, 154. See also Martin, Paul;

Pearson, Lester

Caradon, Lord. See Foot, Hugh

Carter, Thomas, 124, 130

Cassells, James, 65

Castle, Barbara: Central African

Federation views on, 22;

technical and financial assistance

for Rhodesian government

suggested by, 44; Wilson’s Cabinet

management assessed by, 46,

228n255; Wilson’s obsession for

consensus with Conservatives noted

by, 69

Central African Federation (CAF):

Anglo- American consultation on,

157– 61, 185; Australia requested

not to assist white migration from,

126– 27; British military planning

and, 54– 55, 57– 58; collapse of, 15–

16; formation of, 14– 15; Labour

Party views on, 13, 20– 23; military

assets handed over to Southern

Rhodesia, 18, 62, 89, 191– 92;

Old Commonwealth trade and,

135– 36

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 78,

176

Central Intelligence Organisation

(CIO), 60

Chidzero, Bernard, 123

Chiefs of Staff (British), 54, 62– 63, 81,

204

Chiefs of Staff (Rhodesian), 55, 59– 60

China, 7, 86, 130, 150, 166, 183,

196– 99

Cleveland, Harlan, 159, 191

Cleveland, Harrison, 130– 31

Cold War, 2, 4, 8, 10, 71, 121, 161,

192, 196, 202

Colonial Office (CO), 101, 179, 184,

186, 187



Index 305

Commonwealth Prime Ministers’

Meetings, 83– 114

Commonwealth Relations Office

(CRO): Bottomley- Gardiner

mission and, 29; Canadians irritate,

148; Commonwealth consultative

committee proposal and, 97– 98;


Meeting (July 1964) and, 92;


111; five principles and, 31;

Foreign Office bureaucratic conflict

with, 14, 45– 46, 48– 51; Old

Commonwealth consultations with,

90, 147– 48, 262n192; Rhodesia

chief responsibility of, 45; United

States consultations with, 157ff.;

weakness of, 206

Commonwealth Secretariat, 6, 85, 86,

94– 95, 109– 12

Communism: Britain and, 87, 89, 183–

85, 193, 196– 98, 202; Rhodesia

and, 61, 70, 75, 84, 88, 138, 144,

154; United States and, 158, 161,

166, 172, 174, 178, 184– 85, 196–

97, 202

compellence (coercive diplomacy), 54,

71– 81

Confederation of British Industry

(CBI), 43, 206

Congo, 56, 118, 157, 160, 165, 166,

169, 186, 196, 198, 229n275

Conservative Party, 18– 19, 26, 36, 39,

69, 86, 87, 115, 203– 5

contingency planning: British

government and, 14, 45– 52,

206– 7; Old Commonwealth and,

116– 17, 146– 54; United States

and, 162– 70

Coote, Wendell, 166, 168, 181

Cousins, Frank, 46

Crisis, 9, 199– 202, 282n105

Crossman, Richard: Cabinet dismayed

by Wilson’s trip to Salisbury

(Oct. 1965) according to, 36– 37;

Wilson’s Cabinet management

assessed by, 46, 228n259; Wilson

preoccupied with UDI according

to, 204; Wilson’s Vietnam initiative

assessed by, 98

Cunningham, George, 23– 24, 58

Curragh “mutiny”, 66, 236n103

Cyprus, 36, 67, 70, 75, 101, 186

Dean, Patrick, 168, 175, 189, 191, 192,

271n79

Declaration on the Granting of

Independence to Colonial

Countries and Peoples, 186

Defence and Oversea Policy Committee

(DOPC): Anglo- American

relations and, 168; Bottomley

informs about developments in

Rhodesia policy and negotiations,

25, 28, 32, 35; Commonwealth

consultative committee proposal

rejected by, 97– 98; contingency

planning and, 47, 50, 77, 148,

199, 206, 229n268; five principles

and, 97; military intelligence and,

60; Reedman affair discussed by,

263n209; Wilson bypasses, 46

Defence Planning Staff (DPS), 55– 58,

62, 65

Department for Economic Affairs, 46,

67

deterrence, 54, 71– 81, 132– 39

Devlin Royal Commission, 15

Dominican Republic, 176, 178

Dominion Party, 16, 17

Donnelly, Desmond, 68

Douglas- Home, Alec: becomes Prime

Minister, 18; bipartisan policy of,

203; Communist threat in Africa

and, 196; Commonwealth Prime

Ministers’ Meeting (July 1964)

and, 84, 90– 95, 109; disenchanted

with African Commonwealth at

the UN, 128; G. Mennen Williams

and, 157– 58; negotiations with

Winston Field, 18– 19; negotiations

with Ian Smith, 20; receives

suggestion of aid for Rhodesia, 44;

United Nations and, 186– 87, 189;

United States activism on Rhodesia

rebuffed by, 159; Wilson’s initial

handling of Ian Smith commented

on, 26– 27

Du Bois, W. E. B., 2

Dupont, Clifford, 41



306 Index

economic sanctions: Australia and, 135,

146, 149– 50, 183– 84, 195ff.;

Britain and, 45, 47– 49, 52, 58,

69, 76– 80, 84, 105, 148, 165– 70,

172– 74, 181– 82, 183– 84, 195ff.;

Canada and, 118, 135, 147– 48,

183– 84, 195ff.; New Zealand and,

136, 146, 150– 53, 183– 84, 195ff.;

Rhodesia and, 2, 76– 77, 80, 96,

135– 36, 139, 153, 181, 195ff.;

United Nations and, 183– 84;

195ff.; United States and, 58, 165–

70, 172– 74, 178, 181– 82, 183– 84,

195ff.

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 155, 184

European Economic Community

(EEC), 85– 87

Fabian Colonial Bureau, 21

Fabian Society, 71, 204

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

See Central African Federation

Field, Winston: African Commonwealth

disparaged by, 88; Alport’s

assessment of, 17; Australian

diplomatic representation

in Salisbury invited by, 142;

Commonwealth advice refused by,

116, 128– 29; Ian Smith’s opinion

of, 18; independence for Rhodesia

demanded by, 17; negotiations with

British government, 18– 19; ousted

by Ian Smith, 19, 124; United

States alarmed by electoral victory

and subsequent ouster, 159– 60,

162

five (six) principles, 31, 33– 36, 41, 97

Fletcher, Peter, 59, 66

Flower, Ken: British forces’ loyalty

assessed by, 66; plot to oust

Field reported by, 19; Rhodesian

forces’ loyalty assessed by, 60– 61;

Rhodesian Security Council decides

on a UDI, 74

Foot, Hugh, 187– 88, 190, 192, 197,

202, 206, 278n28, 278n33

force (against Rhodesia): Australia

opposed to, 58, 68, 118, 132, 149,

205; British cabinet subcommittee

dismisses as an option, 27– 28, 46,

54; Canada opposed to, 68, 99,

132, 205; Commonwealth calls

for use of, 28, 99– 101, 103, 108;

Commonwealth secretary- general

in favor of, 110; Foreign Office

largely against, 49; Hugh Gaitskell

probably would have been willing

to use, 22; Labour Party attitudes

regarding, 68, 71; New Zealand

opposed to, 132; problems involved

in the use of, 53ff.; United Nations

possibility of, 183ff.; United States

and, 56, 68, 166, 176, 232n30;

Wilson rules out publicly, 38, 74–

76; Wilson willing to contemplate

in certain circumstances, 58, 78–

79, 176, 200– 201

Foreign Office (FO): Commonwealth

consultative committee proposal

and, 97– 98; Commonwealth

Relations Office bureaucratic

conflict with, 14, 45– 46, 48–

51; international policy and, 80;

Kaunda and, 96; Labour Party

suspects intentions of, 204, 283n7;

majority rule and, 80; United States

consultations with, 157ff., 185ff.;

Vietnam peace initiative and, 98

Foulon, Robert, 164

France, 76, 192, 194

franchise (Rhodesian), 16, 209– 10

Fredericks, Wayne, 162– 63

Gaitskell, Hugh, 22

Gardiner, Gerald, 29– 30, 40, 47

Garner, Saville, 90, 94, 100– 101, 111,

162– 63, 168, 171, 206– 7

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(GATT), 151

Ghana: Australian sanctions satisfy, 150;

British government pressured by,

89– 90; Canadian aid and, 123;


Meeting (July 1964) and, 90–

92, 95; Commonwealth Prime


100; Commonwealth Secretariat

proposed by, 95; severs diplomatic

relations with Britain, 103; United

Nations and, 89– 90, 128, 187, 189,



Index 307

191; white Rhodesian migration

suggested by, 127; Wilson’s visit to

(Oct. 1965), 38

Gibbs, Humphrey: attempts to

persuade Winston Field to

remain in office, 19; political

isolation of, 32; receives notice of

India’s termination of diplomatic

representation, 96; refuses to order

Ian Smith’s arrest, 60; Rhodesian

government dismissed by, 1; state

of emergency declared by, 2,

225n200

Gilpatric, Roswell, 175

Glass, Lester, 141

Gore- Booth, Paul, 48

Greenhill, Denis, 205

Griffith, James, 21

Grimond, Jo, 68

Harriman, Averell, 158, 165, 180, 197

Hasluck, Paul, 118, 131

Hawkins, Harold, 60

Haynes, Ulric, 172, 175– 76

Healey, Denis: Britain’s overseas role

and, 237n115; British military

intervention in Rhodesia and,

57, 60, 62, 65, 74, 79, 236n100;

Commonwealth policy and, 87;

defense procurement and, 67;

Wilson assessed by, 74

Heath, Edward, 27, 36, 39, 69

Hilaly, Agha, 101

Hola camp atrocities, 70

Holyoake, Keith: Commonwealth

mission to Rhodesia endorsed

by, 131; economic sanctions

and, 152– 53; objects to Old

Commonwealth acting in concert,

137; relationship with Ian Smith,

132; Rhodesian attendance at


Meeting (July 1964) and, 90– 91;

sympathy for white Rhodesians,

119– 20; Wilson’s deterrent efforts

supported by, 131, 133– 34,

136– 37

Home, Lord. See Douglas- Home, Alec

Home Office, 46

Hood, Samuel, 185

House of Commons (debates and

statements), 22, 27, 32, 67, 74, 90,

91, 107, 128, 183, 200

Howman, Jack, 123– 24, 129– 30

Hughes, Cledwyn, 33– 34, 42

indaba, 20, 24– 25, 40, 143, 164

India: Commonwealth mission proposal

dismissed by, 132; Commonwealth

Prime Ministers’ Meeting (July

1964) and, 90– 91; Commonwealth

Prime Ministers’ Meeting (June

1965) and, 101; Commonwealth

role of, 89; Commonwealth

Secretariat’s powers feared by,

110; democracy in, 89; diplomatic

representation in Salisbury

terminated by, 96; United Nations

and, 189

International Crisis Behavior (ICB)

Project, 8– 10, 200– 202

International History: changing

nature of, 7– 8; relationship with

International Relations (IR), 8– 11

Japan, 76

Johns, G. B., 60

Johnson, Lyndon B.: inherits a

developing crisis in Rhodesia,

157; message to Ian Smith, 173;

preoccupied by other US foreign

policy problems, 178, 275n149;

Roswell Gilpatric’s appointment

as Rhodesia coordinator opposed

by, 175, 273n121; US response

to the UDI authorized by, 174;

Wilson and, 77, 172– 73, 175, 177,

274n142, 274n144; Zambian airlift

authorized by, 176. See also United

States

Johnson, U. Alexis, 175

Johnston, J. B.: Bottomley- Gardiner

mission assessed by, 29– 30; five

principles and, 31; Ian Smith

assessed by, 19– 20; Ian Smith

negotiations with, 30– 32, 35

Joint Intelligence Committee (British),

77, 233n50, 281n91

Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States),

56, 65



308 Index

Kaiser, Philip, 168

Kapwepwe, Simon, 106– 8

Kariba Dam, 44, 56, 58, 166, 201

Kaunda, Kenneth: British military

presence in Zambia and, 57– 58, 63;


Meeting (June 1965) and, 100;

denies Zambia providing a base

for African nationalists, 96; no

independence before majority rule

(NIBMAR) and, 107; participates in

conference on fortieth anniversary

of UDI, 4; Wilson and, 59, 78, 96,

104, 106– 7. See also Zambia

Kennedy, John F., 155, 157, 187, 196

Kenya: British atrocities in, 75;


Meeting (July 1964) and, 91;

independence of turns spotlight on

Rhodesia at United Nations, 141;

mutiny in armed forces, 67; no


(NIBMAR) and, 107; United States’

opinion of before independence,

185. See also Kenyatta, Jomo

Kenyatta, Jomo, 96– 97

Kerr, David, 68, 207

Kevin, J. C. G., 119, 144

King, Cecil, 48

Kissinger, Henry, 178

Knox, William, 42

Labour Party: aid for Rhodesia and, 45;

Central African Federation policy

of, 13, 20– 22; Commonwealth

policy of, 86– 87; pressure group

influence on, 71; Foreign Office

intentions suspected by, 204,

283n7; Rhodesia policy while

in Opposition, 22– 24; Rhodesia

policy requires more research at

constituency level, 207; Vietnam

preoccupies, 68

Land Apportionment Act, 30, 34– 35

Lapsley, J. H., 62

Le Quesne, Martin, 41, 49– 51

Lloyd, Selwyn, 36, 86

MacDonald, Malcolm: African leaders

assessed by, 98– 99; Commonwealth

Prime Ministers’ Meeting (Sept.

1966) and, 108; Kaunda and, 107;

Wilson assessed by, 104, 108

Macleod, Iain, 55, 158, 160

Macmillan, Harold: African policy

legacy of, 203; Douglas- Home

replaces as Prime Minister, 18,

128; Eisenhower and, 155;

Kennedy and, 155, 184; G.

Mennen Williams and, 158; Royal

Commission appointed by, 15;

United Nations and, 186– 88;

“wind of change” speech, 158.

Malaya, 67, 75, 88

Malaysia, 56– 58, 67, 101, 193

Malta, 39, 56, 91, 108, 227n239

March, Derrick, 48– 49

Margai, Alfred, 100– 101

Martin, John, 187

Martin, Paul: Britain and, 134– 35, 147–

48; Canadian policy on aid and

overseas development and, 122;

Canadian policy on Rhodesia and,

117; Oliver Bennett and, 124, 129

McClelland, Roswell, 171

McIntosh, Alister, 152

McIntyre, Laurence, 119

McNamara, Robert, 170

Menzies, Robert: Australian response

to UDI announced by, 150;

Commonwealth consultative

committee proposal and,

97; Commonwealth mission

proposals and, 36, 129, 131– 32;


Meetings and, 90ff., 248n118;


95, 110– 11; five principles and, 97;

Rhodesian government and, 131–

32; Ian Smith and, 28, 36, 132,

134; supports Wilson’s deterrent

efforts, 131, 133ff., 258n109,

259n133; sympathy for white

Rhodesians, 118

methodology, 7– 11. See also

International History

Ministry of Defence (officials in), 45,

54, 60, 62, 66, 79, 81

Ministry of Power, 46

Mitchell, Derek, 98



Index 309

Monckton Commission, 15

Monday Club, 69

Monson, Leslie, 107

Mountbatten, Louis, 55

Movement for Colonial Freedom, 21, 71

Mozambique, 57– 58, 79, 163

Mugabe, Robert, 3, 16

Multilateral Force, 164

Musonga, Paul, 188

Mutasa, E. C., 24,

Nabrit Jr., James M., 194

National Archives (UK), 3, 46, 156,

206

National Democratic Party, 16

National Museum of Labour History,

207

National Security Council (NSC), 159,

171– 73, 175, 178

Ncube, Welshman, 3

negotiation theory, 39– 45

Netherlands, 187

New Zealand: aid and technical

assistance policies of, 125– 27;

Canadian policy given limited

encouragement by, 6, 120– 21, 138;


Meetings and, 90ff.; contingency

planning of and response to UDI,

14, 116– 17, 146, 149, 150– 53,


39; diplomatic representation

in Salisbury absent, 140, 145;

economic sanctions and, 136,

146, 150– 53, 183– 84, 195ff.;

force against Rhodesia opposed

by, 68, 118, 138, 205; influence

on Rhodesia perceived by United

States, 116; interests in Rhodesian

question, 120; sympathy toward

white Rhodesians, 119– 20, 138,

144, 153; trade with Central

African Federation, 135– 36; United

Nations and, 7, 151– 52, 187– 89;

United States and, 156ff. See also

Holyoake, Keith

Nigeria: Canadian aid and, 123;



constitutional conference suggested

by, 96; Ghana and, 92, 95; Lagos

conference and, 103– 6; OAU

and, 103; Rhodesia coalition

government idea supported

by, 131; UDI reaction to, 48;

Wilson suggests participation in

Commonwealth prime ministers’

mission, 131; Wilson’s visit to, 38.

See also Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa

Nkomo, Joshua: Arthur Bottomley

insists on seeing while in detention,

25; funding to train guerillas

sought by, 163; parties formed by,

16; Rhodesia’s 1961 Constitution

repudiated by, 17; UN Special

Committee petitioned by, 188;

Wilson rules out use of force to

influence, 38

Nkrumah, Kwame: British policy

criticized by, 97; Commonwealth

Prime Ministers’ Meeting (June

1965) and, 100; Commonwealth

Secretariat proposed by, 95; Lagos

meeting and, 106; Julius Nyerere

and, 101; OAU and, 103. See also

Ghana

no independence before majority rule

(NIBMAR), 107– 8

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), 57, 68, 185, 196

Northern Rhodesia: Anglo- American

talks and, 158, 160; British military

planning and, 54– 56; Canadian

diplomatic representation in 141;

Central African Federation and,

14, 15, 21; Commonwealth Prime


and, 91; Southern Rhodesia seeks

concomitant independence with,

17– 18, 160. See also Zambia

Nyandoro, George, 123

Nyasaland, 15. See also Malawi

Nyerere, Julius: Commonwealth Prime

Ministers’ Meeting (June 1965)

and, 100, 102; Kwame Nkrumah

and, 101; Lagos meeting and, 106;

no independence before majority

rule (NIBMAR) and, 107, 130;

OAU and, 103; Winston Field and,

129. See also Tanzania



310 Index

Obisesan, Alhaji, 153

Obote, Milton: Commonwealth Prime


100; Commonwealth Secretariat

proposed by, 95; no independence

before majority rule (NIBMAR) and,

107. See also Uganda

O’Connor, D. S. S., 54

Old Commonwealth. See Australia;

Canada; New Zealand

Operation Fume, 56

Operation Mattock, 54, 56– 57

Organization of African Unity

(OAU): British government gives

insufficient consideration to,

48; Canadians recognize need

to forestall criticism from, 130;

further research needed on, 208;

indignation at UDI, 2; Kaunda

feels humiliated in the eyes of, 107;

resolution calls for members to

break of diplomatic relations with

Britain, 103; Wilson anxious about

calls for use of force, 201

Ormsby- Gore, David, 192

Owen, David, 4, 203

Paget, Reginald, 68

Pakistan: Commonwealth Prime


and, 91; Commonwealth Prime


101; Commonwealth role of, 89

Palley, Ahrn, 32

Pearson, Lester: Commonwealth mission

proposal and, 129; Commonwealth

Prime Ministers’ Meetings and, 84,

90ff.; economic sanctions and, 135,

195; five principles and, 97; likely

attitude to Harrison Cleveland’s

constitutional proposals, 131; Ian

Smith and, 132, 134; supports

Wilson’s deterrent efforts, 136– 38;

sympathy for African nationalists,

117; UN peacekeeping mission

opposed by, 195

Pestell, John, 59

Portugal: African colonies complicate

logistics of British military

intervention in Rhodesia, 57– 58;

Anglo- American consultation on,

165, 191, 197; Australia keen to

distance itself from at UN, 150;

Australian ambassador in South

Africa sympathetic towards, 119;

British government concludes

sanctions would be undermined by,

77; further research needed on, 208;

G. Mennen Williams fears Rhodesia

being pushed into closer association

with, 160; Kaunda views as a threat

to peace in southern Africa, 100;

Rhodesian “accredited diplomatic

representative” sent to, 34, 261n167,

263n209; Rhodesians counting on

support from to cope with sanctions,

80; Rhodesians seen as part of a

barrier against spread of Communism

in Africa, 138, 144; US assessment of

likely support for Rhodesia, 65; UN

resolutions opposed by, 194; Wilson

proposes consultative committee

involving, 97– 98. See also Angola;

Mozambique

Powell, Enoch, 86

Poynton, Hilton, 186, 190

Putterill, Rodney, 60, 66

Queen Elizabeth II: Commonwealth

role and, 113; Ian Smith affirms

“unswerving loyalty” of the

Rhodesian people to, 1; Rhodesian

armed forces owed allegiance to,

60– 62

Rahman, Abdul, 101

Ramphal, Shridath, 111

Ramsay, Michael, 71

Reedman, Harry, 34, 261n167, 263n209

representation (diplomatic), 6, 139– 46,

153– 54

Rhodesia Lobby, 69, 71

Rhodesian Front: British military

intervention feared by, 74;

Communism and, 75, 84, 87– 88;

Dominion Party merges with,

16; electoral victory (1965), 32,

96, 102; five principles and, 41;

Ian Smith and, 32, 42, 225n200;

Labour government and, 26, 31, 40,



Index 311

203; majority rule and, 80; Robert

Menzies sees Rhodesian politics in

similar terms to 118; Rhodesian

armed forces and, 59– 61; transfer of

Central African Federation military

assets and, 18; United Federal Party

defeated by, 17; United Nations

and, 189; United States and, 159–

60, 164, 170– 71, 191; Winston

Field and, 18– 19, 162

Rhodesian Institute of Directors, 77

Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), 60– 64,

233n57, 234nn59– 60

Rhodesian Reserve Bank, 77

Rhodesian Security Council, 74

Rogers, Philip, 101, 112

Rogers, William, 175

Royal Air Force (RAF): capabilities for

potential operations against Rhodesia,

57, 62– 63; relationship with Royal

Rhodesian Air Force, 59– 60;

Wilson rules out action by, 74– 75

Royal Commission, 38– 39, 137, 194

Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF):

attitudes of its senior officers, 59–

60; capabilities of, 62

Ruanda- Urundi, 189

Rusk, Dean: consultation with British

politicians and officials, 159, 162,

165, 167, 169– 70, 172– 73, 192;

estimates force needed to invade

Rhodesia, 56; little interest in

African issues, 178; US response to

UDI established by, 174

Salisbury, Lord, 69

Sandys, Duncan: becomes

Commonwealth secretary, 18, 128;

Commonwealth involvement in

Rhodesian problem advocated by,

128– 29; Ghanaian protest received

by, 90; Hugh Foot alarmed by

policy of, 190; negotiations with

Ian Smith, 20, 24– 25; negotiations

with Winston Field, 18– 19, 128–

29; Sangster, Donald, 101

Sharpeville massacre, 70, 186

Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 101

Sierra Leone, 95, 100, 131

Silundika, George, 163

Singapore, 106, 113

Singapore Declaration, 112

Sithole, Ndabaningi: Bottomley insists

on seeing while in detention, 25;

Nkomo criticized by, 16; Welensky

discusses transition to African

majority rule with, 164; Wilson

rules out use of force to influence

attitude of, 38

Skybolt, 156, 177, 179, 181

Slade, H. G., 59– 60

Smith, Arnold: Australian and British

fears about his position as

Commonwealth secretary- general,

110– 11; Canadian assistant

undersecretary for external

affairs, 117, 147; favors Chapter

VII resolution, 282n100; no


(NIBMAR) and, 107; writings on

images of the Commonwealth, 85.

See also Commonwealth Secretariat

Smith, Ian: belief that international

reaction to UDI would be brief,

2; Bottomley- Gardiner mission

and, 29– 30, 221n127; British aid

insufficient to modify belief in

utility of a UDI, 43– 44; British

assessments of, 19, 30, 32, 41– 42;

British public and, 69– 70; Canada

alarmed by posturing of, 147;

Commonwealth and, 36, 88– 91,

95– 96, 102, 116, 131– 32, 134,

136– 37, 139; Communism and,

89, 281n92; economic sanctions

and, 76– 77, 135; Field and, 18– 19,

162; five principles and, 31, 33– 36;

Holyoake and, 119– 20, 132, 134,

136; Menzies and, 94, 99, 132,

134, 136; Mutasa letter and, 24;

negotiations with Bottomley and

Wilson, 25ff.; negotiations with

Douglas- Home and Sandys, 20,

24, 217n45; Pearson and, 134,

136– 37; proclamation of the UDI,

1; reaction to Labour government’s

warning statement (Oct. 1964),

26– 27, 40, 133; refuses to

apologize for deaths of thirty

thousand Zimbabweans, 3;



312 Index

Smith, Ian (continued): responsible

for Mugabe’s rule, 3; Rhodesian

armed forces and, 59– 61, 232n43;

Rhodesian Front and, 32, 42,

221n131, 225n200, 226n223;

Royal Commission and, 38– 39;

South Africa and, 65; status quo and,

42– 43, 226n229; United States and,

162, 171– 73, 272n97, 272n101;

visits London for funeral of Winston

Churchill, 28– 29, 41, 76, 133,

256n74; visits London for talks

with Wilson 35– 36, 74, 226n227;

Wilson’s visit to Salisbury and, 37–

38, 224n192; Zambia and, 96, 176

Smyth, Ian Douglas, 141– 42

South Africa: Anglo- American

consultation on, 165, 191, 197–

99; Australia and, 119, 150; British

arms sales to, 113, 199; British

military intervention in Rhodesia

complicated by, 57– 58, 64– 65;

Central African Federation formed

in response to influence of, 15, 21;

changing attitudes contribute to end

of white minority rule in Rhodesia,

2; Commonwealth withdrawal, 50,

85, 92, 151; further research needed

on, 208; G. Mennen Williams fears

Rhodesia being pushed into closer

association with, 160; Kaunda views

as a threat to peace in southern Africa,

100; Rhodesians counting on support

from to cope with sanctions, 80;

Rhodesian diplomatic representation

in, 34; Rhodesian financial assistance

from, 43; Rhodesians seen as part of a

barrier against spread of Communism

in Africa, 138, 144; sanctions and,

7, 77, 118, 147, 150– 52, 165,

183, 195– 96, 198– 99, 202, 206;

UN resolutions opposed by, 194;

US assessment of likely support for

Rhodesia, 65, 268n46; US considers

Rhodesia of secondary importance

compared to, 157; Wilson proposes

consultative committee involving, 97–

98; Wilson tries to keep off cabinet

agenda, 46. See also Verwoerd,

Hendrick

Southern Rhodesia. See armed forces; institutions of government; political parties; politicians; relations with individual countries and organizations

Soviet Union, 7, 71, 193, 196– 98

Special Air Service (Rhodesian), 63

Special Commonwealth African

Assistance Plan (SCAAP), 123, 126

Stevenson, Adlai, 55, 160

Stewart, Michael: bureaucratic conflict

with Arthur Bottomley, 49– 50;

consultations with Dean Rusk and

George Ball, 169– 70, 271n85;

military intervention considered too

risky by, 53, 62, 230n1; sent to UN

after UDI, 195; Wilson advises Soviet

intervention unlikely, 198, 281n91

Suez, 11, 70, 75, 121, 156, 177, 179,

181, 184– 85

Tanganyika, 89, 128– 29. See also

Nyerere, Julius; Tanzania

Tanzania: Canadian aid and, 123;


Meeting (June 1965) and, 100, 102;

Hastings Banda accuses of harboring

Malawian rebels, 101; Lagos

meeting and, 106; Mozambique’s

guerilla forces and, 163; mutiny in

armed forces, 67; OAU and, 103;

Ian Smith disparages, 89, 132; UN

inflammatory statement by, 194;

Zambian contingency planning and,

166– 67. See also Nyerere, Julius;

Tanganyika

Territorial Force (Rhodesian), 55,

61– 63

Thomson, George, 197

Thorpe, Jeremy, 68– 69

Todd, Garfield, 44– 45, 125, 188

Trading With the Enemy Act (United

States), 170

Treasury, 45

Tree, Marietta P., 170, 193

Trend, Burke: British contingency

planning recognized as deficient

by, 35; British position “morally

impregnable” according to, 29;




Index 313

95; Crossman suggests “decisive

influence” in Wilson’s to visit

Salisbury, 37; Wilson advised to

side with CRO in disagreement

with Foreign Office, 49

Uganda: Canadian aid and, 123;



Commonwealth Secretariat

proposed by, 95; mutiny in armed

forces, 67. See also Obote, Milton

United Federal Party (Rhodesia Party),

16, 17

United Nations (UN): Australia and,

119, 133, 136, 149, 187– 89,

194– 95; Britain and, 7, 14, 27,

28, 36, 48– 49, 53, 62, 65, 70,

77– 79, 86, 103, 129, 137, 159–

60, 163, 167, 170, 180, 183ff.,

205– 7; Canada and, 7, 122, 141,

188– 89, 195, 202; Central African

Federation and, 191– 92; economic

sanctions and, 77– 79, 183– 84;

195ff.; force and, 183ff.; Ghana

and, 89– 90, 128, 187, 189, 191;

Harold Macmillan and, India and,

189; 186– 88; New Zealand and,

7, 151– 52, 187– 89; OAU and,

103; Portugal and, 194; South

Africa and, 194; Tanzania and,

194; UN Charter, 108, 147, 170,

186– 88, 195, 206, 229n273,

277n17; UN Conference on Trade

and Development (UNCTAD),

122, 126, 255n43; UN Fourth

Committee, 187– 88, 191, 194–

95; UN General Assembly, 7, 23,

62,103, 122, 184, 186– 90, 193–

95, 281n91; UN Security Council,

7, 62, 79, 89, 96, 109, 122, 147,

150, 151, 170, 184, 187, 191,

193, 195, 197, 199, 281n91; UN

Special Committee, 27, 119, 186,

188, 192– 93; United States and, 7,

70, 157, 159– 60, 163, 167, 170,

174, 180, 183ff., 202

United States (US): aid and technical

assistance policies of, 124, 163,

269n51; Bermuda Conference

and, 184, 196; Britain and, 27,

45, 48, 68, 138, 155ff., 183ff.,

206; bureaucratic politics, 174–

75, 268n42, 269n60, 270n67;


157– 61, 185; changing attitudes

conditioned white minority rule

in Rhodesia, 2, 178; Communism

and, 158, 161, 166, 172, 174, 178,

184– 85, 196– 97, 202; economic

sanctions and, 58, 165– 70, 172–

74, 178, 181– 82, 183– 84, 195ff.;

force and, 56, 68, 166, 176,

232n30; interests in Rhodesian

question, 157, 160– 61, 166,

174; New Zealand and, 156ff.;

Portuguese and South African

support for Rhodesia assessed by,

65, 268n46; response to UDI,

174; Rhodesia perceived to be

most susceptible to influence of

Australia and New Zealand, 116;

Rhodesian Front and, 159– 60,

164, 170– 71, 191; Ian Smith and,

162, 171– 73, 272n97, 272n101;

United Nations and, 7, 70, 157,

159– 60, 163, 167, 170, 174, 180,

183ff., 202; Vietnam and, 174,

176, 178; Zambia and, 48, 58, 78,

156, 161, 165– 70, 175– 76, 181,

273n132. See also US politicians and officials (e.g., Ball, George;

Bundy, McGeorge; Harriman,

Averell; Haynes, Ulric; Johnson,

Lyndon B.; Komer, Robert; Rusk,

Dean; Williams, G. Mennen);

US government and military institutions (e.g., CIA; Joint Chiefs

of Staff; NSC)

Verwoerd, Hendrick, 64, 190

Victoria Falls Conference, 15, 18, 191

Vienna Convention, 145

Vietnam: Labour Party and, 68, 207;

Rhodesia linked with in Anglo-

American relations, 156, 182; US

preoccupied by at time of UDI,

174, 176, 178; Wilson and, 46,

98, 102, 137, 204; Zambian airlift

affected by US involvement in, 169



314 Index

Walker, Patrick Gordon, 21, 86– 87,

164– 65, 180, 199, 205, 237n115,

238n140

Walker, Victor Lee, 61

Wall, Patrick, 69

Walston, Henry, 24

Wankie colliery, 56, 166

Welensky, Roy: Bottomley- Gardiner

visit assessed by, 221n123; British

government and 158, 162, 190,

230n6; Communist threat in

Africa according to, 196; Edgar

Whitehead and, 164; Winston Field

and, 129

“White Redoubt,” 138, 159

Whitehead, Edgar: British government

and, 159, 191; Ian Smith and,

20; moderate politics of, 17, 191;

Rhodesian Legislative Assembly

warned by, 27; UN Fourth

Committee and, 191; Welensky

and, 164

Whitelaw, William, 69

Wigg, George, 57, 62– 64

Williams, Eric, 95

Williams, G. Mennen (“Soapy”):

Alfred Bentley and, 171; Britain

and, 157– 58, 171, 174, 266n15;

bureaucratic politics and, 175;


158– 59; fears Rhodesia being

pushed into closer association with

South Africa and Portugal, 159–

60; policy recommendations in

UN, 189, 194

Williams, Marcia, 70, 205

Willoughby, John, 66

Wilson, Harold: Abubakar Tafawa

Balewa and, 103– 4, 138;

bureaucratic politics and, 49– 50;

Cabinet management, 5, 27–

28, 46– 47, 98, 181, 228n255;

Commonwealth policy of, 6,

85, 87, 206; Commonwealth

consultative committee proposal,

97– 98; Commonwealth Prime

Ministers’ Meetings and, 33, 84,

95ff.; Communism and, 87, 89,

183, 193, 197– 98; Conservatives

and, 26– 27, 36, 39, 69, 75,

203– 4; economic sanctions and,

45, 47, 51, 76– 78, 105– 6, 176,

182; force and, 27– 28, 38, 58–

59, 63, 74– 76, 78– 79, 80– 81,

105, 176, 193, 200– 201, 205,

240n177, 240n182, 241n212;

Holyoake and, 131, 133ff.; House

of Commons statements, 32, 67,

96, 107, 183, 200– 201; Ian Smith

and, 24ff., 74, 88– 89, 113, 131ff.,

198, 226n227; Johnson and, 77,

172– 73, 175, 177, 274nn141– 42,

274n144; Kaunda and, 59, 78,

96, 104, 106– 7; MacDonald’s

assessment of, 104, 108; majority

rule and, 13, 21, 22, 24, 35,

41, 51, 109, 113, 203; Menzies

and, 102, 131, 133ff., 258n109,

259n133; Nyerere and, 100,

102– 3; Pearson and, 99– 100,

104, 108, 133ff., 195; Opposition

years, 21– 24; Rhodesia policy and

negotiations dominated by, 5,

21 35, 45– 47, 204– 5, 228n259;

Royal Commission proposed by,

38– 39; United Nations and, 103,

183, 193, 195, 197– 98; United

States and, 164, 170ff.; Vietnam

and, 46, 98, 102, 137, 204; visits

Salisbury, 36– 38, 70, 138, 173,

194, 220n94, 224n190, 224n192

Wright, Oliver: Commonwealth Prime

Ministers’ Meeting (Sept. 1966)

recalled by, 108; continuity

in Britain’s Rhodesia policy

acknowledged by, 203– 4; decision

to rule out use of force explained

by, 75; moratorium on Rhodesian

independence issue suggested by,

43; Rhodesia a “second order”

problem according to, 178;

supremacy of domestic issues over

foreign affairs acknowledged by,

81; Vietnam peace initiative details

worked out by, 98; Wilson’s visit to

Rhodesia assessed by, 37

Wyatt, Woodrow, 68

Yates, Sidney R., 192

Yew, Lee Kuan, 106



Index 315

Zambia: Anglo- American consultation

and cooperation on problems of,

48, 58, 78, 156, 161, 165– 70,

175– 76, 181, 273n132; Bottomley

attends independence celebrations

in, 25; British military forces in,

57– 58, 62– 63, 78; Commonwealth

mission opposed by, 132; concept

of crisis and, 9, 200– 202, 282n112;

economic effects of the UDI on,

28, 49, 58, 76, 96, 98, 105– 6, 118,

139, 147, 165ff., 201, 247n91,

272n97; further research needed

on, 208; harboring of guerilla forces

in, 96, 234n60; Soviet Union and,

198. See also Kaunda, Kenneth

Zimbabwe African National Union

(ZANU), 16, 126, 165

Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union

(ZAPU), 16, 159, 165

