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FARC

Revolutionary Armed Forces of ColombiaPeople's Army

Participant in the Colombian armed conflict (1964–present)

FARC–EP coat of arms: shield, flag, and country

Active 1964 – present

Ideology Marxism–LeninismBolivarianismRevolutionary socialismLeft-wing nationalismFoco theory

Leaders Timoleón JiménezPablo CatatumboIván MárquezPastor AlapeJoaquín GómezMauricio JaramilloAlfonso Cano  †Manuel Marulanda †Jacobo Arenas †Raúl Reyes  †Iván Ríos  †Jorge Briceño  †

Area ofoperations

Concentrated in southern, south-western, north-western and eastern Colombia. Incursions to Peru, Venezuela, Brazil,Panama, and Ecuador. Sporadic presence in other Latin American countries, predominantly Mexico, Paraguay,Argentina, and Bolivia.

Strength 7,000 - 10,000 (2013)

Allies Coordinadora Continental BolivarianaCuba (until 1991)

Opponents Government of ColombiaRight-wing paramilitary groupsGovernment of the United States

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (Spanish: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias deColombia—Ejército del Pueblo, FARC–EP and FARC) are a Marxist–Leninist organization involved in thecontinuing Colombian armed conflict since 1964.[1][2] The FARC-EP have a claim to be a peasant army with apolitical platform of agrarianism and anti-imperialism inspired by Bolivarianism.[citation needed] The operations of theFARC–EP are funded by kidnap to ransom, gold mining, and the production and distribution of illegal drugs.The strength of the FARC–EP forces is indeterminate; in 2007, the FARC said they were an armed force of 18,000men and women; in 2010, the Colombian military calculated that FARC forces consisted of approximately 13,800members, 50 per cent of which were armed guerrilla combatants; and, in 2011, the President of Colombia, JuanManuel Santos, said that FARC–EP forces comprised fewer than 10,000 members. 26,648 FARC and ELN membershave decided to demobilize since 2002. According to a report from Human Rights Watch, approximately 20-30% ofthe recruits are minors, most of whom are forced to join the FARC. The greatest concentrations of FARC guerrillaforces are in the south-eastern regions of Colombia's 500,000 square kilometers (190,000 sq mi) of jungle, in theplains at the base of the Andean mountain chain [citation needed] and in northwestern Colombia. However, the FARCand the ELN (National Liberation Army of Colombia) lost control of the territory, forcing them to hide primarily inremote areas in the jungle.

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In 1964, the FARC–EP were established as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party (PartidoComunista Colombiano, PCC), after the Colombian military attacked rural Communist enclaves in the aftermath ofThe Violence (La Violencia, ca. 1948–58). The FARC are a violent non-state actor (VNSA) whose formalrecognition as legitimate belligerent forces is disputed by some organizations. As such, the FARC has been classifiedas a terrorist organization by the governments of Colombia, the United States, Canada, Chile, New Zealand, and theEuropean Union; whereas the governments of Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, and Nicaragua don't. In 2008,Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez recognized the FARC-EP as a proper army. President Chávez also asked theColombian government and their allies to recognize the FARC as a belligerent force, arguing that such politicalrecognition would oblige the FARC to forgo kidnapping and terrorism as methods of civil war and to abide by theGeneva Convention. Juan Manuel Santos, the current President of Colombia, has followed a middle path byrecognizing in 2011 that there is an "armed conflict" in Colombia although his predecessor, Alvaro Uribe, stronglydisagreed. In 2012, FARC announced they would no longer participate in kidnappings for ransom and released thelast 10 soldiers and police officers they kept as prisoners but it has kept silent about the status of hundreds ofcivilians still reported as hostages. In February 2008, millions of Colombians demonstrated against the FARC.In 2012, the FARC made 239 attacks on the energy infrastructure. However, the FARC show signs of social fatigue.Also the FARC are already not seeking battles with the army, and rarely make attacks against the police, Thisfollows the trend of the 1990s during the strengthening of the Government forces. Currently the FARC and theColombian Government are in peace talks in the city of Havana in Cuba.

History

La Violencia and the National Front"There is more repression of individual freedom here, than in any country we've been to; the police patrol the streets, carrying rifles,and demand your papers every few minutes. . . the atmosphere, here, is tense, and it seems a revolution may be brewing. Thecountryside is in open revolt, and the army is powerless to suppress it."

-- Diary of Ernesto "Che" Guevara, July 6, 1952

In 1948, in the aftermath of the assassination of the populist politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, there occurred a decadeof large-scale political violence throughout Colombia, which was a Conservative – Liberal civil war that killed morethan 200,000 people. In Colombian history and culture, the killings are known as La Violencia (The Violence,1948–58); most of the people killed were peasants and laborers in rural Colombia. In 1957–1958, the politicalleadership of the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party agreed to establish a bipartisan political system known asthe National Front (Frente Nacional, 1958–74). The Liberal and the Conservative parties agreed to alternate in theexercise of government power by presenting a joint National Front candidate to each election and restricting theparticipation of other political movements. The pact was ratified as a constitutional amendment by a nationalplebiscite on 1 December 1957 and was supported by the Roman Catholic Church as well as Colombia's businessleaders. The initial power-sharing agreement was effective until 1974; nonetheless, with modifications, theLiberal–Conservative bipartisan system lasted until 1990. The sixteen-year extension of the bipartisan power-sharingagreement permitted the Liberal and Conservative élites to consolidate their socioeconomic control of Colombiansociety, and to strengthen the military to suppress political reform and radical politics proposing alternative forms ofgovernment for Colombia.During the 1960s, the Colombian government effected a policy of Accelerated Economic Development (AED), the agribusiness plan of Lauchlin Currie, a Canadian-born U.S.economist who owned ranching land in Colombia. The plan promoted industrial farming that would produce great yields of agricultural and animal products for world-wide exportation, while the Colombian government would provide subsidies to large-scale private farms. The AED policy came at the expense of the small-scale family farms that only yielded food supplies for local consumption. Based on a legalistic interpretation of what constituted "efficient use" of the land, thousands of peasants were forcefully

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evicted from their farms and migrated to the cities, where they became part of the industrial labor pool. In 1961, thedispossession of farmland had produced 40,000 landless families and by 1969 their numbers amounted to 400,000throughout Colombia. By 1970, the latifundio type of industrial farm (more than 50 hectares in area) occupied morethan 77 per cent of arable land in the country. The AED policy increased the concentration of land ownership amongcattle ranchers and urban industrialists, whose businesses expanded their profits as a result of reductions in the costof labor wages after the influx of thousands of displaced peasants into the cities. During this period, most ruralworkers lacked basic medical care and malnutrition was almost universal, which increased the rates of preventabledisease and infant mortality.

PCC and self-defense communitiesCommunists were active throughout rural and urban Colombia in the period immediately following World War I.The Colombian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Colombiano, PCC) was formally accredited by the Cominternin 1930. The PCC began establishing "peasant leagues" in rural areas and "popular fronts" in urban areas, calling forimproved living and working conditions, education, and rights for the working class. These groups began networkingtogether to present a defensive front against the state-supported violence of large landholders.[3] Members organizedstrikes, protests, seizures of land, and organized communist-controlled "self-defense communities" in southernColombia that were able to resist state military forces, while providing for the subsistence needs of the populace.Many of the PCC's attempts at organizing peasants, were met with violent repression by the Colombian government,and landowning class. U.S. military intelligence estimated that in 1962, the size of the PCC had grown to 8,000 to10,000 active members, and an additional 28,000 supporters.In 1961, a guerrilla leader and long-time PCC organizer named Manuel Marulanda Vélez declared an independent"Republic of Marquetalia". The Lleras government attempted unsuccessfully to attack the communities to drive outthe guerrillas, due to fears that "a Cuban-style revolutionary situation might develop". After the failed attacks,several army outposts were set up in the area.

Plan LazoIn October 1959, the United States sent a "Special Survey Team" composed of counterinsurgency experts toinvestigate Colombia's internal security situation. Among other policy recommendations the US team advised that"in order to shield the interests of both Colombian and US authorities against 'interventionist' charges any special aidgiven for internal security was to be sterile and covert in nature." In February 1962, three years after the 1959 "USSpecial Survey Team", a Fort Bragg top-level U.S. Special Warfare team headed by Special Warfare Centercommander General William P. Yarborough, visited Colombia for a second survey.In a secret supplement to his report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Yarborough encouraged the creation and deploymentof a US-backed force to commit "paramilitary, sabotage and/or terrorist activities against known communistproponents".[4][5]

The new counter-insurgency policy was instituted as Plan Lazo in 1962 and called for both military operations andcivic action programs in violent areas. Following Yarborough's recommendations, the Colombian military recruitedcivilians into "civil defense" groups which worked alongside the military in its counter-insurgency campaign, as wellas in civilian intelligence networks to gather information on guerrilla activity. Doug Stokes argues that it was notuntil the early part of the 1980s that the Colombian government attempted to move away from the counterinsurgencystrategy represented by Plan Lazo and Yarborough's 1962 recommendations.The Colombian government began attacking many of the communist groups in the early 1960s, attempting to re-assimilate the territories under the control of the national government. FARC was formed in 1964 by Manuel Marulanda Vélez and other PCC members, after a military attack on the community of Marquetalia. 16,000 Colombian troops attacked the community, which only had 48 armed fighters. Marulanda and 47 others fought against government forces at Marquetalia, and then escaped into the mountains along with the other fighters. These

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48 men formed the core of FARC, which later grew in size to hundreds of fighters.

Seventh Guerrilla Conference of the FARC-EPIn 1982, FARC-EP held its Seventh Guerrilla Conference, which called for a major shift in FARC's strategy. FARChad historically been doing most of its fighting in rural areas, and was limited to small-scale confrontations withColombian military forces. By 1982, increased income from the "coca boom" allowed them to expand into anirregular army, which would then stage large-scale attacks on Colombian troops. They also began sending fighters toVietnam and the Soviet Union for advanced military training. They also planned to move closer to middle-sizedcities, as opposed to only remote rural areas, and closer to areas rich in natural resources, in order to create a strongeconomic infrastructure. It was also at this conference that FARC added the initials "EP", for "Ejército del Pueblo"or "People's Army", to the organization's name.

La Uribe Agreement and Union Patriótica

In the early 1980s, President Belisario Betancur began discussing the possibility of peace talks with the guerrillas.Ultimately this resulted in the 1984 La Uribe Agreement, which called for a cease-fire, which ended up lasting from1984 to 1987.In 1985, members of the FARC-EP, along with a large number of other leftist and communist groups, formed apolitical party known as the Union Patriótica ("Patriotic Union", UP). The UP sought political reforms (known asApertura Democratica) such as constitutional reform, more democratic local elections, political decentralization, andending the domination of Colombian politics by the Liberal and Conservative parties. They also pursuedsocioeconomic reforms such land redistribution, greater health and education spending, the nationalization of foreignbusinesses, Colombian banks, and transportation, and greater public access to mass media. While many members ofthe UP were involved with the FARC-EP, the large majority of them were not and came from a wide variety ofbackgrounds such as labor unions and socialist parties such as the PCC. In the cities, the FARC-EP began integratingitself with the UP and forming Juntas Patrióticas (or "solidarity cells") -- small groups of people associated withlabor unions, student activist groups, and peasant leagues, who traveled into the barrios discussing social problems,building support for the UP, and determining the sociopolitical stance of the urban peasantry.The UP performed better in elections than any other leftist party in Colombia's history. In 1986, UP candidates won350 local council seats, 23 deputy positions in departmental assemblies, 9 seats in the House, and 6 seats in theSenate. The 1986 Presidential candidate, Jaime Pardo Leal, won 4.6% of the national vote.Since 1986, thousands of members of the UP and other leftist parties were murdered (estimates range from 4,000 to6,000). In 1987, the President of the UP, Jaime Pardo, was murdered. In 1989 a single large landholder had over 400UP members murdered. Over 70% of all Colombian presidential candidates in 1990—and 100% of those fromcenter-left parties—were assassinated.[6]

1990–1998During this period, the Colombian government continued its negotiations with the FARC-EP and other armedgroups, some of which were successful. Some of the groups which demobilized at this time include the EPL, theERP, the Quintín Lame Armed Movement, and the M-19.Towards the end of 1990, the army, with no advance warning and while negotiations were still ongoing with thegroup, attacked a compound known as Casa Verde, which housed the National Secretariat of the FARC-EP. TheColombian government argued that the attack was caused by the FARC-EP's lack of commitment to the process,since the organization was continuing its criminal activities.[citation needed]

During this year on 10 August senior leader Jacobo Arenas, an ideological leader and founder of FARC-EP, died.

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On 3 June 1991, dialogue resumed between the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordinating Board and the government onneutral territory in Caracas, Venezuela and Tlaxcala, Mexico.[7] However, the war did not stop, and armed attacks byboth sides continued. The negotiation process was broken off in 1993 after no agreement was reached. TheCoordinating Board disappeared not long after that time, and guerrilla groups continued their activitiesindependently.Before the break off of dialogue, a letter written by a group of Colombian intellectuals (among whom were Nobellaureate Gabriel García Márquez) to the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordinating Board was released denouncing theapproach taken by the FARC-EP and the dire consequences that it was having for the country.[8]

In the early 1990s, the FARC-EP had between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters, organized into 70 fronts spread throughoutthe country.[citation needed] From 1996 to 1998 they inflicted a series of strikes on the Colombian Army, including athree-day offensive in Mitú (Vaupés department), taking a large number of soldiers prisoner.On 23 September 1994, the FARC kidnapped American agricultural scientist Thomas Hargrove and held him captivefor 11 months. After his release, Hargrove wrote a book about his ordeal which inspired the 2000 film Proof of Lifestarring Meg Ryan and Russell Crowe.Over this period in Colombia, the cultivation of different drugs expanded and there were widespread coca farmers'marches. These marches brought to a halt several major arteries in southern Colombia. Government officials saidthat FARC-EP had forced the protesters to participate.[9][10] According to social anthropologist María ClemenciaRamírez, the relationship between the guerrillas and the marches was ambivalent: FARC-EP promoted the 1996protests as part of their participatory democracy policies yet also exercised authoritarianism, which led to tensionsand negotiations with peasant leaders, but the cocalero movement brought proposals on behalf of the coca growersand defended its own interests.

Andrés Pastrana's presidency (1998–2002)In March 1999 members of a local FARC contingent killed 3 USA-based indigenous rights activists, who wereworking with the U'Wa people to build a school for U'Wa children, and were fighting against encroachment of U'Waterritory by multinational oil corporations. The killings were questioned by many and condemned by many others,and led the United States to increase pressure on the Pastrana administration to crack down on FARC guerrillas.

1998–2002 peace process

FARC guerrillas marching in formation duringthe Caguan peace talks (1998–2002)

With the hope of negotiating a peace settlement, on 7 November 1998,President Andrés Pastrana granted FARC-EP a 42,000 km2

(16,200 sq mi) safe haven meant to serve as a confidence buildingmeasure, centered around the San Vicente del Caguánsettlement.[citation needed]

After a series of high-profile guerrilla actions, including the hijackingof an aircraft, the attack on several small towns and cities, the arrest ofthe Irish Colombia Three (see below) and the alleged training ofFARC-EP militants in bomb making by them, and the kidnapping ofseveral political figures, Pastrana ended the peace talks on 21 February2002 and ordered the armed forces to start retaking the FARC-EPcontrolled zone, beginning at midnight. A 48-hour respite that had been previously agreed to with the rebel groupwas not respected as the government argued that it had already been granted during an earlier crisis in January, whenmost of the more prominent FARC-EP commanders had apparently left the demilitarized zone.[11] Shortly after theend of talks, the FARC-EP kidnapped Oxygen Green Party presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, who was

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traveling in Colombian territory. Betancourt was rescued by the Colombian government on 2 July 2008 (seeOperation Jaque below).

The Colombia Three case

On 24 April 2002, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations published the findings ofits investigation into IRA activities in Colombia. Their report alleged a longstanding connection between the IRAand FARC-EP, mentioned at least 15 IRA members who had been traveling in and out of Colombia since 1998, andestimated that the IRA had received at least $2 million in drug proceeds for training FARC-EP members. TheIRA/FARC-EP connection was first made public on 11 August 2001, following the arrest in Bogotá of two IRAexplosives and urban warfare experts and of a representative of Sinn Féin who was known to be stationed in Cuba.Jim Monaghan, Martin McCauley and Niall Connolly (known as the Colombia Three), were arrested in Colombia inAugust 2001 and were accused of teaching bomb-making methods to FARC-EP.On 15 February 2002, the Colombia Three were charged with training FARC-EP members in bomb-making inColombia. The Colombian authorities had received satellite footage, probably supplied by the CIA, of the men withFARC-EP in an isolated jungle area, where they are thought to have spent the last five weeks. They could have spentup to 20 years in jail if the allegations were proved.During October 2001, a key witness in the case against the three Irish republicans disappeared. This came as SinnFéin President Gerry Adams admitted one of the men was the party's representative in Cuba. The missing witness, aformer police inspector, said he had seen Mr McCauley with FARC-EP members in 1998. Without his testimony,legal sources said the chances of convicting the three men were reduced.[citation needed]

They were eventually found guilty of traveling on false passports in June 2004 but were acquitted of trainingFARC-EP members. That decision was reversed after an appeal by the Attorney General of Colombia and they weresentenced to 17-year terms. However, they vanished in December 2004 while on bail and returned to Ireland.Tánaiste Mary Harney said no deal had been done with Sinn Féin or the IRA over the three's return to Ireland addingthat the Irish government would consider any request from the Colombian authorities for their extradition.Colombian vice-president Francisco Santos Calderón did not rule out allowing them to serve their sentences inIreland.

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Álvaro Uribe's Presidency (2002–2010)

2002–2005 period

President Álvaro Uribe intensified military operationsagainst the FARC-EP, seeking to defeat them.

For most of the period between 2002 and 2005, the FARC-EP wasbelieved to be in a strategic withdrawal due to the increasingmilitary and police actions of new president Álvaro Uribe, whichled to the capture or desertion of many fighters and medium-levelcommanders. Uribe ran for office on an anti-FARC-EP platformand was determined to defeat FARC-EP in a bid to create"confidence" in the country.[citation needed] Uribe's own father hadbeen killed by FARC-EP in an attempted kidnapping in 1983.[12]

In 2002 and 2003, FARC broke up ten large ranches in Meta, aneastern Colombian province, and distributed the land to localsubsistence farmers.During the first two years of the Uribe administration, severalFARC-EP fronts, most notably in Cundinamarca and Antioquia,were broken by the government's military operations.[citation needed]

On 5 May 2003, the FARC assassinated the governor ofAntioquia, Guillermo Gaviria Correa, his advisor for peace, formerdefense minister Gilberto Echeverri Mejía, and 8 soldiers. TheFARC had kidnapped Mr. Gaviria and Mr. Echeverri a yearearlier, when the 2 men were leading a march for peace from Medellín to Caicedo in Antioquia.[13]

On 13 July 2004, the office of the United Nations' High Commissioner for Human Rights publicly condemned thegroup, proving that FARC-EP violated article 17 of the additional Protocol II of the Geneva Convention andinternational humanitarian law, as a result of the 10 July massacre of seven peasants and the subsequentdisplacement of eighty individuals in San Carlos, Antioquia.[14]

In early February 2005, a series of small-scale actions by the FARC-EP around the southwestern departments ofColombia, resulted in an estimated 40 casualties. The FARC-EP, in response to government military operations inthe south and in the southeast, would now be displacing its military center of gravity towards the Nariño, Putumayoand Cauca departments.[15]

Possibility of prisoner exchange with the government

The FARC-EP originally said that they would only release the police and military members they held captive (whomthey considered to be prisoners of war) through exchanges with the government for imprisoned FARC-EP members.During the duration of the DMZ negotiations, a small humanitarian exchange took place.The group demanded a demilitarized zone including two towns (Florida and Pradera) in the strategic region of Valledel Cauca, where much of the current military action against them has taken place, plus this region is also animportant way of transporting drugs to the Pacific coast.[citation needed] This demand was rejected by the Colombiangovernment based on previous experience during the 2002 peace talks.[citation needed]

On 2 December 2004, the government announced the pardon of 23 FARC-EP prisoners, to encourage a reciprocalmove. The prisoners to be released were all of low rank and had promised not to rejoin the armed struggle. InNovember 2004, the FARC-EP had rejected a proposal to hand over 59 of its captives in exchange for 50 guerrillasimprisoned by the government.[16]

In a communique dated 28 November but released publicly on 3 December, the FARC-EP declared that they were no longer insisting on the demilitarization of San Vicente del Caguán and Cartagena del Chairá as a precondition for the

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negotiation of the prisoner exchange, but instead that of Florida and Pradera in the Valle department.[17] They statethat this area would lie outside the "area of influence" of both their Southern and Eastern Blocks (the FARC-EP'sstrongest) and that of the military operations being carried out by the Uribe administration.[citation needed]

They requested security guarantees both for the displacement of their negotiators and that of the guerrillas that wouldbe freed, which are specifically stated to number as many as 500 or more, and ask the Catholic Church to coordinatethe participation of the United Nations and other countries in the process.[citation needed]

The FARC-EP also mention in the communique that Simón Trinidad's extradition, would be a serious obstacle toreaching a prisoner exchange agreement with the government. On 17 December 2004, the Colombian governmentauthorized Trinidad's extradition to the United States, but stated that the measure could be revoked if the FARC-EPreleased all political hostages and military captives in its possession before 30 December. The FARC-EP rejected thedemand.[citation needed]

Partial captive releases and escapes during 2006 and 2007

On 25 March 2006, after a public announcement made weeks earlier, the FARC-EP released two captured policemenat La Dorada, Putumayo. The release took place some 335 miles (539 km) southwest of Bogotá, near the Ecuadoreanborder. The Red Cross said the two were released in good health. Military operations in the area and bad weather hadprevented the release from occurring one week earlier.In a separate series of events, civilian hostage and German citizen Lothar Hintze was released by FARC-EP on 4April 2006, after five years in captivity. Hintze had been kidnapped for extortion purposes, and his wife had paidthree ransom payments without any result. [citation needed]

One prisoner, Julian Ernesto Guevara Castro, a police officer, died of tuberculosis on 28 January 2006. He was acaptain and was captured on 1 November 1998.[18] On 29 March 2009, the FARC-EP announced that they wouldgive Guevara's remains to his mother. The FARC handed over Guevara's remains on 1 April 2010.Another civilian hostage, Fernando Araújo, later named Minister of Foreign Relations and formerly DevelopmentMinister, escaped his captors on 31 December 2006. Araújo had to walk through the jungle for five days beforebeing found by troops in the hamlet of San Agustin, 350 miles (560 km) north of Bogotá. He was kidnapped on 5December 2000 while jogging in the Caribbean coastal city of Cartagena. He was reunited with his family on 5January 2007.Another prisoner, Jhon Frank Pinchao, a police officer, escaped his captors on 28 April 2007 after nine years incaptivity. He was reunited with his family on 15 May 2007. [citation needed]

2007 death of 11 hostage deputies

On 28 June 2007, the FARC-EP reported the death of 11 out of 12 provincial deputies from the Valle del CaucaDepartment whom the guerrillas had kidnapped in 2002. The guerrillas claimed that the deputies had been killed bycrossfire during an attack by an "unidentified military group." The Colombian government stated that governmentforces had not made any rescue attempts and that the FARC-EP executed the hostages. FARC did not report anyother casualties on either side and delayed months before permitting the Red Cross to recover the remains.According to the government, the guerrillas delayed turning over the corpses to let decomposition hide evidence ofhow they died. The Red Cross reported that the corpses had been washed and their clothing changed before burial,hiding evidence of how they were killed. The Red Cross also reported that the deputies had been killed by multipleclose-range shots, many of them in the back of the victims, and even two by shots to the head.[citation needed]

In February 2009, Sigifredo López, the only deputy who survived and was later released by FARC, accused thegroup of killing the 11 captives and denied that any military rescue attempt had taken place. According to López, theunexpected arrival of another guerrilla unit resulted in confusion and paranoia, leading the rebels to kill the rest ofthe Valle deputies. He survived after previously being punished for insubordination and was held in chains nearbybut separated from the rest of the group.

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Major developments during 2008

Clara Rojas and Consuelo González liberation

On 10 January 2008, former vice presidential candidate Clara Rojas and former congresswoman Consuelo Gonzálezwere freed after nearly six years in captivity. In a Venezuela-brokered deal, a helicopter flew deep into Colombia topick up both hostages. The women were escorted out of the jungle by armed guerrillas to a clearing where they werepicked up by Venezuelan helicopters that bore International Red Cross insignias. In a statement published on apro-rebel Web site, the FARC-EP said the unilateral release demonstrated the group's willingness to engage theColombian government in talks over the release of as many as 800 people who are still being held. In a televisedspeech, Colombia's U.S.-allied president, Álvaro Uribe, thanked Chavez for his efforts.During the period she was held kidnapped in the jungle in 2004, Clara Rojas gave birth to her son by Caesarean. At8 months old, the baby was removed from the area and Rojas didn't hear of the boy again until 31 December, whenshe heard Colombian President Álvaro Uribe say on the radio that the child was no longer with her captors. DNAtests later confirmed the boy, who had been living in a Bogotá foster home for more than two years under a differentname, was hers. She reclaimed her son. Asked about her opinion of the FARC-EP as group, Rojas called it "acriminal organization", condemning its kidnappings as "a total violation of human dignity" and saying some captivepolice and soldiers are constantly chained.

February 2008 liberations

On 31 January 2008, the FARC-EP announced that they would release civilian hostages Luis Eladio Perez Bonilla,Gloria Polanco, and Orlando Beltran Cuellar to Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez as a humanitarian gesture. On27 February 2008, the three hostages and Jorge Eduardo Gechem Turbay (who was added to the list due to his poorhealth) were released by FARC-EP. With the authorization of the Colombian government and the participation of theInternational Red Cross, a Venezuelan helicopter transported them to Caracas from San Jose del Guaviare. TheFARC-EP had called its planned release of the hostages a gesture of recognition for the mediation efforts of Chávez,who had called on the international community to recognize the rebels as belligerents a month prior. ColombianPresident Álvaro Uribe, who had tense relations with Chavez, thanked the socialist leader and called for the releaseof all hostages. He said Colombia was still in a fight "against terrorist actions" but was open to reconciliation.[citation

needed]

Anti-FARC rallies

Banner of the February 2008 anti-FARC rallies with slogans in several languages(from left: Spanish, English, Dutch, and French).

On 4 February 2008, several rallies wereheld in Colombia and in other locationsaround the world, criticizing FARC-EP anddemanding the liberation of hundreds ofhostages. The protests were originallyorganized through the popular socialnetworking site Facebook and were alsosupported by local Colombian media outletsas well as the Colombian government.Participation estimates vary from thehundreds of thousands to several millions ofpeople in Colombia and thousandsworldwide.[19][20][21][22][23]

Kiraz Janicke of leftist "Venezuela News, Views and Analysis" website criticized the rallies, claiming that "right-wing paramilitary leaders featured prominently" in their organization and arguing that workers were also

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pressured to attend the gatherings. According to her, the purpose of the protests was to promote "Uribe's policy ofperpetuating Colombia's decades-long civil war."[] Shortly before the rallies took place thirteen demobilized AUCparamilitary leaders, including Salvatore Mancuso, had expressed their support of the protest through a communique.However, this move was rejected by organizer Carlos Andrés Santiago, who stated that such an endorsement washarmful and criticized the AUC's actions.[24]

On 20 July 2008, a subsequent set of rallies against FARC included thousands of Colombians in Bogotá andhundreds of thousands throughout the rest of the country.[25][26]

Death of Raúl Reyes

Raúl Reyes

On 1 March 2008, the Colombian military attacked a FARC-EP camp insideEcuador's territory as part of a targeted killing directed at Raúl Reyes. The attackkilled over 20 people, about 17 of whom were members of the FARC-EP.[27][28]

Reyes, found among the dead along with at least 16 of his fellow guerrillas, wasknown as FARC-EP's international spokesman and hostage release negotiator. Hewas considered to be FARC-EP's second-in-command.[29]

This incident led to a breakdown in diplomatic relations between Ecuador andColombia, and between Venezuela and Colombia. Ecuador condemned theattack.[citation needed]

It has been considered the biggest blow against FARC-EP in its more than fourdecades of existence.[30] This event was quickly followed by the death of IvanRios, another member of FARC-EP's seven-man Secretariat, less than a week

later, by the hand of his own bodyguard. It came as a result of heavy Colombian military pressure and a reward offerof up to $5 million from the Colombian government.[31]

Death of Manuel Marulanda Vélez

Manuel Marulanda Vélez died on 26 March 2008 after a heart attack. His death would be kept a secret, untilColombian magazine, Revista Semana, published an interview with Colombian defense minister Juan Manuel Santoson 24 May 2008 in which Santos mentions the death of Manuel Marulanda Vélez. The news was confirmed byFARC-EP commander 'Timochenko' on pan-Latin American television station teleSUR on 25 May 2008.'Timochenko' announced the new commander in chief is 'Alfonso Cano' After speculations in several national andinternational media about the 'softening up' of the FARC and the announcement of Colombian President ÁlvaroUribe that several FARC leaders were ready to surrender and free their captives, the secretariat of the FARC sent outa communiqué emphasizing the death of their founder would not change their approach towards the captives or thehumanitarian agreement.

Hugo Chávez's call to disarm

On 11 January 2008 during the annual State of the Nation in the Venezuelan National Assembly, VenezuelanPresident Hugo Chavez referred to the FARC as "a real army that occupies territory in Colombia, they're notterrorists [...] They have a political goal and we have to recognize that".However, on 13 January 2008, Chavez retracted his previous statement and stated his disapproval of the FARC-EPstrategy of armed struggle and kidnapping, saying "I don't agree with kidnapping and I don't agree with armedstruggle". President Hugo Chávez has repeatedly expressed his disapproval of the practice of kidnapping stating on14 April that, "If I were a guerrilla, I wouldn't have the need to hold a woman, a man who aren't soldiers...Free thecivilians who don't have anything to do with the war. I don't agree with that.". On 7 March at the Cumbre de Rio,Chavez stated again that the FARC-EP should lay down their arms "Look at what has happened and is happening inLatin America, reflect on this (FARC-EP), we are done with war... enough with all this death". On 8 June Chavez

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repeated his call for a political solution and an end to the war, "The guerrilla war is history...At this moment in LatinAmerica, an armed guerrilla movement is out of place".

Operation Jaque

On 2 July 2008, under a Colombian military operation called Operation Jaque, the FARC-EP was tricked by theColombian Government into releasing 15 captives to Colombian Intelligence agents disguised as journalists andinternational aid workers in a helicopter rescue. Military intelligence agents infiltrated the guerrilla ranks and led thelocal commander in charge of the captives, Gerardo Aguilar Ramírez, alias Cesar, to believe they were going to takethem by helicopter to Alfonso Cano, the guerrillas' supreme leader. The rescued included Íngrid Betancourt (formerpresidential Candidate), U.S. military contractors Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell, as well aseleven Colombian police officers and soldiers. The commander, Cesar and one other rebel were taken into custodyby agents without incident after boarding the helicopter. On 4 July, some observers questioned whether or not thiswas an intercepted captive release made to look like a rescue.In a 5 July communique, FARC itself blamed rebels Cesar and Enrique for the escape of the captives andacknowledged the event as a setback but reiterated their willingness to reach future humanitarian agreements.Immediately after the captive rescue, Colombian military forces cornered the rest of FARC-EP's 1st Front, the unitwhich had held the captives. Colombian forces did not wish to attack the 1st Front but instead offered them amnestyif they surrender.[32]

Colombia's Program for Humanitarian Attention for the Demobilized announced in August 2008 that 339 membersof Colombia's rebel groups surrendered and handed in their weapons in July, including 282 guerrillas from theRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

Óscar Tulio Lizcano Freed

Lizcano, a Colombian Conservative Party congressman, was kidnapped 5 August 2000. On Sunday, 26 October2008, the ex-congressman, Óscar Tulio Lizcano escaped from FARC-EP rebels. Tulio Lizcano was a hostage forover 8 years, and escaped with a FARC-EP rebel he convinced to travel with him. They evaded pursuit for three daysas they trekked through mountains and jungles, encountering the military in the western coastal region of Colombia.Tulio Lizcano is the first hostage to escape since the successful military rescue of Ingrid Betancourt, and the longestheld political hostage by the organization. He became the 22nd Colombian political hostage to gain freedom during2008.[citation needed]

During his final days in captivity, Lizcano told Santos, they had nothing to eat but wild palm hearts and sugar cane.With the military tightening the noose, a FARC-EP rebel turned himself in and provided Colombian authorities withLizcano's exact location in the northwest state of Choco. As police and army troops prepared to launch a rescueoperation, Lizcano escaped alongside one of his guerrilla guards who had decided to desert. The two men hikedthrough the rain forest for three days and nights until they encountered an army patrol. Speaking from a clinic in thewestern city of Cali, Mr Lizcano said that when soldiers saw him screaming from across a jungle river, they thoughthe was drunk and ignored him. Only when he lifted the FARC-EP rebel's Galil assault rifle did the soldiers begin tounderstand that he was escaping from the FARC-EP rebels. "They jumped into the river, and then I started to shout,'I'm Lizcano'", he said.

Other late 2008 developments

Soon after the liberation of this prominent political hostage, the Vice President of Colombia Francisco Santos Calderón called Latin America's biggest guerrilla group a "paper tiger" with little control of the nation's territory, adding that "they have really been diminished to the point where we can say they are a minimal threat to Colombian security", and that "After six years of going after them, reducing their income and promoting reinsertion of most of their members, they look like a paper tiger." However, he warned against any kind of premature triumphalism,

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because "crushing the rebels will take time." The 500,000 square kilometers (190,000 sq mi) of jungle in Colombiamakes it hard to track them down to fight.

February 2009 liberations

On 21 December 2008, The FARC-EP announced that they would release civilian hostages Alan Jara, SigifredoLópez, three low-ranking police officers and a low-ranking soldier to Senator Piedad Córdoba as a humanitariangesture. On 1 February 2009, the FARC-EP proceeded with the release of the four security force members, JuanFernando Galicio Uribe, José Walter Lozano Guarnizo, Alexis Torres Zapata and William Giovanni DomínguezCastro. All of them were captured in 2007. Jara (kidnapped in 2001) was released on 3 February and López(kidnapped in 2002) was released on 5 February.

Release of Swedish hostage

On 17 March 2009, The FARC-EP released Swedish hostage Erik Roland Larsson. Larsson, paralyzed in half hisbody, was handed over to detectives in a rugged region of the northern state of Córdoba. Larsson was kidnappedfrom his ranch in Tierralta, not far from where he was freed, on 16 May 2007, along with his Colombian girlfriend,Diana Patricia Pena while paying workers. She escaped that same month following a gun battle between her captorsand police. Larsson suffered a stroke while in captivity. The FARC-EP had sought a $5 million ransom. One ofLarsson's sons said that the ransom was not paid.

December 2009 hostage killing

On 22 December 2009, the body of Luis Francisco Cuéllar, the Governor of Caquetá, was discovered, a day after hehad been kidnapped from his house in Florencia, Caquetá. Officials said the abduction and execution had beencarried by the FARC. According to officials, he had been killed soon after the abduction. The kidnappers cut thegovernor's throat as they evaded security forces. In a statement broadcast on radio, the acting governor, PatriciaVega, said, "I no longer have any doubts that FARC has done it again." The FARC claimed responsibility forCuéllar's kidnapping and murder in January 2010. The group said that they kidnapped him in order to "put him ontrial for corruption" and blamed his death on an attempt to rescue him by force.

March 2010 liberations

On 16 April 2009, The FARC-EP announced that they would release Army Corporal Pablo Emilio Moncayo Cabrerato Piedad Córdoba as a humanitarian gesture. Moncayo was captured on 21 December 1997. On 28 June 2009, theFARC announced that they would release Professional Soldier Josue Daniel Calvo Sanchez. Calvo was captured on20 April 2009. Calvo was released on 28 March 2010. Moncayo was released on 30 March 2010. [citation needed]

Operation Chameleon

On 13 June 2010, Colombian troops rescued Police Colonel Luis Herlindo Mendieta Ovalle, Police Captain EnriqueMurillo Sanchez and Army Sergeant Arbey Delgado Argote, after twelve years as prisoners. Argote was captured on3 August 1998. Ovalle and Sanchez were captured on 1 November 1998. On 14 June, Police Lieutenant WilliamDonato Gomez was also rescued. He was also captured on 3 August 1998.

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Juan Manuel Santos's presidencyPresident Juan Manuel Santos began his term with a suspected FARC bomb-blast in Bogotá.[33] This followed theresolution of the 2010 Colombia–Venezuela diplomatic crisis which erupted over outgoing President Álvaro Uribe'sallegations of active Venezuelan support for FARC.In early September 2010, FARC-EP attacks in the Nariño Department and Putumayo Department in southernColombia killed some fifty policemen and soldiers in hit-and-run assaults.[34]

According to a December report by the Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris NGO, 473 FARC-EP guerrillas and 357members of the Colombian security forces died in combat between January and September 2010. An additional1,382 government soldiers or policemen were wounded during the same period, with the report estimating that thetotal number of casualties could reach 2,500 by the end of the year.[35] Nuevo Arco Iris head León Valenciaconsidered that FARC guerrillas have reacted to a series of successful military blows against them by splitting uptheir forces into smaller groups and intensifying the offensive use of anti-personnel land mines, leading to what hecalled a further "degradation" of the conflict. Valencia also added that both coca crops and the drug trade have"doubled" in areas with FARC-EP presence. Researcher Claudia López considered that the Colombian governmentis winning the strategic and aerial side of the war but not the infantry front, where both the FARC-EP and ELNcontinue to maintain an offensive capacity.[36]

2010 death of Mono Jojoy

Colombian authorities announced the death of Víctor Julio Suárez Rojas, also known as Mono Jojoy, on 23September 2010. President Juan Manuel Santos stated that the FARC commander was killed in an operation thatbegan in the early hours of 21 September in the department of Meta, 200 miles (320 km) south of the capital Bogotá.According to Santos, he was "the impersonation of terror and a symbol of violence". After this event, the FARC-EPreleased a statement saying that defeating the group would not bring peace to Colombia and called for a negotiatedsolution, not surrender, to the social and political conflict.

January through October 2011

In January 2011 Juan Manuel Santos admitted that FARC-EP had killed 460 government soldiers and wounded over2,000 in 2010. In April 2011 the Colombian congress issued a statement saying that FARC has a 'strong presence' inroughly one third of the municipalities in Colombia, while their attacks have increased. Overall FARC operations,including attacks against security forces as well as kidnappings and the use of land mines, have increased every yearsince 2005. In the first 6 months of 2011 the FARC carried out an estimated 1,115 actions, which constitutes a 10%increase over the same period in 2010.By early 2011 Colombian authorities and news media reported that the FARC and the clandestine sister groups havepartly shifted strategy from guerrilla warfare to 'a war of militias', meaning that they are increasingly operating incivilian clothes while hiding amongst sympathizers in the civilian population. In early January 2011 the Colombianarmy said that the FARC has some 18,000 members, with 9,000 of those forming part of the militias. The army saysit has 'identified' at least 1,400 such militia members in the FARC strongholds of Valle del Cauca and Cauca in 2011.In June 2011 Colombian chief of staff Edgar Cely claimed that the FARC wants to 'urbanize their actions', whichcould partly explain the increased guerrilla activity in Medellín and particularly Cali. Jeremy McDermott, co-directorof Insight Crime, estimates that FARC may have some 30,000 'part-time fighters' in 2011, consisting of both armedand unarmed civilian supporters making up the rebel militia network, instead of full-time fighters wearing uniforms.According to Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, FARC-EP killed 429 members of the Colombian government's security forces between January and October 2011. During this same period, the rebel group lost 316 of its own members. The year 2011 saw over 2,000 incidents of FARC activity, which was the highest figure recorded since 1998. The NGO has stated that while most of these incidents remain defensive in nature and are not like the large offensives from years past, FARC actions have been growing since 2005, and the rebel group is currently carrying out intense

FARC 14

operations against small and medium-sized Colombian military units in vulnerable areas.

Death of Alfonso Cano

Colombian troops killed FARC leader Alfonso Cano in a firefight on 4 November 2011. The 6th Front of the FARC,which was in charge of Cano's security at the time of his death, retaliated by killing two policemen in Suarez andJambaló some 24 hours after the death of Cano.

Death of captives in Operation Jupiter

On 26 November 2011, the FARC killed Police Captain Edgar Yesid Duarte Valero, Police Lieutenant ElkinHernandez Rivas, Army Corporal Libio Jose Martinez Estrada and Police Intendant Alvaro Moreno aftergovernment troops approached the guerrilla camp where they were held. Police Sergeant Luis Alberto Erazo Mayamanaged to escape his captors and was later rescued.The Colombian military had information indicating that there could be captives in the area and initiated OperationJupiter in October 2011, using a 56 men Special Forces unit to carry out surveillance for preparing a future rescuemission that would involve additional troops and air support. According to the Colombian military, this same unitremained in the area for 43 days and did not find the captives until they accidentally ran into the FARC camp on theway back, which led to a shootout. Relatives of the captives, former victims and civil society groups blamed both thegovernment and FARC for the outcome, questioning the operation as well as criticizing military rescues.

2012 release of last political hostages

On 26 February 2012, the FARC announced that they would release their remaining ten political hostages. Thehostages were released on 2 April 2012. The president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, said that this incident was"not enough", and asked the FARC to release the civilian hostages they possess.

Release of Chinese hostages

On 22 November 2012, the FARC released four Chinese oil workers. The hostages were working for the EmeraldEnergy oil company, a British-based subsidiary of China's Sinochem Group, when they were kidnapped on 8 June2011. Their Colombian driver was also kidnapped, but released several hours later. Authorities identified the freedmen as Tang Guofu, Zhao Hongwei, Jian Mingfu, and Jiang Shan.

Peace talks

Santos announced on 27 August 2012 that the Colombian government has engaged in exploratory talks with FARCin order to seek an end to the conflict:

Exploratory conversations have been held with the FARC to find an end to the conflict. I want to makevery clear to Colombians that the approaches that have been carried out and the ones that will happen inthe future will be carried out within the framework based on these principles: We are going to learnfrom the mistakes made in the past so that they are not repeated. Second, any process must lead to theend of the conflict, not making it longer. Third, operations and military presence will be maintainedacross the entire national territory

He also said that he would learn from the mistakes of previous leaders, who failed to secure a lasting ceasefire with FARC, though the military would still continue operations throughout Colombia while talks continued. An unnamed Colombian intelligence source said Santos has assured FARC that no one would be extradited to stand trial in another country. Al Jazeera reported that the initiative began after Santos met with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and asked him to mediate. Former President Uribe has criticized Santos for seeking peace "at any cost" and rejected the idea of holding talks. Telesur reported that FARC and the Colombian government had signed a preliminary agreement in Havana the same day. The first round of the talks will take place in Oslo on 5 October and then return to HavanaWikipedia:Manual of Style/Dates and numbers#Precise language for approximately six months

FARC 15

of talks before culminating in Colombia. However, Santos later ruled out a ceasefire pending the talks in Oslo andreiterated that offensive operations against FARC would continue.ELN leader Nicolas Rodriguez Bautista, otherwise known as Gabino, added that his group was interested in joiningthe talks too: "Well we are open, it's exactly our proposal, to seek room for open dialogue without conditions andstart to discuss the nation's biggest problems. But the government has said no! Santos says he has the keys to peacein his pocket, but I think he has lost them because there seems to be no possibility of a serious dialogue, we remainholding out for that."Colombia's RCN Radio reported on 29 September that a preliminary draft of the proposals indicated that a resolutionwould involve answering FARC's historic grievances including rural development and agrarian reform; democracydevelopment via an enhancement of the number of registered political parties; security and compensation for thevictims of the conflict. In this regards, the Colombian government has alread passed a series of laws that entailcompensation for the victims and a return of land to the displaced. FARC also indicated a willingness to give up theirarms. Former M19 member Antonio Navarro Wolff said: "If the government wants a serious peace plan they willhave to take control of the coca leaf plantations that are currently owned by the FARC because if not anothercriminal group will take over it." Santos later told Al Jazeera that peace was possible if there was "goodwill" on bothsides. Santos told the General debate of the sixty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly on 26September, that Venezuela and Chile were also helping in the discussion along with Cuba and Norway.Peace talks were formally started on 18 October in a hotel 30 miles north of the Norwegian capital Oslo with ajoint-press conference by both delegations. The representatives of the government, led by Humberto de la Calle andthe FARC, led by Iván Márquez, said the so-called second phase of the peace process will be inaugurated in Oslo on15 November, after which the delegations will go to Cuba to work on the negotiation of the peace accord, which willultimately lead to a permanent agreement and ceasefire. The Colombian government has also stated that they expectthat a post-Chavez government will continue to support the peace process. In late 2012, FARC declared a two-monthunilateral cease-fire and said that they would be open to extending it as a bilateral truce afterwards during the rest ofthe negotiations. The Colombian government refused to agree to a bilateral cease-fire, alleging violations of the truceby FARC.Shortly after lifting the ceasefire, FARC conducted attacks on a coal transport railway, which derailed 17 wagonsand forced a suspension of operations and assaulted Milan, a town in the southern Caquetá, killing at least sevengovernment soldiers and injuring five others.[37]

On 27 May 2013, it was announced that one of the most contentious issues had been resolved. Land reform andcompensation was tackled with promises to compensate those who had lost land. This is the first time thegovernment and FARC have reached an agreement on a substantive issue in four different negotiating attempts over30 years. The peace process then moved on to the issue of "political participation", during which FARC insisted onits demand for an elected Constituent Assembly to rewrite Colombia's constitution. This demand has been forcefullyrejected by Colombia's lead government negotiator, Humberto de la Calle.[38]

On 1 July 2013, FARC and the second-largest guerrilla group in Colombia, ELN, announced that they would beworking together to find a "political solution to the social and armed conflict." The details of this partnership,however, are far from clear; Washington Office on Latin America's Adam Isacson explains that two issues central topeace accords with ELN - resource policy and kidnapping - are currently off the table in the talks in Havana withFARC, and the addition of these topics may complicate and slow down an already sluggish process.[39]

On 6 November 2013 the Colombian government and FARC announced that they had come to an agreementregarding the participation of political opposition and would begin discussing their next issue, the illicit drug trade.On 23 January 2014 Juan Fernando Cristo, the President of the Senate of Colombia, proposed a second PlanColombia during a conference on the Colombian peace process in Washington, D.C. Cristo stated that this new planshould be "for the victims" and should redirect the resources from the original Plan Colombia towards supporting apost-conflict Colombia.

FARC 16

FinancingFARC receives most of its funding—which has been estimated to average some $300 million per year—fromtaxation of the illegal drug trade, ransom kidnappings, bank robberies, and extortion of large landholders,multinational corporations, and agribusiness. From taxation of illegal drugs alone, FARC has been estimated toreceive approximately 60 to 100 million dollars per year.

Drug tradeFARC-EP was not initially involved in direct drug cultivation, trafficking, or trans-shipment prior to or during the1980s. Instead, it maintained a system of taxation on the production that took place in the territories that theycontrolled, in exchange for protecting the growers and establishing law and order in these regions by implementingits own rules and regulations.[40] During the 1990s, FARC expanded its operations, in some areas, to includetrafficking and production, which has provided a significant portion of its funding. Right-wing paramilitary groupsalso receive a large portion of their income from drug trafficking and production operations.A 1992 Central Intelligence Agency report "acknowledged that the FARC had become increasingly involved indrugs through their 'taxing' of the trade in areas under their geographical control and that in some cases theinsurgents protected trafficking infrastructure to further fund their insurgency", but also described the relationshipbetween the FARC and the drug traffickers as one "characterized by both cooperation and friction" and concludedthat "we do not believe that the drug industry [in Colombia] would be substantially disrupted in the short term byattacks against guerrillas. Indeed, many traffickers would probably welcome, and even assist, increased operationsagainst insurgents."[41]

In 1994, the DEA came to three similar conclusions. First, that any connections between drug traffickingorganizations and Colombian insurgents were "ad hoc 'alliances of convenience'".[42] Second, that "the independentinvolvement of insurgents in Colombia's domestic drug productions, transportation, and distribution islimited…there is no evidence that the national leadership of either the FARC or the ELN has directed, as a matter ofpolicy, that their respective organizations directly engage in independent illicit drug production, transportation, ordistribution." Third, the report determined that the DEA "has no evidence that the FARC or ELN have been involvedin the transportation, distribution, or marketing of illegal drugs in the United States. Furthermore it is doubtful thateither insurgent group could develop the international transportation and logistics infrastructure necessary toestablish independent drug distribution in the United States or Europe… DEA believes that the insurgents never willbe major players in Colombia's drug trade."

FARC has called for crop substitution programs that would allow coca farmers to find alternative means of incomeand subsistence. In 1999, FARC worked with a United Nations alternative development project to enable thetransition from coca production to sustainable food production. On its own, the group has also implemented agrarianreform programs in Putumayo.In those FARC-EP controlled territories that do produce coca, it is generally grown by peasants on small plots; inparamilitary or government controlled areas, coca is generally grown on large plantations. The FARC-EP generallymakes sure that peasant coca growers receive a much larger share of profits than the paramilitaries would give them,and demands that traffickers pay a decent wage to their workers. When growers in a FARC-controlled area arecaught selling coca to non-FARC brokers, they are generally forced to leave the region, but when growers are caughtselling to FARC in paramilitary-controlled areas, they are generally killed. Lower prices paid for raw coca inparamilitary-controlled areas lead to significantly larger profits for the drug processing and trafficking organizations,which means that they generally prefer that paramilitaries control an area rather than FARC.In 2000, FARC Spokesman Simon Trinidad said that taxes on drug laboratories represented an important part of theorganization's income, although he didn't say how much it was. He defended this funding source, arguing that drugtrade was endemic in Colombia because it had pervaded many sectors of its economy.[43]

FARC 17

After the 21 April 2001 capture of Brazilian drug lord Luiz Fernando da Costa (aka Fernandinho Beira-Mar) inColombia, Colombian and Brazilian authorities accused him of cooperating with FARC-EP through the exchange ofweapons for cocaine. They also claimed that he received armed protection from the guerrilla group.[44][45][46]

In Monday, 18 March 2002 the Attorney General of the United States John Ashcroft indicted leaders of the FARCafter an 18-month investigation into their narcotics trafficking. Tomas Molina Caracas, the commander of theFARC's 16th Front, led the 16th Front's drug-trafficking activities together with Carlos Bolas and a rebel known asOscar El Negro. Between 1994 and 2001, Molina and other 16th Front members controlled Barranco Minas, wherethey collected cocaine from other FARC fronts to sell it to international drug traffickers for payment in currency,weapons and equipment.On 22 March 2006 the Attorney General Alberto Gonzales announced the indictment of fifty leaders of FARC forexporting more than $25 billion worth of cocaine to the United States and other countries. Several of the FARCleaders appeared on the Justice Department's Consolidated Priority Organization target list, which identifies the mostdangerous international drug trafficking organizations. Recognizing the increased profits, the FARC moved tobecome directly involved in the manufacture and distribution of cocaine by setting the price paid for cocaine pasteand transporting it to jungle laboratories under FARC control. The charged FARC leaders ordered that Colombianfarmers who sold paste to non-FARC buyers would be murdered and that U.S. fumigation planes should be shotdown.On 11 October 2012 Jamal Yousef, aka "Talal Hassan Ghantou", a native of Lebanon, was sentenced to 12 years inprison for conspiring to provide military-grade weapons to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (theFARC), in exchange for over a ton of cocaine. Yousef pled guilty in May 2012 to one count of providing materialsupport to the FARC.

KidnappingsThe FARC-EP has carried out both ransom and politically motivated kidnappings in Colombia and has beenresponsible for the majority of such kidnappings carried out in the country.The guerrillas initially targeted the families of drug traffickers, the wealthy upper-class and foreigners but the grouplater expanded its kidnapping and extortion operations to include the middle-class.During the 1984 peace negotiations, FARC pledged to stop kidnapping and condemned the practice. However,hostage-taking by FARC increased in the years following this declaration. In a 1997 interview, FARC-EPCommander Alfonso Cano argued that some guerrilla units continued to do so for "political and economic reasons"in spite of the prohibition issued by the leadership.In 2000, the FARC-EP issued a directive called "Law 002" which demanded a "tax" from all individuals andcorporations with assets worth at least $1 million USD, warning that those who failed to pay would be detained bythe group. In 2001, FARC Commander Simón Trinidad claimed that the FARC-EP does not engage in kidnappingbut instead "retains [individuals] in order to obtain resources needed for our struggle". Commander Trinidad said hedid not know how many people had been taken by FARC or how much money was collected by the organization inexchange for their freedom. In addition, FARC spokesperson Joaquín Gómez stated that the payment demanded wasa tax which many people paid "voluntarily", with kidnapping undertaken because "those who have the resourcesmust pay their share".In 2002, Amnesty International sent a letter to FARC-EP Commander Manuel Marulanda condemning kidnappingand hostage-taking as well as rejecting the threats directed at municipal or judicial officials and their families,arguing that they are civilians who are protected by international humanitarian law as long as they do not participatein hostilities.According to Amnesty International, the number of kidnappings has decreased in recent years but the human rights organization estimates that FARC and ELN guerrillas continue to be behind hundreds of cases. In 2008, press reports

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estimated that about 700 hostages continued to be held captive by FARC. According to the Fundación País Libreanti-kidnapping NGO, an estimated total of 6,778 people were kidnapped by FARC between 1997 and 2007. In2009, the state's anti-kidnapping agency Fondelibertad reviewed 3,307 officially unsettled cases and removed thosethat had already been resolved or for which there was insufficient information. The agency concluded that 125hostages remained in captivity nationwide of whom 66 were being held by the FARC-EP. The government's revisedfigures were considered "absurdly low" by Fundación País Libre, which has argued that its own archives suggest anestimated 1,617 people taken hostage between 2000 and 2008 remain in the hands of their captors, includinghundreds seized by FARC. FARC claimed at the time that it was holding nine people for ransom in addition tohostages kept for a prisoner exchange.In 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez expressed his disagreement with FARC-EP's resorting tokidnappings.[47] Former President Fidel Castro of Cuba also criticized the use of hostage-taking by the guerrillas as"objectively cruel" and suggested that the group free all of its prisoners and hostages.In February 2012, FARC announced that it would release ten members of the security forces, who it described aspolitical prisoners, representing the last such captives in its custody. It further announced the repeal of Law 002,bringing to an end its support for the practice of kidnapping for ransom. However, it was not clear from the FARCstatement what would happen to the civilians it still held in captivity. Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos usedTwitter to welcome the move as a "necessary, if insufficient, step in the right direction".

Human rights concerns

Terrorist attack by the FARC with a car bomb at theheadquarters of Caracol Radio, the attack left 43 people

injured.

FARC has been accused of committing violations of humanrights by numerous groups, including Human Rights Watch,Amnesty International, the United Nations as well as by theColombian, U.S. and European Union governments.A February 2005 report from the United Nations' HighCommissioner for Human Rights mentioned that, during 2004,"FARC-EP continued to commit grave breaches [of humanrights] such as murders of protected persons, torture andhostage-taking, which affected many civilians, including men,women, returnees, boys and girls, and ethnic groups."[48]

Child soldiers

FARC-EP, the ELN and right-wing paramilitaries all train teensas soldiers and informants. Human Rights Watch estimates that the FARC-EP has the majority of child combatantsin Colombia, and that approximately one quarter of its guerrillas are under 18.[49][50] Forcible recruitment ofchildren, by either side, is rare in Colombia. They join for a variety of reasons including poverty, lack of educationalopportunities, avoiding dangerous work in coca processing, escaping from domestic violence, offers of money(mostly from paramilitaries, who pay their soldiers). Human Rights Watch has noted that "once integrated into theFARC-EP, children are typically barred from leaving".[51]

FARC-EP Commander Simón Trinidad has stated that FARC does not allow the enlistment of people under 15 yearsof age, arguing that this is in accordance with Article 38 of the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of theChild.[52] He has argued that the alternatives for many children in Colombia are worse, including prostitution andexploitative work in mines and coca production. Amnesty International has rejected the validity of such a position ininternational law.[]

In June 2000, FARC-EP Commander Carlos Antonio Lozada told Human Rights Watch that the minimum recruitment age of fifteen years was set in 1996 but admitted that "this norm was not enforced" until recently. Lozada

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said, however, that it had become an obligatory standard after Commander Jorge Briceño's statements on the matterin April 2000.[53] A 2001 Human Rights Watch report considered FARC-EP's refusal to admit children under fifteenyears old into their forces to be "encouraging" but added that there is "little evidence that this rule is being strictlyapplied" and called on the group to demobilize all existing child soldiers and cease this practice in the future.In 2003, Human Rights Watch reported that FARC-EP shows no leniency to children because of their age, assigningminors the same duties as adults and sometimes requiring them to participate in executions or witness torture.

Extrajudicial executionsFARC has consistently carried out attacks against civilians specifically targeting suspected supporters of paramilitarygroups, political adversaries, journalists, local leaders, and members of certain indigenous groups since at least asearly as 1994.[54] From 1994 to 1997 the region of Urabá in Antioquia department was the site of FARC attacksagainst civilians. FARC has also executed civilians for failing to pay "war taxes" to their group.In 2001, Human Rights Watch (HRW) denounced that the FARC-EP had abducted and executed civilians accused ofsupporting paramilitary groups in the demilitarized zone and elsewhere, without providing any legal defensemechanisms to the suspects and generally refusing to give any information to relatives of the victims. The humanrights NGO directly investigated three such cases and received additional information about over twenty possibleexecutions during a visit to the zone.According to HRW, those extrajudicial executions would qualify as forced disappearances if they had been carriedout by agents of the government or on its behalf, but nevertheless remained "blatant violations of the FARC-EP'sobligations under international humanitarian law and in particular key provisions of article 4 of Protocol II, whichprotects against violence to the life, physical, and mental well-being of persons, torture, and ill-treatment."The Colombian human rights organization CINEP reported that FARC-EP killed an estimated total of 496 civiliansduring 2000.

Use of gas cylinder mortars and landminesThe FARC-EP has employed a type of improvised mortars made from gas canisters (or cylinders), when launchingattacks.According to Human Rights Watch, the FARC-EP has killed civilians not involved in the conflict through the use ofgas cylinder mortars[55] and its use of landmines.Human Rights Watch considers that "the FARC-EP's continued use of gas cylinder mortars shows this armed group'sflagrant disregard for lives of civilians...gas cylinder bombs are impossible to aim with accuracy and, as a result,frequently strike civilian objects and cause avoidable civilian casualties."[56]

According to the ICBL Landmine and Cluster Munitions Monitor, "FARC is probably the most prolific current userof antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world." Furthermore, FARC use child soldiers to carryand deploy antipersonnel mines.

Violence against indigenous peopleFARC has sometimes threatened or assassinated indigenous Colombian leaders for attempting to prevent FARCincursions into their territory and resisting the forcible recruitment by FARC of indigenous youth. Between 1986 and2001, FARC was responsible for 27 assassinations, 15 threats, and 14 other abuses of indigenous people inAntioquia Department. In March 1999 members of a local FARC contingent killed 3 indigenous rights activists, whowere working with the U'Wa people to build a school for U'Wa children, and were fighting against encroachment ofU'Wa territory by multinational oil corporations. The killings were almost universally condemned, and seriouslyharmed public perceptions of FARC.

FARC 20

Members of indigenous groups have demanded the removal of military bases set up by the Colombian governmentand guerrilla encampments established by FARC in their territories, claiming that both the Colombian NationalArmy and the FARC should respect indigenous autonomy and international humanitarian law.[57] According to theNational Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC), 80.000 members of indigenous communities have beendisplaced from their native lands since 2004 because of FARC-related violence.[58] Luis Evelis, an indigenous leaderand ONIC representative, has stated that "the armed conflict is still in force, causing damages to the indigenous. Ourterritories are self-governed and we demand our autonomy. During the year 2011, fifty-six indigenous people havebeen killed."[59] The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has indicated that no militaryactivities may be carry out within indigenous territories without first undertaking an "effective consultation" withindigenous representatives and authorities from the communities involved.The Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC) issued a statement concerning the release of two hostages takenby FARC in 2011: "Compared to past statements made by the national government, it is important to reiterate thatthe presence of armed groups in our territories is a fact that has been imposed by force of arms, against which ourcommunities and their leaders have remained in peaceful resistance." The CRIC also indicated that neither theColombian government nor the mediators and armed groups involved consulted with the indigenous people and theirauthorities about the hostage release, raising concerns about the application of national and international lawguaranteeing their autonomy, self-determination and self-government. The indigenous organization also demandedthe immediate end of all violence and conflict within indigenous territories and called for a negotiated solution to thewar.[60]

Official Colombian government statistics show that murders of indigenous people between January and May 2011have increased 38% compared to the same timeframe in 2010.[61] Colombia is home to nearly 1 million indigenouspeople, divided into around 100 different ethnicities. The Colombian Constitutional Court has warned that 35 ofthose groups are in danger of dying out.[62] The Permanent Assembly for the Defense of Life and Territorial Controlhas stated that the armed conflict "is not only part of one or two areas, it is a problem of all the indigenous people."

Sexual abuse and forced abortionsAccording to Amnesty International, both civilian women and female combatants have been sexually exploited orvictimized by all of the different parties involved in the Colombian armed conflict.[63] In the case of FARC, it hasbeen reported that young female recruits have been sexually abused by veteran guerrilla soldiers and in several casespregnancies were aborted against their will by FARC doctors.[64][65]

Organization and structureFARC-EP remains the largest and oldest insurgent group in the Americas. According to the Colombian government,FARC-EP had an estimated 6,000–8,000 members in 2008, down from 16,000 in 2001, having lost much of theirfighting force since President Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002.[66] Political analyst and former guerrilla LeónValencia has estimated that FARC's numbers have been reduced to around 11,000 from their 18,000 peak butcautions against considering the group a defeated force.[67] In 2007 FARC-EP Commander Raúl Reyes claimed thattheir force consisted of 18,000 guerrillas.[68]

From 1999 to 2008, the FARC-EP, together with the ELN guerrilla group, was estimated to control up to 40% of theterritory in Colombia.[69] The largest concentrations of FARC-EP guerrillas are located throughout the southeasternparts of Colombia's 500,000 square kilometers (190,000 sq mi) of jungle and in the plains at the base of the Andeanmountains.FARC's organized hierarchically into military units as follows:

FARC 21

Alfonso Cano, former FARCCommander-in-Chief, was killed by

Colombian military forces on 4November 2011

• Central High Command – composed of a five-member Secretariat (one ofthem being the, Commander-in-Chief) and two "supplements".Coordinates the activities of the individual blocks, and determines overallstrategy of FARC-EP.

• Estado Mayor Central – 25 members, who also coordinate activities ofblocks

• Block – 5+ Fronts, with each block corresponding to one of Colombia'sgeographical regions: south, central, east, west, Middle Magdalena,Caribbean, and Cesar.

• Front – 1+ Columns. Within each Front, there are combat, support, andinfrastructure elements.

• Column – 2+ Companies• Company – 2+ Guerrillas• Guerrilla – 2 Squads• Squad – +/- 12 combatantsThe FARC-EP secretariat was led by Alfonso Cano and six others after thedeath of Manuel Marulanda (Pedro Antonio Marín), also known as "Tirofijo", or Sureshot in 2008. The"international spokesman" of the organization was represented by "Raul Reyes", who was killed in a Colombianarmy raid against a guerrilla camp in Ecuador on 1 March 2008. Cano was killed in a military operation on 4November 2011.

FARC-EP remains open to a negotiated solution to the nation's conflict through dialogue with a flexible governmentthat agrees to certain conditions, such as the demilitarization of certain areas, cessation of paramilitary andgovernment violence against rural peasants, social reforms to reduce poverty and inequality, and the release of alljailed (and extradited) FARC-EP rebels. It claims that until these conditions surface, the armed revolutionarystruggle will remain necessary to fight against Colombia's elites. [citation needed] The FARC-EP says it will continueits armed struggle because it perceives the current Colombian government as an enemy because of historicalpolitically motivated violence against its members and supporters including members of the Patriotic Union, aFARC-EP-created political party.[70]

References[1] Latin America by Robert B. Kent (ISBN 978-1572309098), page 141[2] Organized Crime: From Trafficking to Terrorism by Frank G. Shanty and Patit Paban Mishra (ISBN 978-1576073377), page 323[3] Gomez, Alberto (1972) "Perspectives of the revolutionary armed forces of Colombia (FARC)". National Liberation Fronts 1960/1970:

Essays, documents, interviews New York: William Morrow & Company, ISBN 978-0-688-02189-4, p. 248[4][4] Visit to Colombia, South America, by a Team from Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Headquarters, U.S. Army Special

Warfare School, 26 February 1962, Kennedy Library, Box 319, National Security Files, Special Group; Fort Bragg Team; Visit to Colombia;3/62, "Secret Supplement, Colombian Survey Report."

[5] Las Redes de Asesinos de Colombia. La asociación militar-paramilitares y Estados Unidos (http:/ / www. hrw. org/ spanish/ informes/ 1996/colombia2. html), Human Rights Watch, 1996 (Spanish)

[6][6] For a wide-ranging survey of the violence against the UP, see also[7] «40 años de las FARC. Pág. 6: Otros acercamientos» (http:/ / www. bbc. co. uk/ spanish/ specials/ 1441_farc/ page8. shtml), en BBC Mundo.[8] Carta de los intelectuales colombianos a la Coordinadora Guerrilla Simón Bolívar (http:/ / www. nuso. org/ upload/ articulos/ 2246_1. pdf), in

Nueva Sociedad 125: May–June 1993.[9] Ramírez, María Clemencia: «The Politics of Recognition and Citizenship in Putumayo and in the Baja Bota of Cauca: The Case of the 1996

cocalero movement» (http:/ / www. ces. fe. uc. pt/ emancipa/ research/ en/ ft/ marchas. html).[10] Betancourt Santiago, Milson: «El movimiento de campesinos cocaleros del Putumayo en Colombia» (http:/ / www. uasb. edu. ec/ padh/

revista11/ actualidad/ milson betancourt. htm), in Aportes Andinos 11 October 2004.[11] BBC News. "Colombian army moves against rebels." 21 February 2002 Available online (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ americas/

1832060. stm). Retrieved 3 November 2006.[12] BBC News. "Profile: Álvaro Uribe Velez." 3 July 2008. Available online. (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ world/ americas/ 3214685. stm)

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[13] Forero, Juan (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2003/ 05/ 06/ world/ rebels-execute-10-hostages-in-colombia. html?scp=2& sq=colombia&st=nyt), The New York Times, 6 May 2003.

[14][14] Accessed 1 March 2010.[15] BBC News. "'Deadliest' hit on Colombian army." 10 February 2005. Available online (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ americas/ 4252071.

stm). Retrieved 5 November 2006.[16] BBC News. "Colombia 'to release Farc rebels.'" 2 December 2006. Available online (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ americas/ 4063797.

stm). Retrieved 5 November 2006.[17] FARC-EP. Comunicado las FARC. 28 November 2004. Archived online (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20060305112347/ http:/ / www.

farcep. org/ novedades/ comunicados/ sec2004/ diciembre_03. php). Archive created 5 March 2006 and accessed 11 November 2006.[18] The New York Times. "Colombia: Hostage Held Since 1998 Dies." 16 February 2006. Available online (http:/ / query. nytimes. com/ gst/

fullpage. html?res=9C03E2D8133EF935A25751C0A9609C8B63). Retrieved 6 November 2006.[19] BBC. "Colombians in huge FARC protest" 4 February 2008. Available online (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ americas/ 7225824. stm).

Retrieved 6 January 2010.[20] Washington Post. "Anti-FARC Rallies Held Worldwide" 5 February 2008. Available online (http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-dyn/

content/ article/ 2008/ 02/ 04/ AR2008020403019. html). Retrieved 7 February 2008.[21] Reuters. "Colombians take to streets in huge anti-FARC march" 5 February 2008. Available online (http:/ / www. reuters. com/ article/

idUSN0459656620080205). Retrieved 6 January 2010.[22] Sydney Morning Herald. "Worldwide protests against Colombian kidnapping" 5 February 2008. Available online (http:/ / www. smh. com.

au/ news/ world/ worldwide-protests-against-colombian-kidnapping/ 2008/ 02/ 05/ 1202090388923. html). Retrieved 6 January 2010.[23] MSNBC. "Millions of Colombians march against rebels" 4 February 2008. Available online (http:/ / www. msnbc. msn. com/ id/ 22998957/

). Retrieved 6 January 2010.[24] "Organizadores de la marcha rechazan el apoyo de Salvatore Mancuso" (http:/ / www. semana. com/ wf_InfoArticulo. aspx?IdArt=109143),

Revista Semana, 1 February 2008 (Retrieved 03/01/2010)[25] BBC. "Colombian anti-Farc rally" 20 July 2008. Available online (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ americas/ 7516533. stm). Retrieved 6

January 2010.[26] AlJazeera.net. "Colombians hold anti-Farc rally" 20 July 2008. Available online (http:/ / english. aljazeera. net/ news/ americas/ 2008/ 07/

20087201614073667. html). Retrieved 6 January 2010.[27] Pepe Escobar Colombia: What did Interpol find in the laptops? (http:/ / therealnews. com/ id/ 1543/ May22,2008/ Colombia:+ What+ did+

Interpol+ find+ in+ the+ laptops?) – The Real News, 22 May 2008[28] Stephen Lendman Spinning the News – The FARC-EP Files, Venezuela and Interpol (http:/ / www. globalresearch. ca/ index.

php?context=va& aid=8983) – Global Research, 19 May 2008[29] "FARC Aura of Invincibility Shattered," Jeremy McDermott, (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ americas/ 7273320. stm) BBC News, 1 March

2008. Retrieved 8 October 2010.[30] Colombia dice que no violó soberanía de Ecuador en operativo que llevó a la muerte de Raúl Reyes (http:/ / www. eltiempo. com/ conflicto/

noticias/ ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR-3981514. html)[31] Second Colombian rebel leader killed (http:/ / www. cnn. com/ 2008/ WORLD/ americas/ 03/ 07/ colombia. farc/ index. html)[32] Hirsh, Michael, "A Smarter Way To Fight", Newsweek, 21 July 2008.[33] Staff (12 August 2010) "Car bomb rocks Colombian capital" (http:/ / www. bbc. co. uk/ news/ world-latin-america-10953545) BBC News[34] 'Colombian rebel attacks intensify, dozens killed' (http:/ / af. reuters. com/ article/ energyOilNews/ idAFN1025921520100910).Reuters. 10

September 2010.[35] Death of Mono Jojoy forces FARC to carry out different strategy: NGO (http:/ / colombiareports. com/ colombia-news/ news/

13215-death-of-mono-jojoy-forces-farc-to-carry-out-different-strategy-ngo. html). Colombia Reports. 1 December 2010.[36] Colombianas FARC resisten con nueva estrategia tras duros golpes sufridos (http:/ / www. google. com/ hostednews/ afp/ article/

ALeqM5jGjA2qhxBW103DTvIMiF7ebHyNMw?docId=CNG. c83e4798ef35929e6b470b886e11dd0f. 481).AFP. 1 December 2010.[37] "Columbia soldiers die in rebel fight" (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2013/ 02/ 14/ world/ americas/ colombia-soldiers-die-in-rebel-fight.

html?ref=revolutionaryarmedforcesofcolombia& _r=0)[38] De la Calle, Humberto. "De la Calle le dice NO a las Farc. ¿Por qué?" (http:/ / www. semana. com/ nacion/ articulo/

de-calle-dice-no-farc-por-que/ 346491-3) Semana, 15 June 2013. Retrieved 1 August 2013.[39] Isacson, Adam. "Colombia Peace Process Update (July 16, 2013)." (http:/ / colombiapeace. org/ 2013/ 07/ 16/

colombia-peace-process-update-july-15-2013/ ) ColombiaPeace.org, 16 July 2013. Retrieved 1 August 2013.[40] Ferro Medina, Juan Guillermo: «Las FARC y su relación con la economía de la coca en el sur de Colombia: Testimonios de Colonos y

Guerrilleros» (http:/ / www. mamacoca. org/ feb2002/ art_ferro_Farc_y_coca_Caguan_es. html), L´ordinaire Latino-americain 179:enero-marzo de 2000.

[41] Narco-Insurgent Links in the Andes 8 (http:/ / www. gwu. edu/ ~nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/ NSAEBB69/ col24. pdf), Central Intelligence Agency,29 July 1992.

[42] Drug Intelligent Report, Insurgent Involvement in the Colombian Drug Trade 16 (http:/ / www. gwu. edu/ ~nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/ col33. pdf), Drug Enforcement Administration, Jun. 1994

[43] Simón Trinidad, FARC Spokesman at the Negotiating Table (http:/ / www. dominicstreatfeild. com/ 2010/ 11/ 26/interview-with-simon-trinidad-farc-spokesman/ 2/ ) D.Streatfeild. 20 November 2000. Source Interview

FARC 23

[44] El Mercurio Online. "'Fernandinho Beira-Mar', un temible capo aliado de Hernández Norambuena." 15 June 2005. Available online (http:/ /www. emol. com/ noticias/ todas/ detalle/ detallenoticias. asp?idnoticia=185620). Retrieved 1 September 2006.

[45] Clarín.com. "Un capo narco reveló lazos con poderosos de Brasil." Available online (http:/ / www. clarin. com/ diario/ 2001/ 04/ 25/i-02801. htm). Retrieved 11 November 2006.

[46] BBC News. "Polícia investiga relação de Beira-Mar com as FARC." 22 April 2001. Available online (http:/ / www. bbc. co. uk/ portuguese/noticias/ 2001/ 010422_beiramar2. shtml). Retrieved 3 November 2006.

[47] Reuters."Hugo Chávez tells Colombian rebels to stop kidnapping" 13 January 2008. Available online (http:/ / www. reuters. com/ article/worldNews/ idUSN1336689820080113). Retrieved 23 December 2008.

[48] Commission on Human Rights. "Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia." 28February 2005. Available online (http:/ / www. hchr. org. co/ documentoseinformes/ informes/ altocomisionado/ Informe2004_eng. pdf).Retrieved 1 September 2006.

[49] Human Rights Watch. "'You'll Learn Not to Cry: Child Combatants in Colombia." September 2003. ISBN 1-56432-288-2. Available online(http:/ / www. hrw. org/ reports/ 2003/ colombia0903/ colombia0903. pdf). Retrieved 1 September 2006.

[50] Human Rights Watch. "Colombia: Armed Groups Send Children to War." 22 February 2005. Available online (http:/ / hrw. org/ english/docs/ 2005/ 02/ 22/ colomb10202. htm). Retrieved 1 September 2006.

[51] Human Rights Watch. "'International Humanitarian Law and its Application to the Conduct of the FARC-EP. – I. Summary andRecommendations'" August 2001. Available online (http:/ / www. hrw. org/ reports/ 2001/ farc/ Formatted FARC-Eng 8-241. htm#P52_1119).Retrieved 20 August 2010.

[52] ; See also: Article 38 of UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (http:/ / www2. ohchr. org/ english/ law/ crc. htm)[53] Human Rights Watch. "'International Humanitarian Law and its Application to the Conduct of the FARC-EP- VII. Child Soldiers'" August

2001. Available online (http:/ / www. hrw. org/ reports/ 2001/ farc/ Formatted FARC-Eng 8-241-07. htm#P326_50657). Retrieved 20 August2010.

[54] Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, Colombia, One-Sided violence, FARC-Civilians, 1994–2010, http:/ / www. ucdp.uu. se/ gpdatabase/ gpcountry. php?id=35& regionSelect=5-Southern_Americas#

[55] Human Rights Watch. "More FARC Killings with Gas Cylinder Bombs: Atrocities Target Indigenous Group " 25 April 2005. Availableonline (http:/ / www. hrw. org/ en/ news/ 2005/ 04/ 15/ colombia-more-farc-killings-gas-cylinder-bombs). Retrieved 1 September 2006.

[56] Human Rights Watch. "More FARC Killings with Gas Cylinder Bombs: Atrocities Target Indigenous Group " 25 April 2005. Availableonline (http:/ / hrw. org/ english/ docs/ 2005/ 04/ 15/ colomb10496. htm). Retrieved 1 September 2006.

[57] Indigenous groups demand army, FARC remove bases - Colombia news (http:/ / colombiareports. com/ colombia-news/ news/17781-indigenous-colombians-demand-land-from-army-and-farc. html). Colombia Reports (2011-07-21). Retrieved on 2012-10-14.

[58] FARC harasses indigenous Colombians (http:/ / www. infosurhoy. com/ cocoon/ saii/ xhtml/ en_GB/ features/ saii/ features/ main/ 2011/ 12/05/ feature-01). Infosurhoy.com. Retrieved on 2012-10-14.

[59] Atentados ratifican conflicto en Colombia (activista) - Vìdeo Dailymotion (http:/ / www. dailymotion. com/ video/xjuffm_atentados-ratifican-conflicto-en-colombia-activista_new). Dailymotion.com. Retrieved on 2012-10-14.

[60] Colombia: Statement Concerning Release Of Two Indigenous Hostages By FARC - Indigenous Peoples Issues and Resources (http:/ /indigenouspeoplesissues. com/ index. php?option=com_content& view=article&id=9007:colombia-statement-concerning-release-of-two-indigenous-hostages-by-farc& catid=23:south-america-indigenous-peoples&Itemid=56). Indigenouspeoplesissues.com (2011-02-18). Retrieved on 2012-10-14.

[61] Observatorio Derechos Humanos (DDHH) y Derecho Internacional Humanitario (DIH) (http:/ / www. derechoshumanos. gov. co/Observatorio/ Paginas/ Observatorio. aspx). Derechoshumanos.gov.co. Retrieved on 2012-10-14.

[62] FARC Accused of Killing Columbian Indigenous Tribe Leaders (http:/ / www. hispanicallyspeakingnews. com/ notitas-de-noticias/ details/farc-accused-of-killing-columbian-indigenous-tribe-leaders/ 11830/ ). Hispanically Speaking News. Retrieved on 2012-10-14.

[63] Document - Colombia: "Scarred bodies, hidden crimes": Sexual Violence against women in the armed conflict | Amnesty International(http:/ / www. amnesty. org/ en/ library/ asset/ AMR23/ 040/ 2004/ en/ eeb9c46a-d598-11dd-bb24-1fb85fe8fa05/ amr230402004en. html).Amnesty.org. Retrieved on 2012-10-14.

[64] Fighting Mad (http:/ / www. foreignaffairs. com/ articles/ 137672/ anne-phillips/ fighting-mad?page=show). Foreign Affairs (2012-06-01).Retrieved on 2012-10-14.

[65] FP: Why Women Turn to the FARC — and How the FARC Turns on Them (http:/ / www. americas-forum. com/why-women-turn-to-the-farc-and-how-the-farc-turns-on-them/ ). Americas Forum. Retrieved on 2012-10-14.

[66] BBC News "Colombia Seizes 'key FARC Data'" (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ americas/ 7630663. stm) 23 September 2008.[67] Reuters. 9 September 2008. "Commentary: FARC fighting two wars." (http:/ / www. reuters. com/ article/ reutersComService4/

idUSDIS95174420080909).[68] 12 July 2007. "Interview with FARC Commander Raul Reyes." (http:/ / www. colombiajournal. org/ colombia259. htm)[69] Ana Carrigan, "Colombia's Best Chance " (http:/ / www. thenation. com/ article/ colombias-best-chance), The Nation, 21 January 1999[70] Agencia Prensa Rural: 'El baile rojo' by Yezid Campos Zornosa, report by Constanza Vieira on the Colombian documentary film (http:/ /

www. prensarural. org/ vieira20040124. htm). Google video: 'The Red Dance' (http:/ / video. google. com/videoplay?docid=3833186377925394599) Accessed 15 February 2008; Corporación Reiniciar: 'Who are we?' (http:/ / www. reiniciar. org/?q=node/ 136). Retrieved 20 February 2008.

FARC 24

Further reading

Books• James J. Brittain (2 February 2010). Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The Origin and Direction of the

FARC-EP. Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-7453-2875-1.• David Bushnell (1993). The Making of Modern Colombia, A Nation in Spite of Itself. University of California

Press. ISBN 0-520-08289-3.• Aviva Chomsky and Francisco Ramírez Cuellar (2005). The Profits of Extermination: How U.S. Corporate Power

is Destroying Colombia. Common Courage Press. ISBN 1-56751-322-0.• Steven Dudley (January 2004). Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia. Routledge.

ISBN 0-415-93303-X.• Robin Kirk (January 2003). More Terrible than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and America's War in Colombia.

PublicAffairs. ISBN 1-58648-104-5.• Russ Kick, ed. (2009). You are still being lied to: the remixed disinformation guide to media distortion, historical

whitewashes and cultural myths (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=pkUl8QASqHMC& pg=PA160& dq=farc+paramilitaries& cd=14#v=onepage& q=farc paramilitaries). Constellation. pp. 160–163.ISBN 978-1-934708-07-1.

• Kline, H. F., Colombia: Democracy Under Assault, Harper Collins, 1995, ISBN 0-8133-1071-7• Garry M. Leech (2002). Killing Peace: Colombia's Conflict and the Failure of U.S. Intervention. Information

Network of the Americas (INOTA). ISBN 0-9720384-0 Check |isbn= value (help).• Maullin, Richard L., The Fall of Dumar Aljure, a Colombian Guerrilla and Bandit. The Rand Corporation, 1968• Osterling, Jorge P., Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, Transaction Publishers,

1989, ISBN 0-88738-229-0• Bert Ruiz (1 October 2001). The Colombian Civil War. McFarland & Company. ISBN 0-7864-1084-1.• Frank Safford and Marco Palacios (1 July 2001). Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society. Oxford

University Press. ISBN 0-19-504617-X.• Schmid, Alex Peter, and Crelinsten, Ronald D., Western Responses to Terrorism. Routledge, 1993, ISBN

0-7146-4090-5• The Suicide of Colombia, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 7 September 1998• Rebeca Toledo, Teresa Gutierrez, Sara Flounders and Andy McInerney, ed. (2003). War in Colombia: Made in

U.S.A. ISBN 0-9656916-9-1.• Dominic Streatfeild (2002). Cocaine: An Unauthorised Biography. Virgin Books. ISBN 978-0-7535-0627-1.

Articles• Petras, James (30 December 2000 – 5 January 2001). "Geopolitics of Plan Colombia". Economic and Political

Weekly 35 (52/53): 4617–4623. JSTOR  4410105 (http:/ / www. jstor. org/ stable/ 4410105).• Cirlig, Carmen-Cristina. "Colombia: new momentum for peace?" (http:/ / www. europarl. europa. eu/ RegData/

bibliotheque/ briefing/ 2013/ 130577/ LDM_BRI(2013)130577_REV1_EN. pdf). Library Briefing. Library of theEuropean Parliament. Retrieved 15 July 2013.

FARC 25

External links• FARC Official Website (http:/ / www. farc-ep. co/ ) (Spanish)• Official website of the peace delegation of FARC (http:/ / farc-epeace. org/ ) (Spanish)• Second FARC Official Website (http:/ / www. resistencia-colombia. org/ ) (Spanish)• FARC profile (http:/ / colombiareports. com/ colombia-news/ profiles/ 26260-farc. html), Colombia Reports• Colombia Action Network (http:/ / www. colombiaactionnetwork. org/ )• Colombia Solidarity Campaign (http:/ / colombiasolidarity. org. uk/ )• "Evolution of the Colombian Civil War" (http:/ / www. icdc. com/ ~paulwolf/ colombia/ colombiawar. htm) – by

Paul Wolf (collection of declassified U.S. government documents online)• The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade (http:/ / www. tni. org/

detail_page. phtml?page=archives_vargas_farc), Ricardo Vargas Meza, Transnational Institute (TNI), June 1999• Interview with Alfonso Lopez Caballero (http:/ / www. thealligatoronline. com/ ?article/ 36), The Alligator, 2

February 2009• Garry Leech (27 August 2007). "Life in a FARC Camp" (http:/ / colombiajournal. org/ wordpress/

life-in-a-farc-camp. htm). Colombia Journal.

News• FARC news archive (http:/ / colombiareports. com/ component/ tag/ farc. html), Colombia Reports

Government/NGO reports• Human Rights Watch – Humanitarian Law and its Application to the Conduct of the FARC-EP (http:/ / www.

hrw. org/ reports/ 2001/ farc/ )• UN High Commissioner for Human Rights – Colombia 2005 Report (http:/ / www. hchr. org. co/

documentoseinformes/ informes/ altocomisionado/ informes. php3?cod=8& cat=11) (Spanish and English)

Article Sources and Contributors 26

Article Sources and ContributorsFARC  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=599981953  Contributors: *Kat*, 172, 1exec1, 21655, AEMoreira042281, AMK1211, AVM, Aacammy5, Abueno, Adamgarrigus,Addshore, Adhalanay, Aecis, Againme, Ahoerstemeier, Aight 2009, Ajraddatz, Akwadraat, Alansohn, Alex.muller, Allstarecho, Alvarohurtadog, Alxcrlsn, American2, Amigo29 90, Amnesico29,AndrewRT, Andy Marchbanks, Anfoc, Animum, Annita.language, Anthony Appleyard, Apdency, Apokrif, Applebitemak, Appraiser, Arcandam, ArielGold, Arjun01, Artaniz, Arthena, Ashrawi,Askari Mark, Astral, Avaya1, B Fizz, BLZebubba, Bananaclaw, Barry Troost, Basicdesign, Basuper, BatteryIncluded, Bbolen, Beatlesrclassic, Begbiepwns, Bejnar, Bencherlite, Blanchardb,Bletch, Blisco, Bluemoose, Bluezy, Bobblewik, Bobrayner, Bogdan, Bogdangiusca, Bootleg42, Boyar, BreakfastJr, Breawycker, Brewcrewer, Briaboru, BrianPS12, Bridies, Bundas,Burkhard.Plache, Byron Farrow, Béka, C628, Calabraxthis, Camerong, CanadianLinuxUser, Cantus, Caribbean H.Q., Cesarmientosanchez, Cescoby, Chalaby, Charles Essie, Chase me ladies, I'mthe Cavalry, Chicocvenancio, Chimerical05, Chris Gair, Chris the speller, ChrisGualtieri, Ciroa, Cka3n, Cla68, Cmdrjameson, Coasterlover1994, Colombiano21, Colonies Chris, Coltsfan,CommonsDelinker, ComputerJA, ComradeRyan, Constanz, Conversion script, Coqsportif, Crunchysnails, CryptoDerk, Cst17, Cyfraw, DAS232, DJDonegal, DO'Neil, Damifb, Daniel C. Boyer,Daniel Quinlan, Danjel, Daosorios, Darkstar8799, David.palmer99, Deathbunny, Deeahbz, Defender of torch, Delirium, Deodar, DerHexer, Derek R Bullamore, Descendall, Deus Ex,Deutschervolke, Dgies, DhDHdhDHdhDH, Dhartung, Die4Dixie, Diemunkiesdie, Difu Wu, Dissembly, Djacobs, Dl2000, DodgerOfZion, Dogru144, Download, Dr. B. R. Lang, Dravecky,Drlatino, Drmies, Drpickem, Dtaw2001, Dthomsen8, Dtyler7, Dukeofomnium, Echeneida, Ed Poor, Edward, Edward321, El C, El baile rojo, El monty, Elcorretorres, EmanWilm, Emersoni,Emote, Eniagrom, Enigmaticland, Epbr123, Epeefleche, Eric Shalov, EricSerge, ErikHaugen, Ernesto.olivo, Etafly, Everyking, Evil Maniac From Mars, Evil Monkey, Evil saltine, FF2010,Fache, Faizhaider, Fanra, Faulty, Felipego, Felviper, Fibonacci, Fieldday-sunday, FlieGerFaUstMe262, Forich, FormerIP, Fourdee, Funnyhat, FutureTrillionaire, Fuzheado, GCarty, Geochron,Germanfelipebarbosa, Gidonb, Giovanni33, Giraffedata, Glasperlenspiel, Gnevin, Gobonobo, GoingBatty, Goon Noot, Gothbag, Gr8opinionater, Grafen, Graham87, GrainyMagazine, Grant65,Grapple X, GreatGatsby, Green Mamba X, Greenshed, GregorB, Griffbos, Grsz11, Gsuarez1, Gsuarez11, Gulbenk, Guto2003, Gwguffey, Hajor, Harleh, Hcobb, Hdante, Hebrides, Hede2000,Heirpixel, Helptyper10, Henrik, Hibernian, Hmains, Hmwith, Hoof Hearted, Hr oskar, Huhsunqu, Hullaballoo Wolfowitz, Hux, Hwonder, II MusLiM HyBRiD II, ITBlair, ITacho, IZAK,Iamaneeb, IceT13TSOSIM, Ikip, Insanity Incarnate, Insommia, Int21h, Iridescent, IrishPete, Isomorphic, Itayfeldman, J.R. Hercules, J.delanoy, J1.grammar natz, JPMartinez, JRSP, Jackriter,Jafro, Jairo lopez, Jamieli, Janko, Jason M, JasonnF, Jcastibl, Jdcg, Jennavecia, Jerome Charles Potts, Jethro B, Jjasi, Jjl33, Jmcdon10, Jmejedi, Johnlongbond, Jonkerz, JorgeGG, Joseph Solis inAustralia, Jrbohorquezg, Jrtayloriv, Jsmorale, Jturner773, Juancarlos2004, Juanperegrino, Judecannes, Juglar, JustAGal, KAMiKAZOW, KapilTagore, KathrynLybarger, KazakhPol, Kbdank71,Kevstev2607, Kingal86, Kirananils, Kirsten07734, Klemen Kocjancic, Knucklebusted, Kookoobirdz, Kordas, Kormin, Koven.rm, Krashlandon, Kudzu1, Kwertii, LERK, LaPrecieuse, Lacarids,Lancemurdoch, Lapsed Pacifist, Lemuel Gulliver, Leon909, Lexicon, Lightmouse, Lihaas, LilHelpa, Locoloco1us, Logical Cowboy, Lothar von Richthofen, Lotje, Loveshrine11, Lucky to be me,Lulu of the Lotus-Eaters, Lupo, M412k, MER-C, MJCdetroit, Magioladitis, Makeemlighter, Maktrix, Malejotm, Mandarax, Mandsford, MantisEars, Manxruler, Mapryan, Marek69,MartitaJimGen, Maurice Carbonaro, Mav, Maxim, Mbrus, Mcburgertown24, Melchoir, Mentifisto, Metasailor, Mezaco, Mhazard9, MichaelSH, Miguelemejia, Mike Obregon, Mild Bill Hiccup,Minakomel, Mind my edits, Miotroyo, Mirror Vax, Mirrormundo, Mirthachab, Mithridates, Mo ainm, Mogism, Mojo Hand, Monegasque, Monkey Sides, Mrand, Mspraveen, Mumble45, MyUbuntu, N4GMiraflores, Nasnema, Nat, Neilc, Neon white, Neoreich, Neutrality, NiTenIchiRyu, Niceguyedc, Nick-D, Nicknackrussian, Niteowlneils, Nlsanand, Nobunaga24, Nogburt,Nomasfarc, Nono64, Norstrem, Not home, O Fenian, Ochepesiuk, Ofhistoricalnote, Ohconfucius, Ohthelameness, Olafo69, Olegwiki, Oliharvey, OmgItsTheSmartGuy, One Night In Hackney,Onefiveseven, Opspin, Oreo Priest, Orlady, Orland, Orpheus Machina, Orthuberra, Otalpaz, PalestineRemembered, Pamela.casanova, Paquinteroc, Paul, PaulHanson, Pauli133, Peace & Respect,Pedro Gonzalez-Irusta, Peruvianllama, Pgk, Phil5329, PierreAbbat, Pigman, Pinar, Pinkadelica, Pipeafcr, Piraatpino, Poetdancer, Pozole, Psywolf, Quebec99, Queenmomcat, Quickedits322, R,R'n'B, R-41, RachelEhrenfeld2, RafaAzevedo, Rama, Randability, RandomXYZb, Ratemonth, Rbraunwa, Rd232, Realisis, Recognizance, Red and black partisan, Redthoreau, Reggyboy,RenamedUser01302013, Revizionist, Rich Farmbrough, RickK, Riddley, Rjwilmsi, Rmleon, RodC, Rohawn, Ronhjones, Rothorpe, Rrburke, Rror, RuudVisser, Ruy Lopez, S11.1, S3000,Saavedrah, Sam Hocevar, Sam Korn, San Carlos Colombia, Scarykitty, SciCorrector, Seaphoto, Sefesant, Seneb, Sentinel R, Seth Ilys, Sfahey, Shanes, SilverFox183, SkyWalker, Slarre, Sluj,SmartGuy Old, SoWhy, Soetermans, Solar-Wind, SolidSnake0092, Soman, Sousclef, Speedboy Salesman, Spitfire, SqueakBox, Stan En, StaticGull, Stefanomione, Stephenkells, Stismail, Storkk,SummerWithMorons, Supergodzilla2090, Superm401, Svick, TBloemink, TDC, Tainter, Tangola, Tarc, Tassedethe, Technopat, Tedickey, Tempshill, Tequendamia, ThaddeusB, The Anome, TheCunctator, The Deformed Child, The Devil's Advocate, The Thing That Should Not Be, The wub, Theda, Themightyquill, Theopolisme, Theryx7, Thinkvoyager, ThomasLB, Tilbedmig,TimShell, Timholman, Titoxd, Toasterb, Tom1234, TomStar81, Tomtom9041, Tony.bandido, Top Gun, Tracer9999, Trey Stone, TutterMouse, Tvnewswatch, Twalls, Twerges, TypoBoy,Ulric1313, UltimateDogg, Urban XII, Uruguayo, Vanegas123, Vasiľ, Viajero, Victor Victoria, Vinhtantran, Violetriga, VirtualDelight, Vmlinux, W guice, WadeSimMiser, Walton One,Wareditor2013, Wbroun, Wefa, Welsh, West.andrew.g, WhisperToMe, Wiki13, Wikiacc, Wikipelli, Will Beback, Will Beback Auto, X201, XMaster4000, Xavexgoem, Xeron220, Xkoalax,Xyz-321, Yamamoto Ichiro, Yaris678, YeshuaDavid, Yvwv, Yworo, Zafiroblue05, Zanturaeon, Zero Gravity, Zhoban, Zugzwanged, 1556 anonymous edits

Image Sources, Licenses and ContributorsFile:FARC guerrillas marching during the Caguan peace talks (1998-2002).jpg  Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:FARC_guerrillas_marching_during_the_Caguan_peace_talks_(1998-2002).jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: DEA Public AffairsFile:Álvaro Uribe (cropped).jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Álvaro_Uribe_(cropped).jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 2.0  Contributors:Center for American ProgressFile:Logo web.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Logo_web.jpg  License: GNU Free Documentation License  Contributors: *L*u*z*a*File:Raulreyesfarc.png  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Raulreyesfarc.png  License: Public Domain  Contributors: uploader: F3rn4nd0 at en.wikipediaFile:Carro bomba Caracol Radio 20100812.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Carro_bomba_Caracol_Radio_20100812.jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution2.0  Contributors: Julián Ortega MartínezFile:Alfonsocano.png  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Alfonsocano.png  License: Public Domain  Contributors: US Department of State. Original uploader was ZeroGravity at en.wikipedia

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