revision h to 'acceptance test procedure it 533 p/n 1801119

REPORT NO. TR 846

ENCLOSURE 1

ACCEPTANCE TEST PROCEDURE I.T. 533

P/N 1801119-11

82082S0~4~0SO002S+g 820818PDR PDQCK PDRp

PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC ~ KIN-TECH DIVISION

1346 S. State College Blvd. Anaheim, Ca. 92603, (714) 774-5217

REPORT NO. I.T. 533

DATE 2 anuar 1975

TR 846ENCLOSURE 1

ACCEPTANCE TEST

FOR

1801119 Shock Arrestor

1801128 (12-inch Stroke)

FROM

PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC COMPANYAIRCRAFT PRODUCTS DIVISION

PREPA D BY APPROVED B

A. n ineerin

ro ect En ineer

REV,

ReA

B

DATE

1-29-755- 8-75

12-15"755If28-76

BY

HCLHCL

HCL

HCL

APPD. BY

PAHPAH

PAH

PAH

PACES AFFECTED

2,45

Revised method of breakawaytorque test.

Added Materials TraceabilityTabulation.

Added parts to MTT.

PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC COMPANY Aircraft Products Division

IReport No. IT->>>

PageMA of~REV, . DATE BY APPD. BY PAGES AFFECTED

DEFG

8-10-768-23-76

10-14-763- 7-77

H 4- 7-77

HCLHCLHCLHCL

HCL

PAHPAHPAHPAH

PAH

35a

2, 43, 4

3, 4

Upgraded shock arrestors.Added to KCT list.Increase breakaway force.Changed Lost Motion from .060to .040

Tighten tolexances

Pacific Scientific CompanyAIRCRAFT PRODUCTS DIVSION1saft s. state college Blvd.. Anaheim, calif. 92803/I7taI 77a-5217

~33 3

PAGE OF

1.0 PURPOSE

1.1 To assure compliance of production units of the ShockArrestor Assembly with referenced drawings.

2.0 SCOPEI

2.1 This test establishes both visual and functional charac-teristics which could be expected to vary through dimen-sional variation or improper assembly and adjustment.

3.0 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

3.1 PSCo Drawing 1801119

4.3 333U33 UZ

4.1 1801 TF-2 Universal Shock Arrestor Tester

4.2 .0001 Dial Indicator

5. 0 INDIVIDUALTESTS

5. 1 Examination of Product

5.1.1 Each unit shall be subjected to a dimensionalexami'nation to determine compliance with appli-cable final assembly drawing.

5.1.2 Each unit shall be'isually inspected to assurecompleteness of assembly, freedom from burrs andsharp edges, alignment of parts, security offasteners, and dimensional integrity.

5.1.3 Units shall be visually, inspected for generalappearance of plating, painting, freedom fromnicks and damage of finishes.

5.1.4 Units shall be inspected to assure the accuracyand legibility of marking and identification.

6.0 'FINAL FUNCTIONAL TESTS

OF 6.1 Breakawa Friction Force (1200 lbs. max.)

QF OA

OF

6.1. 1 The unit shall extend and retract when subjectedto a maximum force of 1200 pounds. Unit shall beinstalled in the 1801 TF-2 Test Fixture and thestarting force in both the extension and retrac-tion modes measured at three places.

Measurements shall be taken at the approxi-mate mid position and approximately .5 inch fromboth extreme positions. Load measured shall notexceed 1200 pounds.

PAClRC ICIENTlFlC COMPANY Aircraft Products Dnttaion1~ South State Colleoe Boulevard ~ Anaheim. Calilomla 92803 ~ (711) 774-5217

ADDENDUM

Final Inspection Check ListPSCo 1801

aepoRT NO.

PAGE OF

Rev. 8

Shock Arrestor

Ref. paragraphs refer to paragraphs from this procedure, I.T. 533

Part No. Serial No.

PSCo P.O. No. Date

Shop Order No. Customer

I. Visual Examination (para. 5.1)

(a) Dzmenszonal...;......................................

(b) Workmanship.................II. Final Functional Tests

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

OG

(a) Breakaway Friction Force (1200 lbs. max.)(para. 6.1)........................Actual

(b) Lost Motion ( ~ 04o max.)(para. 6.2).........Actual(c) Acceleration/Load Test (.59 sec. min.)(para. 6.3)....

Actual Time

Extending

Retracting

Inspector

Stamp Date

PACIRC ICtKNTlFC COMITY AircraftProducta Diriaiort1346 South State Cotfege Boulevard ~ Anaheim, California 92603 ~ (7tH) 774-52t7

. ~333PAGE~ OF~Rev. H

ASME SECTION III, DIVISION ISUBSECTION NF

MATERIALS TRACEABILITYTABULATION

PSCO P/N

Serial No.

Owner/Agent

Date

Part No.

1801406

1801407

1801415

1801416

1801021 .

1801422

1801423

1801428

1801430

1801432

1801434

1801437

1801507

1801543

1801418

1801418

1801420

Description

Shell, Inertia Mass

Hub, Inertia Mass

Shell, Torque Carrier

Hub, Torque Carrier

Capstan Assy.

Flange

Tube

Housing

Support, Cylinder

Nut> End Cap

Cylinder, TelescopingRef. 1801545

Cap, End End Ca Assembl

,Nut, Adapter

Adapter

Gear, Pinion

Gear, Planet

Gear, Ring

MaterialCode Number

33

Stamp

PACIFIC SCIENZIFIC COMPANY Aircraft Products Division '

Rp N.~page >e ofRev. H

Part No. DescriptionMaterial

Code Number S tamp

4801431 Key, Anti-Rotation

1801433 Key, Capston

1801636 Inertia Mass

Pacific Sclentlflc CompanyAIRCRAFT PRODUCTS DIVSION7 34{{S. State Colleye Blvd., hnahsim, Calif. 92{{03/{71i) 774-5217

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General Electric

San Jose

C P BRAUN S CO

PIPE SNUBBERS AND STRUTSTVA STRIDE

Page 5

400-2June 27, 197fh

~'.0

SCOPE This document defines the functional and enginee~~ngrequirements for the piping snubbers and struts for the Reactor Islandportion of a Boiling Water Reactor facility. The applicable portionsof this specification, the referenced documents, and the Pipe SupportAssembly drawings comprise the Design Specification required forNF components by subsubarticle NCA-3250 of ASME Code, Section III.1.1 DESCRIPTION Pipe snubbers and struts are used to protect thepiping system from damage as a result of dynamic or shock loads such asthose induced by seismic action or loading generated by quick-closingvalves or water hammer. Included are hydraulic or mechanical vibrationsnubbers, rigid struts, and spring-loaded sway braces. Variablespring supports, constant spring supports, pipe restraints and rigidhangers are not included in this specification. Supports covered bythis specification are listed in the procurement cover specificationseries 400-12X.

1.2 BUYER The Buyer of the pipe snubbers and struts defined by thisspecification is Tennessee Valley Authority, Knoxville, Tennessee.

1.3 SELLER The supplier who furnishes the pipe snubbers, struts,and associated components is hereinafter referred to as the Seller.

1.4 ENGINEER Work und".r this specification shall be subject to thereview and approval of General Electric Company, Nuclear EnergyDivision, San Jose, California, or their authorized agents hereinafterreferred to as the Engineer.

1-4.1 REVIEW AND APPROVAL The Engineer shall review and approve alldocuments prepared by the Seller as indicated in this specification.'The Engineer's review and approval shall not relieve the Seller of thefull responsibility for the correctness of the documents furnished asthey may be modified by the Engineer's comments, and for conformancewith the specification.

l.5 QUALITY ASSURANCE The Seller shall comp3;y with the qualityassurance instructions in Appendix A. The Buyer and/or his designatedagent vill have access to the Seller's facilities to audit his qualityassurance program at all times.

L

I

- ~

A,

R Koelscli'L G SmartGeneral Electric

San Jose

C F BRAUN & CO


Page 11

400-20une 27, 1')75

4. 3. 6 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS The rigid strut (RS) 'iall be usedto provide a positive restraint in one direction and lim.ted f"eedomin a plane at 90 degrees. The vibration snubber (SS) shall bv, used toresist rapidly applied or cyclic loads. In contra't it shall afforrelatively low resistance to sustained loadings or slow movements .uchas those caused by thermal expansion. The spring-loaded strut or swaybrace (SB) shall be used where a predetermined resistance force tomovement in tension or compression is desired. It serves as a stayagainst- the loading while accommodating small thermal expansionmovements. In general, attachments to the pipe shall be provided withclose fitting rigid pipe clamps and shall be able to sustain all normal,upset, emergency and faulted loads within 15 der~rees of normal t.o thepipe without slippage. For loads applied at angles greater than 15degrees from normal, other additional attachments vill be provided fortransfer of loads to the pipe. Hydraulic cylinders shall be capable ofoperation for five or more years without maintenance, All other partsof the assemblies shall be capable of operation for 10 years withoutmaintenance. The design of the assemblies shall be concerned withcompactness, ease of installation and adjustment. After initialadjustment during installation, the assemblies shall perform, withoutfurther adjustment, throughout the range of loads and movementsspecified in the design data.

rigi ctural member, usually a pipe section with ball and socketjoints or sp 'l bushings at each end. Each joint shall be capableof a minimum of 1 . ees angular movement and the length of the rigidstrut between the joints be se" to minimize any undesirable arceffect throughout the travel. ality Group D struts, the pipesize shall be determined using good st al practice or test data inchoosing L/r ratios acceptable for the applie ds. 'he machinedsurfaces of the joints shall have a finish of 63 mic 'hes or betterand shall have a permanent dry lube corrosion-resistance p tion-The assemblies shall have free angular movement with no end or sx

4.3 '.2 VIBRATION SNUBBER The vibration snubber assembly may bedesigned using a hydraulic cylinder cr a mechanical design with nohydraulic damper. The functional resistance to gradual movementscaused by thermal expansion shall not exceed one percent of -the ratedload. The total lost motion '(dead band) including clearances; duringcyclic loading of 3,0 to 33 Hertz shall not exceed 0.03 inch. Allsnubber assemblies shall be designed for a life of 5000 cycles at rated

Assemblies requiring a greater number of design cycles will beidentified and the required number of cycles shown on the Pipe SupportAssembly drawings.

R Koelsch I. G SmartGeneral Electric

San Jose

C F SR*UN 8c CO


Page 12

400-20une 27, 1975

lily

4.3.6.2 VIBRATION SNUBBER Continued

The Seller shall provide the design or test data that qualifii theselected snubber for the defined cycle loading. The required minimumspring constants at 200oF for various snubber assembly rated loads reshown in Figure 1. Snubbers used in pairs shall have matched spr.'ngrates within 5 percent. For purposes of establishing spring constants,the snubber assembly is defined as the minimum pin to pin length

snubber'no

extension piece) for each load rating. In some cases the use of ahigher than necessary load rated snubber may be required to satisfy theminimum spring constant criteria. The Seller shall submit a tablegiving the snubber spring constants for each rated load (refer t;oparagraph 6.2) and shall provide, as a separate item, spring constantsfor the wall brackets. Pipe clamps are to have a stiffness 4 timesthat of the snubber attaching to them. The end connections shall haveball type joints or spherical bushings that will allow angular motionof + 5 degrees. Each snubber assembly shall provide a means of visuallydetermining if the snubber is working properly and is not frozen in alocked position. All snubbers shall perform as required by thisspecification in any spatial orientation.

~ 0 ~ ~

do le-acting hydraulic cylinders, fitted with fixed or adjustableorif s to control the velocity of the piston at a given resistiveforce. e cylinders shall comply with Joint Industrial ConferenceStandards 'th hard chrome plated piston rods and seals selected forminimum leaka and long life. Fluid reservoirs shall be integral withthe snubber asse lg and shall have a means of visually indicating thelevel or reserve f d. The seal material shall be subject to approvalby the Engineer. The ngth of stroke required is determined with thepiston centered. Howeve if it is desirable to utilize more of thestroke in one direction by sitioning the piston off center, a safetyfactor of 20 percent shall be lowed to prevent bottoming out thecylinder. The bleedrate and loc rate (lockup rate defined as thepipe velocity that caused the snubb to lock) shall be set and recordedfor each snubber. The proper setting adjustment screws, ifapplicable, shall be marked on valves, an cans shall be provided toprevent tampering in the field. Drag, blee te and lockup rateinformation for each snubber shall be provided the buyer as part ofthe permanent records. Poppet valve snubbers sha allow unrestrictedmovement of the pipe up to a velocity of 6 inches pe inute with adrag force not exceeding one percent of rated load. Th lockup velocityshall be between 6 and 25 inches per minute and the bleed te shall bebetween 1 and 6 inches per minute, Fixed orifice snubbers s 1 limitthe pipe velocity at rated load of 6 to 10 inches per minute. e dragload limit during thermal expansion at one percent of rated load snot apply to fixed orifice snubbers. Performance requirements shall

BG

R Koelschi ' SmartGeneral Electric

San Jose

400-20June 27, 19

6, i'A9PIPE SNUBBERS AND STRUTS

TVA STRIDE

C F BRAUN & CO Page 13Pro'ect 4840-P S ecification

The ecification of the fluid used in all hydraulic snubocrs .allhave t following characteristics.

The Kin atic Viscosity at 77 F shall be 175 Centistokes minim

b Pour Point s ll be minus 30 F or below

c Compressibility - ulk Modules of 190 Ksi or morc

Corrosion Protection - e hydraulic fluid must have the canacityto retard rust and corros n normally causeii by minute quantitie.of moisture and air present 'ny hydraulic system.

Stability — The hydraulic fluid m t retain constant propertieswithout oxidation, aeration, foamin or demulsibility under allcircumstances specified herein.

Material Compatibility - The hydraulic flui must be compatiblewith all seals, materials, assembly parts, coa 'ngs and paintunder all circumstances specified herein.

Fire Resistance - Flash Point 5 F or aboveFire Point 650 or aboveSpontaneous Ignition Temperature 860 F above

h Radiation Life - The hydraulic fluid shall have resistance to "

4.3.6.2.2 MECHANICAL SNUBBER The fully mechanical type of snubbershall control pipe movement by limiting acceleration or by, limitingvelocity. The acceleration limiting snubbers shall restrict therelative pipe acceleration to .02g for any load up to the rated lo;d.Break-away load shall not exceed 5 lbs or one percent of rated load,which ever is greater, The velocity limiting mechanical snubber shallallow unrestricted movement of the pipe up to a maximum accelerationof 0.08g while not excerting a force greater that one percent ofrated load on the pipe. The slip rate (velocity of pipe after snubberactivation) shall be between 1 to 12 inch per minute at all loads up torated load. The mechanical snubber performance shall be met at 75 F

and 200 F in both tension and compression.

t >S

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511ll 15

W hristiansen R KeolochC F SRAUN Ck CO Page 18

San JosePIPE SNUBBERS AND STRUTS

TVA STRIDE

400-70June 27, li750~

g ll test data shall be obtained from production units rani.omlys cted. Pins shall be installed to manufacturer's standardtole ces.

h The Selle hall test two snubbers of each size as outlinedabove.'oth

shall be ested at 75o and 200oF. All results shall beincluded in the mitted report. Prior test results on identical1units are acceptabl

6.3 HYDRAULIC SNUBBER TEST R RT Certification shall be submittedin a test report for hydraulic snu ers to insure that the following i"satisfied.

a The seals function properly after te 'ng per paragraph 6,1.

b The snubber. unit shall not have lost motio in excess of thatallowed by paragraph 4.3.6.2 for the load con tion indicated.

~ c The snubber unit continues to offer rated restrai until theinput motion/force ceases or reverses direction.

d The criteria for drag, lockup rate and bleedrate are met.

e The spring constant is determined and reported as required by

6.4 MECHANICAL SNUP9ER ASSEMBLIES Certified test data shall besubmitted to demonstrate that the mechanical snubbers perform asrequired by paragraph 4.3.6.2. The test shall include the followingprocedures.

a The snubber shall be subjected to either force or displacementthat varies approximately as the sine wave.

b The frequency (Hz) of the input motion or force shall be verifiedat increments of 5 Hz within the range 3 Hz to 33 Hz. All testsshall be conducted for a minimum of 10 seconds at each testfrequency.

c The resulting maximum relative displacements across the snubbershall be recorded at 75op. The effective spring rate shall bedetermined as described and defined in paragraph 6.2.c.

d The Seller shall test the snubbers for break-away load andacceleration limits at 75oF. Velocity limiting mechanicalsnubbers shall be tested for break-away load, acceleration limits,and slip rate.

BG

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v.k

ENCLOSURE

Sections 2.2 and 2.3"Responses to NRC Request

for Additional Information onControl~'of "Heavy.~Loads for

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

4 I

SECTION 2.2Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling System Operating

in the Vicinity of Fuel Stoiage Pools

2. 2-1. The following is a list of overhead handling systemscapable of carrying loads over spent fuel in the storagepool or in the reactor vessel:

Handling DeviceNumber Unit No. Name

Drawing No. 6Mark No.

1-3 125-ton Reactor Bldg. 44N220-223Crane

59 1/4-ton Plain Trolley 44N234and Channel HandlingTool

59 1/4-ton Plain Trolley 44N234and Channel HandlingTool

1/4-ton Plain Trolley 44N234and Channel HandlingTool

70 Refueling Platform - GE 761E738Monorail

., 70 Refueling Platform — GE 761E738Monorail

70 Refueling Platform — GE 761E738Monorail

71 Refueling PlatformAuxiliary Hoist(1/2 ton)

GE 761E738

71 Refueling PlatformAuxiliary Hoist(1/2 ton)

GE 761E738

71 Refueling PlatformAuxilary Hoist(l/2 ton)

GE 761E738

2 ~ 2 2 Of the handling devices listed in Section 2.2-1, deviceNos. 59, 70, and 71 are excluded from consideration because theyhandle loads which weigh less than the combined weight ofa fuel assembly and its handling device.

2 ~ 2 3 The Browns Ferry reactor building crane (handling deviceNo. 6) has been evaluated as having sufficient designfeatures to make the likelihood for a load drop extremelysmall (see Attachment 1) ~ A heavy load/impact areamatrix is provided for this crane.'in Attachment 2.

7

bg

,JP

SECTION 2. 3Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in Plant

Areas Containing Equipment Required for Reactor Shutdown,Core Decay Removal, or Spent Fuel Pool Cooling

2 ~ 3 1 None of the cranes or hoists listed in 2. 1-1, which fallinto the category of Section 2.3, have sufficientdesign features to make the likelihood of a load

drop'xtremelysmall.

2.3-2 The mobile crane (device No. 24) and the chain hoists(device Nos. 47B and 47C) listed in 2.1-1 have beenpresented in matrix format in Attachment 2 as requested.

ATTACHMENT 1

SECTION 2.2-3

Response on Browne Ferry Reactor Building Crane

Sheet' og Zl

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

NUREG 0612

Section 2.2.3

The following is a detailed evaluation of the 125-ton reactor building .crane with respect to the featuxes of design, fabrication, inspection,testing, and operation as delineated in NUREG 0554 and supplemented by theidentified alternatives specified in NUREG 0612, appendix C and proposedalternatives which demonstrate their equivalency. This crane haspreviously been evaluated with respect to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.104 andBranch Technical Position-APCSB9-1. This evaluation is a consolidation ofthe following letters with supplemental information:

Letter'from L. M. Mills to NRC's T. A. Ippolito dated February 10, 1981,with enclosure.

Letter from H. G. Parxis to NRC's A. Schwencer dated June 30, 1976, withenclosure;

To facilitate the evaluation of thebuilding crane as having sufficientof a load drop extremely small, thefailure-proof cranes") were grouped

Bxowns Ferry Nuclear Plant reactordesign features to make the likelihoodguidelines of NUREG 0554 {"single»in the following categories:

A. Specification, design criteria, and installation instructions.

B. Drivers and controls, bxidge and trolley travel, hoisting machinery,and safety features.

C. Testing, preventive*maintenance, operating manual and qualityassurance.

This grouping provides for a point-by-point comparison for each section ofNUREG 0554 while eliminating the'zedundancy inherent in such a comparison.for components perfoxming int'errelated functions. The reactor buildingcrane was manufactured by Ederer, Incorporated. It is a single-trolley,overhead electric traveling-type with a 125-ton main hoist and a 5-tonauxiliary hoist. This crane serves three reactor units, and handles thespent fuel casks and equipment shipped ox received thxough the equipment-access lock.

1 IIl

,

A. Specification, design criteria, and installation instructions.

This crane was used during the plant construction phase and ispresently in service as permanent plant equipment. The performancespecifications for construction and permanent plant use are identical.No changes were made to the crane for the transition from constructionto operating plant service.

The reliability of the crane is based on conservatively applied designprinciples and compliance with accepted industry standards such asCMAA Specification No. 70 and ANSI B30.2-1976. Maximum loads areconsidered to be simultaneously applied static and dynamic loads.The allowable 'stresses used in the design of this crane for

structural'nd

mechanical portions do not exceed 0.9 of the material yield- strength for the most severeload combinations. The degree to whichactual design stresses comply with the allowable stresses given in CMAA70-1975 are shown below for critical structural portions which werefabricated using A-36 steel.

Box Girder:

Maximum ActualSires's ~ksi

ChfAA AllowableStress ksi

TensionCompressionShear

12.211.62.6

17.617.613.2

End Trucks:


7.87.83.2

14.414.410.8

Trolley Frame:


13.513.51.9

14.414.410.8

Structural components are subject to cyclic loading, whereas rotating partsare subject to reverse cyclic loading. Using a conservative 40 percent ofmaterial tensile strength aa the endurance limit, the structural androtating parts were designed for infinite life. This can be verified bycomparing the maximum actual stress for the structural portions listed inthe table above with 40 percent of the tensile strength of A-36 steel(.4 x 58.0, ksi). The critical load bearing rotating parts listed below canlikewise be verified by using the tensile strength of their respectivemetals..

PartMaximum Endurance

Material Stress ~Limit kml)

DrumDrum shaft„Ring gearPinionPinion gear shaft

A-36414041404340

C1140

10. 922. 020. 029. 521. 0

23. 244. 044. 072. 044. 8

The crane was designed for a maximum load. of 125 tons. This design ratedload (DRL) is displayed on the crane. The maximum critical load (MCL)imposed on the crane is the reactor vessel head which, with its liftingdevice, weights 105 tons. The crane will be maintained for the DRL, whichis.l6 percent greater than the MCL. This should compensate for componentdegradation because of wear and exposure. The MCL is not displayed on thecrane.

The auxiliary hoist was designed for a DRL of 5 tons to which it will bemaintained. The MCL handled by the auxiliary hoist is limited to 1/2 tonby Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant technical specifications for loads overspent fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool. The DRL of the auxiliaryhoist is displayed on the crane.

The crane was designed to withstand a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) bymaintaining its structural integrity while retaining control of andholding the load. Bridge, trolley, and hoist holding brakes are appliedwhen the drive motors are deenergized. Trolley wheels are prevented fromleaving the runway by the use of safety blocks with holddown lugs. Eachbridge and trolley truck is equipped with a drop bar which limits thedrop of 1/2 inch in event of failure of any part of the wheel assembly.

A seismic anlaysis of the reactor building crane was performed byidealizing the crane as a lumped-mass mathematical model. The stiffnessof the model was the stiffness of the crane girders. The trolley wasassumed to be rigid and was idealized in the mathematical model as rigidlinks connecting the crane girders. The trolley was assumed to be pinnedto the crane girders in order to maximize the inertial effects of thetrolley. The maximum load on the crane during a seismic event wasassumed to be 150 kips, which is 60 percent of the DRL.

A modal analysis was performed for motion transverse to the cranegirders. The analysis considered two cases of trolley position; one casefor th'e trolley at the center of the girders and one'for the trolley atthe end. Seismic responses were calculated for each case by use ofthe response spectrum method of analysis. Acceleration response spectraat the elevation of the crane runway was taken from the seismic analysisof the reactor building and was used as input to the mathematical model.A damping value of 1 percent of critical damping was used in the responseanalysis for both the operating base earthquake (OBE) and SEE events.

Xn both the longitudinal and vertical directions, the crane was designedfor pseudostatic seismic loads caused by the zero period acceleration (ZPA)of the acceleration response spectrum at the elevation of the bridgerunway.

The seismi.c loads were combined on an absolute basis with other loads inthe appropri,ate loading combinations. Seismic loads from only one horiz-ontal direction at a time were considered to occur simultaneously with thevertical direction.

The criteria fox establishing a minimum operating temperature with respectto material fracture toughness was not met nox was a minimum operatingtemperature specified. The actual temperature on the refuel floorperiodically drops to. 40-45 F when the auxiliary boilers are not availablefor building heat during, extremely cold weather.'he lowest expectedoperating temperatures were 0 F during construction and 65 F as permanentplant equipment. Considering the conservative levels of stress in thecrane at .the DRL, a coldpxoof test followed by an examination of criticalwelds would be sufficient demonstration of material toughness.

Due to the location of the crane in a nonpressure confining paxt of thereactor building, the girders were of a sealed design with no need forventing and drain provisions.

The possibility of surface condensation due to excessive humidity wasprovided for by cleaning, priming, and painting all structural surfacesin an approved manner; using nonhygxoscopic electrical insulation; platingcritical mechanical parts and terminals of electrical devices; andinstalling motor space heaters.

All welding and weldox qualification was in accordance with the "StandardCode for Welding in Building Construction" of the American Welding Society.Visual inspections were made at the contractors'lants to assure that thecrane was fabricated 'in accordance with the specification requirements.There has been no nondestructive examination (NDE) of welds. Preheatingand postweld heat treatment to relive imparted tensile stresses due towelding was not done during fabrication. A review of actual fabricationdrawings indicates that structural and welding details were used which'would neither be expected to cause nox be vulnerable to lamellar tearing.The design is such that tee and corner welded connnections in the mainstructural members are loaded primarily. in shear ox compression and are

''made wit. fillet welds of 5/16 inch or smaller. There is no evidence or,suggestion in available technical literature to indicate that welds of thissize would induce sufficient shrinkage stress to create lamellar tearing.

B. Driver's and controls , bridge and trolley travel, hoisting machinery,and safety features.

All drives axe G.E. stepless D.C. adjustble vo'ltage drive systemsconsisting of operator's master switch, HG set power conversionunit, D.C. drive motor, brakes and protective contxol circuitry.

I I

IIha

Hotox horsepower rating for the hoist drive is identical to thecalculated requirement for the main hoist and is 1.1 percent great'erthan the calculated requirement for the auxiliary hoist. The drivemotor provides rated hoisting speed at rated load and increasinghoisting speeds with lighter loads up to 275 percent of rated speedat no load. The maximum torque available is limited to 200 percent,pxeventing mechanical damage from severe overloads. The stepless drivesystems ensure smooth acceleration and deceleration regardless of theoperator's movement of the controls. The major features involved inthis. acceleration contxol px'oces's are:

(a) Timed acceleration - The rate of change of the speed referencevoltage is limited through a resistor-capacitor network. Thissoftens any abrupt control movement by the operator.

(b) Armature voltage sensing —When a stop is made by.xeturning thecontxo1 to the "off" position, an axmature voltage relay willprevent the,brake from. setting until the motor back EMF and

~ hence speed drops to a present level. Initial slowing isprovided by the much smoother regenerative braking featurewhereby the kinetic energy of the moving parts is convexted toelectrical energy and is diverted back into the electricalsystem.

(c) Torque proving relay — The hoist holding brakes will release onlywhen the, motor is energized and providing sufficient torque toprevent shtick produced. by load sag on initiation of the hoistingmotion. This is accomplished through a torque proving xelay whichsenses armature loop current and delays release of the brakes.

A system to allow the operator to directly limit the load on the crane isin the process of procurement at this time. The system consists of a loadcoll load „detector with digital readouts and adjustble trip points. Withthis system a tr'ip point may be selected slightly above the load to belifted which, if exceeded, would stop the motor and set the holding brakes.This system will effectively limit the stress experienced by the hoistingsyst'm components and protect the load from load hangup conditions.

Protective devices integral to the electric control circuits which limitthe hoist motor torque and thus the load on mechanical components are:

(a) 'Inverse time delay overload relay on MG set A.C. motor — This relayis set at 150 percent of full load current and'limits sustained ovex-Zoads ~

.(b) 'Poist motor current limit circuit - This electronic torque limit isset at 200 percent of full load current and represents the upperlimit of .torque production of the motox. This is accomplished withan SCR voltage regulator.

«5

I ~ I

h

(c) Xnstantaneous, overcurrent relay — This relay is set to trip at250 percent of full load current fox the hoist motor and servesas a backup to the limit cixcuit described in (b).

(d) Overspeed switch — This mechanical switch is directly coupled toeach hoist drive and causes an emergency stop if the drive exceeds125 percent of rated top.speed in either dixection.

.(e) Operational check circuit — This is a backup circuit to the operatorwhereby should the operator command a stop or reversal of the driveand the drive does got react in a present length of time,'he drivewill be automatically stopped.

A procedure was performed during the preopexational testing to establishthe ability of each hoist backup br'ake to independently stop a rated loadat full lowering speed. Data from the test indicated that the load wasstopped in a distance of l/2 inch fox both the main and auxiliary hoist.During this test the regenerative braking system was operable while theemergency dynamic braking was disabled.

Protective limit switches prevent overtravel on all crane motions. Eachhoist is provided with both. rotating and counterweight operated limitswitches to prevent over hoisting and two-blocking. The rotating limitswitch also prevents overlowering. No -shock absorbing device is includedin the hoisting system. The bridge and trolley are provided with a set oflimit switches which are actuated before reaching the maximum. travel limitswitches. Actuation of these switches automatically limits the speedreference voltage to 25 percent of its full .value. This provides anautomatic slowdown feature which limits deceleration by actuation ofmaximum'travel limit switches or contact of bumpers with their stnps.

The bridge mounted cab has'complete operating and emergency controls. Aduplicat'e set of controls for all functions except the main hoist isprovided on a bridge mounted xetractable pendant. Selector switches areprovided to select either "cab" or "pendant" operation. Operation from thecab is prevented until the pendant station is raised to the storedposition.

An emergency stop switch is provided at both stations. This activates amanual-magnetic main power supply contactor that controls the power supplyfor all motions.' second and separate contactor, or cixcuit breaker, isprovided in the power supply to the main crane feed rails which can beoperated by three emergency stop pushbuttons on the operating floor(elevation 664.0). These pushbuttons are located on column line "P" neareach reactor.

Un'.sxvoltage protection ia provided on all drives to sense low,, or loss ofcontrol voltage and causes the driven equipment to stop. Hinimum motorshunt field.protection monit'ors the loss of motox'ield current and stopsthe respective drive if the motor loses field current. A monitor isprov'ded to sense phase xevers~lor loss of'one phase of the A.C. power

»6-

supply. If either of these conditions occur, the drive cannot be started,if it is stopped and the drive will be stopped if running. Hoist motor

" temperature is monitored and an indicating light is located in the cab.All the crane controls are spring-returned to the "off" position.

. This crane does no't handle individual spent fuel elements and therefore-does not require motion interlocks.

Incremental movement of hoist, bridge and trolley drives while avoiding-abrupt changes in motion is provided by. static xeversing. This isaccomplished through static SCR voltage regulators which effect a smoothvoltage reversal instead of the'brupt reversal found in magnetic contactoxcontrols. This eliminates the possibility of plugging and jogging in theusual sense of applying full power (forward or reverse) to promote limitedmovement. Each hoist is provided with a load float feature actuated from athumb switch on the master switch control. Operation of this switch holdsthe brake off independent of the hoist or lower switch and limits the speedreference voltage to 25 percent of its full value. This allows .a load tobe accurately positioned (up and/or down) without the shock producingeffect of the brakes setting and releasing as the load is maneuvered. The

bridge and trolley are provided with a drift point feature which operatesessentially the same as the load float feature described above.

All crine motion drives are equipped with both electrical and mechanicalbraking systems. Regenerative braking for normal contxol converts kineticenergy of moving parts into electrical energy which is'diverted back intothe electrical system. Automatic emergency dynamic braking provides

- controlled lowering of the load under conditions of simultaneous failure ofac. power and the mechanical holding.brakes. Actuation of the emergencystop pushbutton, which opens the main line disconnect switch, will-notdeenergize the A.C. motor of the HG set so that regenerative braking forstopping the 'drive will be provided.

The mechanical brakes axe spring-set and electrically released only when

the drive motor is energized. It is possible to release the brakes on thebridge and trolley drives by actuating the drift point switch with themotox'eenergized. This is not regarded as a safety hazard since.no move-ment of the load is involved in the brake release.

These mechanical brakes have adjustable torque settings and have provisionfor manual operation; Each drive system has two mechanical brakes with thebackup brake being tjmed to set only after the drive motor has stopped. No

drag brakes axe used,and none of these brakes are foot operated.C

Both hoist systems are equipped with two separate gearing systems, eachhaving a,mechanica'1 brake on the high speed shaft. Each'bxake is sized and

adjusted for 150 percent of the full load motor torque at the poi'nt ofapplication. The bridge drive consists of one motor and one brake on eachgirder. The brake on the'.west girder is set at 50 percent and the one onthe east girder is set at 100 percent of the full-load torque of theirrespective drive motors. Each trolley drive brake is set at 75 percent ofthe full-load torqu'e of the drive motor.

tI I

,0

The maximum full load hoisting speeds are 5.33 FPM for the main hoist and

22.6 FPM for the auxiliary hoist. The maximum bridge speed is 54.1 FPM

and the maximum trolley speed is 30.35 FPM. The bridge and trolley areequipped with double flange wheels which axe machined to a tolerance of—.010 inch of each'other. The bridge and trolley drives are not equippedwith overspeed detectors but do-have deceleration limit switches and

maximum travel limit switches which deenergize the drive motors. Wheel

stops, spring-type bumpers, and tie-down devices are provided on both thebridge and trolley.

The wire rope reeving system for the main hoist consists of a gxooved hoistdrum, .upper and lower sheave blocks, dual wire ropes, and a hydraulicequalizing cylinder. The auxiliary hoisting system has two part direct orwhip style reeving to the grooved drum which requires no lower or upperblock.. The two independent auxiliary hoist wire ropes terminate at acrosshead at the hook. Both drums are provided with catch plates that

'imit drum movement in .the horizontal or vertical direction to 1/4 inch and

prevent disengagement from thi bx'aking system should .the drum, shaft, orbearings fail. Each drum is equipped with guards to prevent the ropes, fromleaving the grooves. The maximum fleet angle from drum to lead sheave is2.86 degrees. In the high hook position, the maximum fleet angle betweensheaves is 4.18 degrees. This angle decreases to 3-1/2 degrees within5 feet'6-1/2 inches of hook travel. A minimum amount of handling is donenear the high hook position. Componenet alignment was checked using thecontractor's design drawings and computations. Shear bars and/or tapereddowels are used to secure mechanical components and insure proper align-ment.

/

The main hoist wire rope is 1-1/4 inches in diameter and is made of extraimproved plow steel. The construction of this rope is 6 by 37 with anindependent wire rope core. The breaking strength of this rope as

published by the manufacturer is-152,000 pounds. If this is reduced by15 percent to allow for degradation due to wear'nd exposure,'he maximum

hook load which produces a rope load of 10 percent of this reduced ratingis 57.7 tons. This considers parts of line, xeeving efficiency, weight ofrope and lower block and allows 15 percent of hook load for dynamic(impact) effects. Na reverse bends are used in this reeving system. The

ratio of wire rope diameter to lead sheave, intermediate sheave,'qualizingsheave, and hoist drum diameter is 27 .3, 24.1, 20.1, and 49.6 respectively.The equalizing device is 'a double ended, double acting hydraulic cylinderhaving a 30-inch stroke with an internal control valve. This is a modifiedbeam-type equalizer with internal damping; The equalization rate islimited to 6 inches per minute by a velocity fuse arrangement.

The reeving and equalizing systems are designed such that the load shift,caused by a rope failure. is adequately cushioned by the rope elasticity and

the equalizing cylinder'. The vertical alignment shifts so that the load .

center of gravity 'is under the center of support of. the remaining ropesystem. Th'e induced stresses remain well below ultimate values asconcluded by testing and analysis by the University of Tennessee MechanicalEngineering Department under contract from TVA (see attached ASME papers

No. 76-DE-21 and 76-WA/DE-6). The result of these tests indicate that,based on handling a 70-ton fuel cask and having one rope to fail in thehighest hook position with a fixed equalizing cylinder, the resultingmaximum line load would not exceed 43,300 pounds. Based on the proofloading and conservative design stresses of the wire rope, yield strengthand ultimate strength ratio of the wire rope is adequate and will providethe desired margin of rope strength.

Both the head and load blocks have physically separate sheave systems forthe two ropes. Both blocks are equipped with guards to prevent ropes fromleaving the sheaves under all operating conditions. There are two loadattachment .points on the load block. The spent fuel cask is the only loadfor which the dual attaching points on the load block are used. Theattachment points are 'the sister hook and trunnion. Each attachment pointis capable of supporting three times the maximum critical load. Theauxiliary hoist is not provided with dual load attachment points. The'hookwill support three times its maximum critical load. Both the, sister hookand auxiliary hoist hook were proof tested to 200 percent of their ratedcapacity. with subsequent'magnetic particle examination of the main hook andliquid penetrent/radiograph inspection of the auxiliary hook. The loadblock was not nondestructively examined by surface or volumetrictechniques. All individual components of both hoisting, systems are capableof supporting a static load of .200 percent of their maximum critical loads.(For analysis of lifting devices, see response to section 2 .1.3.d.)

Trolley and bridge structure are designed for 200 percent and 275 percentof full load motor torque at stall, respectively. Mechanical componentshave a design ratio of 5:1 based on the ultimate strength of the material.With this strength and the electrical control limited torque which can beproduced by the hoist drive, resistance to failure of the hoisting. systemshould a load hangup occur is considered to be adequate.

Emergency repair's can be made in-place due to an extensive inventory ofparts,'maintenance manuals furnished by the crane manufacturer, andestablished maintenance procedures. Manual operation of the holding brakeson all crane motions will allow for the safe transfer of the load to anappropriate location.

C.. Testing, preventive maintenance, operating manual, and qualityassurance.

Extensive acceptance and preoperational testing of the crane afterinstall'ation, along with component tests by the manufacturer',established the ability of the crane to perform as designed. Pre-operational tests, No. TVA-21 and No. TVA-21A, describe the proceduresand record the results of these tests. Procedures were provided by thedrives and controls subcontractor for testing the instantaneous over-current relays, hoist overspeed switches, and operational check relays.

mechanical and electrical check list was verified as part of the pre-operational testing along with a set of construction records. Thecrane was tested at 100 percent and 125 percent of the design rated

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.load. Each travel motion was tested with the main hook loaded with theabove loads for smooth acceleration and braking, for maximum speeds ofall crane motions, and'for minimum movement of all crane motions. Alllimit switches and limiting devices were tested for proper functio'ning.All braking torque values were adjusted to those previously stated andwere verified to stop a rated load during a manual load lowering pre-operational test. Tests not performed were manual movement of bridgeand trolley and load hangup.

Frequent 'and periodic inspection requirements have been imposed throughTVA NVC PR division procedures manual N74M15 and N78S2. This crane iscontinuously maintained at 125-ton main hoist capacity and 5-tonauxiliary hoist capacity which is above the MCL for both.

The crane manufacturer provided electrical and mechanical maintenancemanuals specifying lubrication, inspection, and preventive maintenancerequirements; however, an operating manual as described in item 9.0 ofNUREG 0554 was not provided.

This crane is listed as a CSSC item in appendix A of Browns FerryNuclear Plant Operational Quality Assurance Manual. Therefore, allinspection, testing, and operational requirements, as listed in the TVA

NUC PR division procedures manuals N74M15 and N78S2, are auditableby'UC

PR Quality Assurance Staff.

-10-'52175.04

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Mechso)cs) a Ao<ospsco Eve<neo<)oo,T)>e Uo)ve>sny ol Te<v>osseei

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Failure Analysis of a RedundantReeving Hoist

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.rIntroduction,

The handling of radioactive materials always necessitates spe.cial safety measures, especially when large quantities ofsuch mate-rials nre involved. The information presented here is the result ofthe analysis of a redundant reeving system in usc as the mainhoisting mechanism ofTcnnessed Valley Authority's reactor build-ing cranes [1l,'lthough the analysis is easily modified for varia-tinns of the basic design. Tho redundant system is intended to pro-vide fall-safe protection of the hoisting system, which at timeshandles large casks of reactor fuel cle)nenta The rated capacity oftho hoksting system is 125 tons (r>3.5 metric tons). The fail-safemechanism of this crane is being studied, considering no actualtesting of the prototype has been undertaken, and as yet the pri-mary hoisting, mechanism has not failed, leaving the alternativemechanism free from actual duty.

Thc safety feature of this crane )nechanism is the usage of dou-hle noncrosscd rccving through a fixed crown assembly and a trav-eling lower sheave assembly. The system, shown in Fig. 1, can bevisualized as two ii)dividual rope and block assemblies which havebeen rigidly combined, side by side, such that each rope system .

carries one. half of the load being hois'ted in normal operations.The reeving systeln is composed of twelve wire rope lines, six ofwhich will lose load-carrying capacity in the event of failure(t»eekage) oi'ny one linc. In the event of such a rope failure inthis particular syster>, there will be a sudden motion of the lower

'heaveassembly plul the connected fuel cask. Tlic intentions of ther«lundrnt systtcn <l«sign are the cap>)city tn transmit the dynamic'h);)ds developed, nnd the ability to continue hoisting operations

I) Yumbcls in bra<'bets <Iasignalo References nt end of paper."< nlribulcd hy lhe Design Rezh<ce)i<>X f)ivision fov presentation al the

I676 l)volga Rngioe< ring Show, Chicago, April f>-8, 1476, of THIIAhIRIII~AN SOCII;"I'YOF hIRCHANICAI.RIgtilaIRRIIS. htaousctfpt receive<I at

o "hl': Iles<I<)<'>a<le)a J)nua<y 6, 1976. 1>e)>er No. 76 DR.21.

C<;>les willbe avoilah)e ue)II Deceml>cr. 1976.

with six working lines.The method of study undertaken herc is the solution of the dif-

forential equations governing the motion of the system in theevent of a single component failure. The differential equations arcobtained from the fundamental laws of dynamics. A numerical solution of the resulting differentiul equations is obtained whichyields information concerning the loads in the remaining lines as .

well as the motion of the traveling block and fuel cask The formu.Iation of the analysis is of a general nat<ire such that the effects ofdesign changes can be evaluated..

Method ofAnalysisDuring normal hoisting operations, a 2n-part line symmetrically

reeved through the crown and traveling blocks carries the fuel caskand traveling block load. In the event of a single component fail-ure, the total load is shifted from thc 2n lines to n lines; this shift-ing constitutes the fail safe feature of tha system. Although a vari-ety of failure modes is conceivable, it is anticipated that thc mostseve're conditions imposed upon the fail-safe components willoccur ns a result of an instantaneous failure of a single line. Thetraveling block will then drop and rotate due to the n remaininglines carrying the load in an unsymmetrical manner. It is desired1hat the forces in the remaining lines be predicted and that themotion of the traveling block and fuel cask be given.

The description of the geometry is shown in Fig. 2. In this figure,half of thi. symmetrical system is shown in a position subsequentto failure. The fuel cask is attached to the travehng block througha yoke that does not permit movement of the cask relative to thotraveling block in 8-'V plane. tvhcn failure occurs, the motion of .the system can be drsscribed by noting the position of the travelingblock. A reference point on the traveling block in a typical dis-placement is denoted by the parametcn< h, s, nnd 8. Thc

remaining'ines

have different inclinations and their loacls are difi'eront I'romthese prior to fnilure.

'I'lie equations of)notion can be obtained by applying the laws ofdynnn)ice. In thc vertical dircrtion

An analysis fs presented of a reeuing arrangement suitable for the hoisting of criticalmaterials requiring fail-safe criteria. The system consists of two independent wire ropessymmetrically threaded through the crown and lover blocks and reeved by o single take-up dnsm. The analysis prouides for the Iood ir. each line of the luire rope remaining afterfailure of one rope occurs. The motion of the lower block and load are also prouided %rthe uoriety offailure conditions considered. The analysis is use/ul to predict the effect ofunrious design parameters on fhe integrity of system in the euent of a single compone>t tfailure.

Discussion o» this paper will bc acccptcf[ at ASME ETcadqtiartci s 'until lvfay 10, 1976

1

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a e Pal>»OISf'rgl

t PVPfr(1 j>sITs —L >Oft>>rac3~I

trrr "» TftXZ

, ~a'MBgpcf~ S>>f[rr

Ps

Pl PS 5

l PLI,

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Flg. 1 Twelve l>ne redundant reeving syslem

V

Fig. 2 Typical posl>lon of traveling block and cask

mg —} Pr cos Tr ~ ma,r"f~>

where the P's are the actual line loads, T's are the angles of inclina-tion with the vertical of tho lines, m is the mass in motion, nnda,s" is thc vertical component of the acceleration of the center ofgravity. For the horizontal motion

—g Pf sin Tf ~ ma,s (2)i~1

1'or rotation about the center ofgiavity, the equation isn l n-l

(Pr cos Tr + Pr+l cos T;+l) (b~+'cos 0 —L sin 8) +f~rpp 2

'ealN'Pr

sinTT+ Pl+i sin Tier) (L cos8+ byt sin0) ~'Isb (3)

. The acceleration of the center of gravity ol the system can be writtcn in general as

a,r a+Lb+I,bz (4)

Tho components in the horizontal and vertical directions are thenwritten ns.

a,a ~ l + I.b cos 0 - Lbz sin 0

anda,r" h -I.b sin 0- I,bz cos0

The wire rope can be considered ns n linear spring [2] since theequivalent area and modulus are known. The method of analysisdescribes the motion from the equilibrium position in which 2nlines support the load equally. It is then convenient to consider thcchanges in thc line loads as a result of the subsequent motion dueto failure. The line loads at any time can then be expressed as

Pr w P+ SPY . i~ 1,..., n

>vhere P ~ W/2n and 1V is the total weight being hoistef1.The load in the wire rope can be written, in general, os

P~ >YA

where

fl ~ uniform tensile stress

A w equivalent cross-sectional area (7)

The, relation can be rewritten ifHooke's law, using an equivalentmodulus of elasticity, is applied as

bLPAfl>s ~ (3)Lwhere 8 is tho elongation due tn tho load P and I is the lenglh

oi'he

rope. For a change in the load due to n change in elongation,the relation

NoaroaolarareA eaaiealeoe crore.eeeeioaal area of «i e

ropea; ~ distance ~ crown block sheave

b ~ dista:>ce to traveling block sheave

c ~ distnnro between hcisting drum nnderr>wn block

d f distance bclwccn crown 1>lock nmlI fr>Ve:e>ng 41OCaa

I w equivalent modulus of elasticity of

wire ropec ~ distance between crown block and idle

sheave.h ~ vertical disploceinent of traveling

blockF ~ frictional moment

.1. w distnnco lo renter of mossm w total n>ass

w 'number of rcrvcd .line» in foil safo

mechanismP; w lineloadr; ~ sheave radiuss ~ horizontal displacement of traveling

blockx ~ piston displacementyr ~ line anglo8 ~ rotation of traveling blockss; ~ shcavo rotation

. Transactions of the ASME

JI

gP,

Whee% t3 e'r'I

c

~ FAhP ~ (hd)—

L (9)

hfe; ~ hi((~l en h —d + l(z sin 0 i ~ 1, 3, 5...;n - I (10)

No'v taking into consideration the rotation of the sheaves as theli<e< ~ elongate, the resulting changes heconle

hb( h -b/sin 0+r( lp( l r(p/

I odd

i even

wherero ~ 'radius ofhoisting drumr( ~ radiiofsheaves,i ~ 1 through n<(o ~ angular rotation OF drum4; ~ angular rotations of sheaves,i ~ 1 through n

Also from the geometry of Fig. 2, the lengths of the lines betweensheaves can be written as

c

L,(~(c+d'+h-b/sin0)/cosy( i~ 1,...,n-li+I

l Odd2L„~ (d —e+ h —bn(z sin 0)/cos yn j~ '/2 i even

(12)

nnd tho angles of the line inclination as

s+ bl con 0- aotony( ~

, c+d+h-blsin0 i~2,...,n-l

i+1 iodd~+e ccce ec-

tan y( ~ j en

d+h —d/sin0 i/2 . I even

i-1 iodds+ b„/2 cos0-a„(2 2tan yn en . h ec .. (13)d —C+h - bn(zain 0 i/2 i oven

cnn he written.It is nccessnry to describe thc change in elongation of each line,

due to the faiiure, consistent with the rotation of the sheaves in thesyrtcm. Th'e elongation changes nre not independent of each otherbecause of the sheave rotation. Considering first the geometry ofFi„. 2, which does not illustrate sheave rotation, the change ineh>ngation ofeach line can be written ns

P n(cos y(+ cos y;c l) (d;+ l cos <(

—L sin ss)Icz ~ l(l» 2

+ (sin y(+ sin y(c.l) (b~t sin <|l+ I. cos 4e)2,

AEh n-„l (cos y( cos yl+ls ~

+—Z~—+—') b~(+ cos0-Lsin0)

Ics IrlPP Le Ie(+l

jsin y( sin y(~(i AEsin0+ (—+—) ben l Sin 0+ L COS 0) ——

L( L(+l Icscos yl cos ylylwZ I ds+)' + d(c l—') (b(+Icos 0- L sin 0)

( l„sp 2 L( 2 Ie(c.l

( sin yl sin yt+is+ (di~c. —+bet—) (b;etsin0+Lcos0) (16)L(+l ', 2 ~

'n

addition to these three differential equations which lnust besolve<i si<nult<u<e<eusly, there are six differential equations oF m<etion pertaining to the six sheaves which nre free to rotate. For atypical sheave the dynamics nre given by

I(A re(P( -P(+l) -F( i l,...,n (17)

Pnel ~ Cz (20)

whereC ~ viscous dampingk ~ piston velocity

This can be rewritten such that

whereI; n massmomentofinertiar( ~ radius ofsheaveF( ~ bearing friction torque

Utilizingequations (6), the governing equation for each sheave canbe written as

r( F(4~(hP;-hP(<l)--- l ~ l,...,n (18)I( I(

The quantity hPn+l represents the change of load in the line be-tween the idle sheave (No. n) nnd the equalizing cylinder. Thesubsequent analysis considers two conditions of operation.of theequalizing cylinder. The first is that in which the cylinder is notfree to move. In this case hPn+l is sct equal to hPn which in es-sence is the same as dead. ending the wire rope at sheave No. nl

hPn+l hPn „ (19)

This should represent the most severe condition on the remaininglines since it removes a length of line that in reality absorbs a por-tion of the energy released at failure. The other condition of thecylinder is obtained when it is free to move and the motion is re-sisted by a force proportional to the piston velocity:

AEsin n„bI -——g -t sm y( j~

nl (rl lc(

With theso values of hi(, L, A, nnd E, the change in the line loadscan bo obtained from equation (9).

The governing differential equations of motion can then be ob-tained From equations (1)-(3) as

r

P " AFh n cosy;h M I.0 sin 0+ Lbz cos 0 -—P cos y( ——.

nl (rl m (r( L(

i+1I odd

AE sin 0 b; . 2+ s —cosy; j~ ., (14)

m ( (L( '/2 'i even

P n ..AEh n sin y('I.o cos04 I.e)zsin0- —Q siny( ——p-m( l m;l L(

i+1 i odd2

(15)i/2 i even

hPnc l ~ P(zl<erc —1.0) (21)

where Vc is the piston velocity as (( result of n load P. The actualload in the line is probably somewhere Iri between the values ob-tained from these two cases. Even in this later case, the piston isfrco to move only a limited distanco at which time the conttition

oi'quation(19) is obtained as the piston bottoms out.The three equations (14)-(16), representing the gross movement

of the trnveling block nnd fuel.cask, along with the six equations(18) of the sheaves de'scribe a system of nine degrees of freedom.These nine second-otder dlfferentinl equations must be solved si-mul(nncously. Ordinarily, this is no easy task. Howevnr, the systemof equations hns been programmed utilizing an IBM developedprogram designated ns System/360 Continuous System ModelingPl<<gram (CSMI'). 'I'his progrnm conveniently accomplishes the si.multaneo<is integration of the describing coupled differentialequations, and hence various geometrical chnnges can bo ma<leduring tho design of the hoist to investigate tho effect of such pa-rameters.

1

.I<st (<","(I of Engineering for Industry

Br)88.1 1 + c)T

Table 1 Response of rt fixed equsllxfnp cylinder syslem Table 2 Comps()son ol fixed and flee equsllxlllp cylinder sysfemsh

ee«h~ t>II(M

le« leo) il« lto> oe I t ~eee ~ (It) >et (515 IKZie Ie ~I (e ~ I (4ell

I.'Io 4»n I.l . It.l~ .Oe II.I Iay

).14 ).41 II.~ I.~

I«(Ill)eot Iv,tot I',ovt«4. Ie (l454) Iy,)04 ).,450

«I. helh (II~ ) I'I,tlt I).440

hill (545 ~ I,ooe >I.uo SW I.ll 4. ~ I.lc«v«tlto oteene >teen (t.ot'Ilglth x (cleu(I~ I

lw»«httei ~ lee

litt> (yl.ltee Cyl.

Nllh ee«h~t

tvI�

>M

litt> Cyl,

n«CII

Ie, )50 I>,000 I.OI 4.54 il.l 1>.yv

~ I,»xe

~ ). ~ 50

~ 5,4vXI I.II ).44 0.0 4,4

~I„'0 ).I4 ~ .II 4,0

Ilto (tel (lot Ilil ~ e ~ ~ 40

"t> 'll) >ve (llv fn4I (le) II~ ) (le(I

)>,404 I.O> O.II II.I I~ .I

Example ProblemsThe first example is a degenerate case tn cnmpare the results of

tile m(thod of analy»is with a known solution to a simple problem.Considering a simply supported beam (assumed to be a long slen-der rnd), the reaction at one en(l becomes one. fourth of the weightof the beam an instant after the other support fails«This problemcan be apprnximated in the analysis by setting. the distances to allthe sheaves equal, L equal to zero, and writing the mass moment ofinertia as that of a slender rod. The results of the proposed analy-sis yield a reaction of0.30 mg, which is in good agreement. The dif-ference is'attributed primarily to the freedom of the simulatedbeam to move horizontally as failure occurs while the simply sup-ported beam cannot.

The next example represents the geometry of the fuel handlingcrane designed by TVAfor use in its nuclear power plants. A typi-cal load of 75 tnns (68 metric tons) is comprised of a loaded fuelcask weighing 70 tons (63.5 metric tons) along. with the 5-ton (4.5metric ton) traveling block. The reeving arrangement is a twelve-pnrt line. During nor)nal operation the traveling block movesthrough a distance of approximately 100 ft (30.5 m). In the highhook position, the distance between the crown block and the trav-eling block (d in Fig. 2) is 56 in. (1.4 m). This distance in.the lowhook position is 1319 in. (33.6 m).

Results haec been obtained for a ftictionless system and a fixedequalizing cylinder. These are shown in Table 1 for several hookpositions of the hoist.

The condition of failure represented herc is a stationary failuy ~

i.c., the load is stationary and Eailure of a single component occurs,shifting the total lnad fo the six remaining lines. Since the kinetfcc»orgy associated with the hoisting operation is small in cumpari.son'o the energy released at failure, the stationary failure is a verygood approximation of the maximum loads to be expected. Thevalue of 12,500 lb (5676 kg)'s the nnminal twelve. part line loadprie 0 tn failure. Of course, n doubling of the line load would be ex.pcct(vi'as a result nf having half the original number of lines carry-ing the tntal load. The actual increase set)ns to be approaching thecnn(iitinns of n double ln)ul heing suddenly oppli0(l to a slender baifixed at one end. 11, is cl»at that the drop of the traveling block andca»k is nnt() lif)ear function of the line length (honk position).

A third example utilizing the same geometry as before incorpo-rates the free movemcnt at thc equalizing cylinder into the re-sponse due to a single cnmponent failure. Here a total weight of 70tons (63.5 metric tons) is stationary at the instant of failure. Theresults are shown in'Table 2 along with those for a fixed cylinder

CM«tel« («ttl««ltn ~ (0.0ne)(lo)I'1 '(4 ~ le)(l1)

v

conditio'n. Thc action of the c(fualizing cylinder (liminishes thevalue of the maximum load, as would be expected since it absorbsa portion of the released energy. Included in the drop of the block,for the free cylinder condition, is a distance nl'2.50 in. (6.4 cm) dueto the 15 in. (0.38m) free travel of the cylinder.'omparing the maximum line load for the lixed equalizing cyl ~

inder conditions in Tables 1 and 2 indicates that it is proportionalto the hoisted weight. The frequencies of coupled motions are alsoavailable from the results, of the analysis. Three predominatemodes are the vertical and the twn pendulns modes assnciated'withthe double pendulum compri))ed of the long lines and the travelingblock and the Euel cask. The two pendulu» mode are characterizedby a short period for tbe rotation oE the block, 0, and n long periodassociated with the y's sweeping through their range of values. Thevertical mode is closely approximated by the simple spring-masssystem of the six wire ropes and total mass combination.

Conctus)onaThe results of this effort indicate that a method of analysis util-

izing the basic Eundamental» of dynamics and the CSMP programhas been developed to permit the response of a fail.safe hoist de.sign to be predicted. Clearly the method of analysis can be use(1 lofacilitate the design of such a hoist as the effect of each parameteris investigated.

A subsequent paper will present the results of an experimentalprogram which correlates with'the results of analysis prcsentcdhere.

AcknowieilgmentThis work was'completed under Contract No. TV-41303A be-

tween Tennessee Valley Authority and the University of Tenne»-see, Knoxville.

Iteferences1 Pdmcl)d«en, A.J., Melee(0, R. A.~ "Ansfyof~ >Iud MwlclTesting nf a lhe ~

(fondant Reeving Syx(0m for f(OOC(or Fuel Hen(fling Cranes," lb port hfAR.6628 1 ~ Depsytmont uf hfechaniesl e))d Ae(ohpace El)gineeying, The Univey.sity ofTennessee. Knoxville,Tenn., Aug. 1976.

2 Sam(as, R. K., Skop, R. A., and.hfilbu(n, D. A.~"An Analysis of Cou.

pled Extensional-Torsional O)elffa(fons in 1Vi(e ftope,«JOURNAL OP EN-GINFER1NG FOR lNDUSTRY.TRANS. AShfE, Series 8, Vof. 96, No. 4,Nov. 1974, pp.'130-1136.

f'if»(Odin (l. S. A.

v

'Transactions of the ASME

u.

, $3.00'PER COPY$1.50 TO ASME MEMBERS

I I r Iv

y

The Society shall nol be responsible tor statements or opinion," advanced In papers or In discussion at meetings ol thu Society or ol iu,

Divisions or Sections, or printed in its publications. Discussionis prints «onlyillhe paper is published in on ASMEjournal or Proceedings.Released tor general publication upon presentation.Full credit should be given to ASME. the Technical Division,.and th~

author(s).

Dynamic Testing of a RedundantReeving. Hoist

A. J. EDMONDSON

Associate Professor,Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering,The University of Tennessee,Knoxville, Tenn.Mem. ASME

R. A. MOORE

Design EngIneer,Vlnylex Corporation,Knoxville, Tenn.

Controlled failures in a redundant reeved hoist are caused in one ol two independent wireropes symmetrically threaded through the crown and lower blocks. The forces in tlu ~

remaining lines are recorded by transducers integral to the lines. The line loads and motionsubsequent to the failure are compared with those predicted by theoretical analysis. Failutr.is caused during a variety of operating modes.

Contributed by the Design Engineering Division of The American Society of Mechanical Engineers forpresentation at the IViuter Annual Meeting, New York, N; Y., December 5, 1976. Manuscript received utASME Headquarters July 6, 1976.

Copies wiltbe available until September 1, 1977.

I.".i"MICAH SOCIETY OF MECHANICALENGINEERS, UNITED ENGINFERING CENTER, 345 EAST 47th STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 1GOIT

i

0

1

I

GQAB97llc TesCIAg Gf 8 RBdUAdGAiA88vilAQ HGlsi

A. J. EDMONDSON R. A. MOORE

INTRODUCTION

The .handling of radioact1ve materials alwaysnecessitates special safety measures,,especiallywhen large quantities of such materials are in-volved. The information presented here is theresult of the study of a redundant reeving system1n use as the main hoisting mechanism" of Tennes-see Valley Author1ty~s reactor building cranes p,although the results are easily modif1ed for vari-ations of the bas1c design. The redundant system1s intended to provide fail-safe protection ofthe hoisting system which, at times, handleslargo casks of reactor fuel elements. The ratedcapacity of the hoisting system is l25 tons(1.112 MN). The fa11-safe mechan1sm of thiscrane is being studied, considering no actualtesting of the prototype has been undertaken and,'s yet, the primary ho1sting mechanism has notfailed, leaving the alternative mechan1sm freefrom actual duty.

Thc safety 'feature of this crane mechanism1s the usage of double noncrossed reeving througha fixed crown assembly and a travel1ng lowersheave assembly. The system, shown in Pig. l,can be v1sualized as two individual rope andblock assemblies which have been rigidly com-bined, side by side, such that each rope systemcarries one-half of. the load being hoisted innormal operations. The reeving system is com-posed of twelve wire rope lines, six of which w111lose load carryin'g capacity in the event of fail-ure (b'reakage) of any one line. In the event ofsuch a rope failure in th1s particular system,

hi rc will be a sudden motion of the lower sheaveassembly and the connected fuel cask. The inten-tions nf the redundant system design are the ca-pac1ty to tran:mit the dynamic loads developed,and the ab111 y to continue hoisting operations

Edmondson, A ~ J,, and Moore, R, A,,'ua ysis and Model Testing of a Redundant Reev1ng

:t.':m for Reactor Pucl 'Handling Cranes," Report:-6628-1,"Department, of Mechanical and Aexo-

,, " ':. Enginecring, Thc Universigy of Tennessee,~13.1e, Tenn., Aug..1975. ~ . ~,

with six working lines.The study undertaken was comprised of two

parts. The first part consisting of the theoret-1cal analysis was reported earlier. This paperrelates to the experimental program, its resultsand comps'risons with the theoretical predictionsof the earlier reported work. The effort waSdirected toward determining the line loads andmotions of the moving mass. The system is illus-trated in the failed condition in Pig. 2. It

Jshould be noted Chat parameters of the motion,h, s, and 0, are referenced at the intersectionof the traveling block sheave axis and the verti-cal center-line of the symmetrical reeving sys-tem. Also, the fuel cask is attached to the trav-eling block through a yoke that does not permitmovement of the cask relative to the travelingblock 1n the H-V plane„

EXPERIMENTAI PROGRAM

The experimental program for testing thehoisting system by controlled single componentfailure began by us1ng the prototype design. Theprototype crane has two individual wire rope sys-tems composing a l2-line hoisting block. Theho1st drum takes up the 11ne from each half ofthe system when operating. .At thc dead end ofeach wire rope, a double acting, hydraulic equal-1zing cylinder provides for equal line loads inboth sides of'he system under normal operatingconditions. The prototype wire ropes are l 1/4in. (3.17 cm) dia, 6 x 37, extra improved plowsteel, IWRC. The sheaves of the crown and trav-eling blocks are forged steel and have pitch d1-amctcrs of 30 lpga in. (0.76 m) and 30 l/8 in.(0.86 m) ~ The maximum travel distance of thelower block is 130 ft (39.62 m).

Edmondson, A. J., "Pailure Analysis ofa Redundant Reeving Hoist," ASME Paper No. 76-DE-2l, April 1976, (To.be published in Transactionof the ASME, Journal of Engineering f'r Industry) .

I

L'l

Sheet Y7&'I

0 RQI)lP)YSkN

Nltl llOlSTDRUi1

liolST lWG

C5(SIIIG~CRORi'l BLOCK

TCNIt:PPG

Pl P3 5 L

Fakes"S

C: TRAV 1 lGBk)

Fig. 1 Twelve line redundant reeving system

Y

Fig. 2 Typical position of'raveling block andcask

Vslng the foregoing inf'ormation and consid-ering thc availability of components portinent toth» systnn, a scale factor of one-fifth was so-lectcd for the model design. Exact scaling couldnot always be achieved without excessive costsfor- exactly scaled components, yet little devia-tion was actually 1nvolved. The resulting modelis illustrated in Fig. 3. The block assemblieswerc functionally and dimens1onally similar tothe p ototypc design. The ma/or dev1at1on franthc prototype design was the omission of bronzebushings. in the model sheaves. More friction waschercfozc inherent, on a percentage basis to themodel asscmbllcs. Pire rope of the model system:as a'pga in. (0.63 cm) dia, 6 x 3'f, improved

ow steel, 1WHC compos1tion, which is the same..-.Cructlon as the prototype. This resulted 1n

~ '. cozrclation of the flexibilitybetween theand prototypi:.'"ho location of the hoitt was such that a

".ai travel di"tance of 18 ft (5.48 m) was,'ale.. Thc des1red scale distance would bc''(.92 m). The high hook position of the":pe is such that d'tance between the cen-

'I

tezlincs of thc crown and traveling blocks is 56in. (1.42 m). This position during the testswas modeled at 23.5 in. (0.59 rp) which would cor-respond to 117 .5 in. (2.98 m) on the prototype.The distance between block centerlines for thelow hook'osition of the prototype 1s 1319 in.(33.5 m). The model was tested in a low'ook po-sition of 206 in. (5.23 m) which would correspondto a prototype distance of 1030 in. ( 26.16 m).Thus, the actual testing was conducted at posi-.tions within the prototype high and low hook,positions.

An Xngersoll-Hand tiodel C aiz powered ho'1st, was modified to accommodate two 11ncs componentof the system. The unmodified hoist was rated ata capacity of 2000 lb (8896 N) for a double linereev1ng arrangement, resulting in nominal lineloads of 1000 lb (4448 N). Since,the model tostswere conducted with nom1nal 11nc loads of ap-proximately 100 lb (444.8 N), thc braking mecha-nism of the hoist was deemed adequate to producean abrupt halt to the hoist1ng opezation whentest conditions nec'essitated it.

l,ONER BlOCKASS MLY

6-9/16 Itt. (16.7 CIO

, RIGIDLltlK

. 6-1/16 ll . (15.4 Ql)

IIAR'IESS-

Q-V2 It ~ (29.2 CH)

lingr le

Fig. 4 Transient line loads

36 Itt. (91.4 00

FUEL CASK

t Fig. 3 Lower block.with harness, safety links,and fuel cask

cession, the remaining strands fail. The mostsevere case would be expected in the event of acomplete instantaneous failure of all strandssimultaneously. This type failure would resultln a more suddenly applied load to the remainingsix lines of the reeving syst'em and, hence, great-er dynamic loads. A quick disconnect hydrauliccoupling provided the mechanism by which instan-taneous line separations were achieved. Thecoupling was easily integrated into the failureside of thc reeving system by using speltersockets. The coupling vas placed in the reevingsystem ln the line to the. hoist drum opposite aload cell ln the redundant hoist line.

'he scaled load cylinder, or model fuelcask, was fabricated from a 13-in., ( 0.33-m) innerdiameter steel pipe, 36 in. (0.91 rn) long. Theends of the pipe were capped with 3/8 ln. (0.95cm) steel plate, and a harness vas welded-to thepipe. The harness was a rigid steel channel as-sembly. The tvo rigid bar connect'ing the travel-ing block and the fuel cask harness on each siderestrain the fuel cask from any motion relativeto the lower block in the plane containing theaxis of .the sheaves .and the vertical axis of thefuel cask.. The rigid links are redundant safety

'I

corrrrections as a protection in the event of ahook fa/lure. Por the model testing, the niodelfuel ca..k vas loaded'with lead and steel.„ Loadsused for testing vere 1000 lb (4448 N) and 1361lb (6054 !I).

: Por controlled failure tooting, a singlecomponent failure raust occur at'command; The de-

'I;ormination of maximum linc loads vao 'thy prime~ blcctlvc of. the testing. Pailure of a:strandedaire rope lo usually a gradual breakage. One

~ r:rwrd o('ireo vill onap, and then in rapid suc-

Xnstrumentation~ Of primary concern was a technique to meas-

ure the dynamic loads in the wire ropes after afailure of one-half of the redundant system.Load cells made of 2014-T6 aluminum vere developedsuch that a cell could bc inserted. into variouspositions along the wire rope length. The hollowaluminum tube was instrumented with four foilstrain gages in a full Wheatotone Bridge, to pro-vide temperature compensation and sensitivity toaxial loads only. Spelter sockets were developedto accommodate the broomed out cnd of the 1/4-1n.wire rope so that the load cell', as well as thedisconnect coupling, could be inscrtod into theline. The broomed-out end of the wire rope washeld in the spelter socket with a 90/10 zinc/tincompound poured at approximately 300 F.

Considering the six remaining lines and theoscillation following a single component failure,the n!aximum load at any instant would be eitherln the hoisting line, at the inside of the reevingsystem, or ln tho opposite end of the rope, theequalizing cylinder line at the outside of the

I

0

ll

Ic

r

Table 1 Experimental Line .Loads in Pounds LovHook Position; t(eight ~ 1000 Pounds

Table 2 Experimental Line Loads 1n Pounds HighHook Pos1tion; Height 1000 Pounds

Iojotrnd

Ctvc'llrln4 Crrrndcr

II

ltvclltlod Cylinderpo rane rona

6intr, rect. Salt. rccx. Iolotral

Ktvoltcrat Crrrnrorroacttoncl

Staarittol Crrrndcrnot rvacttonol

$6 24lait rect, lait rtcx, lolt. Kc~, lait rtox

nova Stop

lt~ tla

Vp Coot

$54040

7540

I'1SO74IS$0

10095

2512512I419$264

241150

$$ 210$0 21$IS 21040 20$4$ 20$

75 1$070 1$ 5

170 70 11017570 11S'210 95 .2$ 5

ll1 95110121 10S 211

70 210 9570 20$ 9570 700 95

25025$260

IS 750 $0$ 5 25$ .407$ 20$ 60

170Srs11$

90" 260 75

$ 5 261 7$90 26545

21011020$

75 215 100 . 250IS 212 90 2657S 140 100 "240 Stalin ~ 5

Cp Coot 105

Stop 110

Oovn Cont 75IO

Oova Stop 7$40

1$$1$5

21$701

210

22$

250

100 21510S 212

$0 190 100 110

100 200 4010$ 214

105 10$ 2$$

90 '19$ IS907$IS

211100 10l225100 10$12c 95 20022$ .95 '00

75 195 110105

22570 20070 200

75195 105 225 40

Vp Stop 100'00 26526$

7$ 1107$ 210

9$ 2SI 7095 252 71

100 261 70

212272212

Coarororoa Sottoror rr v (6 ~ 464) (Sji)

Coavoroloa lactorot rt o (6 664) (2'bv)

reeving system. Zn view of this ~ only two loadcells were deemed necessary for the entire systemto determine the max1mum dynamic loads in ten-sion.

Thc tvo load transducers vere cal1bratedand showed sensitivities of 9.15 and 9.24 micro-inch/in. pcr 10 lb (44.48 N) axial load, respec«tively. Hach transducer was connected to a Honey-well 'Accudata 238 Bridge Amplif1err such that thebridge output could, be recorded on a Model 2106oscillograph equ1pped vith M1650 fluid dampedg.".lvanometers.

~ The test1ng of the system was by controlled.,tlure. por an accurate record, an indicationo." the time of rope failure vas recorded on theoscillograph record. The timing mark vas madefrom a third galvanometer trace, which respondedto a s1nglc from a dry cell battery in serieswith a switch fixed to the quick disconnect mecha-nism, Switching was also developed to sense when,the. equalizing cylinder bottomed out at the endof its free movement. The Model 2106 oscillographprodides an accurate internal timing system torecord reference timel1nes across the paper widthat predet;ermined invervals. Prior to testing,the timing circuits were calibrated using appro-~ iat: t:imcrcountcrs. Timing intervals of 1/lO:ec werc used.

~r'roceduI't7«v:xp rim:ntai testing of t;he model sys-." Si "prcific fuel cask load and elevation.!v.".aken for fi;e d1ffercnt hoist1ng condi-

~ c'. c"lch (if two modes of operat1on of thc

equalizing cylinder. The cylinder was controlledto either float freely or rema1n stationary. Thehoist1ng conditions were:

1 Upward travel init1ally with continuedtravel during and after rope failure

2 Upward travel 1nitially and immediatestop at the instant of rope failureNo vcx'tical travel

4 Downward travel initiallywith continuedtravel during and after rope failure

5 Downward travel 1nitially and immediatestop at the 1nstant'f rope failure.

The 1mmediate stop of vertical travel was an op-erator response and, 1n general, occurred within1 sec after the rope failure. Ho1sting velocitieswere measured, by stopwatch and meterst1ck as 0.951n./sec (?.4 cm/sec) traveling dovn, and 0.831n./scc (2.1 cm/sec) travel1ng up.

RESULTS AND COMPARISONS

The dynam1c 11ne loads of the model systemwere recorded by the oscillography for each fail-ure condit;ion. The hoist line, Pl, and the equal-izing cylinder line load, P6, were monitored. Atypical record is shovn in Pig. 4. The initialand average maximum loads indicated by the oscil-lograph traces have been tabulated in Tables 1and 2. The variat1on from the average 1s normal-ly less than 10 percent. The presence of fric-tion in thc model is not;iccable, as well as thetight and loose side characteristics of frict,ionalpower transmission. Upon hoisting up, the ho1stlinc lcprescnts the tight.'ide where the equal-izing cylirtder linc 1s t'ight upon hoisting dovn.

Sheet 20 o4')

Table 5 Axial Linc Loads —Comparison withTheoretical Values Weight <o 1000 pounds

Lov Rooc 705rtloh

Table rr Axial Line Loads —Fixed and Free Equal-izing Cyl1ndcr

lOV RIOR tOSITlON

Rolstlna ln ac tea x

»»i»»toll, a<ax Max. Rol ~ tlol

Rtosllalst Cyrtrnrcctoncttsnst

Ilnlt a<ax» mat ~ rr»a

Stoslrarnc Cytlncstr<ot conc tonali

lace. rc»x. loca. rc»x

70 2OI 95 rla IS 245 74$ Oo»<o Cont» ~ 41 1IS ~ 74 270 70 205 94 254

Stationary

Op Coat

Ct Scop

7S 11597 154 45244 Sll

41, 270 I$ 115 4$ 1l5 2lS

91 241 71 204 41 2452\597 2$ 7 71 215 CS lty 747

271 44 212 41 1$ 0

2ll 7$ 15$ 91, 241

Stationary 41 4$ 225

71 20ilCoat 94 .

Op SCop 100 245 75 210 97 157 7l ill

Oo»<a SCop 74 215 100 211 7$ 1iS 97 2$4

lCR RIOR tOSlclOR

Conc, 50 190 100 250 I$ 754 14l

IO 1OS 10$ 2$$ IS $04 $04

ll 11595 20l 5$ 254 244

Cont 10$ 21$ IO 14$ l$ 144 254

104 224 71200 5$ » $04 $0l

Stop

r ~ tronsay

p 5aop

Ssr»arras tal Tncoratccalt lo) tl lal tl rl

Rolotlnl lace ~ less. ~ at test» laic» "ox» i<ax

Coat ~

Scop

cstlonsrt

p Cont ~

Scop

'RICO 'ROOX tOS TTOR

Rtoarrarot Cyllalstto<»c cons

f»toaltarna Cyl ra»rocNoc t»»nctlona

lotC. l'ox. lott. tt»x

40 190 100 2$ 0

IO '05 10$ 25$

~ 4 225 ll 201

74 1I5 107 214

7I 114 105209IS 270

10$ 21S

110 250

90 195

75 1'75105 21S 40 14$

7$ 195 104 274 75200

conxacoron lactacac rc (4 '44) (SI»)Conxocolon raccocaa N o (4»44 ~ ) (1 ~ »)

t should be noted that the failure from a sta- . greater percentage of the energy released attionaly.pos1tion represents a very good approxi- 'ailure, thus requir1ng the lines to absorb lessmation of response, during moving failures, since energy in the high hook posit1on.the kinct1c energy of the moving mass, prior to'fthe five failure cond1tions 1llustrated,failure, is small in compar1son to the energy re- the down continuous, stationary, and thc up con-

lrascd during failure of a single, wire rope. tinuous are all theoretically cqulvalent. The

For a comparison with the theoretical val- two stopped condit1ons xepresent a slightly high-ucs, the average of the maximum loads in each ex energy level and, hence, greater line loads.l1ne for a spec1flc fa1lure mode, cqualls1ng cyl- Since the k1net1c energy of the moving wc1ght, isirldcr fixed, has been tabulated along with the small in comparison with thc energy released upon ~

theoretical values in Table 3. Th1s was the'most failure, it is hardly noticeable 1n the cxperi-sevcre failure cond1tion and the maximum line mental line loads.loads that werc obseryed in all of the tests. 'able r) illustrates the comparison between

Thc difference between the theoretical values of the two conditions of fixed and free equal1zing

pl and P6 is very slight, and is a result of the cylinder conditions. It would be expected that:assumptions of a frictionless system in the analy»» the line loads 1n t;he free cylinder conditionsix, as well as sheaves w1th small moments of in»» would be less than those for a fixed cylinder«7 tea. An averag< of the experimental values of condition. ,This is because the equalizing cyl1n-, l land P6'ives a value less than the predicted der 1s an energy absorber. From the comparisons ~

value, and is 1n very good agreement with the this 1s 'generally borne out. However, even thoughpra;dict;cd values of the low hook pos1tion.. In thc loads are generally lower, they are not s1g-che rase of thc high hook position> the predicted niflcantly so..The free cylinder traveled ap-;a.'..1.S aro Signifceantly higher tlSan thOSe aCtu- prOXimately ) 1/8 in. (7.9) Cm) befOre it bOttOmed

a.t.ty <! ".'crmincd in the tests. It appears that out.r

~

~

~

rr,ion is .= more significant. factor 1n 'the high When tests were conduct;cd at a total weight. ~, Fn itton t;han irl thc low'hook position. For of 1361 lb (605rr ll), the results indicated that

>.utt:rant va)uc of friction, it rcprcscnts a the linc loads arc a linear function of tlat t,'otal

Shmt Zl o+ (-I

weight. The average value of 'Pl and P6 for thefixed cylinder, stationary failure mode was 512lb (1588 N), compared wi,th the value of 228 lb(1014 N) for thc 1000 lb (4448 N) weight.

Prom the information plesented in Tables 3and 4, it can be concluded that thc line loadscon be predicted; duc to a single 'component fail-ure, by the previously reported method of analy-sis, and that. the action of the equalizing cylin-der does not significantly affect the maximumlin(t loads developed.

Xn addition to the line loads, the periodsof several oscillations of the system were identi-fied from the oscillograph records. These modesof vibration are the vertical and the double-pendulum. The Vertical mode is associated withthe stif'fness of the wire ropes and the suspended)nasa. The period of this. motion for the low hookposition is 0.151 sec ~ The theoretical analysispredicts a value of 0.107 sec. The double pendu-lus motion is-a result of the suspended cask atthe cnd of a long line. The period of the lowerpendulum is 0.689 sec, compared with a value of0.597 sec from the theoretical analysis predictsa value of 4.64 sec.

One mode of vibration which was observedto occur that was not predicted by the theoreti-cal analysis was a rotation of the cask aboutthe vortical axis. This mode is that of a hexa-filar pendulum that is .activated when the load isno longer symmetrically sttpported by twelve lines.

CONCLUSIONS

Nookroattton

Table 5

Ltna Load Ltoa Load naxI

h a dtn tn da )

too (t)ld tn) Sl 000 5) ~ 000 '~ 06 6 dl lS 1 14.5

aad. Sou (1010) 5)al00 Sraloo 1.5) 6.04 15.5 1).l~ ad ~ htth (lid) 1 ~ ,600 Sd ~ 600 5.16 1,60 11 d t,dtch (Sd) 45,%00 45.d00 ' Stadt 1 %1 0 d 1

Convaraton tacrorat narara (0.0154)(tn)t N (4 440)(lh)

ACKNONLEDOHENT

This work was completed under Contract No.TV-41503A between Tennessee Valley Autholity andthe University- of Tennessee, Yuoxville.

dicate that the theoretical analysis is valid inpredicting the maximum line loads in the eventof a single component failure'. The program hasbeen used to predict the loads in the prototypedesign for a variety of conditions The mostsignificant are present here.

Using a weight of 10,000 lb (44.48 kN) forthe traveling block, and a weight of 140,000 lb(622.7 kN) for the caska the maximum line loads,the average line load and the motion of the sys-tem, for a fixed equalizing cylinder, are givenin Table 5. The nominal 12 line load is 12,500lb (55a6 kN).

The results presented in the foregoing in-

ATTACHMENT 2

Heavy Load/impact Area Matrix

T.IPTING DEVICE: 125 TON 0 CRANE SHEET 1 OP 28

LOCATION REACTOR BUILDING

IMPACT AREA REFUELING FLOOR

LOADS.COL R. 8 R4, Rll, „AND R18

ELEVATIONSAPETX RELATED HAZARD'LIM.

~ EQUXPHCNT ATEGORY (NOTE 1 ELEVATION'APETY RELATED

EQUIPMENT

HAZARD ELIM.CATEGORY (NOTE 1)

REACTOR MELLSHIELD. BLOCKS(99. 5 'TONS)

.664.0 DRYICELL HEAD

DRYMELL HEAD

(65 TONS)635.0'EACTOR

'RESSUREVESSEL HEAD

LOCATION

- LIFTING.DEVICE'25 TON EAD CRANE SHEET 2 OF 28


LOADS

COL R 8 R4, Rll, AND R18

ELEVATIONSAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT ATEGORY (NOTE1 ELEVATIONSAFETY RELATED

EQUIPMENTHAZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY (NOTE1)

REACTOR PRESSUREV.ESSEL HEAD(105 TONS)

664.O' STEAM DRYER. ASSEMBLY

664.0'EACTORVESSELINTERNALS

STEAM DRYER~ASSEMBLY

(45 TONS)

664.0'EACTORVESSELINTERNALS

LOCATION

LIFTING DEVICE'25 TON 0 AD CRANE

REACTOR BUILDING

SHEET 3 OF 28

LOADS


COL R 8 R10, R5, HAND. R17

ELEVATIONSAFETY RELATED

EQUIPMENT

HAZARD HLIM.ATEGORY(NOTEl ELEVATION

SAFETY. RELATEDEQUIPMENT

HAZARD ELIM.CATEGORY(NOTEl)

REFUELING SLOTSHIELD PLUGS(5-1/2 TONS)

664.0' REACTOR'.:'VESSEL

INTERNALS

664.0'PENT FUELIN POOL

REFUELING CANALSHIELD(12 TONS)

664.0'. REACTORVESSELINTERNALS. ~


0LOCATION

.LXFTXNG DEVICE: 125 TO HEAD CRANE

REACTOR BUILDING

SHEET 4 OF 28

LOADS


COL R (t R4, Rll, AND R18

MOISTURE SEPARATERASSEMBLY (70 TONS)

ELEVATION664.0'AFETYRELATED .

EQUIPMENT

REACTORVESSELINTERNALS

HAZARD ELIM.ATEGORY(NOTEl ELEVATION

SAFETY RELATEDEQUIPMENT


REACTOR PRESSUREVESSEL HEADINSULATION PACKAGE

(4

TONS)'64.0'EACTORVESSELINTERNALS

D

ll y,

~ ~

i

1

I

LIFTXNG DEVICE: 125 TON EAD CRANE SHEET 5 OF 28

LOCATION REACTOR 3UILDXNG

IMPACT AREA REFUELING FLOORR 8 R4, Rll, AND R18

LOADS


.EQUIPMENTHAZARD ELIM.ATEGORY (NOTE1 ELEVATION

SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.EQUIPMENT CATEGORY(NOTE1)

STUD TENSIONERCAROUSEL

664.0'PV HEAD

SPENT FUELIN POOL

RPV SERVICEPLATFORM ANDSUPPORT

(7 TONS)

664.0 I REACTOR

VESSELXNTERNALS

D

1

j

4

4

LOCATION

LIFTING DEVICE: 125-TON EAD CRANE

REACTOR BUILDING

SHEET 6 OF 28

IMPACT AREA REFUELING FLOORR 8 R9, R6, AND R16

LOADS


EQUIPMENT

HAZARD ELIM.ATEGORY (NOTE 1 ELEVATION


HAZARD ELIM.CATEGORY(NOTE1)

SPENT FUELCASK

(67 TONS)


D'ORTABLE

JIBCRANE


LIFTXNG DEVICE: 125 TON .0 AD CRANE SHEET 7 OF 28

LOCATION REACTOR BUILDING

IMPACT AREA REFUELING FLOORcol R 8 R4; Rll, AND R18

REFUELING FLOORCOL R 8 R4, Rll AND R18

LOADS

SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.ELEVATION - .EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTEl ELEVATION



NEN FUELASSEMBLY.(1000 LBS)

664.0'EACTOR. VESSEL'NTERNALS

FUEL POOL GATES(2 TONS)


'I ~

g

0LOCATION

LIFTING DEVICE 125 TON P

REACTOR BUILDING

SHEET 8 OF 28

IMPACT AREA 'REFUELING FLOOR

COL R 8 R6, R9$ R16

LOADS

NEW FUELSTORAGE VAULTCOVER

(8500 LBS.)

ELEVATION

=

664.0'AFETYRELATED

EQUIPMENT

SPENT FUELIN POOL

HAZARD ELIM."ATEGORY (NOTE 1 ELEVATION


HAZARD ELIM.CATEGORY (NOTE1)

II,

~ s

0

LIFTING DE>ICE: TWO-OPE SELF PROPELLED TRUCKCRANE SHEET 9 OF

LOCATION4

LMPACT AREA DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING

ROOF (UNITS 1 6 2)

DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING

ROOF (UNIT 3)

LOADS


EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTE1 ELEVATION

SAFETY RELATED

EQUIPMENT


REACTOR BUILDINGEXHAUST FANMOTORS

(1700 LBS)

595;0'95.0'95.0'G

AIRINTAKE

. DG AIREXHAUST

DG AIRINTAKEFILTER

B

(SEE NOTE 2)

B

(SEE NOTE 2)

B

(SEE NOTE 2)

595.0'95

0

595.0'G

AIRINTAKE

DG AIREXHAUST

DG AIRINTAKEFILTER

B

"(SEE NOTE 2).

.B

(SEE NOTE 2)

(SEE NOTE 2)

r,

I "I

LOCATION

LIFTING DEVICE: TWO OPE — SELF PROPELLED TRUCK CRANE

I '

YARD

SHEET 10 8

IMPACT AREA DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDINGROOF (UNIT 3)

LOADS


EQUIPMENT

HAZARD ELIM.ATEGORY (NOTE1 ELEVATION

SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.EQUIPMENT CATEGORY(NOTE1)

REACTOR BUILDINGEXHAUST FAN>jOTORS

(1700 LBS) .

595.0DG A/CCHILLED WATER

PANEL NO.25-284B

DG A/C595.0''HILLED WATER

::PANEL'O.25.-2844 (SEE NOTE 3)

B

(SEE NOTE 3)

595 Os

DG A/CCHILLED WATER

PANEL NO.25-284C (SEE NOTE 3)

REACTOR BUILDINGEXHAUST FANMOTORS,

(1700 LBS)

595.0'G A/CCHILLED WATER

PANEL NO.250284 D (SEE NOTE 3)

.LOCATION

. LIFTING DEVICE: TWO OPE SELP PROPELLED TRUCK CRANE

YARD,

lSHEET ll 8

IMPACT AREA .. INTAKE PUMPINGSTATION

LOADS

CONDENSER CIRCULATINGWATER PUMPS, (CCW)(40,700 LBS)

ELEVATION565.0'APETYRELATED

. EQUIPMENT

RHRSW

PUMPS

HAZARD ELIM.ATEGORY (NOTE 1

B

(SEE NOTE 4)

ELEVATIONSAPETY RELATED

EQUIPMFNTHAZARD ELIH.

CATEGORY(NOTEl)

CCW PUMP

MOTORS

(48,700 LBS)

565.0'HRSWPUMPS

B

SEE NOTE 4)

LIFTING DFVICE: TWO-OPE SELF PROPELLED

TRUCK C

SHEET l2 0

LOCATION

IMPACT AREA INTAKE PUMPING STATIONDECK

LOADS


EQUIPMENT

HAZARD ELIM.ATEGORY (NOTE 1 ELEVATION

SAFETY RELATED

EQUIPMENT

HAZARD ELIMCATEGORY(NOTEl)

FIRE PUMPS

(2530 LBS)565.0 ~ RHRSW

„' ~ PUMPS

B

(SEE NOTE 4)

RHRSW PUMP

(3400 LBS)565 0 RHRSW

PUMPS

C

(SEE NOTE 5)

LIFTING DEVICE' TON HO E CHAIN IIOIST SHEET 13 OF

LOCATION REACTOR BUILDING - UNIT 1:

IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS) ROOM

COL N 8 R2

CORE SPRAY (CS) ROOM

COL N 8 R2

LOADS


.EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTE1 ELEVATIONSAFETY RELATED

EQUIPMENT

HAZARD ELIM.CATEGORY (NOTE1)

CORE SPRAY

PUMP.. MOTOR

(5200 LBS) 519.0'19:0

'19.0

'.S.PUMP.

lA POMER- SUPPLY'CABLE

C.S. PUMP'A CONTROLCABLES

C.S. PUMP ',» 1C POMER

SUPPLY CABLE

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

B

(SEE NOTE 6).

519.0'19.0'19.0'4"

C.S., PIPINGTO REACTOR

VESSEL

C. S. PUMP

1A PIPING

'C.S. PUMP

1C PIPING

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

B

(SEE NOTE- 6)

P

CORE SPRAYPUMP MOTOR

(5200 .LBS)

519 ..0 C.S. PUMP

1C CONTROL

CABLES,(SEE NOTE 6)

-519.0

519.0

FCV 75-11ELECTRICALCABLa''S

FCV . 75-12ELECTRICALCABLES

(SEE NOTE 6 )

(SEE NOTE 6)

0LOCATION

LIFTING DEVICE: .'4 TON HOO " CIIAIN IlOIST

REACTOR BUILDING — UNIT 1

SHEET 14 OF 2S

LOADS


COL N (I R2

Pt"


ECOL N 8 R2

CRD .PUMP MOTORS

(2500 LBS)

ELEVATION

519.0'. S. PUMP

;, 1A POWER.;SUPPLY'ABLE

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.EQUIPMENT . ATEGORY (NOTE1 ELEVATION

519 0

SAFETY RELATED

EQUIPMENT

14" C.S ~ PIPINGTO REACTORVESSEL


(SEE NOTE 6)

519:0'19.0

'.S. P.lJMP

'1A CONTROL

CABi;ES

C.S. PUMP

1C POWER

SUPPLY CABLE

(SEE NOTE 6)

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0

519 0

C. S. PUMP

1A PIPING

C.S. PUMP

1C PIPING

(SEE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6)

CRD PUMP MOTORS

(2500 LBS)

519.0 C.S. PUMP

1C CONTROL

CABLES(SEE NOTE 6)

519. 0

519.0

.FCV 75-11ELECTRICALCABLE.'S

FOV 75-12ELECTRICALCABLES

(SEE NOTE 6 )

(SE~ NOTE 6)

I tI

0

1

LIrTING DEVICE: 4 TON uo E CHAIN llOIST SHEET 15 OF 28

LOCATION REACTOR BUILDING — UNIT 1


COL N 8 R2


COL N 9 R2

LOADS


ZgUIPMl:NTHAZARD ELIM.ATEGORY(NOTEl ELEVATION

SAI'ETY RELATED 'HAZARD ELIM.EQUIPMENT CATEGORY(NOTE1)

HATCH SHIELDBLOCKS(1500 LBS)

519.0'19;0

'.S. PUMP

:. 1A POWER,SUPPLY

-"CABLE

C.S. PUMP

.1A CONTROL

CABLES

(SEE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6)

14" C.S.1'IPING'19.0'O REACTOR

VESSEL

C.S. PUMP

519.0' lA. PIPING

(SEE NOTE 6)'

(SEE NOTE 6)

519,0 0

C.S. PUMP

1C POWER

SUPPLY CABLE.(SEE NOTE 6)

519. 0 I

C.S. PUMP

1C PIPING

(SEE NOTE 6)

HATCH SHIELDBLOCKS

'(1500 LBS)

519.0 C.S. PlJMP

1C CONTROL

CABLES(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0 1CV /5-11ELECTRICAL

CABLES(SEE NOTE 6)

519.G FCV,75-12ELECTRICALCABLES

(SEE NOTE 6)

0LOCATION

LIPTXNG DEVICE: 4 TON 1100K 'HAXN IIOIST

RLACTOR BUILDING — UNIT 1

SHEET 16 OP 28

' ~

XMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS) ROOM

COL N 9 R2


'COL N 8 R2

LOADS

ELEVATIONSAFETY RELATED IQ,ZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT ATEGORY (NOTE 1 - ELEVATIONSAFETY RELATED

EQUXPMENT


~ CRD PUIfP MOTORS

(2500 LBS)

519.0'19;0'.

C. S. PUMP

-'$A POWERPURPLYCABLE

C.S. PUMP

1A CONTROLCABi.ES

(Sr.E NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0

'19.O'4"

C.S. PIPINGTO REACTORvrssrL

C.S. PUMP

1A PIPING

(SEE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0';S. PUMP

1C POMER

:.SUPPLY CABLE(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0'.S.PUMP

1C PXPXNG

(SEE. NOTE 6)

CRD PUMP MOTORS

(2500 LBS)

519.0 C.S. PUMP

iC CONTROL

CABLES {SiE NOTE 6)

519. 0

519.0

ECV 75-11~ ELECTRICALCABLES

PCV. 75-12ELECTRICALCAIILES

{SEE NOTE 6)

:0LOCATION

LI1'TING DavIca' Tov 1100 E cHAIN HoIsT.

REACTOR BUILDING — UNXT 2

SHEET 17 OF 28~ ~


COL N 8 R14


COL N (l R2

LOADS

CRD PUMP

MOTOR

(2500 LBS)

ELEVATION

519.0'19:0'19.0'APETX

RELATEDEQUXPMENT

C. S.PUMP'.A

POMER:"SUPPLY

CABLE

C.S. PUMP

2C CONTROLCABLES

T „

C.S. PUMP

2A 'POWER

SUPPLY CABLE

HAZARD ELIM.ATEGORY(NOTE1

(saa NoTE 6)

'saa

N0TE 6)

B

(saa N0TE 6)

ELEVATXON

519 0

519.0'19.0'AFETY

RELATEDrl}UIPMENT

14" C.S. PIPINGTO REACTORVESSEL

C: S. PlJMP

1A PIPXNG

C.S.'UMP1C PIPXNG

11AZARD ELIM.CATEGORY(NOTal)

(SEE VOTE 6)

(sar. NoTa 6)

(srr. NoTE 6)

CRD PUMP

MOTOR

(2500 LBS)

519.0 C.S. PUMP

2C CONTROLCABLES

(SEE NOTE 6)

519. 0 rCV 75-:2ELECTRICALCABLES

~ (sar; NoTa 6)

519.0 1CV 75-K1ELECTRICAL

PB

~ ~

~ ~

~ I

~ ~

~ ~

~ o

~ ~

~ )

a > a s

0

C~

LIFTING DEVICE: 4 TON HO PE CHAIN HOIST SHEET 19.OF 28

- LOCATION,. REACTOR BUXLDING UNIT 3

IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS) PUMP ROOM

COL N 8 R15

CORE SPRAY (CS) PUMP ROOM

COL N 8 R15

LOADS

ELEVATXONSAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT A'GREGORY (NOTE1 ELEVATIONSAFETY. RELATED - HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT . CATEGORY(NOTE1)

CORE SPRAYPUMP MOTOR

(5200 LBS)

519.0'ORE SPRAY

;PUMP 3DPOWER SUPPLY

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

519 0 .CORE SPRAYPUMP 3DPIPING

B

(SEE NOTE')

519.0'. S. PUMP

3B PIPING'.B

(SEE NOTE 6)

CRD PUMP*

MOTOR,(2500 LBS)

519.0'19

Os

CORE SPRAY

PUMP 3DPOWER SUPPLYCABLE

C. S. PUMP

3D PIPING

o

(SEE NOTE 6)

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

519'. S. PUMP

3B PXPING

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0'4I ~

PIPING TO THE

REACTOR

y "..SSEL

(SEE NOTE 6)

~ I~ r

IV

LIFTING DEVICE: 4 TON TYPE CHAIN HOIST SHEFT 20 OF~ ~



COL N 8 R15

LOADS

ELEVATIONSAFETY RELATED'AZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT ATEGORY (NOTE 1, ELEVATION



1QTCH SHIELDBLOCKS

(1500 LBS),

519. 0'g

519'0 I

C. S. PUMP

3D POWER

'SUPPLY CABLE

C. S. PUMP

3D PIPING

(SEE NOTE 6)

B

(SEE NOTE

6)'19,0'4"C. S. PIPNG.

TO REACTOR VESSE

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

519. 0'. S. PUMP

3B PIPING.-;B

.(SEE NOTZ 6)

II~ 1 4

~ I

L

LOCATION

LIFTING DEVICE: 4 TON HO E CHAIN

HOIST'EACTOR

BUILDING — UNIT 1

SHEET'1 OF 28,


COL N 8 R7.

CORE SPARY (CS) PUMP ROOM

COL N 8 R7

LOADS


EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTE1 ELEVATIONSAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT CATEGORY (NOTE1)

CORE SPRAYPUMP MOTOR(5200 LBS)

519 0 C. S. PUMP

1B POWER

SUPPLY CABLE

B

(SEE NOTE 6)519 0 14" CS PIPING

LINE TO REACTORVESSEL

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0': C. S. PUMP

1B CONTROLCABLE

(SEE NOTE 6).

519 0 C. S. PUMP

1B PIPING(SEE NOTE 6)

519. 0'. S. PUMP

lD POWER

SUPPLY CABLE

B

{SEE NOTE 6)

519.0'. S. PUMP

1D PIPINGB

{SEE NOTE 6)

CORE SPRAYPmP MOTOR

(5200 LBS)

519. 0 C. S. PUMP . B

1D CONTROL'SEE NOTE 6)CABLE

519.0'19

0

FCV 75-30ELECTRICALCABLES

FCV-75-39ELECTRICALCABL'ES

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

LXFTING DEVICE: 4 TON H PH CHAIN HOIST SHEET 22 OF 28

LOCATION REACTOR BUILDING - UNIT 1

IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS) PUMP ROOM'OL

N 8 R7.


COL N 8 R7

LOADS

- CRD PUMP MOTOR

(2500 LBS)

ELEVATION

19 0

519. 0

SAFETY RELATEDEQUIPMHNT

C. S. PUMP

lg POWER

'SUPPLY CABLE

C.. S. PUMP

IB CONTROLCABLE

HAZARD HLIM.ATHGORY(NOTEl

B *

(SHE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6)

ELEVATION

519.0'19.0'AFETY

RELATEDEQUIPMENT

14" CS PIPXNGLINE TO REACTORVESSEL

C. S. PUMP

1B PIPING

HAZARD HLXM, .

CATEGORY(NOTE1)

(SEE NOTE 6)

,B

(SHE NOTE 6)

519.0'. S. PmlP1D POWER

SUPPLY CABL'E (SEE NOTE 6)

519.0'. S. PUMP.lD PIPING

(SEE NOTE 6)

CRD PUMP MOTOR

(2500 LBS)519, 0

519.0'.S. PUMP

1D CONTROL

CABLE


B(SEE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0'CV-75-39ELECTRICALCABLES

(SEE NOTE 6)

~ y

~ I I

~ 1

LOCATION -.

LI1'TING DHVXCE: 4 TON HO H CHAIN

HOIST'EACTOR

BUILDING'- UNXT 1

'HEET 23 OF 28I

o„~

IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS) PUMP ROOM:

COL N 8 R7.


COLN 8 R7


ELEVATION

519.0'19.0i

SAFETY RELATEDI:QUIPMHNT

C. S.PUMP'.1B

POWER",SljPPLY CABLE

C.. S. PUMP1B CONTROL .

CABLL'AZARD

HLIM.ATEGORY(NOTE1

B

(SHE NOTE 6)

B

(SEE NOTE 6) .

HLHVATXON

519.0'

519

0'AFETYRELATED

EQUXPMENT

14" CS PIPINGLXNE TO REACTORVESSEL

C. S. PUMP

1B PIPXNG

llAZARD HLIM.CATEGORY(NOTHl)

(SEE NOTE 6)

,,B(SHE NOTE 6)

519.0'. S. PUMP

1D POWER

SUPPLY CABL'E

B

(SHH NOTL'. 6)

519.0 C. S. 'PUMP.1D PIPING 'SEE NOTE 6)


519. 0

519.0'.S. PUMP

1D CONTROLCABLE

FCV 75-30ELECTRICALCABLES.

B

(SEE NOTE.6)

B(SEE NOTE 6)

19 0 FCV-75-39ELECTRICALCABLES

B

(SEE 'NOTE 6)

~ p I ~ ~

LIFTING DEVXCE: 4 TON H YPE CHAIN HOIST SHEET 24 OF 2S

LOCATION 'REACTOR BUILDING —UNIT 2


COL N 8 R8


COL N 8 RS

LOADS


EQUIPMENTHAZARD ELIM.-ATEGORY (NOTE1 ELEVATXON

SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.EQUIPMENT CATEGORY (NOTE1)

CORE SPRAY PUMP.

MOTOR

(5200 LBS): 519.0'19.0'.

S. PUMP 2DPOWERSUPPLYCABLE

C. S. PUMP 2BPIPING

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE.6)

519.0'19.0'"C.S.

PIPING0 REACTOR VESSEL

.CV 75-30LECTRXCAL CABLES

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

B

(SEE 'NOTE 6)

519.0'. S. PUMP 2D

PIPING (SEE NOTE 6).

519.0'CV 75-39ELECTRICAL CABLES

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

CRD PUMP MOTOR

(2500 LBS)519.05

519.0'19.0'.

S. PUMP 2DPOWER SUPPLYCABLE

C. S. PUMP 2BPIPING

C. S. PUMP 2DPIPING

.B

(SEE NOTE 6)

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0.'519.0'19.0'CV

75-30 .

ELECTRICAL CABLES


FCV 75-30ELECTRICAL CABLES

(SEE NOTE 6) ~

(SEE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6)

i

Qlfjt I

C

0 LIFTING DEVICE' TON HO E CHAIN HOIST SHEET 25 OF 28


IMPACT AREA .CORE SPRAY (CS) PUMP ROOM

COL N 8 RS

.LOADS

HATCH SHIELD BLOCKS(1500 LBS)

ELEVATION

519.0'~

C(

SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM..EQUIPMENT ATEGORY (NOTE1

tC. S..PUMP 2D BPOMER SUPPLY (SEE NOTE 6)CABLE


EQUIPMENT 'ATEGORY (NOTE 1)

519:0'. S. PUMP 2BPIPING

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0'. S. PUMP 2DPIPING

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

HATCH SHIELD BLOCKS(1500 LBS)

519.0

'19.0'19.0'4"

C. S.PIPING TO

REACTORVESSEL


FCV '75-39ELECTRICALCABLES

B

(SEh NOTE 6)

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

B

(SEL. NOTE 6)

- ~LOCATION

LIFTING DEVICE: 4 TON HOO CHAIN HOIST


SHEET 26 OF 28

IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS) PUMP, ROOM

COL N 8 R21

CORE SPRAY (CS) PUMP. ROOM

COL N 8 R21

LOADS

ELEVATIONSAFETY RELATED HAZARD HLIM.

EQUIPMENT ATHGORY(NOTE1 ELEVATIONSAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT CATEGORY(NOTH1)

. CORE. SPRAY PUMP MOTOR(5200 LBS)

519 0C. S. PUMP

3A CONTROL.'- '-CABLES

B

(SEE NOTE 6) 19 0 .-C. S. PUMP 3APIPING

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0 'C. S. PUMP'3C CONTROLCABLES

B

(SEE NOTE 6)519 01 C. S. PUMP 3C

PIPINGB

(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0'. S. PUMP '3C POWER ~

.

SUPPLY CABLE

B

(SHE NOTE 6)

519. 0 '4" C. S. TOPIPING TO RHACTOVESSEL .

(SHE NOTE 6) ~

CRD PUMP MOTOR

(2500 LBS) 519.0'19.0'.S. PUMP

3A CONTROLCABLES

C. S. PUMP'3C CONTROLCABLES

B

(SEE NOTE.6)

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

519 0

519 0

C. S. PUMP 3APIPING

C. S. PUMP 3CPIPING

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0'. S. PUMP

3C. POWER

SUPPLY CABLE (SEE NOTE 6)

519.0'4" C. S. PIPINGTO REACTOR VESSEL

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

~e )

g 1 ~

J

jf i ~

LOCATION

LIFTING DEVICE: 'TON H PE C11AIN HOIST


SHEET 27 OF 28, I'I


COL N 8 R21


COL N CJ R21

LOADS


EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTE1 ELEVATION

SAFETY RELATED

EQUIPMENT


HATCH .SHIELD-BLOCKS

(1500 LBS)

519.0'. S. PUMP

3A CONTROL

CABLES(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0'. S. PUMP 3APIPING

(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0'. S. P.UMP

3CCONTROL'ABLES

B

(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0'. S. PUMP

3C PIPING B

(SEE NOTE 6)

'19.0'. S. PUMP

3C POWER

SUPPLYCABLE

(SEE NOTE 6)

519.0 '4" C. S. PIPINGTO REACTOR VESSE

(SEE NOTE 6)

~ . ~ >4

~ ~

revision h to 'acceptance test procedure it 533 p/n 1801119

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