reviews and commentary

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Reviews and commentaryE. Henry Knoche a & Hayden B. Peake b ca Executive director of the National Photographic InterpretationCenter ,b Executive Director of the National Intelligence Study Center ,c Adjunct professor at the Defense Intelligence College ,WashingtonPublished online: 09 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: E. Henry Knoche & Hayden B. Peake (1991) Reviews and commentary,International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 5:4, 467-483, DOI:10.1080/08850609108435195

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Intelligence Won One in CubaE. HENRY KNOCHE

Dino Brugioni: Eyeball to EyeballRandom House, New York, 1991, 622 p., $35.00.

No international flap has been morefrequently chronicled and studied than theCuban missile crisis in the fall of 1962.President John F. Kennedy's adroithandling of the crisis on the American sidebrought failure and retreat to Khrushchevand the Soviet side. As the Soviets chose towithdraw their strategic weaponry fromCuba at Kennedy's insistence, the worldstepped back from the abyss of a nuclearexchange. The breath of relief was audibleeverywhere.

Kennedy's management use of adviser-members of his especially establishedExecutive Committee (EXCOM) of theNational Security Council, as he and thatbody weighed options to deal with thethreat, has been the stuff of memoirs ofmany who participated. And, the Kennedyhandling of the crisis has served as a modelfor scholarly studies of what is right (andwrong) with our presidential decision-making processes.

Now, after years of interviewing andresearch, Dino Brugioni, in Eyeball toEyeball, provides new dimensions andinsights. As a member of CIA's NationalPhotographic Interpretation Center,Brugioni was involved in NPIC's findingof the initial missile sites in October 1962.The strength of Brugioni's opus is itsdescription of the crucial role played byAmerican intelligence in its illumination ofthe gathering threat.

The October findings came none toosoon. American policy-makers in Augustand September had dithered over thedangers of newly installed defensivesurface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in Cuba.Until the appearance of the SAMs, CIA U-2s had routinely overflown Cuba to keepabreast of Castro's doings there. But, afterAugust our policy-makers were fearful of aU-2 shootdown and permission foroverhead reconnaissance was denied toCIA. (This was in the days before the

Mr. Knoche is a retired CIA officer. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, he was anassistant to Director John McCone and, later, to Deputy Director Marshall Carter. Helater served as executive director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center andas Deputy Director of Central Intelligence under Director George Bush in 1976-77.

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INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELUGENCE VOLUME 5, NUMBER 4

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468 REVIEWS AND COMMENTARY

availability of high-resolution photographyfrom satellites.)

Discovery of the offensive missileconstruction came on 14 October, five daysafter Kennedy granted approval to resumeU-2 operations. It was a feisty and insistentCIA Director — John McCone — whopersuaded Kennedy to issue the green lightto check out McCone's long-heldsuspicions that missile introduction wasunderway in Cuba. In the ensuing days,reconnaissance was intensified. Kennedysecretly kept his options open, settled on anaval "quarantine" as the means to shut offthe feverish Soviet construction, andannounced the whole thing publicly in lateOctober.

The key to the American success was,of course, the outstanding work done byphoto-interpreters and intelligence analysts.They watched the Soviet moves and madeaccurate judgments about the status of themissile sites as they neared operationalcapacity. The Soviets never reached thatcapacity. Kennedy had the preciseinformation and time he needed to laycareful plans for action.

Brugioni is masterful in describing theintelligence work. His hero — and a mostdeserving one — is the late Arthur C.Lundahl. Lundahl was NPIC's chief at thetime. It was Lundahl, a superb briefer, whocarried the first word of the discovery tohis CIA superiors and to the President. Andit was Lundahl, working closely withMcCone, who kept the President and hiscolleagues fully informed day by day andhour by hour thereafter.

Lundahl was a most remarkable man.Possessed of a wide array of knowledgeabout earth science, mathematics,engineering and more, he was a pioneer inAmerican photo-interpretation. He wasactive in this field as a naval officer in the

Far East during World War II and as acivilian in the navy after the war.

As the CIA set about to develop the U-2reconnaissance plane in the mid-50s, theAgency planned the establishment of aphoto-interpretation unit. Lundahl — thenation's foremost expert — was hired awayfrom the Navy. He was put in charge of theCIA effort, which mushroomed in size andimportance as U-2s began their operationsin 1956.

Lundahl was a man of great warmth andcharm. He always did his homework andhad few equals in presenting anddescribing his information. Few Americansin history have made so significant acontribution to their nation's security as didArt Lundahl.

McCone was another of the heroes.When an unexplained and mysterious surgeof Soviet shipping to Cuba began in July of1962, McCone concluded quickly that theSoviets were about to emplace strategicmissiles in Cuba. There was no clear-cut,specific evidence to support McCone'sconclusion, but he felt sufficientlyconvinced so that he began in early Augustto warn the President and the senior policy-makers that — in his visceral judgment —a missile capability in Cuba was imminent.McCone urged that reconnaissanceoperations be intensified. His advice wasnot heeded until 9 October, when the go-ahead for the U-2s was given. Theslowness in the approval process stemmedfrom concern about U-2 vulnerability and,probably, from all the "assurances" givenprivately by Soviet spokesmen that nothingsignificant was afoot in Cuba.

Brugioni elaborates on the actions anddeliberations of Washington policymakersduring the crisis. He covers the manner inwhich Allied heads of government andintelligence services were advised of the

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF

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REVIEWS AND COMMENTARY 469

ominous intelligence. And, the author hasdone a solid job in sifting through stacks ofopen-source materials (magazines,newspapers, radio broadcasts and the like)to describe actions and reactions takingplace in Moscow and Havana as skiesdarkened.

In Brugioni's treatment of Washingtondeliberations, history purists will be put offby his extensive use of quotes pertaining toevents and conversations the author couldnot have encountered directly. Thisreliance on second- and third-hand reportsand recollections creates more certitudethan may be deserved in some instances.Many of the quotes smack of self-serviceas aging participants in the crisis seek to re-create their roles — with the mostfavorable spin they can impart.

If Kennedy, McCone and Lundahl arethe heroes in Brugioni's eyes, others fareless well. Among those are DefenseSecretary Robert McNamara, Air ForceChief of Staff Curtis LeMay, and StateDepartment intelligence chief RogerHilsman.

One CIA insider implicitly faulted byBrugioni is Army Lieutenant GeneralMarshall Carter, the man Kennedy andMcCone had tapped in early 1962 to beCIA's Deputy Director, the Number Twopost in the Agency. A West Pointer and theson of a long-time dean of the faculty at theU.S. Military Academy, Carter had wonspurs as a superb staff officer serving withthe great George Marshall. Marshall hadhand-picked Carter to be his top assistantwhen he served as Secretary of State and,later, of Defense. At one time, when DeanAcheson headed State, Carter carried therank of Minister while he participated in aninternational conference in Europe.

This unique background and experienceled McCone and Kennedy to select Carterfor the deputy job. In joining CIA, Carter

felt somewhat uncomfortable. He had longbeen a recipient of intelligenceinformation, but he had never beenassigned to an intelligence function. Hequickly became a champion of the Agencyand its people and invariably took theirside in inter-agency turf battles andsubstantive debates. After his tour at CIAended in 1965, Carter was named Directorof the National Security Agency, anotherkey element of the intelligence community.Wherever posted, Carter served withdiligence and integrity. At CIA from 1962to 1965, Carter says, "I owed my soul tothe company store." Within the halls ofgovernment, he was always a champion ofCIA causes.

In August 1962, after issuing hiswarning to the President and others in theadministration that implantation ofoffensive missiles in Cuba was imminent,McCone remarried and left for an extendedhoneymoon on the French Riviera. Fromthere he peppered Carter with his"honeymoon cables," most of whichrepeated his visceral concerns about theprospects in Cuba and the need forcontinuing aerial reconnaissance. Carter asActing Director pressed the case forreconnaissance but was rebuffed bySecretary of State Dean Rusk andpresidential security adviser McGeorgeBundy, who feared a U-2 shootdown andhoped (fruitlessly) that the island could bephotographed obliquely from beyond itsterritorial limits.

At about the same time, Bundy askedthe Agency to prepare a special nationalintelligence estimate on the question ofSoviet intentions in Cuba. Advised of this,McCone cabled Carter with the sameconcerns he had expressed earlier to thePresident and others before leavingWashington. Carter passed McCone'scable along to the man in charge of


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intelligence estimates, Sherman Kent, forhis consideration. Since there was noevidence on hand at the time pointing tomissile introduction (McCone's instinctswere not evidence), the estimate did notreflect the McCone thesis.

All national intelligence estimates arethe product of the entire intelligencecommunity. They may contain differingpoints of views in footnotes, but the finaltext represents the views of the Director ofCentral Intelligence. An estimate is alwaysthat of the DCI and the estimate is issuedover his signature. With McCone inEurope, Carter was Acting DCI and hissignature was properly and responsiblyaffixed to the estimate which, in the agreedview of the intelligence community,concluded that Soviet missile emplacementin Cuba was improbable. To his dying day,Kent insisted that the estimate was right,by which he meant that the Soviets werewrong in carrying out their dangerous andfeckless policy.

In Eyeball to Eyeball, Brugioni chargesthe unlucky Carter with having ignored hisboss's cables (not so) and withineffectiveness in getting permission forresumption of U-2 overflights. In fact,Carter did what he could in the latterrespect, but options are next to nil when theSecretary of State and the President's topsecurity adviser are united, as they wereagainst Carter in the case of overflights inAugust and September.

Brugioni chides Carter for having been"ever responsive" to the military. To thoseof us who worked closely with Carter,nothing could be farther from the facts.Carter fought many a battle with hiscounterparts at Defense. He was no one'spatsy. He did not fear the damage to hisarmy career that might be incurred from hisarguments with the Pentagon.

It is to be hoped that a second edition ofEyeball to Eyeball will contain correctionsconcerning the Carter profile andperformance.

Yes, the intelligence contributions in thecrisis were crucial and accurate. But, in theaftermath, there was much hue and cry —some in the Executive; some in theCongress — that there had been anintelligence failure and the missile findingswere dangerously belated. Unmentioned byBrugioni is the colorful McCone reactionto this. Fiercely objective, independentlywealthy, and skilled as a Washingtoninsider operating at top levels, McConewould have no part of being associatedwith failure, particularly when his ownvision had proved to be so correct. Hesummoned his top dozen or so lieutenantsto his office, sat them down, andproceeded, one after the other, to rake thehide off each of them for perceivedshortcomings. McCone seemed intent ondistancing himself from an Agency hethought might be tagged with the charge offailure. After that session, Carter metprivately with McCone and warned himthat he risked CIA's demoralization andruination by disowning his Agencyassociates. Carter told McCone if hewanted someone to pay a price, he, Carter—not the others —should be singled out.Carter said he would willingly resign thatvery moment McCone listened and madeno response.

The records of McCone's premonitionsand warnings were quickly assembled.These, and a report by CIA's InspectorGeneral recapping the history of Cubanreconnaissance and the solid performanceof photo-interpreters and intelligenceanalysts, served as McCone's ammunitionas he moved about town shooting down thenotion of an intelligence failure.


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All told, Eyeball to Eyeball is a first-ratecontribution to our knowledge of theworld's most serious nuclear-age crisis. Itis a marvelous piece of research. It stitches

together much detail heretofore ignored ordescribed as mere snippets.

Brugioni's is a seminal work, despite allthe previously published treatment of thesubject.

Some Disturbing Definitions:Caveat Emptor

HAYDEN B. PEAKE

Leo D. Carl: The International Dictionary of IntelligenceMaven Books, McLean, Va., 1990, 472 p., $49.95 HB, $24.95 PB.

The International Dictionary of Intelli-gence is the third attempt since 1984 tomeet a genuine need for an authoritativedictionary of intelligence terms.1 With 472pages and over 7300 entries. It is almostfive times larger than the other twocombined — about 6000 more entries. Bythis measure it makes an impressive claimto being the most comprehensive anddetailed, not to say definitive, work on thesubject. But before accepting thatcharacterization, the reasons for its size andthe reliability of its content, the sine quanon of all dictionaries, should be con-sidered. Toward this end, the objectivesand types of entries in the dictionary willbe considered first, and then the accuracyof the terms defined in its pages. Withthese data in hand the questions of

comprehensiveness, utility, and reliabilitycan be addressed.

OBJECTIVES AND TOPICALFRAMEWORK

Author Leo Carl, a former intelligenceofficer with the United States Air Forceand Army, also served briefly with theCentral Intelligence Agency where hedeveloped ingenious comparative Russianlanguage transliteration tables. Anotherproduct of his service was recognition ofthe need for an intelligence dictionary, anidea which found fruition in the presentwork. Mr. Carl has aimed his dictionary at"the intelligence neophyte...the experi-enced case officer...[the] intelligenceanalyst..." and, as the flyleaf tells us:

Hayden Peake, a former CIA intelligence officer, is Executive Director of the NationalIntelligence Study Center and adjunct professor at the Defense Intelligence College inWashington.

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 5, NUMBER 4

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the active or retired intelligence,counterintelligence, or securityspecialist, the investigator, thecryptologist, the political scientist,the historian, the spy-fictionwriter, and...the reader ofespionage literature.2

This wide audience accounts in part for therelatively large number of entries. Anothercontributing factor is the inclusion ofdefinitional variations of basic terms. Forinstance, the term intelligence, with itsmany contexts, consumes over 18 pages or128 entries. Similarly, there are over fourpages containing 46 variants of the oftenmisused word "agent" and 24 pages (over300 entries) devoted to various namedoperations. The reader is cautionedconcerning the latter; only about half aregermane to intelligence.

In addition to audience and definitionalbreadth, a third factor affecting size is thescope of application. In addition to theconventional intelligence components(collection, analysis, security, espionage,counterintelligence, and covert action) thisdictionary includes terrorism and "nar-cotics and narcoterrorism," military orderof battle (OB),3 and assorted political andmiscellaneous terms, all on an internationalscale.

A final consideration has a constrainingeffect on size and comprehensiveness —the omission of proper names as entries. Itis unfortunate that Mr. Carl chose not toinclude entries on at least some of the keyfigures in the intelligence profession like,for example, Ralph Van Deman, William J.Donovan, Herbert Yardley, JamesAngleton, Richard Helms, William Colby,William Casey, William Webster, or AllenDulles from the United States. Applicationof the international factor might havebrought forth names such as Sir FrancisWalsingham, Richard Sorge, Wilhelm

Canaris, Reinhard Gehlen, FelixDzerzhinsky, Markus Wolf, Kim Philby,and Sir Stewart Menzies, to name a few atrandom.4 The only proper name foundlisted as a separate entry (there may beothers) was Stefan Bandera, a UkrainianNationalist leader assassinated by theKGB.

Given this broad framework of entriesand the author's objectives, the questionarises as to how well his goal has beenaccomplished — have the expectationsnormally associated with a dictionary beenmet? For the answer, some performancemeasures are required.

MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE

The editor of the Random House Diction-ary of the English Language writes that adictionary must meet at least threeconditions. First, it must be "a book givinginformation on particular subjects or on aparticular class of facts, usually arranged inalphabetical order." Second, recognizingthat completeness is not a realisticobjective, it must reflect "judiciousselectivity" based on expert analysis ofmany sources. Third, and "above all," adictionary must "be accurate and up todate."5 The extent to which Leo Carl'swork meets these conditions then, is ameasure of its utility and reliability onwhich user confidence depends.

A quick glance at Mr. Carl's dictionarywill convince most readers that he has metthe first requirement. Consequently, thefocus will be on issues of selectivity as anindicator of utility, and of sources andaccuracy as indicators of reliability.

MR. CARL'S APPROACH

In his foreword, Mr. Carl touches onselectivity, noting that "I make no pretense


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of having prepared a definitive compila-tion. I am sure that there are many wordsand phrases, particularly in the area oftradecraft jargon, that I may haveoverlooked inadvertently." As for being upto date, he acknowledges that some of theterms included "may have becomeoutdated since I prepared by unpublishedmanuscript in 1952." Nevertheless, he says,he has worked to "enlarge and update thedictionary" since that time.

In his discussion of sources, Mr. Carlnotes he has provided a bibliography ofgovernment and secondary works andmentions the help of an "anonymouspanel." He then adds that, "Most of the

terms defined in this book have eitherappeared previously, in one form oranother, in the open literature, although notnecessarily with my definitions..." (empha-sis added). This last point speaks not onlyto sources and authority, but also toaccuracy, a topic Mr. Carl does notmention specifically. Of course, the burdenof accuracy must be borne by the authoralone where only his definition is given.Where Mr. Carl has used an officialgovernment source(s) for a definition, it ispreceded by the word "official" or thename of the agency involved, though theparticular document concerned is notalways cited. In any case, for purposes of

TABLE I Definition Categories, Sample Sizes and Estimates of Number of Entries

Categories

Non-IntelligenceOBMisc.PoliticalTERR/NARC

IntelligenceHistoricalOfficialNon-Official

SampleNo. Entries

17816718681

17589

718

%'Total

11.110.212.05.0

11.145.05.6

Estimate TotalNo. Entries

819752885369

8193319413

Notes:1. Calculations: Entries per page and total number of entries estimates:

a. First procedure: 102 pages In sample; 1594 entries counted, equals 16.0/page(fractions rounded to nearest full number). Total pages with entries: 461 x 16 = 7376 totalentries.

b. Second procedure: 66 pages with 1042entrles= 15.78 entries/page (pages differentfrom first sample).2. Redundancy estimate: 637 redundancy entries/230 pgs. = 2.76 (3.0)/page orapproximately 17 percent of the total entries.

'The percentage values In this column were calculated on the basis of the number of entries In the sample for eachcategory compared to the total sample size. The resulting percentage (shown In the midde column) was then applied tothe total number of entries as estimated Independentty as specified In Note 1 above. The resuft gave the estimated total foreach category of entries In the book, which are shown In the right hand column


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this review, these "official" definitions arepresumed correct.6 The remaining entriesare provided by Mr. Carl and referred toherein as "non-official." Before looking atthis group more closely in terms ofaccuracy, identifying the topical categoriesused in the dictionary might be useful.

ENTRY CATEGORIES ANDDISTRIBUTION

In order to identify specific topicalcategories and estimate the number ofterms in each, 100 pages containingapproximately 1600 entries were chosen atrandom. Each entry was found to fall intoone of the categories shown in Table I.7

Categories 1-4 cover the topics of order-of-battle, political, miscellaneous, anddrugs and terrorism. These account fornearly 40 percent of the total number ofentries. A look at the entry content in thesecategories provided the first surprise: thedefinitions and descriptions do not containprofessional intelligence terms. These arefound only in the remaining categories (5-7): intelligence history, official intelligencedefinitions, and non-official intelligencedefinitions. A few example from eachcategory should clarify the distinctions.

Order-Of-Battle(OB)

Certainly, OB itself is an intelligence termand the processes of OB collection anddata analysis are part of intelligence. But,the OB product details, the weaponsnomenclature, organizational identifies,operational matters, are not professionalintelligence terms. An analogous situationobtains in other professions. For instance, adictionary of professional publishing andjournalism terms would not list all books orarticles written, nor would a dictionary ofcomputer programming terms include the

parameters of various commercial wordprocessing or spreadsheet programs.

Looking at entries in the Order of Battle(OB) category in Mr. Carl's dictionary, onefinds entries for:

a. names of radars and weaponssystems (e.g., FLAP WHEEL,FLAT FACE, FOBS);

b. civilian organizations (e.g., USPC[United States Peace Council] andUSSC [United States SpaceCouncil]);

c. military organizations (e.g.,PLUGAH, Hebrew for company ina battalion); and

d. space systems (e.g., SOYUZ TM-3,first manned station in orbit 326days).

Though no doubt of genuine interest,the more than 800 (about 11 percent of thetotal) OB definitions and descriptions inthis category do not mention intelligencenor is any relationship indicated.8

Miscellaneous Entries

The same rationale applies here withentries like "bomzhi," the Russianequivalent "for the homeless of Moscow;""Lyuber, Soviet jargon for muscle freak(Charles Atlas type);" "MR, for maritimereconnaissance;" "MT, for megaton;""info, colloquial and message abbreviationfor information;" "HUE, abbreviation for'highly' enriched uranium;" "LUNA 10,the moon's first artificial satellite;" "AirForce One...;" "ARC.Acoustic ResearchCenter;" and "Operation DESERTGLOW," an FBI investigation of toxicwaste procedures at Rocky Flats. Whowould question the social significance ofthese topics and the approximately 750 (10percent) others in this category? And,conceivably, they could be used in anintelligence estimate or a related product.


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But the justification for their inclusion in adictionary of professional intelligenceterms, is obscure.

Political Entries

The political category has approximately850 entries, or 12 percent of the total.Typical examples found there include,"nuclear winter;" "Christian NationalAction Party, an all-white, minoritypolitical party in Namibia....;" "mullarchy,neologism for the Islamic Republic ofIran;" Adrazhenne, Byelorussian for'Rebirth,' a leading opposition group in theByelorussian SSR;" "ANC, AfricanNational Congress;" "ARGONAUT...World War II cryptonym for summitmeeting of Allied leaders...;" "CommonMarket, see European EconomicCommunity;" "Eco-Glasnost...a dissidentenvironmental group formed in Bulgaria in1989;" "SOWETO;" "Soyuz;" and the"South Pacific Forum (SPF), a regionalorganization established in 1971," part ofthe anti-nuclear movement. If these groupshave some intelligence connection, it is notevident from the content of Mr. Carl'sentry.

Terrorism and Narcoterrorism

The terrorist and narcotics categories haverelatively few entries and were combinedfor convenience. They totaled 371, or 5percent of the whole. Most of the terroristentries are names of groups or organiza-tions. The narcotics category includesterms like "dime rock, street jargon for a$10.00 chunk of crack," and "OperationCLEAN SWEEP," run by the Washington,D.C. police department. These terms areunquestionably useful to those involved inthe war on drugs, and should be found in aDrug Enforcement Agency professionaldictionary. But their inclusion here without

any mention of intelligence links isbaffling.

Intelligence Terms

Returning to Table I, categories 5-7 (60percent of the total entries) comprise theprofessional intelligence terms found in thedictionary. The first, category, labeled"History," has 819 entries (11 percent ofthe book's total) and concerns variousWorld War II era (and occasionally older)operations and intelligence services, someno longer in existence. Terms like"GARBO," a double cross committeedouble agent and "General Grishin,Spanish Civil War alias" for GRU GeneralYan Berzin, are found here, as are a fewJapanese terms, some Italian, many aboutWorld War II German elements (SD,RSHA, GESTAPO, ABWEHR, etc.), andsome from other nations. Unfortunately,the treatment is uneven and not all thementioned services are treated in the samedepth.9

The second and third categories (3645entries) approximately 49 percent of thebook, contain the contemporaryintelligence terms. The second categoryincludes "official" definitions (taken fromgovernment publications) and numbers 413(or 5.6 percent of the total entries.10 Thethird category is comprised of the "non-official" intelligence terms and contains3,319 entries (45 percent of the total).Here, definitions and explanatory materialhave been compiled or furnished by Mr.Carl.

Before examining the "official" and"non-official" categories in greater detail,the totals need to be adjusted for entry-redundancy. That is to say, on the average,3 entries per page (17 percent of the totalentries) are concerned with terms whichappear elsewhere either as abbreviations, or


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in the reverse of the sequence given.11 Anexample of the former may be found onpage 177 where the abbreviation forINSCOM is explained, and then again onpage 179 where it appears with its fullname and is described in more detail. Anexample of the latter may be found on page239 where the entry for "militaryintelligence" read "see intelligence,military." This feature may be helpful tothe user, but it should be taken into accountwhen estimating the number of differentdefinitions. When the redundancy isremoved from the intelligence entires, thetotals for the official and non-officialcategories are reduced to 266 and 2,722entries respectively. In other words, TheInternational Dictionary of Intelligencecontains approximately 300 differentmodern intelligence-related terms (40percent of the total entries). If history termsare included, the total increases to about 50percent. Next to be considered is thereliability — are they accurate? — andutility of these intelligence definitions.

CONFIDENCE IN THE INTELLIGENCETERMS

For a dictionary to be used with confidencethe number of errors should be very smalland the definitions, including comments,unambiguous. To get a handle on themagnitude of the problem in Mr. Carl'svolume, a total of 250 pages wereexamined, each of which had at least oneintelligence-related entry. Over 100 errorswere found.12 Some example follow.

Factual Errors

The factual errors ranged from the minor toserious. Harmless is the entry ASIO (pp.28, 31), which explains that these lettersare an "abbreviation for Australian

Security and Intelligence Organization."Harvey Barnett, former Director General ofASIO, uses the correct designation — Aus-tralian Security Intelligence Organiza-tion}3

Somewhat more serious is an entry onpage 18 of concern to historians:

ALSOS: British World War IIcryptonym for a World War IIintelligence mission to ascertainthe nature and progress of Germanatomic research and development(R&D).

ALSOS was an American not a British codeword. U.S. Army Colonel Boris Pash, themilitary head of the ALSOS mission, wrotethat the "code name" was "dreamed up bysomeone in General Groves's [head of theMANHATTAN Project] office...ALS0Sbeing the Greek word for a grove (oftrees)."14 Pash's version is confirmed bythe scientific head of the ALSOS team,Dutch scientist Samuel A. Goudsmit, in hisbook ALSOS.15

Several so-called "tradecraft jargon"entries have fundamental errors. Forinstance, HONEYTRAP is defined as"jargon for an attractive female used as baitin an entrapment or recruitment operation."In fact, as explained by Henry Becket, asource cited by Carl, a HONEYTRAP, is asynonym for sexual entrapment; the femaleparticipant is called a SWALLOW by theKGB. What Mr. Carl did not point out isthat this term is used mainly by the Britishin the intelligence literature.16

Another concerns the term illegal. Carldefines it as "KGB/GRU tradecraft jargonfor a deep-cover agent in a foreigncountry...." [p. 173] But an illegal need notbe an agent, as demonstrated by ColonelRudolph Abel, a KGB officer.

Carl gives the official definitions ofIllegal Residency, admitting they would


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make Abel an illegal rezident [which hewas], but then he disagrees noting:

that this was hardly the case at thetime. The author believes that,even where KGB officers act asagents themselves, they can onlybe described as an illegal agentnet(work). An illegal rezidenturawould be an oxymoron, (emphasisadded)17

But there is no contradiction here. Thereare two types of residents and residencies,one legal, the other not. The term illegalrezident and its variations, including illegalrezidentura, are common usage amongintelligence officers and historians.18 Thissame quote also errs by referring to KGBofficers acting as agents. According toKGB defector Vladimir Kuzichkin, a KGBofficer can not be an illegal agent, only anillegal.19

Another instance of incorrect tradecraftjargon is worth attention. Mr. Carl has anentry for defector-in-place, a term thatappears from time to time in theintelligence literature, but which is indeedan oxymoron; one cannot defect andremain in place. Carl goes further and saysthat the term means:

an individual who renounces hiscitizenship clandestinely, butremains in his place of residenceand employment as an agent forthe erstwhile opposition. A goodexample was Oleg Penkov-skiy....20

Penkovskiy did not renounce hiscitizenship, refused repeatedly to defect,and in fact never did. Appropriatealternative terms are agent-in-place or pen-etration; neither requires the renouncing ofcitizenship.21

The entry for agent-in-place refers torecruitment-in-place, another incorrect

definition. Mr. Carl explains that the term"usually" refers to "a defector who agreesto serve as a double agent by remaining inhis position and place of residence." Onceagain he cites Oleg Penkovskiy as anexample, but is only half right. Penkovskiywas recruited to remain in place, but wasnot a double agent or a defector.

The entry for mole (p. 243) also requiressome modification. It begins by stating thatthe term applies to "a penetration agentinfiltrated into an opposition intelligenceservice or other opposition governmentagency." Several comments are in order:(1) penetration alone would be correct ifthe person involved were an officer ofanother service; (2) infiltration is alwaysnecessary, the mole might already bewhere the service desired; (3) the termmole is reserved for penetration of anintelligence service and technically doesnot apply to other government agencieswhich are equally penetrated.22 Mr. Carl'sassertion that a mole is also "a defector-in-place" is not good usage, and that he/shecan be a "sleeper," is unlikely.23

Some of the factual errors contribute tothe myths of intelligence lore. Oneexample, which includes several mistakes,appears on page 245:

Mother: informal sobriquet for thelate, former chief of the CI staff,James Jesus Angleton, in theCentral Intelligence Agency(CIA) DDP and later DDO, q.v.See also Delphic Oracle and NoKnock.24

Mother, Delphic Oracle, and No Knockmay have been the nicknames given toAngleton surrogates in novels, but thosewith whom he worked in the CIA did notuse the terms.25 The late Miles Copeland,in his book Without Cloak and Dagger,included a character he called "Mother"


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who, he said, was a "CIA counterterroristleader" that many took to be Angleton. ButCopeland never used Angleton's name. Inhis memoirs, The Game Player, Copelandmentions Angleton, but no nicknames.Sound scholarship would, at the very least,have revealed ambiguity associated withthis entry. As written, it merely perpetuatesa myth.

Illustrative Errors

A few more examples give a better sense ofthe problem. In some cases sources for thecorrect definition are provided, while inothers that task is left as an exercise for thereader and the author.

1. ULTRA [p. 435] was not "Ahuge machine developedduring World War II to decodeENIGMA intercepts...." The"Bomb" was not a "Britishnickname for ULTRA" [p. 43],and BONIFACE is not the"original British MI6 codewordfor the World War II ENIGMAintercepts subsequently re-named ULTRA."26

2. Neither the Department ofDefense nor the NationalSecurity Agency were createdby the National Security Act of1947. Instead the Act createdthe Central IntelligenceAgency and the position, oroffice, of the Secretary ofDefense.

3. Judea and Samaria [p. 209] arenot the "official name of theWest Bank of Jordan onCentral Intelligence Agency(CIA) maps."27

4. INTREPID was neither a codename nor a cryptonym for SirWilliam Stephenson duringWorld War II, as Carl states onp.200.28

5. While Dirty tricks may be apopular media term, it is notCIA "jargon for covertoperations or covert action."(p. HO)

6. The OWI did not conduct jointoperations with OSS.

7. "Adieu" may be French forfarewell, but the mole whopenetrated the GB for theFrench was code namedFAREWELL, not ADIEU asstated by Carl on page 4; atleast in Thierry Wolton's book,Le KGB en France, see "Ledossier FAREWELL (p. 241-281).

8. An agent, free-lance, contraryto Mr. Carl, may indeed beunder control. And thestatement (p. 10) that JohnWalker was only nominallyunder control and "very closeto, if not in fact, a freelanceagent," is inconsistent with thepublished facts of the case.

9. Robert Lamphere is misquotedin the entry on "Allo"broadcasts concerning"Gammas."29

10. An agent, career, is not"actually, a staff officer ratherthan an agent in a clandestineagency."

11. The entry for SMERSH isinaccurate after the translation.

12. "Agent coopted," [sic] is notrestricted to "an agent of oneintelligence service coOpted[sic] by another...." The KGB,for example has coopted,among others, journalists.

13. Intelligence jargon (p. 186) isprofessional terminology, notslang.

14. There is no such element as aDeputy Directorate (p. 59-60)


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in the CIA. The proper term isDeputy Director according tothe CIA Factbook OnIntelligence, June 1990.

15. The count of communists in theentry on APOSTLES is wrongand the names of othersimportant to the Soviets areomitted. In this entry thesource of the data is notmentioned or otherwise givencredit.30

16. The term eliciting is notconfined to subjects "on acompletely unwitting basis...inorder to obtain informationfrom them without theirconscious realization that theyhave served as sources." It maybe used with witting, thoughperhaps reluctant, sources aswell. In any case subtlety isimplied.

17. The Canadian SecurityIntelligence Service (CSIS) isnot the former Royal CanadianMounted Police (RCMP).Likewise, the CanadianForeign Intelligence Bureau isnot the Canadian "counterpartof British MI6."31

18. CIRA stands for CentralIntelligence Retirees (notRetirement) Association.

19. The term DROP in intelligencetradecraft usage is not "jargonfor to discharge, to fire, tocan." It is used in context tomean, inter alia, dead drop orletter drop, etc.

20. Cover name has an officialdefinition on page 67 whichconflicts with the one given byMr. Carl (page 85) astradecraft jargon for alias,pseudonym, cryptonym, orcode name?2

Misleading or Judgmental Errors

In this category are entries like advisor[p. 6], which the author implies is peculiarto the KGB when in fact it applies to theGRU and most other world intelligenceagencies. Another example is spookspeak,which is called "neologistic jargon for'tradecraft jargon.' " Mr. Carl fails to saythat it is not a recognized intelligence term,nor is it used by professionals as asynonym. It does appear in the subtitle tothe Becket dictionary,33 though not in thedictionary itself.

A most peculiar example is found inAppendix II under Notable Women Spies inWartime in which there are only twoentries, Mata Hari ("the popular image ofthe female spy in wartime") andTREASURE, a "World War II triple agent."Mr. Carl may be correct about the popularimage, but in a dictionary of this type it isnot unreasonable to expect some commenton the reality. The substantial debate overTREASURE as a triple agent is ignored byMr. Carl. Finally, why only two entries, letalone these two? The United States andmany other countries have producedfemale intelligence officers and recruitedfemale agents with far better credentials.

Perhaps the best illustration of the typeof entry to be found in this category is thedefinition for the multi-context termintelligence. Mr. Carl lists a number ofdefinitions quoted from a report publishedby the House Permanent Select Committeeon Intelligence.34 Some define intelligenceas the product resulting from collecting andprocessing information. This is thedefinition he says is correct. But one of thealternative definitions presented (inExecutive Order 12036) reads in part,Intelligence: (1) Foreign intelligence andcounterintelligence. In addition to collec-tion and processing, this arguably broadens


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the concept in accordance with commonusage. To this Mr. Carl responds that the"executive order may have erred incombining intelligence and counter-intelligence under the same rubric." Laterexpanding this interpretation in his entry oncounterintelligence, he writes that "neithercounterintelligence nor covert action canproperly be categorized as intelligence inthe author's view."35

Mr. Carl's attempts to retain a narrowdefinition of the multi-context termintelligence are inconsistent with profes-sional and common usage. The wordintelligence may be, and often is, used torefer only to the product. But it may alsorefer, in context, to the activitiesundertaken to acquire the material for theproduct. And, even more generally, whenreferring to the profession as a whole,intelligence includes all the pertinentelements, counterintelligence, and covertaction among them.36 As a matter of fact,the latter context is precisely how Mr. Carlhas used the term in the title of hisdictionary. Indeed, had he applied hisdefinition of intelligence when selectingterms for his dictionary, it would notcontain any counterintelligence, covertaction, or security related terms.37

COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS, ANDRECOMMENDATIONS

Are all the intelligence entries in thedictionary as inaccurate as those citedabove? The answer is no. For example, the27 entries concerning the Soviet Criminalcode were checked by native Russians andfound to be generally correct for theversion of the statutes cited, but it was notthe most recent.38 Many of theorganizational and tradecraft terms are alsocorrect, but too many are not. All this

raises the question — what can be said ofthe dictionary as a whole?

There are sufficient errors to cast doubton The International Dictionary ofIntelligence as a reliable source of defini-tions of intelligence terms. Or put anotherway, high confidence cannot be placed inthe accuracy of the "non-official"intelligence entries. Obviously, readerswith wide experience will be able toidentify the errors without difficulty. Theproblem arises for those without that ability— the "neophyte" part of the audience forwhom it was intended, those with relativelynarrow areas of expertise, or those wishingto decide a fine point — they run a real riskof being misinformed.

Under these conditions the utility of thedictionary is limited and an alternativesource is recommended. The novice orscholar would do well to start with theofficial sources mentioned above.39

The conclusion with regard to accuracymay not apply in the same degree to theorder-of-battle, political and miscellaneousentries. They were not examined in asmuch detail and thus were not included inthe error count. Why were those entriesincluded in the first place, since they arenot part of the professional intelligencelexicon? Most of the terms concerningterrorism and narcotics are in the samecategory. Even if viewed as helpful, itshould have been made clear they are notregarded as basic intelligence terminology.

Regarding the judicious selectivity ofterms, the dictionary is inconsistent andincomplete in those categories consideredhere. The omission of entries namingpersons involved in intelligence is onereason. The differences in types of dataprovided for the various services isanother.40 Moreover, in some cases theentries are not up-to-date and the


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definitions do not always indicate this fact.Had the author compiled and analyzedmore of the definitions from the publicdomain,41 documented his own contribu-tions, and omitted the non-intelligenceterms, the errors and weaknesses couldhave been avoided and the result wouldhave been a more significant addition tothe literature of intelligence.

In sum, The International Dictionary ofIntelligence falls too far short of its objec-tives and could be hazardous to one'sprofessional health: caveat emptor!

REFERENCES1 The other two, exclusive of encyclopedias, are:

Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, TheDictionary of Espionage 1984, Harrap, London,234 p., (published in the United States as Who'sWho in Espionage St. Martin's Press, New York;and Henry S. A. Becket, 1986, The Dictionary ofEspionage: Spookspeak into English, Stein & Day,New York, 202 p.

In the Foreword to the present work, author LeoCarl notes that both a "tradecraft dictionary" and a"glossary of tradecraft terms" were published since1985 by former "CIA staffers." Unfortunately, Mr.Carl does not identify the books or the authors. Theonly dictionary Mr. Carl lists in his bibliography isBecket's, mentioned above. Henry S. A. Becket is apseudonym for author Joseph C. Goulden who isnot a former or present "CIA staffer." The onlyglossary listed in his bibliography is Bob Burton's,Top Secret: A Clandestine Operator's Glossary OfTerms, 1986, Paladin Press, Boulder, Co. Burtondoes not mention his professional credentials.

2 This quote taken from the back flyleaf. Although thedust jacket does not mention the author, and thetitle page does not mention the publisher (MavenBooks), they are one and the same.

3 The military order-of-battle (OB) category does notcontain any intelligence terms. There areintelligence OB terms, of course, but these areincluded in the "intelligence entry" category count.Military OB terms counted here include weaponssystems designations, military units, aircraft types,etc.

4 Some names are mentioned in connection withspecific terms as in the case of William J. Donovan.There is an entry for "Donovan's dreamers" andOSS where he is mentioned, but no entry underDonovan's name. The entries in Dobson and Payne,op. cit., are almost entirely names. Becket, op. cit . ,

like Carl, has relatively few. Standard dictionariesdo list names of famous people as a matter ofcourse.

5Laurence Urdang, ed., 1968, Random HouseDictionary of the English Language, collegeedition, Random House, New York.

6As a matter of prudence, some of the official entrieswere checked against the documents from whichthey were extracted and no errors were found.

7The categorization process is a matter of judgment.Some terms put in one category might have beenplaced in another. But these are relatively few andthe overall numbers would be little changed. Thedecision on sample size was pragmatic but notinconsistent with sound statistical practice. Initialestimates were made on a sample of 25 pages. Thiswas repeated raising the sample to 50. Although theparameters calculated did not change significantly,this procedure was repeated two more times for atotal of 100 pages. The result increased familiaritywith the dictionary and confidence in the statisticaldata.

8 If one argues that Mr. Carl has properly extendedhis definition to include OB nomenclature, then onemust also ask why haven't all of them (aircraft,weapons, vehicles, units, leaders, etc.) for allnations, been included? As is, the selection ofentries is inconsistent. For example, there areentries for Iran, but none for Iraq; aircraft for somecountries are mentioned while those for another arenot; some weapon types are included, others not.The author gives no explanation for the selectionprocess.

9 Another aspect of the uneven treatment issue nottouched on elsewhere, is the omission of terms onemight reasonably expect to find. Examples includethe Venlo operation, the German term forrecruitment Werbung and its Russian derivative,verbovka.

10On many occasions Mr. Carl begins an entry withone of his definitions, followed by one or moreofficial versions. In these cases, to be on the safeside, I have counted the entry as "official." Thisdoes artificially inflate the total for that category,but not enough to make a difference in theconclusions reached.

11 The figure of 3 per page is an estimate based on asample size of 230 pages (3630 entries).

12 Two types of terms were excluded from the searchbecause it was not possible to make a judgment asto accuracy. The first involved entries whichimplied they were current organizationaldesignations of foreign intelligence services, forexample Britain's MI5 and MI6, and for which noofficial sources were cited. Since most of theseservices do not publish their current organizationalterms, those included in the dictionary are verylikely outdated. The second type of term excluded


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is exemplified by the entry "BYEMAN aka B:Compromised cryptonym for one of the principalaccess-codeword systems." (p. 49) If the term wasonce a codeword, was compromised, and evenappears in the public domain, it is not necessarilydeclassified. If it was declassified that fact is madea matter of public record but Mr. Carl provides nosuch indication. If it was not declassified it shouldnot be in the book. More than 40 entries of this typewere found.

13Harvey Barnett, 1988, Tale of the Scorpion, Allen &Unwin, Sydney, glossary, p. 226.

14Boris T. Pash, 1969, The ALSOS Mission, AwardHouse, New York, p. 11. The use of "code name"by Pash is consistent with the official definition ofthe term since it applied to the task force he headed.If one applies Mr. Carl's definition of"cryptonym," (p. 89) which excludes organizations,then his usage is incorrect. If, however, the officialdefinition he gives on page 89 is used,organizations are included and the term couldapply. From the evidence provided by Mr. Carl,there is no way to tell whether or not it was used asa cryptonym.

15 Samuel A. Goudsmit, 1947, ALSOS, HenrySchulman, Inc., New Yoik, p. 26. Both Pash andGoudsmit noted that the selection of a codewordwith any relationship to the nature of the missionwas not good security.

1 6 Henry S. A. Becket, 1986, The Dictionary ofEspionage, Stein & Day, New York, p. 81. A moredetailed version appears in Bruce W. Watson,Susan M. Watson, and Gerald W. Hopple, eds.,1990, United States Intelligence: An Encyclopedia,Garland Pub. Co., Inc., p. 275. The termHONEYTRAP is used more by journalists thanformer intelligence officers in their writings. Forexample, John Barron and Harry Rositzke usesexual entrapment in their books on the KGB. Intheir book, HONEYTRAP: The Secret World ofStephen Ward Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1987, journalists Anthony Summers and StephenDorril stated the term was intelligence parlance,"used it a few times, but did not include it in theindex.

17Carl,op. cit., p. 173.18See Vladimir Petrov debriefing, Soviet "Illegal"

Intelligence Operations, pp. 6-13, AustralianArchives, ACT CRS, A6283 XR1; John J. Dziak,1988, Chekisty: A History of the KGB, LexingtonBooks, Lexington, Mass. p. 64. Dziak describesWalter Krivitsky as an "NKVD illegal rezident inthe Netherlands"; William R. Corson and Robert T.Crowley, 1985, The New KGB: Engine of SovietPower, Morrow, New York, p. 66; and William R.Johnson, 1987, Thwarting Enemies At Home andAbroad: How To Be A Counter intelligence Officer,Stone Trail Press, Bethesda, Md., p. 39. Johnson

refers to Konon Molody's (Gordon Lonsdale)illegal rezidentura.

19 Vladimir Kuzichkin, 1990, Inside The KGB: Myth& Reality, Andre Deutsch, London, pp. 82, 87.Kuzichkin was trained for and served in KGBDirectorate S (Illegals). His book provides detaileddefinitions and descriptions of illegal training andoperations. See also the Petrov debriefingstatements, op. cit.

20 On page 347 Carl writes that "H.A.R. (Kim) Philbycould also be a defector-in-place ex post facto."Whatever that means, it is incorrect Philby resisteddefection, though he had many opportunities, untilhe had no choice. And when he went he was still aBritish citizen.

21 In his book MOLE Weidenfeld and Nicolson,London, 1982, William Hood refers to the GRUwalk-in Pyotr Popov as an agent-in-place, andagent and as a penetration agent (pp. 294,297-29),but not as a defector-in-place.

22 In Appendix IV under Soviet and Bloc Moles, Carllists, inter alia, Larry Wu-Tai Chin (with noapology to the Chinese), Donald Maclean who wasa penetration of the Foreign Office not a mole, andAlister Watson who was not in the Britishintelligence services and therefore a penetration orjust plain agent

23 For a discussion of the terms mole and penetration,see William R. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 113-137. Asleeper is not likely to be a mole. If one serviceachieves a penetration of another it would beextraordinary not to make use of the situation, inwhich case the penetration becomes a mole and isno longer a sleeper. A more likely scenario wouldbe for a sleeper to build his legend and after asuitable period join or be recruited by a service, atwhich point he would become a mole, if he made it

These may seem like subtle, petty, or nit-picking distinctions since the terms are sometimesused as Carl defines them, even by professionals.But this is supposed to be a dictionary and therefoercontain correct usage and definitions. Wheredifferences between technical meaning and usageexist they should be pointed out where they arefound.

24 According to Carl, who does not provide anysources for this entry, the term No Knock derivedfrom the fact that Angleton could enter AllenDulles's office (when he was DCI) "withoutknocking or being previously announced." Mr.Carl's definitions of the abbreviations DDP andDDO are also incorrect.

23 A number of Jim Angleton's former colleagues,some who agreed with him and some who did not,were asked whether they had ever called hm, orheard him referred to, by any of the nicknamesposited by Mr. Carl. Not one had, and certainly thisreviewer never did. Several also made the point that


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he never used his middle name or initial and that itwould have been uncharacteristic of him to haveentered the DCI's office without knocking orwithout being announced by the DCI's secretary.

26 For clarification of these terms see Ronald Lewin,1978, ULTRA Goes To War, McGraw-Hill, NewYork; and Gordon Welchman, 1982, The Hut SixStory: Breaking the Engima Codes, McGraw-Hill,New York, p. 77. The correct term is "bombe," theFrench for bomb. It referred to a machine, notULTRA.

27 See The World Fact Book, CIA, Washington, D.C.,1990. Map VI. Judea and Samaria are notmentioned on the map annotation or in the narrativefor the Israel or Jordan entries.

2 8 See Nigel West, 1985, A Thread Of Deceit:Espionage Myths of World War II, Random House,New York, p. 127.

29 Robert Lamphere, 1986, The FBI-KGB War: ASpecial Agent's Story, Random House, New York,p. 275.

30 The data for this entry appear to come from JohnCostello's Mask Of Treachery, William Morrow,New York, 1988, p. 190. If so, this could explainthe error in count and the names omitted, becausethe table from which the data are drawn begins onpage 189, which Carl appears to have overlooked.

31 The source here is a former Canadian SecurityService officer.

32 Parts of the non-official definitions of each of theseterms are confusing. In some cases they containconflicts and errors which are beyond the scope ofa review article to sort out.

33 Becket, op. cit.34 House of Representatives, Annual Report, by the

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, #95-1795, Washington, D.C., 1978.

35 Carl, op. cit., see entry for counterintelligence pp.83-84.

36A good treatment of the term intelligence, withofficial references, can be found in United StatesIntelligence: An Encyclopedia, edited by Bruce W.Watson, Susan M. Watson, and Gerald W. Hopple,Garland Publ. Co., New York, 1990.

37Carl also includes counterterrorism, counter-espionage, countersabotage, countersubversion andall security measures as part of counterintelligence.Thus whether or not one agrees with thisgeneralization, and it is by no means accepted asCarl states it, had he applied his definition to hisdictionary it would be many hundreds of entriessmaller. There are times when a distinction isdrawn, for emphasis, between intelligence andcounterintelligence, as in the title of this journal.Presumably, in this case, the publishers wish tomake clear that counterintelligence is included inits scope.

38The inclusion of these references to Sovietespionage and intelligence related laws isinteresting, but the absence of a similar treatment ofother services is not explained and is typical andthe ad hoc approach to selectivity taken by theauthor.

39The other intelligence dictionaries andencyclopedias cited herein may also be used butthey too contain errors. Use of more than one isadvised to check interpretations and because nonecontain all the terms.


40 Had the common or comparable data about variousintelligence services been presented in an appendixit would have been much more useful. Even alisting of names would have been valuable.

4 1 For example the DIA term PROGNOSIS, theCOMSEC term Z Variable, and the DOD termLeast Intrusive Means ate as pertinent as otherschosen by Carl and they are available ingovernment publications. For definitions of theseterms see Brace W. Watson, et. al., op. cit.

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reviews and commentary

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