UNICEF Division of Human Resources

Review of the Fast Track Recruitment Process

Enrico Leonardi, Jessica Alexander and Dr. David Bassiouni Harare/New York, January 2013

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Acknowledgements The consultants would like to thank Tanya Accone, from the Division of Human Resources, and Robert McCouch, from the Evaluation Office, for facilitating their work in Headquarters and for managing and coordinating this Review in a professional and constructive way. Support from the additional Steering Committee members, Lisa Sutton, from the Change Management Office (CMO), and James Rogan, from the Office of Emergency Programs (EMOPS), was also greatly appreciated. Additional thanks are due to Shannon McGuire Mulholland and John Paul (JP) Anderson, from the DHR Emergency Unit, for their important inputs, continuous support and assistance. During this Review, the consultants met or spoke by phone and Skype to almost 100 UNICEF staff in New York and around the world. We would like to thank all of them for their availability, time and important inputs. Three interns assisted with the population and analysis of the database: Qian He, Tianjiao Huango and Tianshu Li. Their dedication to the project and intelligent contribution have been extremely valuable and appreciated by the whole team. The team is extremely grateful for the dynamic and proactive support of Erica Mattellone, from the Evaluation Office. Her contribution to the exercise, including the training and supervision of three interns, analysis of data, bibliographic research, interviews and continuous inputs to the Review has been outstanding. Finally, the team leader would like to thank UNCEF Zimbabwe for providing him with an office, phone lines and internet connection to carry out the greatest part of the job from Harare.

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TABLES OF CONTENTS Acronyms 4 Executive Summary 5 1. Introduction 12 2. Background 12 3. Methodology 14 3.1 Project Coordination and Communication 14 3.2 Data Collection 14 3.3 Analysis and Triangulation 17 4. Findings and Conclusions 17 4.1 Application of the FTRP 17

4.2 Timeliness 19 4.3 Transparency 29 4.4 Quality and Performance of Recruits 31 4.5 Difficult Areas for Recruitment 34 4.6 Additional Positive Outcomes of the FTRP 36

4.7 Additional Negative Outcomes of the FTRP 36 4.8 Costs and Benefits 38

4.9 Other HR issues 40 4.10 Other Organisations 43 Annexes

1. Terms of Reference 2. Consultants Bios 3. Interview Guideline Forms 4. Survey Protocol 5. FTRP Database Analysis Plan 6. Breakdown of Application of FTRP by Country 7. Analysis of Timeliness 8. Interviews with Other Organisations 9. List of People Met and Interviewed 10. Documents Consulted

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Acronyms BCPR Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery C4D Communication for Development CAR Central African Republic CMO Change Management Office CO Country Office CRB Central Review Body DED Deputy Executive Director DHR Division of Human Resources DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EMOPS Office of Emergency Programmes EO Evaluation Office EPF Emergency Programme Fund EPRP Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning ERT Emergency Response Team ESARO Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office ExDir Executive Directive FGD Focus Group Discussion FO Field Office FTA Fixed-Term Appointment FTRP Fast-Track Recruitment Process FTS Fast-Track System GSC Global Service Centre HQ Headquarters HR Human Resources ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IP International Professional ITC Information and Telecommunication ITSSD Information Technology Services and Solutions Division JD Job Description KII Key Informant Interview MENARO Middle East and North Africa Regional Office NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NYHQ New York Headquarters Ops Operations oPt occupied Palestinian territories PD Programme Division PER Personal Evaluation Report PM&E Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation RD Regional Director REA Regional Emergency Advisor Rep Representative RO Regional Office ROSA South Asia Regional Office SCF-US Save the Children – United States SOLA Special Operations Living Allowance SSR Senior Staff Review SM Staff Member TA Travel Authorisation TA Temporary Appointment TACRO The Americas and Caribbean Regional Office ToR Terms of Reference UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNLP United Nations Laisser Passer UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs WCARO Western and Central Africa Regional Office WFP World Food Programme

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Executive Summary

The recruitment and deployment of qualified, skilled staff are critical determinants of UNICEF’s ability to deliver results for children and women in emergencies. Since the nineties, alongside efforts to ensure flexible funding, strengthen programmatic coordination and avail pre-positioned supplies, the Organisation has invested in measures for enhanced human resource management in humanitarian contexts. An Emergency Unit within Division of Human Resources (DHR) established after the 2004 tsunami was re-activated in 2010, after the Haiti earthquake, and has been the driving force behind the application of the newly designed Fast Track Recruitment Process (FTRP). The Executive Directive: “Recruitment and Staffing in Emergency Situations” (CF/EXD/2010-005, of 31 December 2010) establishes the FTRP to promote “agility within the bounds of compliance.” The FTRP aims to fulfil the Organisation’s need for the fast deployment of staff in emergencies, without compromising on quality. The Deputy Executive Director (DED) for Management reviews and approves the list of Country Offices (COs) which can apply the FTRP, developed on a quarterly basis by the Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS), in coordination with DHR and Programme Division, and to a lesser extent, Supply Division. Since its inception, the FTRP has been applied in 27 offices around the world to recruit and deploy more than 200 fixed-term international staff. The purpose of this Review is to analyse the implementation of this policy between 2010 and 2012, including by comparing quantitative and qualitative data relative to other recruitment processes, investigating its efficiency and effectiveness, and analysing the risks associated with practical application. A team of three consultants was commissioned to conduct this Review. The process was coordinated by representatives of the Office of the Director (DHR) and the Evaluation Office (EO), and overseen by a small Steering Group composed by representatives of DHR, Office of Emergency Programs (EMOPS), EO and Change Management Office (CMO).

The methodology of the exercise is based on quantitative and qualitative approaches, and is articulated around four core elements: - An informal desk review of relevant documents, policies, evaluations and

studies; - The development, population and analysis of a comprehensive database

including emergency recruitments since 2010 allowing for the investigation of quantitative variables, parameters and trends;

- A client survey carried out among supervisors of staff recruited either with or without the FTRP;

- More than one hundred interviews (either in small focus group discussions, FGD, or as key informant interviews, KII) carried out with key staff members (SM) in headquarters (HQ); supervisors in Country Offices (CO); supervisees in COs;

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senior managers and HR/Operations/Emergency specialists in COs and Regional Offices (RO); HR representatives from other organisations.

Data triangulated across these sources showed an overwhelming positive response by managers and staff to utilising the FTRP as an effective and efficient emergency response measure for UNICEF. A number of respondents argued that the FTRP should be expanded to all emergencies, to countries in transition whereby candidates with specific “double-skills” are needed, and to COs facing large and complex turnover of staff. Several interviewees, at all levels of the Organisation, emphasised further that the FTRP should eventually be expanded to all UNICEF recruitment processes. Other key findings are summarised below. Application of the FTRP – Clarity is required on the FTRP application in terms of CO authority to apply the process, when to apply the FTRP and the particular role of the Regional Office (RO). For example, some COs are not fully aware that when authorised, the FTRP can be utilised for all vacant positions, from Representatives to drivers. Some COs did argue, however, that the FTRP be more flexible and applied also for in-country emergency-related contexts and field offices, and not for the whole CO. It is still not clear what the specific role of the RO must play in the recruitment of international and national staff in terms of the FTRP. Timeliness – Although the FTRP still requires some further review and fine-tuning, overall it has proven to be a useful mechanism for the timely recruitment and deployment of fixed-term staff in emergencies. Analysis of data shows that certain countries (such as Ivory Coast, Sudan, South Sudan, Afghanistan and Mali) have had particular success in applying the FTRP. Besides the obvious advantages of deploying staff faster in the field, the FTRP appears to have reduced the risk of selected candidates being “stolen” by other offices or organisations, which often occurs due to the long waits associated with normal recruitment processes. Other identified benefits of the FTRP are less waiting time and frustration for candidates under recruitment, greater confidence by Representatives and senior managers in the recruitment process and more accountability to beneficiaries and partners, including donors, ultimately contributing towards UNICEF’s reputation. Proactive head-hunting, accelerated short-listing, faster turnaround of documents such as swift issuance of the offer letter have been indicated as the areas where most gains have been attained with the FTRP. Areas that still require attention include the quality of short-listing, occasional challenges with the Central Review Body (CRB), processes at CO level, administrative steps under the responsibility of the Global Service Centre (GSC), and final deployment. The creation and expansion of the Talent Groups (pools of candidates with different profiles, pre-screened and pre-cleared, who can be immediately deployed) is

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considered to be an important positive initiative. Most of the participants in the Review appreciate their potential, although many stressed that these Talent Groups are still limited in scope, under-populated and cannot be directly accessed by COs. Transparency – This Review revealed no evidence of any difference in the perceived transparency of the FTRP compared to other recruitment processes. In principle, the policy of the FTRP allows for some recruitment steps to be omitted (such as vacancy advertisement or the CRB), although in most cases COs prefer to maintain all steps in the recruitment process, and focus instead on accelerating procedures. Several interviewees indicated that a more flexible and faster emergency CRB should be considered in all FTRP recruitments, with the only exception of those few necessary at the beginning of new major crises. It should be noted that during this Review, concerns were raised by COs, especially amongst senior managers, about what many stated as “the excessive pressure from DHR” to consider people on abolished posts in selection processes, who are not necessarily perceived as qualified for the job at hand. While there is a recognition that all UNICEF offices have a responsibility to support the policy for the recruitment of this category of staff, respondents felt that the additional work required to justify why a CO does not intend to hire a candidate on abolished post is counterproductive in an emergency and a cause of delays, and could potentially negatively impact on the overall transparency of the recruitment process. Quality and Performance – The database revealed no differences between the quality and performance of international staff recruited with or without the FTRP. In comparing the job description (JD) and resume of candidates, and reviewing references and personal evaluation reports (PER), no discrepancies exist between different recruitment processes. This is further underlined by the perception of the majority of UNICEF staff interviewed: only nine cases of “wrong recruitment” – namely, staff unsuited to the task for which they were recruited – were mentioned out of 87 interviews, and only one of these could be attributed to the FTRP. Some interviewees felt that using the FTRP actually increased the probability of selecting better candidates, due to the increased focus and attention on the selection process. An analysis of disciplinary actions against staff recruited with the FTRP did not provide evidence of a correlation between the utilisation of this recruitment system and an increased number of disciplinary cases. Negative Outcomes – Risks associated with the FTRP have been identified only in the event of poor application of the approach by COs and HR. This underlines the importance of having a clear understanding of the FTRP at all levels of the Organisation (HQ, RO and CO), of defining some unclear roles and responsibilities, and the importance for the COs – ultimately the Representative – to learn how to “navigate” the system in close coordination with the DHR Emergency Unit. Costs and Benefits – All respondents (32) agreed that the benefits of maintaining the DHR Emergency Unit to support the implementation of the FTRP outweigh the costs,

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and that the Unit should continue to be funded. Its role cannot be overestimated and the attitude, pro-activity and creativity of the team is noted and appreciated by most respondents. Among interviewees who offered additional comments (21), about half deemed the current size of the Unit about right for the routine job of assisting small scale and chronic crises; the others thought that its size should be expanded. An “accordion” model, expanded and down-sized depending on needs, has been proposed by several respondents in the event of new large, Level 3 crises or multiple Level 2 crises: pre-selected and pre-trained staff (from other DHR Divisions, from rosters) should temporarily strengthen the Unit’s capacities, and costs should be covered by various funding sources (emergency programme fund; Executive Director Discretionary Fund; fundraising done by affected CO/s). Other Human Resources Issues – During the Review, the consultants identified issues and areas of HR beyond the FTRP, which should be taken into consideration in any divisional strategic and planning exercise since they have a bearing on the mechanism. The most important has been the widespread feeling among interviewed staff that the Organisation needs a clear, realistic and credible rotation policy. This and other findings are comprehensively described in the Report.

Recommendations What follows, is the synthesis of key findings and consequent recommendations proposed for the FTRP. All findings are further articulated and detailed in the text of this Report. Some of the recommendations extend beyond the scope and functions of the FTRP itself, and are broader proposals to enhance the effectiveness of UNICEF HR in emergencies.

FINDINGS RECOMMENDATIONS Application of the FTRP1 Limited understanding and occasional misconceptions about the role and scope of the FTRP among certain ROs and COs.

- DHR should ensure that all ROs and COs have the same understanding of the application of the FTRP, for all vacant positions, and for specific internal situations and contexts. This would require a review of the FTRP policy, and a global awareness campaign among senior managers and HR officers at all levels of the Organisation and especially in those regions and countries where its application has been limited due to undue concerns and occasional misconceptions.

- DHR should clarify the role played by ROs in the application of the FTRP, including in the use of the approach for national staff positions in the COs.

1 Some of the findings and recommendations included here in the “Application of the FTRP” boxes incorporate findings are recommendations detailed in the text under the chapter “Additional Negative Outcomes of the FTRP”.

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Challenges faced by several COs to cope with the increased influx of new staff, accelerated by the FTRP. Perceived usefulness of increased flexibility in the application of FTRP to specific contexts and situations.

COs, with the support of the Regional Emergency Advisors (REA), and in coordination with EMOPS, should include the FTRP in all Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning (EPRP) tools and trainings. Specifically, CO HR, Operations, Administration and ITC Units, should include provisions for sudden increases of staff in their sections of the EPRP exercises and plans. EMOPS/DHR should start including specific situations and contexts in the list of COs authorised to use the FTRP, and CO Representatives should advocate with respective ROs, EMOPS and DHR for the inclusion of these specific internal situations and contexts in the official FTRP quarterly list.

Timeliness Recognition of the potential usefulness of the Talent Groups, associated with limited understanding of their use. Occasional poor quality of short-lists proposed to COs. Steps of the FTRP process at CO level constitute the main source of delays in the majority of cases. Role of the CRB in the FTRP perceived as broadly

DHR should continue populating the Talent Groups and provide COs clarity on their purpose and use. Once the utilisation of Talent Groups becomes more operational and frequent, DHR should undertake a review of its efficiency and effectiveness in relation and comparison to other recruitment processes. DHR should propose a “communication protocol” – to be potentially included in the review of the FTRP policy – between its Emergency Unit and COs, to help clarifying profile requirements, allow for better targeted short-listing and avoid unnecessary delays. - COs selected to apply the FTRP should commit to speeding

up selection and recommendation procedures and establish internal targets progressively aiming at the 20 day established target.

- Plans for faster selection and recruitment processes in emergency should be included in the COs’ EPRP processes and initiatives.

- DHR Emergency Unit should assist in monitoring and reporting on the performances and trends of all COs utilising the FTRP.

- DHR should undertake an in-depth review of the application of the FTRP at CO level to identify and collect best practices, and disseminate them for replication among other COs.

DHR Mobility and Staffing Section should revise the role of the CRB in the FTRP, and specifically consider:

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necessary, although in need of shortening and fine-tuning. Delays caused by occasional poor quality of recommendation documents submitted by COs to CRB, through the DHR Emergency Unit. Bottlenecks identified at GSC level causing delays in the entitlement and administrative steps of all recruitment processes. Delays and glitches caused by differences of internal structure of DHR units: geographic versus functional. Problems faced by COs in emergency due to long deployment time of newly recruited staff.

i) re-activating the emergency CRB and establishing credible and ambitious time targets;

ii) re-stressing the roles and responsibilities of CRB members as framed by the CRB ToR, and providing additional training for its use in the FTRP;

iii) clarifying the few situations when the CRB can be completely skipped.

- COs should undertake adequate quality assurance to

ensure the recommendations they submit to the CRB meet the required standards.

- DHR Emergency Unit should dedicate more attention to review selection documentation coming from COs to ensure its sufficient quality before submission to the CRB.

GSC, with the broader involvement and support of DHR and of ITSSD when necessary, should pursue the already started initiatives, and specifically aim at: i) building on the momentum created for electronic records

management (i.e. digitalisation of HR paper Official Status Files), expand the use of e-Recruitment to all HR administrative steps managed by GSC and provide training on this system;

ii) ensure that UNICEF senior management allocate sufficient resources to support GSC staff dedicated to emergencies (1 P2/3 Officer, 1 GS6);

iii) expand opportunities for communication and exchanges between GSC and other DHR sections, both formally and informally, to improve relations and collaboration.

DHR should undertake a review of the internal structure of its organisational units with the aim of optimising coordination and processes. DHR should bring some clarity to the deployment timing issue, defining simple rules for major crises (for example, maximum one month for Level 2 and Level 3 crises), and for other emergency contexts (for example, one month when the SM is coming from a non-emergency country; maximum two months, but preferably less, if coming from an emergency country). These decisions should be formalised and disseminated, and made clear to short-listed candidates during interviews.

Transparency

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Perceptions and misconceptions about SMs on abolished posts, and concerns about application of the existing policy in emergencies.

DHR should clarify and widely disseminate the policy regarding SMs on abolished posts, and counterbalance the misconception that these are “poor quality” staff. Also, it must be ensured that in emergency recruitments SMs on abolished post should be “considered” and not “imposed” by DHR.

Difficult Areas for Recruitment Existing and increasing challenges in attracting good candidates to specific locations and positions, compounded by decrease of benefits in hardship duty stations.

In the broader development of a clear and credible rotation policy, DHR should consider providing incentives to attract candidates to hardship duty stations, and rewarding SMs who have successfully served there. DHR should encourage and support country- and regional-level initiatives aimed at tackling hiring difficulties, eventually reviewing these, and facilitating best-practice exchanges.

Costs and Benefits Large increase of cost per FTRP recruitment between 2011 and 2012. Widespread appreciation at all levels of the Organisation for the support provided by the DHR Emergency Unit, and perceived need to ensure its long-term sustainability. Perceived importance of increasing its flexibility for expansion during large crises. Perceived need of ensuring knowledge about the role, structure, responsibilities and scope of the DHR Emergency Unit throughout the Organisation.

DHR Emergency Unit should undertake an in-depth financial analysis of its yearly costs (and those of contributing DHR Units) and revise the financial plan for the maintenance of its core team and functions, including yearly targets. DED (Management) should ensure regular funding for the maintenance of the core staff and functioning of Emergency Unit. DHR Business Partners, in coordination with EMOPS, should design a clear “accordion model” for its expansion and downsizing, including pre-selection and pre-training of additional staff. DHR Business Partners should disseminate information about any change in the funding, structure, strategy and working models of the DHR Emergency Unit, including possible appointment of dedicated staff to chronic emergencies, as well as its role in the wellbeing of SM hired with the FTRP.

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1. Introduction UNICEF has been, from the beginning of its operations after World War II, a key actor in the response to humanitarian crises. Over the past 20 years UNICEF’s emergency role has progressively expanded programmatically, financially and operationally as the agency has strived to improve its performance in responding to humanitarian crises. Also in response to changing contextual and global trends, major steps have been taken to increase predictability and timeliness into the availability of qualified staff, pre-position supplies and ensure flexible funding at the beginning of a new emergency or the continuation of an existing one. UNICEF has established different structures to address the challenge of having the right people in the right place at the right time. The Division of Human Resources (DHR), in conjunction with other Divisions (EMOPS and Programme Division, PD), has played a leading role. This exercise has tried to systematically and objectively review the utilisation and performance of the latest of these structures: the Fast Track Recruitment Process (FTRP), initiated in 2010. The Review was carried out by a small team of three independent external consultants, each bringing different expertise, backgrounds and perspectives. Their bios are included in Annex 2 of this Report. The work was completed in coordination with counterparts in UNICEF DHR and EO, in consultation with key stakeholders including EMOPS and PD, and guided by the ToR included in Annex 1 to this report.

2. Background Following the Haiti earthquake in January 2010, and the urgent need to deploy large numbers of high-calibre staff to the field, UNICEF’s DHR re-established a dedicated emergency unit, and introduced in May of the same year an emergency recruitment process. Based on the experience gained through the application of this process in Haiti, in December 2010 DHR promulgated – with the issuance of the Executive Directive CF/EXD/2010-005 of 31 December 2010 – the “Recruitment and Staffing in Emergency Situations” (known as the “Fast Track”), as the main policy guiding the modus operandi for the recruitment and deployment of staff in humanitarian crises. The main principle of the policy is “agility within the bounds of compliance”, and aims at fulfilling the organisation’s needs for fast deployment of fixed-term staff in emergencies without compromising on quality.

The Fast Track allows offices facing emergencies to limit and accelerate some recruitment procedures and completely skip some of the steps required in the regular processes.

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Formally utilised as of January 2011, the Fast Track policy has been operational for almost two years, and has so far been applied by 27 UNICEF offices2 around the world. It is automatically applied for all emergencies defined as Level 2 and 3 for the organisation. The Emergency Unit within DHR manages the Fast Track system. Four fixed-term staff and three consultants currently staff the Unit, based in HQ. A lessons-learned exercise was carried out in 2012 to assess UNICEF’s response to the complex humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa in 2010-20113. It highlighted the FTRP as one of the main mechanisms supporting the organisational success in that crisis. Additional anecdotal feedback from senior leaders in the organisation indicates a generally positive experience with the FTRP, but concerns exist around the risk of selecting poorer quality candidates for a fixed-term position within the Organisation in the attempt to achieve faster, more flexible recruitment processes. This would represent a risk for the credibility and reputation of the Organisation. For these reasons, and to guide future organisational decisions on human resources processes and policies, DHR proposed to carry out this systematic, impartial and objective review of the FTRP since its inception in 2010. The objective of this review was: “to determine, as systemically and objectively as possible, the overall effectiveness of the Fast Track Recruitment Process in meeting UNICEF’s need for timely, qualified personnel in the emergencies in which it has been used, and in so in a manner consistent with broader organisational priorities (e.g. general rules and regulations governing staffing, risk management, cost-effectiveness, efficiency and competitiveness within the industry).” Its main purpose being: “to foster early learning among DHR and other key stakeholders, with a view to suggesting concrete ways to improve its functioning moving forward and ultimately help the Organisation maximise its performance in emergencies.” In addition to the main questions outlined in the project ToR and the Inception Note around the FTRP’s effectiveness, efficiency and relevance to date, the Review incorporates an analysis of the risks associated with the application and non-application of the mechanism.

2 Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, East and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office (MENARO), Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, West and Central Africa Regional Office (WCARO) and Yemen. 3 “UNICEF’s Response to the Emergency in the Horn of Africa, 2011-2012: Lesson-Learning Exercise. Final Report Summary” – Evaluation Office (EO) August 2012

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3. Methodology A more detailed description of the methodologies applied, including a data analysis plan, and of the consultant team is included in Annex to this report. What follows is a synthesis of the main approaches and methods utilised during the exercise, including the description of their challenges and limitations. 3.1 Project Coordination and Communication Throughout the exercise, the consultants interacted with key counterparts in the Office of the Director of DHR and in the Evaluation Office to ensure that evaluation standards were sufficiently pursued, that the objectives defined in the ToR were fulfilled, and that connections within and outside of the Organisation were facilitated. A small Steering Group composed of representatives of DHR, EMOPS, EO and Change Management Office (CMO) provided guidance to the team and helped strengthening the credibility of the exercise. Although the exercise was managed by DHR, it was done at the most senior level and entirely removed from the implementation of the FTRP. This was to ensure credibility of the report and analysis. In addition, the ToR was drafted and finalised by EO, which was involved in every step of this exercise. DHR was also forthcoming in providing all of the necessary raw data for the exercise and did not in any way interfere with the analysis. 3.2 Data Collection Several data-collection approaches were used which complemented each other and ensured triangulation. These included both qualitative and quantitative techniques and are explained in greater detail below. 3.2.1 Development and Analysis of Recruitment Database A master database was developed, including all recruitments outside Headquarters locations (New York, Geneva, Brussels, Tokyo) between 2008 and 2012 (N=1,842). The total population for the period 2010-2012 included 850 recruits of which 208 FTRP and 642 non-FTRP. With assistance from the EO, a sample of 683 recruits was drawn for extrapolation to the population of UNICEF emergency recruitments. (This sample size entails a 3.5-point margin of error at the 95% level of confidence.) Among these, all those hired from April 2010 (N=376, 184 FTRP and 192 non-FTRP), when the FTRP started being informally applied in Haiti, were analysed. The analysis focused on differences between the regular recruitment and Fast Track recruitment processes. Owing to the need to over-sample FTRP recruits for optimal statistical validity, the dataset was weighted accordingly and thus the analysis and data reflect the ‘true’ population4.

4 The weighting was calculated as follows: Weight for FTRP = # of FTRP in the population / #of FTRP in the sample (208/184=1.13). Weight for non-FTRP = #of non-FTRP in the population / # of non-FTRP in the sample (642/192=3.34)

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Entering the data was a cumbersome process. All data came from e-Recruitment; the files within contained information that was directly input into the database. DHR entered data for a number of variables, including PER, timing of recruitment, supervisors, basic data on each candidate. Some of this information was automated by e-Recruitment (in particular data related to timing) but the other information had to be entered manually, which led to a few errors. Matching supervisor and supervisee names were found to be in some cases incorrect, and the team alerted DHR about these problems while trying to correct the majority of them. There was also incomplete data for the following variables: reference documentation, PER documentation, timing related to the issuing of the detailed offer letter, and deployment timing. When analysis of these variables was done, the lower sample size has been noted. The complete data analysis plan is included in Annex 5 of this report. 3.2.2 Informal Desk Review Different categories of documents were reviewed by the consultants to provide background information that contributed to the analytical and triangulation phases of the review. These include: - UNICEF HR manuals, policy document, Executive Directives, guidelines,

statistics, etc. referring to recruitment in emergency. - Evaluations, Lesson Learned studies, reviews, main planning and reporting

documents related to previous humanitarian crises. - Internal Audit Reports on HR issues and on Emergencies. - Relevant financial documents describing broad costs sustained for the

implementation of the FTRP. - Human Resources and recruitment documents, policies and guidelines from

other organisations.

A detailed list of documents consulted is included in Annex 10 to this report. 3.2.3 Client Survey A client survey was conducted, targeting all supervisors of emergency recruits hired with or without the Fast Track process between 2010 and 2012. The survey was constructed on Survey Monkey, and launched with an official message from the Director of DHR, to increase response rates. The purpose of the survey was to determine what differences exist (if any) between the recruitment process and quality of candidates for both FTRP and non-FTRP staff. The survey asked supervisors to rate the openness, fairness and timeliness of recruitment processes, and quality and overall performance of the selected candidates. It also asked supervisors to rate their satisfaction with the performance of the recruit in order to determine any differences in quality between FTRP and non-FTRP recruits. The survey included both closed-ended and open-ended questions allowing for qualitative information. The Survey Protocol is included in Annex 4 to this report.

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Some limitations affected the effectiveness of the client survey. Due to the mismatching of supervisors and supervisees in the database, on a number of occasions the supervisor to whom the survey was sent did not recognise the name of the supervisee that he/she was meant to reply about. If the respondent sent an email asking for clarification, personal emails were sent back to them and the problems were resolved. Yet, it is unknown how many of these mismatches occurred without the team being able to rectify the situation. This may have led to a lower response rate, as supervisees may not have been able to recognise their staff members and disregarded the survey without alerting the team. Despite three reminder messages to supervisors, the response rate was lower than expected. A total of 55 people responded (26 from Fast Track and 29 from non-Fast Track). Although this has not yielded a statistically significant response rate, the results are indicative of larger trends and the open-ended responses are also valuable in pointing to issues and confirmed trends found during interviews. 3.2.4 Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) One of the main methodological components of the Review were ninety-nine interviews with UNICEF staff (49 females, 50 males; either in form on KIIs or small FGDs) carried out in New York HQ or by phone and Skype with various COs and ROs5. These interviews were divided in four categories: - Senior managers, DHR and other Divisions staff in NYHQ: N=31; 19 females, 12

males. - Senior managers in COs and ROs: N=44; 23 females, 21 males (COs: 11 Reps, 4

Deputy Reps, 12 HR Chiefs/Specialists, 5 Operations Chiefs, 1 Emergency Specialist. ROs: 3 Reg. Directors, 1 Deputy RD, 3 Reg. Emergency Advisors, 3 Reg. HR Chiefs/Specialists).

- Supervisors in COs: N=12; 3 females, 9males. - Supervisees (FTRP and non-FTRP recruits) in COs: N=12; 4 females, 8 males. In addition, 11 interviews (7 females, 4 males), were conducted either face-to-face or by phone, with representatives from other organisations, both UN and non-UN6. The consultants experienced some challenges organising and conducting some interviews, due to the low response rates from supervisors and supervisees, and the supervisor/supervisees mismatching errors provided by DHR. All interviews were aided by specific interview guides included in Annex 3 to this report. The complete list of people interviewed is included in Annex 9 to this report. 5 The following COs (27) and ROs (5) were involved in one or more of these interviews: Mali, South Sudan, Libya, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Yemen, Kenya, Niger, Uganda, Pakistan, Iraq, Liberia, Central African Republic (CAR), Afghanistan, Cameroon, Mauritania, Sudan, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haiti, Sierra Leone, Bangladesh, occupied Palestinian territories (oPt), Nicaragua, Madagascar, Mozambique, WCARO, ESARO, MENARO, TACRO, ROSA 6 UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women, UNOCHA, WFP, ICRC, and Save the Children US.

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3.3 Analysis and Triangulation Data collected through these approaches was analysed and compared to identify trends, divergences and patterns. Findings and issues from different methodological approaches were triangulated and further analysed to corroborate the evidence. Trends that emerged in the qualitative interviews were further investigated in the database to determine the consistency of the findings. Furthermore, when trends emerged in the course of the interviews, additional analysis was suggested to the database to corroborate these findings.

4. Findings and Conclusions “The FTRP is too simple and elegant for UNICEF; someone might change it!”

Country Office Representative 4.1 Application of the FTRP The FTRP has been so far applied in 24 countries in five UNICEF regions, and three ROs7. Some COs and ROs have a better understanding of its application than others and there is a need to clarify parts of its supporting policy. The list of countries allowed to apply the FTRP is discussed on a quarterly basis by EMOPS in consultation with DHR Emergency Unit and Programme Division (Supply Division is less systematically involved). Specific indicators including scale, urgency, complexity, capacity, and reputational risk to the Organisation are reviewed. The proposed list is submitted to the Deputy Executive Director (DED) for final review and approval. Senior EMOPS managers believe that the final approval of the list should be their responsibility, in light of the level of accountability the office already has with regard to emergencies. An informal agreement between UNICEF HQ Divisions maintains the list of countries allowed to utilise the FTRP remain at an average of 10 at any given time, with a degree of flexibility allowed to increase this number in the event of multiple simultaneous crises. At HQ level, there is a general understanding that once a CO is included in the list of FTRP countries, all vacant positions – ranging from the Rep to the drivers – can be filled through the FTRP. With the exceptions of few COs, the same understanding is shared at the field level. For both FTRP and non-FTRP, regions with the most recruitment cases are ESARO and WCARO, which account for 51.6% and 62% of the total recruitment cases for FTRP and non-FTRP respectively. MENA and ROSA account for 33% of the total FTRP cases and 20% of the total non-FTRP case.

7 See Footnote 2, page 14

18

Percentage of Track Cases by Region

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia are the top two countries with the most FTRP cases, which account for 16.3% and 11.4% of all FTRP cases respectively. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chad, Sudan have also made extensive use of the FTRP. A detailed breakdown of the application of the FTRP by country is included in Annex 6. The Executive Directive 2010-005 states that “the Director (EMOPS) shall pronounce an ‘emergency situation’ for a country, region or subject-matter area8”, offering some additional flexibility to the application of the FTRP to specific contexts inside a country. This is the general interpretation at DHR level. At field level however, several COs are not aware of this interpretation, but would welcome it as some of them indicated the suitability to apply the FTRP to specific internal situations and contexts, and not necessarily to the whole office. A good example is the Dadaab Field Office in Kenya: while the Kenya CO is not currently on the list of FTRP countries, Dadaab is still responding to the Somali refugee crisis, and recruiting staff has been and is still extremely challenging and slow. Kenya CO, like other COs facing similar situations, would greatly benefit from the utilisation of the FTRP for Dadaab. More clarity on these aspects of the FTRP policy would allow Reps to better advocate for its application and COs to utilise it more efficiently. RECOMMENDATIONS 1- DHR should ensure that all ROs and COs have the same understanding of the

application of the FTRP, for all vacant positions, and for specific internal situations and contexts. This would require a review of the FTRP policy, and a global awareness campaign among senior managers and HR officers.

2- EMOPS/DHR should start including specific situations and contexts in the list of COs authorised to use the FTRP, and Representatives should advocate with respective ROs, EMOPS and DHR for the inclusion of these specific internal situations and contexts in the official FTRP quarterly list.

8 An example of a “subject-matter area” is a potential avian influenza pandemic, which might affect certain technical functions across all UNICEF offices globally.

2.70%

15.60%

31.80%

9.80% 9.80% 10.50%

19.80%

27.40%

16.30% 16.80%

4.80%

34.60%

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

30.00%

35.00%

40.00%

CEE/CIS EAPRO ESARO MENA ROSA TACRO WCARO

non-FT FT

19

4.2 Timeliness To what extent has the Fast Track Recruitment Process enabled timely recruitment of staff, fit-for-purpose to the specific functional needs at hand, in the emergencies in which it has been implemented? How much more or less timely, effective, efficient and relevant have Fast Track Recruitments been in relation to standard, non-Fast Track recruitments during the period under review?9 According to the majority of every category of staff interviewed, the speed of the FTRP has been its major accomplishment. As one Representative said, comparing the FTRP to the regular recruiting processes, “is like comparing day and night”. The targets established by DHR for the process have not been attained yet, and the analysis of data clearly underlines that there is still room for improvement in certain areas (hiring recommendations at CO level, entitlements) and fine-tuning of certain steps (CRB, short-listing). However, the FTRP demonstrates that UNICEF has the internal capacity to significantly improve its recruitment processes. In response to the enhanced reputational risk for the Organisation in humanitarian crises, the main objective of the FTRP is to speed up the deployment of staff in emergencies. 56 days is the agreed target indicated by DHR for the period between the end of the vacancy advertisement and the issuing of the initial offer letter. A more ambitious target of 30 days for the same steps has been mentioned by some staff in DHR, but it has not yet been formally adopted. An indicative target of 20 days has been given by DHR to recruiting COs, from the moment they receive the short-list of candidates from DHR till the formalisation and submission of their recommendation. Several COs feel that this is quite a tight and demanding target, though at the same time is a good objective as it offers the opportunity to Representatives to place pressure on their staff. The appreciation of the FTRP timeliness is very consistent: 40 out of the 44 interviews carried out among senior managers and HR staff specifically mentioned their satisfaction with the speed of the process. The most cited positive effect of the increase of speed is the decreased risk of losing good candidates because of long processes. In an increasingly competitive market for high calibre staff in emergencies, this aspect has great significance. In addition, according to several interviewees at CO level, frustration among candidates who have to wait “in limbo” without information on the status of their application is significantly reduced. The perception of the staff recruited through the FTRP confirms these aspects. Out of the 12 supervisees interviewed, 9 of the 11 FTRP recruits who replied found the process quite fast to very fast, in comparison with other recruitment processes by which they were previously recruited. Interestingly, the two exceptions who did not find the FTRP fast came from the same CO, and both cases underlined delays at CO

9 Orange boxes propose the main questions asked by the ToR of this Review and refined in the Inception Note (both in Annex).

20

level (weak HR planning, limited HR capacities, difficulties in reaching quorum for interviews) as the main reasons for slowness. In one case, a very long short-listing further compounded the process. Only one non-FTRP supervisee found the recruitment process very slow. The client survey indicates less polarised positions. Among supervisors who responded about FTRP recruits, 36% of them found this process faster or much faster than other recruitments they had seen, 48% about the same, and 16% slower or much slower. Among those who responded about non-FTRP recruits, 30% of them found this process faster or much faster, 44% about the same, and 26% slower or much slower. Similar less polarised positions stemmed from the question about levels of satisfaction about the recruitment time of different processes (60% of FTRP supervisors and 58% of non-FTRP supervisors “satisfied” or “very satisfied”). Open-ended questions in the same survey though, offer a more polarised image, with four supervisors of FTRP recruits out of four commenting positively on the greater speed of the process and two supervisors of non-FTRP recruits out of two complaining about the slowness of normal recruitment processes. 10 of the 12 supervisors interviewed confirmed their satisfaction with the improved speed of the FTRP.

17%

28%

13%

8%

44%

48%

22%

8%

4%

8%

Non-Fast Track

Fast Track

Compared to other emergency recruitment processes which you have observed, how much faster or slower was the process for this

candidate?

Much Faster (5) Faster (4) About the Same (3) Slower (2) Much Slower (1)

12%

20%

46%

40%

31%

32%

12%

8%

Non-Fast Track

Fast Track

How Satisfied or Dissatisfied Were You With the Time Taken to Recruit the Candidate?

Very Satisfied (4) Satisfied (3) Somewhat Satisfied (2) Not Satisfied At All (1)

21

The findings from the database confirm the faster speed of the FTRP and provide additional information. The analysis looked at the median10 timeliness of the various steps of the different recruitment processes utilised by UNICEF (Regular IP Positions, Executive Decisions11, NETI Positions12, Emergency Decisions13, Direct Selection on IP Positions14), and compared these with the FTRP (Emergency Decisions from 2011). Based on the better quality of available data, the exercise focused mainly on the differences in the period between the end of the vacancy advertisement and the issuing of the initial letter of offer. It should be noted that this is also the period of time DHR utilises for monitoring the performance of different recruitment processes15. A more detailed description of the analysis carried out to compare timeliness of different recruitment processes is included in Annex 7 of this Report.

As the above graph shows, the FTRP (73 days) appears a faster recruitment process than the Regular IP Position recruitment (102 days) and the total of all non-FTRP recruitments (94 days). As expected, it is slower than the processes that follow special procedures (NETI, 46 days; Executive Decisions, 9 days; and Direct

10 Use of median - The median represents the most central value in a distribution. In this report, we have used the median as it best retains this central tendency in the distribution and is not as strongly influenced by outliers and skewed data. The median total number of days for the recruitment timeframe is generated by arranging all the observations from lowest value to highest value and picking the central one, instead of adding up medians from each individual step. Since the distribution of observations differs from step to step, the distribution of the total number is also different from each step. Therefore, the sum of the individual medians is not equal to the median total. 11 “ The Executive Director has the authority to reassign a staff member from one post to another, and to appoint staff members in a way that best serves the interest of UNICEF”. Executive Directive CF/EXD/2009-008 on “Staff Selection Policy”, para 10.1. 12 “The NETI programme focuses on attracting, selecting, developing and retaining new talent from entry to mid-career levels to grow and to develop in the organisation” Executive Directive CF/EXD/2011-006: “New and Emerging Talent Initiative (NETI) program”. 13 Emergency Decisions for the non-FTRP are those that happened before the FTRP was established – primarily Haiti cases. 14 “Direct Selection on IP Positions” indicates selections from Talent Groups. 15 Mobility and Staffing Section in DHR offered these figures in October 2012 related to the period between the end of the vacancy advertisement and the issuing of the first offer letter: Direct Selection, 42 days; Regular Recruitment, 72 days, and FTRP 68 days.

3

7

4

14

13

4

2

27

15

45.5

55

48

54

5

1

15.5

11.5

19

17

3.5

2

5

3

2

Executive Decision - IP

Emergency Decision - IP

Direct Selection IP Positions

NETI Positions

Regular IP Positions

Total

Emergency Decision - IP

no

n-F

TF

T

Comparison of Median No. of Days Across Recruitment Steps

Shortlist Office Review and Recommendation DHR Approval Process Initial Offer Letter

N= 208, Med Total = 73

N=7, Med Total = 66

N=90, Med Total = 41.5

N= 641, Med Total = 94

N= 508, Med Total = 102

N=27, Med Total = 41.5

N=10, Med Total = 9

22

Selections 41.5 days). It appears also slower than Emergency Decisions before the formal application of the FTRP (41.5 days); this might be justified by the urgency of these recruitments, mainly in Haiti, and the lack of a policy framework regulating them. The most notable finding is the very similar length of FTRP (54 days) and regular recruitments (55 days) processes at CO level. This indicates that while the COs benefit from the faster steps at HQ level, they tend to apply the same approaches and take the same time for the selection and recommendation steps with the FTRP as they do with regular recruitments. Some COs indicated that sometimes the quality of the shortlist sent by DHR is not very good, and requires some back-and-forth to revise it. This could potentially add more days to the process steps at CO level. A more in-depth analysis of the breakdown of the FTRP timeliness among COs offers some explanations:

62

5

1

1

23

21

5

5

9

10.5

4

17

2

4

4

10.5

3

4

25

2.5

3

1

5.5

4.5

1

3

13

125

138

118

104

58

42

84

58

71

45.5

72

43

64.5

61

47

44

45

48

30

37

46

41

23

34.5

29.5

25

13

3

7.5

15

30

48

6

24

7

12

6

17

1

1

1

0.5

3

3

15

2

4

3

5.5

2.5

20

5

1

1

4

Nigeria (N=1)

Mauritania (N=1)

Djibouti (N=2)

Niger (N=1)

Cameroon (N=1)

CAR (N=1)

Ethiopia (N=10)

Iraq (N=1)

Yemen (N=10)

Chad (N=14)

Somalia (N=24)

oPt (N=1)

DRC (N=34)

Pakistan (N=15)

Kenya (N=10)

Liberia (N=5)

Haiti (N=10)

Libya (N=6)

Eritrea (N=1)

MENA (N=2)

Mali (N=10)

South Sudan (N=20)

Afghanistan (N=8)

ESARO (N=2)

Sudan (N=11)

Cote d'Ivoire (N=5)

Uganda (N=1)

FTRP Recruitment Steps by Country

Shortlist Office Review and Recommendation Process DHR Approval Process Initial Offer Letter

Note: 1. The figure next to each bar is the median of sub-total from end of vacancy announcement to issuance of the offer letter, which may differ from the sum of medians from individual steps. 2. The order of countries is based on the median of sub-total from end of vacancy announcement to issuance of the offer letter, instead of the sum of individual steps.3. The number in the brackets after country name is the number of cases at the time of issuance of the offer letter.4. M on the right side stands for the median of sub-total from end of vacancy announcement to issuance of the offer letter for each country.

M=34

M=35.5

M=39.5

M=45

M=50

M=50

M=55

M=55

M=57

M=59

M=60

M=67

M=68

M=71

M=75

M=77

M=81

M=84

M=84

M=91

M=91

M=111

M=112

M=121

M=131.5

M=146

M=200

Note: 1. The figure next to each bar is the median of sub-total from end of vacancy announcement to issuance of the offer letter, which may differ from the sum of medians from individual steps. 2. The order of countries is based on the median of sub-total from end of vacancy announcement to issuance of the offer letter, instead of the sum of individual steps.3. The number in the brackets after country name is the number of cases at the time of issuance of the offer letter.4. M on the right side stands for the median of sub-total from end of vacancy announcement to issuance of the offer letter for each country.

M=34

M=35.5

M=39.5

M=45

M=50

M=50

M=55

M=55

M=57

M=59

M=60

M=67

M=68

M=71

M=75

M=77

M=81

M=84

M=84

M=91

M=91

M=111

M=112

M=121

M=131.5

M=146

M=200

1

2

23

From the graph, it appears that some COs have utilised and managed the FTRP more successfully than others. Afghanistan, Ivory Coast and Sudan managed to keep the median of the process steps at CO level below 30 days. Five countries – Ivory Coast, Sudan, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Mali16 – have already outperformed the established target of 56 days. At the other end of the curve, COs – such as CAR, Cameroon, Niger, Djibouti, Mauritania and Nigeria – have unsuccessfully managed only one or two FTRP cases. Among the reasons cited, were a limited understanding of the FTRP, lack of support and advice from respective ROs, specific peculiarities of the CO, and weaknesses of HR units. Information collected from the interviews at CO level adds some clarity. Afghanistan, South Sudan and Mali COs strongly stressed their appreciation for the FTRP and in all cases, staff interviewed showed a very clear understanding of the FTRP, indicating the reasons for their positive performance. Other COs that appreciated and benefited from the FTRP, such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Yemen, Chad and DRC, stressed that while the process greatly helped them speed up various recruitment steps, they faced major challenges in managing the selection steps at CO level, from the reception of the short-list to the submission of the recommendation to DHR. Difficulties in organising selection panels and the general excessive workload associated with large development programmes coupled with emergency response were indicated as the main reasons for these consistent delays at CO level.

The above graph extends the timeliness analysis to the last steps of the recruitment process: issuing of the detailed letter of offer and deployment. Much less data was available for these two steps than for precedent steps. Nonetheless, it is interesting to notice that for the issuing of the detailed letter of appointment, which entails the

16 Uganda, ESARO and MENA are not included due to the very low number of FTRP cases treated.

21

21

14

3

14

13

4

27

2

15

45.5

55

48

54

1

5

15.5

11.5

19

17

3.5

5

3

2

14

8

8.5

25

14

14

13

29.5

72

49

24.5

49.5

43

40

Emergency Decision - IP

Executive Decision - IP

Direct Selection IP Positions

NETI Positions

Regular IP Positions

Total

Emergency Decision - IP

no

n-FT

FT

Comparison of Median No. of Days Across Recruitment Steps

Vacancy Announcement Shortlist Office Review and Recommendation Process DHR Approval Process Initial Offer Letter Detailed Offer Letter Deployment

Total Med = 173

Total Med = 107.5

Total Med = 131

Total Med = 90

Total Med = 137.5

Total Med = 183.5

Total Med = 131

22 4

7

14

2

Note: Sample size for all steps FT=208, Non-FT= 641) , except the sample size for Detailed Offer Letter (FT= 131, Non-FT=468) and Deployment (FT= 123, Non-

FT=458).

24

various administrative and entitlement steps under the responsibility of DHR Global Service Centre (GSC) the differences between the FTRP and regular recruitments, as well as between FTRP and the total of all other recruitments, are extremely limited. This indicates that once the recruitment process exits the DHR Emergency Unit, no fast-track approaches are successfully implemented to keep speeding it up. The consultants looked at different steps of the selection and recruitment process, to identify major areas of time-gain and persisting bottlenecks and delays. Classification – Generic Job Descriptions (JD) exist for approximately 120 common positions. The general recommendation of DHR to recruiting offices is to use these generic JDs, especially in emergencies. Nonetheless, occasionally a new JD is necessary for a context-specific function. If limited changes to a generic JD are sufficient, DHR suggests including these in the vacancy announcement, avoiding in this way a formal re-classification. When a new classification is needed, it takes approximately two weeks for regular recruitments, and about five days for FTRP cases, which are given priority. The respondent, Chief of the responsible unit, estimated that if another HR Assistant was dedicated to FTRP, this period could be reduced to three days. The consultants did not have the opportunity to quantify and analyse the percentage of FTRP recruitments requiring a new classification per year. Nonetheless, in a context where major delays are taking place in other steps of the process (selection and recommendation at CO level, entitlements), a potential gain of two days seems to only partially justify the creation of a new post. Vacancy Advertisement – The ExDir 2010-005 recommends a FTRP vacancy to be open for 7 to 14 days, but this is not mandatory. As confirmed by the analysis of data, most COs have kept vacancies open for 14 days, in order to reach various pools of candidates. In parallel to the use of the FTRP, the Executive Directive encourages the use of Talent Groups, which are pools of candidates who have been previously successfully assessed in a competitive selection process for the same functional area and level. The Groups are populated with candidates who were assessed in a Generic Vacancy Announcement process, or who were recommended but not appointed in a recruitment process. By selecting candidates directly from the Talent Groups, COs can skip the advertisement phase and the majority of the recruitment steps. The potential impact of the Talent Groups is recognised by the majority of staff interviewed. However, the limited number and profiles of candidates within the Talent Groups, as well as lack of clarity about their utilisation, limit their usefulness. The general perception among respondents is that until the Talent Groups are better populated, these should be utilised for proactive head-hunting alongside other pools, networks and rosters.

25

RECOMMENDATION DHR should continue populating the Talent Groups and provide COs clarity on their purpose and use. Once the utilisation of Talent Groups becomes more operational and frequent, DHR should undertake a review of its efficiency and effectiveness in relation and comparison to other recruitment processes. Short-listing – This step is undertaken by the DHR Emergency Unit. According to the SMs interviewed and as confirmed by the data analysis, the process for FTRP is generally faster than for regular recruitments, and the majority of COs appreciate it. Commonly, proactive head-hunting runs in parallel to the opening of the vacancy and offers more chances to indentify suitable candidates, especially for difficult-to-fill positions. Some COs complained about the occasional problems with the short-list provided by DHR such as wrong profiles proposed, and very lengthy short-lists (short-lists of more than 30 candidates have been mentioned). In some cases, COs had to include more suitable candidates from the long-list to the short-list to make up for the poor candidates on the short-list. This has sometimes led to lengthy back-and-forth between DHR and CO and slowed down selection processes at CO level (see below). Many COs stressed the importance of maintaining a good, regular channel of communication with the Emergency Unit in DHR, to refine the specific profile requirements of the office, hence fine-tuning the short-listing process, and avoiding other glitches and misunderstandings. DHR Emergency Unit is currently exploring the possibility to outsourcing short-listing. RECOMMENDATION DHR should propose a “communication protocol” – to be potentially included in the review of the FTRP policy – between its Emergency Unit and COs, to help clarifying profile requirements, allow for better targeted short-listing and avoid unnecessary delays. Selection and Recommendation from CO – As indicated, the recommended number of days for COs to finalise the selection process and submit the recommendation for the best candidate to DHR is 20 days. Within these 20 days, COs must review the short-list, interview the candidates, do the necessary reference checks, and make a decision. While ambitious, this target is deemed by many senior managers a useful way to ensure speed and compels Reps to encourage teams to dedicate time to it. As indicated by the analysis of timing data, this is the step where most delays are still encountered. Difficulty in reaching the quorum for interview panels, especially during peak phases of the emergency, problems with the short-list requiring more back-and-forth with DHR, general excessive workload and weaknesses of some HR units have been cited by COs as the main reasons for delays. While these reasons are understandable, COs not meeting their target is self-defeating and potentially triggering a vicious cycle: the fewer staff available, the greater are the challenges indicated. This lack of capacities of COs to keep up with the efficiency standards attained at HQ level devalues the investment of the

26

Organisation in the FTRP, and ultimately represents a reputational and fundraising risk. This problem has been already indicated by previous internal17 and external audits. Several senior managers interviewed at CO level stressed the importance for the office to learn how to “navigate” the FTRP, and ultimately for the Representative to be directly responsible that due attention, energies and time are dedicated to the selection processes. These attitudes should offer an opportunity to COs to rise to the challenge and improve their performance in the application of the FTRP. The review and dissemination of simplified templates and forms for different recruitment steps is an achievement, which will hopefully reduce the workload of HR staff at CO level. Some COs have been much more efficient than others in “navigating” and managing the FTRP and the options it offers; this calls for a review of these best practices and their dissemination. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. COs selected to apply the FTRP should commit to speeding up selection and

recommendation procedures and establish internal targets progressively aiming at the 20 day established target. Plans for faster selection and recruitment processes in emergency should be included in the COs’ EPRP processes and initiatives. DHR Emergency Unit should assist in monitoring and reporting on the performances and trends of all COs utilising the FTRP.

2. DHR should undertake an in-depth review of the application of the FTRP at CO level to identify and collect best practices, and disseminate them for replication among other COs.

Approval – Once the CO has made a selection, the documentation returns to HQ where it is submitted by the DHR Emergency Unit to the Central Review Body (CRB). The CRB is responsible for clearing all recruitment processes involving internal promotions and hiring of external candidates. While the CRB process is not mandatory for the FTRP, the ExDir recommends conducting it through a fast-track mechanism. Approximately, only 25% of FTRP recruitments go through the CRB. Provided that all documentation is in place, the CRB should take no more than three days to clear the case and submit it to the Director, DHR for final approval. Data analysis indicates that approval processes for the FTRP are the fastest, most likely due to the frequent skipping of the CRB. If the CRB step is skipped, the SM must undergo a review during his/her next recruitment process, even if it is a lateral move. This causes confusion and frustrations. Most COs and staff interviewed at HQ level feel that the CRB is an important check-and-balance step that should be maintained, with the exception of the very early phases of a crisis when the need for speedy recruitments is urgent

17 “Report on an Audit of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Recruitment in UNICEF” August 2011 – Office of Internal Audit (OIA) Report 2011/18

27

and overriding. According to the CRB ToR, its focus should be exclusively on the recruitment processes and not in assessing the quality of the candidates. In cases where CRB members have overstepped this mandate, it has led to delays. A pilot FTRP emergency CRB aimed to review recruitment cases in less than three days was functioning until August 2012. However, due to limited capacity of the DHR Emergency Unit to assist the process, the pilot has been abandoned. In some cases, submission of poor documentation to the CRB has been mentioned as a source of delays, requiring more back-and-forth with the DHR Emergency Unit and the COs. RECOMMENDATIONS 1- DHR Mobility and Staffing Section should revise the role of the CRB in the FTRP,

and specifically consider: i) re-activating the emergency CRB and establishing credible and ambitious time targets; ii) re-stressing the roles and responsibilities of CRB members as framed by the CRB ToR, and providing additional training for its use in the FTRP; and iii) clarifying the few situations when the CRB can be completely skipped.

2- COs should undertake adequate quality assurance to ensure the recommendations they submit to the CRB meet the required standards.

3- DHR Emergency Unit should dedicate more attention to review selection documentation coming from COs to ensure its sufficient quality before submission to the CRB.

Entitlements – Once the DHR Emergency Unit issues the initial offer letter, the documentation is transferred to the Global Service Centre (GSC). The GSC is responsible for all administrative steps to finalise recruitment and entitlements, including facilitating medical clearance and the issuance of the UNLP. Many SMs indicated these steps as the main sources of delays for both FTRP and non-FTRP. Data analysis confirmed that there are no major differences between the entitlements steps for the FTRP and for regular recruitments. However, three main weaknesses with the GSC were identified. First, the GSC does not utilise the e-Recruitment system adopted by other sections of DHR18, and most of the internal processes require paper-based documentation. This requires DHR Emergency Unit staff to print out all hard copies of the work that is on e-Recruitment and physically send it to the GSC office, causing delays and risking the loss of records. Next, the GSC does not have staff dedicated to emergency or to the FTRP, and the same people responsible for all other recruitments handle the emergency cases. According to GSC senior managers, UNICEF is lagging behind other comparable UN Agencies (UNHCR and WFP for example) in terms of number of staff dedicated to recruitment and digitalisation of HR files and processes (all HR personal files exist only in paper, creating also an alarming risk to security confidentiality of information, and lack of

18 The consultants had different explanations about this issue from various sources: i) no access to e-Recruitment for GSC staff, because when the system was adopted funds were not available to cover all DHR units; ii) “reluctance” of GSC staff to utilise at least parts of e-Recruitment accessible by the unit; and iii) incompatibility of e-Recruitment with SAP and VISION. The consultants did not have the opportunity to investigate the specific technical issues, challenges and bottlenecks with ITSSD staff.

28

business continuity. These high-risks to the Organisation have been identified in other audits and reviews19). Finally, some sections in DHR are structured along geographical areas and some along functional lines, creating incompatibility that affects internal communication and the smoothness of the processes. These weaknesses and problems seem well understood by GSC management and DHR in general; work on the identification of specific bottlenecks, proposal of solutions, and establishment of targets has already started, including on digitalisation of HR personnel files. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. GSC, with the broader involvement and support of DHR and of ITSSD when

necessary, should pursue the already started initiatives, and specifically aim at i) building on the momentum created for electronic records management (i.e. digitalisation of HR paper Official Status Files), expand the use of e-Recruitment to all HR administrative steps managed by GSC and provide training on this system; ii) ensure that UNICEF senior management allocate sufficient resources to support GSC staff dedicated to emergencies (1 P2/3 Officer, 1 GS6); iii) expand opportunities for communication and exchanges between GSC and other DHR sections, both formally and informally, to improve relations and collaboration.

2. DHR should undertake a review of the internal structure of its organisational units with the aim of optimising coordination and processes.

Deployment – The informal, customary agreement among COs about the two-month period between the receipt of the Offer Letter by the SM and his/her deployment to the new duty station is considered by many SMs as far too long for emergency countries. However, there is recognition that if the SM is coming from another emergency country, the potential reduction of this period could be a “double-edged sword”, eventually affecting the country of origin. RECOMMENDATION DHR should bring some clarity to the deployment timing issue, defining simple rules for major crises (for example, maximum one month for Level 2 and Level 3 crises), and for other emergency contexts (for example, one month when the SM is coming from a non-emergency country; maximum two months, but preferably less, if coming from an emergency country). These decisions should be formalised and disseminated, and made clear to short-listed candidates during interviews.

19 Audit on the Administration of Separations Benefits and Entitlements (2012/23); Information Security Management Review of UNICEF (2012); identified as a critical, single point of failure in UNICEF’s Business Continuity Plan and the Business Recovery Plan for the HR function (2011, 2012); identified in the Enterprise Risk Management – Risk Control Risk Assessment Inventory (2011, 2012)

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4.3 Transparency Among fixed-term staff recruited through the Fast Track Recruitment Process, to what extent has the Fast Track Recruitment Process adhered to or departed from standard UNICEF staff recruitment rules and regulations? With all methodologies and tools applied, the Review confirmed that there are no substantial differences between FTRP and non-FTRP recruitments, and that transparency between the two is equivalent. 37 out of the 44 interviews carried out among senior managers and HR/Ops officers indicated that the same level of transparency exists in the FTRP as in the other recruitment processes. Among the other interviewees, a few did not have enough experience to provide comments, and some still felt uncomfortable with the application of the FTRP due to the lack of clarity about it. The client survey and follow-up interviews among supervisors confirmed the above. All survey questions related to openness, clarity and fairness indicated high levels of satisfaction results for both FTRP and non-FTRP. More satisfaction was showed for the administrative follow-up (medical clearance, UNLP, contract, TA, etc.) in the FTRP (“satisfied” plus “very satisfied”, 72%) than in the non-FTRP (40%). With very few exceptions, the supervisors’ interviews further confirmed this picture. The graph below shows the results from the survey.

33%

40%

16%

36%

31%

32%

19%

24%

52%

52%

68%

40%

54%

40%

31%

48%

11%

8%

12%

16%

12%

16%

31%

12%

4%

0%

4%

8%

4%

12%

19%

16%

Non-Fast Track

Fast Track

Non-Fast Track

Fast Track

Non-Fast Track

Fast Track

Non-Fast Track

Fast Track

Q. How Satisfied or Dissatisfied Were You With...

Very Satisfied (4) Satisfied (3) Somewhat Satisfied (2) Not Satisfied At All (1)

Administrative follow-up (medical

clearance, UNLP issuance,

contract, TA, etc.)

Fairness of the Process

Clarity of the process

Openness of the Vacancy

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Among the 12 supervisees interviewed, the 11 who were able to compare FTRP and non-FTRP declared that transparency (in terms of openness of the vacancy, and fairness of the process) is equivalent between the two. Several respondents mentioned that overall UNICEF recruitment processes are very transparent and more so than those of other organisations. Two of these cases (from the same CO) experienced delays, and highlighted frustration due to the lack of clarity and information during the long waiting periods. To a very large extent, COs indicate that they ensure transparency by maintaining all key steps of the recruitment process, even when these could be skipped. Given the increased speed of FTRP, COs suggest that the main factor to maintain transparency is the role of the Representative and the HR team, responsible for the management of risks associated with any recruitment process. A concern expressed by some interviewees (especially HR and Operations specialists) is the “personalisation” of the recruitment process by some Representatives and other senior managers. This is the tendency to select people they know, from previous associations and experiences. While encouraging trustworthy staff to apply to a new position makes sense, especially in emergencies, the tendency to “bring on board own teams” becomes counterproductive by creating internal “old friends clubs” and ultimately by negatively affecting the working environment. Operations and HR staff indicate that they have limited capacity to check or prevent these trends. The consultants did not have the elements to further investigate this trend. 4.3.1 Staff on Abolished Posts UNICEF has a policy of supporting candidatures of SMs on abolished posts, and does so by including these SMs in numerous selection processes. While the overall idea is to have these SMs “considered” by recruiting offices, and not necessarily selected, it appears that officers in DHR tend to be quite “pushy”. According to the current existing policy, when a SM on an abolished post is the second recommended candidate, DHR can oblige the recruiting office to offer the position to him/her instead of the best candidate. This seems at odds with the broader recruitment policy of hiring the best candidate. Fifteen senior managers and HR officers described this kind of pressure as counterproductive and increasing the workload for the CO (justifications for not selecting a candidate on abolished post have to be written at all times). Although all UNICEF offices should contribute to the placement of SMs on abolished posts, it becomes especially disadvantageous in emergency given the additional time required to handle these cases. In addition, according to several interviewees at field and HQ level, there is a widespread misconception in the organisation about SMs on abolished posts, who are to a large extent labelled as “bad apples”.

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RECOMMENDATION DHR should clarify and widely disseminate the policy regarding SMs on abolished posts, and counterbalance the misconception that these are “poor quality” staff. Also, it must be ensured that in emergency recruitments SMs on abolished post should be “considered” and not “imposed” by DHR. 4.4 Quality and Performance of Recruits What if any differences in the overall qualifications of the staff recruited have there been in relation to the non-Fast Track recruitments during the period under review? What if any unintended negative consequences has the Fast Track Recruitment Process incurred – e.g., staff performance issues, staff disciplinary actions – and to what extent does the frequency of such cases differ from non-Fast Track recruitments? NOTE: In agreement with DHR counterparts for the exercise, the consultants expanded this area of analysis to also look at differences between quality and performance of FTRP versus non-FTRP recruited staff. Analysis of the qualifications based on the comparison of job description and resumes of the candidate shows no significant differences between staff recruited with the FTRP and those recruited with non-FTRP processes. Perception among people interviewed confirms this finding: the majority of them found no noticeable differences in between FTRP and non-FTRP recruits. The analysis of disciplinary actions among international staff recruited since 2008 could not identify any specific correlation between the recruitment process and the SMs involved in the disciplinary cases. Inside the Organisation there is a general feeling that the quality and performance of people recruited is not dependent on the selection process, unless this process is very poorly managed. 38 out of 44 senior managers and HR officers interviewed confirmed that they feel the same quality of staff is assured by the FTRP as by other recruitment processes. Mistakes can happen with all recruitment processes, and it is a responsibility of the recruiting offices (ultimately the Representative in the CO) to ensure that due attention is dedicated to the selection. “Nobody can be more affected by the selection of a bad candidate than the Rep.”

Country Office Representative Supervisors who participated in the survey, confirmed this perception about quality of FTRP and non-FTRP recruits. High to very high satisfaction was evenly and strongly indicated for both FTRP and non-FTRP (92% of FTRP respondents and 93% of non-FTRP respondents said they were satisfied or very satisfied with the competence of the recruit) in all quality and performance questions.

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There is a sense among some of the interviewees at CO level that the FTRP actually increases the chances of selecting a good candidate. This might be due to the speed of the process, requiring more attention and focus, and the enhanced attention UNICEF receives during an emergency (“being under the spot-light”), requiring more dedication from all recruiting office staff. In comparing FTRP and non-FTRP with regards to differences on their applications, the team investigated the convergence/divergence (required vs. achieved) of the variables in the matrix below.

% Convergence for FTRP

% Convergence for non-FTRP

Statistical Significance between FTRP and non-FTRP? % Conv.20 % Div. % Conv. % Div.

Overall Education Level 84.1% 2.9% 90.2% 0% Yes Education related to field 82.7% 17.3% 86.4% 13.6% No Total staff years of Experience 84.6% .5% 89.7% .5% No Years of experience in the field 86.1% 0% 89.7% .5% No Years of experience related to the sector

86.1% 0% 89.1% 1.1% No

Years of Management Experience

86.1% 13.9% 90.2% 9.8% No

Language Skills 81.8% 3.3% 86.4% 3.1% No Other actual skills/experience 85.1% 0% 89.1% .5% No

For all of these analyses, the majority of candidates for both FTRP and non-FTRP meet the requirements. Additionally, there is no statistically significant difference between FTRP and non-FTRP in meeting these requirements, except for overall education level. In this case, there was no case of divergence for non-FTRP, while for FTRP there was a very small percentage (2.9%) who did not meet the requirements. Some senior managers interviewed indicated that for specific emergency positions (emergency officers, heads of field offices) personal characteristics of the candidates are more important than a Masters degree, and that in these cases more flexibility is necessary. Perhaps the slight difference between FTRP and non-FTRP found in this specific area reflects the outcome of this flexibility.

20 Note that the difference between % convergence/divergence is N/A and was entered when the candidate’s CV could not be found in the e-Recruitment system.

48%

36%

44%

56%

7%

4%

0%

4%

Non-Fast Track

Fast Track

Q. How Satisfied or Dissatisfied Were You With the Overall Competence of the Candidate?

Very Satisfied (4) Satisfied (3) Somewhat Satisfied (2) Not Satisfied At All (1)

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The team analysed the recruitment steps to determine whether there were any differences between the FTRP and non-FTRP candidates. The variables analysed were:

- use of generic JD or not, - use of selection panel or not, - differences on the number of staff on the selection panel, - differences in number of candidates shortlisted by DHR, - differences in the number of shortlisted candidates considered by the

selection panel, - whether or not reference checks were undertaken, - differences in the number of references received, - rating of candidates by their references, - PER used, - CRB review used, and - CRB endorsed without comment or question.

The only two variables for which statistically significant differences were found between the FTRP and the non-FTRP were for whether the CRB was used, and whether the CRB was endorsed without comment or question. For FTRP, only 25.5% used a CRB review whereas for non-FTRP, 54.7%21 of candidates underwent a CRB review. All the candidates reviewed by the CRB were ultimately appointed, however more FTRP candidates were endorsed by the CRB without comments or questions (73.4%) than non-FTRP (43.8%). Please, refer to Findings and Recommendations related to the CRB in the previous pages. Personal Evaluation Reports (PER) data was only available for 2010 and 2011. No statistically significant difference in the PERs between the FTRP and non-FTRP candidates was found when examining the ratings for core competencies, functional competencies and workplan outputs. The median rating for all of these groups was 3/4 (Fully Proficient). In terms of performance, among 87 SMs interviewed (senior managers, HR/Operations officers, supervisors) only nine cases of mistaken recruitments were mentioned, and only one of these could be ascribed to the FTRP. Among the others, one was a SM on abolished post, and the others were related to lack of suitable candidates and pressure to fill a position (often after multiple re-advertisements). The initial, informal application of the FTRP in Haiti, after April 2010, is not a good example of the advantages of the system, and underlines its risks. Following the

21 It was not possible to determine from the database whether the appointment was a lateral move not requiring submission to the CRB, or a promotion or an external recruitment requiring submission to the CRB. Additionally, e-Recruitment didn’t always have information about the CRB. For this reason, the percentages indicated only offer a broad comparison from FTRP and non-FTRP cases as recorded in e-Recruitment.

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earthquake in January, the initial phase of the crisis was characterised by a high level of confusion and a lack of qualified candidates applying to the many newly opened positions. It appears that many of these positions were filled by promoting under-qualified staff, perhaps out of necessity. The CO is currently facing problems in downsizing its operations and abolishing 66 positions, since several of these SMs, due also to limited qualifications, are facing difficulties in finding new jobs. While detailed information is limited, and most SMs are still there, DRC offers a better image. Out of the 33 people recruited there with the FTRP in 2011, several have already moved on to positions of higher responsibility and/or level. It will be interesting to undertake a comparative analysis of successive moves of all staff recruited with the FTRP and other processes in one or two years. Almost unanimously, Representatives and HR officers underlined the importance of reference checks in the selection process. Although the reliability of the PER is still limited but slowly improving, the focus is on more in-depth formal and informal checks through personal networks. As part of the database analysis, the team examined the use of reference checks by the selection committee. There was no statistically significant difference between FTRP and non-FTRP in terms of the number of reference checks sought. Other indicators senior managers look at during the selection process for positions in emergency countries, beyond the standard components of the technical and competency-based interviews, are: adaptability to work in changing work environments; team spirit; people skills; coordination capacities; capacity to work long hours; previous experiences in emergency; previous experiences with UNICEF; capacity to perform under stress; right motivations (not financial ones); persistence; discipline in chaotic settings; emotional intelligence; resilience; maturity; capacity to take risks; independence and ability to operate with limited supervision.

There are very few disciplinary actions activated against international fixed-term staff hired with or without the FTRP since 2008. Out of 2,665 recruits, only 13 formal investigations were started, and out of these, only 9 disciplinary actions were taken, with only one case resulting in the formal dismissal of the SM. Given the extremely low number of cases, no specific correlation was found between these disciplinary action cases and any specific recruitment process. 4.5 Difficult Areas for Recruitment As expected, countries showing general problems in attracting good candidates are those where the capital is a non-family duty-station, or where quality of living is affected by limited education and health facilities and services for family members. The following countries have been indicated during interviews as particularly difficult to recruit for: Mali, Sudan, South Sudan, Nigeria, Yemen, Pakistan, Iraq, Liberia, Afghanistan, Syria, Mauritania, DPRK, Chad, Haiti, and West Africa in general.

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Specific contexts and factors with particularly difficult recruitment challenges are: countries in transition from emergency to development (Libya, Iraq); Field Offices (Kenya, DRC, WCAR, Cameroon, Sudan); high-level positions (Chiefs, P5; in Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, DRC); perception of religious restrictions for women in MENA; need for French speakers in many COs, especially in WCAR, and for Arabic speakers in MENA.

A simple review22 of functional areas for which special challenges exist in identifying good staff, provided the following details: Child Protection (14); Nutrition (14); WASH (12); Education (10); Operations (8); Social Policy (7); Health (6, includes 2 Immunisation and 1 Polio); Communications (4); Security (4); Supply & Logistics (3); Emergency (3); C4D (3); Human Resources (2); Deputy Representative (2); Representative (2); PM&E (1); Cluster Staff (1).

Initiatives have been started at regional and country level to tackle some of these recruitment constraints, to improve the reputation of specific duty stations (Afghanistan, Central African Republic)23, and to build larger pools of candidates for specific functions (WCAR). In compliance with the broader UN family policies, benefits (SOLA, hazard-pay, rest and recuperation allowances) to staff posted in hardship duty stations have been progressively decreasing. Several COs (South Sudan, Iraq, Liberia, Afghanistan,

22 This was carried out in the framework of interviews to senior managers, HR, Operations and Emergency staff at CO and RO level. 23 In Afghanistan, UNICEF senior managers are active in the head-hunting and try to attract suitable candidates by explaining them the largely development-oriented component of the program. In CAR, the whole UN Country Team has proactively spread awareness to counterbalance the bad reputation of the country; according to senior UNICEF staff who worked there, the number and quality of candidates applying for positions in CAR has progressively increased.

Child Protection, 14

Nutrition, 14

WASH, 12

Education, 10

Operations, 8

Social Policy, 7

Health, 6

Communications, 4

Security, 4

Supply and Logistics, 3

Emergency, 3 C4D, 3

HR, 2

Dep Rep, 2Rep, 2

PM&E, 1Cluster , 1

Challenges in Recruitment for Functional Areas

36

Sudan, and Chad) indicated this as an additional factor limiting the chances to attract good candidates. RECOMMENDATION In the broader development of a clear and credible rotation policy, DHR should consider providing incentives to attract candidates to hardship duty stations, and rewarding SMs who have successfully served there. DHR should encourage and support country- and regional-level initiatives aimed at tackling hiring difficulties, eventually reviewing these, and facilitating best-practice exchanges. 4.6 Additional Positive Outcomes of the FTRP What if any evidence is there of tangible positive outcomes in UNICEF’s response that are directly attributable to the Fast Track Recruitment Process – that is, achievements that would very likely not have occurred in its absence? The increased speed of recruitment and deployment of staff in emergency had a positive effect on UNICEF reputation. There is widespread consensus about this among UNICEF SMs and some donors and counterparts confirmed this. In the course of the discussions, interviewees pointed at several additional benefits that can be ascribed to the application of the FTRP. The most frequently mentioned is the increased continuity and seamlessness of programme implementation, due to the more consistent presence of a SM. Ultimately, by ensuring that positions are filled, there is better accountability to beneficiaries. Although some donors observed that thanks to faster recruitments UNICEF had succeeded in “just doing what it is supposed to do”, others recognised and appreciated the improvements and in some countries this has contributed to successful fundraising. It can be expected that these positive outcomes of the FTRP could be further enhanced if the performance of the COs in managing the process will improve and the still existing bottlenecks at HQ level will be eliminated. Several COs indicated that the application of the FTRP increased the empowerment and the maturity of the office. Respecting the recruitment deadlines and targets contributed to management efficiency, increased the Rep’s confidence, reduced levels of frustration, and ultimately improved staff morale. In COs that were on the FTRP list for some time, and then removed from it, staff became “more intolerant of regular recruitment processes”. 4.7 Additional Negative Outcomes of the FTRP There were no specific negative outcomes mentioned in the interviews, but some indicated areas of potential risk. The importance of the role played by the CO, the supervisors and ultimately by the Rep during the FTRP cannot be overstated; when these actors are not in full control of the process, the risk of mistakes increases.

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Some Representatives described the risk of unfair competition between COs utilising the FTRP and those which aren’t, as it increases the chances of the former “stealing” good candidates from the latter due to longer waiting time. There are different interpretations about the role ROs should play in the application of the FTRP. These range from simple facilitation of contacts between CO and DHR, to a much more formal supervision. During the Horn of Africa crisis in 2011, in line with the FTRP policy allowing for the use of this approach for all positions in the office, ESARO supported its application for the recruitment of National Officers. This proved very effective and efficient, and was welcomed by involved COs. Considering that on an average UNICEF recruits 5 National Officers for each international position, the benefits stemming from the formalisation of this approach cannot be overstated. This lack of clarity about the role ROs should play in the FTRP has occasionally limited the applicability of the process and its effectiveness. By increasing awareness and capacities for the FTRP at all levels, the Organisation should be able to counterbalance the perception – expressed wrongly by one interviewee – that “the process risks destabilising regular recruitments.” Several interviewees indicated that the FTRP increases the administrative challenges of coping with high influx of staff in major crises. Specifically, several COs faced problems providing incoming staff with HR and security briefings, mobile phones, laptops, radios, travel clearance, and other administrative and logistic support. RECOMMENDATIONS24 1- DHR should clarify the role played by ROs in the application of the FTRP,

including in the use of the approach for national staff positions in the COs. 2- DHR Emergency Unit should continue disseminating knowledge about the FTRP

at all levels of the Organisation, especially in those regions and countries where its application has been limited due to undue concerns and occasional misconceptions.

3- COs, with the support of the Regional Emergency Advisors (REA), and in coordination with EMOPS, should include the FTRP in all Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning (EPRP) tools and trainings.

4- CO HR, Operations, Administration and ITC Units, should include provisions for sudden increases of staff in their sections of the EPRP exercises and plans.

24 In the Executive Summary, these recommendations are included in the Finding and Recommendation matrix under the boxes related to “Application of the FTRP”.

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4.8 Costs and Benefits On balance, to what extent have the benefits of the Fast Track Recruitment Process outweighed envisaged risks or actual shortcomings? To what extent has it demonstrated value for money to UNICEF – that is, overall, have its benefits to the Organization justified the investment in it? According to the interviews and analysis, the broad perception is that the benefits have certainly justified the investment in the FTRP and its supporting structures. There is a broad consensus among UNICEF staff and the staff of other organisations that the reputational risk of not getting staff on the ground quickly enough during and humanitarian crisis is much greater that the risk of potentially hiring the wrong candidate. The perception among most UNICEF staff is that the FTRP has proven to be an extremely useful tool, demonstrating the capacity of the Organisation to be more efficient in its recruitment processes. Improvement of still existing bottlenecks could further enhance FTRP speed and effectiveness. According to many, parts of the process, or in some cases its entire rationale and approach, should be expanded to all emergencies (not only those selected on a quarterly basis), and eventually to all UNICEF recruitment. Several Representatives stressed the potential usefulness of applying the FTRP to COs facing periods of high turnover of staff, to COs in transition, whereby candidates with specific “double-skills” are needed, and to all COs facing chronic crises. “The FTRP is the most efficient way to do business and should be expanded, especially in emergencies.”

Country Office Representative “The FTRP put order and discipline in the process of recruiting in emergency.”

Country Office Chief of Section With regard to the DHR Emergency Unit, the perception of almost all the interviewees is that benefits to maintain it greatly outweigh its costs. Closing the FTRP in 2008 was described as a “mistake” and a “scandal”. The greatest majority of participants to the Review stressed the usefulness of the Unit, its proactive and positive attitude, its creativity and accessibility. “The DHR Emergency Unit helps translating the issues and problems faced by the COs into HQ language”.

CO Representative Most COs facing a new humanitarian crisis had to deploy additional resources (financial, staff) for the increased workload related to the high number of staff being deployed either on short- or long-term contracts. In general though, no one of these extra investments could be specifically attributed to the implementation of the

39

FTRP. The only possible exception that stands out is the case of DRC. During the peak phase of the recent crisis in 2011, during which – beside many more national staff and people on surge – 33 fixed-term SMs were recruited, the CO was obliged to rent some additional office space and activate phone land-lines to cope with the increased number and speed of interviews. The consultants undertook a simple analysis of costs associated with the implementation of the FTRP by the DHR Emergency Unit between 2010 and 2012, and compared these with the number of staff recruited with the FTRP each year.

Year Cost per Year of the FTRP

Number of FTRP Recruits Average Cost per Recruit

2010 (from April) 309,835$ * * 2011 368,460$ 148 2,490$ 2012 (all year) 466,189$ 60 (till September) 5,827$ * While the DHR Emergency Unit started operations in April 2010, after the Haiti crisis, formal application of the FTRP only started in January 2011.

The large increase of cost per recruit in 2012 might be justified by the lack of new major Level 3 crises during this year, while in 2011 the Horn of Africa crisis called for a very high number of new fixed-term staff. Also, better accounting for the contribution of different staff in the Emergency Unit and the GSC might partially justify this increase. All interviewees at all levels of the Organisation stressed the importance of maintaining the DHR Emergency Unit. In general, there is a perception that the current size of the Unit is about right for its routine work, although some managers interviewed would like to see it expanded to optimise and fine-tune its support to COs in certain areas of the recruitment process (short-listing, direct head-hunting). Additionally, some interviewees recommended to have SMs of the Emergency Unit dedicated to specific chronic emergency countries (Afghanistan, South Sudan); these SMs could gain a good understanding of the specific challenges and dynamics of the respective CO, might visit it at specific junctures, and ultimately provide the CO with “tailored” support. The Unit affirms it is responsible for the wellbeing of SMs hired with the FTRP even after they have been deployed, and assists in tackling their specific problems when these arise. This specific laudable role of the Unit is not well known by COs and ROs. There is a general consensus that the Unit should be scaled up in the event of a major new Level 3 crisis, or multiple medium- to large-scale crises (Level 2). In these instances, some of its members should be deployed to ROs or COs for direct assistance in the initial application of the FTRP. This “accordion model”, whereby a core group is maintained at all times and expanded when needed, would require pre-identification and pre-training of staff who could join the Unit very quickly and on a temporary basis.

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Currently, funding for the existing Emergency Unit comes from a single donor (DFID). Support from DFID to enhance UNICEF capacities in emergency preparedness and response has been consistent during the last years, but given the importance of the Unit, an alternative, more reliable source should be identified. Costs associated with the sudden expansion of the unit should be covered by alternative sources; interviewees suggested the Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) for the initial phases, the Executive Director Discretionary Funding, and direct contributions from COs affected by the new crisis, which typically benefit from good fundraising. RECOMMENDATIONS 1- DHR Emergency Unit should undertake an in-depth financial analysis of its

yearly costs (and those of contributing DHR Units) and revise the financial plan for the maintenance of its core team and functions, including yearly targets.

2- DED (Management) should ensure regular funding for the maintenance of the core staff and functioning of Emergency Unit.

3- DHR Business Partners, in coordination with EMOPS, should design a clear “accordion model” for its expansion and downsizing, including pre-selection and pre-training of additional staff.

4- DHR Business Partners should disseminate information about any change in the funding, structure, strategy and working models of the DHR Emergency Unit, including the possible appointment of dedicated staff to chronic emergencies, as well as its role in the wellbeing of SM hired with the FTRP.

4.9 Other HR issues A number of other issues related to the broader role played by DHR in emergencies, beyond the use of the FTRP were identified. These are proposed here as “food-for-thought” to DHR and the rest of the Organisation. Clarity of Offer Letter Several HR specialists and supervisees underlined the lack of clarity and information included in the initial offer letter both in emergency and non-emergency recruitments. Many recruited staff, especially those who are new to UNICEF, find lack of information on entitlements, including salary, allowances, and administrative steps very frustrating. Some interviewees suggest reviewing the format of the initial offer letter to include at least some basic information about these areas; according to them, this basic information could be easily accessed and would not delay the issuing of the letter. Labelling of Staff and Rotation Policy There is a widespread feeling among interviewed staff that the Organisation needs a clear, realistic and credible rotation policy. The rationale for this is based on different factors. There is still a perceived dichotomy between emergency and development staff, with this labelling embedded in the culture of the Organisation at many levels. This labelling contributes to the recurrent phenomenon of SMs moving

41

from one emergency to the next, and not being able to find a post in a “normal” duty station. The second factor, is the abuse of the word “emergency” utilised to define any crisis, even if small-scale and happening in a country with a well-established development programme (which is the case most of the time), and which requires “special emergency staff”. Thirdly, the decreased benefits and allowances in hardship duty stations are increasingly affecting recruitment in countries where it is already difficult to attract good candidates. There is an increasing feeling inside the organisation that more staff should be exposed to emergencies at least for a period of their career25, and that these postings should be rewarded. The perception of a large number of senior managers and HR staff interviewed, is that a successful rotation policy should break through the culture of “exceptions” based on good connections, allowing SM to spend their whole career in NYHQ or decades in ‘comfortable’ duty stations. Its application should be consistent throughout the levels of the Organisation, in order to gain credibility and trust among staff, and should offer real opportunities, challenges and rewards. Coupled with a coaching and mentoring role of senior managers (Representatives, Regional Directors) in favour of promising young professionals, this policy could attract “new blood” into the Organisation. It should be noted that UNICEF DHR has already started the drafting of such a rotation policy based, inter alia, on the recommendations included in the audit report on Rotation26. Extension of Senior Staff Review to Other Key Positions The Senior Staff Review process aimed at ensuring continuity with no gaps occurring between Representatives is not completely successful. Deputy Representatives and Chiefs of Operations are not yet formally covered by a similar process. Hence, gaps in these positions at field level are very common. According to some senior managers and HR specialists – as well as several other organisations (UNFPA, Save the Children US, ICRC and WFP) do –, the rotation policy should incorporate a stronger, more effective Senior Staff Review (SSR), not only for Representatives, but also for Deputy Reps and Operations Specialists at CO level, to avoid gaps and ensure overlapping and continuity. Country Office Downsizing Challenges The challenge to downsize offices after large-scale crises has been a common issue for UNICEF; from the beginning of the conflict in Afghanistan in 2001, until the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, many COs struggled with this problem, especially for fixed-term staff. Some managers suggest drastically limiting the number of fixed-term positions during the first 12-18 months of a crisis, and recruiting instead

25 The Executive Directive on “Staff Selection Policy” (CF/EXD/2009-008, 3 November 2009) specifically states (para 2.6): “In keeping with the United Nations Charter, as well as with the United National staff regulations and rules, UNICEF, in the selection and employment of its staff, is committed to fostering mobility across geographic locations for internationally recruited staff, entailing, inter alia, the fair sharing of work assignments including at hardship, non-family and emergency duty stations.” 26 “Report on an Audit of Staff Rotation” June 2011 – Office of Internal Audit (OIA) Report 2011/13

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Stand-by Partner staff on long-term missions. This would require a thorough revision of the Stand-by Partners policy, eventually expanding it to more NGOs and including private companies, potentially triggering an increase in efficiency of HR management. Gender and Diversity Concern was raised during interviews at HQ level that the FTRP was potentially not adhering to the diversity principles that the agency tries to uphold. Analysis of the database found this not to be the case. As far as gender diversity is concerned, the proportion of male employees is slightly higher in FTRP (53.6% male vs. 46.4% female) compared to non-FTRP (49.5% male vs. 50.5% female), but there is no statistically significant difference between the two. Among all recruits, the analysis identified an interesting pattern. There are about a third more male than female staff at the P-5 level, and about a third more female staff than male staff at the P-2 level. These differences are statistically significant. Numerous nationalities are represented in both recruitment processes. Non-FTRP has a total of 65 nationalities represented, whereas FTRP has a total of 67. Given that there is a smaller population of FTRP candidates and a higher number of countries of origin, more diversity is shown by this process. The analysis of country of origin by position level is shown in the matrix below, where the ratio is the number of countries divided by number candidates at each level.

P-1 P-2 P-3 P-4 P-5

Number of countries 1 19 65 57 31

Number of candidates 1 54 360 310 111

Ratio 1.00 0.35 0.18 0.18 0.28

0.0%

37.0% 48.9% 49.0%

66.7%

100.0%

63.0% 51.1% 51.0%

33.3%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

P-1 P-2 P-3 P-4 P-5

Gender Composition at each level

Female

Male

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4.10 Other Organisations What is the industry standard for emergency recruitment? What are other UN agencies and large implementation partners able to achieve given similar obstacles? The consultants contacted several other organisations, UN and non-UN, to understand and compare their fixed-term recruitment systems in emergencies, and eventually identify best practices and ideas that might be of interest for UNICEF DHR. A detailed list of issues and outcomes from the interviews carried out with external organisations is included in Annex 5. Fast track systems comparable with the FTRP are applied by UNDP and UNFPA, whose general approach to recruitment is quite similar to UNICEF. Other organisations (WFP, OCHA, ICRC) have also formal or informal fast track systems; their approach to recruitment in emergency though, especially in the case of WFP and ICRC, is consistently based on broader rotation policies, which makes the recruitment of external candidates the exception. These modalities make comparisons with UNICEF less relevant. In general, all organisations adopting formal or informal fast track processes for the recruitment of fixed term staff in emergencies, consider transparency and quality of the recruits to be comparable with regular processes, confirming the perception of most UNICEF interviewees. The risk for mistakes exists in all processes, and it is up to people involved to mitigate them. The importance of reference checks has been underlined, consistent with the feeling of many UNICEF senior managers and HR officers. Not getting staff on the ground in an emergency quickly enough is considered a much bigger reputational risk than hiring the odd wrong candidate. There are few initiatives applied by one or more of the organisations that have particular relevance for UNICEF. UNFPA, Save the Children US, ICRC and WFP put special emphasis on key positions in COs and Delegations; these are normally the Representative or Head of Delegation, senior programme staff, but also positions of special strategic importance (ICRC liaison and networking officers). For these positions, different organisations have established procedures to ensure that their turnover is planned well in advance, that gaps between incumbents are avoided, and that a handover period is assured. UNICEF Senior Staff Review (SSR) for Representatives is based on a similar rationale, but it appears to be not as consistent as it should be. Additionally, and as mentioned by several UNICEF interviewees, a similar approach should be introduced for Deputy Representatives and Chiefs of Operations. Various organisations (OCHA, UNFPA, SCF-US) have been working on different types of rosters and talent pools/groups, with the latter indicating a more advanced level of pre-screening of candidates. Overall, it seems that these networks offer clear advantages in terms of recruitment speed, proportional to the quality and

44

comprehensiveness of the pre-screening and pre-clearance of the candidates, and the degree of population of the rosters/groups. Pre-screened talent groups have been very successful for UNFPA, especially for Representative positions. WFP has included in contracts a probation period of 12 months (in some cases extendable to 18 months) for international staff. ICRC applies a 6 months probation period for national staff turning international for the first time. While legal constraints might limit options in this area, there may be room for UNICEF to look into similar arrangements, which would mitigate risks associated with wrong recruitments. Although not specifically investigated during the interviews, at least one senior manager suggested this approach for UNICEF.

UNICEF Division of Human Resources

Review of the Fast Track Recruitment Process

Annexes

Enrico Leonardi, Jessica Alexander and Dr. David Bassiouni Harare/New York, January 2013

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Annexes Annex 1 Terms of Reference Annex 2 Consultants Bios Annex 3 Interview Guideline Forms Annex 4 Survey Protocol Annex 5 FTRP Database Analysis Plan Annex 6 Breakdown of Application of FTRP by Country Annex 7 Analysis of Timeliness Annex 8 Interviews with Other Organisations Annex 9 List of People Met and Interviewed Annex 10 Documents Consulted

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Annex 1

UNICEF Division of Human Resources

Review of the Fast Track Recruitment Process Terms of Reference - FINAL

6 September 2012 I. Background 1. In the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, UNICEF’s Division of Human Resources (DHR) introduced the emergency recruitment process in order to support the scaling up of UNICEF activities for this emergency response. Based on the recruitment and staffing procedures used in the Haiti response, in December 2010 DHR promulgated the Recruitment and Staffing in Emergency Situations (known as the “Fast Track”), the overarching policy guidance defining UNICEF’s staffing mode of operating in emergency scenarios.1 The main guiding principle underpinning this policy is agility within the bounds of compliance – that is, being able to quickly meet the Organization’s need for highly qualified staff in emergencies, and thus enable UNICEF and its partners to save more lives, while at the same time adhering to attendant rules and regulations surrounding staff selection. 2. Emergencies frequently do not attract large pools of highly qualified candidates. The delay in recruitment due to the difficulty in identifying suitably strong candidates often results in temporary HR measures, such as the deployment of successive waves of staff on mission. As the first six months after the 2010 Haiti earthquake attest, however, there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that these approaches are a relatively costly and inefficient HR proposition that might also have negative effects on programme delivery, partnership, and trust with the host government.2 The Fast Track is intended to ensure that offices facing emergencies are not further hampered by longer HR gaps than are absolutely required. In these cases, the Fast Track allows for flexibility where the regular recruitment policy does not, and alternative methods such as “headhunting” and other measures are employed. 3. Offices recruiting for fixed-term positions may, on the advice of DHR, leverage the flexibility built into the Fast Track to ensure staff are recruited in a rapid and cost-effective manner. The degree of flexibility permitted is reviewed on a case-by-case basis, and depends heavily on the recruitment situation, with minimum procedures required to ensure a transparent and competitive process being noted. That said, in an effort to ensure the policy is used only in the most urgent instances, the majority of emergency recruitments undertaken since the policy’s inception have in fact complied with standard recruitment procedures, but have been completed on an accelerated timeline.

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1 See: CF/EXD/2010-005 2 Independent Review of UNICEF’s Response to the January 2010 Earthquake in Haiti. UNICEF Evaluation Office, September 2011.

4. The emergencies to which the Fast Track is applicable are defined by the Office of the Director of DHR on a quarterly basis, or as a sudden-onset emergency requires. A list is developed through consultation between UNICEF’s Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS), Programme Division (PD), Supply Division (SD) and DHR, with high-risk emergencies being listed through the review of indicators including scale, urgency, complexity, capacity and reputational risk to the Organization. 5. The Fast Track is managed by the Emergency Unit within DHR. The Unit was originally developed after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. By 2008-2009 the Organization dismantled the Unit, however, citing a lack of funding. Following the 2010 Haiti Earthquake the Unit was fully re-established, and is being headed by a P5-level Senior Human Resources Manager: Business Partner Emergencies. The Unit has three fixed-term posts funded on the Support Budget (1 P5, 1 P4 and 1 GS5), one fixed-term post on ORE (1 P3) and four consultants, also funded by ORE. 6. The Recruitment and Staffing in Emergency Situations policy has been operational nearly for over a year. Since its inception, 27 UNICEF Offices have utilized it.3 In the Level 2 Simplified Standard Operating Procedures (SSOPs) currently in draft, EMOPS has made a recommendation that the Fast Track recruitment procedures all countries officially defined as a Level 2 are automatically applicable. II. Rationale 7. DHR has received informal anecdotal feedback on the Fast Track Recruitment Process from senior leaders within the Organization. Moreover, a recent lesson-learning exercise from UNICEF’s 2011-2012 response to the complex emergency in the Horn of Africa highlights, among other areas, the Fast Track Recruitment Process as a major factor enabling UNICEF’s success in that crisis, the first Level 3 emergency since the establishment of the SSOPs for Level 3 emergencies in July 2011.4 In an effort to better understand the needs of the Organization, and particularly COs engaged in emergencies, a more focused, systematic, impartial and objective review of the wider Organization’s experience of the Fast Track Recruitment Process is warranted. 8. In February 2012 DHR approached UNICEF’s Evaluation Office (EO) with a view to commissioning an impartial and objective review of the Fast Track Recruitment Process as it has been implemented to date. Owing to capacity constraints the EO, while not in a position to directly manage the exercise, has agreed to closely advise DHR on the review, which will be internally managed by the DHR Director’s Office but externally conducted by a qualified team of consultants.

5

3 These include: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, ESARO, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mauritania, Mali, MENARO, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Syria, Pakistan and WCARO, and Yemen. 4 UNICEF’s Response to the Crisis in the Horn of Africa (2011-12): Lesson-Learning Exercise. For Internal Use Only. UNICEF Evaluation Office, June 2012.

II. Objectives and Purpose 9. The objective of the review will be to determine, as systematically and objectively as possible, the overall effectiveness of the Fast Track Recruitment Process in meeting UNICEF’s need for timely, qualified personnel in the emergencies in which it has been used, and in doing so in a manner consistent with broader organizational priorities (e.g., general rules and regulations governing staffing, risk management, cost-effectiveness, efficiency and competitiveness within the industry). By generating evidence on the initiative in these areas, its main purpose will be to foster early learning among DHR and other key stakeholders, with a view to suggesting concrete ways to improve its functioning moving forward and ultimately help the Organization maximize its performance in emergencies. In addition, UNICEF needs to continually ensure its services are maximally efficient and its mode of operations trustworthy to donors, host governments, and the general public, implying a focus on accountability as well as learning within this exercise. 10. The review is primarily intended for internal consumption and action, with the Director of Human Resources as its chief client. That said, as with all evaluative exercises throughout the Organization its final report will be posted on UNICEF’s Evaluation Report Database (ERD) and externally quality-assured for its overall credibility as the basis for action. Other key users will include the DHR’s Emergency Unit, which manages the Fast Track Recruitment Process; other sections within DHR, which might draw useful linkages to their own work; DHR’s partner divisions (e.g., EMOPS, PD); and regional and country offices using the process. The Office of the Executive Director, which bears ultimate responsibility for reconciling the numerous expectations and interests of the Organization, constitutes another potential stakeholder. III. Scope 11. The exercise will not constitute a formal full-scale evaluation of the full range of DHR’s work in, or in preparation for, emergencies. Rather, it will focus narrowly on the Fast Track Recruitment process. In order to delimit the precise unit of analysis within this narrow scope, at present it is assumed that Fast Track Recruitment Process and the Recruitment and Staffing in Emergency Situations are one in the same. An early review of relevant documentation will determine the extent to which this is the case, or whether the former is subsumed under the latter. 12. Although not an evaluation, the exercise will take an evaluative approach according

6

to UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards and UNICEF’s Evaluation Policy. Though not fully independent as such, in its approach will aim for maximum impartiality and objectivity so as to generate credible findings and recommendations. (See Management and Governance Arrangements below.) 13. As with other major policy initiatives related to UNICEF’s humanitarian work, the Fast Track Recruitment Process represents an effort to respond to increasing calls from within and outside the Organization for UNICEF to become more effective and efficient in emergency settings – and thus meet human needs in ever-better ways. At the same time, emergencies are known to present heightened risk for any organization, including UNICEF. As with other attempts to tailor the Organization’s standard rules and regulations to the exigencies of emergencies, the Fast Track Recruitment Process carries with such heightened risk – for example, that in the drive for speed, critical candidate screening elements will be overlooked, or that contract lengths are inconsistent with UNICEF’s need to be nimble and cost-effective, thus exposing the Organization – and potentially the populations it serves – to unacceptable risk. This review will therefore not only seek to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the Fast Track Recruitment Process in its own right from the DHR or even ROs’ and COs’ perspective. Rather, it will also incorporate an analysis to explore whether these and other organizational risks have been borne out in reality in the first two years of the programme’s implementation. 14. Before this backdrop, the review will seek answers to the following overarching questions:

To what extent has the Fast Track Recruitment Process enabled timely recruitment of staff, fit-for-purpose to the specific functional needs at hand, in the emergencies in which it has been implemented? How much more or less timely, effective, efficient and relevant have Fast Track Recruitments been in relation to (a) pre-Fast Track recruitments, and (b) standard, non-Fast Track recruitments during the period under review?

How much timelier has it been in recruiting the appropriate staff in comparison to emergencies to which UNICEF responded prior to the Fast Track Recruitment Process being put in place?

What if any differences in the overall qualifications of the staff recruited have there been in relation to the period prior to the process being put in place?

What if any evidence is there of tangible positive outcomes in UNICEF’s response that are directly attributable to the Fast Track Recruitment Process – that is, achievements that would very likely not have occurred in its absence?

What if any unintended negative consequences has the Fast Track Recruitment Process incurred – e.g., staff performance issues, staff disciplinary actions – and to what extent does the frequency of such cases differ from non-Fast Track recruitments?

Among fixed-term staff recruited through the Fast Track Recruitment Process, to what extent has the Fast Track Recruitment Process adhered to or departed from

7

standard UNICEF staff recruitment rules and regulations? On balance, to what extent have the benefits of the Fast Track Recruitment

Process outweighed envisaged risks or actual shortcomings? To what extent has it demonstrated value for money to UNICEF – that is, overall, have its benefits to the Organization justified the investment in it?

What is the industry standard for emergency recruitment? What are other UN agencies and large implementation partners able to achieve given similar obstacles? All of the questions above will be answered with a view to identifying key strengths on which to capitalize, and shortcomings to address, so as to improve the net benefits of the Fast Track Recruitment Process and better manage its attendant risks moving forward. IV. Methodology 15. Inherent in the line of inquiry above is the need for a mixed-method approach including both qualitative and quantitative methods, and both documentary and perceptual evidence. These will include, at minimum:

A general desk review of existing documentation5; A set of formal desk analyses of existing data sources related to staffing

(e.g.,recruitment files, ePAS/PERs, the Emergency Recruitment Survey, and so on); A survey of key stakeholders at the Headquarters, Regional Office and Country

Office level; and One-on-one key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs), as

necessary, among key stakeholders (e.g., DHR staff, emergency recruitment teams of key implementation partners, Headquarters partners, CO and RO partners, and so on) using the most cost-effective means available (e.g., face-to-face, telephone, Skype, or VTC). All documentation and information obtained will be treated as strictly confidential and is not to be used for public dissemination. 16. The selected review team will be expected to triangulate data sources using the most appropriate among these methods to answer each of the questions posed. For example, for questions surrounding outcomes attributable to the Fast Track Recruitment Process, it might suffice to use anecdotal perceptual data gleaned from surveys, interviews and focus groups, coupled with secondary citations from existing evaluations and reviews. To answer questions surrounding the timeliness of recruitments before and after the Fast Track system was put in place, however, perceptions will be necessary but insufficient sources of evidence; primary analysis of recruitment files (either a random sample or the universe, depending on the number of recruitments undertaken) must be undertaken. Similarly, for a comparative analysis of Fast Track and non-Fast Track staff performance, a systematic primary analysis disciplinary records, ePASes/PERs, and other will constitute a necessary tool among the

8

suite of data sources amassed, as might brief interviews with staff supervisors. For individual data points such as investments in the Fast Track Recruitment

5 Among these are included, e.g., UNICEF’s recruitment policies, e-recruitment recruitment statistics, the Emergency Unit’s Recruitment Status Table, recruitment policies and executive directives from other UN agencies on emergency recruitment, major evaluations and reviews in which the Fast Track Recruitment Process has been discussed, the 2011 HR in Emergencies Network Meeting Agreed Action Points, the 2010 Sr Leaders in Emergencies Meeting Geneva Minutes and Action Points, and so on.

Process, the team will be expected to requisition verifiable records of such investments from DHR and/or DFAM. 17. Accordingly, a first course of action for the selected review team, after meeting with DHR and EO staff, will be to deliver an Inception Report that includes, among other items, a detailed analysis plan demonstrating how it will harness specific data sources to answer each of the questions above. V. Management and Governance Arrangements 18. Although the cost of this exercise will be underwritten by DHR’s Emergency Unit, the Section will not be involved in the day-to-day management of the review. Rather, in order to generate credible findings and recommendations from the most objective and impartial standpoint possible (short of an external independent review), it will be managed by the Office of the Director of DHR. The review manager will consult on all major decisions with a small Steering Group comprised of one representative each from DHR, EMOPS, EO, and CMO. The role of the Steering Group will be to help further bolster the credibility of the exercise by advising the Director’s Office the overall strategic direction of the exercise and on specific and technical issues. 19. In this scenario, the Emergencies Recruitment Section will be consulted on a regular basis for source materials, inputs and feedback in order to maintain the relevance of the exercise. It will also serve as a member of a Reference Group, which will be constituted to provide critical substantive inputs into all review outputs, beginning with this ToR, and thus strengthen the accuracy and relevance of the analysis. The Reference Group will be chaired by the Office of the Director of DHR and in addition to DHR’s Emergencies Unit will include one representative each from the Office of Emergency Operations (EMOPS), Programme Division (PD), and other sections involved in the Fast Track Recruitment Process, as well as one or more representatives of the Regional Office perspective, and one or more from the Country Office perspective. 20. The review will be conducted by a team of two external consultants under the management of the Office of the Director of DHR. The consulting team will jointly embody both a grounded knowledge of UNICEF’s emergency operations as well as an established track record for undertaking an evidence-based, mixed-method evaluative

9

exercise such as this one. The ideal profile both candidates will exhibit is as follows: A minimum of 2-3 years’ exposure to emergency operations of the United Nations,

international NGOs, and other humanitarian actors, preferably with experience with their Human Resources systems;

At least 5-7 years’ demonstrated experience in mixed-method data collection and analysis approaches, including the facilitation of KIIs and FGDs, survey design and analysis, systematic sampling of units of analysis (both individuals and documents), and quantitative analysis;

Demonstrated ability to quickly devise an analytical framework to answer evaluation/review questions;

Ability to work autonomously, quickly and resourcefully with minimal supervision; Excellent written and verbal communications; and Fluency in English, with

fluency in French desirable. VII. Timeframe 21. The exercise will last 12 weeks from the consultants’ start date in September, with a final report to be delivered in early December. Expected deliverables include the following: 1. An inception note briefly outlining a roadmap for implementing this ToR, including a data analysis plan; 2. Data collection tools for desk review, KII/FGD, and survey activities planned; 3. A draft report synthesizing the analysis, and the main findings and recommendations emanating from it; 4. A matrix detailing the consultants’ response to comments received from the review manager, the Steering Group, and the Reference Group; 5. A final report, summarizing the discussion, decisions taken and actions agreed, and addressing feedback provided by Steering Group; 6. Meetings with the Steering Group and Reference Groups at key junctures (i.e., delivery of each major output); 7. A debrief with the Director of DHR, the Emergencies Recruitment Section, and the Steering and Reference Group members as necessary. All written outputs will be shared with the review manager, the Steering Group and Reference Group for rapid feedback. 18. Figure 1 summarizes the key milestones associated with the review. Figure 1 – Review of the Fast Track Recruitment Process Action Time Frame Consultant recruitment 15 August – 14 September Background desk review of key documents, delivery of inception report 17-28 September

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Finalization of Inception Report 5 October Deployment of survey 5 October Formal desk-based analyses 8-31 October Key stakeholders KIIs and FGDs 8-31 October Triangulated data analysis and report drafting 1-30 November Delivery of draft report 14 December Final report and debrief 28 December

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Annex 2

Review of UNICEF’s Fast Track Recruitment Process in Emergencies Team Member Bios – 27 September 2012 Mr. Enrico Leonardi – Team Leader Since 2008 Enrico has served UNICEF in various planning, evaluation and monitoring functions in UNICEF regional offices in WCAR and MENA, as well as Kenya, Myanmar and Zimbabwe country offices. Most recently, he has conducted real time, independent assessment of UNICEF’s Response to the Sahel Food and Nutrition Crisis in Nigeria, Niger, Mauritania and Chad. Enrico has conducted evaluation projects for Danish Management for the European Commission and Save the Children, and was a food aid monitor volunteer for the World Food Programme in Rwanda. He later served as Field Operations Project Officer in Rwanda, supporting the repatriation of refugees from Zaire and Tanzania. Enrico is a former Emergency Regional Adviser in UNICEF ESARO where he provided policy and technical guidance, capacity building and analytic support to country offices contingency plans for operational and programmatic response in the event of emergency. As programme officer in EMOPS Humanitarian Support Unit he coordinated HQ support for Latin America, West/Central Africa and CEE/CIS regions. Dr. David Bassiouni – Principal Advisor Dr. Bassiouni is the Chairman and CEO of The Bassiouni Group, the New York based international consultancy cum investment firm (The Bassiouni Group ‐ TBG) specializing in collaborative solutions for the public and private sectors, including Business Strategy/Development, Integrated Marketing, Crisis Management, Social Responsibility and International Development, Humanitarian Assistance, Complex Emergencies, Post‐Conflict Recovery and Reconstruction and Evaluation. A veteran humanitarian and career diplomat, Dr. Bassiouni served in the United Nations system for over twenty six years, primarily working with UNICEF, DHA, OCHA and UNDGO. He held several senior positions including Deputy Director for UNICEF’s Office for Emergency Programmes, Chief of the Interagency and Response branches in DHA/OCHA and Coordinator for IASC/ECHA. Dr. Bassiouni also marked an important milestone in UN history by becoming the first‐ever UN Humanitarian Coordinator and the only Coordinator directly appointed by the Secretary‐General and the Security Council. He also served as the UNICEF Representative in seven countries including

12

Somalia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Ethiopia, OPT, Egypt and Bangladesh. Prior to his career in the UN, Dr. Bassiouni served in senior government positions, including Regional Minister of Agriculture in the Sudan. A graduate of the Veterinary Medicine School of Khartoum University, Sudan, Dr. Bassiouni holds a Masters Degree in Public Administration from Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government as well as a Parvin Fellowship from Princeton University. Among his leadership roles, he sits on the boards of several companies and organizations including The Mary N. Bassiouni Foundation, The Sergio Vieira de Mello Foundation and the International Rural Reconstruction Institute (IRRI) and others. Ms. Jessica Alexander – Analyst Jessica Alexander has conducted evaluations of UNICEF and other humanitarian organizations, including the International Red Cross, International Organization of Migration (IOM) and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). She conducted qualitative analysis of UNICEF’s child protection response in tsunami‐affected regions. In Haiti she tracked and monitored outputs of emergency operations and developed longer term monitoring and evaluations plans, and facilitated development of Save Haiti 5 Year Country Strategy and Country Annual Plan for 2011 and coordinated various inter‐agency/inter‐ sectoral evaluations. She was a team leader for joint Save the Children UK/UNICEF multi‐country (Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia) evaluation of Education Cluster response to the Horn of Africa drought, as well as being lead evaluator of the Education Cluster response to Pakistan floods. At the Inter‐Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) she managed large‐scale independent assessment of the INEE Minimum Standards. She has worked with OCHA including development of an evaluation framework and led consultations with agencies at headquarters and in Kenya and Somalia. With the International Rescue Committee, Jessica coordinated humanitarian activities and developed and implemented community‐based camp management structures and conducted camp‐wide needs assessment to identify and respond to gaps in service. At the IOM, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, she evaluated transitional assistance to former soldiers. In UNHCR, Kigali, Rwanda she monitored living conditions of resettled refugees in Rwandan provinces through quantitative surveys and identified gaps in provision of basic services. Ms. Jessica Alexander – Analyst

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Annex 3

INTERVIEW GUIDELINES FOR SENIOR MANAGERS AND HR OFFICERS IN ROs AND COs (NON-SUPERVISORS)

Name of the interviewee____________________________________________________________________ Title (current/previous if relevant)_______________________________________________________ Office (current/previous if relevant)______________________________________________________ Emergency/ies_______________________________________________________________________________ Timeliness of the FTRP (if possible compared to non-FTRP). Where was there speed, where was there delays (recruitment steps, entitlements, etc.)?________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Transparency (openness of vacancy, fairness of process) of the FTRP (if possible compared to non-FTRP)_____________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Quality of FTRP recruits (if possible compared to non-FTRP recruits). How do you know? What have been the indicators to determine quality of candidates? _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Areas for which it has been easier/harder to recruit good staff quickly. Why do you believe this is the case? Functional areas______________________________________________________________________________ Regions/countries___________________________________________________________________________ Emergency types_____________________________________________________________________________

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Languages____________________________________________________________________________________ Others_________________________________________________________________________________________ Positive outcomes that hinge on the FTRP (provide evidence if possible) _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Negative outcomes that hinge on the FTRP (provide evidence if possible) _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Relative costs and benefits of the FTRP in comparison to non-FTRP (provide evidence if possible) ________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Other questions and information _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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INTERVIEW GUIDELINES FOR SUPERVISORS (Focus is on supervisors who participated in the Survey, and who supervised

more than two persons, either FTRP or non-FTRP recruits) Name of Supervisor:_________________________________________________________________________ Current Position:_____________________________________________________________________________ Current Duty Station:________________________________________________________________________ Number of years in position:________________________________________________________________ Number of Staff (FTRP and non-FTRP) Supervised:______________________________________ Among the staff you are or have been supervising: Average timeliness of the recruitment process. Where was there speed, where were there delays (recruitment steps, entitlements, etc.)? Were the delays due to the field office (i.e. your office) or HQ?_______________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Comment on the transparency (openness of vacancy, fairness of process) of the recruitment process:_________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________________________ Comment on the quality and performance of recruits. How do you know? What have been the indicators to determine quality of candidates?_________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ If you've had a particularly good or bad experience with recruiting any other person who you have supervised (either on the recruitment process itself or on the quality of the candidate), can you please describe the process, why it was particularly good or bad. ________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Positive and negative program outcomes that hinge on the FTRP and non-FTRP processes (provide evidence if possible).__________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Other information____________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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INTERVIEW GUIDELINES FOR FTRP AND NON-FTRP SUPERVISEES Name of Supervisee ______________________________________________________ Name of Supervisor_______________________________________________________ Emergency__________________________________________________ FTRP (Y/N)__________________ Recruitment process: Timeliness______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Openness of the vacancy ___________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Clarity of the process________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Fairness_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Administrative follow-up (medical clearance, UNLP issuance, contract, TA, etc.) ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ If applicable, comparisons with other organisations’ or previous UNICEF’s recruitment processes (FT or similar positions, no short-time surge) _________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Other information ___________________________________________________________________________

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INTERVIEW GUIDELINES EXTERNAL ORGANISATIONS

Organisation__________________________________________________________________________________ Interviewee/s, Name and Title 1)______________________________________________________________________________________________2)______________________________________________________________________________________________3)______________________________________________________________________________________________ General information on deployment in emergency; surge vs. long-term ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Policy and Strategic issues (gender/nationality balance; organisational adaptations to a competitive market for qualified staff; change implementation time/dates; etc.) _________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Timeliness: challenges and solutions. Statistics. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Transparency (openness, fairness) of the process: challenges and solutions ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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Quality of staff: challenges and solutions ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ What have been the indicators to determine quality of candidates? ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Areas for which it has been easier/harder to recruit good staff quickly. Why do you believe this is the case? Functional areas______________________________________________________________________________ Regions/countries___________________________________________________________________________ Emergency types_____________________________________________________________________________ Languages____________________________________________________________________________________ Others_________________________________________________________________________________________ Collaboration with UNICEF for HR issues (recruitment, deployment, exchanges, secondments)____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Other information ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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Annex 4

Survey Protocol

Hello! Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey; your responses are very helpful to the independent consultant team in analyzing the UNICEF recruitment process. This is part of a larger independent exercise examining UNICEF’s Fast Track Recruitment Process. Please note that this is not a performance review and it has nothing to do with PER processes. The Review team is independent, and all responses to the survey are confidential; these will not be shared with anyone in UNICEF. Data collected will be used only in aggregate to analyse trends and broad issues. Please answer the questions as honestly as possible. If you do not know or can not answer a question, please mark N/A. Should you have any questions or concerns about the survey, please contact the team leader, Enrico Leonardi at: leonardi.enrico@gmail.com or Jessica Alexander at: jessalex811@hotmail.com. Please respond by NOVEMBER 2nd. Thank you! 1. In what country are you currently based? 2. For how many years have you been employed by UNICEF?

Less than 1 year

1-5 years

6-10years

11+ years 3. What is your current function? 4. How many staff do you currently supervise?

1

2-4

5-7

8+ 5. In the following list you will find the name of one person you have supervised. We ask you to please select that person below and when answering all of the subsequent questions in the survey, you will be referring to this person. 6. Compared to other emergency recruitment processes which you have observed, how much faster or slower was the process for this candidate?

Much faster

Faster

About the same

Slower

Much slower

N/A 7. How satisfied were you with the time taken to recruit this candidate?

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Very satisfied

Satisfied

Somewhat satisfied

Not satisfied at all

N/A 8. Are there any positive programming outcomes that you can attribute to the timing of the recruitment process? 9. Are there any negative programming outcomes that you can attribute to the timing of the recruitment process? 10. Please rate, for the following elements of the recruitment process, how satisfied or dissatisfied you were with these parts of the process to recruit this candidate. Very Satisfied, Satisfied, Somewhat Satisfied, Not satisfied at all N/A

Openness of the vacancy

Clarity of the process

Fairness in the selection process

Administrative followup (medical clearance, UNLP issuance, contract, TA, etc.) 11. How satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the overall competence of this candidate?

Very satisfied

Satisfied

Somewhat Satisfied

Not Satisfied at all

N/A 12. How much or little did this candidate's actual qualifications meet what was required by the JD?

Exceeded requirements

Met requirements

Fell below requirements

Did not meet requirements at all

N/A 13. How has this candidate's performance met or not met your expectations?

Exceeded expectations

Met expectations

Fell below expectations

Did not meet expectations at all

N/A 14. Any other points about this candidate's performance or recruitment process that you wish to comment on? 15. If you've had a particularly good or bad experience with recruiting any other person who you have supervised, can you please describe the process, why it was particularly good or bad and be sure to include the full name of the person you are referring to? Thank you again for your time and thoughtful answers. Should you have any further thoughts or comments, please send them to Team Leader, Enrico Leonardi: Leonardi.enrico@gmail.com

Annex 5

FTRP Database Analysis Plan

Area of Analysis Variable(s) Description Cells Diversity Gender Comparison of Non-FT to FT

candidates with regards to M/F recruitment tendencies.

Gender (F/M)

Nationality Analyse the level of diversity between FT and Non-FT candidates. - From how many countries are candidates from each recruitment stream? Are there differences between FT and Non-FT in this regard? - Are there country preferences given to one or another country for either recruitment stream?

Nationality

Gender/Nationality and Grade

Analyse the correlation between Gender and Grade and Nationality and Grade. What is the diversity make-up for each Grade?

Gender (F/M), Nationality, Level

Location Region Regional breakdown of FT recruits - Total number of FT recruits per

Region and Recruitment Timeframe for FT (Total No. Days)

23

region - Correlation between time and region: Number of days of recruitment of FT candidates correlated with region (is one region ‘faster’ than another? Is it working better in some regions than others?)

Country Country breakdown of FT recruits - Total number of FT recruits per country - Correlation between time and country: Number of days of recruitment of FT candidates correlated with country (is one country ‘faster’ than another? Is it working better in some countries than others?)

Country and Recruitment Timeframe for FT (Total No. Days)

Post Function - Correlation between time and Function: Number of days of recruitment of FT candidates correlated with function (do certain functions take longer to recruit for than others? Which ones?)

Functional Area and Recruitment Timeframe for FT (Total No Days)

Level - Correlation between time and Level and Recruitment Timeframe for

24

Level: Number of days of recruitment of FT candidates correlated with Level (do certain levels take longer to recruit for than others? Which ones?)

FT (Total No Days)

Timing Trends Recruitment Year Timing of FT Recruitment over time since 2011. Any evidence to show that we are getting faster?

Recruitment Year (2011, 2012) and Timeframe (Total No. Days)

Recruitment Timeframe

Duration of Advertisement

Analysis of the duration of advertisement between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process – ED, Regular IP, Talent Pool, etc)

No. Days Position Advertised

Duration of Shortlist Analysis of the duration of shortlist between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process – ED, Regular IP, Talent Pool, etc)

No. Days Candidates Shortlisted

Office Review and Recommendation

Analysis of the duration of review and recommendation between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process – ED, Regular IP, Talent Pool, etc)

No. Days Office Review and Recommendation Process

DHR Approval Process Analysis of the duration of days for DHR to approve the candidate between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process – ED, Regular IP, Talent Pool, etc)

No, Days DHR Approval Process

25

Initial Offer Letter Analysis of the duration of days for DHR to provide initial offer letter between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process – ED, Regular IP, Talent Pool, etc)

No. Days Issuance of Initial Offer Letter

Detailed Offer Letter Analysis of the duration of days to issue detailed offer letter between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process – ED, Regular IP, Talent Pool, etc)

No Days Issuance of Detailed Offer Letter

Total No. Days Analysis of total time taken from close of advertisement to issuance of detailed offer letter between between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process – ED, Regular IP, Talent Pool, etc)

Sub-Total No. Days

Recruitment Steps Generic JD Used Is there a difference between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process) in terms of kind of JD used?

Generic JD Used? (Yes/No)

Selection Panel Used Is there a difference between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process) in terms of whether a Selection Panel was used?

Selection Panel Used? (Y/N)

No Staff on Selection Is there a difference between FT No. of Staff on Selection Panel

26

Panel and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process) in terms of the number of staff on the selection panel?

No. of Candidates Shortlisted by DHR

Is there a difference between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process) in terms of the number of the number of candidates shortlisted?

No of Candidates Shortlisted by DHR

Shortlisted Candidates considered by Selection Panel

Is there a difference between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process) in terms of the number of candidates considered by the selection panel?

No of Shortlisted Candidates Considered by the Selection Panel

Reference Checks Is there a difference between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process) in terms of whether or not references were sought?

Reference checks undertaken? (Yes/No)

Number of references received

Is there a difference between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process) in terms of the number of references received?

No of References Received

Rating of Candidates in their References

Is there a difference between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process) in terms of the ratings

Median Reference Rating on Overall Performance, Median Reference Rating on Core Values, Median Reference Rating on Core

27

they received in their references? - Analysis of the differences of medians between the groups of candidates

Competencies, Median Reference Rating on Functional Competencies. Median Reference Rating on Technical Knowledge, Median Reference Rating on Planning, Setting Standards and Monitoring, Median Reference Rating on Drive or Results, Median Reference Rating on Teamwork, Median Reference Rating on Communication

PERs Is there a difference between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process) in terms of whether or not PERs were checked?

PERs Considered by the Selection Panel

Rating of Candidates in their PERs (if applicable)

Is there a difference between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process) in terms of the ratings they received in their PERs? - Analysis of the differences of medians between the groups of candidates

Rating on Core Values, Rating for Core Competencies, Rating for Functional Competencies, Overall Rating

CRB Is there a difference between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process) in terms of whether a CRB was used or not? Is there a difference between FT and Non-FT in terms of how the

Use of CRB Review? CRB Endorsed WITHOUT COMMENT OR QUESTION

28

CRB endorsed the candidate? Qualifications Education Level Do FT and Non-FT candidates

meet the Education requirements as set out in the JD?

Overall Level of Convergence/Divergence between Staff Education Level and JD Education Level

Years of Experience Do FT and Non-FT candidates meet the required years of experience as set out in the JD?

Overall Level of Convergence/Divergence between Staff Years Experience and JD Experience Required

Language Skills Do FT and Non-FT candidates meet the required language skills as set out in the JD?

Overall Level of Convergence/Divergence between Language Skills and JD Language Skills Required

Quality of Candidates

Quality of PERS What is the standard deviation amongst PER scores? Are they all the same or do they vary?Is there a difference between FT and Non-FT (Broken down by each kind of recruitment process) in terms of the ratings they received in their PERs? - Analysis of the differences of medians between the groups of candidates

Rating on Core Values, Rating for Core Competencies, Rating for Functional Competencies, Overall RatingRating on Core Values, Rating for Core Competencies, Rating for Functional Competencies, Overall Rating

Candidate Career Trajectory Quality of PERS

- Have FT candidates moved ahead in UNICEF? - Analysis of the ‘staff current grade’ with grade against FTRP grade. What is the standard deviation amongst PER scores?

Current Level and LevelRating on Core Values, Rating for Core Competencies, Rating for Functional Competencies, Overall Rating

29

Are they all the same or do they vary?

Candidate Career Trajectory

- Have FT candidates moved ahead in UNICEF? - Analysis of the ‘staff current grade’ with grade against FTRP grade.

Current Level and Previous Level

Annex 6

Number of FTRP cases by country

Country Frequency Percent

DRC 34 16.3

Somalia 24 11.4

Afghanistan 20 9.8

Pakistan 15 7.1

Chad 14 6.5

Sudan 11 5.4

Ethiopia 10 4.9

Haiti 10 4.9

Kenya 10 4.9

Mali 10 4.9

Yemen 10 4.9

South Sudan 8 3.8

Libya 6 2.7

Cote d'Ivoire 5 2.2

Liberia 5 2.2

Djibouti 2 1.1

ESARO 2 1.1

MENA 2 1.1

Cameroon 1 0.5

Central African Republic 1 0.5

Eritrea 1 0.5

Iraq 1 0.5

Mauritania 1 0.5

Niger 1 0.5

Nigeria 1 0.5

Occupied Territory 1 0.5

Uganda 1 0.5

Total 208 100

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Annex 7 Analysis of Timeliness

No. Days Vacancy Announcement

FTRP/Non-FTRP Recruitment Process N Mean Median Range Std.

Deviation

Variance

FTRP Emergency Decision - IP 208 12.755 14.000 24.0 5.0533 25.536

Total 208 12.755 14.000 24.0 5.0533 25.536

non-FTRP

Direct Selection IP Positions 27 2.625 .000 21.0 7.0788 50.110

Emergency Decision - IP 90 16.370 14.000 28.0 7.6493 58.512

Executive Decision - IP 10 .000 .000 .0 .0000 .000

NETI Positions 7 22.000 22.000 .0 .0000 .000

Regular IP Positions 508 18.039 21.000 36.0 6.9416 48.185

Total 641 16.922 21.000 36.0 7.9125 62.607

Total

Direct Selection IP Positions 27 2.625 .000 21.0 7.0788 50.110

Emergency Decision - IP 298 13.849 14.000 35.0 6.1737 38.115

Executive Decision - IP 10 .000 .000 .0 .0000 .000

NETI Positions 7 22.000 22.000 .0 .0000 .000

Regular IP Positions 508 18.039 21.000 36.0 6.9416 48.185

Total 849 15.902 14.000 36.0 7.5301 56.703

No. Days Candidates Shortlisted

FTRP/Non -FTRP Recruitment Process N Mean Median Range Std.

Deviation

Variance

FTRP Emergency Decision - IP 208 10.35 4.00 116 19.146 366.577

Total 208 10.35 4.00 116 19.146 366.577

non-FTRP

Direct Selection IP Positions 27 9.88 7.00 25 8.519 72.576

Emergency Decision - IP 90 14.74 3.00 98 25.429 646.622

Executive Decision - IP 10 .00 .00 0 .000 .000

NETI Positions 7 4.00 4.00 0 .000 .000

Regular IP Positions 508 17.81 14.00 74 14.435 208.367

Total 641 16.63 13.00 98 16.351 267.370

Total

Direct Selection IP Positions 27 9.88 7.00 25 8.519 72.576

Emergency Decision - IP 298 11.68 3.00 116 21.295 453.489

Executive Decision - IP 10 .00 .00 0 .000 .000

NETI Positions 7 4.00 4.00 0 .000 .000

Regular IP Positions 508 17.81 14.00 74 14.435 208.367

Total 849 15.09 10.00 116 17.279 298.550

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No. Days Office Review and Recommendation

FTRP/Non-FTRP Recruitment Process N Mean Median Range Std.

Deviation

Variance

FTRP Emergency Decision - IP 208 58.09 54.00 229 40.429 1634.499

Total 208 58.09 54.00 229 40.429 1634.499

non-FTRP

Direct Selection IP Positions 27 32.00 15.00 117 37.377 1397.034

Emergency Decision - IP 90 52.89 27.00 197 54.889 3012.766

Executive Decision - IP 10 3.67 2.00 5 2.484 6.171

NETI Positions 7 45.50 45.50 9 4.880 23.815

Regular IP Positions 508 61.38 55.00 174 37.212 1384.738

Total 641 57.89 48.00 197 40.750 1660.583

Total

Direct Selection IP Positions 27 32.00 15.00 117 37.377 1397.034

Emergency Decision - IP 298 56.52 46.16 229 45.260 2048.442

Executive Decision - IP 10 3.67 2.00 5 2.484 6.171

NETI Positions 7 45.50 45.50 9 4.880 23.815

Regular IP Positions 508 61.38 55.00 174 37.212 1384.738

Total 849 57.94 49.00 229 40.648 1652.269

No. Days DHR Approval

FTRP/Non-FTRP Recruitment Process N Mean Median Range Std.

Deviation

Variance

FTRP Emergency Decision - IP 208 7.53 3.50 118 14.016 196.444

Total 208 7.53 3.50 118 14.016 196.444

non-FTRP

Direct Selection IP Positions 27 14.13 15.50 28 9.979 99.586

Emergency Decision - IP 90 4.78 1.00 56 11.010 121.221

Executive Decision - IP 10 3.33 5.00 5 2.484 6.171

NETI Positions 7 11.50 11.50 1 .542 .294

Regular IP Positions 508 20.15 19.00 66 11.547 133.325

Total 641 17.39 17.00 66 12.603 158.828

Total

Direct Selection IP Positions 27 14.13 15.50 28 9.979 99.586

Emergency Decision - IP 298 6.70 2.00 118 13.221 174.804

Executive Decision - IP 10 3.33 5.00 5 2.484 6.171

NETI Positions 7 11.50 11.50 1 .542 .294

Regular IP Positions 508 20.15 19.00 66 11.547 133.325

Total 849 14.97 13.00 118 13.631 185.808

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No. Days Issuance Offer Letter

FTRP/Non-FTRP Recruitment Process N Mean Median Range Std.

Deviation

Variance

FTRP Emergency Decision - IP 208 .67 .00 14 1.876 3.521

Total 208 .67 .00 14 1.876 3.521

non-FTRP

Direct Selection IP Positions 27 2.13 .00 13 4.307 18.554

Emergency Decision - IP 90 2.74 .00 34 7.892 62.290

Executive Decision - IP 10 2.33 2.00 1 .497 .247

NETI Positions 7 5.00 5.00 4 2.169 4.704

Regular IP Positions 508 5.80 3.00 47 7.936 62.984

Total 641 5.15 2.00 47 7.808 60.963

Total

Direct Selection IP Positions 27 2.13 .00 13 4.307 18.554

Emergency Decision - IP 298 1.30 .00 34 4.697 22.059

Executive Decision - IP 10 2.33 2.00 1 .497 .247

NETI Positions 7 5.00 5.00 4 2.169 4.704

Regular IP Positions 508 5.80 3.00 47 7.936 62.984

Total 849 4.05 1.00 47 7.113 50.598

SUB-TOTAL: No. Days from End of Vacancy Announcement to Initial Offer Letter

FTRP/Non-FTRP Recruitment Process N Mean Median Range Std.

Deviation

Variance

FTRP Emergency Decision - IP 208 76.64 73.00 231 42.616 1816.129

Total 208 76.64 73.00 231 42.616 1816.129

non-FTRP

Direct Selection IP Positions 27 58.13 41.50 125 38.481 1480.778

Emergency Decision - IP 90 75.15 59.00 230 55.228 3050.097

Executive Decision - IP 10 9.33 9.00 1 .497 .247

NETI Positions 7 66.00 66.00 6 3.253 10.585

Regular IP Positions 508 105.13 102.00 232 42.164 1777.827

Total 641 97.05 94.50 235 46.950 2204.320

Total

Direct Selection IP Positions 27 58.13 41.50 125 38.481 1480.778

Emergency Decision – IP 298 76.19 71.01 244 46.700 2180.883

Executive Decision - IP 10 9.33 9.00 1 .497 .247

NETI Positions 7 66.00 66.00 6 3.253 10.585

Regular IP Positions 508 105.13 102.00 232 42.164 1777.827

Total 849 92.05 89.00 244 46.735 2184.180

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No. Days Issuance Detailed Offer Letter

FTRP/Non-FTRP Recruitment Process N Mean Median Range Std.

Deviation

Variance

FTRP Emergency Decision - IP 131 19.47 13.00 179 21.764 473.655

Total 131 19.47 13.00 179 21.764 473.655

non-FTRP

Direct Selection IP Positions 13 9.00 8.50 7 2.847 8.107

Emergency Decision - IP 70 50.48 14.00 721 151.590 22979.588

Executive Decision - IP 3 8.00 8.00 0 .000 .000

NETI Positions 7 25.00 25.00 12 6.507 42.338

Regular IP Positions 374 15.92 14.00 60 11.569 133.842

Total 468 20.98 14.00 722 60.578 3669.683

Total

Direct Selection IP Positions 13 9.00 8.50 7 2.847 8.107

Emergency Decision - IP 201 30.28 14.00 722 91.992 8462.497

Executive Decision - IP 3 8.00 8.00 0 .000 .000

NETI Positions 7 25.00 25.00 12 6.507 42.338

Regular IP Positions 374 15.92 14.00 60 11.569 133.842

Total 599 20.65 14.00 722 54.483 2968.347

SUB-TOTAL: No. Days from End of Vacancy Announcement to Detailed Offer Letter

FTRP/Non-FTRP Recruitment Process N Mean Median Range Std.

Deviation

Variance

FTRP Emergency Decision - IP 131 88.57 78.50 234 48.051 2308.877

Total 131 88.57 78.50 234 48.051 2308.877

non-FTRP

Direct Selection IP Positions 13 55.50 53.00 36 13.978 195.374

Emergency Decision - IP 70 120.76 95.00 710 147.105 21639.751

Executive Decision - IP 3 18.00 18.00 0 .000 .000

NETI Positions 7 91.00 91.00 6 3.253 10.585

Regular IP Positions 374 123.96 119.00 254 47.228 2230.461

Total 468 120.30 111.00 734 72.204 5213.488

Total

Direct Selection IP Positions 13 55.50 53.00 36 13.978 195.374

Emergency Decision - IP 201 99.79 80.00 738 95.965 9209.193

Executive Decision - IP 3 18.00 18.00 0 .000 .000

NETI Positions 7 91.00 91.00 6 3.253 10.585

Regular IP Positions 374 123.96 119.00 254 47.228 2230.461

Total 599 113.35 105.00 738 68.884 4745.072

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SUB-TOTAL: No. Days Deployment

FTRP/Non-FTRP Recruitment Process N Mean Median Range Std.

Deviation

Variance

FTRP Emergency Decision - IP 123 41.11 40.00 109 20.677 427.551

Total 123 41.11 40.00 109 20.677 427.551

non-FTRP

Direct Selection IP Positions 13 50.00 49.00 48 18.408 338.864

Emergency Decision - IP 67 30.95 29.50 71 17.011 289.380

Executive Decision - IP 3 72.00 72.00 0 .000 .000

NETI Positions 7 24.50 24.50 7 3.796 14.407

Regular IP Positions 367 49.29 49.50 118 23.663 559.949

Total 458 46.44 43.00 120 23.542 554.246

Total

Direct Selection IP Positions 13 50.00 49.00 48 18.408 338.864

Emergency Decision - IP 190 37.54 37.09 109 20.021 400.836

Executive Decision - IP 3 72.00 72.00 0 .000 .000

NETI Positions 7 24.50 24.50 7 3.796 14.407

Regular IP Positions 367 49.29 49.50 118 23.663 559.949

Total 581 45.31 43.00 121 23.051 531.343

SUB-TOTAL No. Days from End of Vacancy Announcement to Deployment

FTRP/Non-FTRP Recruitment Process N Mean Median Range Std.

Deviation

Variance

FTRP Emergency Decision - IP 123 126.49 118.00 227 46.806 2190.807

Total 123 126.49 118.00 227 46.806 2190.807

non-FTRP

Direct Selection IP Positions 13 105.50 107.50 57 21.765 473.707

Emergency Decision - IP 67 120.60 120.50 197 51.075 2608.692

Executive Decision - IP 3 90.00 90.00 0 .000 .000

NETI Positions 7 115.50 115.50 1 .542 .294

Regular IP Positions 367 173.54 165.00 287 51.478 2650.025

Total 458 162.36 158.00 287 55.101 3036.079

Total

Direct Selection IP Positions 13 105.50 107.50 57 21.765 473.707

Emergency Decision - IP 190 124.42 118.00 227 48.298 2332.664

Executive Decision - IP 3 90.00 90.00 0 .000 .000

NETI Positions 7 115.50 115.50 1 .542 .294

Regular IP Positions 367 173.54 165.00 287 51.478 2650.025

Total 581 154.76 152.00 294 55.391 3068.203

36

TOTAL TIMING from Vacancy Announcement to Deployment

FTRP/Non-FTRP Recruitment Process N Mean Median Range Std.

Deviation

Variance

FTRP Emergency Decision - IP 123 139.01 131.00 240 48.844 2385.746

Total 123 139.01 131.00 240 48.844 2385.746

non-FTRP

Direct Selection IP Positions 13 105.50 107.50 57 21.765 473.707

Emergency Decision - IP 67 137.75 131.00 203 51.651 2667.825

Executive Decision - IP 3 90.00 90.00 0 .000 .000

NETI Positions 7 137.50 137.50 1 .542 .294

Regular IP Positions 367 191.38 183.50 308 52.177 2722.464

Total 458 179.52 173.00 308 56.527 3195.306

Total

Direct Selection IP Positions 13 105.50 107.50 57 21.765 473.707

Emergency Decision - IP 190 138.57 131.00 240 49.716 2471.705

Executive Decision - IP 3 90.00 90.00 0 .000 .000

NETI Positions 7 137.50 137.50 1 .542 .294

Regular IP Positions 367 191.38 183.50 308 52.177 2722.464

Total 581 170.93 170.00 314 57.392 3293.889

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare each step of the recruitment process for FT and non-FT. The test found that FT had statistically significant lower number of days for vacancy announcement, shortlisting, DHR approval and issuance of initial offer letter versus non-FT.

37

Annex 8 Interview Summaries - Other Organisations United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - A Fast Track System (FTS) approved in 2009, covering procurements, HR and

finance. - Since its establishment, used in ±40 countries for sudden onset crises, large-

scale disasters, small-scale localized crises, chronic/protracted crises, countries where strategic and time-critical response is needed.

- FTS may be activated when one or more of the following applies: i) a crisis has been declared (Humanitarian Coordinator appointed, Flash Appeal under preparation, OCHA engaged and cluster system activated; ii) emergency grant approved by BCPR; iii) Surge support has been activated; iv) strategic and/or time-critical response required by Resident Representative.

- The HR component of the FTS includes the following elements for fixed-term positions: i) UNDP HQ can create/extend positions based on CO’s assurance of funding; ii) one week vacancy announcement instead of two; iii) predictable and guaranteed turn-around times of recruitment processes at HQ level.

- No quality issues or problems when applying the FTS. More concerned risks associated with the procurement and financial components.

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) - UNFPA has a Fast Track Policy that covers Temporary Appointments (TA),

Fixed-Term Appointments (FTA), and recruitment of vetted candidates from rosters for Representative positions.

- The most efficient system is the creation of pre-screened candidates, as it is being done for Representatives. Small numbers of candidates apply and decision is taken in one week. Selected candidate is sent to CO two weeks before departure of the incumbent, to ensure proper hand-over. For Representatives, UNFPA has a negative vacancy rate!

- To speed up recruitment of FTAs, CO produce a business case, providing reasons to use the accelerated policy, and indentifying which positions need fast-tracking. This process ensures ownership of the CO. Senior management in NY approves this business case.

- Vacancy announcement is reduced from two weeks to one week. Priority is given to fast-track recruitments, but there no dedicated staff.

- Quality of staff recruited with the fast-track is not an issue; it depends on the context and on external factors, not on the process. The high level of buy-in of senior managers into the Fast Track Policy is an indicator of good quality.

- Not getting staff on the ground in an emergency quickly enough is a much bigger reputational risk for the organisation.

UN Women - DHR very small: 2 SMs, up to 5 consultants and 1 JPO, for ±600 staff worldwide.

38

- Does not have a fast track system, and use staff on TA and SSA as surge. Use small roster system with pre-vetted (CRB) candidates. Advertisement often through word of mouth.

- Minimum time from advertisement to offer is about 2-3 months, then normally long deployment period.

- Establishing the post might take as long as filling it. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) - Two divisions responsible for recruitment: Coordination and Response Division

(EMOPS-like), in New York, for selection, and Administrative Services Branch, in Geneva, for processing recruitment and administrative processes (benefits, entitlements).

- “HR Function” in the Coordination and Response Division works closely with desks to identify HR needs of COs. They open vacancies, develop ToR, classify positions and organise interviews. Also provide coaching and career advisory services.

- OCHA does not have any fast track policy, and follows rules of UN Secretariat. - Vacancies for field positions normally opened for 15 days, then short-listing,

written test, interviews and CRB submission. After closure of the vacancy, it takes an additional 2 to 3 months to fill up the post.

- Use of rosters of suitable candidates – no need for CRB, and some transparency concerns –, and Talent Pools for specific types of jobs. For the latter, JD has to be very specific on requirements (languages issues: French in Haiti, DRC), and has limits given people preferences and might not be interested in going to certain places.

- Use of an “Emergency Response Roster”, similar to UNICEF IRT for deployments of 6-8 weeks. Also OCHA uses Stand-By Partners for up to three months missions.

- Various options to cover gaps till fixed-term staff can be identified and deployed. - Finding French and Spanish speaking staff, candidates for information

management and public information management and for DRC very challenging. UN World Food Programme (WFP) - WFP applies a Mobility and Rotation policy, which favours internal candidates,

including coaching national staff into international positions. External vacancies open only occasionally for specific positions (nutritionists, food/economic security experts). Works well because with current crisis there are always more people than posts.

- When an emergency strikes, various HR surge types: ERT-type staff, rosters, short-terms appointments and consultants, reassignment of internal staff. Meanwhile fixed-term staff search, focusing on internal staff initially, opened to external only at second stage if necessary.

- Selection of IPs was delegated to COs, but some transparency issues called for a return to some control and checks & balances at HQ level (reference and education checks).

39

- Recruitment of internals for fixed-term positions takes about 1 month between the end of the vacancy and the letter of offer; all process, including vacancy ±2,5 months. Could be faster (<2 months). Same process between 3-6 months for external candidates.

- Probation period of one year (extended to 18 months in some cases) in all IP fixed-term contracts. Confirmation of recruitment on 10th month. SM can appeal. Information about non-retained SM available to other UN Agencies.

- Some mistakes made by not being bale to properly gauge behavioural characteristics of candidates during interviews (technically sound, but poor team players).

- Challenges in finding food security nutritionists, engineers, market economists. Problems in usual hardship duty stations, and need for specific profiles for difficult FOs.

- There should be much more coordination and collaboration between UN Agencies at field level, especially when taking over each other’s staff.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) - ICRC working on new comprehensive People Management Strategy for both

national and international staff. Limited openness to external candidates (normally only for high-level positions). ICRC does not have same national diversity requirements of UN. Aiming at more female in high-level positions. Although increasingly more open to other nationalities, most of Heads of Delegations are still Swiss.

- Rotation policy quite sound and efficient. Extensive recruitment of junior positions, then induction and deployment.

- 6 months trial system for national staff turning international. Normally working well.

- Permanent contracts are the standard. Separation and dismissals quite exceptional, albeit costly.

- Planning increasingly challenging due to economic crisis, closing FOs and Delegations, and complex needs of SMs with families.

- Strategic positions in each office (including key liaison and networking officers) treated as priority and recruitment planning done well in advance to avoid gaps and ensure handover. These strategy positions are treated very quickly.

- Various types of surge, based on IRT-type teams in Geneva, missions from other Delegations, rosters for specific functions.

- At present, IP recruitments are mainly managed by Geneva, but progressively authorities are being delegated to Delegations.

- It takes about 1 month from Delegation request to have a SM on the ground, even for long-term positions.

- No CRB-type of recruitment process control, only HR internal control system. - Some misuse of appraisal system; supervisors are accountable, but it is difficult

to follow up consistently.

40

Save the Children US - No specific fast track system for long-term positions after post-crisis surge. Just

try to speed up normal processes. - Surge based on consultant roster (paid 2,000$ also when idle) and less on IRT-

type of team (what SCF UK does). - Vacancy is kept open, and interviews can start when a good candidate applies.

From opening of vacancy it takes approximately 40 days to recruit (try to go faster inn emergencies). Often two interviews (first by phone, then in case with senior recruiter). A lot of focus on reference checks (2-7 days), including criminal records (outsourced and with limits). Letter of offer is already a “contract”. Always try to have a handover.

- If another good candidate applies after one is recruited, the former is included in rosters.

- Targets for gender, nationality diversity balance only in broad policy; does not influence much recruitment processes (go for the best candidate).

- No specific rotation policy for SM in difficult duty stations; only informal policy to take care of well-being of international staff.

- No difference in transparency and quality of recruits between regular recruitment process and emergency accelerated one. Mistakes are possible with both.

- Challenges to find staff for all functions in emergencies, in non English-speaking countries, and in conflicts.

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Annex 9

Persons Met and Interviewed

Name Title Division/Organisation Lisa Sutton Global ERM Focal Point Change Management Office Shannon McGuire Emergency HR Specialist Emergency Unit, DHR John Paul Anderson Emergency HR Specialist Emergency Unit, DHR Terry Davis Security Coordinator, Principal Officer EMOPS Michael Godfrey OPSCEN Man., Deputy Security Coord. OPSCEN, EMOPS Nancy Osborne Regional Security Coordinator OPSCEN, EMOPS Jalpa Ratna Emergency Specialist HFSS, EMOPS Alan Bimelow Security Consultant OPSCEN, EMOPS Marting Mogwanja Deputy Executive Director Office of the DED Lola Galla Human Resources Assistant Emergency Unit, DHR Amanda Gunton Human Resources Consultant Emergency Unit, DHR Rolf Shaller Chief, Mobility & Planning Section DHR Sona Lakhanpal HR Manager, Mobility & Planning Sect. DHR Peter Frobel HR Policy Specialist DHR Marianne Kelly HR Officer, GSC DHR Lisa Gonzales HR Officer, GSC DHR Jokapeci Mocevakaca HR Assistant, WCARO, GSC DHR Julienne Guerrero HR Assistant, ESARO/MENA, GSC DHR Nick Alipui Director Program Division Richard Bridle Director DHR Aruna Thanablasingam Dep. Director, Strategic Talent Managm. DHR Bintou Keita Dep. Director, Business Partner Progr. DHR Betel Tessaw Chief, Business Partner Emergency DHR James Rogan Chief, Peacebuilding and Recovery Sec. EMOPS Akhil Iyer Deputy Director EMOPS Ramou Ndure HR Manager, Policy and Program, BPU, DHR Rose Brown-Bickel Chief, Classification & Org. Design DHR Corine Faletto Chief, HR Services and Systems DHR Liselotte Woltmann Chief Payroll DHR Michael Dahl Business Partner Prog. And Policy DHR Silvia Danailov Chief HFSS EMOPS Beatrice Koffi-Gbedo HR Specialist UNICEF Mali Elizabeth Quaye Operations Manager UNICEF South Sudan Mohamed Mirza HR Specialist UNICEF South Sudan Katharina Imhof Deputy Representative UNICEF Libya Kader Diarra HR Specialist UNICEF Ivory Coast Ranya Kargbo HR Specialist UNICEF Nigeria Melesse Gebre-Egzi Operations Manager UNICEF Nigeria Patrizia Di Giovanni Deputy Representative UNICEF Ethiopia

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Benjamin Omoluyi HR Specialist UNICEF Yemen Antonino Brusa Regional HR Chief UNICEF ESARO Madhavi Ashok Deputy Representative UNICEF Kenya Roseline Araman Chief of Operations UNICEF Niger Aminata Kane HR Specialist UNICEF WCARO (ex DRC) Sharad Sapra Representative UNICEF Uganda Rudolf Messinger Senior HR Manager UNICEF Pakistan Marzio Babille Representative UNICEF Iraq Nazirullah Kahn HR Specialist UNICEF Iraq Gianluca Buono Regional Emergency Advisor UNICEF TACRO Jacques Boyer Deputy Representative UNICEF Nigeria Marcela Madero HR Specialist UNICEF Liberia Karolina Wozinak HR Officer UNICEF Liberia Marmonie Freeman Senior HR Specialist UNICEF Liberia Yasmin Haque Representative UNICEF South Sudan Robert McCarthy Regional Emergency Advisor UNICEF ESARO Tanya Chapuisat Representative UNICEF Costa Rica (ex CAR) Megan Gilgan Chief Field Operations and Emergency UNICEF Kenya Sylvie Kpakpo Regional HR Chief UNICEF WCARO Rose Clynick HR Chief UNICEF Afghanistan Elke Wisch Deputy Regional Director UNICEF ESARO Goeff Wiffin Representative UNICEF Cameroon Grant Leaity Regional Emergency Advisor UNICEF WCARO Isabel Crowley Representative UNICEF Liberia Elhadj Sy Regional Director UNICEF ESARO Carel De Rooy Representative UNICEF Libya Christine Nylander Regional HR Chief UNICEF MENARO Lucia Elmi Representative UNICEF Mauritania Yanina Bouguermouh Chief of Operations UNICEF Mauritania (Ex CAR) Daniel Toole Regional Director UNICEF EAPRO (ex ROSA) Peter Crowley Representative UNICEF Afghanistan Susan Muza HR Manager UNICEF Sudan Leopolidine Djopwo HR Specialist UNICEF Chad Edouard Beigbeder Representative UNICEF Haiti Bernt Aasen Regional Director UNICEF TACRO Magassa Bandjougou HR Manager UNICEF Somalia Smaranda Popa Chief, Child Protection UNICEF Pakistan Gopal Sharma Deputy Representative UNICEF Sierra Leone Thierry Dentice Chief of Operations UNICEF Bangladesh (ex DRC) Tezra Masini Head of Dolo Ado Field Office UNICEF Ethiopia Robert Hanawalt Chief of Operations a.i. UNICEF Mali Noreen Prendiville Chief, Nutrition UNICEF Bangladesh Jean Francoise Basse Chief, Child Protection UNICEF Kenya Douglas Higgins Deputy Representative UNICEF oPt Naresh Guring Retiree, ex Head of Kadugli FO UNICEF Sudan

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Philippe Barragne-Bigot Representative UNICEF Nicaragua (ex DRC) Pierrette Vu Thi Retiree, ex Representative UNICEF DRC Steven Lauwerier Representative UNICEF Madagascar (ex DRC) Luigi D’Aquino M&C Health Specialist UNICEF Mozambique Saja Farouk Abdullah Nutrition Specialist UNICEF Yemen Alistair Gretarsson Chief, Communication UNICEF Afghanistan Francine Muganza Budget Specialist UNICEF Haiti Stephan Atanga Wazeh Health Specialist UNICEF DRC Bhanu Pathak Chief of FO, Herat UNICEF Afghanistan Mahfooz Walizada ICT Specialist UNICEF Liberia Monjour Hossain Chief, Health and Nutrition UNICEF South Sudan Nancy Macharia HR Manager UNICEF South Sudan Susannah Price Chief, Communication UNICEF Somalia Ahmed Mah Chief of FO, Semera UNICEF Ethiopia Elias Machingambi WASH Cluster Coordinator UNICEF DRC Stephen Brightwell HR Department UN Women Matma Singh HR Department UN Women Marina Walter HR Section UNDP Saumik De HR Section UNDP Hyeran Kim HR Section UNDP Michael Emery DHR Director UNFPA (ex DHR Dir. UNDP) Yasuko Sawada HR Specialist UNOCHA Devica Nystedt Chief, Field Support, HR Division WFP Aline Mukamabano Administrator, Reg. Del. For S. Africa ICRC Zimbabwe Francois Moreillon Deputy Head of Delegation ICRC Zimbabwe Carolyn Davis Recruiting Specialist Save the Children US

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Annex 10 Documents Consulted

In addition to the below list of documents reviewed, the team consulted approximately an additional 50 UNICEF reports from countries and regions affected by different humanitarian crises between 2008 and 2012. Executive Directive CF/EXD/2009-008, 3 November 2009 – “Staff Selection

Policy” Executive Directive CF/EXD/2009-009, 3 November 2009 – “Central Review

Bodies” Executive Directive CF/EXD/2010-005, 31 December 2010 – “Recruiting and

staffing in emergency situations” Executive Directive CF/EXD/2011-001, 21 March 2011 – “UNICEF’s Corporate

Emergency Activation Procedure” Executive Directive CF/EXD/2011-006, 4 October 2011 – “New and Emerging

Talent Initiative (NETI) programme” Executive Directive CF/EXD/2012-001, 1 March 2012 – “Simplified Standard

Operating Procedures (SSOPs) pertaining to UNICEF’s Corporate Emergency Activation Procedure”

“Simplified Standard Operating Procedures (SSOPs) for Corporate Emergency Activation Procedure in Level 3 Emergencies” – 1 March 2012

“Fast Track Measures for UNICEF Haiti in the area of Human Resources Management” – Message from Christine Lloyd (Director, DHR) to Omar Abdi (DED, Management); 19 July 2020

“Report on an Audit of Staff Rotation – June 2011” - Office of Internal Audit (OIA) Report 2011/13

“Report on an Audit of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Recruitment in UNICEF - August 2011” – Office of Internal Audit (OIA) Report 2011/18

“Draft report on the audit of safety and security of UNICEF staff, premises and assets in field offices” – Office of Internal Audit (OIA) Report XX/2010

“Report on the Monitoring of Implementation of Audit Recommendations, July 2011 - Audit of the South Sudan Country Office” – Office of Internal Audit (OIA) Report 2011/08

“South Sudan Area Office, Audit Extracts for the input/support by the Regional and Headquarter Divisions” – 2011

“Draft Report on an Audit of the Iraq Country Office, December 2011” – Office of Internal Audit (OIA) Report XX/2011

“Evaluation of DFID-UNICEF Program of Cooperation: Investing in Humanitarian Action Phase III 2006-2009” – Evaluation Office (EO) February 2010

“UNICEF Management Response Report to the Evaluation of DFID-UNICEF Program of Cooperation: Investing in Humanitarian Action Phase III 2006-2009” – Evaluation Office (EO) 2010

“Independent Review of UNICEF’s Operational Response to the January 2010 Earthquake in Haiti” – Evaluation Office (EO) September 2011

“UNICEF Management Response Report to the Independent Review of UNICEF’s

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Operational Response to the January 2010 Earthquake in Haiti” – Evaluation Office (EO) 2011

“The 2010 Haiti Earthquake – Lessons from the emergency response in surge capacity and human resources” DHR Emergency Unit, September 2010; Anders L. Pettersson, Consultant

“Children and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami: Evaluation of UNICEF’s Response in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Maldives (2005-2008). Overall Synthesis Report” – Evaluation Office (EO) December 2009

“UNICEF Management Response Report to Children and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami: Evaluation of UNICEF’s Response in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Maldives (2005-2008). Overall Synthesis Report” – Evaluation Office (EO) 2010

“Indian Ocean Tsunami: UNICEF Staffing Response” – Emergency Unit, TMS, DHR; December 2006

“UNICEF’s Response to the Emergency in the Horn of Africa, 2011-2012: Lesson-Learning Exercise. Final Report Summary” – Evaluation Office (EO) August 2012

“UNICEF West and Central Africa Regional Office: Real-Time Independent Assessment (RTIA) of UNICEF’s Response to the Sahel Food and Nutrition Crisis, 2011–2012” – Ricardo Sole’ Arques, Enrico Leonardi, August 2012

“UNICEF-DFID Programme of Cooperation – Evaluability Assessment” – Draft, 12 October 2012. Westat, The Bassiouni Group

“2012 UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children” – UNICEF January 2012 “2012 UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children – September 2012 Update” –

UNICEF September 2012 “Children of Haiti: Milestones and looking forward at six months” – UNICEF July

2010 “Response to the Horn of Africa Emergency; A Continuing Crisis Threatens Hard-

won Gains” - Regional six-month Progress Report, UNICEF ESARO April 2012 “Children in Pakistan – Six Months after the Floods” – Progress Report July-

November 2010. UNICEF Pakistan, January 2011 “Humanitarian Action Update – Children in Crisis in the Sahel” UNICFE WCARO,

June 2012 “The Haiti Earthquake Operation: Real Time Evaluation for the International

Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies” – IFRC June 2010 “Real Time Evaluation of IFRC Response to 2010 Pakistan Floods” – Cynthia

Burton, 20 January 2011 “Real Time Evaluation of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red

Crescent Societies’ Response to the MENA Civil Unrest” – IFRC August 2011 “Inter‐agency real‐time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake” –

Group URD, GPPI, August 2010 “Introduction to UNDP Fast-Track Policies and Procedures” - Power-Point

Presentation, UNDP October 2012 “UNFPA Fast-Track Policy” - UNFPA “HR Emergency Unit Strategic Framework for DFID Funding proposal (2012-

2015)” DHR, 2011 “FTRP Cost Analysis 2010-2012” – DHR November 2012