rev 0 to ec-risk-1065, 'assessment of common cause failure ... · p = conditional probability...

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NUCLEAR ENGINEERING CALCULATION / STUDY COVER SH/ET and NUCLEAR RECORDS TRANSMITTAL SHEET File ¹ R2-1 1. Page1of Total Pages ~2. TYPE: CALC D 3. NUMBER: EC-RISK-1065 >4. REVISION: 0 5. TRANSMITTAL¹: ">6. UNIT: 3 >7. QUALITYCLASS: N '>8. DISCIPLiNE: 3 ~9, DESCRIPTION: Assessment of Common Cause Failure Probabilities for Use in the Susquehanna IPE. SUPERSEDED BY: EC-N/A 13. Application: NA '>14 Affected Systemsr 'f N/A then line 15 is mandatory. ">15. NON-SYSTEM DESIGNATOR: NA 10. Alternate Number: NA 12: Computer Code or Model used: NA RISK 11. Cycle: NA Fiche Q Disk g Am't -If N/A then line 14 is mandatory 16. Affected Documents: 17. References: Q SAR Change Req'd 18. Equipment / Component ¹: 19. DBD Number: %20. PREPARED BY Print Nam Signat r Casimir A. kiel >22. AP OVED BY/ ATE Print Name F. G. utler Signature >21. REVIEWED BY Print Name Eric Jebsen Signature 23. ACCEPTED BY PP8L/DATE Print Name Signature TO BE COMPLETED BY NUCLEAR RECORDS NR-DCS SIGNATURE/DATE ADD A NEW COVER PAGE FOR EACH REVISION FORM NEPM-QA-0221-1, Revision 2 'erified Fields > REQUIRED FIELDS 98i'fi80050 'rr80709 t OR aOOCX OSOOOS87 P PDR

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Page 1: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

NUCLEAR ENGINEERING

CALCULATION/ STUDY COVER SH/ET and

NUCLEAR RECORDS TRANSMITTALSHEET

File ¹ R2-1

1. Page1ofTotal Pages

~2. TYPE: CALC D 3. NUMBER: EC-RISK-1065 >4. REVISION: 0

5. TRANSMITTAL¹: ">6. UNIT: 3 >7. QUALITYCLASS: N '>8. DISCIPLiNE: 3

~9, DESCRIPTION: Assessment of Common Cause Failure Probabilities for Use in the Susquehanna IPE.

SUPERSEDED BY: EC-N/A

13. Application: NA

'>14 Affected Systemsr'fN/A then line 15 is mandatory.

">15. NON-SYSTEM DESIGNATOR:

NA

10. Alternate Number: NA

12: Computer Code or Model used: NA

RISK

11. Cycle: NA

Fiche Q Disk g Am't

-IfN/A then line 14 is mandatory

16. Affected Documents:

17. References:

Q SAR Change Req'd

18. Equipment / Component ¹:

19. DBD Number:

%20. PREPARED BY

Print Nam

Signat r

Casimir A. kiel

>22. AP OVED BY/ ATE

Print Name F. G. utler

Signature

>21. REVIEWED BY

Print Name Eric Jebsen

Signature

23. ACCEPTED BY PP8L/DATE

Print Name

SignatureTO BE COMPLETED BY NUCLEAR RECORDS

NR-DCS SIGNATURE/DATE

ADD A NEW COVER PAGE FOR EACH REVISIONFORM NEPM-QA-0221-1, Revision 2

'erified Fields> REQUIRED FIELDS

98i'fi80050 'rr80709t OR aOOCX OSOOOS87P PDR

Page 2: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

l

Page 3: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

TABLEOF CONTENTS

TOPIC PAGE

I. Treatment of Common Cause FailureII Method for Estimating Common Cause Failures111.1 Common Cause Failures ofDiesel GeneratorsIII.2 Common Cause Failures ofPumps.III.3 Common Cause failure ofValves.IV. Common Cause Probabilities Assigned to Other SystemsA.I Dies els

A.2 Motor Driven PumpsA.3 Summary ofRHR SOORs and CRs.

Page 4: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

I. Treatment of Common Cause Failure

Common Cause Failures (CCF) of systems and components were treated in theSusquehanna IPE. The significant CCFs are summarized in Volume 6 of the IPE'.Additionally, common failures ofECCS actuation instrumentation (RPV water level,RPV pressure and drywell pressure) were included in the study . The treatment ofcommon cause failure was re-examined in response to questions raised by the NRC intheir SER concerning the treatment ofcommon cause failure. The re-examinationconsisted of three parts.

First, common cause failure ofmultiple instruments caused by Instrument and ControlTechnician was assessed at 10 . This estimate was re-examined. The initial treatment ofinstrumentation was based upon GE analysis performed to extend Surveillance TestIntervals (STIs) and Allowed Outage Times (AOTs) . The GE work is based uponTHERP analysis of the multiple instrumentation calibration. This work was re-evaluatedby re-examining the Susquehanna calibration procedures and the management controls inplace to identify systematic mis-calibration of instrumentation. Surveillance records andinstrument failure data was review to determine ifa common cause foot print wasdiscernible in the data. Finally and independent THERP calculation was performedusing the ASEP method. This work confirmed the original assessment of the instrumentmis- calibration.

Second, a review was performed to determine ifgeneric common cause failure ratesapplied to Susquehanna based upon statistical evaluation. This evaluation was limited tothe station batteries.

Finally, an evaluation ofequipment which has experienced a large number ofmultipledemands and no multiple failures was examined. This situation was treated in greaterdetail to obtain a more accurate estimate of the of the common cause failure probability.

The THERP analysis is addressed in a separate calculation. This calculation addressesthe second and third items.

The followingprobabilities ofmultiple component failures are provided for the IPE.

II Method for Estimating Common Cause Failures

The method used to develop the probability ofmultiple component failures due to acommon cause is based upon the work in NUREG/CR-4780, Procedures for TreatingCommon Cause Failures in Safety and Reliability Studies . The P factor method isapplied to estimate the failure of redundant components given failure of the first. The Pfactor is defined to be:

Page 5: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

P= conditional probability that a cause of a component failure willbe shared by one or

more additional components, given that a specific component has failed, or

Qhl

Q., +QiEq. 1

Here,

Q is the probability ofmultiple failures

Qi is the probability of a single failure.

Q is computed using the followingequation;

nhl .Q = —

'l

hl

Eq. 2

n = the number of times m components of interest fail,N = the number of testing episodes ofm components of interest.

Ifthe number ofdemands N is unknown, then it is estimated from the number of testusing the following formula;

non-staggered testing:

Eq. 3

staggered testing:Nm = Ng+ (m-l)nm, Eq. 4

Here,

m = the number ofcomponents in the test episode.k = the number ofsingle test episodes.

Ifthe number ofdemands is known then following formula are used for computing Nm;

non-staggered testing:

N =Num Eq. 5

Page 6: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

staggered testing

N =ND Eq. 6

In the case ofno failures, the binomial distribution'is used to estimate the median failureprobability. Uncertainty bounds are assumed to be lognormally distributed with theupper bound being computed using the binomial distribution at 95% confidence. Theerror factor is computed using the upper bound and the median. The error factor is usedto compute the lower bound. These formula are applied to estimate the probability ofmultiple failure for the various components.

III.1 Common Cause Failures ofDiesel Generators.

Common cause ofdiesels generators was not included in the 1991 IPE. The dieselgenerator data were reexamined using the common cause failure model described above.Two cases were considered: failure oftwo diesels and failure ofall 4 diesels.

The data for the diesel was obtained from the EC-RISK-0503 and subsequent data wasobtained from diesel start records and from Condition Reports. The start records andcondition reports are included in Appendix A. This data is summarized in the followingTable.

Table IDiesel Generator Starting and Failure Data

Time Period Demands SingleFailure

DoubleFailures

TripleFailures

QuadrupleFailures

6/82-12/891/90-12/921/93-6/977/97-3/98Total

3006288430

72'796

7221

75

11

0000

0

S Estimated from 1/93 through 6/97. Thc arc 18 quarters bctwccn 1/93 through 6/97 inclusive. On thc avcragc there are430 demands/18 quarters ~ 24 test /quarter. There arc 12 quarters between 1/90 & 12/92 inclusive or 12 x 24 288. Ther are 3quarters bctwce 7/97 &3/98 inclusive or 24 x 3 72.

The diesels are tested under a staggered testing strategy per Technical Specifications. Ifadiesel fails, the other engines are started to verify that they are operable. ThereforeEquation 6 is used to determine the number of single and multiple demands. The numberof failures is specific in Table I as well. In the case ofQuadruple failure no failures arereported. In this case the median failure probability is determined using the binomialdistribution withNm = 3796 trials and zero failures. The results ofthese calculations arepresented in Table II.

Page 7: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

Table IIDiesel Generator Failure Probabilities

Lower BoundMedianMean

Upper Bound

SingleDiesel

1.66E-021.99E-021.98E-022.39E-02

DoubleFailures1.75E-032.90E-032.90E-034.80E-03

QuadrupleFailures

4.24E-051.83E-042.72E-047.90E-04

Similar data has not been compiled for the Susquehanna batteries. Therefore the NUREG1150 values were used for the batteries;

III.2 Common Cause Failures ofPumps.

The ECCS systems and the systems that support their operation are tested periodically ona staggered basis per the plant Technical Specifications. Ifa pump failure occurs test ofthe remaining pumps is not strictly required per Technical Specifications. Reviewing thedata shows that the majority ofthe pump starts are in response to the need for suppressionpool cooling. Should a pump fail to start, subsequent pumps would be started to satisfythe need for suppression pool cooling. Therefore the assumptions associated with thestaggered test strategy are applied to the motor driven pump data.

The pump start and failure data is summarized in Table III.There were no cases ofmultiple pump failures. A double failure is assigned to the two pump failure case toconservatively account for a double pump failure precursor. A failure ofa single ESWpump occurred due to end bell erosion. The erosion was cause by operating these pumpsat very low flows. Inspection of the other pumps identified end bell erosion, though to amuch less degree. In fact the pumps were still operable and passed the ASME test.However a failure oftwo pumps is included to account for the precursor.

Table IVpresents run hours and failure to run data. Common cause failure to run is nottreated due the implausibility of two pumps failing at the same time while operating,unless the failure is attributed to an external event. Detailed information is provided inAppendix A.

Page 8: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

Table IIIPump Demand and Failure Data

System

RHRCSRHRSWESW

Total

Total343215533606542214012

Single Double Multiple0 00 00 01 0

19 1

Using this data, a failure probability was computed for each system's pumps and for theaggregate. The results ofthese calculations are shown in Table IV,

Table IVFailure Probability ofPumps

Probability

LowerMedianMeanUpper

Error Factor

5.7E-041.4E-031.7E-033.5E-03

2.5

ESW

9.6E-041.6E-031.7E-032.7E-03

1.7

RHRSW

1.4E-03

2.4E-032.5E-034.0E-03

1.7

Core Spray

1.0E-04

4.4E-046.6E-041.9E-03

4,4

Aggregate

9.9E-041.4E-031.4E-032.0E-03

1.4

With exception of the core spray pumps, the failure rates of theses pumps are supriseinglyclose. Therefore all pumps willbe assigned the same aggregate failure probability.Examining the mean and bounds of the core spray pumps one could conclude that theyare from a more reliable statistical population. However they are being assigned theaggregate failure probability which is conservative.

The common cause failure probability for multiple pumps to start was computed usingthe assumptions associated with staggered testing and the above aggregated data. Theseresults are reported in Table V. These values are treated as mean values for the singleand double failures. The bound are estimated using the binominal distribution. This datais used to calculate the lognormal median and lower bound. There are no quadruplepump failures. Therefore the binomial distribution is used to estimate the median andbound. These estimates are then used to estimate the mean assuming the lognormaldistribution.

Page 9: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

Table VCommon Cause Failure Probabilities for Pumps

Probability Single Double QuadLowerMedianMean

Upper

8.2E-041.3E-031.4E-032.1E-03

2.6E-051.2E-047.1E-053.4E-04

3.8E-064.9E-057.3E-052.1E-04

Error Factor 1.6 2.8 44

Failure to run data values were also computed for the pumps identified above. The runtime and failure data were taken &om the same data sources as the start data. This data isprovided in Tables VITables VII.

Table VIPump Run Hours

System

RHRCSRHRSWESW

Total

Total616502841870774130685

291527

Run Failures

Table VIIFailure to Run

Probability

LowerMedianMeanUpper

Error Factor

1.4E-068.1E-061.4E-054.9E-05

6.0

ESW

8.3E-062.6E-053.1E-057.8E-05

3.1

RHRSW

1.2E-067.1E-061.2E-054.2E-05

6.0

Core Spray

2.9E-061.8E-053.0E-051.1E-04

6.0

Aggregate

3.7E-061.1E-051.4E-053.5E-05

3.1

Page 10: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

III.3 Common Cause failure ofValves.

Common cause failure probability for multiple valves is based staggered testing. Themajority ofthe demands are for suppression pool cooling. Failure ofa valve to openwould result in the inability to operate suppression pooling using this particular division.Should this occure the operator would initiate the redundant loop ofRHR. Theconditional probabilities were derived from RHR valve failure data. A review ofplantdata, shows that the RHR valves were stroked about 11,400 times. Eighteen RHR valvefailures were identified in the plant records. No multiple valve failure were identified.Using this data the failure probability is computed with uncertainty bounds. The boundsare derived &om the Poisson distribution. The median is computed by applying the meanand the bounds generated using the Poisson to the lognormal distribution.

lower = 9.4 x,median = 1.5 x 10

mean = 1.6 x 10

upper=2.5 x 10 .

Since no multiple failures of the valves were observed, 0.5 double failures are assigned tocompute the conditional probability (two/one):

p(two/one) = 0.5/1 8 = 2.3 x 10

and the probability oftwo valves failing becomes:

lower = 1.2 x 10

median = 3.5 x 10

mean = 4.4 x 10

upper=1.1 x10 .

IV. Common Cause Probabilities Assigned to Other Systems

Common cause probabilities were assigned to other components. The assignments weremade based on either; other existing data or screening values.

These values are provided in Table VIII.

Page 11: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,
Page 12: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

Table VIIICommon Cause Failure Rates of Other Components

EventName

Description lower mean upper

TSDV Failure of two scram discharge volumes. Single based 4.8E-8upon NUREG 0460, P 0.01 based upon PP&L reportsNPE-89-003 &RA-1-NA-006

1.8E-7 4.4E-7

SRV1 &SRVIINADSSRV

MCLPP

CCFSLCP

Failure of second and third given first. P = 1.0NUREG 2728Failure of 10 non- ADS ASME code safety reliefvalves given failure of failure of6 ADS valves. P = 0.5assumed.

Failure of low pressure permissive circuit. NUREG1150 value used.

Common cause failure ofSLCS pumps. Assumed P =0.05 based upon other pump data.

2.6E-6

0.13

1.4E-5

5.6E-6

1.1E-5

0.5

5.3E-4

1.8E-4

2.4E-5

10.

1.9E-3

5.6E-4

CCFTDP Common Cause failure ofHPCI &RCIC NPE-86-003&NUREG/CR-2497

CCFCTV Failure ofboth divisions ofRHR/IQIRSW crosstievalves

0.0005

1.2E-5

1.9E-3

4.4E-5

0.0045

I.IEA

Page 13: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

References

'usquehanna IPE Volume VISupplemental Information, Section 3. Deccmbcr 19912 Analysis ofComponent Outage and Failure Data for thc Susquehanna IPE. EC-RISK@503, Rcv I

Technical Specification Improvement Methodology (with Demonstration for BWR ECCS Actuation Instrumentation) Part INEDE-30936P-A, Class Ill,Dec. 19884 Human Error Probability for Instrument Calibration Using ASEP Method, PP&L Recorded caclulation EC-RISK-10645 Procedures for Treating Common Cause Failures in Safety and Reliability Studies, NUREG/CR<780 Volumns I &26 EC-RISK-0503 Rcv. I; EC-RISK-1060, Acccptancc Numbers for Riks Significant System Structures and Components, Czysz andKukielka; & SOORs

Page 14: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

Appendix A

Supporting Data

A.1 DieselsA.2 Motor Driven PumpsA.3 Summary ofRHR SOORs and CRs.

Page 15: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

A.1 Diesel Generator Data

Page 16: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,
Page 17: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

Kukielka, Casimir

From:To:Subject:Date:

D'Angelo, Violet R.Kukielka, CasimirRE: Diesel StartsMonday, September 29, 1997 10:42AM

For D/G A, 8, C, D5 min at 1000 KW10 min at 2000KW10 min at 3000KW210 min at 4000 KW15 min at 500KW for cooldown before S/D

For D/G E5 min at 1375KW10 min at 2750KW220 min at 4000KW15 min at 500KW for cooldown before S/D

rg5

From: Kukielka, CasimirTo: D'Angelo, Violet R.Subject: RE: Diesel StartsDate: Friday, September 26, 1997 4:33PM

Ha Violet,

When you guys have a load run. How Iong is the load run/

Thanks

Cas

From: D'Angelo, Violet R.To: Kukielka, CasimirSubject: FW: Diesel StartsDate: Thursday, September 25, 1997 3:41PM

See attached info.

From: Paley, Robert M.To: D'Angelo, Violet R.Subject: FW:Date: Thursday, September 25, 1997 3:22PM

From: Kukielka, CasimirTo: Paley, Robert M.Date: Thursday, September 25, 1997 2:26PM

Bob,

I have diesel starts through 3rd quarter 96. Do you guys have 4thquarter 96 to the presents If so could you please send it to me.

Page 1

Page 18: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

1" Quarter 1993

I Iy( ~c.l~pf

+41 ~

DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITYRESULTSJAN 93 - DEC 95 BY QUARTERS

DIESELGENERATOR

ABCDE

STARTATTEMPTS

5

43

4.

4

STARTFAILURES

00

0

00

LOAD-RUNATTEMPTS

5

3

3

3

LOAD-RUNFAILURES

0

0000

STARTRELIABILITY

100%100%)PP100%1PP%

2nd Quarter 1993

DIESELGENERATOR

ABCDE

STARTATTEMPTS

3

5

5

3

7

STARTFAILURES

000

~ 00

LOAD-RUNATTEMPTS

3

5

3

5

LOAD-RUNFAILURES

00000

STARTRELIABILITY

100%)PP100%100%100%

3rd Quarter 1993

DIESELGENERATOR

AB.CDE

STARTATI'EMPTS

63

3

3

4I~ 1

STARTFAILURES

00

000

LOAD-RUNATTEMPTS

53

3

24

LOAD-RUNFAILURES

0000

0

STARTRELIABILITY

100%)PP100%100%100%

STARTTTEMPTS

/748

AB

File Name: DQMRR

4 Quarter 1993

DIESELQENERATOR A

START ~ LOAD-RUN E:0AD-RUNFAILURES >ATTEMPTS + FAIDURES

5iIo

4 '0'X

Page 6 of )0

S ARTRELIABILITY/')

00%/ I'0

1000/C

4/26/96

Page 19: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

d ~ ~ %AI ~ d&l bJV d ~ d

4'" u rter 1993

(OCTOBER 1993 TO SEPTEMBER 1996)ROLLING36 MONTHRELIABILITYDATA

MAINTENANCERULE REPORTDIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITYRESULTS

DIESELGENERATOR

A8CDE

1at

STARTATTEMPTS

748

4

3

;J

STARTFAILURES

00000

LOAD-RUNATTEMPTS

5

4643

LOAD-RUNFAILURES

00000

STARTRELIABILITY

100%1PP%100%1PP%100%

DIESELGENERATOR

ABCDE

STARTATTEMPTS

3

6461

d'd'd

STARTFAILURES ~

00000

LOAD-RUNATTEMPTS

3

43

4

1'OAD-RUNFAILURES00000

STARTRELIABILITY

100%100%100%100%100%

DIESEL'ENERATOR

ABCDE

STARTATTEMPTS

8

66

912

STARTFAILURES

000

00

LOAD-RUNATTEMPTS

4545

8

LOAD-RUNFAILURES

00000

STARTRELIABILITY

'00%

1O0%100%tt

100%IO0%

DIESELGENERATOR

ABCDE

ld

STARTATTEMPTS

3

4245

li

STARTFAILURES

00000

LOAD-RUNATTEMPTS

3

32'

5

LOAD-RUNFAILURES

00000

STARTRELIABILITY

100%100%100%100%100%

File Name: 98Q3REP.OOCd

page 8 of 10 7/14/98

Page 20: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

4 a r 1994

ROLL G 36 MONTHRELIABILITY ATA

DIESELGENERATOR

ABCDE

STARTATTEMPTS

5

3

43

6

a,l

STARTFAILURES

0

0000

LOAD-RUNATTEMPTS

5

3

3

3

6

LOAD-RUNFAILURES

0000

0

STARTRELIABILITY

100%100%100%100%100%

1 M e 5

DIESELGENERATOR

ABCDE

STARTATTEMPTS

3

3

43

5

/5

STARTFAILURES

00000

LOAD-RUNATTEMPTS

3

3

43

5

LOAD-RUNFAILURES

00

000

STARTRELIABILITY

1PP

100%100%1P Popo

100%

~er 1995

DIESELGENERATOR

ABCDE

STARTATTEMPTS

266

6:/.p 7

STARTFAILURES

0

0000

LOAD-RUNATTEMPTS

24

45

LOAD-RUNFAILURES

00000

STARTRELIABILITY

10010Q%pp

100%100%

3rd arter 199

DIESELGENERATOR

ABCDE

STARTATTEMPTS

45

5

3

3

STARTFAILURES

00

'

0

LOAD-RUNATTEMPTS

3

43

23

LOAD-RUNFAILURES

00000

STARTRELIABILITY

100%100%100%100%100%

File Name: 96Q3REP.DOC Page 9 of 10 '/14/96

Page 21: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

ROLLING36 MONTHREI IABILITYDATAI 4'" uarter 1995

DIESELGENERATOR

ABCDE

STARTATTEMPTS

976

66

3Y

STARTFAILURES

0

00

0

0

LOAD-RUN .

ATTEMPTS76

45

6

LOAD-RUNFAILURES

00000

STARTRELIABILITY

100%100%100%100%100'l

1 uarter 1996

DIESELGENERATOR

ABCDE

STARTATTEMPTS

3

425

8

STARTFAILURES

0

0000

LOAD-RUNATTEMPTS

3

3

246

LOAD-RUNFAILURES

00000

STARTRELIABILITY

100%100%1PP%100%1 ppo

2nd uarter 1996

DIESELGENERATOR

ABCDE

STARTATTEMPTS

6

3

3

3

3

/$

STARTFAILURES

0

0000

LOAD-RUNATTEMPTS

63

3

3

3

LOAD-RUNFAILURES

00000

STARTRELIABILITY

100%100%100%100 lo100%

3rd uarter 1996

DIESELGENERATOR

ABC

E

STARTATTEMPTS

445

44

3.l

STARTFAILURES

00000

LOAD-RUNATTEMPTS

445

44

LOAD-RUNFAILURES

00000

STARTRELIABILITY

100%100%100%100%100olo

File Name: 08Q3REP,DOC Page 10 af 10

~ O)&c7/14/96

Page 22: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

MAINTENANCERULE REPORTDIESEL GENERATOR AVAILABILITYRESULTS

4'" QUARTER 19g6

''"""""'""""""""""""DIESEL''':::::;.:I:::.::,';:";;<":""':":""::::: ';::I'gHOURSIOUT::: OF...'SERVICE(

0.26 Hrs3.99 Hrs

2208 Hrs2208 Hrs

DE SPARE

3.38 Hrs0.90 Hrs0.58 Hrs

2208 Hrs2208 Hrs2208 Hrs

MAINTENANCERULE REPORTDIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITYRESULTS

4 " QUARTER 1996

"'jgi', ~;::,':DIESEL~"'@:",-'"'':::@P':@@START"i~'""-': <"<."-4N,':,START": ""~~~ )4,"""L'OAD'-RUHR>Pk%'rg LPADWUN!.".";'"'ka'i'GENERATOR!'Ki 5'i;~'ATTEMPTS'N';! „':iij'-')FAIL~URESI!~X 8;:iAT~TEMPTS4~5 MKFAILURESh:"';-".,"

A

D(1) E SPARE)

0 *

00

0

00

000

(1) On 12/10/96, the D/G E was aligned as a spare diesel and was NOT substituted forany diesel when the valid start failure occurred.

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SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION97Q1 MAINTENANCERULE REPORT

DIESEL GENERATOR AVAILABILITYRESULTSfor 1 QUARTER 1997

'::;:"T$.-';,:::';p'~>Ri+<'.i:;DIESEL":;.+<j'":"'"'"4i'4g5lHOURS''OUT:.OF'SERVICE%I 5P'(,::5,"~PDIESEL<HOURS!INN!i'i'-""'~

D

A 11.95 Hrs13.20 Hrs14.37 Hrs0.18 Hrs

2160 Hrs2160 Hrs2160 Hrs2160 Hrs

E SPARE 0.00 Hrs 2160 Hrs

DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITYRESULTSfor 1 QUARTER 1997

z SPARE ~ 9

.::~:..:g„";;.:.DIESEL';:$~"-''-'i::«j'::.;!j'.!NSTART,:g,:::",'»„';

k!'-"'.GENERATOR:,':.~~~'- ki%',ATTEMPTS"4:.""j:,"::ii"'.;:"STARTjg~P<:,"~@,"«:L'OADWUN;.'.;.""

0

0000

Pk(L'OAD-'.RUN>".;;0!.'FAIL'ORES 5~:

00000

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SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION97Q2 MAINTENANCERULE REPORT

DIESEL GENERATOR AVAILABILITYRESULTSfor 2"'UARTER 1997

,'r,'-'"".':::-:::.'::.',":.".:.".!::DIESEL'.,',.'::,'$'P'~V, j'":,ae:.":;I.",".:;..::.,':~.:.'::;-:;".::.",:-""'',-'.,

AB

DE SPARE

j~s: HOURS,'.OUT':OF,„SERVICE'j',:.'4.04

Hrs0.88 Hrs

65.00 Hrs8.02 Hrs13.91 Hrs

i ('j""'~»DIESEL':HOURS,'IN,::,,"::,:~p.';,:.5'184

Hrs2184 Hrs2184 Hrs2184 Hrs2184 Hrs

When substituted for D/G A, B, C or D

DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITYRESULTSfor 2"'UARTER 1997

;:;~></,,;;:;.4~?;~ P-.;:g:„'";(Pig;<~'. (>gAL!IP': S TA'R

AB

DE SPARE)

'.+»»?(< jgQALID@q$?::p'.i

5:;:..'»',FAIL?URES'5"'.::,'-','i

0000

0

i% ATTEMPTS:"~44~, ':» LOAD-.RUN:~j~:-.:

@!;.';» FAIL'URES;';"6'"'

00

~ 00

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SSES SIGNIFICANT

OP ERATING

OCCURRENCE REr QRT

EVENT CLOSURE FORM

REPOAT NO./- fi„(g(„PAGE 1 OF

SOOR Record Package

psaE~OFm>

TITLE

CLOSURE REPORT

+KscP IPYTON OF -„-VENT

RAIMI/-C I=LDWIOW,.er- P -~. I'I

V>4r(3 i"+'4 ~re( I-Q~ 4 C0

P(ZA Sacr~ q p ~~<><g s'~~

C 4

'J 1,C

4

~ ~ V

~ ~ E r A j ~

J4

D»4»C'4V C,4 $ ~ ~

~ ~ ~

4 r

~ Q ~

5

C 4

se1o,g

r r ~

'85 5

'J'- -" b";h un'5~~ +nc4»grcr r @el

:ess dur ngi<<e54grvrr

icvr. and ~ CQ 3. 8,

qrCgq1

«5 r 4~ ~ ~ A I

D

CAI:SZ eF ZUZiT

During the surveillanc» start on 6/19/91 .'Iaintenance personnel vere pr'esentmonitor key engine functions during the start. An installed visicorderprovided a rocd record cf important diesel generator parameters. The

monitoring conclusively identified che cause of the slav start as a fuel cildelivery problem. This conclusion vas based on the folloving:

0 Fuel oil pressure vas observed to stay lov for an extended durat'oninto the start instead of rising in 2 to 8 seconds as is normal.

0 The Fuel Control Rack remained fully open for the scart duration(normal operation)

0 Observed Air Start System operation vas normal.

0 Uislcorder traces shoved all generator parameters to be normal.

'c c'

Ig

~ r44

4

NA4

REFERENCE DOCLIMENTATION:

1. REPORTING FORM2. REPORTABILlTY ASSESSMENT3. RESOLUTION FORM

'.

NPRDS REPORTAGILITY DETERMINATION

tram~: rHScJ~~o QD~D/~Qt i Ec~WC~ICU

~rtIOZO

ACCEPTANC

0 PL E AT

7~-PiDATE SR. COMPLIANCE ENG.

OR DESIGNEE

7 9'iDATE

PORC MEETING NO. ASST. SUPT. OF PLAr& DATE

Page 27: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

gsES $ tGNIF[CANT OPERATING OCCURRENCE REPORT REPoRT NO.

CONTINUATION FORM +'7/-/~cATTACHMENTBEING USED FOR:

PAGE ~ OF~

CONTINUATION OF EVENT DESCRIP '"N

CONTINUATION OF IMMEDIATECORRECTIVE ACTIONS

CONTINUATION OF ASSESSMENTSUMMARY

NO-REPORTABLITY DETERMINATIC"'

CONTINUATION.OF EVENT CAUSE

CONTINUATIONOF CORRECTIVEACTIONS

CONTINUATION OF ACTIONS TOPREVENT RECURRENCE

+ oTHER C a

Based on che irvest'zation, the most probable cause of the 'C'DG slav starthas been concluded to be excessive air ctapped in the fuel supplv headerexisting prior co che init'al survei'ance run on 6/19/91. The cause of a're!.t.apnenc vi.thin the fuel supplv header is believed to be due to en in~eccicnpu"p 'laving 'en;..cdif'ccc'cn'vhich had been inplenenced or. rhe 'C'DC nAugust 1990. The f laving vent modificat'on had been installed to aLleviate anin!eccion pump overheat'ing probler. at idle or lov pover engine operation bydraining excess fuel nil bac'k to the main fuel oil storage tanks. The nevfloving vents have been:ound ineffective in vencing air from the fuel headerdur'ing scarcup. This modification had been installed on EDCs 'A'hrough

'D'etveenAugust and October 1990., It should be noted that EDG 'E', vhich is a

f':th and spa.e EDC ac Susquehanna, is of a diffetent design and d'd nocrequire this modif icacicn. '~'armer outside temperatures experienced recentlyhave cade che problem -ore evident as decreased fuel oil viscosity resultsfaster draining. thus increas'ng the rate at vhich air enters che fuel header.

Prior to the 'C'G 6/19/91 slav start, a concetn for potential voiding c.''.uel supplv header had o):lv been surnised for the 'D'DC. The 'D'DC hadexperienced a slov scarc on Iarch 25, 1991 during a maintenance troubleshootingrun. Although the root cause of rhe 'D'DG slov start could noc beconclusively determined, one pocencia) contributor vas identified as themodification to the fuel oil f loving vent lines. hs a result, the f loving vert''nes vere te-modified to eliminate a potential fuel header voiding problem,Similat re-modifications vere developed ac thar. tineta be implemented as a precautionary measure on the 'h', 'B'nd 'C'DCsduring their next inspection oucagcs.

This event vas detetnined to be rcpot table pcr IOCFR50.73(a) (2)(vii) in thac asingle condition resulted in a porential for cvo or morc independent channelsto become inoperable in a single support system designed to shut dovn thereactor ~ maintain ic in a safe shutdovn condition and mitigate the consequencesof an accident. Namely, air encrapmenc in the fuel supply headers of che EDCs,identified as thc mosr. ptobcble cause of rhc 6/19/91 'C'DC slov start andcaused by a modification performed on 'A'hrough 'D'DGs in 1990, couldpotentially result in start tines exceeding those required vhen thc engines arestarted once per 31 days in accordance vith the Technical Specifications.

) ~

\

}I'}I

r

~ }

:Il.

BOOR R cord PackagePAG OFJ~O

)}I

4 ~

I}

iwMA04Mzi)o. se . z. Osage! c)) )

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osES SIGNIFICANT OPERATING OCCURRENCE REPORT— CONTINUATION FORM

REPORT NO.

/-Pl—~ c.PA(it, ~ wc

/ RCHMENT BEING USED FOR:

CONTINUATION OF EVENT DESCRIPTION

CONTINUATION OF IMMEDIATECORRECTIVE ACTIONS

CONTINUATION OF EVENT CAUSE

CONTINUATION OF CORRECTIVEACTIONS

CONTINUATION OF ASSESSMENTSUMMARY

NO REPORTABLITY„DETERMINATION

CONTINUATION OF ACTIONS TOPREVENT RECURRENCE

OTHER 'E K C 4 i 'M)

CORRECTIVE ACTION'S

Inspections immediately after the failure verified no fuel piping 1caks thatcould have lead co the slow scarc. A manual Fuel Oil Booster Pump start vasinitiated co determine if a pump or pressure regulator valve problem vasevident. Fuel pressure rise vas normal and vithin 2 seconds, demonstratingproper operation of che Booster Pump and a completely "solid" (no air voiding)fuel supply header.

Fuel Control rack operation vas observed to be normal.

A troubleshooting scarc was perf or=ed and the 'C'DC start time vas 7.7seconds. The Booster Pump vas obsezved co scart immediately and stop a fevseconds lacer per ics design. Fuel pressure vas observed to rise to racedpressure vichin 3 seconds.

~ ~

The monthly surveillance cesc vas repeaced. Start time vas 7.6 seconds.Proper fuel system operation vas again observed.

The 'C'DC vas started from ambient conditions at 0535 hours on 6/20/91. Thepurpose of this restart vas to verify that no ocher failure mechanism vas beingaasked by the relatively short shutdovn times becveen the previous starts.Folloving the successful start, the 'C'DC vas declazed OPERABLE.

The ' EDG ~as tested on" e every 7 days in accordance withTech Spec z quirenents. Additionally, start tests wereimmediately performed on the 'A'nd 'B'DGs. As a prudentmeasure. EDGs 'A'nd 'B'ere started once every l5 daysuntil the flowing vent re-mod' ication was completed on thex.The floving vent re-modification was completed on al) EDGeby '7/27/91. Results to-date have shown improvements in EDGstart times. This SOOR is recommended for closure.

&8'P~ Pi-cora W-W SOOR Record Package

PP,GOOF~

Page 29: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

SSES SIGNIFICANT

OPERATING

OCCURRENCE REPORT

EVENT REPORTING FORM

REPORT NO,

1 "91" 156PAGE 1. OF

2

INITIATOR

STA

DATE

WORK GROUP

8ARRY W PALMER 06/ 19/9 1

UNIT SYSTEMNO.

0 24

BLDG. LOCATION EVENT DATE

A E AND TIME44 677 06/19/91 145

RX POWER/CONDITIONU1 100 1

u2 100 1

PRIORITY

I

EVENT DESCRIPTION I INITIALINVESTIGATION

The 'C'iesel generator was declared inoperable when it failed to star twithin 10 seconds dur ing per formance of the Diesel Generator Monthly gQ.VOperability Test.

While performing the Diesel Generator Monthly Operability Test, SO"024-001,"'he'C'iesel generator failed .to start within the T equired 10 seconds. Thestart times to reach rated frequency, speed, and voltage were 28, 24, 20. 1

seconds respectively. The 'C'iesel generator was declar ed inoper able andLCO 3,8.1.1 was entered. Electrical Maintenance was notified to investigate.

SOQi~ Pp~~--,t .-.

FAG~L,"-:~~ L:I

I'I

'4 ~

>I

, ~

L ~ ~ I

IMMEDIATECORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Initiated investigation.Entered LCO.

n

I~ 4

't j't(Lt,StItlI

CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENTHO AGYERSE CONSEQUENCESAEACTOR 5IIUTOOYYHREGUCKQ PLANt CAPACITYIHCREASKQ OUTAQE TIMEKOUtPLIEHT QAUAQKQ

fHQIHEfREO SAPEGVAAO FEATURE ACTUATION+ TECH SPEC ACTION STATELIKNT ENTERKOtECH SPE C YOLAT:OHI'EASQHHEL INJURKO OR COHTAUIHATKO

OTIIEA

FVENT IDENTIFIED BY~ OPERATIONS PERSOttHf LIAC PERSONNELUAYHTKNAHCfPERSONNELTECHNICAL STAPP PEASOHHELHEALTH PtIYSC$ PEASONNELSECURITY PERSQHHKLO'THEA.

i)'!~ II

EVENT DETECTED BYCONTROL ROQtt ALAAII5+ittt~ TURHQYERROUTINE RQUHQ5VERtttCATIQHOP TASROOSEAYATIQN OP CON SKOUE NCE5

LOCAL ALARU~ SUAVEILLAHCE tf$ ttHGQQCUUfHTATIQH R'EVIEWCHAetCK OSSKAYATIQtt

'TIIER

EVENT IS

Q A REPEAT OCCURRENCETHE OIILY KNOWN OCCURRENCESnelPJl tQ A PAST OCCVRRENCERUT IIQT THE SAME

th4V A~ OA ttt 5 ~ ~ PPIH ~ ~ t t.s At) ) TH feO Limbus ~ +':b

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SOQR:",:.-.,r,-w:-...I,~~PA8~0;=~@'

COHSEQJE4=.S ASSESS~ ~

There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event,oi iour diesel generators were available at all ticres meeting the minimumstation backup emergency power supply design basis requirement. The "C"

Diese'eneratordid star and would have been available as a pcM r supply if an eventhad occurred. Once the diesel was started air was purged frcm the uel system.Subsecuent s~s wiJoin - period of approximately two weeks would be ectedto be less than the requiied ten second start time based on investigations o=the problem.

mQ~.+~K MI~) ~ „COPJKCTi~& ACTiGNSCorrective action is to install iXP 91-9013 C, Fuel Oil System Vent LineModification. Un"'l t"..e nadification can be installed the "C" DieselGenerator shall be started every seven days. The reduced period betweenstarts will maintain the fuel upply header purged of air.

Similarly, DCP 91-9013 A and B shall be installed on diese).s "A" and "B" toprevent a similar occurrence. Although a slow start has not ocvuraR on either

'f

these diesels they shall be started at an increased frequency of every15 days as a precaution until the mxlification can be installed.

The uel Oil System Vent Line Mcdification was ccrrpleted on Diesel Generator"D" on 5/25/91.

AC1'ZONS 'IO PR~~Z RECURRENC"There are no 5 Her actions to prevent recun~ce.

PAST SOLAR SOORs1-91-068

I ns or comprotri sa tn~ ~ h i t-Mpyenosafet )cop'cocy ~ ~ so d't'l of>ty ~c ~: .sul t of thj.s

s to hec.ox~n„.. +1 ~ fo tMo or . re i ndepondent-'.-~ye. able in a single suppor d'f: . ~nd/~"coactor. maintain it in ~ safe s

did exist.~itjr:ate the consequences of an accioen .

fun) cu'Qplv headers of EDGsstart timesy have r.

ph~c;e roqu ireful bv Tech Spn such this ~ven".ctprt in +n emergency rjtuatinn. ns

t,noted tn who Co~miss)qn ver 10'CFP50.7 3(a) <2}(vi

I

k

Page 31: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

LICENSEE EVEN~ REPORT HLER)TEXT CONTINUATlON

SSTI4ATSO SVIIOSH ASH Ale@)HSA IV sv~i ~

IHiOII4ATIOH COLLSCf ION IICOVSST 'l00 HAS. iOHWAAOCO44SHTS IISOAIIOIHO SVAOlH ~ ST I4ATl TO 1 HI ASCOAOSAHO 1ltOIITS 4AHAOSHSHT SIIAHCIIIi010I V S HVCLSAII+lOVLATOIIYCO44ISSIOH, ~,ASHIHOTOH. OC TOSSS. AHO TO'IHl >AAtIIWOIIlIISOVCTIOH AHOJSCT ISIS00IOAI. Of AICSOA 4AHAOIUIHTAHO SVOOST,WASIIIHOTOH.OC 10$ 01,

~ A, ITY H~ III OOC IIlT HV40lA TS I

vfAA

LSII HV40SA Ill~ IOVIHIIAL

4 A+IVHHIh

4

~ AOI <SI

1

Sos uehanna Steam E'. ectri c Std t >onflyIIf~~ ~~ ~ ecWewW HIfC Ame~ Sf IITI

o 5 o o o 3S 791 0 0 7 00 06 QF0 c

ADDITIONAL INFOR.'fATION

This Licensee Event Report also ful ills the requirement for issuance of a

Special Report per Technical Speciixcation 4.8.1.1.4 for all EDG failures,valid or non-valid.

Failed Component Identification: None identified

Previous Similar Events: LER 90-015-00 reported a slov start on the A'DG7/26/90. Thlf cause of the slow start vas asheared 1" reducer on the air start header piping.

PLAS-455 {Special Report) described a slow starton the 'D'DG on 10/30/90. No positive root causewas determined.

PLAS-428 {Special Report) described a slov starton the 'E'DG on 5/15/90. This slov start vasattributed to air infiltration into the fuel oilpiping as a result of a Fuel Oil Booster pumpsuction flange leak-.

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5,

Page 33: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

April 24, 1991 cc: H.G. StanleyT.C. DalpinzE.<". Figard0 '. Kuczynsk!S.B. Kuhn8 ~ R. )Ie idnrnO'0 "'c

II..I. I'nImcr

SIISc)',E)IAY4A STF.,": EI.FCTR IC STATIONDIESEI. GENERATOR A — FAILl'RE DURINGSF.-""'-107 APRIL -"", 1991I'. I S- 3 7 2 9» FII.F. R48-6

SF '07, '18~ I nth Diesel Generatnr A and C (or E> Auto Start nnd ESS Buses

nnd .'.0 Fnc rgi;at inn nn Lnss nf Offsire Pnwcr with a I.OCA-Plant Shutdown",pcrfnrms testing tn fulfill sevcrn1 Technical Spccificntinn surveillancerenu!renents. During the performance nf SE-224-107 on April 22, 1991. Diesr 1

Gencrntnr's "A" and "C" vere given n start signal via the SE orocedure. The"A" D!rsr I fni I cc! tc nch'.eve rated speed. As n result, rntec! vc Itnge nndfrccucnrv vc!r nlsn nnt achieved and the Diesel did nnr enrrgi.".r the cmergcnc",bus. Subsequently. the engine vns manually trippec!.

IInsed nn the prnpcr illuminntinr. c f test lights and the nrnn'e. start of the"C" Diesel, ve believe that the failure of the "A" Diesel tn prnperly start isassociated with a problem with the "A" Diesel and nct with thc ESP. logic..Iaintenance is continuing its trouble shootinp,,investign'tion-w5:th- the "A"Diesel to better determine cause. In the interim- the.following issues r.ust beaddressed:

(I'I Substitution o. the "E" Diesel for the "A" Diese...

«ased nn the isfn....atinn ve Lave. "e believe the failure ni the "A" Dieselis assnciated with the engine itself. Therefor . no additionalsurveillance testing, above and beyond what is normally dnne fnrsubst'tuticn. is, required.

',": I '.I.~tu«.l SE-22»-107.

Due tc the problem with the "A" Diesel the test could net be completed.Although pnrtions nf the test were successfully cnrpleted. it is ourintent to reperfnrm the surveillance, in its entirety, vhrn thc "A" Dirse1is returned tn service. II

C

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~—pr«) ('l1 0 < rabf1 ftv tncrfn. n( the "A" 1)f<snl

A'4

lease<l .oo th< in(nrmat ion <:c have Mc h' 'e the f'ail»re o5 thc "A" Diesel

assn<'fated <:I th th< rnpfn< f rsr1 f a»<l not th< FSF Io<;fc. Rctcsr fnr, (orop< rah I 1 1 tv sh<in,d bc <'F. A)<i AO <, rr, < st < nninc < r<rrvr»rv start I<iy I(So-0„"l<-001.

(' I~f < sr I eeneratnr valid/nonval id failure.

AI I fn<licat ion .n datr is that the "A" Dfcs<'1 rcccive<l a valid emergcncvstart sirnal. Therefore, its Eailur~'o adecuatclv start and achieverated c<.rditions ~f thfn 10 seconds sl;:id be considcre<! a valid failure.

"i')

T ..a'.,'Irrk'lant'nefneerfnc .Supcrvfs< r

jl,F. Rorh<'enfnr Co<«pliancc Fncfnccr

Page 35: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

~

~

~

Pennsylvania Power L Light CompanyTwo North Ninth Street ~ Allentown, PA 18101 ~ 215 I 770 5151

June lh, (990 bcc: H.W. Keiser . TW-16A.M. Male A6-2F.G. Butler A6-2I' Cc.

A6»1J.R. Miltenberger A6-1Z.'N.'Z ~y A2-4

Nr. T.T. Hartin m ~~, H.D. Wcxxhshick Spu.. Off1.ce-b.xwiRegional Administrator, Region I M.T, ~n Susq. 'I'raining CenU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccnmission R.J. Prego SB-2475 Allendale Road SRC(Attn: W.R. Licht) A6-1King of Prussia, Pa. 19406 M.M. Golden SSES

T.J. Nork SSESW.G. Hafner SB-1iGHC Secretary SSES

'OC File SSES'.

Dyckrttan - Allegheny Electric C~ratiP.O. sax 1266

SURXJEtVBNA STEAM EZZCZRIC STATI(N Harrisburg, PA 17108-1266SPECIAL REFORI' 'E'IESEL FAILURE 'Io J,D, Decker GeneralACHIEvE 60 HZ FREQUENCY WITHIN 10 SErXNDS 5 Highland Place~- r28 FILE R41-2 ehern, PA 18017

INPO ~rds Cent'er - Suite 15001100 Circle 75 Pkwy.

Docket No. 50-387 Atlanta GA, 30339License LLo. NPF-14 Fearican Nuclear Insurers - The Exchange Suite

270 Fazrt~pxn Ave.Fartttington, CT 06(I32

Dear Mr. Martin Attn: Librarian

Ail Diesel Generator failures, valid or invalid, are to be reporttxt as requiredby Regulatory Guide 1.108, Section C.3.b and Technical Specificaticn 4.8.1.1.4.

On Nay 15, 1990 at, 2125 hours the 'E'iesel Gyrator (D/G) was start~A inaccorda~ with surveillance test SO-024W01 following its substitution for the'O'/G c&c m being renaved ~ service for maintenance. D/G 'E's aspare fi th D/G which can be substit~ for any of the four (A,B,C or D) D/G'sat Susquehanna. The 'E'/G failed to achieve generator. frc~mcy ~f 60 (+3.0,-3,0) Hz within 10 seccax1s as xmp~B by Technical Specification SurveillanceRequirazant 4.8.1.1.2.a. The.'E'/G was shutdown. Limiting '.".yditica forOperation (M3) 3.8.1.1 was entered. 'Ihe 'D'/G was substituted back in forthe 'E'/G. Thus, four separate, independent D/G's were again OPERABLE asrequired by the Technical Specifications and IlD 3.8.1.1 was cleared.

Th s was the second observed abnormal start of the 'E'/G in a little marethan a one nenth period. On April 10, 1990 the cbserved generator frequencydid not meet its required value within 10 seconds during a start attarpt. 'Ibisstart a tempt was classified as a ncnmalid test by Operaticas since it hadfollowed rtaintenance activities wh'ch had beew perfoxmed on the 'E'/G.

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Follcwing the 4-10-90 sluggish start the 'E'/G frequency meter circuit wasenrrnined, along with the governor fuel rack, air start, speed sensing and otherccmponents and no abnormalities were found. prior to the start, the air supplyto the starting header had been conf~ t'o be rxrrmal at greater than or equalto 240 psig. A second start attempt had been successful with the D/G attainingits required parrrmeters within the 10 second time limit. The specific cause'fthe 4-10-90 slow start could not be deterrruned at that time, however, theinvestigation did not identify any reason for the slow start to be classifiedas a valid test or failure. A subsequent start atterrrpt on 4-12-90 at 1331hours was also successful with the 0/G attaining all required parameters withinthe 10 second tine limit.

Following the 5-15-90 slow start, a second start attempt was made with the 0/Gnrccessfully attaining its required parameters within the 10 second tire limit.An investigation was then conducted and several air contml pressure rr gulatoror shuttle valves were disassembled, inspected and tested along with startingrelay logic circuitry. No abnormalities were found. Finally, the fuel oilsystem pipirrg was inspected and a loose suction flange on the DC Fuel OilBooster Pump was found to be leaki;rg slowly and is believed to have beendrawing air in, resulting in slower engine acceleration on fuel oil duringinitial start attempts.

ine Fuel Oil Booster ~ suction flange was properly tight~ and anothersuccessful start of the 'E'/G follcwed at 2040 hours on 5-17-90. The loosesuction flange, and resultant introduction of air to the fuel oil system, isbelieved to be the cause of the 5-15-9.0 surveillance test failure.

To prevent recurrence, the Maintenance Section will rranitor the integrity ofthis flange ard other fuel oil system connections to optimize the inspectionpericds for these types of connections consistent with the D/G reliabilityprogram efforts. As a result of review of the D/G 4-10-90 test runclassification, performed subsequent to the 5-15-90 0/G slow start, PP&L is~iewing its practice ccncerning when a diesel run is classified as a postmaintenance test versus operabilirg test and wiU.. establish clearclassification directions consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.108.

The loose pm'uction flange, discovered-after the 5-15-90 slow start, is newbelieved to be a potential cause of the 4-10-90 slur start, which would lendscrr credence to retroactive classification of the 4-10-90 slow start as avalid test failure. In this case, however, PPRL feels that if bcrc i slow starts

" are attributed to this sarw'. cause, it would not be in the best interest of the0/G reliability efforts to re-classify the 4-10-90 start attempt as a valid;.test failure. 'Ihis would result in having two (2) failures in the last 20,valid tests and a test interval of one start at, least once per 7 days per TechSpec Table 4.8.1.1.2-1, which PPr L feels would be an unneoessary burden on the'E'/G and unjustifiable fran a reliability standpoint. due to a singularcausal factor which was corrected. As such the 4-10-90 slow start will remainclassified as a ncamalid test. This position was reviewed with the NRr SeniorResident Inspector. D/G 'E'as unavailable for substitution use fran 2125

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'I' 4 C ~ ~ ~ '8

hours on'5-15-90 to 2040 hours on 5-17-90. 'Ihe 5-15-90 'E'/G slew start teais ccnsidered a valid test and valid failure. The Diesel Generator Start Logindicates there is one (1) diesel failure in the last 20 valid tests. Thediesel test interval is one start at 1";~t once per 31 days per TechnicalSpecification Table 4.8.1.1.2-1.

~sr'~.G. Stanley

Superintenden of Plant — SusquehannaRRH/mmmm

cc: U.S Nuclear Regulatory CcmnissionDonxmnt Control DeskWashirx~n, DC 20555

Mr. G. S. BarberSr. Resident inspectorU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CcnmissionP.O. Box 35Berwick, PA 18603-0035

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A.2 Motor Driven Pump Data

RHR pumps

NumberDemands

Failures

thru 89 90-97" total thru 89@ 90-97'otal1A1B1C1D2A2B2C2D

408 268 676303 256 559173 199 372198 215 41399 257 356128 274 40286 '51 33789 229 318

0 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 02 0 21 ~ 0 1

1 2 3

,Total 1484 1948 3432 4 2 6

Q Data through 89 is obtained in Volurnc IIISection C.l of the IPE-199lit Demad data is obtained from EC-RISK-1060, Rev. 1. Failure data is obtained from reviews ofSOOR &CR summaries. Thesesummaries are provided in this Appendix

RHR Pump Run Times

The RHR pump run times and failures during operation were obtained from the IPRthrough 1/1/90 and estimated from the attached data through 12/31/97. The number ofpump failures to run were obtained from SOOR & CR summaries. The run hours for thepumps from 1/90 through 12/97 were estimated by multiplying the closed fractionreported on the HRPD output by the number ofhours between 1/90 through 12/97 (70140hours). This was required because the HRPD data was queried only through 7/31/96.

RHR pumps toRun

Numberthru 89 fopen 90-97 total

Failuresthru 89 90-97 total

1A1B1C1D2A2B2C2DTotal

5776 0.931 4837 106133029 0.934 4627 76563608 0.954 3225 68332596 0.952 3365 59612502 0.947 3716 62182704 0.918 5749 84532096 0.925 5258 73543235 0.924 5328 8563

00000000

25546 36104 61650 0 , 0 0

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Page 40: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

Emergency Service WaterPumps'ump

Demands

Number Failures Number FailuresABCD

1559 41472 1

1439 2952 1

30247 1

42212 227191 1

31035 0

Total 5422 8 130685 4

The ESW pump demand data was obtained from EC-RISK-1060 Rev. 1. The failure datathrough 1989 was obtained from EC-RISK-0503. Rev. 1. Failures subsequent to 1989were obtained from a review of the SSPI and Maintenance rule'records. No failures werereported subsequent to 1989.

Core Spray Pumps.

Data for the core spray pumps is derived from unit one data.

Core Starts Failures Run FailureSpray Hours

1A1B1C1D2A2B2C2DTotal

215236190202181

198160170

1553

32854553174959253287361329133092

0 28418 0

RHRSW

The RHRSW starts and run hours were estimated from the attached HRPD data. Thenumbers were estimated since the data did not cover the entire sane of the data. Thereforit was assumed that the pumps were used at a similar frequency and duration during theperiods where the data is absent as when the data is provided by HRPD. The ratio ofknown to estimated data is provided below.

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RHRSWU1

4/30/98 7/1/837/1/83 9/10/82

14.8411 0.805479 0.94852

1/10/95 4/1/982/1/85 5/8/84

9.945205 13.90685 '0.71513

1A1B2A2B

Demand OperatingKnown Estimated Known Estimated

842 888 16902 17819785 828 14531 15320709 991 14483 20252643 899 12431 17383

2979 3606 58347 70774

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NDBH-71UNIT '1,PAGE 138

FORHRPD DATA REPORT

THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:00 ON 7/01/83 ANO 23:59 ON 4/30/9805/21/98 08:20:34

INTERVAL DURATION: 3003 1:59:59POINT: EKZ43 *- ESS BUS 1A TO CSPRY PP A STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 - OPEN 1

— CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

202 TOTAL TIME OPEN2190'OTAL TIME CLOSED

14622: 19: 18 CLOSED

26953:40:25 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION: 0.9763078:19:34

15:09:51

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ql

NDBH-71UNIT 1, PAGE 156

HRPD DATA REPORTFOR THE INTERVAI. BETWEEN 0:00 ON 7/01/83 AND 23:59 ON 4/30/98

'5/21/9808:20:34INTERVAL DURATION: 30031:59:59

POINT: EKZ50 ESS BUS 18 TO 'CSPRY PP 8 STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 - OPEN 1 - CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

2224

21313

TOTAL TIME OPEN

TOTAL TIME CLOSED

556:29:13 CLOSED

25766:03:424265:56:17

18:57:35

IOUT OF SERVICE FRACTION: 0.967

I

II

II

x A Pi/ /cj. I ~~~ - c f st~~r~4/'/i/i s~~ ~ t4 = g3> stirp

pow p~ y'poW/ f<LK P) )3

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UNIT 1, PAGE 171

FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:00 ONHRPD DATA REPORT

7/01/83 AND 23:59 ON 4/30/9805/21/98 08:20:34

INTERVAL DURATION: 30031:59:59POINT: EKZ57 - ESS BUS 1C TO CSPRY PP C STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 — OPEN 1 - CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

179 TOTAL TIME OPEN3

170 TOTAL TIME CLOSED12

705:27:11 CLOSED

28392:27:56 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION: 0.9871639:32:03

9:03:29

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NDBH-71UNIT 1,PAGE 187

FORHRPD DATA REPORT

THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:00 ON 7/01/83 AND 23:59 ON 4/30/9805/21/98 08:20:34

INTERVAL DURATION: 30031:59:59POINT: EKZ63 - ESS BUS 1D TO CSPRY PP 0 STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 — OPEN 1 — CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

1905

18411

TOTAL TIME OPEN

TOTAL TIME CLOSED

638:21:49 CLOSED

I24480:56: 18 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION: 0.9575551:03:41

28:36:49

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NOSH-71UNIT 2,PAGE 17

HRPD DATA REPORTFOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:01 ON 1/01/90 AND 23:59 ON 7/31/96

POINT: EKZ71 - ESS BUS 2A TO RHR PP A STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 - OPEN

08/12/96 10: 31: 40

INTERVAL DURATION: 57695:58:591 — CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

211 TOTAL TIME OPEN3

172 TOTAL TIME CLOSED42

255:21:45 CLOSED

54647:38:02 OUT OF SERVICE FRAG'TION: 0.947

3048:20:5714: 18:41

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Page 48: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

NDBH-71UNIT 2,PAGE 35

FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:01 ON

POINT: EKZ77 - ESS BUS 28 TO RHR PP 8

HRPD DATA REPORT1/01/90 AND 23:59 ON 7/31/96STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 - OPEN

08/12/96 10: 3 I: 40

INTERVAL DURATION: 57695:58:591 - CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

224 TOTAL TIME OPEN4

174 TOTAL T'IME CLOSED54

231: 41: 10 CLOSED

52824:27:15 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION: 0.9164871: 31: 44

21:27:37

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NDBH-71UNIT 2,PAGE 52

FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0: 01 ON

POINT: EKZ82 — ESS BUS 2C TO RHR PP C

HRPD DATA REPORT1/01/90 AND 23:59 ON 7/31/96STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 - OPEN

08/12/96 10: 31: 40

INTERVAL DURATION: 57695: 58: 59

1 - CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

203 TOTAL TIME OPEN6

146 TOTAL TIME CLOSED63

255:17:11 CLOSED

53354:53:21 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION: 0.9254341:05:38

20:52:14

Page 50: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

NDBH-71UNIT 2, PAGE 67

FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEENHRPD DATA REPORT

0:01 ON 1/01/90 AND 23:59 ON 7/31/96POINT: EKZ87 - ESS BUS 2D TO RHR PP D STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 — OPEN

08/12/96 10:3'I:40INTERVAL DURATION: 57695:58:591 — CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

188 TOTAL TIME OPEN3

158 TOTAL TIME CLOSED33

278:59:02 CLOSED

53285:57:40 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION: 0.9244410: 01: 19

23:12:38

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POINT: EKZ41 - ESS BUS 1A TO RHR PP A STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 — OPEN

NDBH-71UNIT 1, PAGE 18

HRPD DATA REPORTFOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:01 ON 1/01/90 AND 23:59 ON 7/31/96

08/12/96 10: 30: 46

INTERVAL DURATION: 57695:58:591 — CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

220 TOTAL TIME OPEN3

213 TOTAL TIME CLOSED10

240:56:19 CLOSED

53729:21:40 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION: 0.9313966:37:19

17:52:03

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NDBH-71UNIT 1,PAGE 35

FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEENHRPD DATA REPORT

0:01 ON I/01/90 ANO 23:59 ON 7/31/96POINT: EKZ48 - ESS BUS 18 TO RHR PP 8 STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 - OPEN

08/12/96 10:30:46INTERVAL DURATION: 5?695:58:59

CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

208 TOTAL TIME OPEN5

203 TOTAL TIME CLOSED10

252:52:38 CLOSED

53862:53:16 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION: 0.934

3833:05:4318:04:50

Page 53: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

NDBH-71UNIT 1,PAGE 49

FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:01 ON

POINT: EKZ55 - ESS BUS 1C TO RHR PP C

HRPD DATA REPORT1/01/90 AND 23:59 ON 7/31/96STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 — OPEN

08/12/96 10 30 46

INTERVAL DURATION: 57695:58:591 - CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

163 TOTAL TIME OPEN3

155 TOTAL TIME CLOSEDll331:42:08 CLOSED

55062:36:01 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION: 0.9542633:22:58

15:57:35

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Page 55: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

NDBH-7 1

UNIT 1, PAGE 64

FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:01 ON

POINT: EKZ61 - ESS BUS 1D TO RHR PP D

HRPD DATA REPORT1/01/90 ANO 23:59 ON 7/31/96STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 — OPEN

08/12/96 10:30:46INTERVAL DURATION: 57695:58:591 - CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CIOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

1781

16712

TOTAL TIME OPEN

TOTAL TIME CLOSED

306:51:42 CLOSED

54928:15:02 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION: 0.9522767:43:57

15:32:56

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A.3 Summary ofRHR SOORs and CRs.

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'NDBtl-7 1

UNIT 1, PAGE 63HRPD DATA REPORT

FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:00 ON 7/01/83 AND 23:59 ON 4/30/9805/21/98 08:20:34

INTERVAL DURATION: 30031:59:59POINT: AEZ49 - RHR SW PUMP A BKR STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 - OPEN 1 - CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

773 TOTAL TIME OPEN69

824 TOTAL TIME CLOSED18

134: 21: 29 CLOSED

$ 13129 l41:05 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:

16902 l 18:54 ~ J ~ gg20:05:52

O. 870~iI

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NDBH 71UNIT 1,PAGE 122 I

HRPD DATA REPORTFOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:00 ON 7/01/83 ANO 23:59 ON 4/30/98

05/21/98 08:20:34INTERVAL DURATION: 30031:59:59

POINT: AEZ50 - RHR SW PUMP 8 'BKR STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 - OPEN 1 - CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

735 TOTAL TiME OPEN50

760 TOTAL TIME CLOSED25

147:08:05 CLOSED

15500:55:43 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION: 0.88814531:04:16

18:32:04

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NDBH-71UNIT 2, PAGE 53

FOR- THE INTERVAL BETWEENPD DATA REPORT

0:00 ON 2/01/85 ANO 0:01 ON 1/01/9505/21/98 08:24:05

INTERVAL DURATION: 86904:01:59POINT: AEZ49 - RHR-SW PUMP A BKR STATE DEFIN IONS: 0 - OPEN 1 - CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

645 TOTAL TIME OPEN64

636 TOTAL TIME CLOSED73

102:08:41 CLOSED

72420:45: 12 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION: 0.83314483:16:47

20:27:23

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NDBH-71UNIT 2,PAGE 101

FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN

POINT: AEZSO — RHR SW PUMP 8 BKR

05/21/98 08:24:05HRPD DATA REPORT

0:00 ON 2/01/85 AND 0:01 ON 1/01/95 INTERVAL DURATION: 86904:01:59STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 — OPEN 1 - CLOSED

TOTAL NUMBER OF OPENTOTAL IMPLIED OPENTOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSEDTOTAL IMPLIED CLOSEDAVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN

579 TOTAL TIME OPEN64

612 TOTAL TIME CLOSED31

115:49:13 CLOSED

74472:32:33 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION: 0.85712431:29:26

19: 21:49

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A.3 Summary of RHR SOORs and CRs.

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Page 64: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

UU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUUUUUUUUUUUU

UUUUUUUUUU

SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS SSSSSSS

SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS

SSSSS

SS SSSSSSSSSSSSSS

SSSSSSSSSS

000000000000000000

00 000000 00 0000 00 0000 00 0000 00 0000 00 000000 00000 00

000000000000000000

7777777777777777777777777 77

7777

77777777777777.

000000000000000

00 0000'0

00 0000 00 0000 00 0000 00 0000 00: 000000 00000 00

000000000000000000

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JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ

JJJJJdJJJJJJ

JJ JJdJ JdJdJJJJJJ

JJJJJd

000000000000000000000000 OO00 00OO OOOO OOOO OOOO OOOO OOOO OO000000000000

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BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB BBBB BBBB BBBBBBBBBBBB888886888688 8688 86BB 88BBBBBBBBBBBB88888888888

000000000000000000

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i~//US070TI JOB 720588P ~ RJE WA RPT , MAIL - GARY BURNS, SYS ENG-2ND!1

NOTIFY: US07JOB NAME: 'S070T1USERID: US07SYSOUT CLASS: A

DESTINATION: RJEBOe

~ PRINT TIME: 10. 49. 084 PRINT DATE: 02 OCT 95

PRINTER NAME: RJEBOPR10 PRINTER TYPE: PRTt~~START++~++START+++~+START+++START+++++START+++++START+>+*+START<++++ST*RT+++

Page 65: Rev 0 to EC-RISK-1065, 'Assessment of Common Cause Failure ... · P = conditional probability that a cause ofa component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components,

UU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUU . UUUUUUUUUUUUUU

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NOTIFY: US07JOB NAME: US070T1USERID: US07SYSOUT CLASS: A

DESTINATION: RJEBO

PRINT TIME: 10.49.08PRINT DATE: 02 OCT 95PRINTER NAME: RJEBOPR1PRINTER TYPE: PRT

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PMI S: 49

10/02/95SUSQU ANNA SES

SOOR SUMMARY REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/ 1

SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE & SOOR /IP M I 5

PAGE 1

SYS SOOR IiOCCUR

DATE DESCRIPTION

49 84-081

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 64

49 86 225

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 54

49 87-395

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 51

49 88-140

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 50 52

49 1-89-339

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-91-089

/

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-91-266

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 51

2/09/84

7/23/05

7/02/87

5/05/88

11/08/89

4/17/91

10/18/91

RHR PUMP SEAL WTR COOLERS ARE INADEQUATELY DESIGNED.2/9/84 EVAL COM. MTG. RECOMMENDS 10CFR72 REPORT, PLI-31058.THE SEAL WATER COOLERS WERE REPLACED WITH NEW SHELLS MADE OFCAST STEEL VS. CAST IRON.'' NQA REVIEW REQ. DELETED PER OPS - 5 R.S.

CI.QSED

HR, ESW FLOW TRANSMITTERS COMPLETELY COVERED UNDER WATER.AUSED~BY> GROUND WATER LEAKING BY SEALS IN MANHOLES.WRAPS-0$ |53PWjtI TTEN TO DETERMINE REPAIR METHODS.,EMPT./PM ISSUED TO PUMP DOWN MANHOLES. WA S65301 & S73632

C)OS) P

"SEALEP fEPPTRATIONS.

POST LOCA BYPASS LEAKAGE WATER SEAL BARRIER IS SUSPECTFOR. BRANCH'LINES CONNECTED TO RHR AND CORE SPRAY SYSTEMS.LICENSING REVIEWED THE CONDITION AND DETERMINED THAT IT WAS NOTREPORTABLE. REF. NCR 87-0288 FOR FURTHER EVALUATION

CLOSED

POTENTIAL REPORTABILITY RE: HPCI, RCIC & RHR LIMITORQUE OPERATORS. NUCLEAR DESIGN CONCLUDED THAT THE AMOUNTING ARRANGEMENT WASNOT ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED. LICENSING DETERMINED THAT THECONDITION IS NOT REPORTABLE PER PART 21. REF NCR'5 88- 110, 181,

182 & 267.CLOSED

CONTAINMENT BOUNDRY VALVE CAP FOUND REMOVED FROM 151077&251077REF NCR 89-0697 AND 701.REF EWR M00020 WHICH DETERMINED THAT THE CONDITION DOES NOTVIOLATE PPL COMMITMENT TO GDC-56.

CLOSED

RWCU BLOWDOWN MAY NOT BE A VIABLE METHOD OF HEAT REMOVALFROM CONTAINMENT BELOW APPROX 450 PSI RX VESSEL PRESSURE.ERT PERFORMED. REF PLI 68259. ROOT CAUSE OF THIS OCCURRENCE WASINADEQUATE COMMUNICATION. THIS CONTRIBUTED TO THE FAILURE TO

RESOLVE THE TECHNICAL OPINION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NUCLEAR FUELS,SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS. THIS IS CONSIDERED TO BE ANISOLATED OCCURRENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO WORK GROUPS.CLOSED

RHR AND CORE SPRAY VALVES SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRESSURE LOCKING ~

RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO DRILL A HOLE IN THE DISKOF EACH AFFECTED INJECTION VALVE. REF DCP 91 9080 THRU 9083

'CP91"9080 AND 91-9082 CORRECTED FOR Ul DURING 6RIO.DCP 91-9081 AND 91-9083 INSTALLED DURING U2 BRIO.CLOSED

TOTAL: 7

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PMIS:EVR49

10/02/95SUSQUEHANNA SES

SOOR SUMMARY REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/1SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE d SOOR tt

P M I S

PAGE 2

SYS SOOR tt

49 83-063/)/~wc'.<

49 83 064

49, 85 088

49'3-129

49C . 83-155

49,v 83 334

49 83-370

49 83-373

49 84-057

49 84-O7O

49 84-138

49 84-204

49 84-298

OCCURDATE

2/16/83

2/16/83

2/ 18/83

4/08/83

5/13/83

1 1/06/83

12/03/83

12/07/83

1/29/84

2/03/84

3/21/84

4/29/84

7/21/84

DESCRIPTION

ALT EPA BKR TRIP CAUSED LOSS OF S/D COOLING.ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY TO THE RPS IS NOT ISOLATED FROM THE PLANTELECTRICAL SYSTEM AND TRIPS ON SMALL VOLTAGE OR FREQUENCYOSCILLATIONS.'QA REVIEW (EQ. DELETED PER OPS - 5 R.S.

CLOSED' " ''

1

ALT'PA BKR. TRIP CAUSED LOSS OF RHR S/D COOLINGALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY TO THE RPS IS NOT ISOLATED FROM THE PLANTELECTRICALi S)STEM iTRIPS ON SMALL VOLTAGE OR FREQUENCYOSCILt:ATiONS.'"~ „'tt A ttEVIEW REQ. DELETED PER OPS - 5 R.B.

RHR" 'Bh INJ. VALVE HIGH VIBRATION. (F017 VALVES)THE OPERAiTit(GJPROCEDURES HAVE BEEN MODIFIED.PgR 82"'051)'l('lSQ't)PFULE) RELEASED 8/7/84."I NQ'4+REVIEW <REQ) 'DELETED PER OPS - 5 R.5.

pAO(I'~>' itHHR Hf PISCHARGE VALVE 1F0038. WOULD NOT OPEN.

T E PTOR WAS" tt'Ekg)L'CED. WA-S31070NR 'REVIEW 'RP'Q. DELETED PER OPS - 5 R.S.C)OSPD"''

5/D COOLING HIGH FLOW SWITCH WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE LIMITS.BARTON MODEL 28IBA SETPOINT DRIFT ~ C

CALIBRATION DATA IS BEING TRENDED-REF SOOR 2 BP P49 WHICH IS MASTER'CLOSED.

RHR LOOP '8'ECLARED INOP - CHECK VALVE )F0318 WOULD NOT SEAT.CAUSED'BY MIS"A).'1GNt(ENT"OF THE VALVE DISC AND A BENT HINGE PIN.EWR')DSEA 60003'7 tPROVIDED CORRECTIVE ACTION.PHR SYS"VLVS WEPE 'f(SPECTED/REPAIRED AS NEEDED.t CLOSED> I 8 W hi

RHR VALVES FAILED TO MEET ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.THE ).EAKAGE PAST'RHR TESTABLE CHECK VALVES ( 1F050 A d 8) ANDE'QUA).12ING'VAKVESV'((F122A d 8) WAS TOO GREAT TO BE MEASURED.PERMANEN'P(CHANGE'MADE TO S0-100-019..

t CLOSED(DCC 1 .8I

RHR CONDUOTIVITY INSTRUMENT CR1.2351 INACCURATE.EMOS WRI TTQMt TO S/A( S AND OPS ABOUT REPORTING WHEN CHEMISTRYgi'TAKENG 'SAtlPL'ES~.

CL6SED/DOCS( '. '1E CIRCUITS t(OT ISOLATED FOR RHR.10CF(50.'65E AND )OCf R21 REPORTS WERE MADE ~

RPF'1 SOOR '-8/~0)2:

CLOSED I) V

RHR PUMP. TRIP. QND VALVES F008 d F009 CLOSED WITH NO ALARMS.PROBhBf.'E CAUSE FROM HIGH FLOW AS A RESULT OF VALVING OPERATIONS.SYSeWAS t(E)klPNjEDiTO SERVICE WITHOUT INCIDENTa"- C'LOSP D'i.".4!r '

4'Pl t~RHR SHUTDO tl COOLING ISOLATION ACTUATION, HIGH FLOW SUSPECTEDSPURIOUSi A TUATION OF RHR DIFF. PRESSURE SWITCHES CAUSED CLOSUREOF 'SH, TDOW tCOOLING INBOARD AND OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVES. THISWAS'iA I ACT A/ION'DF AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE. ESF ~

6 'EVE T'HA 'NOT 'RE-OCCURRED AS OF 10/6/86 NO FURTHER ACTIONS AREPLA NEO. 'EF MASTER SOOR 2-86-171.C,LOSEP'A'OOP

RHR UNIT II INOP. UNABLE TO COMPLETE S0-149-002.CLOSEP

RHR LOOP 'Bi TEST CHECK VALVE 1F0508 REC'D DUAL INDICATIONSISI WAS PERFORMED AND ENG. ANALYSIS WAS MADE THAT VLV.FUNCTIO((S PROPERLY.

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PMI S: E 4910/02/95'USQUE >... SESSOOR SUMMARY REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/1

SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE & SOOR 11

P M I S

SYS SOOR NOCCUR

DATE DESCRIPTION

49 84 299

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 84-316

7/21/84

8/20/84

CLOSED

RHR LOOP '8'QUALIZER VALVE 1F1228 DUAL INDICATION.VLV. VERIFIED CLOSED BY VENTING UPSTREAM PIPING, NO PRESSUREOR FLOW WAS OBSERVED. WA 544361 WILL REWORK THE POSITIONSWITCH WHICH IS SUSPECT. REQUIRES CONTAINMENT ENTRY.

CLOSED

RHR "8 INOP DUE TO FAILED ISI.SO'S WILL BE REVISED TO REFLECT THE 96 HOUR EVALUATION STATEDIN THE ASME CODE.

CLOSED

.OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 84-474 12/19/84-

49j~'84-344 M =" ' ' -'- 9/ '1 1/84 'A'HR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING FULL FLOW TEST VALVE INOP.VALVE 1F024A. ACTUATOR PINION GEAR KEY WAS MISSING.WA 544663 REPLACED KEY AND RESTORED SYSTEM.

NQA REVIEW REQ. DELETED PER OPS - 5 R.B.CLOSED

'RHR F028A VLV. BINDING AND REPEATEDLY TRIPPING BREAKER.INVESTIGATEO BY. MNT & PACKING 'WAS LUBED & ADJUSTED, VLV. THEN

"OPERATED PROPERLY.CLOSED

49 84-483

49 85-049

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 64 83

49 85-092

49 e 85-132

49 85-154

49 85-145

49 85-150

49 85-183

12/25/84

2/01/85

3/04/85

4/27/85

5/15/85

5/16/85

5/20/85

6/08/86

" HIGH PRESS ISOLATION OF RHR SD COOLING, HV151F009 WOULDN'T CLEARNECESSARY TO ISOLATE/VENT PRESS SWITCH 831-N018A TO OPEN VALVE.PMR 86-7026 WILL PROVIDE CORRECTIVE h1EASURES WHICH WILL BETRACKED BY MASTER SOOR 2-85-032.

CLOSED

EXCESS, FLOW CHECK VALVES FAILED SURVEILLANCE TEST.XV-821-F072C FAILED TO ISOLATE, XV-831-F057A FAILED TO REOPEN &XV-831-F0038 FAILED TO ISOLATE.WA S50048 REPLACED BLOWN FUSE.

CLOSEDTO DCC

RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE WOULD NOT RETRACT INTO IT'S HOLDER,DURING RHR 178 VALVE WELD INSPECTOIN.

++CANCELLED/DOC~~

BYPASS 1-85-046 REMOVED CAUSING LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING ISO VLVROOT CAUSE WAS STATES LINKS WERE OPENED IN PNL. 1C201 TOIMPLEMENT PMR 82-434, AND THIS ACTION WAS NOT DOCUh1ENTED.WA-551134 INVESTIGATED AND CORRECTED.

REF. MASTER SOOR 2-85- 112CLOSED.

RHR INIATION PERMISSIVE SETPOINT PS-831-1N0188 OUT OF TOL.FOUND DURING SI 149-304, WAS RE-CAL'ED. SAT.CAUSED BY INSTRUX1ENT DRIFT.

CLOSED

RHR MIN FLOW VALVE TIME DELAY, FOR OPENING, DID NOT FUNCTION.1F007A.

STATUS: REF. MASTER SOOR 1-85- 150CLOSED

1F007A OPENED TO SUPPRESSION POOL WHILE RUNNING 'A'HR PUMPFOP SHUTDOWN COOLING..WA-551403 INVESTIGATED AND EVENT COULD NOT BE DUPLICATED NOR ACAUSE

DETERlhIPPD.'LOSED

WATER HAMMER OCCURRED WHEN 'A'HR PUMP WAS STARTED.DUE TO PIPING'EING DRAINED AND- OP-149-00'OT BEING PERFORMEDPROPERLY. )NVOI.VED OPERATION'S PERSONNEL WERE COUNSELED.

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PMI6: R49

10/02/95

SUSQUEHANNA SESSOOR SUMMARY REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/1

SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE 6 SOOR NP M I S

:PAGE 4

SYS BOOR NOCCUR. DATE DESCRIPTION

49 85-218

49 85-277

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 59

49 86-009

49 86-031

49 86 055

49 86-062

49 86-065

49 86-080

49 86-101

7/12/85

9/10/85

1/08/86

1/31/86

2/19/86

2/28/86

3/01/86

3/16/86

3/31/86

ITEM IS ON OPS AGENDA 85-09.CLOSEDTO DCC

RHR ROOT VALVES FOUND CLOSED'OL DID NOT INCLUDE THEM.RV-1-FT1N013 6 RV-2-FT-1N013 FOR FI-1R607.PCAF 1-85-0895 CORRECTED CONDITION.

CLOSEDTO DCC

RHR/HPCI VLV EXERCISE SURV SE 149-205 6 SE-152-201 NOT PERFORMEDAS REQUIRED. INADEQUATE REVIEW OF PMIS AND SCHEDULING ERRORSCAUSED THE SURV TO MISSED.THIS IS MASTER SOOR FOR 1-85-276, 238 6 253.

OPS ISSUED 50-153-003; REVISED 50-013/113/213-009, REPLACEDSE-111/211-201,465 WITH "SO" PROCEDURESCLOSED

RHR FLOW RECORDER FR-E11-1R608 FOUND OUT OF TOL.INSTRUMENT IS USED DURING 50-149 002, OPS INVESTIGATIONREVEALED THAT- RESULTS WERE NOT AFFECTED.

CLOSED

FLOW IN SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY WAS NOTED, 1F0278 NOTSEATED'OLLOWINGPERFORMANCE OF 50-149-005. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS THAT THE

HANDSWITCH WAS NOT HELD IN THE CLOSE" POSITION EVENT TO BE RE-VIEWED BY LICENSED PERSONNEL. SO- 149-005 REVISED.

CLOSED

'8'HR SWING BUS MG SET TRIPPED, WAS HOT WHEN TOUCHEDBY OPERATOR INVESTIGATING EVENT. LCO ENTERED.NO PROBLEM WAS IDENTIFIED, NO FURTHER OCCURRENCES WEREEXPERIENCED'ND HEAT WAS DETERMINED TO BE NORMAL.

CLOSED

JUMPERS INCORRECTLY PLACED PER SE-149-001 WHILE TESTING RHR BKRSJUMPER WAS PLACED ON THE WRONG SIDE OF A DROPPING RESISTOR.WA-552586 INSPECTED FOR DAMAGE, NONE WAS FOUND. INVOLVEDPERSONNEL REVIEWED THE EVENT, AND PROCEDURAL WORDING HAS BEEN

REVIEWED.CLOSED

'A'HR PUMP OPERATED WITHOUT THRUST BEARING COOLINGVALVED IN. VALVE 111- 129A WAS CLOSED'UE TO IMPROPER TRACKINGOF VALVE STATUS ON WA T53113 AND INCOMPLETE EQUIP. CHECK BY'PSPRIOR TO STARTING. REF. HPES REPORT 86-010.

MAINT AND OPS PERSONNEL REVIEWED THE EVENT.CLOSED

RHR 'A'OOP MIN FLOW VALVE ACTUATION LOWERED VESSEL INVENTORYWHEN IT AUTO OPENED AND DID NOT RECLOSE COMPLETELY WITH HANDSWI.TCH OPERATION, HV"E11 F007A, DUE TO INADEQUATE SPRING-PACPRESSURE. WA 560484 REPLACED SPRING-PAC WITH ONE OF A HIGHER

RANGE, AND ADJUSTED TORQUE SWITCH SETTING TO A HIGHER LEVEL.CLOSED

RHR 1F007A REPEATEDLY STROKED OPEN AFTER IT WAS CLOSED.EVENT OCCURRED WHILE RESTORING ESS 18{ 1A202).1F007A IS THE MIN FLOW VALVE TO SUPPRESSION POOL. CAUSED BYOPENING SUPPLY BKRS. FOR HV-1F00849. PCAF 1-86-451 WRITTEN TO

PROHIBIT OVERRIDING SYS/EQUIPMENT CONTROLS.CLOSED

~c> A~~C

49A 86-270 7/15/86

~'"-49~'~>,87, 604'~/V'P~.""-"~-.-'-" ' - .*'. "4/04/h7

RHR SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY PUMP SUCTION PI-E11 —1R002C OUT OF TOLFOUND DURING PM 01850-01, INSTRUMENT IS USED DURING TECHSPEC 4.0.6 PUMP TESTING. INSTRUMENT,WAS REPLACED 6 SO- 149-002WAS PERFORMED WITH RESULTS SAT.

CLOSED

: RHR'SHUTOFF VALVE .1FONBB WOULb 'NOT STROKE OPEN ~ f /DURING ATTEMPT TO INITIATE SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING.'j

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PMI 5: 49

10/02/95SUSQUE NA SES

SOOR SUMMARY REPORT FOR SYS 49 UNIT 0/ 1

SORTED BY UNIT ~ ISSUE DATE & SOOR NP M I S

PAGE 5

SYS SOOR NOCCUR

DATE DESCRIPTION

49 87-008

49 87-014

1/08/87

1/13/87

A HIGHER SET OF THERMAL OVERLOADS WERE INSTALLED VIA SETPOINTCHANGE. MASTER SOOR FOR 1-87-008. WA S73379 IUSPECTED VALVE

WITHOUT ANY PROBLEMS FOUND.CLOSED

RHR F0288 VALVE THERMALS TRIPPING DURING SUPP POOL COOLINGATTEMPTS. REF MASTER SOOR 1-87-004.

CLOSED

RHR MIN FLOW CHECK VLVS 161F046A-D FAILED SO- 149-002DUE TO LACK OF INSTALLFD INDICATION ON FLOW PATHPCAF 1-87-0049 ISSUED FOR SO- 149-002 TO CLARIFY INSTRUCTIONTO TEST CHECK VALVE. PCAF 2 87 0064 ISSUED FOR SO"249-002.

CLOSED

49 87-075

49 87-100

~ «49 «g~j87-,144«ij=. t&a,~.„, "w'Wn: ~%)~..

49<>~a187~46.3' ~

3/15/87 RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING VALVE 1F0248 FAILED TO FULLY CLOSF .SYSTEM WAS SECURED BY CLOSING THE 1F0288 ISOLATION VALVEVALVE 1F0248 TORQUE SWITCH SETTING WAS INCREASED WHICH ALLOWEDVALVE TO FULLY CLOSE AGAINST SYSTEM DP. EWR M60727 WILL

DETERMINE IF,A LARGER MOTOR/ACTUATOR SHOULD BE INSTALLED.REF. EWR MIS 86-727 AND EWR M71 191 (KEN ANDERSON)WA 570503 RAISED THE TORQUE SETTING FROM 2 1/4 TO 3 1/4 AND THEPROBLEM HAS NOT RE-OCCURRED. . CLOSED

4/07/87 RHR HV 151-F0288 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BONNET LEAKFOLLOWING SE-159-076. DUE TO MISALIGNMENT OF THE BONNET WHENINSTALLED ON THE VALVE 60DY. VALVE WAS REPAIRED AND PROPERLYALIGNED. INVOLVED PERSONNEL RECEIVED TRAINING TO PREVENT

RECURRENCE.CLOSED 4'l?

5/26/87 RHR HV-151-F028A WOULD NOT OPEN, ELECTRICALLY:.„DURINQ~VAIVE~(ZINEUP f j.TO INITIATE .SU)PRESSION'POOL«: COOL'ING. "THERMAL OVERLDADS 'WERE*FOUND.rTRIPPBO'!c'PCA'F ( 87. 0500 ISSUED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE ~

REF. BOOR 1-87-153CLOSED ~C~

6/11/87 RHR F028A VALVE FAILED TO OPEN DURING SUPPRESSION POOL ~~g M4COOLING VALVE ALIGNMENT. WA S70085, S70633 & 695 INVESTIGATED f /WITH NO PROBLEMS FOUND. PCAF«1-87-0500 & EWR M79227 ISSUED.REF. MASTER SOOR 1-87"209.

CLOSED

49 " '.87 206 .. ~

49 87-209

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 87-248

49 87-252

8/03/87

8/04/87

9/ 13/87

9/17/87

RHR HV151F015A WOULD NOT OPEN ELECTRICALLY OR MANUALLYWA S74802 14(VESTIGATED WITH NO ABNORMALITIES FOUND.A DEADMAN SWITCH WAS INSTALLED AND THE VALVE WAS STROKED SEVERALTIMES WITH NO BINDING OR MISALIGNMENT OBSERVED. THERMAL BINDING

IS THE APPARENT CAUSE. WA 563756 INSPECTED DURING 3RFIO.F015A PERFORMED SAT DURING SE-149-001.CLOSED

RHR HV1F0288 FAILED TO OPEN, BKR THERMAL OVERLOADS TRIPPEDPFR'5 SUBMITTED TO INSTALL LARGER VLV OPERATOR MOTORS.OP-149-005 REVISED AS AN INTERIM MEASURE. TO ALLOW VALVEOPENING UNDER STATIC CONDITIONS. MASTER BOOR FOR 1-87-153.

N. ACT: MAINT - REPLACE RHR 28A&B VALVE ACTUATORS FOR UNIT 1&2.MAINT .TO WRITE WA'S. (KVC ACTION 2/14/89) .( NPE IS PERFORMING A DESIGN REVIEW OF MOV'S. REF NRC GENERIC

'ETTER89-10, RIEE 88-0269 & 0270. CLOSED

THE STARTING OF 'C'HR PUMP RESULTED IN A CONTAINMENT ISOLATIONESF ACTUATION WHEN THE F008 VALVE CLOSED, APPARENTLY DUE TO THEPUMP SWAP BEING PERFORMED AT A HIGH FLOW CONDITION. PCAF'S1-87-093 1 & 2-87-0275 ISSUED. REF WA 578192.

CLOSED

WIRING ERROR FOUND ON RHR RELAY 62AX-20409, TB 81-43LINK DID NOT HAVE LEADS LANDED ON BOTH SIDES.INVESTIGATION BY STAFF ENGINEERING FOUND THAT WIRING IS CORRECT.MNT PLANNING GROUP ATTENDED AN OUT SESSION.

CLOSED

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PMI 5: 49

10/02/95SUSQU NNA SES

SOOR SUMMARY REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/1SORTER BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE & SOOR tt

'R th $ S

SYS BOOR NOCCUR

DATE DESCRIPTION

49 87 317

49 87-331

49 87-285

49 87-294

4987-.296'9

87-305

49 87-312

49 87-315

49 87-323

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 58 59

49 87-350

49A 88-009

10/09/87

10/09/87

10/13/87

10/16/87

10/19/87

10/22/87

10/27/87

10/28/87

1 1/01/87

11/17/87

1/1 1/88

RHR CUT IH PS-831-1N0188 SETPOINT WAS NOT REPEATABLEDURING SI-149-304. WA 578145 REPLACEED SWITCH. SI-149 "304SPCTIQN 6.2"WAS PERFORMED SAT.

CLOSED

'A'HR HEAT EXCHANGER SPILLED WATER DURING VALVE EXCHANGE.CAUSED BY HV) 1216A LEAKING BY IT'S SEAT AND CHECK VALVE 112009NOT CHECKING REVERSE FLOW. REF. NCR 86-0871. SYS KEEPFILLINJECTS HIGHER PRESSURE ON THE LOW PRESSURE SIDE OF HV11215A,

CAUSING LEAKAGE.CLOSED

INCORRECT RHR VALVE WAS DETERMINATED BY WORKERS,'WA S71080HV 161 F0288 WAS DETERMED RATHER THAN HV-161 F028A AS SPECIFIEDON THE WA. CAUSE WAS WORK GROUP OVERSIGHT. WORK GROUP REVIEWEDSOOR & SAFETY MEMO AS 14. HPES 87-016 GENERATED. MT GM-060

REVISED AND OJT WAS HELD.CLOSED

INCORRECT WIRING ON RHR F008 PRESSURE SWITCH WAS FOUND DURINGATTEMPT TO INITIATE SHUTDOWN COOLING; WA 578196, REWIRED STATESLINKS TO NORMAL CONFIG. PS-831-1N0188 REPLACED AND TESTED PERWA S78 146.

CLOSED

AN OPDRV EXISTED WHEN RHR F004A WAS OPENED & F006A MOV REMOVED.IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE F008 & F009 VALVES OPEN. THE CONDITIONWAS RECOGNIZED BY OPS IN A TIMELY MANNER & THE F004A&C VAI.VESWERE IMMEDIATELY CLOSED. UNIT COORDINATION REVIEWED THE EVENT

AND AD"QA-326 REQUIREMENTS.CLOSED

RHR HEAT EXCHANGER GASKFT LEAKED DURING TP-149-034'YDROOF RHR DIV I. WA 573533 RETORQUED THE FLANGE STUDS AND

SUBSEQUENT HYDRO TESTED SAT.CLOSED

'A'HR PUMP BREAKER FAILED TO TRIP DURING SE-149-001.A DETERMINATED CABLE WAS FOUND ON VALVE 151F006A. CAUSEDBY OVERSIGHT OF THE WORK GROUP. INVOLVED PERSONNELREVIEWED AD-QA-500 & 502 AND MT-GM-050

CLPSED

INADVERTANT S/ART OF RHR PUMP 1A DURING SE-151-001WHEN'- JUMPER= INSTALLED PER THE TEST "POPPED" OFF AND APPARENTLYSTRUC TERMINATION CCC3-15, STARTING THE PUMP. INVOLVEDPERgO NEL>REVIEWED THE EVENT.

4 CL'0 ED'f 1

AUX BUS POWER SWITCHING RESULTED IN 1/2 SCRAM & ESF ACTUATIONVfHEtt''HE RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED.A ITttA CFER iOF THE 18250/18260 480 VAC LOAD CENTER WILL CAUSEPLOSU E OF HV-151-1F008 WHEN RPS BUS "8" IS POWERED FROM

ALT RNATE SUPPLY, PCAF'S 2-87"0318 & 1-87-1171 INITIATED TOADD THIS PRECAUTION.C)OSED'X

RECIRC VLVS HV- 143F031A & 32A DID NOT CLOSE UPON RHR DIV IMANUAL INITIATION DURING PERFORMANCE OF SE-149-001. THISPROBLEM CAUSED FAILURE OF ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA. APPARENT CAUSEWAS'UMPERS WERE INSALLED ON INCORRECT TERMINALS. A RETEST

WAS PERFORMED SAT. TESTING GROUP REVIEWED THE EVENT.CLOSED

RHR PUMP 8 SUCTION GAUGE PI-E11-1R002 FOUND OUT OF TOLERANCEDURING WA 586017 AND WAS RECALIBRATED. THIS INSTRUMENT IS USEDFOR PERFORMANCE OF 50-149"002, OPS STATES ALL ACCEPTANCECRITERIA WAS COMPLETED SAT ON 1/16/88.

CLOSED

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SOOR SUMMARY REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/ 1

SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE d BOOR TT

P M I S

PAGE 7

SYS BOOR TT

OCCURDATE DESCRIPTION

49A 88- 139

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 83A

49 88- 167

49 88-171

OTHER AFFECTED SYST

49 89 007

49 89-010

49 89-020

49 89-046

49 89-098

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 89-111

OTHER AFFECTED'YST 12E

49 89 114

49 89 134

49 89- 129

49 89- 135

5/04/88

6/01/88

6/02/88

1/07/89

1/07/89

1/13/89

2/ 10/89

3/31/89

4/06/89

4/09/89

4/12/89

4/ 1 6/89

4/21/89

POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE CONDITION RE: SNUBBER FAILURE RATEDURING FUNCTIONAL TESTING..LICENSING EVALUATION DETERMINED THATTHE CONDITION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF PART 21 OR PART 50

CLOSED

RHR LOOP 'A'LOW FT-Ell- 1NOTBA FOUND OUT OF TOL DURING PM 81073THIS INSTRUMENT IS USED DURING S0-024-007 AND SO- 149-002.SO-149-002 WAS COMPLETED SAT ON 7/15/88. TECH EVALUATIONDETERMINED THERE WAS NO EFFECT ON SE- 124" 107 .

'LOSED

RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED DURING SYS INITATIONPRESSURE TRANSIENTS AT PS-831-1NO IBA IS h SUSPECTED CAUSE

,REF PMR 89 9059 d 60. ESF INSTTTTTREF MASTER BOOR 1-89-007, PLAS 323.

CLOSED

RHR FOOB VALVE ISOLATED DURING SHUTDOWN COOLING, C PUMP TRIPPEOOPS WALKED DOWN THE SYS WITH NO APPARENT DAMAGE FOUND. ENS.OP-149-002 REVISED TO INCORPORATE LESSONS LEARNED IN REVIEW OFFILL AND VENT PROCEDURES. PMR 89 9059 INSTALLED: ESF.

CLOSED

INDICATION FOR RHR CHECK VALVE F0508 FAILED DURING S0-149-014.EQUALIZING VALVE F1228 DID NOT. OPEN. '8'OOP OF RHR WASDECLARED INOP. WA S90048 REBUILT THE VALVE AIR CYLINDER. WhS90050 REPLACED L IMIT SWI TCH ARLl

CLOSED

RX LEAKAGE HIGH PRESSURE MONITOR FAILED SI-149-210 CRITERIAWA S96106 REPLACED AN BROKEN TERMINAL SCREW IN PSH-E11-1N022A.CANCELLED

RHR PERMISSIVE PS-831- 1N0188 FAILED TESTING PER SI- 149-204.INVESTIGATION FOUND THAT THE SWITCH DIAPHRAM HAD FAILED AND WASREPLACED PER WA 596278.CLOSED

WHILE PLACING RHR IN SHUTDOWN COOLING THE 1F007A VALVEOPENED'IN

FLOW VALVE TO THE SUPPRESSION POOl,, WHICH CAUSED RX LEVELTT7 DROP 5 INCHES.REF MASTER SOOR I-89-007. INSTllll

CLOS/0

PRESSIOM POOL SPRAY SPARGERS WERE PRESSURIZED BREIFLYLOWING"VALVE MAM1PULATIONS FOR LLRT.

CONDITION 'WAS A'f4EAR MISS IN THAT WORKER WERE PREVIOUSLY INAREAI">"I

LO)EDl

RHR INBOARD SAMPLE VALVE Ell-F079A ~ FAILED CLOSEDh> BLOWN FUSE 1TAS'OUND IN 1C622, FUSE. 821-F 19. ESF . ENS.FATIGUE -Of'-')lll g}lPE"IS THE APPARENT CAUSE.

RHR ~ HV151F0158 WAS FOUND OUT. OF POSITION DURING LLRT, SE-159-032OPS. WAS 'SIC/ED Of|; IN ~ ITS DESIGNATED POSITION.CL)SEb;I I I"l~ 0' ~

PSV 151-F097 DEVELOPED A LEAK DURING RHR HYDRO, SE-149-311.INVESTIGATION FOIIMD' GAG ON PSV 1151-F0558. REF NCR 89-0224WHICH ADDRESSES TH% POTENTIAL FOR OVER PRESSURIZATION OFHB8-120.

CLOSED

PRESSURE BOUNDRY VALVE WAS STROKED DURING RHR '8'YDRO TEST,SE-149 311. HV151F1048 WAS STROKED BY OPS FOR POST MOD TESTING.THE DETERMINED CAUSE WAS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH STATUS CONTROL OF

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P M I 5

~

~

PAGE 8

SYS SOOR NOCCUR

DATE DESCRIPTION

49 89-151

49 89-157

49 89-170

49A 89-183

49 89-182

49 89-188

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 89- 195

49 89-261

49 1-89-362

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-90-021

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-90-075

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

4/28/89

4/29/89

6/09/89

5/14/89

6/16/89

5/ 15/89

5/21/89

7/21/89

12/04/89

2/02/90

3/08/90

THE AFFECTED RHR HYDRO VALVES. AD-QA-480 WAS REVISEDCLOSED

RHR HV161F0158 MOTOR TERMINATION IS NOT ENVIRONMENTALY QUALIFIEDREF NCR 89-0293 FOR CORRECTIVE MEASURES. THE CONDITION WASDETERMINED TO NOT BE REPORTABLE.CLOSED

LEAD SHIELDING ON THE RHR 508 VALVE WAS NOT REMOVED AS REQUIREDPRIOR TO REFILLING THE SYSTEM FOR SE-149-202. EWR ME-9095 WASISSUED TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT ON THE PIPING.A PIPING SHEILDING DATA SHEET HAS BEEN DEVELOPED BY MAINT P&S.

EWR M90529 DETERMINED THAT NO OVERLOADING OF THE PIPING ORSUPPORTS OCCURRED. AD-QA-546 REV 2 PROVIDES CONTROL OF LEADLEAD SHEILDING.CLOSED

INDICATION ON 1C692 WAS REVERSED FOR XV-15109A 6 8CONDITION WAS NOTED DURING SI-199-211 ON 4-28-89.WA 596728 CORRECTED THE WIRING.CLOSED

'O'HR PUMP PI,-E11-1R002C WAS FOUND INDICATION A VACUUMWITH THE PUMP OUT OF SERVICE. WA 596789 REGAL'ED THE INSTRUMENT.THE AS FOUND CONDITION WAS IN THE CONSERVATIVE DIRECTION, NOTAFFECTING SURV REQUIREMNETS.

CLOSED

RHR HV-151-F0248 DID NOT CLOSE ON LPCI MANUAL INITIATIONDURING SE-149-002, DUE TO CONTACTS ON THE K688 RELAY NOT MAKINGUP. WA'S 590741, 590470, 6 593981 ISSUED TO MAKE REPAIRS.CLOSED

INCORRECT DIVISION DESIGNATED ON ERF 90754 FOR WA 593938THE PLANNER AND SCHEDULER WERE COUNSELED AND REVIEWED THE SOOR.UNIT COORDINATION AND OUTAGE MANAGEMENT STAFF ALSO REVIEWED THESOOR RE: REVIEW OF ERF'S.

CLOSED

JUMPER SHORTED ACROSS A TERMINAL ON RELAY K89 DURING SE- 159-200RESULTED IN AN ESF ACTUATION WHEN POWER WAS LOST TO THE K29RELAY CAUSING THE RHR 1F009 VALVE TO ISOLATE AND THE 'A'UMP TOTRIP. BANANA JACKS WERE INSTALLED ON TERMINATIONS USED IN

SE-159-200.CLOSED

CONDUCTIVITY RECORDER CR 12351 FOR RHR HAD A MISSING COMPONENT.THE CONDITION WAS FOUND DURING ROUTINE MAINT. THE COMPONENTSWERE INSTALLED AND THE INSTRUMENT WAS TESTED SAT. A REVIEW BYCHEM REVEALED THAT NO TECH SPEC LIMITS WERE EXCEEDED.

CLSOED

RHR MANUAL INJECTION VALVE 151-F060A HAD DUAL INDICATION.WA ISSUED TO REPAIR.CLOSED

RHR SUCTION RELIEF VALVES LIFTED WHILE ALIGNING FOR SHUTDOWNCOOLING PER OP-149-002. THE RESULTING SPILL CONTAMINATED THE'A'HR ROOM. A TP IS BEING DEVELOPED TO MONITOR SYS PARAMETERSDURING FILL AND VENT OPERATIONS TO ID WHEN THE LIFT OCCURS.

REF PMR 90-9081 AND 90-9082 WHICH WILL REPLACE TYPE OF PSV.REF MASTER SOOR 1-90-259.CLOSED

'A'HR SYSTEM FLOW FT-E11- 1N015A WAS FOUND OUT OF TOLERANCEDURING A CAL CHECK AND WAS REGAL'ED WITHIN FINAL TOLERANCE.CLOSED

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SYS SOOR N

49 1-90 152

OTHER AFFECTED SYS1

49 1-90-259

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-90-267

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-90-269

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-90-279

OTHER AFFECTED SYSQ49 1-90-31 1

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-90 324

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-90-341

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-90-366

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 54

49 1-90-245

OCCURDATE

6/07/90

9/06/90

9/13/90

9/16/90

9/17/90

9/21/90

10/14/90

10/21/90

10/31/90

11/09/90

DESCRIPTION

UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN DUE TO POTENTIAL FAILURE OF RHR MOTOR COOLERS.THIS SOOR WILL DOCUMENT THE U-1 SHUTDOWN, ACTION ITEMS ANDSHUTDOWN REPORT. THE DIRECT CAUSE OF THE RHR PUMP MOTOR COOLINGPROBLEM AND LER SUBMITTAL WILL PER PERSUED VIA SOOR 2-90-076

WHICH IDENTIFIES A COOLER FAILURE ON UNIT 2.REF SHUTDOWN REPORT 1-90 02, PLIS 36009.CLOSED

HANGER HBB- 1104-H15 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A LOOSE BOLT DURING ISIOF THE RHR SYSTEM. THE HANGER IS ON THE SUCTION PIPING FOR THE'D'HR PUMP. WA S04927 MADE CORRECTIONS.REF NCR 90-0194

CLOSED

'O'HR PUMP SUCTION RELIEF VALVE, PSV- 151-F030C. LIFTEDAND REMAINED OPEN WHILE PLACING THE 'A'OOP OF RHR INTOSHUTDOWN COOLING. UNIT 2 COMPLETE.RHR PSV 151F030A,B,C6D REPLACED PER WA 513428 6 513429.

CLOSED

SNUBBER SPGBB 114H2001 REMOVAL WAS SCOPED IN INCORRECT DIVISION.THE SNUBBER WAS ACTUALLY IN DIV Ii RATHER THAN DIV I ASINDICATED ON .ERF A93209. WA.Y90358 WAS CORRECTED. REMAINING WORKDOCUMENTS WERE REVIEWED. EACH SNUBBER CLASSIF,ICATION WILL BE

REVIEWED.CLOSED

SNUBBER GBB-107-H1A MOTION INHIBITED BY AN INSULATION BLANKET.REF NCR 90-0213 WHICH WILL TRACK CORRECTIVE MEASURES.CLOSED

DIV 2 SNUBBER REMOVED FOR TESTING WHEN DIV WAS REQUIRED=.OPERABLESEIS DATA WAS FOUND TO BE INCORRECT. THE SNUBBER WAS REPLACEDWITH AN ACCEPTABLE SPARE. SNUBBER CLASSIFICATIONS WILL BEREVIEWED AND VALIDATED.

MAINT COMPLETED h REVIEW OF SNUBBER DATA IN SEIS FOR ACCURACY.CLOSED

RHR FLOW VERIFICATION FAILEO '50-149-002 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.DETERMINED CAUSE WAS THE INSTRUMENT SENSING LINE HAD NOT BEENBACKFILLED FOLLOWING OUTAGE WORK. WA 507687 CORRECTED. OPS TOREVISE PROCEDURES WHICH CONTAIN FILL AND VENT SECTIONS TO

NOTIFY 16C TO FILL INSTRUMENT SENSING LINES.CLOSED

'A'HR PUMP SUCTION RELIEF PSV-151-F030A LIFTED.WA 505278 DISASSEMBLED THE VALVE AND PERFORMED INSPECTION.NO COMPONENT DEFICIENCIES WERE NOTED. THEREFORE'HE LIFTINGOF THE PSV IS ATTRIBUTED TO OVER PRESSURIZATION OF THE SYSTEMS

CLOSED

'8'OOP OF RHR KEEPFILL VALVE 151-'F0928 WAS FOUND CLOSEDVS: OPEN. INVESTIGATION COULD NOT DETERMINE HOW THE VALVEBECAME CLOSED. OPS PERSONNEL WILL HOLD DISCUSSIONS ON THEIMPORTANCE OF THE EVENT DURING HOT BOX TRAINING 90-66.

CLOSEDI

PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED IN STROKE TESTING RHR FOSOA/8 CHECKVALVE, DUAL INDICATION WAS OBSERVED WHEN STROKE WAS ATTEMPTED.DETERMINED CAUSE WAS AIR TRAPPED UNDER THE CHECK VALVE DISC-CLOSED

3

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SYS BOOR N

49 1-90-372

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-91 087

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-91-090

OTHER AFFECTED SY~49 1 91-091

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1 91 148

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-91-170

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-91- 188

OCCURDATE

1 1/13/90

4/16/91

4/17/91

4/18/91

6/17/91

7/12/91

8/01/91

DESCRIPTION

ERF WAS NOT ISSUED TO PERFORM WORK ON 'A'HR HV-151-F003ACAUSE WAS THE ASSIST FOREMAN NOT KNOWING THE VALVE WAS A 'STROKETIME'ALVE. OPS WAS NOTIFIED OF THE CONDITION AND SO 149-005WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY THE STROKE TIME WAS ACCEPTABLE.

MNT TRAINED PERSONNEL RE AD-QA-423 REQUIREMENTS ANDUPDATED SEIS TO REFLECT- FUNCTIONAL TESTING AND TECH SPEC REQ'MNTCLOSED

RHR FS"E11 1N0218 CONTACTS HAD HIGH RESISTANCE VALUE WHEN TESTEDDURING SURV. THE CONTACTS WERE REPLACED VIA WA P04886 ANDREGAL'ED. REF BOOR 1-91-090CLOSED

RHR FS-E11-1N021A SWITCH CONTACTS HAO HI RESISTANCE DURING CALiTHE SWITCH CONTACTS WERE REPLACED AND CAL'ED PER PM P04885.REF BOOR 1-91-087

,CLOSED

'A'HR LOOPFAILED ITS QUARTERLY FLOW CRITERIA PER S0-149-002DUE TO PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE NOT CLOSING. THE VALVE WASMANUALLY CLOSED AND A RETEST WAS SAT.CLOSED

ALARM 74 RELAY FAILED FOR RHR HV-151-F049 RESULTING IN ALARM,BURNED OUT RELAY COIL REPLACED.CLOSED

'O'HR PUMP MOTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTION FOUND DISCONNECTED.DETERMINED CAUSE WAS PERSONNEL ERROR IN NOT PROPERLY TIGHTENINGA STATES LINK IN 1A20402. REF., WA 510696.CLOSED

RX PRESSURE DROPPED BELOW RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING PERMISSIVEWITHOUT ONE LOOP IN OPERATION. THE UNIT WAS BROUGHT TO A STABLEDEPRESSURIZED CONDITION UNTIL RWCU COULD BE

RESTORED'EF

PLAS 502. TSAT WAS INCORP'ED INTO SO- 100/200-011 REV 7.THE USE OF TSAT WAS APPROVED WITH NRC CLOSURE OF 387/89-01-02 ININSPECTION REPORT 387/91-18.CLOSED

2

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1 91 206 8/15/91

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

~ 4 AP lg jl4fl I idvvA1 ty tggr rl ).8/ 1

RHR 'A'OOP PRESSURIZED GREATER THAN KEEPFILL PRESSUREON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. LEAKAGE INTO RHR IS LESS THAN 1 GPM.MONITORING OF THE PRESSURIZATION RATE HAS BEEN EXTABLISHED VIA.. - PCAF TO. OP.-149-001 AND THE LOGGING IN THE PCO LOG BOOK ~

PENETRATION 'TESTING DURING.6RIO DETERMINED NO SYS„DEGREDATIONEXISTS.--CLOSED

49 1-91-291

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-92-088

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-92 099

1 1/08/91

3/07/92

3/ 16/92

HV-151-F0288 WOULD NOT STROKE ELECTRICALLY FROM CONTROL ROOMDETERMINED CAUSE WAS LACK OF LUBRICATION ON THE VALVE STEMWHICH WAS CORRECTED. FURTHER TESTING PERFORMED PER WA S00598.CLOSED

RHR PSV- 151-F030A LIFTED WHEN S/D COOLING HV- 151-,F008 OPENED.SYS ENG CONCLUDED THAT LONERGAN RELIEF VALVES'ARE UNRELIABLEAND HAS ISSUED RIE 90-272 TO REPLACE THEM WITH ANDERSON-GREENWOOD VALVES PER WA 513428 AND 513429.

REF SOOR 1-90-259 WHICH WILL TRACK VALVE REPLACEMENT.CLOSED

SPILL, 80 SQ.FT, OCCURRED IN.RHR ROOM DURING RHR DRAIN PROCESS.BEF ACR 92-016. DE'1ERMINED CAUSE WAS LACK OF ATTENTION TO DETAIL

2

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P M I S

SYS SOOR NOCCUR

DATE DESCRIPTION

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1 92-107

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 61.

49 1-92" 134

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-92-139

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-92- 148

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-92- 165

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-92-268

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1-92-302

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 1 92 311

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49A 1-92-336

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

3/20/92

4/03/92

4/03/92

4/ 10/92

4/23/92

7/21/92

8/24/92

9/ 1 2/9'2

10/13/92

AND A NON QUESTIONING ATTITUDE. INVOLVED OPS PERSONNEL WERECOUNSELED ON THE EVENT.

CLOSED

BKR 18216114, 18226062 8 18216053 ARE NOT EQ ~ REF NCR 92-049.ERF'S AND WA WRITTEN. THE BREAKERS WERE REPLACED. EQAR-023 ANDEQDF-48 IS BEING REVISE TO SPECIFY THE REQUIRED SUPPLIER OFWESTINGHOUSE MOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKERS.

CLOSED

RHR F009 CLOSED ON SPURIOUS SIGNAL WHILE FILLING SYSTEM.THE. ACTUATING PRESSURE SWITCHES WERE ISOLATED AND THE VALVERECLOSED. DETERMINED CAUSE WAS THE PROCEDURE STEPS WEREPERFORMED OUT OF SEQUENCE NOT STEP BY STEPS TRAINING WAS

CONDUCTED RE: REQ OF NDAP-QA-400, PCAF'S ISSUED TO ASSOCIATEDSE'S ADDING A CAUTION STATEMENT.CLOSED

PERMIT 1-92-2004 DIDN'7 PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR WA 513999-THE WORK SHOULD HAVE BEEN SIGNED ON PERMIT 1 92-2882.DETERMINED CAUSE WAS LACK OF ATTENTION TO DETAIL..ALL E*SPERSONNEL WILL REVIEW THE EVENT. ~

MAINT REVIEWED THIS EVENT WITH E65 PERSONNEL.CLOSED

RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION RELEIF VLV PSV-151-F029 LIFTEDWHEN KEEPF ILL WAS OPENED TO THE RHR SYSTEM FOR FILLING.WA 523703 INVESTIGATED AND DETERMINED THE PSV AS FOUND LIFTPRESSURE TO BE LOWER THAN REQUIRED SETPOINT.

CLOSED

RX COOLANT SAMPLES WERE NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF ACTUAL COOLANTAS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC'5 DURING THE PERIOD OF 4/20 THRU 4/23.THE SAMPLE WAS TAKEN FROM STAGNENT WATER IN THE HEAT EXCHANGERDUE TO BYPASS BEING OPEN.

CHEM REVISEO SC-176/276-101 AND 106 TO ENSURE RHR HXIN SERVICE PRIOR TO OBTAINING SAMPLE.CLOSED

RHR PUMP PI-E11-1R002C FOUND OUT'F TOLERANCE.THE INDICATOR WAS CALIBRATED AND FINAL DATA WAS WITHIN FINALTOLERANCE.CLOSED

USER CONTROLLED PROCEDURE ISSUED WITH A NON-EFFECTIVE PCAF,50-149-005 WITH PCAF 1-92-0237 WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLYDELETED BY PCAF 1-92-0254. DETERMINED CAUSE WAS PERSONNELERROR BY THE CLERK ISSUING THE PROCEDURE. HAND WRITTEN NOTE WAS

USED INSTEAD OF A COMPUTER. GENERATED TRANSMITTAL. THE PROCEDUREMASTER FILE HAS BEEN INCLUDED INTO SPMS AS A DISTRIBUTIONLOCATION. INVOLVED PERSONNEL WERE INSTRUCTEO ON PROPER PROCESS.CLOSED

PSH-Et 1-1N018 FOUND ISOLATED DURING PERFORMANCE OF SI-149-209.INVESTIGATION BY A STATUS CONTROL TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ACAUSE.CLOSED

RHR SYS LEAKAGE PSH-Ett-1N0228 HOUSING SEAL FOUND DAMAGEDDURING SI"149-210. CAL CHECK WAS SAT.WA 527483 ISSUED TO REPLACE THE SWITCH,CLOSED

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PAGE 12

SYS SOOR NOCCUR

DATE DESCRIPTION

49 93-338

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 51

49 93-341

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 93-377

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 94-034

OTHER AFFECTED SYQ,:

49 6, 94 035

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 94-059

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 94-180

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 80

49 94-580

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

10/17/93

10/25/93

1 1/13/93

1/1 1/94

1/1 1/94

1/18/94

3/16/94

11/29/94

CHAIN HOIST WAS FOUND HANGING FROM A CONDUIT UNISTRUT SUPPORTIN THE 705'QUIPMENT SPACE. INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THEHOIST WAS PLACE THERE BY CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL. THE CONTRACTORSUPERVISOR WAS GIVEN A=- DETAILED REVIEW OF STATION RIGGING

PRACTICES. A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE SUPPORT BY ISI PERSONNELDID NOT REVEAL ANY DAMAGE. EWR M30719 DOCUMENTS THE EVALUATION.CLOSED

RHR SDC SAMPLE VLV FOBOA AUTO CLOSED DURING MT-159-004.COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE TEST DIRECTOR AND THE UNIT SUPVFAILED TO INITIATE ACTION TO CLOSE THE VALVE PRIOR TO TESTCOMMENCEMENT. DETERMINED CAUSE WAS LESS THAN ADEQUATE

COMMUNICATION. MT-159-004 WAS REVISED.CLOSED

RHR DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE, 1F031A ~ DID NOT SEATWHICH PREVENTED THE 'A'OOP OF RHR FROM MAINTAININGADEQUATEKEEP-FILL PRESSURE. INVESTIGATION FOUND THAT THE VALVE DISKHAN AN INTERFERENCE WITH A 'CASTING BUMP'N THE VALVE BODY.

DCP 93-3093A '6 8 AND 93-3092A 5 8 ARE PLANNED. REF EWR M30762AND DCN 93-1658 RE: ADDITION OF A SPACER ON THE DISK SHAFT.CLOSED

RHR SD COOLING SUCTION LINE INOP DUE TO F008 VLV PACKING LEAK.THE PACKING ON HV-151-F008 WAS RETORQUEO.

.CLOSED

RHR HV-151-F0248 WOULD NOT FULLY CLOSE DURING TP" 149-054.THE VALVE WAS REBUILT AND TESTED PRIOR TO STARTUP-SEVERE WEAR OF THE ANT.I-ROTATION GUIDE RIB IS THE PROBABLE CAUSE

'AINT TECHNOLOGY WILL PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOWING A REVIEWREF MEMO VLV-622.RE: LOAD SENSITIVE BEHAVIOR OF MOV'S.CI.OSED

HV 151F017A MODIFIED VIA DCP 93-9068A ACTUATOR SWITCHES NOT SETUP AFTER THE MOD WAS PERFORMED. WHEN VOTES TESTED THE VALVEMOTORED ONTO THE BACKSEAT. DETERMINED CAUSE WAS OMMISION OFA PROCEDURE STEP BY THE WORK CREW. THE FOREMAN AND WORK CREW

WERE COUNSELED ON THE EVENT. NON ROUTINE TRAINING IS PLANNED.MAINT/EAS ELECTRICIANS WHO ARE MOV QUALIFIEDREVIEWED THE EVENT.CLOSED

'8'OOP OF LPCI INOP, PIS-821-1N021D OUT OF TOLERANCE.CONDITION FOUND DURING SI-180-301. THE SWITCH WAS CALIBRATEDTO WITHIN TOLERANCE PER THE SURV AND THE LCO WAS CLEARED.CLOSED

'8'HR PP SUCTION VLV THERMAL OVERLOAD JUMPER LOOSE. 18226013.THE F0048 VALVE WAS CLOSED'HE JUMPER CORRECTED'ND THE VALVEWAS RE-OPENED.CLOSED

TOTAL: 119

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SYS SOOR NOCCUR

DATE DESCRIPTION

49 2-84-039

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 54

49 2-84 040

49 2-84-075

49 2-84-097

49 2 84-098

3/28/84

3/28/84

5/04/84

6/21/84

5/21/84

ESW VLV NOT FULLY OPEN; CAUSING HI BEARING TEMP ON RHR PUMP A.THROTTLE VLV TO 'A'OTOR COOLER WAS IN INTERMEDIATE POSITION,OP-54 001-5 INDICATED VLV LOCKED OPEN. GULF OIL ANALYSIS STATESLOWER BEARING OIL IS SAT ~ UPPER BEARING OIL HAS HIGH VISCOSITY.

CLOSED

RHR 'A 6 O'ECLARED INOP. SURV. DETERMINATED TO BE INCORRECT.SRI TEST RESULTS CONTRIDICTED THE SURVEILLENCE DATA. ALSO, AIRWAS DISCOVERED IN BOTH INSTRUMENT LOOPS. WA-V46538 RECALIBRATEDTHE FLOW INDICATORS FOR BOTH LOOPS.

CLOSED

RHR O.O.S. FOR MORE THAN 2 HOURS'OTH LOOPS.'8'AS REMOVED FOR A PIPING VIBRATION TEST. IBC WAS PERFORMINGA SURVEILLANCE ON F008 6 F009 AND CHEh1 WAS PERFORMING A LOOP

'A'LUSH.

CLOSED

PRI CONT ISO 6 CK VALVES DUAL INDICATION WHEN CLOSURE ATTEMPTED.SV251228 (TESTABLE CHECK VALVE F 1228)SV251508 (TESTABLE CHECK VALVE F0508 ACTUATOR)REF1 SOOR'S 2 84 098» 101'07 8 114-

++CLOSED*+

'8'PCI INJECTION VLV CLOSED TO COMPLY WITH T.S. 3.5. 1.83.

49 2-84- 101

49 2 84 107

49 2-84- 1 14

49 2-84-216

OTHER AFFECTEOQYS: 83

49 2-84-251

49 2-84-283

49 2-84-313

5/21/84

5/24/84

5/28/84

8/09/84

9/19/84

10/16/84

11/03/84

REF 1 SOOR 2-84-097<iCLOSEDi+

2F0158 INJECTION VALVE LEAKING, DUAL INDICATION DISPLAYED.THE VALVE WAS DISASSEMBLED, REPAIREO AND RETURNED TO SERVICE.

REF: BOOR 2-84-097CLOSED

LEAKAGE h(EASUREMENT OF RHR LOOP '8'SO VLVS EXCEEDED LIMITS.RHR VALVE HV-2F0158 WAS DISASSEMBLED AND REBUILT.LLRT AND A HYDRO WERE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE.REF: SOOR 2 84 097.

CLOSED

RX SHUTDOWN TO COMPLY WITH'.S. FOR LPCI LOOP '8'NOP.THE N 1 TBV HUNG OPEN. WHEN THE VALVE WAS DISASSEMBLED ACHIPPING HAMMER WAS FOUND IN THE VALVE.REF1 SOOR'S 2-84--097 8 107.

NQA REVIEW REQ. DELETED PER OPS - 5 R.B.~ CLOSED

SURV SI-249-203 WAS COMPLETED ONE DAY PAST VIOLATION DATE.PERSONNEL ERROR WAS CAUSE ~ 16C HAS CHANGED ROUTING OF COMPLETEDSURVEILLANCES TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.

CLOSED

RHR "D" PUMP FAILED TO START ON MANUAL ACTUATION,DUE TO 52LS CONTACTS N~FUHCTIONING PROPERLY.WA V41160 REPLACED RELAY AND RESTORED SYSTEM.

CLOSED

'A'HR LOOP DECLARED INOP WHEN ISI CRITERIA FAILEO.INSTRUMENTS HAVE GREATER CAL TOLERANCE ~THEN ISI CRITERIA SURV.PROCEDURE AD-QA-423 WAS REVISED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.

CLOSED

SNUBBER DCA-210-H11 ON '8'OOP OF RHR IS SUSPECT,PER RESULTS OF ST 17.7 PER TER 90. WA V43859 REPLACED SNUBBER.NCR 85-0130 VERIFIED PROPER OPERATION PER WA V63915 DURINGFIRST REFUELING OUTAGE.

CLOSED

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DATE DESCRIPTION

49 2 84-334

49 2-85-032

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

12/10/84

1/29/85

IMPROPER FUSE POSITION LABELING IN TB 0631 PANEL.WA-V41612 ISSUED FOR FUSE LABELING.AD-QA-324'/BE ISSUED T/PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR PLT LABELING PROG.BOOR 2-84-31 1 IS SIMILAR.

CLOSED

, RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION ISOLATION VLV 2F008 DID NOT ISOLATE(OUTBOARD). INBOARD VALVE 2F009 ISOLATED AT 74 PSIG RX PRESSURE.PS-831-N018A (BARTON 288A) WAS RE"CAL'D PER WA-V50092 d V56224 ~

RFM'S WRITTEN 1/30/86. THE ISOLATION WAS AN ESF ACTUATION.PMR 86-7026 ALSO PROVIDES CORRECTIVE MEASURES FOR BOOR 1-84-483.CLOSED

49 . 2-85-061 3/13/85 RHR ROOM COOLER VLV 211-127A WAS PERMIT TAGGED OPEN VICE CLOSEDTHIS VLV HAS LEFTHAND THREADS WHICH CONTRIBUTED .TO THE ERRORSEWR PE-1622 WRITTEN TO ID ALL VLVS. OF THIS TYPE. OPS LABELEDTHOSE VALVES WHICH WERE READILY KNOWN TO BE REVERSE ACTING.

TECH COMPLETED A REVIEW OF PLANT VALVES TO ID ANY REMAININGONES REQUIRING LABELS. PMR 87-9048 ISSUED BY NPE 1/26/88.LABELING COMPLETED PER LRF 87- 177-239 d 88-277-017.WA V83845 RELOCATED HANDWHEEL 180 DEG. / CLOSED

49 2-85-121

49 2-85- 123

49 2-85;287

49H 2-86-023

49 2-86-079

49 2-86-092

49 2-86-1 13

49 2-86-120

49. 2 86- 129

4/27/86

4/27/85

12/20/85

1/31/86

6/ 18/86

6/ 18/86

8/06/86

8/17/86

8/24/86

WATER HAMMER OCCURRED'LACING RHR '8'OOP IN SHUTDOWN COOLINGAPPARENT CAUSE WAS PIPING BEING FILLED WHEN BYPASS VLV. WASOPENED.REF. MASTER SOOR 2-85-123.

CLOSED.

SHUTDOWN COOLING VLVS ISOLATED AFTER RHR 'O'UMP WAS STARTED.APPARENT CAUSE WAS STEAM POC'KETS IN PIPING WHICH COLLAPSED ANDCAUSES EXCESSIVE FLOW SIGNAL. MASTER BOOR FOR 2-85 121.EVENT HAS NOT RE-OCCURRED AS OF 10/6/86. REF EWR IREIR 101171

THE ISOLATION CONSTITUTED AN ESF ACTUATION.CLOSED

RHR, SHUTDOWN COOLING PRESSURE PERMISSIVES FOUND OUT OF TOL.DURING SI-249-304. ~ P IS-831-2N018A ~ PS-831-2ND(88, DUE TOSETPOINT DRIFT AND WERE RE-CAL'ED PER SA A54425.

CLOSED

RHR/DRYWELL SPRAY FT-251208 WAS FOUND OUT OF TOL.DURING PM WA P60122 .AND WAS RE CAL'ED'ER IC-DC-100, REV. 5.OPS REVIEW HAS,DETERMINED THAT SURV. RESULTS WERE NOT AFFECTEDSINCE THIS INSTRUMENT IS NOT USED IN ANY "SO'5".

CLOSED

CONSEQUENCES OF ERF'S INOP'ED 8 CS, 8 LPCI d SGTS.REF. ERF A51508, A53440, A53968 d A54445.THE REQUIRED ECCS SYSTEM EQUIPMENT WAS RESTORED TO OPERABLESTATUS d LCO'S WERE CLEARED. PNSS/OPS/IdC ADDRESSED. WA V66623

ERF PREP FAILED TO NOTE RHR ISOLATION SWITCH.CLOSED

RHR INITIATION PERMISSIVE PS-831-2N0188 FOUND OUT OF TOL.DURING SI-249"304, WHICH WAS THEN RE-CAL'ED ~

CALIBRATION DRIFT WAS THE DETERMINED CAUSE.CLOSED

'8'OOP OF RHR INOP DUE TO FAILURE OF ISI TESTING.VENDOR WELD NGBB-204-4-2-C IS SUSPECT. NCR 86-0424DETERMINED CAUSE TO BE MANUFACTURING DISCONTINUITIES, WA V64274CORRECTED NRPDS COMPLETE.

CLOSED

SPILL OF APPROX 30 GAL. OF WATER DURING LLRT OF RHRTHRU DISASSEMBLED HV-251-F017A. NO PERSONNEL WERE CONTAMINATEDOR INJURED. SUPT. MEMO PROVIDES GUIDELINES FOR LLRT DURING THEREMAINDER OF THE U2 FRO. (PLIS 23922)

CLOSED

CONTAMINATED'OIL DRIPPED FROM RHR VLV 558 WHILE BEING MOVED

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SYS BOOR NOCCUR

DATE I'ESCRIPTION

49 2-86-132

49 2-86- 136

49 2-86- 139

49 2-86-147

49 2-86- 153

49 2-86" 169

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 34

49 2-86- 17 1

49 2-86-239

49 2-86- 181

49 2-86-207

8/25/86

9/05/86

9/07/86

9/18/86

9/25/86

10/08/86

10/12/86

10/13/86

10/24/86

1 1/20/86

FROM RX BLDG 683'O THE DECON SHOP. 13 INDIVIDUAL PERSONNELCONTAMINATION REPORTS WERE WRITTEN AS A RESULT.A TRANSFER CART SUITED FOR VAI,VES HAS BEEN FABRICATEO.

CLOSED

SPILL OF APPROX 100 GAL CONTAMINATED WATER DURING WORK ON RHRPUMP DISCHARGE FLOW ORIFICE REPLACEMENT.ONE PERSON WAS CONTAMINATED AND WAS DECONNED ~ AS WAS THE WORKAREA. ORIGIN OF THE WATER COULD NOT BE DETERMINED.

CLOSED

RADIOGRAPHY OF RHR 178 VALVE CAUSED VENDOR TO RECEIVE 170 MRWHOLE BODY EXPOSURE. CAUSED BY A FAULTY CAMERA MECHANISMCOMBINED WITH A NON-FUNCTIONING SURVEY METER, (OWNED BY U.S.TESTiNG). HP-HI-048 ISSUED TO ASSIST IN PREVENTION OF RECURRENCE

CLOSED

RHR 'D'UMP SEAL WATER COOLER SPOOL PIECE MISSINGA REVIEW OF WORK DOCUMENTS COULD NOT DETERMINE HOW SPOOLWAS REMOVED. SYSTEM WAS RESTORED.MAINT SUPERVISORS REVIEWED EVENT, REF PLIS 2495 1.

CLOSED

RHR LPCI PUMP PRESSURE HI ~ PS-E11-2N020A FOUND OUT OF TOLDURING SI-249-303, CAUSED BY SETPOINT, DRIFT, AND WERE RE-CAL'EDREF SA A63204

CLOSED

HPCI STEAM SUPPLY PIPING BECAME PRESSURIZED DURING RHR TESTINGRHR VALVES 2F051A 6 52A WERE VERIFIEO IN THE CLOSED POSITIONBUT ARE SUSPECTED OF LEAKING.REF: PMR 86 7033 6 34

CLOSED

SWITCH GEAR ROOM COOLING INOP CAUSING ALL ECCS TO BE INOP'A' '8'X UNIT OUT OF SERVICE FAN 2V2228 WOULD NOT START.ELEC MAINT INVESTIGATED PER WA V61096 ~ -WHEN DX UNIT WAS RESETA CONTROL ROOM PANEL, THE '8'AN STARTED. SI-251-401 AND

SI 280 403 REVISED TO ALERT SHIFT SUPERVISION OF OX AUTO STARTLOGIC.CLOSED

RHR 2F008 VALVE CLOSED WHEN SWAPPING SHUTDOWN COOLING PUMPS.(MASTER SOOR FOR 1-84-138) A PARTIAL SYS DRAIN DOWN OCCURREDRESULTING IN A WATER HAMMER UPON RESTART. THE ISOLATIONCONSTITUTED AN ESF ACTUATION. OPS PERSONNEL REVIEWED THE EVENT.

CLOSED

RHR HV-251-F015A REWORKED W/0 STROKE TIME TESTING PERFORMED.WA V64549 6 WA V63141. AD-QA-302 REVISED BY OPS. TO USESURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES TO INSURE APPLICABLE VALVES ARE TESTEDFOLLOWING MAINTENANCE. OPS HOT BOX TRAINING 87-07 REVIEWED THE

EVENT. PCAF 1-87-0584 ISSUED TO AD-QA-502 TO PROVIDE CONTROLSFOR REPACKEO VALVES.CLOSED

RHR PIPING HANGER DAMAGED FROM WATERHAMMER WHICH OCCURREDWHILE ATTEMPTING TO SEAT A CHECK VALVE.OPS TO REVIEW EVENT AND CONTACT TECH PRIOR TO ATTEMPTINGA SIMILAR ACTION OF SEATING VALVES. PCAF'S INITIATED FOR

GO-100/200-002. REF NSAG REPORT 1 87. OPERATOR TRAINING ONWATERHAMMER, SC038 HAS BEEN DEVELOPED.CLOSED

'8'HR PMP FAILED TO iSTART WHILE ALIGNING '8'OOP RHRIN SUPP POOL COOLING NIUVI= FDR UPCOMING RCIC RUN. 4KV BKR WAS NOTRACKED COMPLETELY INTO PLACE. WA V61285 INVESTIGATED. THE BKRWAS RACKED OUT THEN BACK IN. '8'HR PUMP THEN STARTED PROPERLY.

SAFTY RELATED 4KV BKR LOADS TO BE TESTED FOLLOWING BKR RACK IN"CLOSED

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49 2-87-036

49 2 87 045

49 2-87-092

49 2-87-107

49 2-87 161

OCCURDATE

3/08/87

DESCRIPTION

12/17/87

RHR FLOW Fi-25105 FAILED TO INDICATE DURING 50-200-001CAUSED BY A LOOSE WIRE ON TERMINAL 14 OF SRU03, WA V76326CORRECTED.

CLOSED

3/23/87 '8'HR PUMP FAILED TO START DURING 50-249"002, (2P20281DUE TO OPEN BREAKER CONTACTS CAUSED BY STICKY OIL RESIDUE ONTHE OPERATING LINKAGE. WA V70163 CORRECTED. MT-GE-006 REVISEDTO ELIMINATE LUBRICANTS.

CLOSED~ q

6/21/87 RHR F024A WOULtI NOT ELECTRICALLY, OPEN FULLY DURING SUPPRESSIONPOOL COOLING LINEUP DUE TO FAILURE OF THE MOTOR PINION GEAR.WA V70299 REPAIRED.

CLOSED> a~ i. "~ «~p~q eye g~~~~~ „;~ ~ ivi.. ~- ~" ~ a" -.'".':,~ r V .: <~ ..p .=«qp,7/13/87 RHR '8'ULL FLOW TEST VALVE 2F0248 INOPERATIVE

CAUSED BY A LOOSE STEM ANTI-ROTATION DEVICE.WA V73632 CORRECTED.A REVIEW WAS MADE OF NCR'S 82-911 d 82-1071 WHICH HAD ID'DADDITIONAL VALVES TO BE INSPECTED FOR THIS CONDITION d WA'S HAVE

BEEN ISSUED. NPE ISSUED EWR M79457 WHICH LISTS VALVES SUBJECT TOTHIS PROBLEM. PM'S HAVE BEEN GENERATED FOR ALL APPLICABLE VALVESCLOSED

RHR HV2F0288 TRIPPED OVERLOADS ON TWO.ATTEMPTS TO OPENTO PERFORM 50-249-002. WA V70827 INVESTIGATED AND FOUND THE„VALVE MOTOR TO BE INOPERABLE AND REPLACED IT,.

CLOSED-

j~ g 4'~= ~

49 2"88-036

49 2-88-069

49 2-88-079

49 2-88-086

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-88-096

49 2-88-097

49 2~88-098~t

I'/05/883/ 1 9/88

3/29/88

4/08/88

4/19/88

4/19/88

4/19/88

AUTO CLOSURE OF THE RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING VALVE F009 OCCURREDDURING OP-249-002. Idc INVESTIGATION FOUND PDIS-E11-2N019AINOP AND RE-CAL'ED PER WA A80992.

CLOSED

RHR MIN FLOW VALVE F007A CONTROL CIRCUIT DIDN'T OPERATE PROPERLYIN THAT IT OPENED IMMEDIATELY, RATHER THAN AFTER A TIME DELAY.DETERMINED CAUSE WAS FAULTY OPERATION OF RELAY E11-K84A WHICHWAS REPLACED PER WA V80280. THIS IS MASTER BOOR FOR 2-88- 144

WA V80363 INSPECTED RELAY E11-K84A WITH NO DRIFT NOTED.CLOSED

FUSE F 168 WAS FOUND INSTALLED IN 20612 WITH A RED TAG HANGINGON THE FUSE HOLDER. FUSE WAS INSTALLED AND VERFIED ON 3-21-88TO CLOSE PERMIT 2-88-720 WHILE ANOTHER PERMIT, 2-88 738 WASSTILL IN EFFECT WITH IT'S RED TAG HANGING ON THE FUSE HOLDER.

THE EVENT WAS REVIEWED DURING OPS SOA 88-05.CLOSED

WORKERS NOTICED THAT A JUMPER WAS DISCONNECTED IN PANEL 20617.INVESTIGATE FOUND THAT THE JUMPER WAS INSTALLED FOR USE DURINGA LLRT TEST. IT COULD NOT BE DETERMINED IF THE JUMPER HAD BEEN'BUMPED'FF BY THE WORKER OR IF IT WAS OFF PRIOR TO THEIR WORK.

ENG.. SUPPORT USE'S" WILL BE REVISED TO UTILIZE BANANA JACKS.TECH REVIEWED ALL PENS SURV'S AND ISSUED WA'S TO INSTALLBANANA JACKS.CLOSED

'A'HR PUMP DID NOT START AS EXPECTED DURING SE-249-001.DETERMINED CAUSE WAS IMPROPER LIMIT SWITCH SET-UP IN HV26 1F004A.WA V80366 CORRECTED.CLOSED

'A'HR PUMP UNEXPECTED START DURING SE-249-001.THE TEST WAS STOPPED TO ADJUST VALVE LIMIT SWITCH FORHV-251F004A. THIS CAUSED INITIATION LOGIC TO SEAL IN AND WASNOT RESET PRIOR TO RESTARTING THE TEST. ~ C/™

CLOSED

RHR 2F024A VALVE PINION'ECAME DISCONNECTEDFROQ THE MOTOR SHAFTAND MECHANICAL DAMAGE RESULTED. CONDITION WAS FOUND DURING PER-FORMANCE OF SE-249-001. WA V83644 AND V80409 REPAIRED.

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PAGE 17

SYS SOOR NOCCUR

DATE DESCRIPTION

49 2 88 099

49 2-88-102

OTHER AFFECTED SYS1

49 2-88- 107

49 2-88-109

49 2-88-112

49 2-88-125

49 2-88-144

49 2-88-156 ~

49 2-88-201

49 2-88-216

49 2-89-023

49 2-89-031

4/20/88

4/22/88

4/22/88

4/25/88

4/27/88

5/16/88

6/11/88

6/21/88

8/ 1 2/88

9/07/88

2/28/89

3/04/89

CLOSED

'A'HR PUMP INADVERTENT START DURING SE-251-001.APPARENT CAUSE WAS DURING JUMPER INSTALLATION, WHEN TERMINATIONCCC3-7 WAS CONTACTED, ENERGIZING RELAYS E118 AND K2018.A GUIDELINE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR JUMPER INSTALLATION DURING

TP'S AND SE'S.CLOSED

RHR SERVICE WATER '8'OOP RAD MONITOR LOST POWER,CALIBRATION VALUES WERE LOST. CONDITION WAS FOUND AT THE START

-OF SC-216-104. MONITOR IS POWERED BY 2Y219 CIRCUIT 28, ANYINTERUPTION WILL CAUSE THE SETPOINT VALUES TO BE LOST.

RHR WAS NOT IN SERVICE THEREFORE MONITORS WERE NOT REQUIRED.POWER WAS RESTORED AND SETPOINTS WERE ENTERED.CLOSED

INCORRECT WIRE TERMINATION ON RHR LOGIC RELAY K958, SUSPECT PMR87-9092A WHICH HAD BEEN WORKED DURING THE 2RFIO. CWO C804 18CORRECTED THE WIRING ERROR. INVOLVED PERSONNEL REVIEWED THEEVENT.

CLOSED

RHR 'A'ONDUCTIVITY RECORDER WAS DISABLED DUE TO BREAKER OUTAGEFOR CLEANING'X260. OPS REVIEWED THE EVENT WITH PERSONNELDURING AGENDA 88-03.CLOSED

RHR RELAY E11A-K11A CONTACTS 3 6 4 DID NOT CLOSE DURING SURVSE-249-002, (RHR DIV 2 LSFT). INVESTIGATION FOUND THE RELAY WASENERGIZED, HOWEVER CONTACTS 3 8 4 WOULD NOT MAKE-UP. WA V80393CLEANED= AND INSPECTED CONTACTS.

CLOSED

REATOR PRESSURE PS-821-2N018 FOUND OUT OF TOLERANCE DURING SURVSI-249-304 AND WAS RE CALIBRATED PER THE SURVEILLANCE.THE CONDITION WAS CAUSED BY SETPOINT DRIFT. PMR 86 7027 WILLREPLACE THE

SWITCHES'LOSED

RHR MIN FLOW F007A OPENED IMMEDIATELY DURING SHUTDOWN COOLINGINITIATION. WA V80280 REPLACED SUSPECT RELAY E11-K84A. WA V80363WILL TEST. WA V80558 INSTALLED .MONITORING EQUIPMENT PER TECH ENGREF: MASTER SOOR 2-88-069

CLOSED

2D RHR PUMP WAS RUN 4 HOURS WITHOUT ESW COOLING WATER ALIGNED.THE '8'SW PUMP WAS STARTED RATHER THAN THE 'A'R 'O'SREQUIRED BY OP-249-005. RHR UPPER BEARINGS REACHED TEMPS INEXCESS OF 200 F. OPS REVIEWED THE EVENT DURING SOA 88 04.

CLOSED

RHR PIS-831-2N018A SW 111 FOUND OUT OF TOLERANCE DURING SURVSI-249-304 AND WAS RECALIBRATED PER THE SURVEILLANCE.CLOSED

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PMR 87-9092A MAY NOT BE ADEQUATE REVIEWREF NCR 88-0610 WHICH CONCLUDED THAT UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONSDO NOT EXIST. REF PLI 57015 AND 54445.CLOSED

RHR MIN FLOW VALVE F007A OPENED DURING SHUTDOWN COOLING INITIAT-ION.REF SOOR 2-89-037 FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.

CLOSED

TERMINATIONS E203062A-.8 8 WERE NOT PROPERLY LANDED IN 28216022THE CONDITION WAS FOUND DURING INVESTIGATION FOR WA V90105.THE TERMINATIONS WERE INCORRECT AS A RESULT OF PMR 87-30258.THE MOD WAS CANCELLED AND AS A RESULT SCHEME CHECKS WERE NOT

ISSUED. WA V90105 CORRECTED THE CONDITION.

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DATE DESCRIPTION

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2 89 037

49 2-89- 128

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-89-139

49 2-89- 165

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2 89 171

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 83G 76D

49 2 89- 173

OTHER AFFECTED SYS

49 . 2 "89-177

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

. 49 2-89- 186

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 51

49 2-89-197

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-89-207

3/15/89

9/18/89

9/22/89

10/16/89

1 0/2 1/89

10/23/89

10/25/89

10/31/89

11/06/89

1 1/18/89

CLOSED

F007A MIN FLOW VALVE OPENED DURING SHUTDOWN COOLING ALIGNMENT.APPARENT CAUSE IS TS-E11-1N021A OPENING ON INCREASING FLOW ~

PMR 89-9069 d 60 WERE INITIATED.REF MASTER BOOR 1-89-007

CLOSED

PSV251F030D FAILEO TO LIFT AT DESIRED PRESSUREVALVE WAS DISASSEMBLED TO DETERMINE CAUSE OF FAILURE, VLVSTEM FOUND DAMAGED, POSSIBLY DUE TO IMPROPER GAGGING OF PSV.DURING WA F91676 PSV 251F029 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BENT STEM.

REF MASTER SOOR 2-89-197CLOSED

RELIEF VALVE PSV251068 GAGGED INCORRECTLY DURING WA V8427 1

REF LLRT 101, SE 249-311.INADEQUATE WORK CONTROL AND PROCEDURES WAS THE DETERMINED CAUSE.SE-250-310 AND 311 WERE REVISED TO PROVIDE PROPER DIRECTION.

REF MASTER BOOR 2-89-197CLOSED

SMALL CONTAMINATED SPILL DURING RHR LOGIC FUNCTIONAL SE-249-001DUE TO VENT 261 077 BEING OPEN FOR LLRT INVESTIGATION OFLEAKAGE PAST THE 2F016A.DETERMINED CAUSE WAS A LACK OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ALL

PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE TEST. OPS REVIEWED THE EVENT DURINGSOA 90-01.CLOSED

RHR TSH-E11"2N6008 WAS FOUND OUT OF TOLERANCE DURING SURVSI-249-306 AND-WAS RECAL'ED PER-THE SURVEILLANCE.CLOSED

'8'ND 'D'HR SUCTION RELIEF VALVES WERE FOUND LIFTEDFOLLOWING INITIATION OF SHUTDOWN COOLING. DETERMINED CAUSEWAS THE LIFTING DISC CONTACTING THE MANUAL ACTUALTION SHAFT.REF MASTER SOOR 2-89- 197

CLOSED

'O'HR PUMP WOULD NOT RESTART DURING PERFORMANCE OF SE-224-002WHEN THE 4KV BREAKER WAS RACKED OUT AND THEN BACK IN, THE PUMP

-STARTED.CLOSED

7 VALVES HAD PACKING TIGHTENED W/0 ERF'S SUBMITTED PRIOR TO WORK= THIS RESULTED IN DECLARING 3 OUT OF 7 AVAILABLE LOW PRESSURE

ECCS SYSTEMS INOP DUE TO STROKE TIMES BEING UNKNOWN-THE CAUSE WAS A FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE ACTIVITY WORKPLAN.

MAINT REVIEWED THE EVENT DURING VALVE TEAM TRAINING.PENS REVISED SE-100/200-002 TO ENSURE MNT COMPLIES WITHAD-QA-306 PRIOR TO WORKING ANY COMPONENTS.PORC ACTION ITEM INITATED, BOOR CLOSED.

'8'HR PUMP SUCTION RELIEF VALVE LIFTED DURING SYS ALIGNMENT.REPEAT OCCURRENCE, REF SOOR 2-.89- 173. THE LIFTING DISC ANDCASTLE NUT WERE FOUND NOT PROPERLY JAMMED ALLOWING THE DISC TOVIBRATE DOWN THE SHAFT THREADS. MNT ADJUSTED PSV PROGRAM PROCED.

CLOSED

CORE SPRAY AND RHR TESTABLE CHECK VALVES FAILED TEST REQUIREMENTFOR LEAKAGE. THE TEST WAS REPEATED AND SATISFACTORY RESULTS WEREOBTAINED. GO-100(200)-002 CHANGED> REF. PCAF'S 1 90-0450 d2"90-0 193

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PM I.S

SYS BOOR llOCCUR

DATE DESCRIPTION

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 51

49 2-90.-019

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-90-021

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-90-076

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 54

49 2-90- 165

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 * 2-91-009

.OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-91-024

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2 91 049

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-91-062

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-91-091

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-91-112

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

2/06/90

2/1 1/90

8/29/90

12/18/90

1/08/91

2/07/91

3/10/91

3/10/91

4/1 2/9

1'/23/9

1

CLOSED

RHR CROSSTIE RELIEF VALVE PSV-25193 LIFTED AND WOULD NOT RESEATDURING ATTEMPTS TO FLUSH RHR PIPING. THE VALVE WAS REWORKED PERWA V03106.REF MASTER BOOR 2-89- 197.

CLOSED

RHR TESTABLE CHECK VALVE HV-251-F0508 INDICATION NOT FULL OPENDURING 50-249-014. DETERMINED CAUSE WAS WORN SEALS ON THE AIROPERATOR UNEE PAC SEALS AND THE UPPER SEALS. WA V03223 REPLACEDTHE SEALS.

CLOSED

ESW LEAK FOUND AT THE 'O'HR PUMP MOTOR OIL COOLER.CAUSED BY HOLE IN COPPER TUBING ATTRIBUTED TO UNDER-DEPOSITLOCAL PITTING, NOT BY AS FIRST IMPLICATED. MICROBIOLOGICALLYINFLUENCED CORROSION WHICH SHUTDOWN UNIT DUE.TO GENERIC

IMPLICATIONS. ALL RHR PUMPS HAD THEIR COOLERS REPLACED.OTHER SAFETY RELATED HEAT EXCHANGES „WERE INSPECTED FOR SIMILARCONDITIONS. NO PROBLEMS WERE FOUND. REF SPEC H-1004 AND PLAS 432REF NCR 90-0114. CLOSED

RHR TSH-E11-2N600A WAS FOUND OUT OF TOLERANCE DURING SI-249-306.THE SWITCH WAS REPLACED PER THE SURVEILLANCE.CLOSED

INADVERTENT ISOLATION OCCURRED TO RHR SDC INBOARD ISO VALVEDURING 16C WORK ACTIVITIES TO REPLACE PERMISSIVE PRESS SWITCHPIS-821-2N018A. REF. WA V16020PLANNERS GUIDE WAS REVIEWED BY I6C ASSIST FOREMAN.

EXTENSION TO POST CYC25 APPROVED BY PORC 92-168.ECO 93-6041 INSTALLED WIRING IN T8-2000682.CLOSED

POSITION INDICATION FOR 'O'HR PUMP BREAKER WAS LOST.WA V10119 INVESTIGATED AND FOUND A SPRING CLIP HAD FALLENFROM THE BREAKER LINKAGE AND ALLOWED THE LINKAGE TO SEPARATE.A CLIP WAS INSTALLED AND THE BREAKER STROKED SAT.

CLOSED

PSV-251-F030C LIFTED SEVERAL TIMES WHILE FILLING AND VENTOF THE 'A'OOP IN PREPARATION FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING.REF MASTER SOOR 1"90-259CLOSED

BOTH LOOPS OF LPCI WERE INOP AT THE SAME TIMEWHILE PLACING RHR INTO SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE.CLOSED

SNUBBER NOT ISTALLED ON 'A'ECIRC PIPING AS REQUIRED.RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING DIV I WAS REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE.THE SNUBBER WAS REMOVED VIA WA Y00350 AND TO BE RE-INSTALLEDPER WA Y00155 WHICH WAS CLOSED WITHOUT INSTALLING THE SNUBBER.

THE SNUBBER WAS REPLACED PER WA Y00294.CLOSED

RHR DISCHARGE RELIEF PSV-251-F025A FOUND LIFTED.INVESTIGATION COULD NOT DETERMINE A CAUSE. REF WA V13549.CLOSED

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PMI 49

10/02/95~ SUSQ NNA SES

SOOR SUMMARY REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 2SORTEO BY UNIT ~ ISSUE DATE & SOOR II

P M I S

PAGE 20

SYS SOOR NOCCUR

DATE DESCRIPTION

49 2-91-159

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-91-171

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-92-007

OTHER AFFECTED SYS1

49 2-92"020

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-92-032

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-92-033

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-92-026

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 64

49 2-92-095

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-92- 108

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:~49 2-92-118

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

6/13/91

7/09/91

1/21/92

2/24/92

3/19/92

3/19/92

3/23/92

9/13/92

9/26/92

10/07/92

RHR SUCTION PRESSURE GAUGE ROOT VALVES WERE FOUND CLOSED.THE VALVE WERE PLACED IN THEIR PROPER POSITION. INVESTIGATIONCOULD NOT DETERMINE HOW THE VALVES GOT CLOSED. LRF 91-249-231WAS ISSUED'EF DCN 91-2331.

CLOSED

ROOT VLV OP1-PI-2R0038 WAS FOUND CLOSED VS: OPEN AS REQUIREDBY CL-249-0015. FOUND DURING SO 249-002.ROOT CAUSE COULD NOT BE DETERMINED. THE VALVE WAS RESTORED TOTHE OPEN POSITION. OPS AND I&C REVIEWED THE EVENT.

CLOSED

RHR SI-249-306 FOUND TE-E11-2N009A DEFECTIVE d 2N600A OUT OF CALWA V26047 REPLACED THE METER MODULE IN TH1; INDICATION CIRCUIT,.WA V26025 REGAL'ED TSH-E11-2NBOOA.CLOSED

WORKER NOTICED THAT 2 BOLTS WERE MISSING FROM RHR FLANGEWHERE FLOW ORIFACE FO-E11-20001-82 WAS CONNECTED. MAINTWAS CONTACTED AND THE MISSING BOLTS WERE INSTALLED PER WA V23106NO CAUSE COULD 'BE DETERMINED FOR THE ABSENSE OF THE BOLTS.

CLOSED .

PSV-251-F029 LIFTED DURING LINE UP FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING.VALVE RESPONDED PER DESIGN TO OVER PRESSURE CONDITION LIKELYCAUSED BY ACCOUSTIC HYDRAULIC EXCITATION.REPLACEMENT OF THE VALVE IS PLANNED AS PART OF THE RELIEF VLV

UPGRADE PROGRAM.CLOSED

PSV-251-F025A APPARENTLY LIFTED DURING SHUTDOWN COOLING.WA V23161 INVESTIGATED, THE VALVE BODY WAS LIGHTLY TAPPED ANDTHE VALVE RESEATED.CLOSED

BKR 28226062, 28216053, 28237043 d 28237043A NOT EQ, NCR 92-049.ERF'S AND WAIS WRITTEN. THE BREAKERS IN CUBICLES 28216053 AND28226062 WERE REPLACED. EQAR-023 AND EQDF-48 IS BEING REVISEDTO SPECIFY THE REQUIRED SUPPLIER OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS.

CLOSED

FLOW THRU RHR CHECK VLV F031A/F046A LIFTED 'A'UCTION RELIEFPSV-251-F030A. THE 'A'HR PUMP AND ASSOCIATED LPCI FLOW PATHWERE SUBSEQUENTLY DECLARED INOP DUE TO THE NEED TO, ISOLATE APOTENTIAL RX VESSEL DRAIN PATH. REF WA V20523.

MNT REPAIRED F046A PER WA P23099.CLOSED

ESF ACTUATION'WHEN RHR OUTBOARD ISOLATION HV-251-F008 CLOSEDDURING SHUTDOWN COOLING. '8'HR PUMP HAD TRIPPED. REF PLA 541.DEFECTIVE RELAY BASE ON 821H K94 WAS REPLACED BY WA V20623.CLOSED

'A'HR PUMP FAILED T~~T DURING SYSTEM RESTORATIONFOLLOWING OUTAGE ACTIVITIES. AT BREAKER 2A20101, A FLAG WAS UPON THE 'A'HASE 50/51 RELAY. DETERMINED CAUSE OF THIS EVENT WASAN IMPROPERLY ADJUSTED LIMIT SWITCH FOR HV251F004A, RHR PUMP

SUCTION. THE ACTUATOR WAS INSPECTED/ADJUSTED PER MT-GM-050.THE VALVE WAS TESTED SAT.MT-GM-050 REVISED TO ENSURE CORRECT 4 TRAIN LIMITSWITCH POSITION. CLOSED

2.

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PMI S. 49

10/02/95SUSQ NNA SES

SOOR SUMMARY REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 2SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE 6 SOOR N

P M I S

PAGE 21

SYS SOOR N

49 2-92-126

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 2-92 132

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 6949 2-92-133

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 5

49 93 460

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 93-458

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 93-461

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 93-467

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 94-175

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 94-241

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 94-240

OCCURDATE

10/15/92

10/26/92

10/26/92

12/1 1/93

1 2/ 19/93

12/21/93

12/21/93

3/15/94

4/02/94

4/07/94

DESCRIPTION

RELIEF VALVE ON TEST PUMP BLEW OFF DURING SE-249-202.PRESSURE WAS AT 800 PSI. WORKER WAS DRENCHED WITH WATER BUT NOTCONTAMINATED. THE TEST SKID WILL BE REWORKED TO ELIMINATECOMPRESSION FITTINGS ON RELIEF VALVES.

CLOSED

LOOSE TERMINATION ON TERMINAL 81 OF RELAY 821H-K59CAUSED THE RELAY TO DE-ENERGIZE. OCCURRED DURING PCIS TESTINGUNDER SE-269-200 FOR DCP 92-9006.CLOSED.

SHUTDOWN COOLING VALVES ISOLATED DUE TO GROUNDED LEAD, ESFACTUATION. HV-261F009 AND HV-251F015A CLOSED. ERT REQUIRED ~

DETERMINED CAUSES WERE: 1)LEAD WAS NOT TERMINEATED. 2) INVOLVEDPERSONNEL DID NOT PLAN FOR EVERY POSSIBLE FAILURE. 3) TIGHT WORK

SPACE/PHSICALLY DIFFICULT. REF PLAS 648.CLOSED

RHR HV-251-F0038 FAILED TO OPEN FOLLOWING CLOSURE WHILE IN SDC. SiTHE VALVE WAS CLOSED BECAUSE COOLDOWN RATE WAS TOO HIGH. OPSINVESTIGATION FOUND THE VLV BREAKER THERMALS HAD TRIPPED.DETERMINED CAUSE WAS THERMAL BINDING'P-149/249-002 WERE

REVISED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.CLOSED

VACUUM SUCKED VLV BONNET FOR HV-261F0038 BACK ON TO VLV BODYDURING WA V33836 BREACH AND DISASSEMBLY ON THE RHR SYSTEM.THE BONNET WAS RE-INSTALLED TO TERMINATE THE VACUUM LEAKAGE.ERT REQUIRED. NDAP-QA-0302 REV 3 ISSUED. OPS REVIEWED THE EVENT.

MAINT REVIEWED THIS EVENT WITH MAINT PLANNERS.CLOSED

RHR RAD WASTE VENT VLV 261-811 FOUND UNCAPPED CONTRARY TO CLWHICH REQUIRES IT TO BE CAPPED, CL-249-0018. PROBABLE CAUSEWAS DURING FILL AND VENT EVOLUTION. OPS WILL REVIEW THIS EVENT.MOA TRAINING CYCLE 94-1 COMPLETE.

CLOSED

POTENTIAL STATUS CONTROL EVENT WHEN WRONG DIV RHR CL IMPLEMENTEDROOT CAUSE OF THIS OCCURRENCE WAS OPERATOR ERROR. AN INDEPENDENTVERIFICATION WAS PERFORMED. MOA 94- 1 REVIEWED THIS EVENTSSOOR 93-201 WILL ADDRESS VALVE LOCKING

POLICY/METHODS'LOSED

HANDWHEEL FOR RHR LOOP A INBOARD INJECTION TEST VLV OFF OF STEMSFOUND ON GRATING. VLV 251063. CONDITION WAS FOUND DURING INITIALDRYWELL ENTRY FOLLOWING SHUTDOWN. INVESTIGATION FOUND THE VALVESTEM HAD FAILED DUE TO HIGH STRESS LOADING AND POOR DESIGNS

THE VALVE WAS REPLACED WITH A DIFFERENT DESIGN PER WA V43319RIE 94 0081.CLOSED

MATERIAL CUT FROM PIPE HANGER CLAMP W/0 WORK INSTRUCTIONSOR ENGIN ERING ANALYSIS. HANGER GBB-205-H89 ~ WA V43467.

HEDETERMINED CAUSE WAS MIS-INTERPRETATION OF THE WORK PLAN BY TGROUP FOREMAN. NCR 94-079, CAL EC-049-1007 'SE-AS-IS DISPO.

MAINT CONDUCTED TRAINING ON THE EVENT.CLOSED

SCAFFOLDING INTERFERED WITH '8'HR DISCH CHECK VALVE CLOSING.SCAFFOLDING BUILT NEAR THE '8'UMP DID NOT ALLOW THE CHECKVALVE HANDLE TO SWING FULLY IN THE CLOSED POSITION.TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED FOR THE 'DRAIN'REWS.

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PMIS:EVR49

10/02/95SUSQUEHANNA SES

SOOR SUMMARY REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 2SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE 6 SOOR N

P M I 5

PAGE 22

SYS BOOR NOCCUR

DATE DESCRIPTION

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 94 245

OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 60, 62

49 94-249

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 94-254

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 94-266

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 94-283

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 94-356

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

49 94-366

OTHER AFFECTED SYS:

4/08/94

4/10/94

4/ 10/94

4/17/94

4/29/94

5/29/94

6/04/94

CLOSED

FLOOR DRAINS BACKED UP WHILE DRAINING DIV Ii RHRUSING FLOOR DRAINS IN THR RHR PIPE WAY. HPCI AND RCIC ROOMSWERE CONTAMINATED'00 SQ FEET, LVL WAS BK WET. REF ACR 94- 10.THE DRAIN BLOCKAGE WAS CLEARED. 01-AD-055 REV 8 INCLUDES

DIRECTION TO MONITOR FLOOR DRAINS DURING DRAINING EVOLUTIONS.CLOSED

WATER LEAKED FROM RHR HV"251-F050A PRESSURE SEALRESULTING IN DRYWELL AREA CONTAMINATION. 400 SQ FEET, LEVELSWERE 20,000 DPM WET. REF ACR 94 011.DETERMINED CAUSE WAS WHEN THE VALVE BONNET WAS RAISED UNEVENLY

IN THE INITIAL RE-INSTALLATION, RESULTING IN IT BEING COCKED1/4 INCH. PROPER ADJUSTMENT WAS MADE,.CLOSED

DURING LLRT DRAIN VLV 251018 WAS FOUND OPEN VS: CLOSEDAS REQUIRED BY THE LLRT LINE UP. THE VALVE WAS OPENED- BY OPSTO SUPPORT DRAINING OF THE RHR SYSTEM. THE LLRT TAG WAS NOTNOTICED BY THE OPERATOR. CORRECTIVE ACTION TRACKED UNDER

SOOR 94-245.CLOSED

POTENTIAL EXISTED FOR HIGH FLOW ISOLATION FOLLOWING SE-249-203DUE TO VALVE CONFIGURATION ON INSTRUMENTATION. THE SUPPLY VLVSTO THE SWITCHES WERE OPENED PRIOR TO THE ROOT VALVES BEINGOPENED. PCAF'5 WERE ISSUED TO THE APPROPRIATE 'SE'ROCEDURES

TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.CLOSED

AMBER LIGHT FOR HV-251-F049 BLEW WHEN HSS-25111A WAS PLACED. IN THE EMERGENCY POSITION DURING TP-200-'010. THE BULB WAS

REPLACED AND THE EVENT WAS REPEATED. TP WAS HALTED ANDINVESTIGATION INITIATED.

DMG UPDATED RSP SCHEMATICS TO REFLECT CORRECT RESISTANCE VALUES.CLOSED

.8 6 D RHR PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES NOT SEATINGTO MAINTAIN KEEPFILL PRESSURE: CONDITION FOUND DURINGRESTORATION OF SE-224-207 'HE A 6 C RHR CHECK VALVES WERE FOUNDNOT CLOSED DURING PREPARTION FOR THE VESSEL HYDRO.

INVESTIGATION FOUND THE VALVE DISK STOPS WERE TOO SHORT, VENDORERROR. PORC 94-136 REVIEWED RESO. REF PLI 78723.'. ACT: TRNG - INCLUDE THIS EVENT IN ENGR CONTINUING TRAINING

MNT SAI E06393. TRNG SAI E06395 ~ REVIEW RIE PROCEDURES.

RHR KEEPFILL ISOLATED WITHOUT TAXING PUMP 4XV MOTOR BKRS OOS,RESULTING IN CONFIG WITH POTENTIAL FOR WATER HAMMER.THE DC KNIFE SWITCHES WERE OPENED AND YELLOW TAGGED TO PREVENTPUMP START.

PCAF 1-95-1016 REVISED NDAP-QA-0323N. ACT: CMPL - CLOSURE

r 2

2

TOTAL: 105

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UU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUU UUUUUUUUUUUUUU

UUUUUUUUUU

SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS SSSSSSS

SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS

SSSSS

SS SSSSSSSSSSSSSS

SSSSSSSSSS

000000000000000000

00 000000 00 0000 00 0000 00 0000 00 .00

'00 00 000000 00000 00

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7777777777777777777777777 77

7777

77777777777777

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00 000000 00 '0000 00 0000 00 0000 00 00oq 00 000000 , 00oqo 'o'POQ0000000

PQOOPQPO

TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT

TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT

11111

111111111111111111

11111111 111111111111

JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ

JJJJJJJJJJJJ

JJ JJJJ JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ

OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO OOOO OOOO OOOO OOOO - OOOO OOOO OOOO OOOOOOOOOOOOOO

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BBBBBBBBBBB888888888888Be BeBB BBBe ee8888888888888868888888 8888 Be88 88BBBBBBBBBBBB88888888888

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'0000000 00 0000 00 0000 00 0000 00 0000 00 000000 00000 00

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6666666666666lg6666666666 6666666666666666666666666666666 6666 6666 66666666666666

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555555555555SSBSSSSSSSSS5555555565555556665656658

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00 000000 00 0000 00 0000 00 ~ 0000 00 0000 00 000000 00000 '0

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888888888888888888888888 8888 88

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EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE

NN NNNNN NNNNNN NNNN NN NNNN NN NNNN NN 'NNN NN NNNN NN NNNN NNNNNN . NNNNN ~ - NNNN N

ODDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD DDDD iDDDD DDDD DDDD DDDD DDDD DDDD DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDOOOD

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e

0

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Open and Closed Condition Report Data by Selected System

27-"Feb-96

Search on System Number: 49

For Information Only

CR NO. UNIT SYS // EVENTDATE NC? OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE? LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT . REPEATFF? FF? MPFF? MPFF?

95-0051 1 49 3/28/95 YES NO NO 2 RCA

THE BREAKER MAGNETICTRIP SETPOINT, 300 AMP SPECIFIED IN E-612, SH 7, REV. 7 FOR BREAKER IB246-021 IS BEYOND BREAKERTRIP RANGE OF 90-270 AMP. BREAKER.TRIP SETPOINT OF 300 MAYNOT BEACHIEVABLE.

Description:

SIMILARPROBLEM WAS IDENTIFIEDFOR 250 VDC MCC BREAKERS PER EDR 094-041. THEREFORE, SITEENGINEERS WERE MAKINGSURE THATSIMILARPROBLEM DOES.NOT EXIST FOR 480 VACMCCBREAKERS. DURING INSTALLATIONOF SEISMIC CLIPS FOR 480 VACMCC BREAKER IB246-021, THISPROBLEM WAS DETECTED.

References:1

Equip Nost

IB246-02 I

954069 1 49 4/265 YES NO NO

DURING PERFORMANCE OF TP-059-001, IT WAS NOTED THATSEVERAL NUTS ON THE BOTTOM SUCTIONSTRAINERS FOR RHR WERE NOT PROPERLY TORQUED.

. Description:

DURING THE COURSE OF TP-059-001 (SUPPRESSION POOL DEBRIS/SUCTION STRAINER INSPECTION), ANUT ON A BOTTOMRHR SUCTION STRAINER WAS FOUND NOT PROPERLY TORQUED. WHEN THE DIVERROTATED THE NUT, BOTH NUTS ANDTHESTUD WERE FREE TO ROTATE. OTHER NUTS ON THE STRAINERWERE CHECKED ANDA TOTALOF FIVE WERE FOUND ON THE 'A'OWER STRAINER.

References:

, WA S53415

Equip Nos:

IF407 B

IF409B

IF4IOB

RptSystem

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Search on System Number: 49

CR NO. UNIT SYS // EVENTDATE NC2 OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE? LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEATFF? FF? MPFF? MPFF?

NOI

95- 9 2 '9.'-'vP~THE 2D RHR PUMP TRIPPED DUE TO ANAPPARENT MOTOR BURNUP.

5/8/95 YES YES RCA 2/8/96

Description:

WHEN THE 2D RHR PUMP, 2P202D, WAS STARTED FOR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING, A PLANTOPERATORMONITORINGTHE PUMP FROM A SAFE DISTANCE OBSERVED SPARKS ANDFLAMES COMING FROM THEMOTOR VENTLOUVERS. HE IMMEDIATELYRADIOED THE CONTROL ROOM PCO ANDHADTHE PUMPSHUTDOWN. PUMP OPERATING PARAMETERS AS VIEWEDFROM THE CONTROL ROOM APPEARED TO BENORMALDURING THE PERIOD FOLLOWINGTHE MOTOR START. INITIALINVESTIGATIONHASIDENTIFIEDDAMAGETO THE MOTOR WINDINGS. OIL WAS SEEN TO BE DRIPPING INSIDE THE MOTORCASING ONTO THE ROTOR ANDA FILMEXISTED ON THE VENTLOUVERS. OIL WAS ALSO DRIPPINGFROM THE MOTOR CASING ONTO THE FLOOR. ADDITIONALLY,PUMP GROUND OVERCURRENT RELAYTARGET 50AG HADTRIPPED DURING THE EVENT.

YES

References:

SPEC EI107WA V50299

Equip Nos:

2P202D

FLAMES EMANATINGFROM THE PUMP MOTOR, PRESENT FOR ONLYA FEW SECONDS, DIDNOT REQUIRE

ANYMANUALINTERVENTIONBEFORE DYINGOUT ON THEIR OWN.

THE CONTROL ANDTRIP DC KNIFE SWITCH WAS OPENED TO PREVENT START OF THE PUMP.

954206 2 49 5/11/95 NO NO

p™p lt p~POSSIBLE PUMP SEAL DAMAGEON 2D RHR.

Description:

NO INVEST 0/10/95

References: Equip Nos:

2D RHR PUMP MOTOR WAS REMOVED PER MT-049-002. MT-049-001 RHR PUMPDISASSEMBLY/REASSEMBLYSTEP-BY-STEP CONDITIONALWAS NOT REFERENCED AND STEPS 5.1.1P AND5.1.1D WERE NOT PERFORMED AS REQUIRED.

2 RptSystem

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Search on System Number: 49

CR,NO UNIT SYS // EVENT DATE NC? OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE?. LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEATFF? FF? MPFF? MPFF?

NO INVEST 0/10/95954268 2 49 6/20/95 NO YES

4@"% pA(c 6AS FOUND VOTES TEST OF BV=251F0278 DATED 6/20/95 RESULTED IN FINALMEASURED.THRUST 35781

LBS EXCEEDING ALLOWABLELIMITOF 19340 LBS PER DRAWINGM-1395. SEE EWR ATTACHED..

Description:

AN ELECTRICALCALIBRATIONWAS PERFORMED IN ANAS FOUND CONFIGURATION. MEASUREDTHRUST SEEN WAS 35781 BLS. THE VOTES TEST IMMEDIATELYFOLLOWED WITHA MAXIMUMTHRUSTOF 34129 LBS. (EQUIPMENT ERROR NOT INCLUDED). THE ALLOWABLELIMITOF 19340 LBS IS BASED ONEXTENDED ACTUATORTHRUST RATING.

References:

EWR M58023

Equip Nos:

IIV251F027B

3 RptSystem

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Search on System Number: 49

CR NO. UNIT SYS It EVENTDATE NC? OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE? LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEATFF. FF. MPFF? MPFF7

95-0344 1 49 S/1185 YES NO NO 2 RCA 0/12/955gI,'f t w(o'c ~UgY,=,IS,IF02'P MAYBE IN A DEGRADED CONDITIONBECAUSE OF POTENTIALSIGNIFICANTOVERTHRUST

RESULTING FROM ITTIPPING ITS THERMALOVERLOADS (REFERENCE WA S21676 DATED 11/25/92). INADDITION,TORQUE SWITCH REPLACEMENT WAS PERFORfvKD AS PART OF INVESTIGATIONANDNO

POST MAINTENANCEVOTES TEST WAS DONE. THIS IS INVIOLA@ON QF AD-QA-531, THE PROCEDURE INEFFECT ATTHE TIME.

Description:

DURING A REVIEW OF HV-151F027B VALVEMAINTENANCEHISTORY, IT WAS DISCOVERED THATTHEMOVTRIPPED ITS THERMALOVERLOADS TWICE (REFERENCE WA S21676 DATED 11/25/92), INDICATINGTHATPOTENTIALSIGNIFICANTOVERTHRUST ANDOVERTiORQUE @AS OCCURRED. IN ANINVESTIGATION,A DEFECTIVE TORQUE SWITCH WAS FOUND. TfgWADOCUMENTED TORQUE SWITCH

REPLACEMENT WAS PERFORMED; HOWEVER, THERE WAg QO EVIDENCE OF A POST-MAINTENANCEVOTES TEST. THE DATE OF THE LATESTVOTES TEST PEQ~ORMED Og ~IS MOV IS 4/18/92 (WA S10396).

a

TWO CONCERNS EXIST

1. THE MOV)MAYBE IN A DEGRADED CONDITION PECAN:.SE OF THE SIGNIFICANTOVERTHRUST AND OVERTORQUE RESULTING FR(/II 'f@PPIhP ITS PfEQUALOVERLOADS.-

References:

WA P34011WA S51119WA S51144

Equip Nos:

HVISlF027B

2. NOT PERFORMING A POST-MAINTENANCEVOTES TEST FOLLOWINGTORQUESWITCH REPLACEMENT IS IN VIOLATIONOF AD-QA-531, REV. 0, ATTACHMENTB

SECTION 1.9 WHICHWAS IN EFFECT ATTHATTIME.

RptSystem

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Search on System Number: 49

CR NO UNIT SYS // EVENTDATE NC? OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE? LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEATFF? FF? MPFF? MPFF?

NO NO95-0400 2 49 2/23/96 A NOU'A /0'~ g,~~~~MOVDATADETAILDRAWING M-l404 FOR VALVETAG NO. EV2/lIF102R CONTAINS THE INCORRECTSTEM MATERIAL(ASTMA-582 GR 416 VERSUS THE ACTUALMATERIALSA-564 GR-630.)

Description:

DURING REVISION OF THE MOVDATADETAIL,LIMITSWITCH SETTING ANDTORQUE SWITCH SETTINGSFOR HV251F103A (CALCULATIONNO. EC-049-0552), THE INCORRECT STEM'MATERIALWAS NOTED.

THIS INCORRECT STEM MATERIALIS INPUT TO THE VOTES SOFTWARE FOR VOTES TESTING.THEREFORE, BASED ON THE INCORRECT STEM MATERIAL,THE VOTES THRUST DATAFOR THIS VALVEIS OFFSET.

References:

CR 95-0447WA V-50869

Equip Nos:

HV251F I03A

95-0437 2 49 9/18/95 NO NO NO 2 RCA

FOREIGN POTENTIALREVIEWWAS NOT PERFORMED PRIOR TO PERFORMINGSE-259-100, TEST 2.

Description:

WHILEPERFORMING REVIEWFOLOWING COMPLETION OF SE-259-100, ITWAS NOTICED THATTHEPREREQUISITES INCLUDETHE FOREIGN POTENTIALREVIEW. ATTHE TIMESE-259-100, TEST 2 WASPRESSURIZED, PERMIT 2-95-2001 WAS ACTIVE. THE SYSTEM PERMIT SUPERVISOR WAS THE ONLYSIGN-

- ON ON THE 2001 PERMIT. THE PREREQUISITES WERE COMPLETED PRIOR TO PERFORMANCE OF TEST 1

ON 9/14/95. ATTHATTIMEFOREIGN POTENTIALREVIEW WAS NO.

References: Equip Nos:

RptSysteut

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Search on System Number: 49

CR NO. UNIT SYS ¹ EVENTDATE NC? OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE? LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEATFF? FF? MPFF? MPFF?

954472 2 49 912885 NO NO NO 2 INVEST NO

RHR COMMON PIPING CONTAINEDWATERALTHOUGHITWAS THOUGHT TO BE COMPI.ETELYDRAINED.

Description:

AR206 A5 (LIQUIDRW COLLECT PANEL 2C209 SYSTEM TROUBLE) UNEXPECTEDLYALARMEDIN THECONTROL ROOM ON 2C651 ANDMOMENTS LATERAR207 (DW FLOOR DRN SUMP A HI-HILVL)ON IC601ALSO ALARMED.RECORDER LR-26102A INDICATEDLEVELIN THE 'A'UMPINCREASING. THE UNIT2PCO CONTACTED THE WORK CONTROL CENTER TO SEE IF ANYONGOING ACTIVITYWAS CAUSING THEINCREASED SUMP LEVEL. THE WORK CONTROL CENTER SUSPECTED A PSV (PSV251F126) REWORK THATWAS IN PROGRESS SO ANOPERATOR WAS DISPATCHED TO INVESTIGATE. THE CONTROL ROOM PCOCONTACTED THE DRYWELLCOORDINATORTO INVESTIGATE. THE DW COORDINATOR REPORTED TOTHE CONTROL ROOM THATTHE SUMP LEVELLOCALINDICATIONON EL. 719 WAS SHOWING 97%. HETHEN WENT INTO THE DRYWELLAND FOUND THE SUMP FILLEDANDSLIGHTLYOVERFLOWING. THETEMPORARY SUMP PUMP CORD WAS FOUND UNPLUGGED. THE PUMP WAS PLUGGED IN ANDTHE PIPINGDRAINWAS REDIRECTED INTO A DOWNCOMMER.

References: Equip Nost

MECHANICALMAINTENANCEWAS SIGNED ONTO ANDWORKINGWITHINTHE BOUNDARIES OF SYSTEMPERMIT 2-95-2000. THE SUBJECT PIPING WAS PREVIOUSLY DRAINEDTO SUPPORT AN LLRT(SE-259-030).

RptSystem

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Search on System Number: 49

CR NO. UNIT SYS // EVENTDATE NC7 OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLET LEVEL RESO 'LOSED REPEAT REPEATFF? FF? MPFF? MPFF?

95-0517 2 49 10/9/95 NO NO NO 2 INVEST NO

HANGER DRAW1NG DCA-210-H1, REV. 3 DOES NOT REFLECT THE ACTUALPLANTINSTALLATIONOF DCA-210-HI

Description:

WHILEPERFORMING A VT3 INSPECTION ON DCA-210-H1, ITWAS NOTED THATTHE HANGER DRAWINGSHOWS ITEM ¹5 TO BE A SIZE 20 SPRING CAN, HOWEVER, A SIZE 19 SPRING CAN IS ACTUALLYINSTALLED. FURTHER INSPECTIONS REVEALEDTHATGEMS ¹3,$ ,6,),S THATARE ACTUALYINSTALLEDIN THE PLANTARE DIFFERENT THANWHATIS SPECIFIEP QQ Tfg~GOD DRAWINGBILLOFMATERIAL. THE DRAWINGSPECIFIES THESE PARTS TO PE PPR P 2.5'i %PLOP PRACKET THEY AREACTUALLYFOR A2.25" WELDED BRACKET. THE WELDDE'JAP. Og TgE QQ~G SPECIFIES A FLAREBEVEL WELD ON TWO SIDES WITHA FILLETWELD ON TPE'PVvq OPPOSE SP)gS, THE ACTUALFIELDINSTALLATIONDOES NOT HAVETHE FLARE BEVEL WELDS PfSg+LED. D/SCU)SION'S WITHSITESYSTEM ENGINEERING ANDTHROUGH THEIR INVESTjGQTlqN6g THE $$QVE OPTED DRAWINGDISCREPANCIES IS WAS CONCLUDED THATA SUPERSEQPD( ID'AS+COgPgPATED INTO REV. 3 OFDCA-'210-HI. ,I. f t

References: Equip Nos:

RptSystem

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Search on System Number: 49

CR NO. UNIT SYS tt EVENT DATE NCT OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE? LEVEL RESO ~ 'LOSED REPEAT- REPEATFF? FF? MPFF. MPFF?

954539 2 49 10/1485 NO NO 1 RCA NO

DURING PERFORMANCE OF SE-200-002 "ASME CLASS I BOUNDARYSYSTEM LEAKAGE/HYDROSTATIC

PRESSURE TESTING" RHR HEAD SPRAY IB SHUTOFF HV-251F022 AUTO CLOSED. ESF ACTUATION

Description:

STEP 6.1.8 OF SE-200-002, OPENS RHR HEAD SPRAY IB SHUTOFF HV-251F022. DURING RPV

PRESSURIZATION, ITWAS NOTICED THATTHE F022 VALVEHAD CLOSED. THIS OCCURRED DURING THE

2 PERFORMANCES OF SE-200-002 ON 10/13/95 AND 10/14/95 WHEN PRESSURE WAS ABOVE 98 PSIG. ATNO

TIMEIN THIS PROCEDURE IS THIS VALVECLOSED, INTERLOCKDEFEATED OR IDENTIFIEDTHATTHIS

VALVEWOULDAUTO CLOSE.t

NSE/PNSS WAS NOTIFIED OF THESE OCCURRENCES ANDCONCLUDED THATTHE VALVEWOULDAUTO

CLOSE, IF OPENED, WHEN RPV PRESSURE IS GREATER THAN98 PSIG VIARELAYB21H-K82 IN PANEL

2C622 (REF. 8856-Ml-B21-101(10)). STEP 6.1.15 WOULDHAVEPREVENTED THIS ISOLATIONTO OCCUR, BUT

THIS STEP IS ONLYPERFORMED DURING THE "HYDRO"NOT THE "SYSTEM LEAKAGE"PRESSURE TEST.

(ON THESE DATES SE-200-002 SYSTEM LEAKAGETEST WAS BEING PERFORMED NOT THE HYDRO.)

References:

LER 388/95-013

Equip Nos:

HV25IF022

10 RptSystem

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Search on System Number: 49

CR NO UNIT SYS // EVENT DATE NC? OP AFFECTED? REPORTAIILE? LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT 'EPEATFF? FF? MPFF? MPFF~

95-0664 2 49 11/16/95 NO NO 2 RCA NO

INCORRECT THERMALLOAD.CASE WAS USED TO QUALIFYTHE NEW SURROGATE ASSEMBLIES FOR .

PSV251F055A &B VALVESREPLACEMENT. THE THERMALLOADCASE USED WAS UNCONSERVATIVE.

Description:.

DURING THE PREPARATION OF THE UNIT I CALCULATIONSFOR THE PSV151F055A &B VALVEREPLACEMENTS, THE UNIT2 CALCULATIONEC-PIPE-6027 WAS REVIEWED TO DETERMINE IF THESURROGATE ASSEMBLIES SMILARTO THE UNIT2 MODIFICATIONCOULD BE USED IN THE UNIT2

MODIFICATIONCOULD BE USED INTHE UNIT I DCP. THE FOLLOWINGDISCREPANCY WAS FOUND:

References: Equip Nos:

UNIT2 RHR PSV251F055A &B VALVESWERE REPLACED WITHTHE SURROGATE ASSEMBLIES PER DCP 94-

9083.. THE SURROGATE ASSEMBLIES WERE DESIGNED TO SIMULATETHE REMOVED VALVESIN WEIGHTANDCENTER OF GRAVITY(CALCULATIONEC-PIPE-6027, REV. 0). THEREFORE, THE RERUN OF ME101

COMPUTER. PIPING ANALYSISWAS NOT REQUIRED. HOWEVER, WEIGHT, THERMALAND SEISMICLOADINGWAS EXTRACTED ANDUSED TO QUALIFYTHE NEW SURROGATES FOR THE RHR VALVES.

'HE

UNIT2 CALCULATIONEC-PIPE-6027, USED INCORRECT THERMALLOAD'CASETO QUALIFYTHEWELDS BETWEEN THE 8" AND6" BLINDFLANGES ON THE SURROGATE ASSEMBLIES. THERE ARE SEVEN

(7) THERMALLOADCASES IN THE EXISTING MEIOI COMPUTER PIPING ANALYSIS,WHICHARE LOCATEDIN CALCULATIONSPLS-2643 (EC-PIPE-0621) &PLS-2646 (EC-PIPE-0677). THE THERMALLOADCASES AREDEFINED BELOW:

THRM01 - MINIMUMFLOW BYPASS MODE PUMP "D"RUNNING

THRM02- MINIMUMFLOW BYPASS MODE PUMP "B"RUNNING

II IlTHRM03 - POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENTSPRAY PUMPS B &D RUNNING

THRM04 - NORMALSHUTDOWN AFTER BLOWDOWNTO MAINCONDENSER, PUMP "D"RUNNING

THRM05 - NORMALSHUTDOWN AFTER BLOWDOWNTO MAINCONDENSER, PUMP "B"RUNNINGI

THRM06 - SYSTEM ON STANDBY,NO PUMPS RUNNING

RpISystem

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Search on System Number: 49

CR NO. UNIT SYS tt EVENTDATE NCT OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE? LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEATFF? FF? MPFF? MPFF?

THRMFA- FAULTEDTHERMALLOADCASE (POST-LOCA TEMPERATURE) WITHMAXIMUMTEMPERATURE USED TO QUALIFYFOR NOZZLE AND SUPPORT LOADS (SEE NOTE BELOW)

THE LOADCASE THRM01 - THRM06 SHOULD HAVEBEEN USED TO QUALIFYTHE 8" AND 6" BLINDFLANGES ON THE UNIT2 MODIFICATION. HOWEVER, ONLYTHRMOI WAS CONSIDERED IN THEQUALIFICATIONOF THE SURROGATE ASSEMBLY. THIS, RESULTED IN UNCONSERVATIVERESULTS.

NOTE: POST-LOCA ENVIORNMENTALTEMPERATURE RISE IS A FAULTEDCONDITIONANDANYEXPANSION STRESS RESULTING FROM THISCONDITIONIS CLASSIFIED AS SECONDARY. CODE EVALUATIONClF PIPINGSTRESSES/PIPE SUPPORT MEMBERS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR THISFAULTEDCONDITIONPER BLP 25976, DATED I/23/84.

12 RptSystem

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Search on System Number: 49

CR NO. UNIT SYS 0 EVENTDATE NC? OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE? LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEATFF? FF? MPFF? MPFF?

66 1 49 11/17/95 NOC

NO

1D RHR PUMP FAILEDSURVEILLANCEACCEPTANCE CRITERIA REGARDING DPVELOPED DIFFERENTIAL~ PRESSURE.

Description:C

WHILEPERFORMING SO-149-002 AND ESTABLISHED PHP. FLGW OF i 0 I~GPM TiIROUGH THE HEATEXCHANGERAS READ ON THE FLOW RECORDER, 'PIE ID P IBP Dl I«;ERE1 f'GALPRESSURE WASDETERMINEDTO BE 247 PSID. THE ACCEPTANCE CRI POP.TI EIDIFIERPNjIALPRESSUREBETWEEN 248 AND272 PSID. THE IB RHR PUMP PASSEYlTHEI(CCEPTA4QCE CRITERIA, HOWEVER, WITHNO MARGIN(I.E, RECORDED DP OF 250 WITHACCEPT 'CE'IA~AZ.250-27tIPSID).-''i. ii'~' h4 ii/ LPf<%'t'i",t

it.'BSERVED

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FR AND Fl VAQUERO LEAP TQ (UPlECT THE RECORDER'S ACCURACY.THE RECORDER'S INDICATIONAPPEARTS TO BE LOWER~Q /tI.CT'PPL, I&6:P$S CONTACTED TOINVESTIGATE.

1&C DETERMINEDTHE FR INDICATIONOUT OF CALIBRATION.LOWP'PROXMATELYI KGPM ANDRECALIBRATIONWAS PERFORMED UNDER WA S7212. THE B ANDD PUMPS WERE RETESTEDSATISFACTORILYWITHDIFFERENTIALPRESSURES OF 273 PSID (250-274 ACCEPTABLE)AND267 PSID (248-272 ACCEPTABLE).

References: Equip Nos:

FRElllR608

13 RptSystem

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Search on System Number: 49

CR NO UNIT SYS // EVENTDATE NC. OP AFFECI ED? REPORTABLE? LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEATFF? FF? MPFF? MPFF?

96-0111 I 49 I/30/96 NO NO 2 CLOSURE 2/2/96

CONTAINMENTSPARY OP'S CHANGED AND CONFLICTWITHSTATEMENTIN FSAR.

Description:

ON 11/21/95, PCAFS WERE PREPARED TO ALLOW,.CONCURRENT USE OF LPCI AND DRYWELLSPRAY. THISCHANGE PROVIDED MORE FLEXIBILITYIN RESPONDING TO POSTULATED TRANSIENTS THATCAUSE ANINCREASE TO PRIMARYCONTAINMENTPRESSURE. PFACS 1-95-1157 AND2-95-0520 WERE APPROVEDAND DISTRIBUTED.

References: Equip Nos:

A LATERREVIEWOF THE FSAR INDICATEDTHE FOLLOWINGEXCERPT FROM SECTION 6.2.2.2- IF THEOPERATOR CHOOSES TO USE THE CONTAINMENTSPARY, HE MUST OPEN THE SPARY VALVESANDCLOSE THE LPCI INJECTION VALVE.

CONTRARYTO THE FSAR STATEMENTABOVE, THE PCAFS PERMITTED LINE-UP OF BOTH LPCI INJECTIONANDDRYWELLSPRAY ATTHE SAME TIME.

96-0138 2 49 .2/7/96 NO NO 2 CLOSURE 2/9/96 NO

DURING PERFORMANCE. OF SI-249-309 (18 MONTHCAL. OF REACTOR COOLANTSYSTEM LEAKAGEHIPRESSURE) PSH-E11-2N018 (SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION HEADER HIGH PRESSURE) FOUND PSH-E11-

2N01& OUT OF ALLOWABLEVALUE.

Description:

FOUND AS FOUND VALVEON PSH-E11-2N018 AT 155.6 PSIG. ALLOWABLEVALUEIS LES THANOR EQUAL~ TO 142 PSIG (148.7 HEAD CORRECTED).

References: Equip Nos:

PS HE l l2N018

14 RptSystem

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CR NO. UNIT LEADGRP OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE? LVL RESO TYPE

974121 NO NO 3 CLOSURE Equip Nos: SYSTEM:

LEVELSWITCH LIS-821-2N024D FAILEDTO MEET ACCEPTANCECI:ITERIA STEP 6.2.15 OF SI-280-311 (A63867) Evcnl Date:

Itrsu

(:I<<sure

I/24/97

Schedule Actual LISD212N024D 80

')7-0 I "2 hIN'I'<) NO 3 ( l.t)SI <lti I'.quip N SY!< I'I:hl:

INAI)VI!I(I I'.N I'/O SCRAhl WAS I(l;CEIVI.Dl)URI(iNTIII'ERFORMANCEOF SI-280-311. I'.vrnt l)atr:

It<'«<

Ctu«irr

1/24/97

<:rhi <Intr A<'tu:il I".iil2I?N<< 31) nn

97-0123 hIVI' COIIIII.CfCOi4l)ITION Equip Nus: 8 YS'I I'.h I:

HAIR PIN CLIP MISSING ON OA510-005 CUBB SHUTTER ACTUATIONLEVER HINGE PIN.

Schedule Actual OAS IO

Event Date: I/21/97

Rcsu

Clos<<re 3/2<//97

974124 NUCT NO NO

DEGRADED COND. DEMIN.RESIN PERFORMANCE.

2 CAUSE DETERMINATION

Schedule Actual

Event Date: I/24/97

Res o 5/30/97

Closure

Equip Nos: SYSTEM:

39

RptLIkePMIS'

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t