rethinking war rethinking war - nacla war san salvador gas ... lutionary army and a defensible...

RETHINKING WAR

T IME OFTEN STRETCHES OUT LONG ANDslow in El Salvador, as it has for centuries.There are

occasional ugly explosions, when for a brief violentinstant the class hatred which permeates everythingcondenses into a critical mass. Then the pressure sub-sides, and the old rhythms resume. These days, however,the air crackles with activity and expectation. Among themembers of the Farabundo MartI National LiberationFront, the sense of urgency is palpable.

An underground FMLN leader sat fidgeting in thecapital city just prior to the March elections, drumminghis fingers on his knee incessantly. "The military factorcan be accelerated because it's in our hands," he said."But the political process can't be accelerated by sheerwill. It's a gradual process...but it has to speed up,because things can't stay static. Sometimes the momen-tum is too fast for contradictions to emerge, and at othertimes the growth of the movementi itself creates contra-dictions. The point is to see the whole picture, to be in theforest yet see both the trees and the mountain. We have toseek velocity in order to defeat time."

FMLN cadre have not always been in such a hurry.Indeed, during the previous decade the movement, influ-enced by the guerrilla doctrine of "prolonged popularwar," sought to stretch out the war. But now the FMLNhas initiated a new phase of its struggle, the "strategiccounteroffensive," which it hopes will bring the longarmed conflict to a close—either through a negotiatedsettlement or an insurrection.

The strength of the FMLN's offensive has come as asurprise to some observers. As late as October of lastyear, one widely-cited analyst declared that there was"no reason the situation cannot continue, as is, indefi-nitely." And even some guerrilla commanders admit that1984-1988 were the "most difficult" years for the rebels.Yet as early as 1986, a time which appeared to many asthe guerrillas' low point, the FMLN was secretly plan-ning the "strategic counteroffensive" to be launched atthe end of 1988.

Understanding how this shift in strategy came aboutrequires a closer look at the recent past. Today's offensiveis not a rabbit the rebels pulled out of their hat at the last

16 REPORT ON THE AMERICAS

El Salvador II

RETHINKING WAR

San Salvador gas station: The kid on the corner with a Molotov cocktail has become the key

TIME OFTEN STRETCHES OUT LONG ANDslow in El Salvador, as it has for centuries. There areoccasional ugly explosions, when for a brief violentinstant the class hatred which permeates everythingcondenses into a critical mass. Then the pressure sub-sides, and the old rhythms resume. These days, however,the air crackles with activity and expectation. Among themembers of the Farabundo Martf National LiberationFront, the sense of urgency is palpable.

An underground FMLN leader sat fidgeting in thecapital city just prior to the March elections, drumminghis fingers on his knee incessantly. "The military factorcan be accelerated because it's in our hands," he said."But the political process can't be accelerated by sheerwill. It's a gradual process...but it has to speed up,because things can't stay static. Sometimes the momen-tum is too fast for contradictions to emerge, and at othertimes the growth [of the movement] itself creates contra-dictions. The point is to see the whole picture, to be in theforest yet see both the trees and the mountain. We have toseek velocity in order to defeat time."

FMLN cadre have not always been in such a hurry.Indeed, during the previous decade the movement, influ-enced by the guerrilla doctrine of "prolonged popularwar," sought to stretch out the war. But now the FMLNhas initiated a new phase of its struggle, the "strategiccounteroffensive," which it hopes will bring the longarmed conflict to a close-either through a negotiatedsettlement or an insurrection.

The strength of the FMLN's offensive has come as asurprise to some observers. As late as October of lastyear, one widely-cited analyst declared that there was"no reason the situation cannot continue, as is, indefi-nitely." And even some guerrilla commanders admit that1984-1988 were the "most difficult" years for the rebels.Yet as early as 1986, a time which appeared to many asthe guerrillas' low point, the FMLN was secretly plan-ning the "strategic counteroffensive" to be launched atthe end of 1988.

Understanding how this shift in strategy came aboutrequires a closer look at the recent past. Today's offensiveis not a rabbit the rebels pulled out of their hat at the last

REPORT ON THE AMERICAS

__

16

moment, but the culmination of an elusive, difficult phaseof the war, a phase conceived of by FMLN strategists asthe "war of resistance."

T HE CONFUSING APPEARANCE OF THE WARof resistance is in part the result of inevitable com-

parisons with the heady fireworks of the period whichcame before. After a failed attempt at urban insurrectionin early 1981 and the ferocious repression that followed,the FMLN withdrew from the cities to the countrysidewhere a long and difficult process of constructing a revo-lutionary army and a defensible strategic rear guard, or"zones of control," began.' By 1983 the revolutionarymovement had successfully transformed itself into a so-phisticated, almost professional revolutionary army.

The war, although never ceasing to be a guerrilla insur-gency, acquired some increasingly conventional charac-teristics. Beginning in 1982, the FMLN grouped its fight-ers into larger and larger concentrations and launched aseries of spectacular actions. These culminated in the1984 destruction of the country's largest and most heav-ily-defended bridge, the Cuscatlán, an action that broughttogether forces from over half the country, from theeastern province of Morazán to the bridge itself at the RIoLempa.2

In smaller, yet more significant actions during thesame period, rebel forces systematically overwhelmedgovernment outposts in the zones of control and their sur-roundings. The Armed Forces finally had to abandonthese fixed positions—implicitly acknowledging loss ofthese areas. They then attempted to regain the initiative byusing mobile forces with extensive air and artillery sup-port, seeking out the guerrillas on their own terrain. At thispoint U.S. assistance became crucial. The United Statestrained immediate reaction and cazador (hunter) battal-ions and provided helicopters for rapid troop transport,without which the Armed Forces would have been unableto make the difficult transition to this war of movement.

By 1984 the fireworks were largely over. In place ofbrigade-sized assaults on fixed army positions, FMLNfighters were blowing up telephone poles. Instead of cap-turing prisoners of war and valuable war materiel, therebels were dispersing in the face of army advances.Homemade mines left in the path of enemy soldiers be-came the guerrillas' weapon of choice.*

Armed Forces and U.S. Embassy spokesmen claimedan important corner had been turned. Noted one U.S.military adviser, "Look, in guerrilla strategy you're sup-posed to progress to larger and larger concentrations of

*Spectacul actions did not, however, end completely. Major as-saults were launched at a rate of about two per year on several of theArmed Forces' most strategic installations, including the FourthBrigade in Chalatenango and the Third Brigade in San Miguel. Manyof these actions produced heavy government casualties, but theywere not central to the accumulation of guerrilla strength duringthose years. Rather, they served to "maintain the perspective ofvictory" in a period when much of the struggle was invisible, evento participants who lacked a "big picture" of the clandestine work.

VOLUME XXIII, NO.3 (SPTEMBER 1989)

forces....These guys' units are getting smaller. What moreevidence do you want [of rebel declinel?"3 The ArmedForces were so convinced of this that they actually madeplans on the assumption of steadily decreasing guerrillaactivity. The secret operational manual for the most am-bitious counterinsurgency plan to date, "United to Re-construct," for example, asserted in 1986 that "terroristactions will be maintained at an equal or lesser level ofoperations than they are today," and claimed that "thedevelopment of the terrorist forces has been stopped."4

P ARADOXICALLY, WITH THE ADVANTAGEof hindsight one could argue that for the Left it is the

pre-1984 period of guerrilla concentrations and spectacu-lar actions that deserves the most negative marks. With-out doubt, victories were won that were indispensable tothe further advance of the struggle. The elimination offixed government positions in large parts of the country-side opened space for a new relationship to developbetween the FMLN and the residents of these zones, aswell as for the rebel army to train new fighters andconsolidate its political and logistical structures.

Despite these achievements, new problems emerged.As one FMLN member close to the strategy discussionsof the time describes it, "The FMLN's growth from 1981to 1984 was essentially the transformation of the popularmovement of 1979-1980 into a popular army. Through1983 there was no social limit to growth; the problem waslack of arms and time to train military units. This processreached a limit by 1984; the social reserve was exhausted.In just three years, the FMLN converted a guerrillanucleus and a radical mass movement into a large, almost

moment, but the culmination of an elusive, difficult phaseof the war, a phase conceived of by FMLN strategists asthe "war of resistance."

HE CONFUSING APPEARANCE OF THE WARof resistance is in part the result of inevitable com-

parisons with the heady fireworks of the period whichcame before. After a failed attempt at urban insurrectionin early 1981 and the ferocious repression that followed,the FMLN withdrew from the cities to the countrysidewhere a long and difficult process of constructing a revo-lutionary army and a defensible strategic rear guard, or"zones of control," began.' By 1983 the revolutionarymovement had successfully transformed itself into a so-phisticated, almost professional revolutionary army.

The war, although never ceasing to be a guerrilla insur-gency, acquired some increasingly conventional charac-teristics. Beginning in 1982, the FMLN grouped its fight-ers into larger and larger concentrations and launched aseries of spectacular actions. These culminated in the1984 destruction of the country's largest and most heav-ily-defended bridge, the Cuscatlin, an action that broughttogether forces from over half the country, from theeastern province of Morazdin to the bridge itself at the RioLempa.2

In smaller, yet more significant actions during thesame period, rebel forces systematically overwhelmedgovernment outposts in the zones of control and their sur-roundings. The Armed Forces finally had to abandonthese fixed positions-implicitly acknowledging loss ofthese areas. They then attempted to regain the initiative byusing mobile forces with extensive air and artillery sup-port, seeking out the guerrillas on their own terrain. At thispoint U.S. assistance became crucial. The United Statestrained immediate reaction and cazador (hunter) battal-ions and provided helicopters for rapid troop transport,without which the Armed Forces would have been unableto make the difficult transition to this war of movement.

By 1984 the fireworks were largely over. In place ofbrigade-sized assaults on fixed army positions, FMLNfighters were blowing up telephone poles. Instead of cap-turing prisoners of war and valuable war materiel, therebels were dispersing in the face of army advances.Homemade mines left in the path of enemy soldiers be-came the guerrillas' weapon of choice.*

Armed Forces and U.S. Embassy spokesmen claimedan important comer had been turned. Noted one U.S.military adviser, "Look, in guerrilla strategy you're sup-posed to progress to larger and larger concentrations of

forces....These guys' units are getting smaller. What moreevidence do you want [of rebel decline]?"' The ArmedForces were so convinced of this that they actually madeplans on the assumption of steadily decreasing guerrillaactivity. The secret operational manual for the most am-bitious counterinsurgency plan to date, "United to Re-construct," for example, asserted in 1986 that "terroristactions will be maintained at an equal or lesser level ofoperations than they are today," and claimed that "thedevelopment of the terrorist forces has been stopped." 4

ARADOXICALLY, WITH THE ADVANTAGEof hindsight one could argue that for the Left it is the

pre-1984 period of guerrilla concentrations and spectacu-lar actions that deserves the most negative marks. With-out doubt, victories were won that were indispensable tothe further advance of the struggle. The elimination offixed government positions in large parts of the country-side opened space for a new relationship to developbetween the FMLN and the residents of these zones, aswell as for the rebel army to train new fighters andconsolidate its political and logistical structures.

Despite these achievements, new problems emerged.As one FMLN member close to the strategy discussionsof the time describes it, "The FMLN's growth from 1981to 1984 was essentially the transformation of the popularmovement of 1979-1980 into a popular army. Through1983 there was no social limit to growth; the problem waslack of arms and time to train military units. This processreached a limit by 1984; the social reserve was exhausted.In just three years, the FMLN converted a guerrillanucleus and a radical mass movement into a large, almost

Victims of the 1986 earthquake are still in shacks

*Spectacular actions did not, however, end completely. Major as-saults were launched at a rate of about two per year on several of theArmed Forces' most strategic installations, including the FourthBrigade in Chalatenango and the Third Brigade in San Miguel. Manyof these actions produced heavy government casualties, but theywere not central to the accumulation of guerrilla strength duringthose years. Rather, they served to "maintain the perspective ofvictory" in a period when much of the struggle was invisible, evento participants who lacked a "big picture" of the clandestine work.

VOLUME XXIII, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 1989) 17

kEl Salvador II

professional revolutionary army, which had brought theArmed Forces to the point of collapse. But the ArmedForces enjoyed the advantage of limitless resources. Andwhen they did not collapse, this advantage suddenlybecame decisive."

Given the increasingly conventional characteristicsthe war was assuming, the instruments placed at thedisposal of the Armed Forces by escalating U.S. aid—inparticular the rapidly expanding air force—became evermore effective. To maintain the tempo of the fighting,rebel cadre were pulled from irregular structures such asmilitia and guerrilla units to fill the ranks of the largerconcentrations. The transformation of the FMLN into anencamped, full-time force meant losing important day-to-day contact with the rebels' civilian base of support, andthat meant a political decline. Yet it was precisely suchorganizing and daily contact which were needed to re-plenish the "social reserve" that was becoming ex-hausted.

Behind these problems was a much more fundamentalone: The incorporation of FMLN cadre into the populararmy had sapped the above-ground popular movement ofwhatever energy it might have reserved in the face of therepression. The movement was sorely missed, in thewords of the same FMLN source, "partly as a reserve forthe growth of the guerrilla army, but especially as a forcewhich could combine its own struggles with the militarystruggle of the FMLN."

In the end, pressure to keep up with the dynamic ofescalation even led to forced recruitment in some areas to

fill the holes left by the high casualty rate conventionalwarfare entails. FMLN leaders have since publicly criti-cized this practice. Remarked Francisco Jovel of the Gen-eral Command,5 "In 1983 and 1984 we committed errors.Often comrades who had only joined recently, includingsome who were forcibly recruited, were sent into combatright off the bat. As a consequence we had desertions,unnecessary deaths, people who had a very negative psy-chological response to combat... .We learned that the onlypowerful guerrilla force is a voluntary one. We have toinvolve people gradually, and never, never take a guer-rilla fighter away from his people."6

It is hard to distinguish between a strategy which suc-cessfully makes the most of a difficult situation, onewhich encounters problems in implementation, and onewhich is simply inadequate. But one thing is certain:During the period of guerrilla concentrations, the dy-namic of the rebels' "accumulation of forces' '—that is,the building of a social base of support, political clout andmilitary power, which is the central axis of all guerrillastrategy—was channeled into a scheme which ultimatelybecame unsustainable. By late 1983, at the height of theapparent success of the guerrilla concentrations, the FMLNwas forced to completely restructure its strategy andforces. The process of transition was not as clear at thetime as it now appears in hindsight. In the words of FMLNCommander Leo Cabral, "In a war like this, in whichirregular factors are so important, to establish boundariesbetween one stage and another is very complicated and isalmost always done after the change has occurred."7


KFMLN fighters, Morazan 1984: They went underground to organize a network of clandestine collaborators

professional revolutionary army, which had brought theArmed Forces to the point of collapse. But the ArmedForces enjoyed the advantage of limitless resources. Andwhen they did not collapse, this advantage suddenlybecame decisive."

Given the increasingly conventional characteristicsthe war was assuming, the instruments placed at thedisposal of the Armed Forces by escalating U.S. aid-inparticular the rapidly expanding air force-became evermore effective. To maintain the tempo of the fighting,rebel cadre were pulled from irregular structures such asmilitia and guerrilla units to fill the ranks of the largerconcentrations. The transformation of the FMLN into anencamped, full-time force meant losing important day-to-day contact with the rebels' civilian base of support, andthat meant a political decline. Yet it was precisely suchorganizing and daily contact which were needed to re-plenish the "social reserve" that was becoming ex-hausted.

Behind these problems was a much more fundamentalone: The incorporation of FMLN cadre into the populararmy had sapped the above-ground popular movement ofwhatever energy it might have reserved in the face of therepression. The movement was sorely missed, in thewords of the same FMLN source, "partly as a reserve forthe growth of the guerrilla army, but especially as a forcewhich could combine its own struggles with the militarystruggle of the FMLN."

In the end, pressure to keep up with the dynamic ofescalation even led to forced recruitment in some areas to

fill the holes left by the high casualty rate conventionalwarfare entails. FMLN leaders have since publicly criti-cized this practice. Remarked Francisco Jovel of the Gen-eral Command,5 "In 1983 and 1984 we committed errors.Often comrades who had only joined recently, includingsome who were forcibly recruited, were sent into combatright off the bat. As a consequence we had desertions,unnecessary deaths, people who had a very negative psy-chological response to combat.....We learned that the onlypowerful guerrilla force is a voluntary one. We have toinvolve people gradually, and never, never take a guer-rilla fighter away from his people."'

It is hard to distinguish between a strategy which suc-cessfully makes the most of a difficult situation, onewhich encounters problems in implementation, and onewhich is simply inadequate. But one thing is certain:During the period of guerrilla concentrations, the dy-namic of the rebels' "accumulation of forces' -that is,the building of a social base of support, political clout andmilitary power, which is the central axis of all guerrillastrategy-was channeled into a scheme whicj ultimatelybecame unsustainable. By late 1983, at the height of theapparent success of the guerrilla concentrations, the FMLNwas forced to completely restructure its strategy andforces. The process of transition was not as clear at thetime as it now appears in hindsight. In the words of FMLNCommander Leo Cabral, "In a war like this, in whichirregular factors are so important, to establish boundariesbetween one stage and another is very complicated and isalmost always done after the change has occurred." 7

REPORT ON THE AMERICAS18

The process was prolonged and difficult, with muchtrial and error, leading the U.S. Embassy and the ArmedForces to make the kind of exultant declarations notedabove. Nevertheless, the result was the development of anew strategic line—the "war of resistance"—that, in theeyes of the FMLN leadership, could carry the rebels tovictory.

I N ESSENCE, BEGINNING IN 1984, THE WAR OFresistance marked a return to guerrilla war: Military

units were dispersed and returned to a more irregularstatus, a mixing of the "fish" back into the "sea." Inplace of the emphasis on a permanent revolutionary army,the clandestine scaffolding of collaborators, militia, andguerrillas was renewed and strengthened.* Some cadreleft the armed struggle and returned to the city to workwith the reemerging workers' movement. Others formedunderground urban commando cells, so that the next timethe guerrillas launched an offensive the regime would beforced to divide its troops between hitting the rebels in thecountryside and defending its own strategic rear guard inthe cities. (The core of the permanent forces that re-mained, however, became even more specialized. Anelite reserve of "special forces" was developed, and usedonly for actions of strategic importance, such as the attackon the headquarters of the Fourth Brigade at El Paralso in1988.)

The objective was to return the process of accumula-tion of forces to a more "popular" footing: to become amore grass-roots, multi-dimensional, and political forcethat could again become self-sustaining. At some futurepoint, such a force could launch an offensive againstwhich the conventional war waged by the Armed Forceswould be inadequate. Meanwhile, new military tacticswere implemented to disperse and wear down the enemywhile the revolution adjusted to the transition: minewarfare, economic sabotage, traffic stoppages (paros),and a constant harassment of the Armed Forces thatcaused greater government casualties than had the spec-tacular actions of the previous four years.

Some of these new tactics carried a cost, and raisedissues that have yet to be resolved, as the FMLN attemptsto balance their military effectiveness with their politicalconsequences. During the paros, for example, the guerril-las order a halt to all commercial transportation (buses,taxis, and commercial trucks) for a given period of time onpenalty of destruction by rebel forces. According to pollstaken by the University of Central America (UCA), the

paros are widely disliked by the population.8 They arefurther seen as disproportionately affecting the poor, whomust walk to work or miss it altogether, while the Cher-okees and Toyotas of the bourgeoisie circulate freely. Yetin military terms the paros are enormously effective. Ittakes few actual acts of sabotage to enforce compliancewith the boycott, and thus requires the mobilization ofonly a small number of FMLN troops. The Armed Forces,on the other hand, are obliged to mobilize tens of thou-sands of troops to defend highways and bus lines, leavingcorridors open for the unharrassed transport of guerrillaforces and materiel.

The FMLN campaign against local mayors is anothercontentious issue. In this campaign, the FMLN has de-manded that mayors of towns in areas of guerrilla strengthresign on penalty of execution. Only eight mayors haveactually been killed in this campaign, but an incredible120, or 45 percent of all the mayors in the country, haveresigned. Another 64 live and work in the provincialcapitals under the protection of military garrisons. But insome towns, such as San Francisco Gotera, even the pres-

By openly declaring its relationship with civilians, theFMLN turned them into targets of the armys wrath

* FMLN forces are structured into a hierarchy of several tiers. At thelowest level are the civilian supporters who do political organizingor provide intelligence or logistical support. Militia members arepart-time fighters who maintain a public identity by day but fight asguerrillas by night. Guerrilla forces are given more training andbetter weapons, but only fight in the area in which they live. Regularforces are full-time fighters who move throughout the country.Finally, special forces are highly trained specialists who usuallyhave long political experience.

VOLUME XXIII, NO.3 (SEPTEMBER 1989)

The process was prolonged and difficult, with muchtrial and error, leading the U.S. Embassy and the ArmedForces to make the kind of exultant declarations notedabove. Nevertheless, the result was the development of anew strategic line-the "war of resistance -that, in theeyes of the FMLN leadership, could carry the rebels tovictory.

IN ESSENCE, BEGINNING IN 1984, THE WAR OFresistance marked a return to guerrilla war: Military

units were dispersed and returned to a more irregularstatus, a mixing of the "fish" back into the "sea." Inplace of the emphasis on a permanent revolutionary army,the clandestine scaffolding of collaborators, militia, andguerrillas was renewed and strengthened.* Some cadreleft the armed struggle and returned to the city to workwith the reemerging workers' movement. Others formedunderground urban commando cells, so that the next timethe guerrillas launched an offensive the regime would beforced to divide its troops between hitting the rebels in thecountryside and defending its own strategic rear guard inthe cities. (The core of the permanent forces that re-mained, however, became even more specialized. Anelite reserve of "special forces" was developed, and usedonly for actions of strategic importance, such as the attackon the headquarters of the Fourth Brigade at El Paraiso in1988.)

The objective was to return the process of accumula-tion of forces to a more "popular" footing: to become amore grass-roots, multi-dimensional, and political forcethat could again become self-sustaining. At some futurepoint, such a force could launch an offensive againstwhich the conventional war waged by the Armed Forceswould be inadequate. Meanwhile, new military tacticswere implemented to disperse and wear down the enemywhile the revolution adjusted to the transition: minewarfare, economic sabotage, traffic stoppages (paros),and a constant harassment of the Armed Forces thatcaused greater government casualties than had the spec-tacular actions of the previous four years.

Some of these new tactics carried a cost, and raisedissues that have yet to be resolved, as the FMLN attemptsto balance their military effectiveness with their politicalconsequences. During theparos, for example, the guerril-las order a halt to all commercial transportation (buses,taxis, and commercial trucks) for a given period of time onpenalty of destruction by rebel forces. According to pollstaken by the University of Central America (UCA), the

* FMLN forces are structured into a hierarchy of several tiers. At thelowest level are the civilian supporters who do political organizingor provide intelligence or logistical support. Militia members arepart-time fighters who maintain a public identity by day but fight asguerrillas by night. Guerrilla forces are given more training andbetter weapons, but only fight in the area in which they live. Regularforces are full-time fighters who move throughout the country.Finally, special forces are highly trained specialists who usuallyhave long political experience.

VOLUME XXIII, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 1989)

paros are widely disliked by the population They arefurther seen as disproportionately affecting the poor, whomust walk to work or miss it altogether, while the Cher-okees and Toyotas of the bourgeoisie circulate freely. Yetin military terms the paros are enormously effective. Ittakes few actual acts of sabotage to enforce compliancewith the boycott, and thus requires the mobilization ofonly a small number of FMLN troops. The Armed Forces,on the other hand, are obliged to mobilize tens of thou-sands of troops to defend highways and bus lines, leavingcorridors open for the unharrassed transport of guerrillaforces and materiel.

The FMLN campaign against local mayors is anothercontentious issue. In this campaign, the FMLN has de-manded that mayors of towns in areas of guerrilla strengthresign on penalty of execution. Only eight mayors haveactually been killed in this campaign, but an incredible120, or 45 percent of all the mayors in the country, haveresigned. Another 64 live and work in the provincialcapitals under the protection of military garrisons. But insome towns, such as San Francisco Gotera, even the pres-

By openly declaring its relationship with civilians, theFMLN turned them into targets of the army's wrath

19

"a" ý_ýs?

El Salvador II

ence of brigade-sized garrisons has not convinced themayors to stay on.

FMLN leaders argue that the mayors' offices are thenerve centers for local counterinsurgency organizing, andthus are legitimate military targets. Indeed, according toa recent study commissioned by the Agency for Interna-tional Development (U.S.AID), the only components ofthe government's counterinsurgency campaigns of recentyears that have been at all successful are those "civicactions" that bypassed the corrupt central state apparatusand were administered directly by local mayors.9

With the campaign against the mayors, the FMLNchopped off the last feeble leg on which civic action wasstanding. But while the effectiveness of the campaign isbeyond dispute, the contention that mayors are legitimatemilitary targets has little basis in relevant internationallaw, and the campaign has been harshly condemned byboth Americas Watch and Amnesty International.'0

P OLITICAL ORGANIZING BECAME THE CRUXof the rebel plan during the 1984-1988 war of resis-

Hector Recinos is a founder of the National Federationof Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS) and one of the fewsu?-viving leaders of the labor movement of the 1970s. Herecently returned to El Salvador after several years in exile,and was interviewed in late March.

Why have you returned to El Salvador at this time?I was here for [FENASTRAS] congresses in 1985 and

1986. Our evaluation at that time was that we needed tostrengthen our international work, so I left. Now we believethat conditions are ripe to work for a national consensus fora political solution. This is the avenue the movement musttake.

Have other leaders also returned?Some have always been here, others have rtumed. We

have been working for some time holding events wherecornpañeros return to exchange ideas for a time and thenleave. And more will come, depending on conditions. Wehave been combining the movement experiences of the1970s and l980s. This interchange of experience betweenold and new leaders is what will allow us to move forward.

How would you compare the union movements of the 1970sand 1980s?

There were different contexts. In the 1 970s we werewinning terrain for a new unionism, which overcame econ-omism and bureaucratism and led to a more combativeposture. We began in STECEL [the electrical workersunion] in 1969 to constitute ourselves as a de facto union,and begin a de facto struggle. De facto struggle meant beingready for anything. We won legal recognition during theelections of 1972. We offered our votes to the official party,the PCN [National Conciliation Party]. We made a political

tance. The Armed Forces moved in a similar direction, inline with the "hearts and minds" approach pushed byU.S. advisers as part of the low-intensity conflict strategy.In the words of one FMLN political officer workingamong cotton pickers in the steamy South, "For the firsttime, both parties have put the dispute for the masses at thecenter of their political and military strategy."

In the countryside, poder de doble cara (literally,"double-faced power") emerged as the principal form ofrevolutionary organizing: the fostering of grass-rootsorganizations which show a legal "face" to the regimewhile also showing a clandestine, collaborative "face"to the revolution. Doble cara developed as a response toseveral factors: the Armed Forces' war of movement, thedispersion of guerrilla forces, and an internal FMLNdebate on how to relate to its civilian supporters (masas,in Salvadoran political jargon))2

The local masas served, in theory, as the rear guard forthe guerrilla army, providing them with food, logistics,and intelligence. In practice, they often became a burdenon the fighters, who were obliged to care for and protect

Idecision: votes for legal rights. This was very important. Itgave us a vision of the kinds of alliances we could committo, even with the enemy itself. What are the principles thatone must respect, and what are the rights we have. Thishistory is important, it's part of the process that educatedour leaders.

i


R"e4po 4A4or4 1 eA4El Salvador II

ence of brigade-sized garrisons has not convinced themayors to stay on.

FMLN leaders argue that the mayors' offices are thenerve centers for local counterinsurgency organizing, andthus are legitimate military targets. Indeed, according toa recent study commissioned by the Agency for Interna-tional Development (U.S.AID), the only components ofthe government's counterinsurgency campaigns of recentyears that have been at all successful are those "civicactions" that bypassed the corrupt central state apparatusand were administered directly by local mayors.'

With the campaign against the mayors, the FMLNchopped off the last feeble leg on which civic action wasstanding. But while the effectiveness of the campaign isbeyond dispute, the contention that mayors are legitimatemilitary targets has little basis in relevant internationallaw, and the campaign has been harshly condemned byboth Americas Watch and Amnesty International.'o

P OLITICAL ORGANIZING BECAME THE CRUXof the rebel plan during the 1984-1988 war of resis-

H•ctor Recinos: Pushing from Behind

Hdctor Recinos is a founder of the National Federationof Salvadoran orkers (FENASTRAS)aand one of the fewsurviving leaders of the labor movement of the 1970s. Herecently returned to El Salvador after several years in exile,and was interviewed in late March.

Why have you returned to El Salvador at this time?I was here for [FENASTRAS] congresses in 1985 and

1986. Our evaluation at that time was that we needed tostrengthen our international work, so I left. Now we believethat conditions are ripe to work for a national consensus fora political solution. This is the avenue the movement musttake.

Have other leaders also returned?Some have always been here, others have returned. We

have been working for some time holding events wherecompaneros return to exchange ideas for a time and thenleave. And more will come, depending on conditions. Wehave been combining the movement experiences of the1970s and 1980s. This interchange of experience betweenold and new leaders is what will allow us to move forward.

How would you compare the union movements of the 1970sand 1980s?

There were different contexts. In the 1970s we werewinning terrain for a new unionism, which overcame econ-omism and bureaucratism and led to a more combativeposture. We began in STECEL [the electrical workersunion] in 1969 to constitute ourselves as a de factor union,and begin a de facto struggle. De facto struggle meant beingready for anything. We won legal recognition during theelections of 1972. We offered our votes to the official party,the PCN [National Conciliation Party]. We made a political

tance. The Armed Forces moved in a similar direction, inline with the "hearts and minds" approach pushed byU.S. advisers as part of the low-intensity conflict strategy.In the words of one FMLN political officer workingamong cotton pickers in the steamy South, "For the firsttime, both parties have put the dispute for the masses at thecenter of their political and military strategy.""

In the countryside, poder de doble cara (literally,"double-faced power") emerged as the principal form ofrevolutionary organizing: the fostering of grass-rootsorganizations which show a legal "face" to the regimewhile also showing a clandestine, collaborative "face"to the revolution. Doble cara developed as a response toseveral factors: the Armed Forces' war of movement, thedispersion of guerrilla forces, and an internal FMLNdebate on how to relate to its civilian supporters (masas,in Salvadoran political jargon).' 2

The local masas served, in theory, as the rear guard forthe guerrilla army, providing them with food, logistics,and intelligence. In practice, they often became a burdenon the fighters, who were obliged to care for and protect

Labor leader Hector Recinos sees new unity emerging

decision: votes for legal rights. This was very important. Itgave us a vision of the kinds of alliances we could committo, even with the enemy itself. What are the principles thatone must respect, and what are the rights we have. Thishistory is important, it's part of the process that educatedour leaders.


hundreds and even thousands of people against armyincursions, which grew increasingly destructive as thegovernment forces became more adept at their war ofmovement. These problems confronted the FMLN in allits rear guard areas, but they were particularly severe inthose zones where "local popular powers" had beenorganized. "Local popular powers' '—civilian governingbodies formed by some FMLN member organizationsduring the period of guerrilla concentrations—were in-tended as an open, formal expression of dual power in therural areas where the Armed Forces had lost permanentcontrol.'3 But the particular characteristics of this form oforganizing exacerbated many of the difficulties the revo-lutionary movement faced.

"The FMLN, by openly declaring its relationshipwith these people, made them illegal, which put them intoconfrontation with the enemy," notes Mercedes delCarmen Letona ("Commander Luisa"), one of the prin-cipal architects of the doble cara strategy, in an FMLNpaper on the topic)4 "But the masas were unarmed andonly had the options of running or hiding, which in turn

So the l970s was a struggle against ecoriomism, bureau-cratism, legalism, [maladies] which were overcome in1975-1976 with the emergence of a revolutionary currentwithin the unions. We found ourselves amid workers with atremendous disposition to fight.

From 1980 on, another generation of union leadersemerged. in the context of the FMLN offensive. Many of uswere assassinated or jailed. 1 was a prisoner for four yearsand two months. With this repression everyone either fledthe country or went to the [guerrilla] fronts, whether or notwe were actually connected [to the FMLNI. This left thecities without organizers, and new leaders then emerged ina context of retreat.

These conditions continued through 1983. There hadbeen an enormous accumulation [of experience]. The prob-lem was how to make the strength that had been accunsu-lated come forth. So the struggles began once again, typi-cally with the creation of new organizations. At times thiswas difficult for people in solidarity work to understand.Yesterday it was one thing, now it is another. But this hasbeen the dynamic.

This new contingent of organizers has been immersed infierce struggles. They are deeply committed to the interestsof the workers, and they have become radicalized. We couldnot ask for more commitment. Their task was to protect theworkers organizations, and [this very process] led them tobecome radicalized. But at the same time they did notunderstand that there were other workers and organizationsthat were politically more backwards. They wanted to judgethe whole world, when they should have interpreted it. Theydemanded the same development from everyone. This iswhere they committed errors.

There was a time when this type of strictness had a role.But once you become stronger you can be more flexible.Now we must change. We have been in the front, leading,saying this and thaL But we can push from behind perfectlywell.

made them even more illegal." Friction developed be-tween rebel combat units and niasas in some areas, and"the masas became isolated from the rest of the civilianpopulation, who did not want to turn themselves intomilitary targets and who preferred to maintain their sub-sistence activities without being forced to live on therun."

Furthermore, the FMLN was now dispersing its fight-ers throughout the country. Instead of massing combat-ants in a zone of control, where they would have to besupplied by overt collaborators, the FMLN broke itsfighters up into small groups to carry out political andmilitary work on a much broader, though more clandes-tine basis. Towns which had formerly seen a regular rebelcolumn pass through a few times a year now had a con-tinuing guerrilla, and often militia, presence. These units,operating in zones controlled by the Armed Forces, couldnot rely on support structures which functioned only inareas of rebel control.

In some areas, "popular power" structures had neverbeen developed. There, the FMLN experimented with dif-

We cannot ask for more faithfulness, more sacrifice. Butthis lack of analysis of the situation, of the development ofSalvadoran society. and of the development of each sector,has led to errors for which we have paid a price. We have notgrown with the rhythm we had at the beginning, in 1983,1984 and 1985. We arrived ata dead end because of the lackof a new form of convergence. of organizing, ideas, slogans.coincidence of common interests. The difference is that thenew contingent [of leaders] was born in the heat of war. Thishas led them to be less flexible in pursuing the objective ofprotecting their unions.

The problem of radical rhetoric [became clear] in thedispute over the participation of AIFLD ]American lnstitute for Free Labor Development] and the organizations theChristian Democrats built to win over the more backwardsectors by buying leaders. Whoever puts up the moneysolves the problems. They buy allegiance. opinions, thevoice of a union. This happened. But these unions. fraternalunions, have been weakened and split, and we [radicalunions] have paid for it. They have split and have lost theirbase.

We have not grown, but we have not lost strength either.And we have not split. First, this shows our unity of thinkingand our common interests. Second, it helps us to understandour problems. We have seen the problem of radicalization.and are searching for the common ground which will allow'us to broaden our alliances.

The ARENA victory will allow us to seek commoninterests, common flags. and confront a common enemy. Iam talking of all the democratic forces, including the base ofthe PDC [Christian Democratic Party]. We must join to-gether to face the common enemy and to defend the victorieswe have won, and work for peace through a negotiatedsolution. We must begin a process of discussion concerningsolutions, concerning peace. Here we see a future in whichnew' organizations will be created, new forms of struggle.new slogans, which will bring us together. SM & BO §

VOLUME XXIII. NO.3 (SEPTEMBER 1989) 21

hundreds and even thousands of people against armyincursions, which grew increasingly destructive as thegovernment forces became more adept at their war ofmovement. These problems confronted the FMLN in allits rear guard areas, but they were particularly severe inthose zones where "local popular powers" had beenorganized. "Local popular powers ---civilian governingbodies formed by some FMLN member organizationsduring the period of guerrilla concentrations-were in-tended as an open, formal expression of dual power in therural areas where the Armed Forces had lost permanentcontrol. 3 But the particular characteristics of this form oforganizing exacerbated many of the difficulties the revo-lutionary movement faced.

"The FMLN, by openly declaring its relationshipwith these people, made them illegal, which put them intoconfrontation with the enemy," notes Mercedes delCarmen Letona ("Commander Luisa"), one of the prin-cipal architects of the doble cara strategy, in an FMLNpaper on the topic.'" "But the masas were unarmed andonly had the options of running or hiding, which in turn

So the 1970s was a struggle against economism, bureau-cratism, legalismi, maladies] which were overcome in1975-1976 with the emergence of a revolutionary currentwithin the unions. We found ourselves amid workers with atremendous disposition to fight.

From 1980 on, another generation of union leadersemerged, in the context of the FMLN offensive. Many of uswere assassinated or jailed. I was a prisoner for four yearsand two months. With this repression everyone either fledthe country or went to the [guerrilla] fronts, whether or notwe were actually connected [to the FMLN]. This left thecities without organizers, and new leaders then emerged ina context of retreat.

These conditions continued through 1983. There hadbeen an enormous accumulation [of experience]. The prob-lem was how to make the strength that had been accumu-lated come forth. So the struggles began once again, typi-cally with the creation of new organizations. At times thiswas difficult for people in solidarity work to understand.Yesterday it was one thing, now it is another. But this hasbeen the dynamic.

This new contingent of organizers has been immersed infierce struggles. They are deeply committed to the interestsof the workers, and they have become radicalized. We couldnot ask for more commitment. Their task was to protect theworkers' organizations, and [this very process] led them tobecome radicalized. But at the same time they did notunderstand that there were other workers and organizationsthat were politically more backwards. They wanted to judgethe whole world, when they should have interpreted it. Theydemanded the same development from everyone. This iswhere they committed errors.

There was a time when this type of strictness had a role.But once you become stronger you can be more flexible.Now we must change. We have been in the front, leading,saying this and that. But we can push from behind perfectlywell.

made them even more illegal." Friction developed be-tween rebel combat units and masas in some areas, and"the masas became isolated from the rest of the civilianpopulation, who did not want to turn themselves intomilitary targets and who preferred to maintain their sub-sistence activities without being forced to live on therun."

Furthermore, the FMLN was now dispersing its fight-ers throughout the country. Instead of massing combat-ants in a zone of control, where they would have to besupplied by overt collaborators, the FMLN broke itsfighters up into small groups to carry out political andmilitary work on a much broader, though more clandes-tine basis. Towns which had formerly seen a regular rebelcolumn pass through a few times a year now had a con-tinuing guerrilla, and often militia, presence. These units,operating in zones controlled by the Armed Forces, couldnot rely on support structures which functioned only inareas of rebel control.

In some areas, "popular power" structures had neverbeen developed. There, the FMLN experimented with dif-

We cannot ask for more faithfulness, more sacrifice. Butthis lack of analysis of the situation, of the development ofSalvadoran society, and of the development of each sector,has led to errors for which we have paid a price. We have notgrown with the rhythm we had at the beginning, in 1983,1984 and 1985. We arrived at a dead end because of the lackof a new form of convergence, of organizing, ideas, slogans,coincidence of common interests. The difference is that thenew contingent [of leaders] was born in the heat of war. Thishas led them to be less flexible in pursuing the objective ofprotecting their unions.

The problem of radical rhetoric [became clear] in thedispute over the participation of AIFLD [American Insti-tute for Free Labor Development] and the organizations theChristian Democrats built to win over the more backwardsectors by buying leaders. Whoever puts up the moneysolves the problems. They buy allegiance, opinions, thevoice of a union. This happened. But these unions, fraternalunions, have been weakened and split, and we [radicalunions] have paid for it. They have split and have lost theirbase.

We have not grown, but we have not lost strength either.And we have not split. First, this shows our unity of thinkingand our common interests, Second, it helps us to understandour problems. We have seen the problem of radicalization,and are searching for the common ground which will allowus to broaden our alliances.

The ARENA victory will allow us to seek commoninterests, common flags, and confront a common enemy. Iam talking of all the democratic forces, including the base ofthe PDC [Christian Democratic Party]. We must join to-gether to face the common enemy and to defend the victorieswe have won, and work for peace through a negotiatedsolution. We must begin a process of discussion concerningsolutions, concerning peace. Here we see a future in whichnew organizations will be created, new forms of struggle,new slogans, which will bring us together. SM & BO §

VOLUME XXIII, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 1989) 21

El Salvador U

The rural insurgency is winning the war

ferent forms of organization to define a more flexiblerelationship between the rebels and their civilian support-ers. As military pressure and political problems threw thepopular power structures into crisis, these experimentsgradually formalized into what today is known as doblecara.

By working simultaneously aboveground as legal en-tities and underground as FMLN collaborators, doblecara organizations are both more overt and more covertthan the "popular powers." The form is intended to beflexible enough, in the words of one organizer, for "thecivilian population to organize as such, not simply inaccordance with the needs of the guerrilla fronts." It seeksthe establishment, above all, of legality: of civiliansinsisting on their right to be civilians and to build legiti-mate and legal community organizations. At the sametime, doble cara is an ambitious effort to develop more

autonomous, self-determining mass organizations whichare not dependent on FMLN combatants for politicaldirection or military protection. Unlike the "popularpowers," doble cara organizations involve many peoplewho are not sympathizers of the FMLN but who neverthe-less feel the organizations fight for their interests. "Ourline is participation," writes Commander Luisa, "inwhich the masas debate ideas, and conduct, organize anddecide on their own actions. This means the real practiceof democratic liberties, and we have to make an effort tohave people understand this."5

W HILE DOBLE CARA WAS EMERGING IN THEcountryside, new developments were occurring

in the cities. In 1985 unions began to mobilize again andthe mid- 1 980s saw one of the largest strike waves in Sal-vadoran history. The National University, closed by theregime since 1980, reopened and immediately resumedits role as an anti-government organizing center. Follow-ing the earthquake in 1986, squatter communities becamea new locus of Left activity. The FMLN moved to createurban militia, as well as deeper cover "urban commandocells." Working on political terrain controlled by thestate, advances came slowly and urban organizing laggedbehind the rural insurgency.

Though most of the FMLN's clandestine organizingremained invisible from the outside, by the end of 1986 anew dynamic of accumulation of forces had developed tothe point where the leadership believed plans could belaid for the next stage, the strategic counteroffensive.

An FMLN General Command strategy paper latercaptured by the Armed Forces shows how clearly theguerrilla leadership, as early as 1986, discerned the path

1988 seems to be the best or most appropriatemoment for launching the strategic counteroffen-sive. By that time, the party structure of the FMLNwill have developed considerably, the experience ac-cumulated by the mass movement will be great, the ac-cumulation of insurrectional forces will have isolatedthe regime, and elections will have been shown to beunable to offer any solution to even the most back-wards elements...

The enemy will be encircled by its own internalcontradictions and hegemonic disputes, exacerbatedby the 1988 elections for mayors and deputies and thesearch, through the 1989 presidential elections, for anew partner for the North American government...

If the masses spontaneously move to more de-cided struggles and show a willingness to insurrectwe must not hold them back.... But we must guardagainst provoking any artificial or voluntaristic explo-sions. The situation is entirely favorable and we mustbring together all the people, in the most widespreadand simultaneous way possible...

"Time is with us," the General Command concludes,"but we have not a moment to lose." §


El Salvador II

The rural insurgency is winning the war

ferent forms of organization to define a more flexiblerelationship between the rebels and their civilian support-ers. As military pressure and political problems threw thepopular power structures into crisis, these experimentsgradually formalized into what today is known as doblecara.

By working simultaneously aboveground as legal en-tities and underground as FMLN collaborators, doblecara organizations are both more overt and more covertthan the "popular powers." The form is intended to beflexible enough, in the words of one organizer, for "thecivilian population to organize as such, not simply inaccordance with the needs of the guerrilla fronts." It seeksthe establishment, above all, of legality: of civiliansinsisting on their right to be civilians and to build legiti-mate and legal community organizations. At the sametime, doble cara is an ambitious effort to develop more

autonomous, self-determining mass organizations whichare not dependent on FMLN combatants for politicaldirection or military protection. Unlike the "popularpowers," doble cara organizations involve many peoplewho are not sympathizers of the FMLN but who neverthe-less feel the organizations fight for their interests. "Ourline is participation," writes Commander Luisa, "inwhich the masas debate ideas, and conduct, organize anddecide on their own actions. This means the real practiceof democratic liberties, and we have to make an effort tohave people understand this.""

W HILEDOBLE CARA WAS EMERGING IN THEcountryside, new developments were occurring

in the cities. In 1985 unions began to mobilize again andthe mid-1980s saw one of the largest strike waves in Sal-vadoran history. The National University, closed by theregime since 1980, reopened and immediately resumedits role as an anti-government organizing center. Follow-ing the earthquake in 1986, squatter communities becamea new locus of Left activity. The FMLN moved to createurban militia, as well as deeper cover "urban commandocells." Working on political terrain controlled by thestate, advances came slowly and urban organizing laggedbehind the rural insurgency.

Though most of the FMLN's clandestine organizingremained invisible from the outside, by the end of 1986 anew dynamic of accumulation of forces had developed tothe point where the leadership believed plans could belaid for the next stage, the strategic counteroffensive.

An FMLN General Command strategy paper latercaptured by the Armed Forces shows how clearly theguerrilla leadership, as early as 1986, discerned the pathahead:16

1988 seems to be the best or most appropriatemoment for launching the strategic counteroffen-sive. By that time, the party structure of the FMLNwill have developed considerably, the experience ac-cumulated by the mass movement will be great, the ac-cumulation of insurrectional forces will have isolatedthe regime, and elections will have been shown to beunable to offer any solution to even the most back-wards elements...

The enemy will be encircled by its own internalcontradictions and hegemonic disputes, exacerbatedby the 1988 elections for mayors and deputies and thesearch, through the 1989 presidential elections, for anew partner for the North American government...

If the masses spontaneously move to more de-cided struggles and show a willingness to insurrectwe must not hold them back.... But we must guardagainst provoking any artificial or voluntaristic explo-sions. The situation is entirely favorable and we mustbring together all the people, in the most widespreadand simultaneous way possible...

"Time is with us," the General Command concludes,"but we have not a moment to lose." §


04% 4E Salvador 11

References

Rethinking War

I. The FMLN is one of the few insurgencies that, from thestart, conceptualized and then constructed its strategic rear guardwithin the borders of the nation in which it was fighting. For aninsightful and extended treatment of the political aspects of thisperiod, see Mario Lungo, El Salvador 1981-3984: Ia dimensionpoiltica de Ia guerra (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1985).

2. An early action employing this new dynamic was the'Campafla Gonzalo" in Morazán in August, 1982, for which the

People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the FMLN faction basedin that area, amassed its entire contingent of fighters. The largestand best-known of the FMLN concentrations was the RafaelArce Zablah Brigade (BRAZ). The actual number of FMLNcombatants is a closely guarded secret. However, by our bestestimate, by the end of 1983 the BRAZ had some two thousandfighters in arms in two groupings, one in the north and anotherin the south, and could concentrate them for specific actions.

3. Col. James Steele, author's interview, 1986.4. Fuerzas Armadas de El Salvador, 'Campafia de Contrain-

surgencia Unidos Para Reconstruir," March 1986.5. In t989, following a diplomatic tour of Latin America by

members of the FMLN General Command, the three GeneralCommand members who had used newts de guerre began to usetheir real names instead. Francisco Jovel had gone by the nameof Roberto Roca, Eduardo Sancho had called himself FermánCienfuegos, and Salvador Sanchez Cerén had been known asLeonel Gonzalez. The other two members, JoaquIn Villalobosand Schafik Jorge I-Iándal, had been using their real namespreviously.

6. Authors' interview, April 1989.7. Cabral also noted a similar difficulty in characterizing the

period beginning in 1981, after the FMLN's failed "final offen-sive," when the FMLN began to regroup in the countryside. Au-thors' interview, January 1989.

8. See Ignacio Martin-BanS, As'! piensan los saivadoi'eOos or-hanos, (1986-1987) (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1987).

9. Allan Austin et al, CONARA Impact Evaluation, Sept. 20,1988, Research Triangle Institute. The campaign against themayors also has proven enormously embarrassing for the ArmedForces, as it reveals the degree to which government forces havelost control in large parts of the country. The FMLN maintainsit has executed only seven mayors; the eighth, they say, wascaught in crossfire during a battle.

10. See, for example, Americas Watch Report, "NightmareRevisited: 1987-88," September 1988. It is worth noting that 80Christian Democratic mayors were assassinated by right-wingdeath squads in 1980.

II. Author's interview, April 1985. The development of the'low-intensity conflict" strategy on the part of the ArmedForces and their U.S. advisers has been developed in depthelsewhere, See Sara Miles, "The Real War: Low-IntensityConflict in Central America," Reporton the Americas, Vol. XX,No.2 (April/May 1986), and Paul Martin, "The Dispute for theMasses," AMPO: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review, Vol. 18, No. I.

12. We should stress that our use of the term masas is not usedin the traditional Left sense of masses, or large numbers ofunorganized people. Rather we follow the particular Salvadoransense of the word, meaning those people who are at the base ofthe multi-layered scaffolding of the revolutionary movement,and who are fully organized by that movement.

13. A comprehensive description of the structure and func-tioning of local "popular powers" can be found in Jenny Pearce,Promised Land: Peasant Rebellion in Chalatenango El Salva-dor, (London: Latin America Bureau, 1986).

14. Mercedes del Carmen Letona, ("Commander Luisa")"El Poder de Doble Cara," internal FMLN manuscript, Mo-razán, 1987.

15. Letona, ibid.16. 'Fase Preparatoria de la Contraofensiva Estrategica,"

identified as a document prepared for the November 1986meeting of the FMLN General Command.

Rethinking Peace

I. Author's interview, April 1989.2. Author's interview, October 1988.3. One such document is "Organizar El Plan Fuego: una ne-

cesidad imperativa para avanzar hacia Ia victoria," identified asa synthesis of a meeting of the General Command in Morazdn,January 1988. Aratherhigh numberof FMLN documents turn upin enemy hands. According to one U.S. military adviser, "TheFMLN has great [radioj communications security, and terribledocument security.... That's what comes of having a bunch ofcollege graduates running around in the woods. They writeeverything down."

4. The dynamiting of poles has become surprisingly refined.FMLN saboteurs have perfected the art of blowing them up: toosmall a charge does not topple them, while too large a chargecompletely detaches the upper portion, facilitating clean-up andrepair. If calculated correctly, the pole is knocked over but thefallen half remains attached to the base, making repair the mostdifficult. The government now has highly trained Units of elec-trical pole repair specialists, and the FMLN keeps them busy.

5. Control of the capital is primarily the job of the statesecurity forces (including the Treasury Police, the NationalPolice, and the National Guard) whose work is coordinated withthe Armed Forces through the Defense Ministry.

6. The FMLN appears to have anticipated this, and designedits strategy accordingly. In the words of FMLN representativeAna Guadalupe Martinez, "Obviously we knew ARENA wouldat first say no, since the polls gave them a virtual certainty ofvictory. We thought the PDC would speak of unconstitutional-ity, but would search for aformula that would make them appearto be at least considering it.... And this is what happened.ARENA said no, the PDC, without saying no, did not say yes, andthis facilitated the electoral game the other parties played, whichgave us the space to make another procedural proposal to keepthe debate alive." Authors' interview, February 1987.

7. Col. Juan Orlando Zepeda, "Estrategia global revolucion-aria y su aplicaciOn en El Salvador,'' internal Armed Forcesdocument, June 1988.

8. Joaquin Villalobos, "A Democratic Revolution for ElSalvador," Foreign Policy, Spring 1989. This is an Efiglishtranslation of one section of Villalobos' "Perspectivasdevicto-na y proyecto revolucionario," Esrudios Centroamericanos,Vol. XLIV, No, 483-484 (Jan/Feb 1989). The rest of the work,in translation, appears in "The Coming Insurrection in El Salva-dor," Latin American Perspectives (Summer 1989).

9. Fermhn Cienfuegos, Veredas de la audacia (San Salvador:Ediciones Roque Dalton, 1989).

10. Unpublished interview by italian journalist Gianni Ber-ella, April 1989.

II. Carlos Ramos, writing in La OpiniOn (Los Angeles).


RElit oSlador tAm aEI Salvador I1

References

Rethinking War

1. The FMLN is one of the few insurgencies that, from thestart, conceptualized and then constructed its strategic rear guardwithin the borders of the nation in which it was fighting. For aninsightful and extended treatment of the political aspects of thisperiod, see Mario Lungo, El Salvador 1981-1984: la dimensionpolftica de la guerra (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1985).

2. An early action employing this new dynamic was the"Campafia Gonzalo" in Morazin in August, 1982, for which thePeople's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the FMLN faction basedin that area, amassed its entire contingent of fighters. The largestand best-known of the FMLN concentrations was the RafaelArce Zablah Brigade (BRAZ). The actual number of FMLNcombatants is a closely guarded secret. However, by our bestestimate, by the end of 1983 the BRAZ had some two thousandfighters in arms in two groupings, one in the north and anotherin the south, and could concentrate them for specific actions.

3. Col. James Steele, author's interview, 1986.4. Fuerzas Armadas de El Salvador, 'Campania de Contrain-

surgencia Unidos Para Reconstruir," March 1986.5. In 1989, following a diplomatic tour of Latin America by

members of the FMLN General Command, the three GeneralCommand members who had used noms de guerre began to usetheir real names instead. Francisco Jovel had gone by the nameof Roberto Roca, Eduardo Sancho had called himself FermdinCienfuegos, and Salvador SAnchez Cer6n had been known asLeonel GonzAlez. The other two members, Joaquin Villalobosand Schafik Jorge Hdndal, had been using their real namespreviously.

6. Authors' interview, April 1989.7. Cabral also noted a similar difficulty in characterizing the

period beginning in 1981, after the FMLN's failed "final offen-sive," when the FMLN began to regroup in the countryside. Au-thors' interview, January 1989.

8. See Ignacio Martin-Bar6, Asipiensan los salvadorefos ur-banos, (1986-1987) (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1987).

9. Allan Austin et al, CONARA Impact Evaluation, Sept. 20,1988, Research Triangle Institute. The campaign against themayors also has proven enormously embarrassing for the ArmedForces, as it reveals the degree to which government forces havelost control in large parts of the country. The FMLN maintainsit has executed only seven mayors; the eighth, they say, wascaught in crossfire during a battle.

10. See, for example, Americas Watch Report, "NightmareRevisited: 1987-88," September 1988. It is worth noting that 80Christian Democratic mayors were assassinated by right-wingdeath squads in 1980.

11. Author's interview, April 1985. The development of the"low-intensity conflict" strategy on the part of the ArmedForces and their U.S. advisers has been developed in depthelsewhere. See Sara Miles, "The Real War: Low-IntensityConflict in Central America," Reporton the Americas, Vol. XX,No. 2 (April/May 1986), and Paul Martin, "The Dispute for theMasses," AMPO: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review, Vol. 18, No. 1.

12. We should stress that our use of the term masas is not usedin the traditional Left sense of masses, or large numbers ofunorganized people. Rather we follow the particular Salvadoransense of the word, meaning those people who are at the base ofthe multi-layered scaffolding of the revolutionary movement,and who are fully organized by that movement.

13. A comprehensive description of the structure and func-tioning of local "popular powers" can be found in Jenny Pearce,Promised Land: Peasant Rebellion in Chalarenango El Salva-dor, (London: Latin America Bureau, 1986).

14. Mercedes del Carmen Letona, ("Commander Luisa")"El Poder de Doble Cara," internal FMLN manuscript, Mo-razdn, 1987.

15. Letona, ibid.16. "Fase Preparatoria de la Contraofensiva Estrat6gica,"

identified as a document prepared for the November 1986meeting of the FMLN General Command.

Rethinking Peace

1. Author's interview, April 1989.2. Author's interview, October 1988.3. One such document is "Organizar El Plan Fuego: una ne-

cesidad imperativa para avanzar hacia la victoria," identified asa synthesis of a meeting of the General Command in Morazin,January 1988. A rather high numberof FMLN documents turn upin enemy hands. According to one U.S. military adviser, "TheFMLN has great [radio] communications security, and terribledocument security.... That's what comes of having a bunch ofcollege graduates running around in the woods. They writeeverything down."

4. The dynamiting of poles has become surprisingly refined.FMLN saboteurs have perfected the art of blowing them up: toosmall a charge does not topple them, while too large a chargecompletely detaches the upper portion, facilitating clean-up andrepair. If calculated correctly, the pole is knocked over but thefallen half remains attached to the base, making repair the mostdifficult. The government now has highly trained units of elec-trical pole repair specialists, and the FMLN keeps them busy.

5. Control of the capital is primarily the job of the statesecurity forces (including the Treasury Police, the NationalPolice, and the National Guard) whose work is coordinated withthe Armed Forces through the Defense Ministry.

6. The FMLN appears to have anticipated this, and designedits strategy accordingly. In the words of FMLN representativeAna Guadalupe Martinez, "Obviously we knew ARENA wouldat first say no, since the polls gave them a virtual certainty ofvictory. We thought the PDC would speak of unconstitutional-ity, but would search for aformula that would make them appearto be at least considering it.... And this is what happened.ARENA said no, the PDC, without saying no, did not say yes, andthis facilitated the electoral game the other parties played, whichgave us the space to make another procedural proposal to keepthe debate alive." Authors' interview, February 1987.

7. Col. Juan Orlando Zepeda, "Estrategia global revolucion-aria y su aplicaci6n en El Salvador," internal Armed Forcesdocument, June 1988.

8. Joaquin Villalobos, "A Democratic Revolution for ElSalvador," Foreign Policy, Spring 1989. This is an Englishtranslation of one section of Villalobos' "Perspectivas de victo-ria y proyecto revolucionario," Estudios Centroamericanos,Vol. XLIV, No. 483-484 (Jan/Feb 1989). The rest of the work,in translation, appears in "The Coming Insurrection in El Salva-dor," Latin American Perspectives (Summer 1989).

9. Fermin Cienfuegos, Veredas de la audacia (San Salvador:Ediciones Roque Dalton, 1989).

10. Unpublished interview by Italian journalist Gianni Ber-etta, April 1989.

11. Carlos Ramos, writing in La Opini6n (Los Angeles).


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